# Appendix — Western Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 424 U.S. 958

## Text

-_—---

Supreme Court, U. »
= FILED
3 19/5
IN THE ee
ICHAB RODAK, OX,
Supreme Court of the Anited ——

OctTosEer TERM 1975

No. 75-711

WESTERN AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner
v.
CONTINENTAL AIR LInEs, INc., Respondent

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Of Counsel: Emory N. ELLIs, JR.
Fulbright & Jaworski

1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

GERALD P. O’Grapy

Senior Vice President
Legal and Secretary
Western Airlines

P.O. Box 92005

World Way Postal Center
Los Angeles, Calif. 90009

FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI

1140 Connecticut Ave.,
N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Pagss or Brraon S. Apams Paintine, Inc., WasnhincrTon, D. C.

—oeerere

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Opinion and Order on Reconsideration (No. 74-5-17)
CAB Docket No. 18104, Additional Service to San
EE 6 24Uchehenencedécenseesss 37a (J.A. 100)

Opinion and Order (72-12-29) CAB Docket No. 18104,
Additional Service to San Diego Case .. 60a (J.A. 83)

Supplemental Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg,
Hearing Examiner, CAB No. 18104 et al., Re-
manded Additional Service to San Diego Case,
dated February 22, 1972, and attach-

PE S606 6 00ss daccdecseuscadacecess 74a (J.A.530)

Note: References in petitioner’s brief to these orders and
opinions are made to the joint appendix (J.A.) sub-
mitted by the parties in the Court below. Therefore,
joint appendix page numbers are noted in brackets
at the left margin in the line where such material

begins.

37a

75-5-17

[J.A. 100] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.v.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board at its office in
Washington, D.C. on the 3rd day of May, 1974.

Docket 18104

ADDITIONAL Service To San Dieco Case
(San Diego-Denver)

Opinion and Order On Reconsideration

By tHE Boarp:

By Order 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, the Board issued its
decision in the remanded phase of this case, in which it
denied all applications for additional nonstop San Diego-
Denver authority. Petitions for reconsideration of Order
72-12-29 were filed by Continental Air Lines, Inc.; the City
and County ot Denver and the Public Utilities Commission
of Colorado; Kansas City and the Chamber of Commerce
of Greater Kansas City;' and the San Diego Unified Port
District, the City of San Diego, and the San Diego Chamber
of Commerce. Western Air Lines filed an answer opposing
the petitions for reconsideration and Airwest, Trans World
Airlines, and United Air Lines filed similar answers oppos-
ing reconsideration and generally supporting the Board’s
decision.

Upon consideration of the matters presented, we have
decided to deny the petitions for reconsideration of the
Board’s original decision. We do so essentially for the rea-
sons set forth in that decision and, in addition, because
of the current fuel shortage which has become a significant

*The Board inadvertently omitted refernce to the Kansas City
Parties in its list of those persons filing briefs and participating
in oral argument. However, the Board did consider their argu-
ments presented in their brief and appearance before the Board.

38a

problem since the original decision was issued. In our De-
cember 1972 opinion, the Board emphasized that it must
be more than usually cautious—when the industry is
plagued by retrenchments and lagging traffic growth—
about granting new competitive route awards. Applying
this principle to the case before it, the Board found the
incumbent’s San Diego-Denver service fully met the mar-
ket’s needs. In those circumstances, the Board declined to
authorize additional competition, particularly since profits
for new service could not be predicted with confidence.

The industry continues to falter in its attempts to make
the financial recovery which our policy of caution was de-
signed to assist. This fortifies our resolve to avoid making
unnecessary awards of competitive authority on routes
which are adequately served. Similarly, because of the cur-
rent fuel shortage, the Board must guard against licensing
one carrier to duplicate another carrier’s services to the
detriment of essential services elsewhere.

In reaching our conclusions on reconsideration, we have
also fully evaluated (a) the allegations of error regarding
the Board’s original economic findings and (b) the most
current data available. This evaluation convinces us that
there is no fundamental defect in the Board’s original deter-
mination which requires reconsideration as a matter of law *
{J.A. 101] or that a change in the Board’s original result is
otherwise warranted by the public interest. Specifically, we
find nothing in the petitions to support the claim that one
of the Board’s original findings—t.e., that a competitive
award would lead, at best, to economically marginal operat-
ing results—was either unsupported by the record or con-
stituted an improper exercise of the Board’s discretion. “e
appreciate, of course, that the data which have become avail-
able since the Board’s original decision was reached now
tend to indicate that the prospects for profitable competitive

? Delta Air Lines v. CAB, No. 72-1377 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 23,
1973).

39a

operations are far stronger than earlier believed, and we
have carefully considered this change in reaching our de-
cision on reconsideration. However, the Board’s original
decision did not turn on profitability alone, and we be-
lieve, in sum, that the public interest would not be best
served by a change in the Board’s original result.* Our
views with respect to the fuel shortage and our comments
on various matters raised in the petitions for reconsidera-
tion, are discussed below.

[J.A. 103] Recent Precedent and Policy

Petitioners argue that the Board’s action in this proceed-
ing is wholly at odds with decisions over the recent past,
particularly with respect to the awards of competitive au-
thority. We reject this argument. We acknowledge that the
Board has not often set down a route case for hearing and
then decided at the end of the proceeding on the basis of
the record that it was not in the public interest to certificate
new service. However, this proceeding is unusual in that
it involved—at the outset—the basic question of first non-
stop service. Such service was, in fact, authorized and the
Board has declined only to make a competitive award in
the same proceeding. Thus, the case is substantially similar
to the Phoentz-Portland/Seattle Nonstop Case, Order 70-
8-13, August 5, 1970. More importantly, we see nothing in
other cases in which the Board has certificated new com-
petition that requires us to do so in this case. On the con-
trary, the Board remains free, subject to a full explana-
tion of its findings and considerations, to reach a conclusion
on the merits of this case which may vary from the results
reached in other circumstances, in other markets, or in prior
times. The facts of this case persuade us not to authorize
new competition. Our decision is supported by the record
and is in accord with the policy guidelines established by
the Federal Aviation Act.

* See ICC v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944).

40a

The route awards chiefly relied on by Continental in urg-
ing reconsideration were made before or during 1970. How-
ever, the economic climate in which these cases were set
down and decided was different from that which has been
evolving since. Indeed, in the original opinion in this very
ease, issued in April 1970, the Board sounded one of its
[.J.A. 104] earliest notes of caution with respect to declining
traffic growth, the profit picture within the industry, and the
hazards of overcapacity. After recognizing that competitive
nonstop service had been authorized in the past in markets
no larger than San Diego-Denver the Board nonetheless
concluded :

... [I]t appears that Western’s proposed service will
be entirely adequate to meet the service needs of the
markets at issue. Under all the circumstances, there-
fore, we find it more consistent with the geal of foster-
ing sound economic conditions in air transportation—
even at the cost of foregoing some undoubted beyond
benefits a second carrier could provided—to certificate
only Western at this time....

Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, p.4. See also, by way of exam-
ple, Application of Ozark Air Lines, Order 71-1-78, January
15, 1971, declining to set the local service carrier’s applica-
tion for hearing notwithstanding substantial first single-
plane benefits (including the avoidance of the congested
airport facilities at Chicago); and the Des Moines-Twin
Cities-St. Louis Subpart M Proceeding, Order 70-4-150,
April 29, 1970, establishing new and stricter criteria for the
lifting of certificate restrictions on local service carrier
[ J.A. 105] operating authority in competitive markets.‘ Most

*See also, Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (Phase 6B—
Load Factors), Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971, where the Board
adopted load factor standards as a new approach to discouraging
capacity inereases in excess of traffic needs; Piedmont Aviation
Deletion of Elizabeth City, Order 72-4-96, April 18, 1972, and
similar cases, where the Board enunciated principles concerning

|
|

4la

recently, in declining to adopt its tentative decision authoriz-
ing competitive service in the Mohawk Seqments 8 and 9
Renewal Proceeding, Order 73-9-100, September 27, 1973,
the Board stated:

The air transportation system is slowly emerging from
a period of lagging traffic growth and overcapacity and
the Board is now engaged in a long range program
looking toward a rationalization of the existing system
and an improvement in the economic health of the in-
dustry. The earnings prospects of the carriers, how-
ever, still remain uncertain. In such an atmosphere the
Board must be more than usually careful in appraising
all of the various costs and benefits that a route award
might have on air transportation system and on the
public, which, in the end, can only be served by the
maintenance of a healthy industry... .

This approach has been warranted in light of recent experi-
ence. As this experience has taught, an unduly optimistic
anticipation regarding traffic response on the part of car-
rier-applicants or the Board can have unfortunate economic
effects, even for financially healthy carriers. A failure of
traffic to materialize as forecast, after all, can result in
both serious inconvenience to passengers who come to an-
ticipate or rely on newly authorized services, as well as
increased costs to the carrier and, ultimately, the Federal
Treasury or the traveling public in general.°

the elimination of unnecessary services at smaller communities;
and the Flying Tiger Line Inc. Additional Points Case, Order
71-11-33, November 8, 1971, where the Board declined to award
\l-eargo authority at new points.

°In the Service to Omaha and Des Moines Case, Order 70-7-24,
July 6, 1970, to cite a single example, it was concluded that the
Omaha-Chicago market would generate almost 1,000 daily pas-
sengers in 1970, and that such traffic could support nonstop com-
petitive operations. The forecast utilized the historic (1964-1968)
growth rate and also applied the 20 percent figure ordinarily used

42a

[.J.A.] 106 To be sure, certain competitive awards have been
made during the transitional period. In such cases, however,
the records have ordinarily revealed some unique service or
operational consideration, such as substantial deficiencies
in historie or existing service, Southern Airways Route
Realignment Proceeding, Order 73-2-90, Feb. 23, 1973, or
markets located in a fashion which would permit the car-
rier to combine service to several points so as to provide an
economically sound operation, Twin Cities/Milwaukee
Southeast Points Investigation, Order 70-11-6, Nov. 3, 1970,
and Additional Service to Columbia and Augusta Case,
Order 71-7-118, July 21, 1971. Such circumstances are not
present here. Moreover, the Board’s earlier awards were
made at a time when the fuel emergency had not yet become
a major concern.

Specific comparisons have been made between the instant
ease and the Board’s decision in the Southern Tier Com-
petitive Nonstop Investigation (Houston-Miami Phase),
Docket 18257. While the two proceedings have certain sim-
ilarities which, in fact, led four members of the Board to
conclude that similar results would be justified,® the differ-

to measure the stimulative effect of first competitive service. In
fact, however, local O&D and connecting traffic reached only about
500 daily passengers by 1971 with the result that Frontier—the
carrier selected to provide the competitive service—was required
to suspend its Chicago-Omaha operations. See Order 71-1-100, Jan-
uary 28, 1972. While other factors may also have contributed to
the need for suspension, the failure to fully anticipate traffic de-
velopments was clearly an important element. In a related case,
the Board authorized Frontier to provide nonstop competitive
service in the Chicago-Lincoln market (Order 71-4-75) largely to
correct the lag in service benefits (including the lack of com-
muter schedules) which characterized the incumbent's operations.
Such nonstop. competitive service, however, was never instituted.

‘(Chairman Timm and Vice Chairman Gillilland would have
denied competitive authorizations in both cases, Member Minetti
and former Member Murphy would have made competitive awards

in both cases.

a

43a

ences between the two cases are also sufficiently material so
that an award of competitive authority in Houston-Miami
does not mandate an identical result here. To begin with,
the Houston-Miami market was about 20 percent larger in
1972 notwithstanding both markets received the same vol-
ume of nonstop service for much of the year.’ The Houston-
{J.A. 107] Miami market was also forecast to be larger with
new competition in 1973 (almost 420 daily passengers vs.
about 275 daily passengers), and Continental possesses a
more substantial backup system to support its operation.
Furthermore, Western’s existing services between San
Diego and Denver (as well as its historic responsiveness to
the needs of the market) were found to be sufficient although
competition was found required in the Houston-Miami mar-
ket to correct serious deficiencies in the services offered by
the incumbent carrier.* And, finally, the Houston-Miami
award involved the question of continuing service earlier
found to have been required by the public convenience and
necessity and not judicially challenged.’ As such it stands in
a somewhat different posture from the authorization of
wholly new competitive service.”

In the Board’s original decision in this proceeding, it was
concluded, on the basis of the record then before the Board,
that the prospects for successful competitive operations

" Houston-Miami received three daily round trips. San Diego-
Denver received two daily round trips until June, when a third
round trip was added.

* The smaller San Diego-Denver market will receive 50 percent
more nonstop service (3 round trips vs. 2) than the Houston-
Miami market would have received in the absence of competition.

* The court proceeding which resulted in the remand of the
Houston-Miami award concerned only the question of carrier se-
— See Orders 71-3-34, Mareh 5, 1971 and 71-11-17, Nov. 3,

a

*° Cf: Application of American Airlines and Frontier Airlines,
Order 73-6-106, June 27, 1973.

tta

were limited, at best, and that certification of a second
nonstop carrier under all the circumstances would be im-
prudent. While the more recent information now suggests
that the prospect for profitable competitive operations is
improved, we continue to believe that, on balance, a com-
petitive authorization is unnecessary and undesirable at
this time. This conclusion is fully consistent with current
Board precedent and policy.

[J.A.108] Decisional Considerations.

Continental argues that the Board (a) did not consider
the administrative law judge’s evaluation of the record and
(b) gave improper weight to certain decisional considera-
tions—e.g., the use of recent growth rates as opposed to
growth rates premised on longer, prior periods, and the
recognition of service improvements made during the course
of the proceeding. We disagree with these arguments. The
administrative law judge’s material findings were fully
evaluated in the course of the Board’s decision. The fact
that the Board’s opinion does not discuss each of his deter-
minations in terms, or find them persuasive, does not sug-
gest that they were not considered. Indeed, as we read the
petitions for reconsideration, their primary disagreement
is with the Board’s evaluation of the administrative law
judge’s findings and the evidence of record rather than
with any failure to consider such findings and evidence.”

Continental challenges our reliance on Western’s nonstop
operations as violative of a policy against according weight
to an incumbent’s schedule improvements made during the
course of a competitive service investigation. It is unneces-
sary to address ourselves in this case to the present dimen-

"There are frequent references in the petitions to the Board’s
‘“‘errors’’ as to traffic growth, participation, expenses, ete. Such
‘‘errors’’, in fact, largely represent disagreements which the peti-
tioners have with the inferences and determinations which the
Board has drawn from the evidence of record.

eee

45a

sions of such a policy. For, as was noted in the original opin-
ion, the circumstances of this proceeding are unusuul in that
a primary purpose of the remand was to consider the need for
[J.A. 109] an additional award in light of Western’s actual
experience with new nonstop operations. Moreover, as that
earlier opinion made clear, the consideration of Western’s
actual nonstop service (including the addition of the third
nonstop round trip) was a means of reviewing the continu-
ing needs of the market in light of the implementation of
Western’s original service proposal. See Order 72-12-29, at
5, 8. In our judgment, this it quite different from the usual
ease involving the defensive upgrading of schedules by an
incumbent already serving the market.

Further, the somewhat less optimistic forecasting ap-
proach (including a greater focus on existing or near fu-
ture forecasting assumptions) has been characteristic of
recent route determinations. This has been true even in
those situations where the Board has made a competitive
authorization. See, e.g., Additional Service to Columbia and
Augusta Case, supra. As noted above, we believe this gen-
eral approach has been warranted by recent experience—
notwithstanding the particular traffic increase which oc-
curred in the San Diego-Denver market in 1972."

Finally, we reiterate the majority’s earlier view that the
demands of beyond traffic do not justify the award of com-
petitive service in the local San Diego-Denver market.

Forecast for Competitive Operations.

Continental objects to the Board’s failure to set out a full
financial forecast for competitive operations since the case,
in the carrier’s view, turns on the issue of profitability.
Furthermore, Continental argues that the Board’s financial
projections were deficient. To begin with, the Board’s de-
cision does not ‘‘turn on profitability’’ as suggested by Con-

12 We note, by way of comparison, than the San Diego-Kansas
City market showed virtually no traffic growth in calendar 1972.

46a

tinental since profitability is not the sole, controlling criter-
ion for authorizing competition. Further, the Board is not
[J.A. 110] required in every case to make a dollar-for-dollar
analysis with regard to each component of an applicant’s
service proposal. While the Board recognizes its obligation
to evaluate the economics of proposed route awards on the
basis of the evidence cf record, and to bring its judgment to
bear on such evaluation, the Board has seldom found it nec-
essary to publish, in terms, a forecast for each carrier.”
Rather, the Board ordinarily reviews all the estimates of
record and adopts, as it finds appropriate, the forecast of the
administrative law judge, or the Bureau of Operating Rights
or one of the other litigants, spelling out in the text of the
opinion such changes, concerns, or disagreements as the
Board may find necessary. Forecasting, after all, is largely
a matter of attempting to predict an overall future result
(rather than determining whether any particular component
in a forecast is correct or incorrect) and cannot be an exact
science. Nonetheless, the Board explains its forecasting de-
cisions in sufficient detail to enable interested persons to
understand the results.

Such procedure was followed in this case. In fact, despite
Continental’s complaint about the Board’s forecasts, the
carrier was able to construct complete forecasts (for itself
and Western) based on the textual comments in the Board’s
opinion. As indicated in that opinion (p. 10), the Board
utilized the Bureau’s forecasts which were adopted as rea-
sonable by Judge Goldberg (I.D. 66, 80) but made adjust-
ments with regard to certain of his forecasting assump-

' Continental asserts that the Board's ‘‘usual practice’’ is to
set forth a profit and loss statement when a decision turns on the
question of profitability. However, one of the two cases cited as
an example of this ‘‘usual practice’’ (Order 70-8-1, Appendix A)
involved only Board adjustments to forecast traffic—but not the
related revenues, or expenses—and is thus virtually identical
(apart from form) to the approach taken in the Board’s original
opinion in the instant case.

~ ee et 8 ee ee ee

47a

[J.A. 111] tions with which it disagreed. Such adjustments
are plainly spelled out at pages 8-12 of the original opinion,
and were sufficient to demonstrate that the prospects for suc-
cessful competitive operations were limited, at best, and that
certification of a second nonstop carrier under all the cir-
cumstances would be imprudent. Under such circumstances,
it was not found necessary to further quantify all potential
adjustments."

Continental acknowledges that under the Board’s pro-
jections there would be losses for both Western and Conti-
nental if competitive service were authorized. However,
Continental challenges the Board’s original finding that a
competitive award would lead—at best—to economically
marginal operating results ; Continental claims, specifically,
that the Board improperly excluded various adjustments to
the forecasts adopted by the administrative law judge and
utilized by the Board which, if made, would result in an
increase in revenues and a reduction in expenses sufficient
to produce large operating profits for both Continental and
Western. The exclusion of these items at the time of the
Board’s original decision was based upon the evidence of
record and nothing in the petitions for reconsideration es-
tablishes that their exclusion at that time was unreasonable.
Nonetheless, in view of Continental’s assertion that these
matters were wholly disregarded by the Board (and the
earrier’s appendices in support of its assertion), it appears
desirable—although not necessary—that each be addressed
in terms. These matters are set forth as Appendix B to
this opinion.

[J.A.112] Finally, we recognize that more recent data not
available at the time of the Board’s original decision suggest
that a few of the requested adjustments might now be appro-
priate and that competitive service would be more profitable

%* See, for example, Order 72-12-29, note 12. This is the same
general approach adopted by Judge Goldberg—albeit with a dif-
ferent ultimate results (1.D. 70).

48a

than originally anticipated—although not as profitable as
Continental claims. However, nothing in the petitions, or in
the recent data, causes us to change our judgment that a com-
petitive award to Continental is unwarranted at this time.

The Current Fuel Shortage

As we have stated in our comparison opinion in the
Remanded Atlanta-Detroit /Cleveland/Cincinnati Investiga-
tion, Docket 20724, the nation in general, and the airlines in
particular, are now confronted with a crucial problem of
diminished fuel supplies. Thus, in the short term, at least,
decisions affecting the level of service in one market will,
more than ever before, directly affect service elsewhere in
the country. This consideration requires that the Board
appraise each individual route authorization with a view to
insuring the maintenance of essential existing services and
providing the public with the best nationwide air service
possible given the limited levels of service necessitated by
the fuel shortage. Concomitantly, it mandates a greater
emphasis on the need to foster ecom my of operation in the
airline industry.

[.J.A. 113] We have considered the petitions for reconsidera-
tion in this context and we believe that denial is more consist-
ent with the nation’s fuel conservation efforts. The San
Diego-Denver market already receives a level of nonstop
service which is reasonably related to traffic demand.” There-

** In this connection, we have reviewed the service needs of the
market in light of more current officially noticeable data and the
data submitted by Western since the issuance of the Board’s origi-
nal decision. While the most recent traffic figures show a sub-
stantial increase in San Diego-Denver traffic during 1972, Western's
load factor data indicate that reserved seat coach load factors have
averaged between the low 40s during the Fall season and the low
60s during the peak Summer season. These data confirm the Board’s
earlier judgment that the addition of a third nonstop round trip
in June 1972 would accommodate traffic increases and that there
would be ample nonstop capacity for existing traffic demand.
Western's load factors reflecting implementation of its third round
trip are set out as Appendix A.

a ee ee es

49a

fore, a grant of competitive authority to Continental would
mainly permit unneeded San Diego-Denver service. Such
service is also likely to be provided at the expense of serv-
ice in other markets—to the overall detriment of the public
interest. Similarly, we have considered the additional bene-
fit which Continental could offer in its beyond markets, par-
ticularly San Diego-Kansas City. Recent data show virtu-
ally no growth in traffic in the San Diego-Kansas City mar-
ket between 1971 and 1972 and we see no reason to alter the
Board’s original judgment that the benefit to beyond pas-
sengers does not outweigh the factors which otherwise mili-
tate against an award of competitive authority to Conti-
nental in the San Diego-Denver market.

Accorpincty, It Is Ornperep Tat:

1. The petitions for reconsideration of Order 72-12-29 be
and they hereby are denied;

[J.A.114] 2. The motions of Continental and Western for
leave to file pleadings in excess of the page limitations set
out in the Rules of Practice be and they hereby are granted;

3. The motion of Continental requesting the Board to
receive certain data, dated September 14, 1973, be and it
hereby is granted; and

4. The motions of Continental requesting the Board to
direct Western to supply load-factor and traffic data, dated
December 12, 1972 and February 27, 1973, be and they here-
by are dismissed as moot.

Timm, Chairman, and GriumLLanp, Vice Chairman, con-
curred in the above opinion and order. Minett1, Member,
filed the attached dissent. West and O’Me.ia, Members, did

not participate.

Epwin Z. Hotianp
Secretary
(SEAL)

[J.A. 115]

50a

APPENDIX A

WESTERN’S COACH LOAD FACTORS

Month

July ’73
June

May

April
March
February
January
December °72
November
October
September
August
July

June

Reserved Seat LF

62.4%
61.3
43.2
53.1
58.1
53.8
51.6
59.8
46.6
41.7
44.6
63.4
58.9
60.7

On Board LF

70.1%
69.1
51.4
62.0
65.6
62.5
57.8
65.9
55.1
50.6
54.6
74.8
67.5
71.3

ee ee en

5la
[J.A. 116] APPENDIX B
FORECAST FOR COMPETITIVE OPERATIONS

The Forecast for Western.

1. The major alterations requested by Continental in its
petition for reconsideration—t.e., revenue increases re-
lated to San Diego-Denver and San Diego-beyond traffic—
were fully evaluated but not adopted in the Board’s origi-
nal opinion. Such alterations constitute about half of the
$2.7 million in potential revenue which Continental claims
was improperly excluded from the Board’s estimate of
Western’s operating results. The basis of Continental’s
claim was a proffer of more recent on-line data submitted
by Western. However, the Board’s general practice is to
rely on changes in the more standardized O&D figures. In
this case, there was no substantial showing that Western’s
on-line data represented a more trustworthy indicator of
changes in local San Diego-Denver traffic patterns so as
to warrant reliance on the on-line data in lieu of the data
utilized in the Board’s projections.’ Consequently, in light
of the limited traffic growth during the 3-4 years prior to
the time of decision, the Board did not agree with the
petitioners that the increase in Western’s on-line traffic
constituted ample proof that the market’s pre-1968 growth
had resumed or that it was certain to be resumed at the
15-20 percent level.

‘For example, Western’s data revealed that the carrier's San
Diego-Denver on-line traffic increased about 17 percent between
1969 and 1970 (from 60,688 passengers to 70,947 passengers) al-
though the Board’s survey of O&D and interline connecting traffic
showed no increase during the same period. The 20 percent increase
in Western’s on-line traffic between 1970 and 1971 was also higher
than the 15.6 percent reflected in the Board’s surveys. The problem
is compounded with regard to the 1972 on-line figures since the
effects of the Northwest strike between June and October 1972
could not readily be quantified.

52a

Similarly the Board’s original 18.4 percent participa-
tion figure was a reasonably reliable guide to the percent-
age of Twin Cities-San Diego traffic which was likely to
flow over Denver. Continental argues in favor of a 40 per-
cent figure and Judge Goldberg employed a 30 percent
figure. However, as noted in the original opinion, the evi-
dence of record indicated that only 6 pereent of the Twin
Cities-San Diego traffic moved via Denver during a period
(such as the forecast period) when Western operated non-
stop San Diego-Twin Cities services, but that 40 percent
of this traffic moved via Denver when no nonstop service
was offered. Use of the 18.4 percent figure for forecasting
[.J.A.117] purposes took into account the fact that West-
ern’s load factors on the nonstop flights were low and that
the carrier could revert to its prior pattern of operating
nonstop flights only during select months of the year.

2. The Board properly rejected Continental’s claim that
Western’s ‘‘other operating revenue’’ should be 8.8 per-
cent of passenger revenue rather than the 5.1 percent em-
ployed in the Bureau's forecast (according to Continental,
such adjustment would add $231,000 in revenues for West-
ern). Continental appears to have relief on an Airwest
assertion that the 5.1 percent figure did not inelude mail
and charter revenues (see also I.D. 70-71). However,
Western pointed out in its original brief to the Board that
the 5.1 pereent figure did, in fact, include such revenues
for the Denver-San Diego nonstop segment, and that it
was merely coincidental that 5.1 percent also represented
Western’s systemwide figure for property revenue only.
On this basis, it was concluded that employment of the
5.1 percent figure was sound.

3. The Board properly concluded that there was no need
to increase the revenues attributable to ‘‘all other beyond
traffic’’ (Continental indicated that such an increase would
add $223,000 to Western’s gross revenues). See I.D. 71.
The argument in favor of an increase in such revenues

53a

apparently rested upon an Airwest exhibit (RW-SR-906)
which attempted to predici beyond traffic in the forecast
year. In so doing, however, the exhibit assumed, among
other things, a blanket 5 percent annual growth rate in
all beyond markets. The officially noticeable data available
at the time of the Board’s decision showed that the growth
rates in the two largest markets set out in the exhibits
(these markets constituted over 65 percent of the total
traffic forecast in the exhibit) were 1.0 percent, and—3.6
percent, respectively, between 1970 and 1971. Thus, there
was no evidentiary support for any increase in revenues
attributable to ‘‘all other beyond traffic.’’

4. Employment of the 18 percent dilution rate as set
forth in the Bureau’s estimate was reasonable. Continental
assumed that Western’s actual experienced dilution rate
of 18.4 percent in 1971 was based on a mix of first class
and coach traffic only, and argued from this that the rate
should be adjusted downward (Continental suggests 12
percent) so as to incorporate Continental’s experience
with ‘‘K’’ fares which Western indicated it would intro-
duce if Continental were also certificated in the market.
See also I.D. 70. (Continental anticipated that such change
would increase Western’s gross forecast revenues by
$667,000.) Contrary to Continental’s assumption, however,
the 18 percent estimate employed in the Bureau's forecast
and adopted by the administrative law judge was based
on a mix of first class, economy, and ‘‘K’”’ fare traffic (see
[J.A.118] WA-R-201). And, while that 18 percent figure
represented, in part, a judgment estimate that 8 percent of
Western’s traffic would travel at ‘‘K’’ fares, there was no
suggestion by Continental that such judgment estimate was
in error.’

*We appreciate that the Board’s decision in Phase 5 of the
DPFI to eliminate certain discount fares might have warranted
a downward adjustment in the dilution rate by some indeterminate
amount. However, there was no evidence in the record upon which
to quantify an appropriate adjustment.

o+a

5. Continental suggests that Western’s operating ex-
penses could have been reduced by about $300,000 if the
carrier substituted B-727-200 aircraft for the B-720B uti-
lized for two of its three daily nonstop around trip flights.
See also I.). 73-74. However, the equipment to be operated
over a particular route at a particular time depends upon
a number of factors, including the availability of other
aircraft and the equipment needs on other parts of a car-
rier’s system. As a general rule, each carrier is given
broad discretion with regard to the employment of its air-
craft. Western argued that it was employing its equip-
ment in the most efficient manner and Continental had not
proven that Western was unnecessarily inflating costs by
operating equipment clearly unsuitable to the particular
route. Thus, predicating Western's operating results on
the actual mix of B-720B and B-727 aircraft then in use
was reasonable and, at the time, more accurate.

6. Finally, adoption of the 3 percent annual escalation
figure by the administrative law judge and the Board was
reasonable. (See 1.D). 72-72.) Continental asserts that em-
ployment of an escalation figure of .5 percent for 1972-
1973 would be more appropriate and would reduce West-
ern’s expense forecast by almost $100,000." Western ar-
gued, on brief to the Board, that its actual expenses in-
creased by just over 7 percent between 197° and 1971.
This assertion strongly suggested that the 3 percent esea-
lation figure originally adopted by the administrative law
judge understated—rather than overstated—actual cost
increases.

[J.A.119] The Forecast for Continental.

All but about $53,000 of the $827,000 alleged by Conti-
nental to have been improperly excluded from its first year

‘Continental did not request any adjustment in the 3 percent
per year figure employed for the 1970-1972 period.

55a

forecast involves traffic in the San Diego-Denver/beyond
markets. The basis for rejecting Continental’s allegations
in this regard was fully explained in the Board’s original
opinivn. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, the validity of
the remaining adjustments which Continental claims are
necessary, this would not have altered the original con-
clusion that an award of competitive authority would pro-
duce—at best—margirally profitable results. However,
Continental’s petition for reconsideration also points to
an increase of $135,000 in gross revenues as a result of a
reduction in its dilution factor to 12 percent from the 16
percent set out in the Bureau’s forecast. The 16 percent
dilution factor was based on Continental’s experience.
(CO-401B) and was thus reasonable and supported by the
record. Adherence to the 16 percent dilution factor turns
Continental’s projected $53,000 profit into a forecast loss.

{[J.A.120] Mrinert1, Member, dissenting

My views on the merits of this case have not changed.’
Accordingly, I would grant the petitions for reconsidera-
tion filed by Continental Air Lines and the San Diego,
Denver, and Kansas City parties and would award Con-
tinental competitive nonstop authority between San Diego
and Denver. In my judgment, each successive considera-
tion of this case has made it clearer that competitive serv-
ice in this substantial market could and undoubtedly would
be conducted on a sound economic basis by both carriers;
that such service is required in the interests of the travel-
ing public; and that the San Diego-Kansas City market
with its significant long-term upward growth trend is en-
titled to the benefits of first single-plane service which

See my earlier dissents with former Member Murphy in Orders
70-4-46 (April 9, 1970); 71-3-135 (Mareh 23, 1971); 71-4-112
(April 16, 1971—order of remand, concurrence in the result) ;
and 72-12-29 (December 8, 1972).

56a

would result from an award to Continental.? At most, the
present fuel shortage would lead me to stay the effective-
ness of Continental’s award for a period.

In calendar 1971 Western carried 85,522 on-line O&D pas-
sengers hetween San Diego and Denver. In 1972 this traffic
(J.A. 121] increased 24 percent to 105,978 passengers. In the
first seven months of 1973 alone, Western’s on-line O&D
traffic increased to 70,501 passengers,’ presaging another
very substantial increase for 1973 as a whole. These traffic
figures do not include any San Diego-Denver passengers
who used carriers other than Western or used connecting
service; any passengers on board Western’s San Diego-
Denver flights who moved beyond San Diego or Denver to
or from other points on Western’s system; or any pros-
pective stimulation from the introduction of competitive
service in the San Diego-Denver market, first single-plane
service in the San Diego-Kansas City market, and first
single-carrier service in other markets on Continental’s
system.

These figures make it clear that Bureau Counsel and the
Administrative Law Judge were on sound ground, indeed

*I do not understand the majority's opinions, either originally
or on reconsideration, as holding that benefits to ‘‘bevyond-market’’
travelers (such as those in the San Diego-Kansas City market)
are not a material factor in determining the public convenience
and necessity for the service in issue, or that revenues to be re-
ceived from such travelers should not be taken into account in
assessing the profitability of proposed competitive operations. Any
such holding, of course, would depart drastically from many years
of Board precedents, and would have to be based on more explana-
tion than a eryptie phrase.

‘Figures brought to the Board's attention by Continental's
motion filed September 14, 1973, based on information furnished
by Western pursuant to the prehearing conference order in this
proceeding. These most recent figures do not form the basis of
my conclusions, but simply serve to confirm conclusions amply
supported by evidence already in the record and the findings of
the Administrative Law Judge.

57a

conservative, in forecasting a traffic flow of 127,000 pas- ,
sengers for 1973 under conditions of two-carrier compe-
tition. For fiscal 1975, which of course would now be the
earliest possible first year of competitive operations under
an award to Continental, a market of well over 150,000 an-
nual passengers would clearly be in prospect, and the po-
[J.A. 122]}tential for profitable operations by both carriers
could hardly be doubted.‘ I consider these more recent traffic
figures a far more reliable indicator of the San Diego-
Denver market’s potential than the depressed statistics
of the 1969-71 era on which my colleagues continue to rely.

I also cannot fail to note the persistence of quite high load
factors on Western’s San Diego-Denver flights,’ as well as

‘Traffic in fiseal 1975, in faet, should be approximately 50 per
cent Ingher than that originally forecast for the first vear of
competitive service by the Admiinstrative Law Judge in the origi-
nal proceeding (Order 70-4-46), on the basis of which he made
a well-substantiated forecast of profitable operations for both
carriers.

In view of the comments on pp. 12-13 and Appendix B, p. 3
of the maiority’s present opinion, T would note that in June of
1973 Western in fact substituted B-727-200's for B-720B's on
Flichts 603, 543, and 423 (OAG, June 1, 1973). Also, the ma-
jority’s treatment of the fare dilution issue makes no attempt to
quantify the substantially lessened dilution which will unquestion-
ably result from the termination of youth, family and Discover
America fares ordered by the Board in Phase 5 of the Domestic
Passenger-Fare Investigation, as well as from the Board's more
restrictive recent policy towards diseount fares generally, Overall,
it is hard to avoid the impression that the majority is not really
interested in whether competitive service would be profitable, and
has effectively eliminated this as a decisional factor.

‘For a recent six-month period (February through July of
1973) Western's nonstop San Diego-Denver coach load factors
averaged 63.5 percent, and were over 65 percent in three months
out of six, peaking at 70.1 percent in July. Western's eastbound
midday Flight 424 had an average coach load factor of just under
80 percent for the six months, dropping below 75 percent only
in May and peaking at 87 percent in March. Meanwhile, Western's
one-stop flights over Phoenix, referred to earlier by my colleagues

58a

[.J.A. 125] some troublesome gaps in its nonstop schedules.’
These factors, together with the amply documented find-
ings of the Administrative Law Judge, and my own views
previously expressed at the several stages of this long-
drawn-out proceeding, leave me with an abiding convie-
tion that competitive San Diego-Denver service by Con-
tinental is required by the public convenience and necessity.

Like my colleagues, I have taken into account the cur-
rent fuel shortage, but that cireumstance convinces me
neither that the present case was correctly decided at its
earlier stages,’ nor that it ought to be decided differently
under present conditions. While I have joined in the
Board's opinion in the Atlanta-Detroit /Cleveland /Cincin-
nati Investigation, the present case seems to me so clearly
distinguishable, on both procedural and factual grounds,

Quan

as providing convenient back-up service in the market, were
plagued with considerably higher load factors. On the critical
Phoenix-Denver leg, coach load factors averaged 78.4 percent for
the six months, dropping below 75 percent only in May and peak-
ing at 84.6 percent in March. (On the San Diezo- Phoenix leg load
fact rs for the six months averaged a very healthy 65 percent.)
Numerous individual flights showed monthly critical-segment load
factors in the 0's or high 80's, making it abundantly clear that
Passengers in many cases were not being accommodated on the
flight of their choice.

* According to the May 1, 1974, Official Airline Guide, as appears
to be typical of the last vear or two, no westbound nonstop flight
is scheduled to depart until 10:50 am. (arriving 11:50 a.m. PDT)
While no eastbound nonstop flight departs after 3:35 p.m, Thus a
Denver-orizinating passe ver cannot do more than a couple of
hours’ business in San Diego and return home on the same day
In June, for the tirst time, Western proposes to add both an

earlier (9:15a.m.) westbound nonstop and a later (8:00 p.m.)
eastbound nonstop. _

The decision which is here being reconsidered was adopted in
December 1972, many months before the present acute fuel short-
age came into being. The earlier decisions in this case which to
me seem erroneous go back to 1970 (see footnote 1, supra).

in

ee ee ee

ot i clay en Mt a A te A OA OAL LEELA AS

59a

that I do not believe the Atlanta result requires a similar
outcome here. The fact that Western will be able in June
of this year to schedule four and a half nonstop round
trips in the San Diego-Denver market makes it plain, I think,
that competitive service in this market is possible without
[J.A. 124] materially increasing overall jet fuel consumption
or reducing service in other, perhaps more essential mar-
kets. The clearly and repeatedly demonstrated need for
competitive service convinces me that an award to Con-
tinental should be made now. At most, the one concession
to the current fuel shortage which I might be prepared
to consider justified would be to stay the effectiveness of
an award to Continental for some reasonable period, say
six months, or until the recognized end of the fuel short-

age, whichever first occurs.
/s/ G. Josepn Mrvettt

60a

[J.A. 83] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Docket 18104

Appitional. Service to Sax Dirco Case
(San Diego-Denver)

Decided: December 8, 1972

All applications for competitive nonstop authority denied
and investigation terminated.

APPEARANCES:

Same as in the supplemental initial decision, and in ad-
dition the following:

George C. Pendleton, on behalf of the Wichita Parties.

Opinion
[J.A.84] By rue Boarp:

The remanded portion of this proceeding involves the
question of whether the public convenience and necessity
require the award of first competitive nonstop authority
between San Diego, California, and Denver, Colorado
and, if so, which carriers should be selected to provide
the service. In the original phase of this proceeding the
Board, by Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, authorized West-
ern Air Lines to provide nonstop service in the San
Diego-Denver market but declined to authorize competi-
tive service at the same time. By Order 71-4112, April

6la

16, 1971, however, the Board reopened and remanded the
proceeding to the administrative law judge specifically
for the purpose of reexamining the issue of the need for
competitive service on the basis of more recent traffic and
cost data, as well as Western’s actual experience with
nonstop service in the market.

Hearings in the reopened phase of the case were held
before Administrative Law Judge Hyman Goldberg and
his supplemental initial decision was issued on March
20, 1972. He found that nonstop competitive service is
warranted and that Continental Air Lines should be
selected to compete with Western. His decision to certi-
ficate a second nonstop carrier was based on three pri-
mary considerations: (1) the market in the forecast
years (1972 and 1973) should be large enough to justify
competitive nonstop service under normal circumstances;
(2) there are serious deficiencies and omissions in the service
operated by Western ir the market; and (3) both carriers
will achieve a substantial operating profit in the forecast
[J.A.85] years, while Western will not suffer harmful
diversion as a consequence of an award of competitive
nonstop authority. The Board granted discretionary re-
view. On brief to the Board, TWA, one of the applicants
for new authority, contends that the record demonstrates
no immediate need for competitive service. Similarly,
United Air Lines concludes that a reasonable forecast of
financial results would show that the costs which would
be incurred by competitive service would not be recovered
by available revenues. All other parties, except Western,
generally approve Judge Goldberg’s need for service
finding.’

’ Briefs to the Board were filed by Western Air Lines, Conti-
nental Air Lines, Hughes Airwest, Trans World Airlines, United
Air Lines, the San Diego Unified Port District, the City of San
Diego and the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, and the Bureau
of Operating Rights, while the City and County of Denver and

62a

Upon careful consideration of the initial decision, the
contentions of the parties, and all the facts of record, we
have concluded that the public convenience and necessity
would be better served at this time by not authorizing
competitive service in this market.’ Our decision reflects
the belief that during a period of lagging traffic growth
and retrenchment within the industry, and during the sub-
sequent period of recovery before an adequate upward
trend has been assured (both generally and in markets
which may be at issue), we must be more than usually
eareful to avoid impeding the industry’s opportunities for
full recovery. An unduly optimistic anticipation regarding
traffic response on the part of carrier-applicants or the
Board can have unfortunate economic effects, even for
[.J.A. 86] financially healthy carriers, to the detriment of the
national air transportation system.’ In each case, of course,
we also bear in mind that the need of the traveling public
for air transportation service is a paramount element of
the puble interest, and that competition ultimately holds
the greatest prospect for vigorous development of air
transportation. In this connection, we fully appreciate that
in other circumstances, and at other times, awards were
made in smaller markets, under more optimistic forecast-
ing assumptions, or with somewhat less consideration of
an incumbent carrier’s scheduling practices during the
pendency of a proceeding.‘ Moreover, we are aware that

the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado adopted
its brief to the administrative law judge as its brief to the Board.

* Except to the extent modified herein, we adopt as our own the
findings and conelusions of the administrative law judge. The
supplemental initial decision is attached as an appendix to this
opinion.

*See. «a, Application of Continental Air Lines, Order 72-5-72,
May 19, 1972.

‘As noted above, however, the circumstances of this reopened
case are highly unusual and an imnortant purpose of our remand
was to examine the need for competitive service in light of West-
ern’s actual experience with nonstop operatioxs.

63a

certain indicators now point to a trend away from the eco-
nomic picture of the recent past. In these circumstances,
we believe we should analyze the unique need of each mar-
ket for service within an atmosphere of caution and re-
straint to insure that a proper balance is struck between
the needs of the traveler or shipper and the effect which
a competitive award might have on the air transportation
system and on the public who in the end can only be served
by the maintenance of a healthy industry.

There is little question that the San Diego-Denver route
offers a potential for future certification of competition.
However, in the circumstances of this case—where West-
ern’s service has been, and appears likely to be, reason-
ably responsive to the needs of the market, and where the
traffic growth in the local San Diego-Denver market, and
the beyond markets which would support much local oper-
ations, show no strong sign of improvement—we believe
it imprudent, on balance, to certificate a second nonstop
carrier where competitive service is likely to produce, at
best, only marginal financial results.°

[J.A.87] Quality of Service

We believe that Western’s historic efforts to satisfy
the demands of the local market have been fairly satisfac-
tory. As Judge Goldberg notes in his supplemental initial
decision (pp. 14-16) the carrier has increased its frequen-
cies, introduced modern equipment, and generally up-
graded its service since it received single-plane authority
at the end of 1957 In reviewing Western’s recent nonstop
performance, however, the initial decision suggests that
local passengers have not received the quality and quantity
of service to which they are entitled, noting (1) high load
factors on certain flights, (2) insufficient frequencies and

*See also Phoenix-Seattle/Portland Nonstop Case, Order 70-8-
13, August 5, 1970, at 3-4; Cf: Service to Salt Lake City Investi-
gation, Order 70-8-1, August 3, 1970, at 7.

64a

undesirable schedule times, and (3) the operation of San
Diego-Denver service as part of a long-haul operation. We
do not share Judge Goldberg’s appraisal of the evidence.

A. Load Factors

Western began its nonstop service with morning and
evening departures in both directions (flight 474 departed
San Diego at 8:05 AM, flight 421 departed Denver at 8
AM, flight 426 left San Diego at 5:15 PM, and flight 425
left Denver at 6:30 PM). As the initial decision recognizes,
however, flights 421 and 426 operated at extremely low
load factors during the first seven months of service ended
December 30, 1970; as a result. oa January 5, 1971, West-
ern replaced them with two m.u-day departures (replace-
ment flight 603 departed San Diego at 3:50 PM and flight
[J.A. 88] 543 left Denver at 11:55 AM). These replacement
flights produced some improvements in load factors but, sig-
nificantly, average load factors (except for the predictable
summertime increase) continued to remain modest. See
I.D. Appendix 6, page 1. In our judgment, the emphasis
in the initial decision on pre-January 1971 schedules to
support the interrelated findings that high load factors on
certain flights indicate substantial passenger inconveni-
ence, while low load factors on other flights indicate poor
scheduling (I.D. 61-64), presents a somewhat unrepresen-
tative picture of Western’s overall nonstop load factor
and scheduling experience. Western’s reserved-seat load
factors for the overall record period June 1970-February
1972 (i.e., including the period followng schedule changes
in January 1971), show that average load factors were
only 43 percent nonwithstanding the schedule changes.°

®In this connection, footnote 35 of the initial decision is some-
what misleading as it suggests that the original flights 426 and
421 had attained overall load factors of 65.7 percent and 65.5
percent (and on-board coach load factors of 69.7 percent and 74.5
pereent) respectively ‘‘when this schedule was changed.’’ Load
factors on these fiights on the January 5 date of the schedule

65a

Similarly, the proper standard for load factor evaluation
is the reserved-seat load factor, not the on-board load fac-
tor, since the purported purpose of standby fares is to fill
otherwise empty seats. In short, we believe that the record
as a whole shows that there has been ample nonstop ca-
pacity for existing traffic demand. The addition of a third
nonstop round trip in June 1972 should accommodate
whatever traffic increases are likely to occur in the near
future.

[J.A.89] We would note, in this connection, that the Board
recently concluded that a reasonable long-range industry
load-factor standard should be at least 55 percent for rate-
making purposes.’ We are not suggesting that such in-
dustry- load-factor standards for rate-making purposes
should determine decisions with regard to competitive route
authorizations in particular markets, or that the same meas-
ure must necessarily govern rate and route questions. Use
of on-board load factors, for example, is more appropriate
for rate-making purposes although reserved-seat load fac-
tors more accurately reflect the true demand for seats in
the context of evaluating the need for service. Nonetheless,
we believe that the exposure to competition should be care-
fully measured where—as here—an incumbent carrier’s
load factors are substantially below the recommended in-
dustry standard.*®

change—reflecting the post New Year traffic surge during the first
few days of January—are not representative of load factors which
might be anticipated for January had a full month’s pattern of
service been operated.

"Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 6B (Load Fae-
tor), Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971.

* The Board has, on occasion, concluded that competitive service
was warranted notwithstanding modest load factors.

66a

B. Schedules

We are unable to endorse Judge Goldberg’s view that
Western’s nonstop schedules are ill-timed. In the first place,
we believe that his concern that only one flight in each
direction operates at ‘‘prime’* times (1.D. 60) does not
fully consider that the attrac iveness of San Diego-Denver
schedules cannot be measured in terms of what might con-
stitute ‘peak period’? departures in other markets. An
important portion of San Diego-Denver traffic, after all,
consists of non-business travelers. See Brief of San Diego
Parties, pp. 6-7. A significant partion of the traffic also
utilizes the flights for connecting service at Denver. His-
torically, upwards of 25 percent of the market makes inter-
line connections (1.D. Appendix 2.) and an additional per-
centage, of course, makes on-line connections. These factors
[.J.A. 90) are complicated by the fact that San Diego-Denver
flights operate across the time zone between the Rocky Moun-
tains and the Pacifie Coast. Thus, the mid-afternoon east-
bound departure and the mid-afternoon westbound depar-
ture are really more responsive to the needs of the traffic than
so-called ‘‘prime time’’ departures might be. A review (pp.
4-5, supra) of the load factors on Western’s initial evening
‘‘orime hour’’ flight to Denver and the morning ‘‘ prime
hour’’ flight to San Diego constitutes strong evidence of
this fact. Secondly, the indication that there is no eastbound
service ‘‘for a period of 16 hours’? (I.D. 59) is less com-
pelling when it is considered that much of that 4 PM-8 AM
period is during the night, and that any significantly later
departure would not—because of the time change—allow
for reasonable connecting opportunities at Denver. The
valid concern over a lack of westbound service between
11:20 AM and 5 PM (I.D. note 118) has been obviated by
the recent institution of a mid-afternoon westbound non-
stop flight. In short, contrary to the initial decision, we
find that the eurrent scheduling pattern is reasonably well
suited to the needs of the traffic.

67a

C. Long-Haul Service

Finally, we note no significant problems flowing from the
fact that Western operates its San Diego-Denver service
as part of a long-haul pattern. The primary faults with
long-haul service, after all, are usually that local schedule
needs are compromised, that seats are not available for
local traffic, and that there is a potential for disruption in
the operation of flights due to difficulties at distant points.’
Clearly the San Diego-Denver market represents an impor-
tant one for Western so that its schedules, as noted above, are
[J.A.91] geared largely to the needs of passengers travel-
ing over the San Diego-Denver segment. Moreover, non-
stop seats are available. And, lastly, the carrier’s perform-
ance factor and on-time record are good. Few nonstop
flights were canceled (I.D. 16) and Western’s on-time per-
formance is above the trunkline average. (Western's Brief
to the Board, Appendix B.)

Finally, the Board recognizes that Western did not, until
June, 1972, offer the last of the three daily round trips
which it proposed in the original phase of this proceeding.
However, in view of lagging traffic growth generally, and
the modest traffic response to the original two-daily-round-
trip pattern, we do not find that Western’s action warrants
serious criticism.

Traffic Growth and Profitability

We believe that the prospect for profitable two-carrier
operation is tenuous at this time. The administrative law
judge accepted as reasonable the Bureau’s forecast of
127,409 passengers in 1973 (348 per day) and characterized
this projection as sound and conservative.’® The Bureau’s

*See Dallas/Fort Worth-Phoenix Nonstop Service Case, Order
69-7137, July 24, 1969, note 3 and accompanying text.

*° Among the carrier parties, the market size was forecast for
1973 between a low of 101,893 (United) and a high of 132,701
( Airwest).

68a

forecast employed a traffic base premised on Western’s on-
line trafie (rather than O&D and connecting traffic), used
a 7.5-pereent annual growth rate, estimated stimulation at
15 percent on the basis of QST, and assumed that 30 per-
cent of the eurrent San Diego-Twin Cities traffic would
travel on Western’s San Diego-Denver flights and serve
to support Western's service. We believe this forecast is
too optimistic.

To begin with, we would not use the 7.5-percent annual
growth rate. According to the Board’s surveys, the growth
rate since 1968 has been declining, i.e., 7.5 percent for 1968-
(J.A.92] 1969, and 0 percent for 1969-1970, The 1970-1971 in-
crease of 11.6 percent can be attributed to the stimulation of
Western’s new nonstop service, with true growth, for all
practical purposes, again at about 0 percent. Thus, over
the last two years, there has bee: virtualy no true traffic
growth, and only 2.5-percent annual growth since 1968.
Consequently, the Board considers a 3-percent growth rate
for 1972 and 1973 far more realistic.

Moreover, a projection of 15-percent stimulation based
on QSI appears high in light of recent experience in the
market. The Board’s original estimate (based on a Bu-
reau QSI forecast) projected stimulation at 33 percent
for Western’s proposed three-daily-round-trip-nonstop pat-
tern but Western’s new service increased traffic only 15.6
percent. Even adjusting for the two-round-trip-a-day pat-
tern actually operated, the new service should have pro-
duced stimulation in the 20-25-percent range. The Board
is inclined therefore to discount the current prediction of
15-percent stimulation based on a similar QsI estimate
for Continental’s proposed nonstop competitive service.
This judgment is reinforced by the belief that such bleedoff
traffic as may have oeen appropriately included in the
Board’s original forecast (when only one-stop San Diego-
Denver service was available) has been largely recaptured
since Western inaugurated its nonstop service. A 10-percent
figure would appear more reliable.

69a

(J.A.93] Lastly, we would not employ Western’s Fiscal
1971 traffic figures as a base in constructing the local traffic
forecast. As the Board had occasion to note recently, it has
been our uniform practice to express the primary market
traffic in terms of true O&D and inter-line connecting passen-
gers because these passengers would be more o rless equally
accessible to all carriers operating in the market." Addi-
tional on-line traffic, to the extent it can accurately be
quantified, is more appropriately included as traffic support
for a particular carrier. Thus, we do not find that the use
of O&D and connecting data as a base either ‘‘understates”’
the market or is otherwise less reliable as suggested in the
initial decision (I.D. 56-57). In addition, we believe that
the two remaining reasons advanced by Judge Goldberg
for rejecting the traditional approach in this case—that
Western’s on-line data are more current and that O&D
data include a strike period—have been obviated by our
utilization of calendar 1971 data.

Assuming only the adjustments described above, but
otherwise using the Bureau’s forecast assumptions, there
may well be a reduction of 16,000 passengers for Western
in the local market and a commensurate reduction of anti-
cipated gross revenues (based on a 55:45 split in participa-
tion) of $850,000. Even a modest increase in traffic to re-
flect any additional on-line passengers which might not be
included in the forecast would not substantially alter this
yrospect. Moreover, there is also likely to be a reduction
of 13,000 passengers for Continental and a reduction in
gross revenues of over $750,000.

[J.A.94] A similar—and equally troublesome—picture
emerges in the major beyond markets. A review of the growth
pattern in Western’s primary beyond market, for example
(San Diego-Twin Cities), reveals that since 1969 the total
market has declined every year—from 12,730 O&D and con-

"Cf: Alaska Service Investigation, Order 72-1-94, January 26,
1972, p. 6.

70a

necting passengers in 1969 to 46,970 in 1971. Thus, even the
Bureau's projected 5-percent growth rate is highly doubtful.
Similarly, a review of the O&D surveys for the 1970-1971
period for the beyond markets which Continental proposes
to serve reveals that only Colorado Springs—with 3,690
passengers in 1971 (10 per day)—experienced growth over
calendar 1969 and 1970. Even that growth was a mere 3.7
percent. Moreover, the Bureau’s estimate that 30 percent
of the Twin Cities beyond traffic would travel over Denver
contemplated that no nonstop service would be operated
in the San Diego-Twin Cities market. As the Bureau points
out, Western carried about 40 percent of its Twin Cities
traffic via Denver during the period when no nonstop service
to the Twin Cities was offered, but carried only 6 percent
of such traffie via Denver during the period when it also
operated nonstop service between San Diego and the Twin
Cities. A witness testified that Western would institute and
maintain nonstop service on a more or less indefinite basis
beginning in the middle of 1972 (Tr. 488-489) and the car-
rier, in fact, has done so (see OAG Nov. 1, 1972). Although
we appreciate that Western can climinate that nonstop
service, nonetheless reliance on the Bureau’s 30-percent
figure seems too chancy at this time.

(J.A.95] Assuming only a 3-percent growth rate in the Twin
Cities market, and utilizing (for forecasting purposes) the
18.4-percent Twin Cities participation which the Board pro-
jected in its original order on remand, Western’s beyond
traffic could be reduced by 9,600 passengers and beyond
revenues could be more than half a million dollars below
that predicted by the Bureau, while the Bureau’s estimate
of Continental’s beyond traffic could be overstated by about
7,000 beyond passengers, and its beyond revenues could
be about $700,000 too high. These prospects seriously chal-
lenge the conclusion that two-carrier competition would
be successful.”

17 A number of assumptions made by the Bureau—e.g., stimula-
tion in markets which have service comparable to that which

A ae

ne

——

7la

Other Considerations

We have also examined beyond-segment benefits and the
potential for carrier strengthening or operational flexibility
insofar as these are relevant aspects of the public con-
venience and necessity." As we have noted throughout
this vpinion, boih the loeal aud major beyond markets have
been characterized by a paucity of growth and, with this
backdrop, the Board does not conclude that the potential
first single-plane service for Kansas City-San Diego pas-
sengers (the San Diego-Kansas City market generated 29
passengers per day in each direction in 1971) and addi-
tional single-carrier service outweigh the other considera-
tions detailed above. The Board believes that the demand of
a second market should not be the justification for award-
ing competitive service in the primary market at issue here.
Likewise, the local service carrier applicant cannot offer
any impressive beyond-segment benefits and, overall, we

do not believe that there is any probability of subsidy
reduction.

[J.A.96] Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, and all the
facts of record, we find that:

1. The public convenience and necessity require the denial
of all applications for competitive nonstop authority in the
San Diego-Denver market at this time; and

2. All applications, requests, and motions involved herein
should be denied and the investigation should be terminated.

An appropriate order will be entered.

Browne, Chairman, GrmuiLianp, Vice Chairman, and
Timm, Member, concurred in the above opinion. Minetti and
Murpuy, Members, filed the attached dissent.

Continental would provide—are also subject to question. We find

it unnecessary, however, to attempt to quantify our doubts in
these areas.

** See Chicago-Baltimore Nonstop Service Investigation, Order
71-9-64, September 16, 1971.

72a

{| J.A.97] Mixert1 ann Murpuy, Members, Dissenting:

We cannot agree with the decision of the majority of the
Board. We stated in our dissents to the Board’s previous
decisions (Orders 70-4-46 and 71-3-135) that competitive
nonstop service in the large San Diego-Denver market is
required by the publie convenience and necessity and that
Continental Air Lines should be selected to compete with
Western. The Administrative Law Judge, on the basis of
more recent evidence in the remanded proc-cding, reaches
the same conclusion—so does the Bureau of Operating
Rights. Our own review of the present record on remand
only serves to confirm the position we earlier expressed.
For the reasons stated by the Administrative Law Judge
and those expressed in our previous dissents, we continue to
he of the opinion that Continental should be authorized to
provide nonstop service in the San Diego-Denver market.

/s/ G. Josern MINETTI

/s/ Rosert T. Mvurrery

APPENDIX
[J.A. 98] DOCKET 18104

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S INITIAL DECISION REFERRED
TO HEREIN IS NOT ATTACHED TO THIS COPY BECAUSE OF THE
WIDE CIRCULATION GIVEN AT THE TIME OF ITS RELEASE. THE
INITIAL DECISION IS ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL OF THE BOARD'S
OPINION AND TO THE OFFICIAL COPIES AND TO THE OFFICIAL
COPIES IN THE BOARD’S FILES AND MAY BE EXAMINED THERE.
IT WILL ALSO BE PRINTED AS PART OF THE OFFICIAL ‘‘ CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS.”’

:
:

73a

Order 72-12-29

[J.A. 99} UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D.C.,
on the 8th day of December, 1972

AppitTionaL Service to San Dieco Case
(San Diego-Denver)

DOCKET 18104

Order

A full public hearing having been held in the above-
entitled proceeding, and the Board having issued its opinion
containing its findings, conclusions, and decision, which is
attached hereto and made a part hereof;

Ir Is Onperep THat:

1. All applications for competitive nonstop authority be
and they hereby are denied;

2. All petitions, motions and other requests involved here-
in be and they are hereby are denied, and this investigation
is terminated.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

Harry J. Zinx

Secretary
(SEAL)

74a

[J.A. 530] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Remanpep ApprTionaL Service to San Dreco Case
(San Dreco-Denver)

DOCKET 18104 et al.

Certificate of Continental Air Lines, Inc., for route 29,
amended so as to add a new segment extending between
the terminal point Denver, Colo., and the terminal point
San Diego, Calif.

Decision of the Board in Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970,
to the extent that it denied applications of Hughes Air
Corp. (Air West), Trans World Airlines, Inc., and United
Air Lines, Ine., for certificated nonstop authority between
Denver, Colo., and San Diego, Calif., affirmed.

Except to the extent granted, petitions for reconsidera-
tion of Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, which were deferred
in Order 70-6-43, June 5, 1970, denied. This proceeding ter-
minated.

Appearances;

Richard A. Fitzacrald and John W. Simpson for Hughes
Air Corp. (Air West).

Lee M. Huyudeman and James T. Lioyd for Continental
Air Lines, Ine.

Joseph B. Goldman for Frontier Airlines, Inc. (Rule 14
participant).

Edmund E. Harvey for Trans World Airlines, Ine.
William M. Dickson for United Air Lines, Ine. f

Ernest T. Kaufmann and Gilbert L. Amyot for Western
Air Lines, Ine.

75a

Tedford Dees for the city and County of Denver, Colo.,
and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colo-
rado.

Nordahl E. Holte for the City of Kansas City, Missouri,
and the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City.

Joseph D. Patello for the San Diego Unified Port Dis-
trict, the City of San Diego, California, and the San Diego
Chamber of Commerce.

J. Michael Roach for the Buerau of Operating Rights,
Civil Aeronautics Board.

(J.A. 531] Supplemental Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg.

Preliminary Statement

The basic question in this reopened and remanded pro-
ceeding is whether competitive nonstop service should be
certificated between San Diego, Calif.. and Denver, Colo.,
and if so, whether Hughes Air Corp. (Air West), Conti-
nental Air Lines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Ine., or
United Air Lines, Inc., should be selected for the award.

In his initial decision in the original proceeding, the
examiner concluded, among other things, that two carriers
should be certificated for San Diego-Denver nonstop serv-
ice, that Western Air Lines, Inc., and Continental should
be selected for the nonstop authorizations, and that the
applications of Air West, TWA, and United should be
denied. By Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, the Board, inter
alia, sustained the award to Western; however, finding that
the need for a competitive nonstop authorization at the
time had not been demonstrated, the Board denied the
applications of Air West, Continental, TWA, and United."

* Members Minetti and Murphy in their coneurring and dissent-
ing opinion agreed with the examiner that a comp ¢itive authori-
zation was required, that Continental should be granted such
authorization, and that the applications of Air West, TWA, and
United should be denied.

76a

Thereafter, by Order 70-6-43, June 5, 1970, the Board
deferred action on petitions for reconsideration filed by
Air West, Continental, the Denver and Colorado Parties,
and the San Diego Parties, to the extent that these peti-
tions sought authorization of a second unrestricted nonstop
carrier between San Diego and Denver, and allowed West-
ern’s amended certificate for route 35 containing the San
Diego-Denver nonstop award to become effective. By Order
(.J.A. 532] 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, the Board denied the de-
ferred petitions and affirmed its original decision not to au-
thorize competitive San Diego-Denver nonstop service at
that time.? However, by Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, acting
upon its own initiative, the Board vacated Order 71-3-135
and reopened and remanded the proceeding to the exam-
iner for a further hearing on the issue of whether the
public corvenience and necessity require competitive non-
stop scivice between San Diego and Denver and, if so,
which carrier or carriers should be selected for such au-
thority.’ The Board further directed the examiner to issue
a supplemental initial decision on the San Diego-Denver
issue.*

Order 71-4-112 was followed by filings by Western *® and

?Members Minetti and Murphy, again dissenting, adhered to
their earlier view that Continental should be certificated for com-
petitive San Diego-Denver nonstop service.

* Members Minetti and Murphy concurred in the result.

‘In addition, the Board ordered that all parties to the original
proceeding shall be parties to the reopened and remanded proceed-
ing. However, by Order 71-6-33, issued by the examiner under
delegated authority on June 7, 1971, participation as parties was
limited to Air West, Continental, TWA, United, Western, the
Denver and Colorado Parties, the City of Kansas City, Mo., the
San Diego Parties, the City and Chamber of Commerce of Witchita,
Kansas, the Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Operating
Rights.

’ Western filed a ‘‘Motion for Modification of the Issues’’ and
a ‘‘Contingent Motion to Consolidate.’’ In the first motion Western

|

:
;
:
;
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:
:
:
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-

77a

TWA.* By Order 71-7-34, July 7, 1971, the Board denied
the motions of the two carriers. However, the Board stat-
ed that the parties remained free to introduce evidence
and to argue for or against the imposition upon any award
of restrictions deemed necessary to avoid competitive im-
pact or prejudice to excluded applications.

[J.A.533] After due notice, a prehearing conference and a
public hearing were held. Statements of position and briefs
were submitted by Air West, Continental, TWA, United,
Western, the Denver and Colorado Parties, the Kansas City
Parties, the San Diego Parties, and the Bureau; a brief
was filed by the Wichita Area Chamber of Commerce; and
a statement of position was provided prior to the close
of the hearing by Frontier Airlines, Inc., appearing under
Rule 14 of the Board’s Rules of Practice.’ The positions
set forth in these documents are sutumarized in Appendix
1 attached hereto. This proceeding now stands submitted
to the examiner.

Based upon a consideration of the record and the argu-
ments of the parties, the examiner concludes, as he con-
cluded in the original phase of this case, that the publie
convenience and necessity require the authorization of a
second nonstop carrier between San Diego and Denver

requested the Board to modify the issues in the remanded pro-
ceeding so as to impose a pretrial restriction prohibiting San
Diego-Denver nonstop flights under any new award from also
serving Kansas City or Chicago. In the second motion Western
requested the Board, in the event of denial of the first motion, to
consolidate its concurrently-filed application for nonstop Denver-
Kansas City and Denver-Chicago segments, subject to a San Diego
long-haul restriction (Docket 23441).

°*TWA filed a ‘‘Contingent Motion to Consolidate’’ requesting
the Board, in the event of denial of Western's motion for modi-
fication of the issues, supra, to consolidate TWA’s concurrently.
filed application for a nonstop San Diego-Kansas City segment
(Docket 23484).

"A brief was also filed by Frontier, but such filing is not au-
thorized by Rule 14.

78a

on an unrestricted basis and that Continental should be
selected over Air West, TWA, and United for the addi-
tional nonstop authorization. The examiner further con-
cludes that the amended certificate granted to Continental
for unrestricted San Diego-Denver nonstop service should
carry the usual effective date fixed in route cases rather
than the January 1, 1973 effective date proposed by the
Bureau.

(.J.A.534] The San Diego and Denver Communities

Both San Diego and Denver are large and growing com-
munities. As of 1970, San Diego had a metropolitan area
population of 1,357,854, representing an inerease of 31.4
percent over its 1960 population total as against an in-
crease of 13.3 percent in the nation’s population during
the same decade. San Diego had the 5th fastest growth
rate in the 1960-1970 decade among 24 United States met-
ropolitan areas having a population of over one million
in 1960, and the most rapid growth rate of any of these
metropolitan areas lying in the western third of the United
States. Denver in 1970 had a metropolitan area population
of 1,252,100, and was the largest community in the ecight-
State Rocky Mountain Census Region consisting of Ari-
zona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah, and Wyoming. The 1970 population total is an in-
crease of more than 30 percent over Denver’s 1960 popu-
lation.

San Diego and Denver are major tourist attractions.
San Diego has the appeal of ideal weather conditions
throughout the year and the proximity of the ocean and
mountains which have produced a steady and rapid growth
in tourist expenditures over the past 20 years. In 1970,
such expenditures in San Diego amounted to $381,827,000,
and approximately 11 percent of the San Diego tourists
came from the mountain states of which Denver is the
major hub. Denver itself is one of the major ski centers of

79a

the nation; with its mountains, winter sports, and scenic
attractions, it is an attraction for visitors from San Diego.

In conjunction with tourist attractions, San Diego has de-
veloped ino a major site for conventions. A total of 551
conventions were held in San Diego in 1970, with 343,825
delegates attending these conventions. The 1972 Republi-
ean National Convention is scheduled to be held in San
Diego.

[J.A.535] Tourism and convention activity have generated
a thriving hotel/motel industry, In 1970 iiere were 25,570
hotel/motel rooms in the San Diego area. Some 30 hotels
comprising 8,737 rooms alone have a combined capacity to
accommodate 20,386 persons for meetings and 15,670 for
banquets; over 5,000 of these rooms were added between
1967 and 1970.

San Diego* and Denver are large air stations. In 1969,
San Diego generated a total of 3,117,002 local O&D pas-
sengers, including 1,825,730 passengers shown by the
Board’s O&D surveys and 1,291,272 PSA passengers; this
passenger generation total made San Diego the 19th rank-
ing city in the United States in terms of production of
O&D traffic. Further, among 22 large hubs in the United
States, San Diego had the second most rapid growth rate
between 1968 and 1969,° with an increase of 12.45 percent;
this compares with an increase of 5.28 pereent for the 22
hubs as a group and an increase of 5.1 percent for the
United States. It further appears that PSA enplanements

*San Diego is currently served by the six Federally certificated
air carriers (Air West, American, Delta, National, United, and
Western) and two air carriers certificated by the State of Cali-
fornia for intrastate service (Pacific Southwest and Air California).
A substantial number of additional air carriers and foreign air
carriers maintain sales offices in San Diego.

*From 1,433,570 enplaned passengers (including 578.848 PSA
passengers) in 1968 to 1,612,095 enplaned passengers (including
645,636 PSA passengers) in 1969.

80a

at San Diego exceed those of any other carrier serving
San Diego, with PSA generating 40.0 percent of the total
San Diego enplanements in 1969.'° Apparently, also, all
of the seven San Diego carriers (including PSA) expe-
rienced increases in San Diego enplanements between 1968
and 1969, ranging from National's high of 65.9 percent to
United's low of 6.5 percent. Other data which include sched-
uled intrastate operations at San Diego show that there were
(.J.A. 536] 3,341,291 San Diego passengers in 1970, which
was an increase of 0.6 percent over 1969; that between
1965 and 1970 the compound annual growth rate was 15.4
percent; and that in the first siv months of 1971, San Diego
generated 1,611,948 passengers compared to 1,567,927 in
the first six months of 1970, which was an increase of
2.8 percent."' Additional data indicate that scheduled do-
mestic and international enplanements at San Diego
rose from 856,000 in 1968 to 998,000 in 1970, or a two-ytar
gain of 16.6 percent and an annual gain of 8.0 percent;
similar enplanements of 11 trunks and nine local service
mainland airlines increased from 147,997,000 in 1968 to
154,466,000 in 1970, or a two-vear increase of 4.4 percent
and an annual growth of 2.2 percent.

On the other hand, based upon the Board’s traffie sur-
veys, San Diego's total O&D and connecting passengers de-
clined 0.8 percent from 2,284,250 passengers in fiseal year
1969 to 2,266,320 in fiseal year 1970, and declined 6.5 per-
cent from the first six months of 1969 (1,103,870 passen-

United 347,105 enplanements (21.5 percent), American 266,-
796 (16.6 percent), Western 229,245 (14.2 percent), Delta 47.792
(3.0 percent), National 41,225 (2.6 pervent), and Air West 34,296
(2.1 percent).

" Exeluding passengers enplaned by the California intrastate
carriers, the record shows that passengers enplaned by the trunk
carriers at San Diego inereased 0.2 percent from 933,000 in 1969
to 935,000 in 1970, and that there was a decrease of 4.4 percent
between the first six months of 1970 (436,000 passengers) and the
same period of 1971 (417,000 passengers).

8la

gers) to the first six months of 1970 (1,032,410 passen-
gers), as compared to a domestic industry gain of 2.3 per-
cent between fiscal 1969 and fiseal 1970 and a loss of 1.8
pereent between the first six-month periods of 1969 and
1970. Also, based upon CAB Form 41 data, San Diego’s
domestie scheduled passenger enplanements increased 13.4
percent between 1968 (853,018 passengers) and 1969 (967,-
109 passengers), but declined 0.2 pereent between 1969 and
1970 (965,015 passengers), 2.9 percent between the year
ended March 31, 1970 and the year ended Mareh 31, 1971,
and 1.6 percent between the year ended June 30, 1970 and
the year ended June 30, 1971.

[J.A.537] Finally, as to San Diego’s traffie-generating ca-
pacity, there is evidence indicating that the Board’s O&D
traffic surveys underestimate actual San Diego traffic. Ap-
parently, some San Diego passengers travel by intrastate air
carriers to Los Angeles for flights and others proceed by
surface transportation to Los Angeles, and are reflected
in the Board’s surveys as Lés Angeles passengers rather
than San Diego passengers. However, the record does not
quantify the volume of such ‘‘lost’’ traffic.

As for Denver, that community ranks first among air
stations in the 8-State Rocky Mountain region in all the
usual indicators of station size, including O&D passengers
and passenger-miles, enplaned domestic passengers, and
aircraft departures. In 1969, Denver generated 3,850,450
O&D passengers, which gave it a ranking of 15th among
U.S. cities in local O&D passenger production. Among 22
large hubs in the United States, Denver had the fastest
growth rate between 1968 and 1969—14.01 percent mea-
sured in terms of enplaned passengers." In fiscal year
1970, Denver generated a total of 3,860,420 O&D passen-
gers, representing 1.74 percent of the U.S. total, and its
percentage of the U.S. O&D passenger total has risen stead-

"? From 2,936,123 enplaned passengers in 1968 to 3,347,514 in
1969.

82a

ily sinee 1950. Denver's domestic enplaned passengers in
fiscal vear 1970 totalled 3,517,428, or 9.6 percent greater
than in fiscal year 1969 (3,208,136); its domestic enplaned
passengers in the first six months of 1971 (1,801,819) was
5.9 pereent greater than in the comparable period of 1970
(1,700,810). Other data show that Denver’s scheduled pas-
senger enplanements increased from 2,936,000 in 1968 to
3,610,000 in 1970, which is a two-year growth of 23.0 per-
cent or 10.9 percent annually.

[.J.A. 538] Additionally, the Board’s traffic surveys indicate
that Denver's total O&D and connecting passengers grew
from 5,717,840 in fiscal year 1969 to 5,956,650 in fiseal year
1970, or 4.2 percent; and that there was a decline of 1.3 per-
cent in such traffie from the first six months of 1969 (2,804,-
480) to the same period of 1970 (2,766,650). CAB Form 41
data show that Denver's passengers enplaned by trunk car-
riers in scheduled service grew from 2,765,000 in 1969 to 2,-
860,000 in 1970, or 3.4 percent; and that there was a growth
of 4.9 percent in such traffic from the first six months of
1970 (2,328,000) to the comparable period of 1971 (1,393,-
000).

Furthermore, upon the basis of 1969 CAB survey data,
Denver is the sixth largest interline transfer point of
domestic passengers in the United States, producing 1,661,-
050 interline connecting passengers; Denver in this re-
spect is exceeded only by Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, Los
Angeles, and Washington, D.C., and exceeds New York,
St. Louis, San Francisco, and Pittsburgh, among other
major hubs.’ Denver also has the 4th highest ratio of
domestic interline connecting passengers to true O&D pas-
sengers, namely, 43 percent (in 1969), with only Atlanta,
Dallas, and Chicago having larger ratios." Thus, airline

‘Denver ranked 7th each year from 1959 through 1968, and
advanced to 6th place, ahead of New York, in 1969.

'* Denver's ranking in terms of this ratio has been 4th continu-
ously each year beginning in 1964.

ese. Bee orem

ee

83a

services at Denver draw connecting traffic support from
Denver connections in larger numbers than all but five sta-
tions in the country and in larger proportions than all but
three stations in the country.

[J.A. 539] The San Dieqo-Denver Market:
Traffic and Service Data

1. General. The San Diego-Denver market, nonstop, is
840 miles long, and onestop via Phoenix, 894 miles. West-
ern is the only carrier certificated to serve the market
nonstop, having inaugurated such service on June 8, 1970
pursuant to its award in the initial phase of this ease.
Western is also certificated to serve the market onestop
via Phoenix, and does so under an award in the Service
to Phoenix Case in 1957."* United is the only other carrier
authorized to operate single-plane service in the market,
which it can do via a mandatory stop at Los Angeles by
tacking of two certificated authorizations.

Based upon fiseal year 1970 local O&D passenger data,
the San Diego-Denver market is San Diego’s ninth largest
market and its largest market without nonstop competi-
tion; it is Denver’s 21st ranking market and the largest
Denver market without competitive nonstop authority. The
evidence further shows that the San Diego-Denver market
is Western’s largest monopoly market, and that it is larg-
er in passenger volume than the San Diego-Washington,
D.C./Baltimore market which was certificated for compet-
itive nonstop service in the original phase of this ease."

[J.A.540] 2. C.A.B. Passenger Survey Data. In fiscal year
1970, as shown by the Board's traffic surveys, the San Diego-

*° 25 C.A.B. 647.

** According to fiscal year 1970 data. the San Diego-Denver mar-
ket generated 70,430 O&D and connecting passengers compared to
70,040 such passengers moving in the San Diego-Washington, D.C./
Baltimore market.

84a

Denver market generated a total of 70,430 passengers (193
passengers per day), consisting of 50,840 local O&D and
19,590 connecting passengers. This total represents a slight
increase over the total of 69,520 passengers (48,560 local
O&D, 20,960 connecting) or 190 passengers per day gen-
erated in calendar year 1969." It further appears that in
fiseal 1970, as in calendar 1969, Western carried approxi-
mately 80 percent of the total market and United approxi-
mately 1214 percent.’* Western’s share of online passen-
gers moving in the market was even larger, 86.1 percent
in fiscal 1970 and 86.3 percent in calendar 1969." In the
second quarter of calendar 1970, when the market gener-
ated 16,970 online passengers, Western’s share mounted
to 91.0 percent (15,450 passengers).

(.J.A.541] A breakdown of San Diego-Denver local O&D
passengers by quarter, March 1968 through June 1970, is set
forth in Appendix 2 attached hereto.” This breakdown
shows that the market generated 38,180 local O&D passen-
vers in the nine months ended June 30, 1969, representing
an inerease of 5,090 passengers or 15.4 percent.” Since

‘7 See Appendix 2. page 1, attached hereto for a breakdown. year
by vear. of local O&D and connecting traffic, calendar 1966-fiscal
1070. It shonld be noted that there was a Western strike in the
third quarter of 1969 (from July 29 to August 15), thus affect-
ing the market traffie totals in calendar 1969 and fiseal 1970.

‘See Appendix 2, page 2, attached hereto. Western’s share of
the total market declined somewhat in these years from its historic
share in the 1964-1968 period, apparently because of a strike in
the third quarter of 1969. In the second quarter of 1970, Western
carried 87.0 percent of the total market and United 8.2 percent
‘total market 17,750 passengers, Western 15,450 pasengers, and
United 1,450 passengers).

See Appendix 2. psge 3, attached hereto. United's share of
the total online traffic wes 13.6 percent in fiscal 1970 and calendar
1969,

7° At page 4.

*\ The comparison is made on a nine months’ basis rather than
a fiscal year basis in order to exclude the third quarter of 1969
when Western was on strike.

85a

Western did not commence nonstop operations between
San Diego and Denver until June 8, 1970, these data for
all practical purposes do not reflect any significant stimu-
lative effect due to Western’s nonstop service.

As indicated by the Board’s traffic surveys, the San
Diego-Denver market generates a large number of inter-
line connecting passengers, and the ratio of such passen.-
gers to local O&D passengers over the years has been
substantial.” In fiscal year 1970 the ratio was 38.5 percent;
for calendar 1969, chere was a ratio of 43.2 percent.

3. Western’s Passenger Data. Attached as Appendix 3™
is a table showing, on a monthly basis, the mumber and
class of San Diego-Denver online O&D passengers Western
has carried since January 1969. According to this table,
Western carried 60,688 such passengers in 1969 (its opera-
tions were suspended July 29-August 15 due to a strike),
74,114 in 1970, and 70,150 in the first 10 months of 1971
(on an annualized basis, 84,180). First-class and coach
traffic represented 5.6 percent and 94.4 percent, respective-
ly, in 1970, and 4.4 percent and 95.6 percent, respectively,
in the first 10 months of 1971.

(J.A.542] It further appears from the table that there was
an increase of 22.1 percent in Western’s online passengers
from 1969 ‘a strike year) to 1970; from 1970 to 1971 (10
months, annualized), the increase was 13.6 percent. On a fiseal
year basis, there was an increase of 34.5 percent, from 60,939
passengers in fiscal 1970 (a strike year) to 81,969 passen-
gers in fiscal 1971. Looking at the latest 12-month periods
for which duta are available, there was a smaller increase,
namely, 18.0 percent, from 71,296 passengers in the 12-
months ended October 31, 1970 to 84,096 passengers in the
12-months ended October 31, 1971. Comparing periods in
1970 and 1971 in which Western operated nonstop service

7? See Appendix 2, page 5, attached hereto.

7 At page 1.

86a

throughout, there was still a smaller increase—7.5 percent,
from 29,321 passengers in the 4-month period July-October
1970, to 30,447 passengers in the July-October period of
1971.

Focusing on the period since Western’s 1969 strike and
comparing online passenger totals by month in 1969, 1970,
and 1971," there was an increase in every instance between
September 1969 and October 1971. However, the size of
the monthly inerease dropped to a level below 10 percent
beginning with July 1971 and continuing through October
1971 as compared with the comparable months of 1970.”

(.J.A. 543] Comparing Western’s online passenger data with
the single-carrier data shown for Western in the Board’s
traffic surveys, it appears that the Board’s reported passen-
ger data are understated.” Thus, the latter passenger total
apparently was understated by 9.5 pereent in calendar
1969, by 8.5 percent in fiseal 1970, and by 10.3 percent in
the six quarters ended June 30, 1970.

Continental made an analysis of Western's reported on-
line O&D passengers and reserved seat load factor data for
the earrier’s San Diego-Denver nonstop flights, for the pe-
riod June 1970-May 1971, on a monthly basis. Continen-
tal's analysis shows that in June 1970 when Western in-
augurated nonstop service, 43 percent of the carrier’s San
Diego-Denver passengers used nonstop or connecting serv-
ices; and that beginning with July 1970 through May 1971,

** See Appendix 3, page 2, attached hereto.

~The San Diego Parties point out that Western's online O&D
passengers inereased 24.5 percent from the 10-month period Sep-
tember 1969-June 1970 to the comparable period September 1970-

June 1971: and that the inerease from the 8-month period Sep-

tember 1969-April 1970 to the comparable period September 1970-
April 1971 was 26.8 percent as against a decline of 2.1 percent in
total U.S. domestic enplanements.

** See Appendix 3, page 3, attached hereto.

87a

the percentage of Western’s online passengers employing
onestop or connecting services ranged from a low of 7 per-
cent in February 1971 to a high of 36 percent in September
1970.

Air West also made an analysis of Western’s reported
online O&D passengers and reserved seat load factors for
its nonstop flights, covering the months of August and
November 1970 and February and May 1971. From this
analysis, Air West concludes that the number of Western’s
San Diego-Denver passengers not on board the nonstop
flights ranged from a low of 6.9 percent in February 1971
to a high of 30.3 percent in August 1970, with an average
of 22.4 percent for the four months covered.

[J.A.544] 4. San Diego-Denver Service Data. Western is
the exclusive carrier operating single-plane and nonstop
service in the San Diego-Denver Market.” The carrier’s
single-plane service authority dates back to 1957 when it was
authorized to provide such service via a mandatory inter-
mediate stop at Phoenix. Western’s nonstop service au-
thority stems from an award in the initial phase of this
proceeding which became effective on June 8, 1970.

Western inaugurated San Diego-Denver single-plane
service in December 1957, on two daily round trips employ-
ing DC-6B equipment. Since then, the carrier has contin-

** While United holds authority, by tacking, to provide single-
plane service in the market with a stop at Los Angeles, the carrier
has not operated such service for a few years. The carrier, aceord-
ing to the Official Airine Guide, Quick Reference Edition, for
November 1971, offered daily one-carrier connecting services, three
eastbound and four westbound ; however, the December 1971 Quick
Reference Edition indicates that United discontinued these one-
carrier connecting services. As of December 1, 1971, other than
Western’s schedules, only two-carrier connecting services on a one-
stop basis (almost exclusively via Los Angeles) were available.
See Appendix 4 attached hereto.

* Service to Phoenix Case, 25 C.A.B. 647 (1957).

88a

ously upgraded its service by offering an increasing num-
ber of schedules, introducing more modern equipment, and
eliminating the Phoenix stop on several frequencies. Thus,
the record shows that in June 1968,Western provided four
daily flights each way with B-720B fan jet aircraft. Be-
tween January 1, 1969 and June 7, 1970, the carrier sched-
uled four daily frequencies eastbound and five westbound,
using B-720B and B-737-200 equipment.”

[J.A.545] On June 8, 1970, immediately upon the effective
date of its certificate for nonstop operations, Western inaug-
urated nonstop service between San Diego and Denver. The
carrier at the outset offered two daily nonstop frequencies In
each direction, with B-720B and B-737-200 equipment from
San Diego to Denver and with B-720B and B-727-200 air-
craft in the opposite direction. In addition, there were
three daily onestop schedules eastbound (two with B-737-
900 aircraft and one with a B-727-200) and four onestop
flights the other way (three with B-737-200’s and one with
a B-727-200). The B-737-200’s were operated all-coach, and
the other aircraft in a dual first-class/coach configuration.
The evidence shows that Western operated this pattern of
schedules (including equipment) a year later, in June 1971,
and in July 1971; and further shows that a pattern of five
easthound frequencies and six westbound schedules was in
effect as of December 1, 1971, with the nonstops in both
directions employing B-720B aircraft in dual configura-
tion.*°

2? At the beginning of this period, B-720B aircraft were em-
ployed on two easthound flights and three westbound schedules,
and B-737-200 aircraft were utilized for two eastbound frequencies
and two westbound services. At the close of the period, Western
was conducting an all B-737-200 operation eastbound on its four
daily flights; westbound, the carrier was employing B-720B equip-
ment on two flights and B-737-200 aircraft on the other three
schedules.

© See Appendix 5 attached hereto for a summary of Western's
December 1, 1971 schedules.

89a

As of December 1, 1971, the San Diego departure times
of Western’s eastbound schedules were spread between
8:10 A.M. and 3:50 P.M.; westbound, the departure time
spread at Denver was from 9:20 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. West-
ern’s one-way fares were first-class $79.63 and coach $62.04.
The seating capacity of Western’s aircraft in San Diego-
Denv-r service was as follows: B-737-200 (95 seats), B-727-
200 (122 seats), and B-720B (120 seats).™

(J.A.546] Western furnished performance factor data for
its San Diego-Denver scheduled services, nonstop and one-
stop, by flight, by direction, and by month, for the period Jan-
uary 1969 through October 1971: These data show that in the
period July 1970-October 1971 when nonstop service was
operated, the eastbound nonstop flights 474 and 426/603
had performance factors of 100 percent in 11 months and
10 months, respectively, out of the 16 months involved;
and that the westbound nonstop fl&chts 425 and 421/543 had
100 percent performance factors in 11 and 9 months, re-
spectively. Further, according to Western’s evidence, its
experienced dilution factors for the San Diego-Denver non-
stop segment in March 1971 were: first-class 12.4 percent,
coach 18.9 percent, and overall 18.4 percent.

In 1970 (including the pre-inaugural period), Western’s
advertising and sales promotion expenditures for the San
Diego-Denver nonstop route amounted to $100,000. The ear-
rier estimates that in 1971 these expenditures will increase
to $127,000. Western also observes that it has prepared
extensive, imaginative and effective advertising for use on
local radio, television, and in many newspapers; that it is

** Western's evidence indicates that in July 1971 the carrier
offered a total of 1,176 seats daily on its 11 nonstop and onestop
schedules in the San Diego-Denver market (eastbound, 527 seats,
and westbound, 649 seats). It further appears that as of Septem-
ber 1971, Western had 70 aircraft in its fleet, including 25 B-
720B’s, 6 B-727-200's and 30 B-737-200’s; and that the carrier
had 3 B-727-200's on order and 3 on option.

90a

continuously promoting the market through its various
sales and publie relations efforts; that it is featuring San
Diego as a stopover point for those passengers traveling
from Denver and the Rocky Mountain area to Hawaii; and
that it is offering a new low tour basing fare from Denver
io Southern California via San Diego.

Western supplied information respecting its extra-section
activity over the San Diego-Denver segment. The carrier
states that it operated one extra section and one charter
over the segment during the first year of nonstop opera-
tions: that it was booking two extra sections to be oper-
ated during the 1971 Thanksgiving holiday; that two extra
sections and three charters were scheduled for the Decem-
ber 12-15, 1971 weekend to accommodate a professional
football game between the Denver and San Diego teams;
and that additional extra sections were scheduled over the
Christmas and New Year’s holidays.

[.J.A.547] 5. Western’s San Diego-Denver Load Factors.
Western submitted load factor data respecting its nonstop
and one-stop San Diego-Denver services, both on a total on-
board basis (that is, including standby traffic) and on a re-
served seat basis (that is, excluding standby traffic).** It ap-
pears from these data that Western’s on-board load factor
for its nonstop services” averaged 45.2 percent for the period
June-December 1970 and 47.6 percent for the 12 months
ended June 30, 1971, and that in the period June 1970-June
1971 the on-board load factor ranged between a low of 36.5
percent in October 1970 and a high of 55.3 percent in June
1971. During July and August 1971 the onboard load factor
mounted to 60.9 percent and 66.9 percent, respectively, but
declined to 52.7 percent and 45.8 percent in September and
October 1971, respectively.

‘See Appendix 6 attached hereto for details of the load factor
data.

* See Appendix 6, page 1 attached hereto.

9la

Western’s on-board coach load factors for its nonstop
services were higher than the carrier’s overall load fac-
tors.* Thus, in the June-December 1970 period the coach
load factor averaged 48.9 percent, with a low of 39.2 per-
cent in October and a high of 58.8 percent in August; in
the January-October 1971 period the coach load factor
ranged between a low of 45.9 percent in May and a high
of 69.6 percent in August.**

[J.A.548] An analysis of the nonstop services on a flight-
by-flight basis discloses substantial variations in monthly on-
board coach load factors as between nonstop flights in the
17-month period June 1970-October 1971. The variations
are reflected in the following table: *

** See Appendix 6, page 1 attached hereto. In contrast, the on-
board first-class load factors on the nonstop flights were signifi-
cantly lower than the overall load fa-tors. In the June-December
1970 period the average first-class load factor was 17.3 percent,
with a low of 14.5 percent in October and a high of 23.1 percent
in December; in the January-October 1971 period, the low first-
class load factor was 23.0 percent in June and the high was 35.6
percent in March and August.

** Throughout the June 1970-October 1971 period Western oper-
ated a pattern of nonstop flights bearing the same flight numbers,
except that on January 6, 1971 the earrier discontinued flights
426 and 421 and inaugurated flights 603 and 543. When this sehed-
ule change was made, flights 426 and 421 had attained on-board
coach load factors of 69.7 pereent and 74.5 pereent, respectively,
- ala load factors of 65.7 percent and 65.5 percent, respee-
tively.

** For details, see Appendix 6, page 2 attached hereto.

92a
cas Eastbound Flights Westbound Flights
~~ Flight Flights Flight Flights
$74 426/603 425 21/543
; : 58.8% 79.5% 55.8%
High monthly coach 88.9% 58.8% 9.5% ;
load factor (Aug. 1971) (Aug. 1971) (Aug. 1971) (Aug. 197")
5 : 55.4% 16.4%
Low monthly coach 51.2% 27.1% 5
load factor (Nov. 1970) (Jan. 1971) (Oct. 1970) (Oct. 1970)
No. of months: .
Under 20% — - a= ;
20-29% _ 2 _— -
30-39% — 5 —_ :
40-49% _ 8 - :
50-59% 4 2 5 *
60-69% 4 — 7 >
70-79% 6 _ 5 i
Over 80% 3 om a

Turning to the on-board load factors on Western’s one-
stop services in the San Diego-Denver market,” it appears
that in calendar 1970, the San Diego-Phoenix segment had
an average overall on-board load factor of 53.6 percent,
with a range between a high of 64.2 percent in August and
a low of 45.2 percent in April; and that the on-board coach
load factor averaged 55.6 percent, with a range between
a high of 66.9 percent in August and a ww of 47.8 percent
in April. The monthly on-board coach load factor was be-
(J.A. 549] tween 40 and 49 percent twice, in the 50-59% range
7 times, and over 60 percent in 3 months. On the Phoenix-
Denver sector of the onestop services, the average overall
load factor in calendar 1970 was 68.9 percent, with a range
between a high of 80.3 percent in August and a low of 58.9
percent in April; the on-board coach load factor averaged
70.7 percent, the high being 82.99 percent in August and
the low being 60.3 percent in April. The monthly on-board
coach load factor on the Phoenix-Denver sector in 1970 was
between 60 and 69 percent 6 times, in the 70-79 percent
range in 5 months, and over 80 percent once.

3* See Appendix 6, page 3 attached hereto.

Oh a ae tt te Cy 2 VE the Ns hs A Se we

ee ee ee ee

|

93a

There were significant variations in the monthly on-
board coach load factors on the onestop services as between
flights. In the January-October 1971 period for which West-
ern supplied load factor data, the carrier operated three
daily eastbound flights.** Flight 700 had monthly coach load
factors ranging between 87.2 percent (August) and 70.7
percent (January) on the San Diego-Phoenix segment, with
the monthly factor being in the 70-79 percent range in 7
months and over 80 percent 3 times; on the Phoenix-Denver
sector, flight 700’s monthly coach load factor ranged be-
tween 96.6 percent (April) and 70.5 percent (September),
with the monthly factor being in the 70-79 percent range
in 4 montls, between 80 and 89 percent, 4 times, and over
90 percent twice. Eastbound flight 476 had a range in its
monthly coach load factor on the San Diego-Phoenix seg-
ment between 77.8 percent (September) and 49.5 percent
(October), with the monthly factor being under 50 percent
once, between 50 and 59 percent 4 times, in the 60-69 per-
cent range in 4 months, and over 70 percent once; on the
Phoenix-Denver sector, flight 476 achieved a high monthly
coach load factor of 91.5 percent (March) and a low of 68.7
[ J.A. 550] percent (May), with the coach factor being under
70 percent once, in the 70-79 percent range twice, between 80
and 89 percent 6 times, and over 90 percent in one month.
The remaining eastbound flight—flight 216—had monthly
on-board coach load factors on the San Diego-Phoenix seg-
ment ranging between 63.3 percent (April) and 45.2 per-
cent (September), with the load factor being in the 40’s
twice, in the 50’s five times, and over 60 percent in one
month; on the Phoenix-Denver sector, flight 216 had a
range in its monthly on-board coach load factor between
79.9 percent (April) and 63.4 percent (September), with
the load factor being in the 60’s 4 times and in the 70’s
6 times.

*8 See Appendix 6, page 4 attached hereto.

94a

Western operated four daily westbound flights in the
January-October 1971 period.*® Flight 215 had a monthly
on-hoard eanech load factor on the Denver-Phoenix sector
ranging between 95.7 percent (February) and 69.9 percent
(September), with the factor being under 70 percent once,
in the 70-79 pereent range twice, between 80 and 89 per-
cent in 4 months, and over 90 percent in three months; on
the Phoenix-San Diego sector, the monthly on-board coach
load factor ranged between 76.2 percent (January) and
54.4 percent (October), with the factor being under 60 per-
cent twice, in the 60-69 percent range in 2 months, and over
70 percent in 6 months. The monthly on-board coach load
factor on flight 417 over the Denver-Phoenix segment
ranged between 84.3 pereent (February) and 71.5 percent
(May), and was in the 70’s 6 times and the 80’s in 4
months; over the Phoenix-San Diego sector, flight 417’s
eoach load factor had a range of 89.2 (Mareh)—75.2 (Oc-
tober), and the coach load factor was in the 70’s twice and
the 80’s in six months. Flight 479’s monthly on-board coach
load factor Denver-Phoenix ranged between 82.6 percent
[.J.A.551] (August) and 60.7 percent (May), with the load
factor being in the 60’s once, in the 70-79 percent range 95
times, and the 80’s in 4 months; on the Phoenix-San Diego
sector, fight 479 had a monthly on-board coach load factor
ranging between 81.3 percent (August) and 57.0 percent
(March), and the coach load factor was in the 50’s once, be-
tween 60 and 69 percent 4 times, in the 70-79 percent range in
4 months, and over 80 percent once. Flight 701 over the
Denver-Phoenix sector, had a high monthly on-board coach
load factor of 90.7 percent (February) and a low of 59.7
percent (September, October), with the coach load factor
being in the 50’s twice, the 60’s 4 times, the 70’s once, the
80's twice, and the 90’s once; on the Phoenix-San Diego
sector, flight 701 had a monthly coach load factor with a
high of 53.0 percent in January and a low of 35.5 percent

** See Appendix 6, page 5 attached hereto.

a ln ats a at ne ER ee

95a

in September, with the coach load factor being in the 30’s
in two months, in the 40’s 7 times, and in the 50’s once.

6. Western’s San Diego-Denver Capacity Data. Western
furnished data respecting the capacity flown and unused on
its nonstop services.*® Such data show that in fiscal 1971
Western offered a total of 162,213 nonstop seats, or an
average of 444 seats per day. The empty seats flown on the
nonstop service in fiscal 1971 averaged 233 per day (266
per day excluding standby passengers). The average num-
ber of empty seats flown, excluding the peak months of Au-
gust, December, April, and June, was 247 seats per day
(278 per day without standby traffic).

[J.A.552] Western further notes that effective September
8, 1971, it increased its San Diego-Denver nonstop capacity
by 25 seats daily, or 99,125 seats annually, by substituting
one 120-seat B-720B aircraft for a 95-seat B-737-200 aircraft
(employed on flight 474). On the other hand, as observed
by Continental, subsequent schedules indicate that Western
plans to change the equipment on flight 474 back to a B-737-
200 on December 15, 1971 and thus will eliminate the pre-
viously adde? nonstop seat capacity.

In addition, Western points out that its two daily non-
stop round trips are supplemented by its daily onestop
flights via Phoenix, three eastbound and four westbound.
The carrier asserts that through a combination of the non-
stop and onestop flights there is an abundance of capacity
in the market.

Western’s San Diego-Denver Service Plans

Western states that while the use of equipment may vary
from time to time due to routing and equipment mainte-
nance requirements, it intends to continue serving the non-
stop market with B-720B and B-727-200 aircraft. According
to the carrier, these aircraft are better suited for the stage

*° See Appendix 7 attached hereto.

96a

length involved than Western’s B-737-200 aircraft which
it asserts are designed to serve shorter-haul markets. Fur-
ther, Western observes that the B-737-200 aircraft lacks the
capacity of the B-720B and the B-727-200. However, testi-
mony of Western’s witness as to the equipment to be oper-
ated in 1972 expressly indicates that the equipment plans
has not been firmed up.

Western additionally states that it plans to introduce a
third daily nonstop round trip in the San Diego-Denver
market some time before the summer of 1972, adding that the
nonstop services will continue to be supplemented by numer-
(.J.A. 553] ous onestop frequencies via Phoenix. The carrier
comments that the introduction of the third nonstop round
trip (two daily flights at 120 seats per flight) will add a
total of 87,600 seats annually in the market, so that, for a
time, demand should be exceeded by a comfortable margin.
However, Western’s witnesses were unable to give any indi-
eation as to the routing of the future schedules and stated
that none of the carrier’s 1972 schedules had been finalized.

With respect to extra-section activity, Western expects
an inerease in business of this nature as the market con-
tinues to develop. The carrier states that it plans to oper-
ate extra section flights to San Diego in August 1972 in
connection with the Republican National Convention, and
anticipates that other peak periods such as Easter and
heavy summer weekend traffic will require additional extra
sections.

Proposals of the Carrier-Applicants

Four carriers—Air West, Continental, TWA, and
United—-submitted proposals to serve the San Diego-
Denver nonstop market in competition with Western. A
summary of the proposed service of each carrier, together
with its forecasts of traffic and financial results, follows.

97a

1. Atr West, which has a station at San Diego, proposes
to establish a new station at Denver,” and to operate two
nonstop round trips between San Diego and Denver. One
round trip, which would be operated daily, would consist of a
midday departure originating at San Diego and proceeding
[J.A. 554] to Denver, and an early evening departure f rom
Denver to San Diego which would continue on to Santa
Ana,** 76 miles from San Diego. The second round trip
would be operated six days a week, daily except Saturday
eastbound and except Sunday westbound; this round trip
would consist of a schedule originating at Santa Ana, de-
parting San Diego in the evening for Denver, and leaving
Denver in the morning for San Diego.“ The San Diego-
Santa Ana portions of the two round trips would operate
over Air West’s existing system, and the San Diego-Denver
portions would be new flight mileage. The proposed serv-
ices would be provided with DC-9-30 aircraft, 98 seats, in
standard class configuration, with 3-and-2 abreast seating."
The carrier proposes to offer an ‘‘S’’ class fare equal to
the San Diego-Denver coach fare of $62.04 and to ecommon-
rate the San Diego-Denver and Santa Ana-Denver markets.
According to the carrier, it will operate the same pattern
of service in 1973 as in 1972.

1 Air West does not expect that it will acquire any new ground
equipment at Denver because it will probably contract with an-
other carrier to conduct Air West’s ground servicing operations
at Denver. 7

*? The aircraft flown on these schedules would turn around at
Denver.

e Apparently, the aircraft employed on these schedules would
overnight at Denver.

** Air West states that the additional aircraft hours required
by the proposed San Diego-Denver flights involve less than one
aircraft, and anticipates that no additional aircraft will be re-
quired. However. if such is not the case, the carrier states that
z will acquire the necessary aircraft through either purchase or
ease.

98a

Air West forecasts that the San Diego-Denver market
will amount to 120,637 passengers in 1972 and 132,701 in
1973. The base of Air West’s forecast is Western’s re-
ported online O&D passengers in fiscal year 1971—81,969
passengers. Estimating the ratio of Western’s online O&D
passengers to total online O&D passengers at 95 percent
and again estimating the ratio of total online O&D passen-
gers to true O&D and connecting passengers at 95 percent,
Air West constructs a fiscal year 1971 total of 90,824 true
[J.A.555] O&D and connecting passengers. Applying a 10
percent per year growth factor * and a 15 percent stimula-
tion factor for first competitive nonstop service,“* Air West
predicts a total 1972 market of 120,637 passengers after its
entry and a total 1973 market of 132,701 passengers.

Air West further estimates that it will carry 46,415 San
Diego-Denver passengers in 1972 and 51,057 in 1973. These
estimates are derived as follows: First, the carrier fore-
casts that of the total market after Air West’s entry, 95
percent will be single-carrier passengers on the services of
Air West and Western (114,605 in 1972 and 126,066 in
1973), and that 90 percent of the single-carrier passengers
will be nonstop passengers (103,145 in 1972 and 113,459
in 1973).*7 Then, Air West estimates its participation in

** Air West claims that this growth rate is conservative, taking
into account the historic growth of San Diego-Denver traffie in
the 1964-1969 period, the strong growth of San Diego and Denver
traffic during a period when the industry as a whole has remained
relatively static, and the strong growth trend in Western's San
Diego-Denver traffic even when full allowance is made for stimu-
lation due to inauguration of nonstop service. Air West asserts
that if the New Economie Program is successful, the actual growth
rate should be substantially greater than 10 percent.

‘© This is based upon the Bureau's Q.S.I. traffic forecasting tech-
nique and Air West's addition to the market of two nonstop
round trips operated with jet aircraft.

* Air West states that this makes allowance for the fact that
United will continue to carry some online traffic between San

99a

the nonstop traffic at 45 percent “ to obtain its estimates
of 46,415 passengers in 1972 and 51,057 in 1973.

{J.A.556] In addition, Air West expects to carry 8,448
Santa Ana-Denver passengers in 1972 and 8,870 such pas-
sengers in 1973. Total Air West passengers under its service
proposal would therefore amount to 54,863 in 1972, and
59,927 in 1973. The carrier predicts a passenger load factor
of 42.1 percent in 1972 and 46.0 percent in 1973.

Air West’s net passenger revenues (after dilution at 15
percent) are es imated at $2,892,926 in 1972 and $3,159,951
in 1973. Including non-passenger revenues at 5.5 percent
of passenger revenues (based upon Air West’s experience
for the year ended March 31, 197 modified to exclude char-
ter revenues), the carrier expects to realize total revenues
of $3,052,037 in 1973 and $3,333,748 in 1

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1322%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
