# Petition — Nonnewaug Regional School District No. 14 v. Scott

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 424 U.S. 965

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No 75-528 |

NonNEWAUG ReaionaL Scuoou District No, 14,

Town or BETHLEHEM,
Petitioners,
VS,

Josern M. Scort,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

Tuomas N, SULLIVAN
Attorney for Nonnewaug School
District No. 14
632 Prospect Avenue
Hartford, Conn. 06105

Donatp J. DenEEN
Attorney for Town of Bethlehem
20 Maple Avenue
Windsor, Conn. 06095

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IV. CownstirvTionaL Provisions Statutes AND Reov-
ERE RE EEN ORE, Oe i ee Rae ee ee Oe

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The One-Ferson-One-Vote Principle Of Constitu-
tional Law Is Not Applicable To The Election Of
Members Of The Board Of Education Of A
Regional School District Created Pursuant To
Provisions Of The Connecticut General Statutes ..

APPENDIX

A. United States Court of Appeals for the See-
Ond Circuit—Opinion ...........ccc.ccecscsccserssrecsseereoees

B. United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut—Opinion ..................ccceceeeeeeeeeees

Table of Cases

Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec, 410 U.S. 748

RRR NR pe: SEC RAPE ENE tos er
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) ............
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ..............cccsccesseeeesies
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) ...0.....0.....ccccccsseseees

Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan
Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) .. 7

Keegan v. Town of ke 103 Conn. 418, 130 A
SE” EIT: heredeensnithindisenaaeheneneealadabiaemiaaniainianabatininininemainies

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S, 533 (1964) saiieeniiniiiiia

Sailors v. Board of Education of the County of Kent,
es Se CITED sisiichertsteiecsiastumseeninieiaictanitisiennntinestinien
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S.
Re PTUUED sncseesciesiciniienttentitansiasneiaiaintbiitnistenalictanatiatitiapiaicipsertas

Second School District of Glastonbury, 8 86 Conn. 590
86 A 577 (1913)

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Statutes

(Connecticut General Statutes Sections)

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References:

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Supreme Court Rules, Rule 19 20.......0.....cccccccceeeeeeee
Title 28, U.S. Code, Sections 1254(1) & 1343(3) ....

Title 42, U.S. Code, Section

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No.
eee

NonnewavuG Reoionat Scuoon District No. 14,
Town or BETHLEHEM,
4 Petitioners,
vs.

Josern M, Scort,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

To the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States:

The Petitioners Nonnewaug Regional School District
No. 14, and Town of Bethlehem, Connecticut, pray that a
Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rendered on July 23, 1975 affirming the judgment of the
Honorable Jon O. Newman, U. S. District Court for
Connecticut.

I.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, entered on July 23, 1975 is at this time
unreported. It is set forth in Appendix A, pp. la et seq.

2

The opinion of the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut, entered on November 22, 1974,
is also unreported and is set forth in Appendix B. pp. lb
et seq.

Il.
JURISDICTION

This suit was originally commenced in the United District
Court with jurisdiction sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. see-
tions 1343 (3) and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C,
sections 1983, The District Court granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on November 22, 1974 and
entered judgment for plaintiff on January 8, 1975 (Appen-
dix B). Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the judgment on July 23, 1975
(Appendix A). The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
invoked, under Rule 19 of the Supreme Court Rules and
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254 (1) on the ground
that review by the Supreme Court by a Writ of Certiorari
is sought of a judgment of the affirmance on appeal by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Il.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does the one-person-one-vote rule apply to the election
of members of the board of education of a regional school
district created pursuant to the provisions of the Connecti-
cut General Statutes?

IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Constitutional Provisions: Fourteenth Amendment.

Statutes: Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1254(1)
and Sections 1343(3); Title 42, United States Code, Section
1983; Connecticut General Statutes, Sections 10-46, 10-47,

3
10-51, 10-56, 10-60, 10-220, 10-221, 10-240, 10-241, 10-241a,
10-242, 10-262.
- Rules: Rule 19, Supreme Court Rules.

V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was brought in the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut, by the Plaintiff, a
citizen, elector and taxpayer ef the Town of Woodbury,
Connecticut to obtain a permanent injunction requiring the
reorganization of Nonnewaug Regional School District No.
14. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. Sections 1343(3)
and injunctive relief sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections
1983. Plaintiff complained that the allocation of member-
ship on the regional district’s board of education deprived
the electors of the Town of Woodbury of equal protection
of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.

Nonnewaug Regional School District No. 14 was estab-
lished by the Towns of Woodbury and Bethlehem, Con-
necticut on May 20, 1968, by a vote of the majority of the
electors in each of the towns. It was organized pursuant
to and now operates under the provisions of the Connecti-
cut General Statutes pertaining to regional school districts.
Under Section 10-47 of the Connecticut General Statutes,
such a regional board is not possessed of general govern-
mental powers, but is. vested with very specific and
restricted powers. General governmental powers with
regard to the publie school system are vested in the towns
themselves.

The Regional Board of Education serving the Nonne-
waug Regional School District consists of eight members,
four elected from each of the two towns. According to the
1970 United States Census of Population, the respective

4

populations are 5,869 for Woodbury and 1,923 for Bethle-
hem; the respective electorates are 3,653 for Woodbury
and 1,298 for Bethlehem. .

The basis for determining the size and composition of
a regional school board is determined by statutory proced-
ure which requires approval by referendum held in each
participating town. (Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-46.)

VI.
ARGUMENT

The One-Person-One-Vote Principal of Constitutional
Law is not Applicable to the Election of Members of
the Board of Education of a Regional School District
Created Pursuant to Provisions of the Connecticut
General Statutes.

A.

The constitutional principle of one-person-one-vote, first
enunciated in Baker vy. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and
extended in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), was held
applicable in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968)
to “units of local government having general governmental
powers over the entire geographic area served by the
body.” Id., at 485. The Court in Avery, however, recog-
nized that the Midland County Commissioner’s Court “is
representative of most of the general governing bodies of
American cities, counties, towns, and villages”, id. at 483
and warned against a too liberal application of the rule:

This Court is aware of the immense pressures facing
units of local government, and of the greatly varying
problems with which they must deal. The Constitu-
tion does not require that a uniform straitjacket bind
citizens in devising mechanisms of local government
suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local
problems. Id at 485.

5

In Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967)
and Hadley v. Junior College District (1970), this Court
considered the applicability of the one-person-one-vote rule
to the method of selecting members of two school boards.
In Sailors, the governing board of education was found to
be appointive, not elective, and to be performing essentially
adminstrative functions. Consequently, the one-person-
one-vote principle was held inapplicable. Commenting on
Sailors and its companion case, Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S.
112 (1967), this Court later observed in Avery, supra, that:

The Sailors and Dusch cases demonstrate that the
Constitution and this Court are not roadblocks in
the path of innovation, experiment, and development
among units of local government. We will not bar
what Professor Wood has called “the emergence of
a new idealogy and structure of public bodies,
equipped with new capacities and motivations . . .”
R. Wood 1400 Governments, at 175 (1961). Id. at
485.

In Hadley, this Court reviewed a statutory scheme for
the election of a board of trustees for a regional junior
college district which diluted the votes of the electors in the
more populous districts comprising the junior college dis-
trict. After a discussion of the powers exercised by the
board of trustees, the Court found application of the one-
person-one-vote principal to election of its members con.
stitutionally required:

Appellants in this case argue that the junior college
trustees exercised general governmental powers over
the entire district and that under Avery the State
was thus required to apportion the trustees according
to population on an equal basis, as far as practicable.
Appellants argue that since the trustees can levy and
collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions,
hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees,
supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions

6

to annex school districts, acquire property by con-
demnation, and in general manage the operations of
the junior college their powers are equivalent, for
apportionment purposes, to those exercised by the
County Commissioners in Avery. We feel that these
powers, while not fully as broad as those of the Mid-
land County Commissioners, certainly show that the
trustees perform important governmental functions
within the district, and we think these powers are
general enough to have sufficient impact throughout
the district to justify the conclusion that the princi-
ple which we applied in Avery should also be applied
here. Id. at 53.

Nevertheless, the Hadley Court, quoting from Sailors,
supra, echoed the cautionary note found in Avery, supra:

As we said before, “(v)iable local governments may
need many innovations, numerous combinations of
old and new devices, great flexibility in muncipal
arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We
see nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimen-
tation. Id. at 59.

This reference to Sailors by the Hadley Court is of pecu-
liar interest in light of its enunciation of the general rule
that:

(W)hen a state or local government decides to select
persons by popular election to perform governmental
functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter
must be given an equal opportunity to participate in
that election, and when members of an elected body
are chosen from separate districts, each district must
be established on a basis that will insure, as far as
it is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can
vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.
Id. at 56.

With Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S.
719 (1973) and Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec, 410

7

U.S. 743 (1973), this Court limited application of the one-
person-one-vote rule as it had developed through earlier
decisions. In Salyer, the Court held the rule inapplicable
to election of members of the governing board of a
California Water District which has the statutory power
to eontract for the construction of district projects; the
power to condemn private property for use in such projects;
the authority to issue general obligation bonds; the power
of eminent domain; the power to employ and to dismiss
persons on a regular staff; the authority to provide for
the generation and distribution of hydro-electric power ; and
the power to fix tolls and charge for the use of water, and
to collect them from persons receiving services in propor-
tion to the services rendered. Salyer, at 723-724 and 728 n.7.

Despite the possession of such governmental powers the
majority of this Court held that the one-person-one-vote
principle does not apply to such a governmental arrange-
ment:

The appellee district in this case, although vested
with some typical governmental powers, has rela-
tively limited authority. Its primary purpose, indeed
the reason for its existence, is to provide for the
acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for
farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. It provides no
cther general public services, such as_ schools,
housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything
else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal
body. App. 86. There are no towns, shops, hospitals,
or other facilities designed to improve the quality of
life within the district boundares, and it does not
have a fire department, police, buses, or trains. [bid
Id. at 728-729.

B.

The decision of this Court in Salyer, supra, resulting from
a careful analysis of the governmental powers possessed
by the Tulare Water District demonstrates the utility of

8

such an analysis in cases which involve the application of
the one-person-one-vote rule to cooperative governmental
efforts. An assessment of the powers possessed by the
boards of education of Connecticut regional school districts
must lead to the conclusion that the one-person-one-vote
rule is not applicable to the election of members of such
boards.

In Connecticut the respective powers of the school dis-
trict, and its governing body, the school board, are care-
fully delineated and distinguished by the following state
statutes: 10-46, 10-47, 10-51, 10-53, 10-56, 10-60, 10-220,
10-221, 10-240, 10-241, 10-241a, 10-242, and 10-262. General
Statutes Section 10-240 provides that:

Each town shall maintain the control of all ihe public
schools within its limits and for this purpose shall
be a school district and shall have all the powers and
duties of school districts, except so far as such
powers and duties are inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this chapter.

The intent of Section 10-240 was to transfer control of
all the public schools within the town to the town itself,
with each town constituting a separate school district. See
Keegan v. Town of Thompson, 103 Conn. 418, 130A. 707
(1925). Second School District of Glastonbury, 86 Conn.
590, 86A. 577 (1913). General Statutes Section 10-241 pro-
vides that “(e)ach school district shall be a body corporate”
with certain powers, including the power to lay taxes. Sec-
tion 10-242 establishes the annual town meeting as the
annual school district meeting.

The duties of the school board as distinct and separate
from the power vested solely in the school district, are
found in Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-220 which provides
that boards of education shall maintain in their several
towns good public elementary and secondary schools and
shall promote the educational interests of the State. The

9

terms “school district” and “school board” are not used
interchangeably in the statutes and while, for example,
school districts in Connecticut do have the power to levy
and collect taxes, it is clear that Connecticut school boards
do not possess such power.

When the Connecticut legislature adopted its statutory
scheme for the creation of regional school districts, the
distinction between the powers possessed by the school
district and those possessed by the sehool board was main-
tained and made a part of the regional school laws. Thus
Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-56 provides in part:

A regional school district shall be a body politie and
corporate with power to sue and be sued; to pur-
chase, receive, hold and convey real and personal
property for school purposes; and to build, equip,
purchase, rent, maintain or expand schools. Such
district may issue bonds in the name and upon the
full faith and credit of such district and the member
towns to acquire land, prepare sites, purchase or
erect buildings and equip the same for school pur-
poses, if so authorized by referendum.

The powers enumerated in Section 10-56, powers which
may be described as important governmental powers, are
vested in the regional school districts, i.e., in the voters of
such districts qualified to vote at the regional school dis-
trict meeting. They are not possessed by regional school
boards. The primary function of the regional school board
is to administer the affairs of the regional school district.
In addition, while Section 10-60 of the Connecticut General
Statutes refers to a power to issue bonds as provided in
Section 10-56, a reading of that statute makes clear that
the power to authorize the issuance of bonds lies exclusively
with the voters of the school district at the regional school
district meeting. Indeed, to borrow money at all, the
regional board of education must have the authorization of

10

a majority of the region’s voters present at a regional
district meeting called specifically for the purpose of obtain-
ing such authorization. And, while a regional board of
education has the duty to prepare an estimated budget for
the region, the power to adopt a budget lies exclusively
with the voters at a regional school district meeting as pro-
vided in Section 10-51.

In Connecticut, it is the regional school district, operat-
ing through the school district meeting, which possesses
general governmental powers, which powers are exercised
in accordance with the one-person-one-vote principal. The
lack of such powers in regional boards of education in
Connecticut clearly exempts them from this constitutional
mandate.!

The distinction between the essentially administrative
powers possessed by regional school boards in Connecticut
and the broad governmental powers vested in the voters
of regional school districts and exercised at the district
meeting is readily discernible upon a reading of the
relevant statutes. These statutes evidence a legislative
intent that Connecticut’s traditionally autonomous towns
retain some control of the administration of their local
schools, even upon regionalization. The vehicle for reten-
tion of such control is a statutory scheme which permits
towns equal representation on the regional school board
while, at the same time, vesting the region’s voters with
the district’s important governmental powers, which powers
they exercise at the regional district meeting, on a one-
person-one-vote basis. The result is a mechanism of local
government meeting legitimate local needs without diluting
the vote of the regional school district voters when it comes
to the exercise of important governmental functions.

1, Judge Oakes’ opinion in the Court of Appeals decision recognizes
the Regional Board's limited power to propose and initiate in the
area of school financing with the ultimate and final authority in the
voters to approve or disapprove such proposals (See Appendix
Page 6a).

ll

Residents of large and small towns alike benefit economic-
ally from the cooperative educational effort which region-
alization brings: a combining of resources among towns to
provide for more efficient school operation with a resultant
improvement in educational programs. In addition, region-
alization is encouraged by the state through the legislative
provision for a greater portion of state aid (through the
“average daily membership grant”) to regional school
districts as opposed to local school districts, thus easing
the tax burden of local towns. (Conn, Gen. Stat., Section
10-262). The legislative intent to encourage regionaliza-
tion is further evidenced by the requirement found in
Conn. Gen, Stat. Section 10-39 which requires the State
Board of Edueation to promulgate regulations setting
standards governing the formation of regional school
districts with respect to those factors which bear on “the
achievement of more efficient administration of a school
district and efficacious education of the pupils therein.”
And although each member town is required to have at least
one representative on the regional board of education, there
ean be no doubt that the otherwise unfettered discretion
towns have in apportioning membership on the board upon
formation of the district greatly encourages regionalization.
(General Statutes, Section 10-46).

It is, of course, true that after Avery, a mechanism of
local government which has general governmental authority
cannot be comprised of officers who are elected on other
than a one-person-one-vote basis even if it meets legitimate
local needs. But, even this Court’s decision in Hadley does
not require the application of the one-person-one-vote rule
to all regional schoo) administration schemes without regard
to their differences and unique characteristics. Such a
non-discriminatory application would unduly discourage
the development of cooperative governmental efforts in the
area of public education and necessitate the imposition of

12

constitutional requirements beyond those laid down in
Avery.

Since the legislative scheme for the creation of regional
school districts in Connecticut does not result in regional
school boards with general governmental powers, the one-
person-one-vote principle should not be found applicable
to election to membership on such boards.

Respectfully Submitted,

Tuomas N. SULLIVAN
Suuziivay, Lerrick & Scnoen
632 Prospect Avenue
Hart! »rd, Connecticut 06105
Counsel for the Appellant
Nonnewaug Regional School
District No, 14

Donato J, Deneen and Anprew G.
Messina, JR.
O’Matiey, Deneen, Messtna &
Osweckt
20 Maple Avenue
Windsor, Connecticut 06095
Attorneys for Appellant
Town of Bethlehem

la
APPENDIX |
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tae Seconp Circuit

Nos. 845, 898-99, 921-22—September Term, 1974.
(Argued June 6, 1975 Decided July 23, 1975.)
Docket Nos. 75-7001, 75-7009, 75-7015, 75-7039-40
Ee
Joun E. Baker and Greravpine S. Georae,

~ Appellees,

Reciona Hicu Scnoont District No. 5, Reaionan Boarp
or Epvucation or Reaionat Hien Scioon District No. 5,
Henry W. Benepict, James Berry, Smney Svirsky and

Jean Hanna, Appellants.

Josern M. Scort, Sr. Appellee,

v.

Nonnewavue Reaionat Scuoon District No. 14, et al.,
Appellants.

B e f o r e—Smirn, Anperson and Oakes, Circuit Judges.
EE ae

Appeal from a decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut, Jon O. Newman,
Judge, which held on motion for summary judgment that
certain Connecticut regional school boards performed a
range of activities sufficiently extensive to require the appli-
cation of one person-one vote principles. Held that not-

2a

withstanding the fact that the boards in question could
neither levy taxes nor issue bonds, their powers were gov-
ernmental in nature, thus requiring that election to the
boards be in accordance with one person-one vote principles.

Oakes, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this appeal is the applicability of one person-
one vote principles (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)) to the elee-
tion of school board members in two Connecticut regional
school districts.' The districts in question are each com-
prised of towns with substantial population differences,
but, as presently organized, each participating town has
an equal number of elected representatives serving on the
regional school board and voting with equal weight. The
United States District Court for the District of Connecti-
eut, Jon O. Newman, Judge, relying on Hadley vy. Junior
College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (trustees of a junior
college school district performing governmental functions
must be elected in accordance with one person-one vote
standards) ; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968)
(applying one person-one vote standards to the election
of county officials); Rosenthal vy. Board of Education of
Central High School District #3, 497 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.
1974) (finding a substantial federal question presented by
a requested application of one person-one vote principles
to an elected school board which had the power to issue
bonds and propose taxes); Leopold v. Young, 340 F. Supp.
1014 (D. Vt. 1972) (applying one person-one vote stan-
dards to a school board with substantial public functions),

1. A number of other districts throughout Connecticut will pre-
sumably be affected by this decision since most, although not all,
of Connecticut's regional boards are not apportioned on the basis of
one person-one vote. The statutes under which regional school dis-
tricts were created did not require malapportionment, but permitted
towns to agree among themselves on the terms of their consolidation.

3a

held, on motion for summary judgment, that the school
boards in question performed a range of governmental
activities sufficiently extensive to require the application
of one person-one vote principles.? We affirm.’

The facts presented by these two consolidated appeals
are the same in all significant aspects. The school district
in Scott, Connecticut Regional District No. 14 (Nonne-
waug), is comprised of two towns, Woodbury (population
5,869) and Bethlehem (population 1,923). As of May, 1973,
1,887 pupils were attending the school district with 1,385
from Woodbury and 492 from Bethlehem. For each of the
three years ending with 1973-74, Woodbury contributed
to the regional district budget in an amount equal to two
and one-half times the amount contributed by Bethlehem.
Each of the towns, however, is equally represented on the
regional school board by four members.

The school district in Baker is comprised of three
towns, Bethany (population 3,857), Woodbridge (popula-
tion 7,673), and Orange (population 13,524). The average‘
number of pupils in the district is 3,377, with 543 pupils
from Bethany, 998 from Woodbridge and 1,835 from
Orange. Orange contributed in 1972-73 55.04 per cent of

2. In fashioning a remedy for these constitutional violations,
Judge Newman, whose opinion is unpublished, granted declaratory
relief only. His denial of injunctive relief was premised on his
unwillingness “to disrupt on-going educational activities pending
legislative action.” In response to Judge Newman's decision, we are
advised, the Connecticut General AssembMy has enacted contingency
legislation which would apply one person-one vote principles to school
districts, while providing that towns so inclined may withdraw from
regional school districts. (H.R. Bill No. 6596.)

3. Jurisdiction is grounded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and
injunctive and declaratory relief was sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
28 U.S.C. § 2201. A three-judge court is not required as there is no
facial attack on the Connecticut statutes which create regional boards,
and any special acts involved relate only to the particular district
involved and hence are not of statewide applicability.

4. An average student census was — from the actual daily

membership as of June, 1973; October, 1973; and February, 1974.

da

the total school budget, with Bethany's share amounting
to 15.62 per cent and Woodbridge’s 29.34 per cent. How-
ever, each of the three towns is equally represented on
the regional board by three members. In both districts,
the members of the boards are selected through an elective
process.’

Plaintiffs-appellees in both Scott and Baker are resi-
dents, taxpayers and electors of Woodbury and Orange
respectively,® who claim that the present apportionment
on their regional boards of education dilutes their voting
power and deprives them of the equal protection of the
law. ‘The critical question on this appeal therefore is
whether these school boards are elective bodies perform-
ing regulatory functions of a kind that can be characterized
as governmental. Jladley vy. Junior College District, 397
U.S. at 53-54. An affirmative answer to this question re-
quires the additional finding that the boards are con-
structed unconstitutionally, since all parties concede that
their members are not elected according to strict one
person-one vote principles, nor do they vote in accordance
with any kind of weighted formula which would reflect the
population differences in the towns they represent.

The towns in Scott elect members directly to the school
board; the towns in Baker, however, maintain that their
regional hoard is not elective in the sense the Supreme
Court intended for application of the one person-one vote
principle. The essence of this claim is that the board

5. See text at note 7 infra.

6. The Baker appellants maintain that this court's jurisdiction has
heen improperly invoked through “collusive joinder.” Their theory
seems to be that voters of the town are not the real parties in interest
here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). It is, however, the electors whos
vote is being diluted and as such their interests are quite properly
before the court. This is clearly not a case where collusion has been
used to manufacture diversity jurisdiction.

5a

members are “appointed” through a “legislative” town
meeting’ rather than elected through a “popular election.”
We find no merit to this line of argument. While the
forum for selecting board members was a town meeting,
any person who was an elector of the town had the right
to cast a vote at the meeting, and the majority prevailed.
The suggested distinction is one of form, not substance.

On the question whether the board is governmental in
character, appellants make much of the powers which the
school boards lack. By reading Hadley v. Junior College
District as narrowly as possible, they maintain that, since
the Connecticut regional boards lack the powers to levy
and collect taxes and to issue bonds, then their powers are
not sufficiently broad or general to be governmental. But
as Judge Newman recognized in his opinion below, “[t]he
proper question is rather whether the power the Boards
do have, in fulfilling what ‘has traditionally been a vital
governmental function,’ Hadley v. Junior College District,
397 U.S. at 56, make it reasonable to describe the board
members as ‘governmental officials in every relevant sense
of the term.’ Ibid.”

The powers of Connecticut’s regional school districts
are detailed in what is now Chapter 164 of the Connecti-
cut General Statutes,® with Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-47 pro-
viding as follows:

7. In the traditional town meeting, a moderator is chosen by the
assembled electors of the town, and thereafter the meeting is con-
ducted as if it were a parliamentary body.

8. The Baker appellants maintain that there are material facts in
issue concerning the powers of the boards so as to preclude a sum-
mary judgment. Because the regional boards’ powers are statutory
and are for our purposes unambiguous summary judgment was

roperly rendered in the present case. See Leopold v. Young, 340
F. Supp. at 1015.

6a

Regional boards of education shall have all the
powers and duties conferred upon boards of educa-
tion by the general statutes not inconsistent with
the provisions of this part. Such boards may pur-
chase, lease or rent property for school purposes
and, as part of the purchase price may assume and
agree to pay any bonds or other capital indebted-
ness issued by a town for any land and buildings so
purchased; shall perform all acts required to imple-
ment the plan of the committee for the transfer of
property from the participating towns to the re-
gional school district and may build, add to or equip
schools for the benefit of the towns comprising the
district. Such boards may receive gifts of real and
and personal property for the purposes of the
regional school districts. .. .

In the area of school financing, a regional board may auth-
orize bond anticipation notes for periods of up to four
years, and may treat the proceeds of the notes as other
school districts or municipalities. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-
56(¢)-(d). In addition, the board may also borrow money
for periods up to five years. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-60.
While such actions by the board must be approved by the
voters of the regional district in a referendum, it is or
should be clear that this does not substantially undercut
the significance of the boards’ function. As stated in the
amicus brief of the town of New Hartford, “whether to
propose a bond ordinance, for what purpose, when, for
how much, and in what form are all within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regional board.” While the voters have
the final word, what they ratify or disapprove can be only
what the board decides to present to them. See also Leo-
pold v. Young, supra.

Similarly, with respect to the budget-making process,
the board has the exclusive power to initiate and propose.
The voters may choose not to ratify, but it is within the
sole power of the board to draw up the budget, and if it

7a

is disapproved, the board then decides whether to amend
and how to amend. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-51.

In addition, the regional school boards hire and fire
teachers, supervise and discipline students, and in gen-
eral manage all of the schools within their district.2 As
such, there can be no question but that the board members

perform important governmental functions within
the districts and . . . these powers are general enough
and have sufficient impact throughout the district to
justify the conclusion that [one person-one vote]
should be applied here,

Hadley vy. Junior College District, 397 U.S. at 53-54.

With respect to collective bargaining agreements, again
the contract is negotiated by the board; a district meet-
ing must ratify the board’s action only if the chief execu-
tive officer of a constitutent town requests that a meeting
be called. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-153d.

The power to tax is not a sine qua non to a determina-
tion that a local board serves a governmental function.
The regulatory and supervisory powers possessed by the
regional boards here at issue are sufficiently broad to be
classified as governmental activity. See generally Powers
v. Maine School Administrative District No. 1, 359 F. Supp.
30 (D. Me. 1973); Leopold v. Young, supra."

Appellants’ last line of argument focuses upon the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973),

9. Nor is this a complete list of the boards’ powers and duties.
The boards also have duties in connection with school curriculum,
transportation and a wide range of support services. In short, this
is not a case like Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967),

where an appointed school board, whose duties were largely admin-
istrative, was exempted from application of one person-one vote

principles.

10. Nor does havi So geee ie ates ee Sy ee
mental in nature. ‘ulyer Co. v. Tulare ¢ Basin Water
Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973).

8a

and Associated Enterprises, Inc. vy. Toltec Watershed
Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973), to diminish the
force of Hadley. In Salyer and Toltec the Court held that
one person-one vote principles did not apply to the elec-
tion of members of the governing board of a California
water and a Wyoming watershed district. Since the dis-
tricts in issue in Salyer and Toltec had a “special limited
purpose” and since the districts’ action had a substan-
tially “disproportionate effect . . . on landowners as a
group,” 410 U.S. at 728, 410 U.S. at 744, it was aeceptable
for the officers of the district to be elected by weighted
vote of the district's landowners. The regional school
hoards’ impact is general and related to all voters of the
towns as such. In Salyer, the Court was careful to note
that it was the land which was being benefited and the
landowners only paying the costs; the Court also empha-
sized that the water district “provides no other general
publie services such as a school.” Id. at 728-29 (emphasis
added). Here we have school districts in which those
towns which are paying the most for the districts’ sup-
port have to accept a diluted vote" in the running of the
schools. Salyer and Toltec are simply not relevant. The
boards here are elective bodies serving governmental
functions. They must be organized to reflect one person-
one vote principles.
Judgment affirmed.

11. It is of no aid to appellants that the manner in which the
regional boards were to be organized was voted upon and accepted
by a majority of the voters of each of the towns in the district. As
the Supreme Court held in Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly
of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964):

An individual’s constitutionally protected right to cast an
equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a
majority of a State’s electorate, if the apportionment scheme
adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause. Manifestly, the fact that an
apportionment plan is adopted in a popular referendum is
insufficient to sustain its constitutionality or to induce a court
of equity to refuse to act.

Nor is the fact that the districts were formed pursuant to agreement
of the towns. See Leopold v. Young, supra.

9a

APPENDIX Il
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE

Seconp Crrcvit
$<

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court-
house in the City of New York, on the twenty-third day of
July one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five

Present—Hon. J. Josep Sarrn,
Hon. Rosert P. ANDERSON,
Hon. James L. Oakes, Circuit Judges.
75,7001, 75-7009, 75-7015, 75-7039, 75-7040.

Joun E. Baker, and Geratprne 8. Georeer,
Appellees,
v.

RecionaL Hicu Scuoor District No. 5, Recionat Boarp or
Epvucation or Recionat Hig Scuoor District No. 5, Mrs.
Marion P. Crocco, Mr. Grorce P. Davis, Jr., Mrs. Jean
Virsuvup, Mr. Lovis Kurzner, Mrs. Jean S. Mippieton, Dr.
Freperick Streicert, Mrs. Frank Gruskay, Dr. Hersert
HersHenson, and Mr. Leonarp Loxwne, individually and in
their official capacities as members of the Recionat Boarp
or Epvucation oF Recionat High Scuoout District No. 5,
Dove.as J. Suir, individually and in his official capacity
as Acting Superintendent or Reciona Hicw Scuoor Dis-
rrict No. 5, Mr. Frepertck Ross, Mr. Henry W. Bewnepict,
Mr. Harry I. Wirson, as Treasurers respectively of the
Towns of Orange, Bethany, and Woodbridge, and Mrs.
Marsorre B. Wanxquist, Mr. Smney Svirsxky and Mrs.
Jean Hanna, as Town Clerks respectively of the Towns of
Orange, Bethany and Woodbridge,

Defendants,

10a

Recionat Hicw Scnoor District No. 5 and Recronat Boarp
or Epvucation or Recionat High Scuoot Disrrict No. 5,
James Berry, as Treasurer of the Town of Woodbridge
(succeeding Harry I. Witson, deceased)

Defendants-A ppellants,

JosepH M. Scort, Sr.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vv.

NonnewavuG Recionat Scuoor District No. 14, THe Town
or Woopsury, Connecticut, THe Town or BretHLEHEM
Connecticut, Town or Woopsury, and Samvet J. Swenp-
SEN, First SetectTMAN, Town oF BETHLEHEM,

Defendants

NonnewauG RecionaL Scuoot District No. 14, Town or
BETHLEHEM,
Defendants-A ppellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.

+ ———— nl Oe

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record
from the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut, and was argued by counsel.

Own ConsiperaTion WHereor, it is now hereby ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District
Court be and it hereby is affirmed with costs to be taxed
against the appellants.

lla

APPENDIX Ill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District or CONNECTICUT

Civil No. B-538
Civil No. N-74-75

rr

JosepnH M. Scort, Sr.
vw
Nonnewavue Recionat Scuoor District No. 14, et al.,
Joun E. Baker, et al.
v.

Recionat Hicu Scuoor District No. 5, et al.

rrr)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These motions for summary judgment present identical
questions concerning the applicability of one person-one vote
principles to boards of education of Connecticut’s regional
school districts. See generally, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 10-39 to
10-63i. Plaintiff in Civil No. B-538 (Scott), a resident, tax-
payer, and elector of the Town of Woodbury, seeks the
reorganization of the Board of Education of Nonnewaug
Regional School District No. 14, which administers the joint
elementary and secondary school systems of the Towns of
Woodbury and Bethlehem.' In Civil No. N-74-75 (Baker),

1. Plaintiff Scott seeks to pursue the suit as a class action.
Since “any equitable relief to which [plaintiff] may be entitled would
benefit all persons similarly situated, there is no compelling reason
to designate a class.” Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of
Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 354 F. Supp. 778, 783 (D.
Conn. 1973), modified on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.
1973). Class action designation is accordingly denied.

12a

plaintiffs are residents, taxpayers, and electors of the Town
of Orange, and they seek re-organization of the Board of
Education of Regional High School District No. 5, which
includes the Towns of Orange, Bethany and Woodbridge.

The defendants in Scott are Regional District No. 14, the
chairman of the Distriet’s Board of Education, the Towns
of Woodbury and Bethlehem, and the First Selectman of
each Town? In Baker the defendants are Regional Dis-
trict No. 5, its Board of Education and the members of the
Board, the District’s superintendent, and the treasurers and
clerks of the Towns of Orange, Woodbridge and Bethany.

Tn addition, the Towns of Bethany and Woodbridge have
moved to intervene as defendants in Baker. They argue
that they have sicnificant interests not adequately protected
by the present defendants, and that only they are properly
situated to protect the interests of their residents and elec-
_tors.’ However, the elected representatives of the voters
who are already parties to this action are equal to that task.
Cf. Powers v. Maine School Administrative District No. 1,
359 F.Supp. 30(D. Me. 1973) ; Leopold v. Young, 340 F.Supp.
1014 (D. Vt. 1972). The Towns as such do not have any
substantial interest in the controversy; they are merely
election districts from which board members are chosen.
Cf. Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F.Supp. 754, 798-99 (D.
Conn, 1964) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Town of
Franklin vy. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 562 (1964). See Rey-
nolds vy. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Moreover, an ap-
propriately fashioned remedy will adequately protect the
Towns. See 3A Moore's Federal Practice § 19.07-2[2]. The
motions to intervene are denied.

2. The Town of New Hartford has moved to appear in Scott as
amicus curiae. The motion is granted.

3. Other defendants have raised the same issue in the form of an
affirmative defense alleging that the Towns are necessary parties
without whose joinder the action cannot go forward, Fed. R. Civ,
P. 19,

13a

In both actions plaintiffs argue that the present appor-
tionment of membership on their respective regional boards
of education impermissibly dilutes their voting power and
deprives them of the equal protection of the laws, They
claim jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1343(3), and request a
variety of injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. In
Scott the parties have stipulated to the material facts,‘
and both actions are before the Court on motions for sum-
mary judgment.$

Preliminarily, the Baker defendants dispute this Court’s
jurisdiction and urge that a three-judge court must be con-
vened to hear the suit. They rely primarily on Judge Tim-

4. Defendants in Baker note that in their action the parties have

not entered into a stipulation and urge that summary judgment is
inappropriate because a triable issue of fact is presented by disagree-
ment about the powers of their Board. There is no dispute, however,
that the powers of the Boards are defined by the Connecticut Gen-
eral Statutes, compare Education/Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore,
F.2d (2d Cir. 1974), Slip op. at 5321 (August 21, 1974) (Oakes,
J. dissenting); the only disagreement is whether as a matter of law
the powers conferred 4 statute are sufficient to bring the Boards
within apportionment requirements.

5. The Baker defendants oppose summary judgment on the
— that the plaintiffs are not real parties in interest, Fed. R.
iv. P. 17(a), and on the additional ground that jurisdiction of this
Court has been invoked by “improper or collusive joinder,” 28 U.S.C,
§ 1359. Rule 17(a) is designed to make certain that an action is
brought by one who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to
be enforced. Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional
Hospital, 35 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. S.C. 1964); 3A Moore’s Federal
Practice § 17.07, text at n. 1. But as this opinion explains, text fol-
lowing n. 2, supra, the right sought to be protected in this case is
that of the Orange electors in an undiluted vote. Section 1359 is
similarly designed to prevent collusive attempts to “manufacture”
diversity jurisdiction, O’Brien v. Avco Corporation, 425 F.2d 1030
(2d Cir, 1969). It thus has no application in the present context.
Moreover, even if, as defendants allege, officials of the Town of
Orange solicited plaintiffs’ participation, and even if the Town of
Orange is paying the expenses of the litigation, it does not follow
that there has been the kind of “collusion” at which the statute is
directed Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 204
F.Supp. 83 (D. Conn, 1962).

l4a

bers’ tentative opinion in Giordano v. Amity Regional High
School District #5, 313 F.Supp. 403 (D. Conn, 1970). The
simple answer to this claim is one not raised by the parties
in Giordano (although recognized as persuasive by Judge
Timbers, 313 F.Supp. at 408-09, n, 9), but pressed strenu-
ously by all plaintiffs in the present actions. Plaintiffs here
do not seek to enjoin enforcement of a statute of statewide
application. Compare Hadley y. Junior College District of
Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 57 (1970), with
Leopold vy. Young, 340 F.Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Vt. 1972).
The Connecticut statutory system at issue “does not require
malapportionment, but only permits towns to agree among
themselves on the terms under which they will consolidate,
including the apportionment of school board members.”
Ibid. See C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of the Federal
Courts 190, text at n. 21 (1970).

The situation is no different as to Special Act 74-69,
regardless of the interpretation placed on it. If, as plain-
tiffs urge, it merely sets the time at which board members
will take office, there is no question of enjoining its enforce-
ment. And even if, as defendants urge, it represents a
“fixing” of the present apportionment of board members,
it applies by its terms only to District No. 5 and is there-
fore not a statute of statewide application,

Moreover, as the remainder of this opinion makes clear,
the law has progressed considerably since Giordano, and
what Judge Timbers concluded was a question requiring
three judges for resolution is now so clearly settled that
the issue lacks the substantiality requiring a three-judge
court. In such circumstances a single judge possesses the
power to dispose of the case. Bailey vy. Patterson, 369 U.S.
31 (1962); Anderson v. Nemetz, 474 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1973); Consumer Party v. Tucker, 364 F.Supp. 594, 604
(E.D. Pa. 1973). See Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375
F.2d 129, 131 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1967).

15a

Regional District No. 14 began operating on July 1,
1968, having been approved several months earlier by
separate referenda conducted in Woodbury and Bethle-
hem. ‘The District's board consists of eight members, with
four chosen by the electors of each of the two member
towns. Plaintiff Scott bases his objection to the equal divi-
sion of the membership on a comparison of the populations
of the two communities. According to the 1970 census,
Woodbury'’s population was 5,869 and Bethlehem’s was
1,923, and of the 1,887 pupils attending school in the Dis-
trict as of May, 1973, 1,885 were frore Woodbury and 492
were from Bethlehem. Finally, for each of the three con-
secutive academic years ending with 1973-74, Woodbury’s
contribution to the Regional District’s budget was approxi-
mately two and one-half times as large as Bethlehem’s. In
short, plaintiff complains that Woodbury has roughly 75%
of the joint distriet’s population and pupils, and contrib-
utes a similar proportion of the joint district’s budget, but
has only 50% of the votes on the body that administers
the District.

The comparable statistics for District No. 5, which com-
menced operations in the 1952-53 academic year, reflect a
similar imbalance, Orange, the largest of the three towns,
has approximately 55% of the population, 55% of the
student body, and contributes 55% of the District’s budget.
Bethany accounts fur approximately 15% of each category,
and Woodbridge 30%. Each Town, however, elects three
members of the nine-member joint Board of Education.

Defendants do not dispute the contention that the votes
of the Woodbury and Orange electors are in fact substan-
tially diluted. Cf. Powers v. Maine School Administrative
District No. 1, supra, 359 F.Supp. at 35. Nor do they
seriously contest the proposition that because the members
of the Regional Boards are chosen by election® the one per-

6. The Baker defendants do suggest that the town meetings from
which their Board members are elected are exercises of legislative

16a

son—one vote rules must apply. £.g., Hadley v. Junior
College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50,
D4 (1970); Rosenthal vy. Board of Education of Central
High School District No. 3 of Town of Hempstead, 497
F.2d 726, 729 (2d Cir. 1974).

On the merits of the motions for summary judgment
defendants press only two contentions. The first is that
the Regional Boards whose composition is at issue perform
an insufficiently broad range of governmental functions and
are therefore not the type of elective bodies to which appor-
tionment requirements apply. Compare Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719,
728-29 (1973). Both Regional Boards lack several signi-
ficant powers that were possessed by the junior college
board of trustees in Hadley, and defendants contend that
these were essential both in Hadley and in similar cases.
These include the power to levy and collect taxes, to issue
bonds, and to pass on petitions to annex school districts
and acquire property by condemnation.

Defendants’ approach, enumerating the powers that these
Regional Boards lack, is misconceived. Cf. Hadley v. Jun-
tor College District, supra, 397 U.S. at 53-54; Rosenthal
v. Board of Education, supra, 497 F.2d at 728. The proper
question is rather whether the powers the Boards do have
in fulfilling what “has traditionally been a vital govern-
mental function,” Hadley v. Junior College District, supra,

power and not “popular elections” within the meaning of Hadley,
and that one person-one vote requirements for that reason do not
apply. Defendants do not dispute, however, that in each member
town all registered voters are eligible to vote for board members,
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-46(b). Nothing in Hadley indicates that the
Court intended to limit its holding to elections of a particular type.
On the contrary, Justice Black took pains to observe that at the
center of each of the Supreme Court’s reapportionment cases was
“the decision of the government to have citizens participate individu-
ally by ballot in the selection of certain people who carry out govern-
mental functions.” 397 U.S. at 54. To accept the consequences of
defendants’ characterization would be to nak form over substance
at the expense of the right to vote.

17a

397 U.S. at 56, make it reasonable to describe the board
members as “government officials in every relevant sense
of that term.” Ibid.

With the question thus posed, the answer becomes clear.
The powers of the two Boards before this Court do not
differ significantly from those of the Board in Rosenthal,
supra, and the only question that troubled the Court of
Appeals in Rosenthal was whether the manner of selection
of board members was more nearly elective than it was
appointive; it was obvious to the Court that if the board
members were elected, their powers were sufficiently gov-
ernmental to invoke one person-one vote requirements. 497
F.2d at 729, text at n. 10. As the Court of Appeals has
more recently observed, “there was no question [in Rosen-
thal] that the body in question performed substantial gov-
ernmental functions.’”” Education/Instruccion, Inc, v.
Moore, —— F.2d . (2d Cir. 1974), Slip op. at 5320
(August 21, 1974). Compare, e.g., Dameron v. Tangipahoa
Parish Police Jury, 315 F.Supp. 137, 138 (E.D. La. 1970).
See also, Regional High School District ivo. 3 v. Town of
Newtown, 134 Conn. 613, 620-21 (1948).

Defendants’ second argument relies on dictum in Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). They suggest that
regional districts are a form of educational innovation and
are for that reason immune from judicial interference, even
interference in the name of equal protection. Defendants
contend that requiring equal apportionment will make it
unlikely that smaller towns will join regional districts, and
that a legitimate attempt by the State to provide for more
efficient operation of schools and improved educational
opportunity for students will thereby be frustrated.

In Avery, which held that elections for County Commis-
sioners Court in Texas must be conducted in accordance

7. The Rosenthal Board also lacked the power to set taxes. 497
F.2d at 728, n. 7 and accompanying text. .

18a

with principles of voting equality, the Supreme Court
acknowledged in passing that local governments are under
immense pressures to solve local problems, and denied that
such experimentation is foreclosed by the Constitution, The
two cases cited by the Court, however, indicate that these
observations were in no way intended to encourage retreat
from the Constitutional imperative. Sailors v. Board of
Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), exempted a board whose
members were appointed and whose duties were adminis-
trative, and in Dusch vy. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), the
Court upheld residence requirements imposed on the
members of a multicounty legislative body, finding that the
voting power of the electors of the component counties
was not diluted. Defendants express a legitimate concern
in urging that there be no needless thwarting of experi-
mentation with regional arrangements in general or in the
field of education in particular. The desirability of such
arrangements, however, cannot suspend the Fourteenth
Amendment’s apportionment requirements. If regional
school districts are to be encouraged, it will have to be
done by ereative legislative authorization and cooperative
local arrangements that resolve the competing large and
small town interests within Constitutional standards.
Although the Constitution leaves a great deal of room for
legitimate experimentation and innovation, it also “imposes
one ground rule for the development of arrangements of
local government: a requirement that units with general
governmental powers over an entire geographic area not be
apportioned among... districts of substantially unequal
population.” Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S.
at 485-86,

The only question remaining is one of remedy. Plaintiffs
in hoth actions have requested a broad range of coercive
injunctive relief, hoth permanent and interlocutory. Plain-
tiffs have clearly established that they are entitled to a

19a

declaratory judgment, but it does not follow that the
requested permanent mandatory injunction is also appro-
priate at this time. While it is true that the violations
could be cured without legislative action, compare Hadley
v. Junior College District, supra, the relatively few options
presently available to defendants were designed by a legis-
lature that may well have thought that regional districts
would be free from one person-one vote requirements.
Respect for the pre-eminence of the states in matters of
educational policy requires, therefore, that the legislature
be given a reasonable opportunity to develop new alterna-
tives in light of this Court’s declaration before an injunc-
tion issues requiring defendants to act. Cf. Powers v.
Maine School Administrative District No. 1, supra. For
example, the legislature may want to consider the pro-
cedures for forming new districts and for dissolving, or
permitting withdrawal from, present districts now that one
person-one vote principles are applicable. The General
Assembly is to convene in January and should have at
least two months to consider whether it wishes to frame
legislation responsive to the concerns of these and other
aspects of regional districts. Permanent injunctive relief
will therefore be denied, without prejudice to a renewed
application after March 1, 1975. At any time prior to that
date, any parties may submit to the Court their proposals
for reapportionment plans and implementation procedures,
which the Court will review before formulating a final
deeree after March 1, 1975.

With respect to the requests for interim relief pending
entry of a final decree, the Court is not willing needlessly
to disrupt on-going educational activities pending legisla-
tive action. The requested decrees would work a substan-
tial departure from the status quo, and the request for
such relief is therefore denied. Plaintiffs are free to seek
supplemental interim relief if it should appear that the

20a

Regional Districts are about to undertake substantial
building programs or make other substantial capital
commitments.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment
are granted,* and judgment wili enter declaring that the
allocation of membership on the Boards of Education of
Nonnewaug Regional School District No. 14, and of
Regional High School District No. 5, deprives plaintiffs
of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 22 day of
November, 1974.

Jon O. Newman
United States District Judge

8. The motion of defendants in Scott is correspondingly denied.

2la

APPENDIX IV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

District oF CONNECTICUT

Civil No. B-538
Civil No. N-74-75

ee

JosepH M. Scort, Sr.
v.
NonnewavucG Recionat ScHoot District No. 14, e¢ al.,
Joun E. Baker, et al.,
v.

RecionaL Hiew ScHoor District No. 5, et al.

rrr i

JUDGMENT

The above cases having come on for consideration by the
Court on plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment and
the Court having rendered its Memorandum of Decision,
under date of November 22, 1974, granting said motions;
and the Court having rendered its Ruling on Request for
Rule 54(b) Certification, under date of January 3, 1975,
finding that there is no just reason for delay and specifically
directing the Clerk to enter judgment on the claims for
declaratory relief,

It is ORDERED and apsupGeED that judgment be and is hereby
entered declaring that the allocation of membership on the
Boards of Education of Nonnewaug Regional School Dis-

22a

trict No. 14, and of Regional High School District No. 5,
deprives plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 8th day of Janu-
ary, 1975.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1154%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.