# Opposition — Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 424 U.S. 934

## Text

Octroper Term, 1975

No. 75-923

Construction INpustRY AssoclATION OF Sonoma COUNTY,
a California non-profit corporation, THE San FRANcIsco,
PENINSULA AND Repwoop Empire Burtpine INpusTRY
AssociaTion, a California non-profit corporation,
PetatumMa Partners, a California limited part-
nership, and Wiri1amM LAWRENCE,

Petitioners,

vs.

Tre Crry or Peratuma, a California Charter City, HELEN
Putnam, Ropert A. Brunner, Jonn W. Cavanaau,
Rosert E. Dary, James L. Harperson, Frep
V. Martret, and Wu.timM A. Perry,
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit
———[—hBB|

Rosert T. ANpDERSON,
Den-DvuLK, Dovetass & ANDERSON,
The Vintage Building, Suite 310
P.O. Box 918,
Orinda, California 94563
Telephone: (415) 254-7400

Epovarp F. Robert,
133'/p Kentucky Street.
Petaluma, California 94952,
Telephone: | 707) 762-8725

Attorneys for Respondents.

PERNAU - WALSH PRINTING CO.- 562 MISSION STREET - SAN FRANCISCO, CA 84105

Page
NN FR ee eae eS 1
BED 660n cneend ncn ccncéncccncudedsebésectiscbdccias 6

Petitioners have no standing to assert the right to travel 6

IT.

In any event, the right to travel has no application to
land use regulations which give equal treatment to resi-

dents and non-residents alike ................--2.000: 9
ITI.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is in strict accord
Se re GE GD ccvcncccccnccstenessucces 12
IV.

The validity of a local land-use regulation is not deter-
mined by its regional effect. In any event, the Petaluma
plan is in furtherance of the general welfare even if
measured by regional impact ....................5-- 15

CE a a ie are ee a 19

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages

Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 18 L.Ed. 745
CED 6 cnveqescoescucdvedscuuessccousessesacdéacacec 9
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) .. 9
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) .. 9

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 39
SE ED CED voncesnnccucccenscecceesoecstscéeee 9

Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 300, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849) 9
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) 9

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) .......
epbaceedadubbetedketsdbesenbnseneeasneeese 11, 12, 13, 17, 18

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 12

Warth v. Seldin, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (June 25, 1975) ......... 7
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250
(Othh Cle. 1974) 2. ccccccccccccccccccccccccecescscces 13

In the Supreme Court
Huited States

Octoser Term, 1975

ConstTrucTION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION Or Sonoma CouNTYy,
a California non-profit corporation, THE San FRANCISCO,
PENINSULA AND REpwoop Empire Burtpine INDUSTRY
AssociaTion, a California non-profit corporation,
PETALUMA PARTNERs, a California limited part-
nership, and WILLIAM LAWRENCE,

Petitioners,

vs.

Tue City or Peratvma, a California Charter City, HELEN
PutNaM, Rospert A. BRUNNER, JOHN W. CAVANAGH,
Rospert E. Day, James L. Harperson, FRED
V. Martel, and Wituiam A. Perry,
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the validity of land use regulations
of the City of Petaluma, California. These land use regu-
lations, which were adopted by the City Council in 1971
and 1972, have been collectively referred to throughout

2

this litigation as the Petaluma Plan or the Plan and will
be so referred to herein. Some of the purposes and poli-
cies of the Plan are stated in the portions of the Plan
which are set forth in the Appendix to this Brief.

In early 1971, the City of Petaluma adopted a tempo-
rary freeze on development. The freeze was designed to
give the City an opportunity to evaluate development
trends, ascertain the needs and desires of its citizens, and
develop a coordinated response to a broad range of press-
ing municipal concerns, including the inadequacy of public
facilities (principally water supply and sewage treatment
facilities) to serve a rapidly increasing population, the
adverse environmental impact of urban sprawl and of
expanded residential construction, the imbalance between
single-family and multi-family residential units, the con-
centration of growth in the form of grid-type subdivisions
in the eastern section of the City, and adverse effect of
these trends upon the City’s tax base.

Shortly after the imposition of the freeze, the City
established a special Development Policy Advisory Com-
mittee. With the aid of a firm of independent planning
consultants, this Committee prepared a Development Pol-
iey which was reviewed and recommended favorably by
the city planning commission, The city council adopted
the Development Policy in June, 1971. ( Plaintiffs’ Exhibit
No. 1-5, Pages 29-36)

After extensive public hearings and full expression of
views by all segments of the community, including prop-
erty owners and developers, the City Council adopted
Environmental Design Plans in March, 1972 (Plaintiffs’
Exhibit No. 1-5, Page 37), stated the City’s Policy with

3

Respect to Residential Construction and Population
Growth in April, 1972 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5, Pages
38-40), adopted the Residential Development Control Sys-
tem in August, 1972 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-7), and
adopted the Housing Element of the General Plan in
September, 1972. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8)

These five elements, collectively referred to as the Plan,
constitute an interim land use regulation in effect for a
period of five years ending in 1977. The Plan provides for
orderly, manageable and reasonable growth both within
and without the City during its five year duration. The
Plan as adopted and in effect is the sole matter before
the court, not some other or different regulation or plan
about which there may be speculation. It is a growth plan,
not a no-growth plan.

The Plan provides that residential development which
is subject to the Plan shall be limited to about 500 res-
idential units per year, or a total of 2,500 for the five
year period. Residential developments of four dwelling
units or less are excepted from the Plan, and do not count
against the stated numerical limit. Development in Peta-
luma at the rate of 500 dwelling units per year represents
a growth rate of approximately six percent (6%) each
year, even without taking into account the developments
of four units or less; the growth rate in the entire San
Francisco Bay area, in contrast, is approximately one and
one-half pereent (114%) per year.

The Plan provides a system of allocation of the per-
mitted number of dwelling units among applicants engaged
in the business of residential development. An allocation
board makes a preliminary determination upon the basis

4

of several criteria enumerated in the Plan, and the final
allocation determination is made by the City Council. The
allocation procedure is spelled out in detail and includes
provisions for hearings an. appeals.

Allocations are divided between sections of the City
and between single-family dwellings and multiple residen-
tial units. Specific provision is made for low and moderate
income housing: the Council may require that 8-12% of
the dwelling units each year shall be in this category,
and low and moderate income housing is established as
one of the criteria for which allocation points are given.
If all of the allocations for one year are not made, there
are provisions for carryover of the unused allocations to
following years.

This case clearly does not involve racial discrimination,
economic status discrimination or discrimination between
residents and non-residents. In short, it does not invelve
discrimination in any manner, shape or form. This non-
discriminatory feature of the Plan was clearly recognized

by the Court of Appeals:

“Although appellees have attempted to align their
business interests in attacking the Plan with legiti-
mate housing needs of the urban poor and racial
minorities, the Association has not alleged nor can it
allege, based on the record in this case, that the
Plan has the purpose and effect of excluding poor
persons and racial minorities. Cf. Board of County
Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va.
653, 107 S.E. 2d 390 (1959). Contrary to the picture
painted by appellees, the Petaluma Plan is ‘inclusion-
ary’ to the extent that it offers new opportunities,
previously unavailable, to minorities and low and
moderate-income persons. Under the pre-Plan system

4)

single family, middle-income housing dominated the
Petaluma market, and as a result low and moderate
income persons were unable to secure housing in the
area, The Plan radically changes the previous build-
ing pattern and requires that housing permits be
evenly divided between single family and multi-family
units and that approximately eight to twelve per
cent of the units be constructed specifically for low
and moderate income persons.”

(Petition, App. B, at 55 n. 16)

The District Court adjudged the Plan to be invalid
solely on the ground that it violated the constitutional
right to travel. The City secured from Mr. Justice Douglas
a stay of the District Court’s judgment pending appeal.

In its appeal the City was supported by the following
amici:

The Attorney General of the State of California;

Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. and Sierra
Club;

Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachuetts
Institute of Technology and Harvard University;

Environmental Defense Fund;

The County of Marin, California;

The City of Los Angeles;

The following California cities:
Walnut Creek, Burbank, Corona, Norco, Pasadena,
San Diego, Livermore, Pleasanton, Lafayette, Pleas-
ant Hill, Vallejo, Hayward, Richmond, Mountain
View, San Jose, Chico, Sacramento, Santa Ana,
Thousand Oaks, Davis, Concord, Benicia, Fullerton,
Riverside, Irvine, Yorba Linda, Palo Alto, San
Juan Capistrano, McFarland and Tehachapi.

The Court of Appeals, in unanimously reversing the
judgment of the District Court, determined that the Peti-

6

tioners did not have standing to raise the issue of right
to travel, and that the Plan did not violate the due process
or commerce clauses and was therefore valid and con-
stitutional.

ARGUMENT
a.

PETITIONERS HAVE NO STANDING TO ASSERT
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Petitioners are two trade associations whose members
are real estate developers and homebuilders, one owner
of property outside the City of Petaluma, and an owner
of property substantially all of which is outside the City
of Petaluma. Thus all of the petitioners are persons or
entities engaged in or interested in land development.
Without alleging or establishing any representative or
derivative capacity, petitioners seek to represent unnamed
and unnamedable persons whose right to travel is allegedly
being infringed by the Plan. These people are allegedly
being frustrated in their efforts to move from points
unknown to Petaluma. It is evident that the primary
concern of petitioners, however, is really an alleged “right”
to build residential units wherever and whenever they
choose, regardless of local land use regulations. Petitioners
seek to advance their economic interests by masquerad-
ing under the attempted assertion of a right to travel on
behalf of a group to which petitioners bear no demon-
strable connection. None of the petitioners is in the cate-
gory of persons who may claim a right to migrate and
settle as part of the right to travel, nor have they estab-

7

lished the kind of relationship to such persons that would
permit them to assume representation of the interests
of such persons. Petitioners thus have no standing to
raise the right to travel issue.

This Court’s recent decision in Warth v. Seldin, 45
L.Ed.2d 343 (June 25, 1975) is fully dispositive of the
standing issue. In that case an attack was made by a
group of low-income and minority-group plaintiffs on the
validity of the zoning regulations of the incorporated
municipality of Penfield, a suburb of Rochester, New York,
it being contended that the zoning regulations effectively
prevented minority and low and moderate income people
from living in the town. A home builders association
comprised of firms engaged in residential construction in
the Rochester area, including Penfield, sought to intervene.
An organization known as the Housing Council, made up
of members interested in housing problems, petitioned to
be joined as a party plaintiff. It was alleged that one of
the members of the Housing Council, Penfield Better
Homes Corporation, “is and has been actively attempting
to develop moderate income housing” in Penfield “but has
been stymied by its inability to secure the necessary ap-
provals.” Standing was denied to the low-income and
minority-group plaintiffs, and on the same ground of
lack of standing the petition of the homebuilders associa-
tion to intervene was denied and the Housing Council was
refused permission to be joined as a party plaintiff.

In the Petaluma case, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Cireuit denied standing to petitioners to raise the
right to travel issue on the direct authority of Warth,
using the following language:

8

“A corollary to the ‘zone of interest’ requirement is
the well-recognized general rule that ‘even when the
plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the “case
or controversy” requirement, ... the plaintiff must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests
of third parties.’ Warth v. Seldin, _. US. —-, —,
slip op. at 8 (1975); accord, United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249, 256 (1953). |

“ .. their economic interests are undisputedly out-
side the zone of interest to be protected by any pur-
ported constitutional right to travel. Accordingly,
appellees’ right to travel claim ‘falls squarely within
the prudential standing rule that normally bars
litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests
of others in order to obtain relief from injury to
themselves.’ Warth v. Seldin, U.S. at ..., slip op. at
18.”

(Petition, App. B, at 44-46)

In short, the Court of Appeals gave careful and detailed
consideration to the issue of petitioners’ standing to raise
a right to travel claim, and correctly applied the prior
decisions of this Court in concluding that petitioners
lacked standing. The instant case presents no new con-
siderations which might warrant review by the Court.

9

Il.

IN ANY EVENT, THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL HAS NO APPLICA-
TION TO LAND USE REGULATIONS WHICH GIVE EQUAL
TREATMENT TO RESIDENTS AND NON-RESIDENTS ALIKE.

The Plan, as described above, provides a fair and rea-
sonable system designed to ensure that new housing in
the Petaluma area will be constructed and located in an
orderly and rational manner, thereby promoting and pro-
tecting the health, safety and well being of the citizenry.
The Plan’s regulations and policies apply equally to all
and in no way singles out only those who have traveled.
Yet, in every case in which the Supreme Court has found
a violation of the right to travel, the challenged regulation
has on its face singled out for disadvantageous treatment
only those who have traveled. In the Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 300, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849), the statutes in
question imposed a tax on alien passengers landing at
state ports. In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,
18 L.Ed. 745 (1868), the Court struck down a tax of one
dollar a head imposed on the exit of persons from the
State of Nevada. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
86 L.Ed. 119 (1941), the challenged statute prohibited the
introduction of indigent persons into the State of Cali-
fornia. And more recently, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974),
residency requirements barring new residents from re-
ceiving welfare, from voting, and from receiving free
medical services, were invalidated.

Thus, while many local and state regulations, including
those governing land use, may have an indirect impact on

10

the right to travel in the sense that the restriction of such
regulations may cause some to believe that the city or
state imposing the regulations is a less desirable place to
live, there is no violation of the right to travel unless the
regulations are more restrictive for new residents. This
point was recognized by the Court of Appeals in its
decision in this case:

“The plaintiffs in Belle Terre claimed inter alia that
the ordinance interfered with a person’s right to
travel and right to migrate to and settle within a
state.

The Supreme Court held that since the ordinance
was not aimed at transients, there was no infringe-
ment of anyone’s right to travel. 416 U.S. at 7. Al-
though due to appellees’ lack of standing we do not
reach today the right to travel issue, we note that
the Petaluma Plan is not aimed at transients, nor
does it penalize those who have recently exercised
their right to travel. See CEEED v. California
Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 43 Cal.App.3d
306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 332-334 (1974); ef. Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).”

(Petition, App. B, at 52-53 n.13).

The Petaluma Plan does not single out newcomers for
special and disadvantageous treatment; both newcomers
and persons residing in Petaluma who are seeking new
housing have equal access to the available housing on the
market. Like virtually all land use regulation, the Peta-
luma Plan’s indirect effect on the production and cost of
housing is felt equally by all, regardless of whether one
is migrating from New York to Petaluma, or only moving
around the corner in search of a larger home for a grow-
ing family.

11

The error inherent in the expansion of the right to
travel into the area of land use regulation, as urged by
petitioners, was underscored by this Court’s flat rejection
of such ar expansion last term in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). There a New York village
ordinance which restricted land use to one family dwell-
ings, excluding lodging, boarding, fraternity or multiple
dwelling houses, and defined the word “family” to mean
one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, or not more than two unrelated persons, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, was
challenged as violating, inter alia, the right to travel. The
Court dismissed this assertion quickly, holding that the
ordinance “involves no ‘fundamental’ right guaranteed
by the Constitution. .. . We deal with economie and
social legislation where legislatures have historically
drawn lines which we respect against the charge of viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be ‘reason-
able, not arbitrary’ and bear ‘a rational relationship to a
(permissible) state objective.’” Belle Terre, supra, 416
U.S. at 7-8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Moreover, Mr. Justice Marshall, while dissenting on the
grounds that the ordinance burdened the exercise of First
Amendments rights, concurred in this Court’s express
holding that there existed a broadly defined zoning power
wholly free from limitations imposed by the right to
travel:

“T would also agree with the majority that local zon-
ing authorities may properly act in furtherance of
the objectives asserted to be served by the ordinance
at issue here: restricting uncontrolled growth, solving
traffic problems, keeping rental costs at a reasonable

12

level, and making the community attractive to
families.”

416 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added)

Il.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN STRICT
ACCORD WITH ALL EXISTING AUTHORITY

In this case the Court of Appeals carefully applied the
test by which the validity of land use regulations has
been measured since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)—whether the regulations are a
reasonable exercise of the police power. The court stated:

“It is well settled that zoning regulations ‘must
find their justification in some aspect of the police
power, asserted for the public welfare.’ Vilage of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
The concept of the public welfare, however, is not
limited to the regulation of noxious activities or dan-
gerous structures. As the Court stated in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954):

The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It
is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.

(citations omitted). Accord, Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1974).
“In determining whether the City’s interest in pre

serving its small town character and in avoiding
uncontrolled and rapid growth falls within the broad

13

concept of ‘public welfare’, we are considerably
assisted by two recent cases. Belle Terre, supra, and
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250 (9th Cir. 1974), each of which upheld as not
unreasonable a zoning regulation much more restric-
tive than the Petaluma Plan, are dispositive of the
due process issue in this case.”

(Petition, App. B, at 51-52)

The court then discussed at length the holdings in Belle
Terre and Los Altos Hills:

“Both the Belle Terre ordinance and the Los Altos
Hills regulation had the purpose and effect of per-
manently restricting growth; nonetheless, the court
in each case upheld the particular law before it on
the ground that the regulation served a legitimate
governmental] interest falling within the concept of
the public welfare: the preservation of quiet family
neighborhoods (Belle Terre) and the preservation of
a rural environment (Los Altos Hills). Even less
restrictive or exclusionary than the above zoning
ordinances is the Petaluma Plan which, unlike those
ordinances, does not freeze the population at present
or near-present levels. Further, unlike the Los Altos
Hills ordinance and the various zoning regulations
struck down by state courts in recent years, the Peta-
luma Plan does not have the undesirable effect of
walling out any particular income class nor any
racial minority group.”

“We conclude therefore that under Belle Terre and
Los Altos Hills the concept of the public welfare is
sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma’s desire to pre-
serve its small town character, its open spaces and
low density of population, and to grow at an orderly
and deliberate pace.”

(Petition, App. B, at 54-55, 57)

14

Petitioners contend that the Petaluma Plan is an “ad-
mittedly exclusionary land-use ordinance.” Nothing of the
sort has even been admitted. In fact, as pointed out above,
the Court of Appeals characterized the Plan as “inclu-
sionary” rather than exclusionary. The Court of Appeals
properly recognized that “Practically all zoning restric-
tions have as a purpose and effect the exclusion of some
activity or structure or a certain density of inhabitants.”
(Page 51) Petitioners apparently have seized upon this
statement of a universally recognized characteristic of
zoning regulations in their attempt to liken the Petaluma
Plan to those local land-use regulations that have been
invalidated by the highest state courts of Pennsylvania
and New Jersey on the ground that they were “exclusion-
ary”. Petitioners clearly misunderstand not only the
intrinsic nature of zoning regulations but also the very
narrow and specialized applicability of the so-called “ex-
clusionary zoning” theory.

The Court of Appeals, recognizing the exclusionary
nature of all zoning regulations, clearly delineated the
province of the court in passing upon the validity of
such regulations:

+

. in reviewing the reasonableness of a zoning
ordinance, our inquiry does not terminate with a
finding that it is for an exclusionary purpose. We
must determine further whether the exclusion bears
any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
If it does not, then the zoning regulation is invalid.
If, on the other hand, a legitimate state interest is
furthered by the zoning regulation, we must defer to
the legislative act. Being neither a super legislature
nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal court is with-

15

out authority to weigh and reappraise the factors
considered or ignored by the legislative body in pass-
ing the challenged zoning regulation. The reasonable-
ness, not the wisdom, of the Petaluma Plan is at issue
in this sutt.”
(Petition, App. B, at 51) (lasi emphasis added)
The Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals decision conflicts
neither with any past decision of the Supreme Court

nor with that of any other circuit. It makes no new law

but rather is entirely consistent with well-established
principles long ago set forth by the Court. These prin-
ciples are sound and make good sense and no justification
for departure from them had been demonstrated.

IV.

THE VALIDITY OF A LOCAL LAND-USE REGULATION IS NOT
DETERMINED BY ITS REGIONAL EFFECT. IN ANY EVENT,
THE PETALUMA PLAN IS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE
GENERAL WELFARE EVEN IF MEASURED BY REGIONAL
IMPACT.

Petitioners continue to assert that the validity of local
land-use regulations must be determined upon the basis
of their regional impact. While it is true that a local
land-use regulation may have an effect upon the surround-
ing region, it does not follow that the constitutional
validity of the regulation is determined upon that basis.
The Court of Appeals clearly stated the law in this
regard:

“Although we assume that some persons desirous
of living in Petaluma will be excluded under the

16

housing permit limitation and that, thus, the Plan
may frustrate some legitimate regional housing needs,
the Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable. We agree
with appellees that unlike the situation in the past
most municipalities today are neither isolated nor
wholly independent from neighboring municipalities
and that, consequently, unilateral land use decisions
by one local entity affect the needs and resources of
an entire region. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Board
of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E. 2d 491,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972): National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Note, Phased Zoning:
Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land De-
velopment, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 605 (1974). It does
not necessarily follow, however, that the due process
rights of builders and landowners are violated merely
because a local entity exercises in its own self-interest
the police power lawfully delegated to it by the state.
See Belle Terre, supra; Los Altos Hills, supra. If
the present system of delegated zoning power does
not effectively serve the state interest in furthering
the general welfare of the region or entire state, it
is the state legislature’s and not the federal courts’
role to intervene and adjust the system. As stated
supra, the federal court is not a super zoning board
and should not be called on to mark the point at
which legitimate local interests in promoting the
welfare of the community are outweighed by legiti-
mate regional interests. See Note, supra, at 608-11.”

(Petition, App. B, at 56-57)

It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals
assumed “that some persons desirous of living in Peta-
luma will be excluded under the housing permit limita-

17

tion.” While this assumption may be legitimate, there is
nothing in the record which directly su »ports it. There
are no allegations or proof in this case that there is any
shortage of housing in Petaluma or that any person seek-
ing housing in Petaluma has been unable to find it.

Even if regional impact is adopted as part of the test
to determine the validity of a loca) '‘and-use regulation,
it is submitted that the Petaluma Plan is in furtherance
of the general welfare and therefore valid.

It is a legitimate function of the exercise of the zoning
power to restrict uncontrolled growth and a local govern-
mental entity has broad discretion in selecting the means
to implement such objective. In Belle Terre, Mr. Justice
Marshall dissented from the majority opinion but con-
curred with the Court’s holding that the zoning power is
extremely broad:

“(L)ocal zoning authorities may properly act in fur-
therance of the objectives asserted to be served by
the ordinance at issue here: restricting uncontrolled
growth, solving traffic problems, keeping rental costs
at a reasonable level, and making the community
attractive to families. The police power which pro-
vides the justification for zoning is not narrowly con-
fined. And, it is appropriate that we afford zoning
authorities considerable latitude in choosing the means
by which to implement such purposes.”

416 U.S. at 13-14 (emphasis added)

Any zoning measure which restricts uncontrolled growth
in one community may have an effect on the demand for
growth in another community, but uncontrolled growth
in any community is inimical to the general weifare.

18

While different communities may select different means
to accomplish the same objective, the general welfare is
served where the police power test stated by the court in
Belle Terre is met:

“A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and

motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in
a land-use project addressed to family needs. This
goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker,
supra. The police power is not confined to elimination
of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people.”

416 U.S. at 9

Moreover, virtually every modern case relied upon by
petitioners to support their vague assertion that regional
needs are the touchstone for review of local land use
regulation, involved the exclusion from a community of
a particular type of land use—whether low or moderate
income housing, small lot development, apartments or
mobile homes—all of which the Petaluma Plan actively
encourages.

To suggest, as petitioners do here, that the proper
manner of resolution of possible conflicts between regional
and local needs in land use planning is the blunt instru-
ment of constitutional law is to belie the enormous com-
plexity of the task the federal courts are being invited
to assume. Local government has no authority over re-
gional problems, yet it is asserted that they are constitu-
tionally mandated to solve them. Moreover, regional needs
may be defined differently by different localities. Most

19

importantly, regions have a variety of needs, only one of
which is housing, and all of which may conflict. To place
the Federal courts in the position of arbiter of these
conflicts is to make the courts not just a zoning board
of appeals, but a legislature.

CONCLUSION

The Petaluma Plan is an effort by a relatively small
community to manage its anticipated residential growth
in a reasonable, well-balanced, non-chaotic manner. It is
not an attempt to curtail or limit growth necessarily,
but rather to provide some order to the amount of growth
that could be reasonably anticipated from previous ex-
perience. The number of residential units permitted to be
built annually under the Petaluma Plan is substantially
the same as the average annual rate for the five year
period 1967-1971. Thus the number used has a sound basis
and is not an arbitrary or unreasonable figure.

It is inherent in the very concept of land use regula-
tion that there will be an incidental effect of reducing
the amount of residential construction to less than market
demand (although respondents submit that petitioners
have not proven this to be the case with respect to
Petaluma. )

The Court of Appeals has held that the Plan is a rea-
sonable and legitimate exercise of the City’s police power
and is therefore valid and constitutional. The decision of

20

the Court of Appeals is in accord with all authority and
should stand; the petition for a writ of certiorari should
be denied.

Dated, January 26, 1976.

Respectfully submitted,
Rospert T. ANDERSON,
Den-DuLk, Dovctass & ANDERSON,
Epovarp E. Rosert,
By Rosert T. ANDERSON,
Attorneys for Respondents.

(Appendix Follows)

APPENDIX

Appendix

DEVELOPMENT POLICY.

“A. In order to protect its small town character and
surrounding open space, it shall be the policy of
the City to control its future rate and distribu-
tion of growth. A five-year development strategy
is feasible and shall be based on the following
criteria:

1. Development rate shall be tied to school and
utility capacity and the balance or imbalance
shall be constantly monitored and adjusted.

2. A growth rate of about 500 dwelling units
anually shall be the City’s growth policy.

3. The County is hereby solicited to ensure that
all urban and suburban development in the
vicinity of Petaluma is approved by and is
acceptable for annexation to the City without
exception.

4, An east-west balance shall be encouraged in
considering new development.

B. It shall be the policy of the City to provide a
wide choice in types of dwellings and environ-
ments consistent with Petaluma’s essentially sub-
urban character.

C. It shall be the policy of the City to ensure a per-
manent greenbelt of open hills and marshlands
together with open space for recreation and for
definition of urban form.

D. It shall be the policy of the City to protect and
enhance those elements which add beauty and
character to the community.

“TI. Poxuictes Arrectinc RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT

It shall be the policy of the City to improve sub-
divisions and zoning regulations and others con-
trols over development to implement both the
broad policies of growth and environmental qual-
ity and variety in residential areas.

A.

1.

Proper planning and zoning will require En-
vironmental Design Plans, Planned Commu-
nity Districts, and Planned Unit Development
procedures to gain the best design possible
from large-scale land development.

The strategy for the next five years shall be
to redress the present deficiency in multi-
family units in Petaluma, and the zoning or-
dinanece will include bonus allowances +t»
encourage better apartment design and site
planning.

The zoning ordinance will provide for variety -

in densities and building types and thus, wide
ranges of prices and rents. Acceptable qual-
ity shall be maintained at all levels through
good site and architectural design and maxi-
mum use of available Federal subsidies, as
local conditions warrant.

All available laws will be used to ensure that
schools, parks, and greenbelts are provided
as part of the residential development process.

iii

5. Historically important structures shall be pro-
tected.

6. Petaluma will encourage the continued con-
struction of apartments designed for families
with children and pets.

7. The ordinance will provide for both mobile
homes and modular housing, will distinguish
between the two and avoid any tendency for
manufactured units to be clustered in any one
section of the City.

B. The following steps are deemed to be effective to
encourage appropriate location of needed multi-
family development.

1. A limited amount of high density housing will
be encouraged near the Central Business Dis-
trict and above commercial uses.

2. Remodeling of old single-family houses to
apartments in close-in areas will respect his-
toric character of such houses and special zon-
ing regulations will ensure that any new
apartment buildings will be compatible with
older structures.

3. Apartments will be encouraged on the east
side as well as the west side of Petaluma to
provide more variety of population and en-
vironment.”

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5, at 31-33)

iv

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN PLANS.

“Five years is a suitable time period for strategic
planning. It assumes that the City should and can
control its short-range future since it can foresee with
reasonable assurance what its problems are and how
much growth it can accommodate while maintaining
an adequate level of public service and a good en-
vironment. Since 500 dwelling units annually is pretty
close to the City’s average during the past decade,
neither the adopted policy statement nor the Environ-
mental Design Plan actually will arrest Petaluma’s
growth. Nor do these plans really restrict the op-
portunity of private property owners to develop their
land. Even without guidance from a five year En-
vironmental Design Plan, very little subdivision ac-
tivity has occurred except adjacent to existing
development. As this report makes clear, it is the
magnitude of the market for developed real estate
in Petaluma’s vicinity that drastically reduces the
likelihood that any particular parcel outside the City
will be developed in the next five years. The Environ-

mental Design Plans have the sole purpose of con- —

tributing to Petaluma’s future welfare by ensuring
that development in the next five years, will take place
in a reasonable, orderly, attractive manner, rather
than in a completely haphazard and unattractive man-
ner’ (emphasis added)

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5, at 1)

HOUSING ELEMENT OF THE GENERAL PLAN.

“. . . the recommended Residential Development
Program is a response to the City’s desire to formu-
late and adopt policies and plans which will orient
future residential development in Petaluma in ac-
cordance to public choice. Jt is, in effect, an effort to
allow the City to control its growth im a manageable
and environmentally conscious manner rather than
simply reacting to unimpeded development. (emphasis
added)

“The Environmental Design Plans serve the pur-
pose of providing a functional framework for the
overall development of Petaluma during the next five
years. The Housing Element must in turn extract
guideline policies for residential construction during
the period 1973-1977 . . .”

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8, at 18)

RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
SYSTEM.

“It is the adopted policy of the City of Petaluma
to establish control over the quality, distribution,
and rate of growth of the City in the interest of:

Preserving the quality of the community;

Protecting the green open-space frame of the City;

Insuring the adequacy of City facilities and ser-

vices within acceptable allocation of City and
school tax funds;

Insuring a balance of housing types and values in
the City which will accommodate a variety of
families including families of moderate income
and older families on limited, fixed incomes, and

Insuring the balanced development of the City east,
north, and west of the central core.

“These policies are more completely set forth in
the Official Statement of Development Policy for the
City of Petaluma, adopted by the City Council, Reso-
lution No. 5760 N.C.S., June 7, 1971.

“The policies of the City are given increasingly
specific form in three documents:

1. The Petaluma General Plan adopted March 5,
1962, and as subsequently amended from time
to time.

2. The Petaluma Environmental Design Plans
adopted March 27, 1972.

3. The Housing Element of the General Plan
adopted

“The General Plan establishes long-range general
development policy. The Environmental Design Plan
establishes medium-range and more specific and de-
tailed development policy directed to the develop-
ment period 1973-1977. The Housing Element of the
General Plan defines the housing policy goals of the
City and establishes a proposed Residential Develop- ~
ment Program 1973-1977 as set forth in page 24 of
the Housing Flement.

“It is the purpose of this Residential Development
Control System to implement the policies of the
City of Petaluma as recorded in the Development
Policy Resolution and the three official documents re-
ferred to above .. .”

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-7, at 1)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1508%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
