# motion to affirm — Graham v. Fong Eu > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1346%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** motion to affirm - **Published:** January 1, 1976 - **Citation:** 423 U.S. 1067 ## Text Su. ' me Co PILES ‘ v : DEC 26 1975 — MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK Supreme Court of the Uniied States Octoser Term, 1975 No. 75-740 James 8. GraHaM, Appellant, Vs. Marcu Fone Ev, Secretary of State, and Repusiican State CenTRAL COMMITTEE oF CALIFORNIA, Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Motion to Affirm Paut R. Harrie 2 Embarcadero Center San Francisco, California 94111 James D’A. WELCH Attorney for Appellee THELEN, Marrin, JOHNSON Republican State Central & Bripces Committee of California 2 Embarcadero Center San Francisco, California 94111 of Counsel — SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94105 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Ay TEI cessssciesitsalbiniaiinnidaiiitibicciteialaasideamicitaltibeiiaaaaesiuiaiag 1 Argument ........... ssnihabeehaetapiaesiaiviahlteielsheiehttesaiatpaa loans sini 2 I. California’s Winner-Take-All Republican Pres- idential Primary Election Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause ................--.-ccesscsseceseeees 2 “ IL. This Court Has Increasingly Recognized the Impropriety of Further Judicial Intrusions Into I MII -cieinsieabishiatirhiseisaesneeiidemtbiaicesiniastin 11 Ill. The Winner-Take-All Primary Election Ration- ally Advances Legitimate State Interests ........ 17 rr « CN ae 21 Appendix: Assembly Bill No. 427 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Pages Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) .......................0- 3 American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 SIE ssciiuisensbcsusienieliel caer dahl cathedrals 20 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) -........... 3 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ..................-cccceccceeees 3,4 Bode vy. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972). 16 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) ...........2........... 3, 17, 20 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) -....................... 5 Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) ~.......0000222... 5, 6,8 Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) -................. 11, 13, 16 Doty v. Montana State Central Committee, 337 fo ES: BO Fe 4 Dunn vy. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) ...00000002..- 19 Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965) —..020.... 5) Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1972) .. 16 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1968) 000 10 Iladley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970).. 3 Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) .............c..ccccccccccersecceees 17 Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minne- sota, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968) ......................ccccceecees 3, 16 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) —...0022... 20 Keane vy. National Democratic Party, 409 U.S. 1 IE STUIED \cscrssssnsecibsaieettiiaetetaeinsipsbaaeadeabainiaeniiditaidishiaieaniatnaibiiabaiadieaiidd 13, 14 Kirkpatric v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969)... 3 Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) —0 ) Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) -0 0. 17, 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iil ‘ Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d. Cir. 1965) ........ 16 Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) oo 3 Maxey v. Washington State Central Committee, 319 F.Supp., 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970) 00.0.2... eeeeeeeeeee ee 4 McDonald vy. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) 2. 17, 18, 21 Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) oo. 3 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921) ........ 3 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) ooocccececeeeceeeeeeeee 3 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) .0.......2....c.ce0-e-- 3 O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) occ 13, 14, 16 Redfern v. Delaware Republican State Committee, 362 Sn TO I I eames 4 Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 20. 3 Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, ...., F.2d. ...y 44 U.S.L.W. 2161 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 20. 15, 16 Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) -0020.. Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Commit- tee, 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972) ooo. ccc ee 4 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ooo. 3, 16 Smith v. State Exec. Comm. of Dem. Party of Ga., 288 fo BB 8k ee ee 3 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) 0. 17, 19, 20 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) 3 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) oo. 3 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) oo. 3 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) 0c. 2.5 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) oo. d, 7 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) ....................8, 19, 20 Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 288 F.Supp. 622 (.D. Va., 1968), aff’d per curiam, 393 ef ee Eee 2,8, 9, 10 STATUTES ee eee rs OE _sauadniecienniassnenianeaeonenesns to Law Reviews Note, One Man, One Vote and the Selection of Dele- gates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. NGI: SUID CUED ss asaihsnesisiianiiineabenamnncienrseientioes 16 Note: One Person, One Vote: The Presidential Prim- aries and Other National Convention Delegate Selec- tion Processes, 24 Hastings L. Rev. 257, 274 (1973).. bo bo . IN THE Supreme Court of the United States Octoser Term, 1975 No. 75-740 James §S. GraHaM, Appellant, Vs. Marcu Fone Ev, Secretary of State, and Repusiican State CenTRAL COMMITTEE oF CALIFORNIA, Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Motion to Affirm Appellee, Republican State Central Committee of Cali- fornia (hereinafter referred to as “RSCCC”), moves, pur- suant to Supreme Court Rule 16, to affirm the judgment of the District Court on the ground that it is manifest that the questions on which the decision of the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument. OPINION BELOW After the presentation of evidence and hearing argu- ments on the merits, the District Court held that the Repub- lican Partv’s winner-take-all presidential primary election 2 system as established by California statute did not violate appellant’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the First Amendment. The Dis- trict Court relied principally on this Court’s decisions in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), and Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff’d mem 393 U.S. 320 (1969), which upheld the constitutionality of the winner-take-all rule within, respec- tively, the contexts of legislative apportionment schemes and the Electoral College. Relying upon the standards set forth in Whitcomb, the District Court found that appellant had failed to prove that any identifiable group “had less opportunity than did other[s] ... to participate in the political process and to elect [delegates to the National Convention] of their choice.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra at 149. ARGUMENT 1. California's Winner-Take-All Republican Presidential Primary Election Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause. In this action appellant seeks to declare Cal. Elec. Code $ 6201 unconstitutional on the grounds that California’s “winner-take-all” Republican presidential primary election violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ His theory is that the winner-take-all primary 1. Citations to the California Election Code are to sections which were in effect at the time of trial. On September 24, 1975 the provisions of former Chapter 1, commencing with Section 6000, of Division 5 of the California Elections Code was repealed and superseded by Assembly Bill No, 427. The new law modifies the procedure for presidential primary elections of the Republi- can Party in California, but retains the winner-take-all rule of the former statute. Sections 6056, 6071(¢), Cal. Elee. Code. Assembly Bill No. 427 is set forth in the Appendix. NN ——————————eeEeeeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeeeEeeeeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeeEeaaE=SeeeeEEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeaeaeaeoeaeEeEeaeaeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEeEOeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 3 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it does not afford proportionate representation at the National Con- vention of the various political factions within the Party. To date the only decisions by this Court applying equal protection principles to the electoral process have involved the first tier of the electoral process, i.e., the method by which representatives are chosen. At no time has this Court ruled that various political factions are entitled to propor- tionate representation. It has merely ruled that eligible voters must have equal access to the political process, that all votes be weighed equally, and that the election procedure may not contain a built-in bias which dilutes or cancels the voting strength of identifiable racial or political groups.? 2. For example, the White Primary Cases collectively held that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by systems which pre- vented blacks from participating in primary elections or in state nominating conventions held in lieu of primary elections. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (19382); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). The Reapportionment Cases similarly imposed the one man— one vote standard on elections of legislative representatives and other governmental officials. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) ; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). The’ Ballot Access Cases were only concerned with the ability of candidates for public office to be placed on the ballot. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) ; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). On the other hand Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968), rejected the contention that the State convention which selected delegates to the national convention must be apportioned on the basis of one man, one vote. It held that the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause were satisfied sinee all party members were entitled to participate equally at the precinet caucuses. Accord, Smith v. State E-rec. Comm. of Dem. Party of Ga., 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968). It has also been held that where delegates to the national con- vention are chosen at state conventions (rather than by primary elections) the delegates to the state conventions must be appor- 4 RSCCC contends that the principles of the Equal Pro- tection Clause are not offended by the winner-take-all rule in presidential primary elections, and that it is manifestly inappropriate to extend those principles into the intra-party process of selecting a political party’s Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Appellant does not contend that the principle of one man-one vote established by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), is violated by the winner-take-all rule. Indeed, no such contention is possible, because the election is conducted on a statewide basis, each eligible Republican voter being entitled to an equally weighted vote. Rather, appellant con- tends that the winner-take-all rule contains a built-in bias which dilutes and cancels the voting strength of discernible voting elements. The thrust of appellant’s argument is that the winner- take-all rule is inherently unfair because voters for non- plurality candidates are not represented at the Republican National Convention, particularly at the time when Presi- dential and Vice Presidential candidates are nominated. He contends that the Equal Protection Clause requires that non-plurality factions must have the possibility of obtaining delegate representation, and suggests that this can be best accomplished by the election of delegates from districts within the State. tioned among geographie units within the state. Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Committee, 459 F. 2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972); Redfern v. Delaware Republican State Committee, 362 F. Supp. 65 (D. Del. 1973); Doty v. Montana State Central Com- mittec, 337 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mont. 1971); Mazey v. Washington State Central Committee, 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970). The common denominator among these cases is that the courts required proportionate representation at the state convention— i.c., the first tier at which state delegates to the national conven- tion were seleeted. None of those decisions required that delegates to the national convention represent the various and diverse in- terest present at the state convention. 5 The substance of appellant’s arguments is not novel. He helabors at length the real or alleged shortcomings of the winner-take-all rule which have been carefully considered by this Court on several recent occasions in a series of decisions regarding multi-member legislative districts. Al- though this Court has expressed a judicial preference for single-member districts in court ordered reapportionment plans on the basis of its supervisory powers, Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975), it has consistently held that the winner-take-all rule is not per se unconstitutional. Rather, the challenger bears the burden of establishing that the scheme “was designed to or would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 (1966). Accord, Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) ; Whit- comb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971); Kilgarlin v. ITill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). The District Court found that “plaintiff has failed to demonstrate factually that any identifiable group has been denied, because of racial or political differences, an oppor- tunity to participate in the Republican primary and to elect delegates of its choice”. Appellant contends that the Dis- trict Court’s decision was contrary to this Court’s teachings in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Nevertheless, in his arguments before the District Court, and again in his Jurisdictional Statement, appellant has failed, and is apparently unable, to fulfill the two criteria which are necessary for a successful attack. First, he has completely failed to specify the characteristics which serve to identify the “discernible voting elements” which are allegedly dis- criminated against. Nor does he assert that he is a member of any identifiable minority, or that he has anything in 6 common with any recognizable group of voters. Indeed, in his declaration submitted to the District Court, appellant stated that “in light of the fact that in California delegates were awarded only to the candidate winning the primary campaign, I chose not to cast my ballot and did not vote in the [1972] primary election at all.” Nor is there any evi- dence that appellant voted, or was eligible to vote, in any other primary elections. Secondly, appellant has failed to show that the winner- take-all rule was “conceived or operated as [a] purposeful device to further racial or econom:. discrimination.” Whit- comb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. In Whitcomb this Court re- jected the motion “that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in [the final decision-making forum] if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat”. 403 U.S. at 156. In response to arguments strikingly similar to those of appellant, this Court stated, The failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as a fune- tion of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting power of the ghetto resi- dents may have been cancelled out as the District Court held, but this is a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls .. .[WJ]e have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates, even in those so-called ‘safe’ districts where the same party wins year after year. /d. at 153.* These principles were recently reaffirmed in Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975), where this Court said “there must be more evidence than a simple disproportionality between the voting potential and the legislative seats won by a racial or political group. There must be evidence that the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups.” Id. at 17. *Emphasis supplied throughout, unless otherwise noted. 7 By way of contrast, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), affirmed the decision of the District Court which held under the facts in that case that a legislative reappor- tionment scheme which provided for multi-member districts in two counties invidiously discriminated against cognizable racial or ethnic groups, and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, this Court reiterated that, It is not enough that the racial group allegedly dis- criminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential, The plaintiff’s bur- den is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. Jd. at 765-66. The District Court reviewed the history of racial discrim- ination in Texas, its relationship with the effects of multi-member districting and concluded that “‘the black community has been effectively excluded from partici- pation in the Democratic primary selection process,’ and was therefore generally not permitted to enter the political process in a reliable and meaningful manner.” Jd. at 767. The District Court also found that “the multi-member dis- trict, as designed and operated in Bexar County, invidiously excluded Mexican-American from effective participation in political life, specifically in the election of representatives to the Texas House of Representatives.” Jd. at 769. The factors supporting the decision in White v. Register are totally lacking in the instant case, There is no claim of racial discrimination, nor discrimination against any other cognizable group. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the winner-take-all rule contains any built-in biases or was conceived or operated to perpetuate any discrimination. 8 Although appellant stresses that the primary election in California is state-wide and that a victory in that election may increase a candidate’s power at the National Conven- tion, this Court, nevertheless, has made it clear that the elements of proof remain the same regardless of the size of the constituency. Chapman v. Meier, supra at 17. From the foregoing, it is clear that minority elements of an electorate must be given an equal opportunity to par- ticipate in the election of their representatives. But the Equal Protection Clause does not require that “distinctive substantive-law interests” of such minority groups be pro- portionately represented in legislatures, much less that all of the various, divergent and fluid political factions which form within the Republican Party during primary election campaigns be proportionately represented at its National Convention. Appellant’s contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, the similarity between multi-member districting and the winner-take-all primary is quite striking. At the voter level, the first tier of the process, all voters have an equal oppor- tunity to vote, their votes are weighed equally in determin- ing the outcome of the election, and the winning candidates are vested with all of the allocated political power of the constituency. At the second level, whether the legislature or a national convention, the elected representatives have the right to cast their votes consistent with the wishes of the electorate which chose them for office. The fact that certain minority factions may be unrepresented at the second level is not because of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but because of political defeat at the polls. Tn addition to the reapportionment cases just discussed, this Court has had occasion to consider the constitutionality of the winner-take-all rule in the context of the Electoral College. In Williams rv. Virginia State Board of Elections, 9 288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968) aff’d mem., 393 U.S. 320 (1969), the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of Vir- ginia’s winner-take-all rule in Presidential elections which provided for a state-wide election and for the successful Presidential candidate to be entitled to all of the State's electors. As in the present case, plaintiffs complained that Virginia’s state-wide winner-take-all rule was unfair be- cause it did not afford minority representation among the electors. The District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. In facts in Williams are strikingly parallel to those of the present case. At the first voting tier all eligible voters cast votes of equal weight, the successful candidate was en- titled to all of the state’s electors, and those electors were committed to a given candidate. It was not until the second voting tier, i.e., the Electoral College, that the minority voters were unrepresented. Although appellant would have this Court read Williams as resting solely on a construction of Article IT, Section 1, and the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution, such is not the case. On the contrary, the District Court stated: “the authorization of each State by Article IT to ‘appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct’ is ‘sub- ject to possible constitutional limitations.’ ” 288 F. Supp. at 626. Thereafter, it analyzed the case on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause and the one person-one vote rule and stated: In the selection of electors the [winner-take-all] rule does not in any way denigrate the power of one citizen’s ballot and heighten the influence of another’s vote. Ad- mittedly, once the electoral slate is chosen, it speaks only for the element with the largest number of votes. This in a sense is discrimination against the minority voters, but in a democratic society the majority must rule, unless the discrimination is invidious. No such 10 evil has been made manifest here. Every citizen is offered equal suffrage and no deprivation of the suffr- age is suffered by anyone. 288 F.Supp. at 627. If the District Court, or this Court, had concluded that the winner-take-all rule was contrary to the Equal Protection Clause, nothing in Article II, Section 1, would have pre- vented the imposition of the districting remedy, The Dis- trict Court considered arguments of vote dilution and can- cellation that were virtually identical with those made in this case and held that the winner-take-all method of election was consistent with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause. Appellant places great reliance upon the decision in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1972), in which this Court heid unconstitutional Georgia’s county unit system of counting votes in state-wide primary elections for United States Senator and state-wide offices because that system resulted in weighing the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weighed some rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties. This Court stated: “once the geo- graphic unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote...” Jd. at 379. Thus, the evil struck down in that case was the disproportionate weighing of votes as a result of geographic factors, an issue not presented in the present case. It should also be noted that in Gray this Court specifically left open the question of whether the Equal Pro- tection Clause governs conventions used for nominating candidates in lieu of the primary election system. /d. at 378, n. 10. This Court did observe, however, “the only weighing of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concerns matters of representation, such as the allocation of Senators irrespec- tive of population and the use of the Electoral College in the choice of a President.” Jd. at 380. 11 From the foregoing discussion, the principle clearly emerges that nothing in the Constitution requires that all minority interests be proportionately represented at all government levels. Just as electors to the Electoral College and legislators may be elected on a winner-take-all basis, so also may the Republican voters of California choose their delegates to the National Convention. Since appellant has failed to demonstrate that the winner-take-all rule contains a built-in bias which discriminates against any identifiable groups, this motion should be granted and the decision of the District Court affirmed. ll. This Court Has Increasingly Recognized the Impropriety of Further Judicial Intrusions into Intra-Party Affairs. By this action appellant seeks to induce this Court to extend the one man-one vote principles of the Equal Protee- tion Clause beyond the elective stage and into the represen- tative stage of the essentially political and deliberative process of selecting a political party’s Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Shortly stated, appellant invites this Court to inject it- self into internal affairs of the Republican Party—namely the manner in which the political power of the State of Cali- fornia must be exercised at the Republican National Con- vention. On the other hand, appellee RSCCC contends that this case is singularly appropriate for exercise of judicial restraint following the example set in several recent de- cisions of this Court and lower federal courts. As will be developed below, judicial restraint has been manifested in related cases by the refusal of the courts to attempt to su- perimpose the principles of the Equal Protection Clause on the inner workings of political parties. The most recent such example is Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), which involved the competing claims of two delegations from Chicago to be seated at the 1972 Dem- 12 ocra National Convention. The Wigoda delegates had been elected at the March 1972 Illinois primary election con- sistent with applicable state law; the Cousins delegates had been chosen at private caucuses held in Chicago after having been previously defeated at the primary. At the convention, the Cousins delegates successfully challenged the seating of the Wigoda delegates on the ground, among others, that the slate-making procedures under which the Wigoda delegates were selected violated the Democratic Party rules. There- after, the Cousins delegates were seated and fully partici- pated in the Convention. This Court was confronted with a conflict between the Tllinois election laws and the Democratic Party’s rules, and held that the Party’s rules prevailed over contrary state law. Thus, it held that the Cousins delegates, which had been selected at private caucuses rather than by popular election, had heen properly seated. This ruling was an exer- cise of judicial restraint on several levels. First, it estab- lished that national party rules regarding the qualifications of delegates are not subject to being overturned by incon- sistent state laws. Second, it ratified the decisions of the convention which seated the Cousins delegates, thereby avoiding questions as to the validity of the convention de- cisions in which the Cousins delegates participated. Third, and of particular significance to this case, it held that the cor..ention acted properly in rejecting the delegates who had been pepularly elected and by seating those who had been chosen at private caucuses. Although this Court expressly disclaimed any view on the issue of “whether national political parties are subject to the principles of the reapportionment decisions, or other constitutional restraints in their methods of delegate selec- tion, and allocation”, Id. at 484, n. 4(2), that decision cer- tainly bears on such questions inasmuch as this Court & 13 approved the action of the convention in seating the Cousins delegates. This Court’s ruling virtually rejected any notion that national convention delegates must be chosen on the basis of one man-one vote, much less that the delegates must proportionately represent the various political factions of their constituencies. Indeed, the effect of this Court’s holding is to the contrary—convention dele- gates may be selected without a popular vote if chosen consistent with the Party’s rules. Thus, in Cousins, this Court held that the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of political association elevated the Democratic Party’: rules regarding the quali- fications of delegates to a stature superior to that of inconsistent state law. A fortiori, when state law is con- sistent with a national party’s rules, the validity of the state law should receive the same protection. In the present ease, California’s winner-take-all rule is vonsistent with the Republican Party’s rules and both should thus partake of First Amendment protection. Cousins v. Wigoda was the sequel to this Court’s earlier decision in O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972), which involved the same basic dispute, and in which this Court stressed the desirability of judicial restraint. In O’Brien, and the companion case of Keane v. National Democratic Party, convention delegates from California and Illinois challenged the actions of the 1972 Democratic Convention’s Credentials Committee which had recommended that plain- tiffs be unseated. The District Court dismissed the com- plaints, but the Court of Appeals reversed, granting relief to the California delegates and denying relief to the Illinois delegates, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C, Cir. 1972). On review, this Court granted stays of the judgments of the Court of Appeals principally on the ground that the case was not appropriate for judicial intervention. This Court noted: 14 No case is cited to us in which any federal court has undertaken to interject itself into the deliberative processes of a national political convention; no holding of this Court up to now gives support for judicial intervention in the circumstances presented here, in- volving as they do relationships of great delicacy that are essentially political in nature. Judicial intervention in this area traditionally has been approached with great caution and restraint. See Irish v. Democratic- Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965); Smith v. State Exec. Comm. of Dem. Party of Ga. 288 F.Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968). It has been understood since our national political parties first came into being as voluntary associations of individuals that the convention i..elf is the proper forum for deter- mining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be seated. Thus, these cases involve claims of the power of the federal judiciary to review actions hereto- fore thought to lie in the control of political parties. 409 U.S. at 4. It should not be overlooked that the challenge to the California delegation in O’Brien was based on California’s winner-take-all primary election law applicable to the Demo- cratic Party (since altered), the challengers arguing that the winner-take-all rule violated that party’s rules. Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court addressed the constitu- tional issue involved, although it appears that the chal- lengers argued that a state’s delegation should be distributed in proportion to the votes received by the candidates they represent. Nevertheless, the effect of this Court’s action was to leave the decision to the convention.* 3. O’Brien was finally dismissed a moot, 409 U.S. 816 (1972), and its companion case, Keane v. National Democratic Party, was remanded to the Court of Appeals, 409 U.S. 816 (1972), where it was dismissed. 475 F.2d 1287 (1973). 15 The most recent example of judicial restraint is found in the decision of Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, .... F.2d ..., 44 U.S.L.W. 2161 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the Republican Party’s method of allocating delegates among the States, alleging that the formula violated the one man-vote standard of the Equal Protection Clause because it did not allocate delegates in proportion to the States’ populations. The Court of Appeals rejected the notion that the Equal Protec- tion Clause is applicable to such internal affairs of the Republican Party, stating that: “Tnjational conventions have never been conceived as having the function of providing a strict one person- one vote representation to a definable national con- stituency .... Moreover, the interests advanced by adopting representation schemes of the party’s own choosing seen to be of great importance and of clearly constitutional stature.” Jd. at 2162. The primary basis upon which the Court of Appeals rest- ed its decision was the First Amendment’s guarantee of free political association. In this regard, the court stated: What is important is that a party’s choice of the one way of governing itself that seems best calculated to strengthen the party and advance its interests deserves the protection of the constitution as much, if not more, than its condemnation. The constitutional rights of speech and assembly are of slight value if they do not carry with them a comitant (sic) right of political association ... there must be a right not only to form political associations but to organize and direct them in the way that will make them most effective. ... Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause, assum- ing it is applicable, does not require a representation in presidential nominating conventions of some defined constituency on a one person-one vote basis. Jd. at 2162. 16 It is evident from a review of this decision that the central issue concerned the manner in which the political power of the Repubiican Party may be allocated and exer- cised. Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had earlier demonstrated no reluctance to become involved in such matters (e.g., O’Brien v. Brown, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1972), stay granted, 409 U.S. 1 (1972), Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1972) and Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972)), its decision in Ripon appar- ently signaled its acknowledgment and understanding of this Court’s contrary inclinations as exhibited in O’Brien and Cousins. As the Court of Appeals stated in Ripon, “it is the essence of the First Amendment rights that the parties exercise that they make their own contrary (and rational) judgments without interference from the courts.” Id. at 2162-63. The perception of the Court of Appeals in Ripon is surely correct. The approval of the Smith, Irish and Lynch cases in this Court’s opinion. in O’Brien and the later decision in Cousins clearly demonstrate this Court’s conviction that judicial intrusions into intra-party affairs should not go beyond assuring both equal voter participation and full voter protection at the grass roots level of the delegate selection process. The reason for such restraint is clear: judicial intervention may have a significant impact on the delicate balance of power between competing party factions and could produce substantial and unanticipated changes in the operation of the political system itself. Considering these potential effects, the courts lack judicially manageable standards for dealing with such questions. See, e.g., Note: One Man, One Vote and the Selection of Delegates to Na- tional Nominating Conventions, 37 U, Chi. L. Rev. 536, 547 (1970). 17 ill. The Winner-Take-All Primary Election Rationally Advances Legitimate State Interests. Appellant contends that the District Court erred by failing to test the winner-take-all rule by a standard of strict review. The District Court reached this conclusion on the basis that appellant had not demonstrated that the winner-take-all rule operates to discriminate against any identifiable political group (fn. 30). In his Jurisdictional Statement, appellant contends that proof of such discrimina- tion is not a necessary predicate to employing the strict standard of judicial review, relying on this Court’s decisions in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) ; Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) ; and Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) Although it is true that the challengers in those cases were not required to identify specific political groups in order to sustain their challenges, each of those cases involved various restrictions on the exercise of the right of suffrage, matters which are not in issue in this case, Hill and Kusper, respectively, involved rules which disenfranchised those who did not own real property and those who desired to change their party affiliations. Storer and Bullock involved restrictions which prevented candidates from being placed on the ballot. These cases are inapposite simply because the present case does not involve any infringements on the exercise of the right to vote. The issues, as presented by appellant, involve solely the results of elections. Considering that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the winner-take-all rule infringes upon the protections of the Equal Protection Clause, it is evident that the statute in question must be judged by the so-called “rational rela- tionship” test rather than the “compelling state interest” test. The applicable standard of judicial scrutiny is found in the decision of McDonald v. Board of Election Commis- 18 stoners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), where this Court held that an Illinois statute which denied unsentenced prisoners the right to vote by absentee ballot did not violate the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of evidence that they were absolutely prohibited from voting. Clearly the statute in question severely hampered the unsentenced prisoners in the exercise of their right to vote. Nevertheless, this Court rejected the applicability of the “compelling state interest” test, saying that Such an exacting approach is not necessary here, how- ever, for two readily apparent reasons. First, the dis- tinctions made by Illinois’ absentee provisions are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race. Secondly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme had an impact on appelants’ ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote. It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots, 394 U.S. at 807. The rationale of McDonald is applicable to the present ease. Appellant does not contend that the winner-take-all primary discriminates on the basis of wealth, race, geo- graphy or other “invidiously discriminatory” factors, Rath- er, his complaint is that it prevents proportionate represen- tation of divergent philosophies at the national convention. It follows from McDonald that in a case such as the present where the challenged statute does not create “constitution- ally suspect” classifications, and does not even hamper the citizen’s exercise of the right to vote as did the Illinois law, the “rational relationship” test is the appropriate standard, and appellant must establish by competent evidence that the statute in question is totally unrelated to the pursuit of a legitimate state end. In McDonald the “rational relationship” was defined as follows: i3 ... [The] statute must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as viola- tive of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitution- ally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived of to justify them. 394 U.S. at 809. In evaluating the constitutionality of the winner-take-all primary election rule, the court must “consider all the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interest which the state claims to be protecting, and the interest of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). Accord, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 385 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1973). In a series of recent decisions, this Court has approved the legitimacy of the following state interests as a basis for regulating elections. The state has a “substantial State interest in encouraging compromise and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner will rep- resent a majority of the community and in providing the electorate with an understandable ballot... ”. Storer v. Brown, supra at 729; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). The state has a compelling interest in maintaining the stability of its political system which is intimately de- pendent upon preserving the integrity of its political parties. See Storer v. Brown, supra at 736. Accord, Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) ; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S, 51 (1973). In Storer this Court agreed with the State of California’s concern that “splintered parties and unrestrained factional- ism may do significant damage to the fabric of government.” 20 415 U.S. at 736. It has further recognized that a state has a “legitimate interest in regulating the number of candi- dates on the ballot” and may properly seek “to prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a substantial plurality, of those voting ...”. More- over, a state has an interest if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudu- lent candidates. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972). Accord, Storer v. Brown, supra at 732; Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 32; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S, 481, 442 (1971). Subsequently, in American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974), this Court deemed the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process and regu- lating the number of candidates on the ballot to avoid voter confusion a compelling state interest. Jd. at 782, n. 14. Fin- ally, it has held that the state has a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the nominating process of party primary election. American Party of Texas v. White, supra at 786. It is clear that the statute in question in the instant case advances the foregoing state interests and is rationally re- lated to the pursuit of those goals. The winner-take-all pri- mary is designed to-assure that California’s delegation to the Republican National Convention represents the views of the majority, or at least a substantial plurality, of those voting. By permitting a unified delegation, California fos- ters unity in the state’s Republican Party. Voting as a bloe, the California Republican delegation may more successfully influence the national convention to nominate a Presidential candidate and adopt programs as part of the Party’s cam- paign platform that will meet with the approval not only of California Republicans, but California voters generally. In short, the winner-take-all rule advances several signi- ficant and compelling state interests and is rationally re- 21 lated to the achievement of a legitimate state end. Cer- tainly it cannot be said that the statute in question is “based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal” or that the statutory scheme should be set aside because “no grounds can be conceived to justify them.” McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, supra at 809. IV. Conclusion. From the foregoing it is clear that the one man-one vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of political association do not require that state delegates to national political con- ventions must be apportioned among the various Presi- dential candidates participating in the primary election. In complete conformance with the theories underlying our rep- resentative form of government, national convention dele- gates are representatives of the state’s political party at the convention, and there is no Constitutional mandate that the various philosophical factions of given constituencies be afforded proportionate representation. The Constitution simply demands that all eligible voters be equally entitled to participate in the process whereby representatives are chosen, Thus, just as a state’s representatives in the Elec- toral College or the members of a multi-member legislative district may be elected on a winner-take-all basis, so also may a state’s delegates to a national political convention be chosen. A rule to the contrary, imposing the one man-one vote principle, w ald have serious ramifications far beyond the instant case. If a state’s allocated number of convention delegates must be apportioned among all contenders in the primary election, the obvious and necessary result is a Con- stitutional mandate that every state hold a Presidential 22 primary election for each political party. According to ap- pellant’s own law review article, only twenty-three jurisdic- tions held Presidential primaries in 1972, and among them there were at least four general types of systems. Note: One Persem-One Vote: The Presidential Primaries and Other National Convention Delegate Selection Processes, 24 Hlastings L. Rev. 257, 274 (1973). If convention dele- gates must be apportioned among the Presidential candi- dates on the basis of election results not only must each of these twenty-four jurisdictions conform their election sys- tems, but the remaining jurisdictions must also hold Presi- dential primary elections. Clearly a rule of such constitu- tional magnitude cannot apply to the State of California alone. The impaci on the states as well as Presidential candi- dates would be enormous. At least one major factor perti- nent to a state’s decision not to hold a Presidential primary is the substantial cost involved. From the candidate’s view- point, he has neither the time nor the funds to actively compete in primary elections in each jurisdiction. What could be more discouraging to potential candidates that the necessity of spending the time and investing the resources necessary to compete in primary elections throughout the nation? Indeed, only those few candidates with overwhelm- ing resources could ever participate in, much less survive, the primary process demanded by appellant. Surely the Constitution does not impose such unreasonable demands. 23 For the foregoing reasons, appellee RSCCC urges that its motion to affirm be granted and the decision of the Dis- trict Court affirmed. Dated: December 19, 1975 Respectfully submitted, Paut R. Harrie Attorney for Appellee Republican State Central Committee of California James p’A. WELCH THELEN, Marrin, JOHNSON & Brinvces of Counsel (Appendix Follows) SS EES Oe oe a eee: es ee eee ee ee a Ls -LdhUhmlmmmmttt—C“Ctst‘CSOSNSSCSCSNSNNNNNC#§ Appendix Assembly Bill No. 427 CHAPTER 1048 An act to repeal and add Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 6000) of Division 5 of the Elections Code, relating to the presidential primary. | Approved by Governor September 24, 1975. Filed with Secretary of State September 24, 1975. ] The people of the State of California do enact as follows: SECTION 1. Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 6000) of Division 5 of the Elections Code is repealed. SEC. 2. Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 6000) is added to Division 5 of the Elections Code, to read: CHAPTER 1. PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY Article 1. General Provisions 6000. The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable only to the presidential primary ballot of the Republican Party, and qualified parties for which no other provisions apply. 6001. The provisions of this code relating to the direct primary apply to the presidential primary insofar as the former do not conflict with the latter. Article 2. Number and Certification of Delegates 6005. The chairman of the state central committee shall notify the Secretary of State on or before the first day of February immediately preceding the presidential primary as to the number of delegates to represent the state in the next national convention of his party. 2 Appendix 6006. The notification of the number of delegates shall be in substantially the following form: STATEMENT OF NUMBER OF DELEGATES TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION To the Secretary of State Sacramento, California You are hereby notified that the number of delegates to represent the State of California in the next national con- vention of the Republican Party is ~................ SE TINE isstnsesnnsesnaisinion Bt Se itceeernvintens ~ one Chairman of the State Central Committee of the Republican Party. 6007. If the chairman of the state central committee fails to file a notice as to the number of delegates, the Secretary of State shall ascertain the number from the call for the national convention issued by the national committee of the party. 6008. The Secretary of State shall, on or before the 10th day of February of the year of the presidential primary, certify to the county clerk of each evunty the number of delegates to be elected by the Republican Party. 6009. The certification to the county clerk of the number of delegates shall be in substantially the following form: CERTIFICATE OF SECRETARY OF STATE AS TO NUMBER OF DELEGATES TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION To the County Clerk of -................... County: T hereby certify to vou that the Republican Party is quali- fied to participate in the presidential primary to be held in this state on the 0000000000... SUNT saddcdiddanaaiiievads eae , and “aK Appendiz 3 the number of delegates to be elected by the Republican Party to represent the State of California in its next na- tional convention is ................--.-. Dated at Sacramento, California, this .................... day of February, 19......... Secretary of State (SEAL) Article 3. Selection of Candidates by the Secretary of State 6010. The Secretary of State shall place the name of a candidate upon the Republican presidential primary ballot when the Secretary of State shall have determined that such a candidate is generally recognized throughout the United States or California as a candidate for the nomination of the Republican Party for President of the United States. On or before February 1 immediately preceding a presi- dential primary election the Secretary of State shall public- ly announce and distribute to the news media for publication a list of the candidates he intends to place on the ballot at the following presidential primary election. Following this announcement he may add candidates to his selection, but he may not delete any candidate whose name appears on the announced list. 6011. When the Secretary of State decides to place the name of a candidate on the ballot pursuant to Section 6010, he shall notify the candidate that his name will appear on the ballot of this state in the presidential primary election. The secretary shall also notify the candidate that he may withdraw his name from the ballot by filing with the Secre- tary of State an affidavit pursuant to Section 6012 no later than the 64th day before the election. + Appendiz 6012. Ifa selected candidate or a nonselected candidate files with the Secretary of State, no later than the 64th day before the presidential primary, an affidavit stating with- out qualification that he is not now a candiate for the office of President of the United States at the forthcoming presi- dential primary election, his name shall be omitted from the list of names certified by the Secretary of State to the county clerks for the ballot and his name shall not appear on the presidential primary ballot. 6013. Any unselected candidate desiring to have his name placed on the presidential primary ballot shall have nomina- tion papers circulated in his behalf, In order to qualify his name for placement on the presidential primary ballot, the candidate’s nomination papers shall be signed by voters registered as affiliated with the Republican Party equal in number to not less than 1 percent of the number of persons registered as members of the Republican Party, as reflected in the report of registration issued by the Secretary of State in January of the vear of the presidential primary election. Article 4. Nomination Papers 6021. Nomination papers properly prepared, circulated signed and verified shall be left, for examination, with the county clerk of the county in which they are circulated, at least 74 days prior to the presidential primary. 6024. Each signer of a nomination paper may sign only one paper. He shall declare his intention to support the candidate for nomination, add his place of residence, and give his street and number if any. His election precinct shall also appear on the paper just preceding his name, and he shall write the date of his signature at the end of the line just after his residence. 6025. Any nomination paper may he presented in sec- tions. Each section shall contain the names of the candidate. Appendiz 5 Each section shall bear the name of the county in which it is circulated. Only voters of the county registered as intend- ing to affiliate with the political party by which the nomina- tions are to be made are competent to sign. 6026. Each section shall be prepared with the lines for signatures numbered, and shall have attached the affidavit of the verification deputy who obtained signatures to it, stating that all the signatures to the attached section were made in his presence, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief each signature to the section is the genuine sig- nature of the person whose name it purports to be. No other affidavit is required. The affidavit of any verification deputy shall be verified free of charge by any officer authorized to administer oaths. 6027. A verified nomination paper is prima facie evi- dence that the signatures are genuine and that the persons signing it are voters, until it is otherwise proved by com- parison of the signatures with the affidavits of registration in the office of the county clerk. 6028. The nomination paper for a candidate shall be in substantially the following form: SECTION OF NOMINATION PAPER SIGNED BY VOTER ON BEHALF OF CANDIDATE CN OE eckictdimees Nomination paper for .................... as presidential nominee of the Republican Party. State of California ™ ES OF sccemicrstimtmnnisn ' Signer’s Statement I, the undersigned, am a voter of the County of ................ . State of California, and am registered as intending to affi- € dAppendiz liate with the Republican Party. I have not signed the nom- ination paper of any other candidates for the same office, and further declare that I intend to support the nomination of the candidate named herein at the Republican Party presidential primary to be held on the 2.0... day of nemenniienia ~ See Number Precinct Signature Residence Date Sh sctesiinuinsieseeerniiessidemieasiiesimesiaieenindandtanmnnnianieuesnnindiannnasnaniapneneniiten I sascieasceniuaitaeeinndanihieieieanataneeceentaetndeiedeinbeneiieateiatistiniiatagiensianiaditaitiunesiiiaiiiiie Or saoticapeseiteedaaocne cect ae ia ED GUID enseccetscaeconhiniicheiceipicpiiieiaabacerstninpatainttiniaateabinaeiadansnaniieilidaaiiins Verification Deputy’s Affidavit : a , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have been appointed as a verification deputy to secure EEE Th Gr I I easisescrccncdtncincsicrccetncsntetmntnincs to the nomination paper of the candidate named in the signer’s statement above as candidate for nomination by the Repub- lican Party at its presidential primary election; that all the signatures on this section of the nomination paper numbered from 1 to ......................------00++ , inclusive, were made in my presence, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief each signature is the genuine signature of the person whose name it purports to be. EEE eee er ere Verification Deputy Subscribed and sworn to before me this -................. day of FEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EERE EERE ee te te te te te Notary Publie (or other official) Appendiz 7 Article 5. Verificacion Deputies 6030. The candidate or his designee may arrange for the appointment of verification deputies to serve within the county in which the deputies reside in securing signatures to the nomination paper of the candidate. The verification deputies thus appointed are the duly authorized verification deputies to secure signatures to the nomination paper of the candidate in that county. The form on which the verifica- tion deputies are appointed shall be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the verification deputies reside, at or before the time the nomination paper of the candidate is left with the county clerk for examination. Additional verification deputies may be appointed in the same manner as the original verification deputies were appointed. 6031. The verification deputies may be appointed by the candidate or his designee on a form which shall be substan- tially as follows: APPOINTMENT OF VERIFICATION DEPUTIES BY CANDIDATE OR HIS DESIGNEE I, the undersigned candidate or designee, do hereby appoint the following voters of the County of -.............. as verification deputies to obtain signatures, in that county, to nomination papers for -...........-...-.......--.---- as a candidate in the Republican Party presidential primary, to be held a I GIT enninsincsinsintarnnitaiin’ > Verification Deputies Name Residence ee eee eee eee ee ee eee eee ee ee eee eee a Appendiz Candidate or His Designee Name Residence Filed in the office of the County Clerk of -.........-.......-. County, this ............ gD > 6032. Verification deputies may obtain signatures to the nomination paper of a candidate for whom they were appointed, at any time not more than 104 nor less than 74 days prior to the presidential primary. 6033. The verification of signatures to nomination papers shall not be made by a county clerk, a deputy county clerk, or within 100 feet of any election booth, polling place, or any place where registration of electors is being con- ducted. Article 6. Arrangement and Examination of Nomination Papers 6040. Each section of a nomination paper, after being verified, shall be returned by the verification deputy who circulated it to the candidate or his designee by whom the verification deputy was appointed. All the sections cireu- lated in any county he shall be collected by the candidate or his designee and he shall arrange and leave the sections with the county clerk for examination. 6041. Prior to filing, the sections of a nomination paper for a candidate shall be numbered in order. 6042. Nomination papers, properly assembled, may be consolidated and fastened together by counties, but nomina- tion papers signed by voters in different counties shall not be thus fastened together. Appendiz 9 6043. The county clerk shall examine all nomination papers left with him for examination and shall disregard and mark “not sufficient” the name of any voter of his county which does not appear in the same handwriting on an affidavit of registration in the office of the county clerk. He shall also disregard and mark “not sufficient” the name of any voter of his county who has not stated his intention to affiliate with the Republican Party. 6044. Within five days after any nomination papers are left with him for examination, the county clerk shall: (a) Examine and affix to them a certificate reciting that he ha. examined them and stating the number of names which have not been marked “not sufficient.” (b) Transmit the papers with the certificate of examina- tion to the Secretary of State, who shall file the papers. 6045. The county clerk’s certificate to nomination papers of a candidate shall be in substantially the following form: COUNTY CLERK’S CERTIFICATE TO NOMINATION PAPERS OF A CANDIDATE To the Secretary of State: I, County Clerk of the County of ~.....0.0022....... , hereby certify that I have examined the nomination papers, to which this certificate is attached, of the candidate for the ensuing presidential primary, and that the number of names which I have not marked “not sufficient” is ~.........22..........--- The candidate named in the nomination papers is............ 10 Appendiz 6046. No filing fee is required from any person to be voted for at a presidential primary. Article 7. Certified List of Candidates, Notice of Elee- tion 6050. At least 59 days before a presidential primary, the Secretary of State shall transmit to each county clerk a certified list containing the names and addresses of the candidates for whom nomination papers have been filed and who are entitled to be voted for at the presidential primary. The certified list shall be in substantially the following form: CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATES SECRETARY OF STATE Te the Commty Coacit 0 cacssscccssishidiastithiecsenndiabenaaaa County: is sesisnnecdelbniemneiibiaaaanel , Secretary of State, do hereby certify that the following list contains the name and post office address of each person for whom nomination papers have been filed in my office and who is entitled to be voted for at the presidential primary to be held on the ............ day of seccideshibddiiiaiamiaai , 19...., as nominee of the Republican Party. List of Candidates Republican Party Name Address | .ncseesesersssnsrsesresnneheeniisenmnssinnee _sausnsnsnssunnnn una ye ©]