# Petition — Farr v. Pitchess > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1075%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1976 - **Citation:** 427 U.S. 658 ## Text pate . Supreme Court, U. S. Bakes | SEP 22 1875 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1975 WILLIAM T. FARR, Petitioner, PETER J. PITCHESS, SHERIFF OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARK HURWITZ Attorney at Law 100 West Chapman Orange, California 92666 Telephone: [714] 547-0997 Attorney for Petitioner J. GALLAGHER, Printed Briefs (714) 547-6073 Oe a ae SUBJECT INDEX Page Opinions Below......................445. teens 1 SUITES. «kh REO UAE iii ese hd 1 SED «6 oa cc's caccvcccsncemitewBeessdenunds 2 Questions Presented ................ ccc cence eee 3 soa 6 es Sst iie bib co osie Shee Fé tae 4 Statement of Facts ............... ccc eee eens 4 Reasons for Granting the Writ ................... 10 IG 5.5. os nba be Fe bons Oe k Canwecdewes 23 INDEX TO EXHIBITS Exhibit A. Memorandum of Decision and Order, United States District Court for the Central District of California ...... ccc ccc ccc ccc eees Exhibit B. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit................. Exhibit C. Findings and Order Adjudging Contempts; Sentence Pursuant to C.C.P. 1218; Order of Commitment....................... Exhibit D. Memorandum Decision issued by Justice William O. Douglas, January 11, 1973 .... Exhibit E. Order Staying Issuance of Mandate .... Exhibit F. Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1070 .... Exhibit G. Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Second Judicial District, In Re Farr, 22 Cal.App.3d 60 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED Cases Page Branzburg vs. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, [1972] ....... 10, 12 Bouie vs. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, ks oe ec ese ceneareenye ens 16 Craig vs. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67S.Ct. 1239 ..... 12, 14 DeGregory vs. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 86 S.Ct. 1148 [1966] ................ 12 Farr vs. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App.3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342(1970].................. 2,3, 15, 18 Gibson vs. Florida Legislative Investment Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546, 83 S.Ct. REE aa Oe Ce pa a ee 12 in Re Farr, 36 Cal.App. 3d 577[1974] ............ 3,4 In Re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665[1972] .................. 10 James vs. United States, 366 U.S. 213, ae er a eer 16 Johnson vs. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, i a eke be see at eei nes eas 21 Mayberry vs. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 SE ccc accbetot bu subesdesusceee's 21 NAACP vs. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328 ....... 12 Pennekemp vs. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, co aide yee heeeeeu ese sees 12 Raley vs. The State of Ohio, 360 ee cll tied acre thadbaeeuednebewws 18 Sheppard vs. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 [1966] .... 10, 11, 13 United States vs. Caldwel!, 408 U.S. 665[1972]....... 10 United States vs. Meyer, 462 Fed.2d 827([1970]....... 21 STATUTES Page California Evidence Code, ry 4,6,7, 15, 16, 19 United States Code, Title 28, Section 1254[ 1]... 2... ccc cece cece cece eee eeeeees 1 United States Constitution, First Amendment ....... 2, 3,7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 23, 25 United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment ..............-500++5: 3, 19 iv. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1975 WILLIAM T. FARR, Petitioner vs. PETER J. PITCHESS, SHERIFF OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. Petitioner, WILLIAM T. FARR, prays thai a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District sustaining the contempt adjudication is officially reported and published in 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, December 17, 1971. The Memorandum of Decision and Order of the Federal District Court is attached hereto marked Exhibit “A” and is herein incorporated by reference. The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is attached hereto marked Exhibit “B” and is herein incorporated by reference. JURISDICTION The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under and pursuant to 28 U.S. Code, Section 1254(1). 1 1. The Transcript reterences, contained herein are to the Reporter's Transcript in proceedings held in the case of People vs. Manson, et al., being Case No. A 253 156, in the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, presided over by the Honorable Charles H. Older. However, the proceedings applicable to the Petitioner herein were reported in four separate stages: i) The first proceeding was conducted in chambers. Said transcript reference will hereinafter be referred to as in-Chambers Tr. (ii) The hearings on the order to show cause proceeding that gave rise to the contempt adjudication (of which review is herein sought) were separately reported on June 3, June 30, and July 19, 1971. 2. “The Findings and Order Adjudging Contempts; Sentence Pursuant to C.C.P. 1218; Order of Commit- ment’ dated August 6, 1974, is attached hereto marked Exhibit “C” and is incorporated herein by reference. 3. The opinion of the California District Court of Appeal, Second Judicial District, In Re Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60 is attached hereto marked Exhibit “G” and is incorporated herein by reference. 4. The Memorandum of Decision and Order of the Federal District Court dated December 18, 1972 (Exhibit “A”). 5. The memorandum decision issued by Justice Willlam O. Douglas, January 11, 1973, ordering petitioner's Release on His Own Recognizance Pending i os Appeal in the United States Court of Appeals is attached hereto marked Exhibit “D” and is incorporated herein by reference. 6. The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dated August 7, 1975 (Exhibit B). 7. Stay of Mandate ordered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dated August 22, 1975, is attached hereto marked Exhibit “E” and is incorporated herein by reference. QUESTIONS PRESENTED | The order adjudging petitioner’s contempt is invalid by virtue of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 Petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law and to be free from the processes of an ex post facto law were violated by the retroactive application of an Appellate Court’s determination in Farr vs. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App.3d 60, 99 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1970), that the California immunity statute was unconstitutional in the proceedings in which it was invoked by petitioner. il Petitioner was denied a hearing before an impartial court as demanded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. STATUTES INVOLVED California Evidence Code, Section 1070 (see Exhibit “F” which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference). STATEMENT OF FACTS Petitioner is presently released from confinement on his own recognizance pursuant to an order of Justice William O. Douglas (Exhibit “D”) and by virtue of an order for a stay of mandate issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on August 22, 1975 (Exhibit —? On June 20, 1974, the Honorable William H. Levit, Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, after a hearing held pursuant to a decision of the California Court of Appeal in in Re Farr, 36 Cal.App.3d 577 (1974), issued an order terminating the coercive sentence imposed on July 28, 1971 by Judge Older. On August 6, 1974, Judge Older issued a new Order of Commitment on his Findings and Order Adjudging Contempts issued and entered July 28, 1971. Petitioner was thereby sentenced to five days in jail and a $500 fine. (A copy of this punitive order now confronting petitioner is attached hereto marked Exhibit “C”’.) The July 28, 1971 contempt (the only contempt ever found against Mr. Farr) was adjudicated as a conse- quence of petitioner's refusal to answer thirteen various questions propounded during hearings held pursuant to an order to show cause issued by Judge Older on May 5, 1971. The express purpose of this order to show cause proceeding was to enable the Court to determine if any persons subject to a “publicity order” imposed for the Manson murder trial had been contemptuous of that order. It has, at all times, been conceded that petitioner was not a party subject to this “Order Re Publicity.” Approximately seven months earlier on October 5, 1970, a written statement by one Virginia Graham relating confessions made to her by her celimate, Susan Atkins, a Manson codefendant, was obtained by one of the Deputy District Attorneys assigned to the Manson case. Pursuant to the trial court’s order, one copy of the statement was distributed, respectively, to each of the attorneys of record in that criminal trial. Petitioner, who was then a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald Examiner and who had conducted an investigation for approximately six months for the purpose of acquiring facts concerning this confession, received two copies of the Graham statement on October 7, 1970, and another on October 8, 1970, after promising his sources of information that he would not reveai their identity. On October 8, 1970, before the contents of such statements were published in the Herald Examiner, and after being apprised by Miss Graham's attorney that petitioner had been given a copy of the statement, Judge Older, then presiding over the Manson trial, conducted an in-chambers hearing to ascertain if, in fact, this was true and, if so, the identity of the persons who had given this material to Mr. Farr and what he intended to do with the same. Mr. Farr acknowledged the receipt of the statement. Judge Older then requested that Mr. Farr voluntarily reveal his sources of information, but carefully advised petitioner that he had a right to refuse to respond to the Couri’s request by virtue of California Evidence Code, Section 1070, stating: “Another aspect, Mr. Farr, if | were to call you to the witness stand, for example, or someone would subpoena you to testify to these matters, you could, of course, assert or refuse to disclose your news under 1070, which provides that you cannot be adjudged in contempt by a court for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured for publishing and published in the newspapers. “It does not say you cannot be called. “The point I'm making is this, while | could not order you, that is, effectively order you to disclose the source, there is nothing to prevent you in the interest of justice and in aid of the administration of justice from voluntarily revealing it without waiving any right in the future to assert that immunity or privilege.” (In-Chambers Tr., October 8, 1970, page 8, lines 7-28.) Later, in that same in-chambers hearing Judge Older further commented: “And | assure you that there is no compulsion whatever to do it. “It is put on a purely voluntary basis. | won't think any the less of you or the Herald Examiner or anyone en ella else if you say no. . . .” (In-Chambers Tr., October 8, 1970, page 11, lines 15-23.) No further action was taken at that time. Petitioner continued to invoke the First Amendment and California Evidence Code, Section 1070 in support of his refusal to disclose. On October 9, 1970, the day following the aforementioned in-chambers hearing, a story based upon the Virginia Graham statement was published in the Herald Examiner. On May 5, 1971, Judge Older executed the aforemen- tioned order to show cause. No order to show cause proceeding has ever been initiated against any party subject to the publicity order imposed for the Manson trial. , Petitioner appeared with counsel at hearings on the order to show cause conducted on June 3, June 30, and July 19, 1971. He revealed that he had received copies of the Graham statement from two of the six attorneys of record in the Manson case and one from another source who may have been subject to the court’s “Order Re Publicity.” He refused, however, to identify his source, invoking, when ordered to do so, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and California Evidence Code, Section i070. Judge Older then reversed the position that he had earlier taken with respect to Evidence Code, Section 1070, and found that petitioner “wilfully refused” to answer the thirteen separate questions, all of which were designed to elicit a disclosure of the identity of those from whom he received his information. It is this July 28, 1971 contempt adjudication for which petitioner hereby seeks review. Judge Older then issued a stay of execution of the commitment Order pending appeal. This Trial Court Judge advised on November 27, 1972, that he issued this stay because he felt the appellate outcome on this question, “was not free of doubt.” (November 27, 1972, transcript, page 17, line 3.) Petitioner sought review with the California Court of Appeal. An alternative Writ issued and after oral argument a written opinion of the Court of Appeal affirmed the Judgment of Contempt. This opinion is reported in 22 Cal.App.3d 60. On March 20, 1972, a Petition for Hearing by the California Supreme Court was denied. A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal was sought before the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 13, 1972. On November 16, 1972, the day after a remittitur was issued by the Supreme Court. Judge Older conducted another hearing for the purpose of allowing Mr. Farr to purge himself of the contempts. When he refused to do so he was ordered to jail pursuant to the July 28, 1971, Order of Commitment. A request for a stay pending the filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or for bail was denied by the Tria! Court and on November 16, 1972, petitioner was incarcerated. That same day petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the California Court of Appeal. That Court ordered Farr released on his own recognizance pending its determination. On November 21, 1972, habeas corpus was denied. On November 27, 1972, Judge Older conducted another hearing at which Farr continued to refuse to disclose his sources. Petitioner was again ordered remanded to custody. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT MR. FARR WAS NOT FOUND IN CONTEMPT FOR HIS REFUSAL TO DIS- CLOSE THE IDENTITY OF HIS SOURCES OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON AS A RESULT OF EITHER OF THE NOVEMBER 1972 HEARINGS. THE ONLY CONTEMPT THAT HAS EVER BEEN ADJUDICATED WAS THAT FOUND BY THE COURT ON JULY 28, 1971, AS AFORESAID. On November 21, 1972, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed with the California Supreme Court. The same was denied on November 29, 1972. On November 30, 1972, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Robert J. Kelleher, Judge Presiding. Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C., Section 2254. That Petition was denied on December 18, 1972. The Federal District Court, however, on December 19, 1972, issued a Certificate of Probabie Cause for appeal. Dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Federal District Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on August 7, 1975. Application for rehearing was denied on September 12, 1975. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ! THE ORDER ADJUDGING PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT IS INVALID BY VIRTUE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. Both the Federal District and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals properly recognized that a balancing of competing interests, consonant with Branzburg vs. Hayes, In re Pappas, and United States vs. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), is required when a newsman attempts to protect his sources of confidentially divulged informa- tion. They. however, seriously erred in determining that this Court’s mandate in Sheppard vs. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) is here in issue or that under the precise facts of this particular proceeding a defendant's right to a fair trial is the value against which petitioner's First Amendment position should be balanced. Mr. Farr’s contempt was NOT found for soliciting a violation of the Manson court’s publicity order or for collaborating with or in any way aiding or abetting those who may have disobeyed that order. He was, in fact, 10 acquitted of all of those charges in a separate contempt proceeding instituted in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the Honorable Bernard Jefferson, Judge Pre- siding.'It must, at the outset, also be noted that this newsman has never been cnarged in any legal proceeding with either writing or in any respect participating in the publication or dissemination of any story that had an inflammatory or prejudicial effect upon the Manson trial processes. The contempt adjudication of which petitioner hereby seeks review was found only for this individual’s refusal, in an order to show cause proceeding brought almost two months after the conclusion of the Manson trial, to testify as to the identity of those who provided information to him in possible violation of the court’s publicity order. An inquiry to determine “. . . where lies the paramount interest” in weighing the relative importance of peti- tioner's First Amendment claim (see Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, page 4) must be limited to the conduct for which the contemnor was ordered incarcerated. When that is accomplished and all 1. In September 1971, Judge Older executed an affidavit in support of another order to show cause in re contempt issued against Mr. Farr. Judge Older therein charged that Farr acted in complicity with and promised to conceal the identity of those who violated the “publicity order.” Mr. Farr’s acquittal of all of those charges that have Sheppard implications was ordered in December 1971, by Judge Jefferson. 11 misconceptions are set aside, it can readily be seen that the true question before this Court is whether the importance of acquiring a news reporter's testimony in a yet-to-be instituted contempt proceeding against those who may have violated the court’s publicity order is so “overriding” and “compelling” as to justify an an- tagonism of the First Amendment. This Court, as Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in Branzburg vs. Hayes, supra, has repeatedly shown a “solicitude” for First Amendment freedoms. It has always required a painstakingly careful showing of a “serious and eminent,” “overriding,” “compelling,” or “clear and present” danger before permitting an intrusion upon the freedom of the press. Pennekemp vs. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L.Ed. 1295 (1946); Gibson vs. Florida Legislative Investment Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546, 83 S.Ct. 880 (1963); NAACP vs. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328; DeGregory vs. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 826, 86 S.Ct. 1148 (1966); Craig vs. Harney, 331 U.S 367, 67 S.Ct. 1239. We suggest thai particularly in light of the Court’s reticence to “annex the news media as an investigative arm of government” (Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Branzburg vs. Hayes, supra), and its sensitivity to the notion that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,” (Branzburg vs. Hayes, supra at page 681) a review of this proceeding by our highest court is in order. 12 a A careful analysis of this record will reveal that not even the Manson trial judge, at a time when he was closest to the proceeding, ever took the position that those matters that were the subject of this Court's concern in Sheppard vs. Maxwell, namely: (1) the existence of unfair and prejudicial news comment, and (2) the intrusion into the deliberative processes of such outside prejudicial influences or any other aspect of a defendant's right to a fair trial, were placed in issue or jeopardized in the Manson case by virtue of petitioner's refusal to violate his commitment of confidentiality to news sources. Judge Older was made aware by Mr. Farr that he had acquired the information in question from sources whose identity he was unwilling to disclose before an article concerning the same was published by petitioner's newspaper. At that time this trial judge put the entire matter into its proper perspective when he asked Mr. Farr if he would voluntarily reveal his sources of information, Stating: “And |! assure you that there is no compulsion whatever to do it. It is put on a purely voluntary basis. | won't think any the less of you or the Herald Examiner or anyone else if you say no. On the other hand, | think it would be something constructive, because | think it is important that a deliberate and willful violation of any court order be deait with. That is the reason | am asking you, not out of idle curiosity.” (In-Chambers Tr., October 8, 1970.) (Em- phasis added.) 13 The fact that Judge Older thought that “it would be something constructive” or that he was of the opinion that a wilful violation of “any lawful! court order” should be dealt with, is not sufficient to support the appellate court's determination that petitioner's First Amendment position must be balanced against a defendant’s right to a fair trial. (Emphasis added.) It is likewise respectfully submitted that the federal trial and appellate courts’ implicit premise that if the First Amendment is allowed to prevail in this particular proceeding, all future publicity orders would be ineffectua!, is an unfounded overstatement of this case. It suggests that not only do attorneys have a proclivity for violating court publicity orders and perjuring themselves when they do, but also ignores the other evidentiary avenues available to the court in a prosecution against those contemptuous of such court orders. it must also not be forgotten that newsmen remain subject to prosecution if they, in a conspiratorial fashion, collaborate with those acting in violation of court orders. In summary, the lower courts have addressed themselves to the prognostication of 4 danger too remote and improbabie to justify an abrogation of the fundamental notion that without the ability to promise confidentiality the news gathering ability of reporters is seriously retarded. We were warned in Craig vs. Harney, supra, that before an impairment of press freedoms will be tolerated, the danger established “. . . must not be remote or even improbable; it must immediately imperil.” (67 S.Ct. 1249. at 1255.) 14 we) EE Oe Oe ON — PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO BE FREE FROM THE PROCESSES OF AN EX POST FACTO LAW WERE VIOLATED BY THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF AN APPELLATE COURT'S DETERMINATION IN FARR VS. SUPERIOR COURT, 22 CAL. APP.3D, 60, 99 CAL.RPTR. 342 (1970) THAT THE CALIFORNIA IMMUNITY STATUTE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH IT WAS INVOKED BY PETITIONER. On October 7 and 8, 1970, petitioner, in reliance upon the First Amendment and California Evidence Code, Section 1070 promised confidentiality and acquired the Virginia Graham statement. Judge Older, by his advice in chambers on October 8, 1970, judicially reenforced the only reasonable interpreta- tion that could have been placed upon the then unadulterated language of that California immunity statute.2 2. At the time here involved, Section 1070 read: “A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, or by a press association or wire service, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a court, the Legislature, or any administrative body, for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured for publication and published in a newspaper. Nor can a radio or te'evision news reporter or other person connected with or employed by a radio or television station be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured for and used for news or news commentary purposes on radio or television.” 15 At the time petitioner relied upon and invoked California Evidence Code, Section 1070 in promising confidentiality, gathering his information and in refusing to answer the questions that gave rise to his contempt adjudication, he was entitled to rely on the clear and precise wording of that legislation. Accordingly, it is a most blatant violation of due process for petitioner to now face imprisonment because he did not anticipate that the appellate court would, more than a year later, say that a statute which read, “a... reporter. . . cannot be adjudged in contempt by a court” (emphasis added) does not mean that at all, but it instead means just the opposite, namely that: “a reporter will be adjudged in contempt by a court for refusing to disclose his sources of information.” The unforeseeable state court interpretation of a statute when applied retroactively so as to subject an individual to liability for past conduct that was permissible at the time he acted, deprives that citizen of fair warning of the consequences of his conduct as demanded by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Bouie vs. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (1964); James vs. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 81 S.Ct. 1052. Petitioner concedes that if, as the Federal District Court erroneously reported, he refused to answer the questions at issue, asserted the immunity statute and was adjudicated to be in contempt for such refusal after the California Appellate Court found Section 1070 to be 16 ~~ ae ad unconstitutional, there would be no vioiation of due process or of the prohibitions against ex post facto. This, however, was simply not the case. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the District Court correctly found the record on this issue. Petitioner, however, respectfully submits that the federal trial court seriously erred and cornpletely misconstrued the state of the record, the issue before it and petitioner's position on this matter when it commented, “. . . he was, on two occasions after his claim of privilege and immunity had been rejected by the California Appellate Courts, again afforded the oppor- tunity to answer and thereby purge himself. His refusals then constitute the contempt for which he is committed. Petitioner presents no constitutional claim on this issue.” (Emphasis added.) Mr. Farr was not found in contempt after his matter had been reviewed by the California Appellate Court. Just to the contrary, he invoked the immunity statute, refused to disclose his sources of information, and on July 28, 1971, was found to be in contempt and ordered committed. It was not until December 17, 1971, that the California District Court of Appeal, unforeseeable and after the fact determined that the statutory protection afforded petitioner more than a year earlier should be cancelled and taken from him. No new or further contempt proceed- 17 ings were thereafter instituted.3 It is no answer to say that petitioner knows now that he may not refuse to answer. That simply begs the issue and has no bearing upon the July 28, 1971 contempt adjudication for which he was, on August 4, 1974, sentenced and fined. Any reporter who today invokes and acts in reliance upon California Evidence Code, Section 1070 is given fair warning of Farr vs. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App.3d 60, 99 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1970). This petitioner was not. He must not be punished because he could not foresee that a later appellate court ruling would completely change the meaning of the statute or that the trial judge would ultimately reverse his interpretation of that statute long after publication of the material in question occurred. This Court, in Raley vs. The State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1950) admonished that: “To now punish for conduct which was innocent when performed would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the court. . . convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege or a right which the court had clearly told him was available to him.” 3. Mr. Farr’s contempt was adjudicated on July 28, 1971, as the result of his failure to answer certain questions during testimony that he gave on June 3, and July 19, 1971, in an order to show cause proceeding issued May 5, 1971. The two occasions to which the Federai District Court referred wherein Farr was again “afforded an opportunity to answer and thereby purge himself’ were hearings held by Judge Older on November 16. and November 27. 1972. His continual refusal to disclose his sources on those occasions were not visited with additional contempt orders 18 tT PETITIONER WAS DENIED A HEARING BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL COURT AS DEMANDED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND- MENT. A review of the entire record that has evolved in this matter reflects that petitioner's contempt was ad- judicated by a trial judge who became so intimately involved in the prosecution of petitioner and as a party in the lawsuit against him that he did not provide to the proceedings the impartial trial judge required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The order to show cause proceeding was initiated and presided over by Judge Older approximately seven months after he questioned petitioner in his chambers and advised him prior to publication that he had a right to rely upon California Evidence Code, Section 1070 in refusing to disclose his sources of information. Less than two months after finding petitioner's contempt in the order to show cause proceeding that he himself instituted, this same trial judge executed an affidavit in support of a new order to show cause in re contempt (see footnote 1) charging petitioner with having acted in complicity with those who violated the order. Even though Mr. Farr was acquitted of such charges when tried in December 1971 before the Honorable Bernard Jefferson, as aforesaid, Judge Older thereafter persisted in accusing him of having so acted. On 19 November 27, 1972, Jude > Older erroneously reported in open court that Mr. Farr himself, testified that: _. he set out deliberately to subvert the lawful publicity order by soliciting these persons who were subject to the order to violate it. . .” (In-Chambers Tr., November 27, 1972, page 17, lines 16-19.) It is felt that a reading of the transcripts of the hearings Judge Older conducted on November 16, and November 27, 1972, and specifically the summary and angry manner in which he ruled on various motions made by petitioner's counsel reflects the extent to which this Judge feels that he has been vilified by petitioner's refusal to violate his commitment of confidentiality. Effort was made on petitioner's behalf in the Federal District Court to augment the record on this issue by providing Judge Older’s testimony that, in an effort to develop and find petitioner's contempt, he had, on numerous occasions, from the very inception of the entire proceeding, acted in secret collaboration with the Deputy County Counsel representing respondent. This County Counsel, however, objected to providing Judge Older's testimony, representing to the Court that Judge Older was his client and that any communications concerning this case that had taken place between the two of them were privileged by virtue of their 20 attorney-client relationship. The objection was sus- tained.4 The United States Supreme Court has made” it abundantly clear that contempt hearings, in order to satisfy the constitutional requisite of due process, must be heard before a judge other than the prosecuting judge, unless an emergency situation pertaining to proceedings immediately pending require an instant citation and adjudication. This principle was articulated in Mayberry vs. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499 (1971), and Johnson vs. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971). The critical element which disqualifies a judge in contempt proceedings and as a result of said disqualifi- cation precludes a summary disposition of the contempt matter is the existence of bias on the part of the judge. As the Court recognized in United States vs. Meyer, 462 Fed.2¢ 827 (1970), it is the existence of bias and not the source thereof which is controlling. In a well-reasoned opinion, which will be followed closely by petitioner in the remainder ot the argument on this point, the Court in Meyer ohserved that a judge who adopts an adversary 4. The County Counsel (Mr. William Stewart) stipulated at a hearing held in the within matter on December 1, 1972, in the Federal District Court, that he and Judge Older met on several occasions prior and subsequent to the issuance of the Findings and Order of Commitment without the presence of petitioner or his counsel. He, however, invoked the attorney-client privilege in refusing to disclose the content of their conversations concerning thts proceeding. 21 posture vis-a-vis the alleged contemnor is disqualified and summary proceedings for contempt may not be held. The Court stated at page 841 as follows: “The due process requirement of disposition by an impartial judge is threatened, not only when the contempt is of such a personal nature as to create actual embroilment or the likelihood of perswnal engagement of the feelings of the trial judge, but also when the judge adopts an adversary posture with respect to the alleged contemnor, even if he has not been personally attacked. . .” (Emphasis added.) It is appropriate to refocus attention on the problem as it exists in the present case: The petitioner was a witness at an investigative hearing. He refused to answer questions at said investigative hearing. He was immediately cited for contempt. However, the actual finding of contempt and the sentence imposed did not occur until nine days after the investigative hearing itself was over. Under those circumstances, and given the extent of the trial judge’s participation in the initiating processes of the investigative hearing, the subsequent contempt proceedings against petitioner and the posture he maintained after learning that petitioner was no longer a reporter on the staff of the Herald Examiner, it is respectfully submitted that due process required that Judge Older disqualify himself from hearing the contempt in question. The factual questions presented, specfically on the issue of wilfullness and the availability of legisiative and constitutional protections, may very 22 fea Sait well have been decided differently by a trial judge who was nota “client” in the action. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing authorities and arguments, it is respectfully urged that this Court issue its Writ of Certiorari in the within matter. Respectfully submitted, MARK HURWITZ, Attorney for Petitioner 23 EXHIBIT “A” IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WILLIAM T. FARR, CIVIL NO. 72-2858-RJK Petitioner, Vv. ) MEMORANDUM OF PETER J. PITCHESS, ) SHERIFF OF LOS ) DECISION ANGELES COUNTY, ) ) AND ) Respondent. ) ORDER This proceeding in habeas corpus, together with an application for release of petitioner on his own recognizance, was filed November 30, 1972, by Mark E. Hurwitz, Esq., as attorney for petitioner. At a conference in chambers on that date counsel for petitioner and William F. Stewart, Esq., Deputy County Counsel, representing respondent, agreed that there were no disputed issues of fact. It was then stipulated by counsel that an order issue forthwith directing respon- 24 dent, at 9:30 A.M. on December 1, 1972, to show cause why petitioner should not be ordered discharged from the detention and restraint by respondent. At a hearing on December 1, 1972, on the order to show cause and on petitoner’s application for release on his own recognizance the respondent filed his return comprised of points and authorities in opposition and a copy of his Brief For Respondent In Opposition, theretofore filed in the Supreme Court of the United States. Counsel thereupon agreed in open court that the matter should be determined by the Court upon a record of certain agreed documents thereafter to be filed with the Court, the list of such documents being noted below. The Court thereupon denied without prejudice peti- tioner's application for release on his own recognizance and, agreeably to counsel, ordered that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus stand submitted upon the filing with the Clerk of the Court, by counsel, of a joint certificate that all documents constituting the agrecd record had been filed. In the course of the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, petitioner and respondent again assured the court that no disputed factual issues were presented, with one possible exception. Petitioner suggested as an exception that there might be an issue of fact as to when, where and what meetings or conferences had occurred between counse! for respondent and Honorable Charles H. Older, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Los Angeles, during and prior to the 25 proceedings which resulted in the Order of Commitment which is here challenged by petitioner. Counsel for respondent offered to stipulate, which was approved by the Court, that there had been such meetings and conferences but counsel for respondent deciined to disclose the conversations which occurred in this connection. The Court thereupon announced its reserva- tion of ruling on the question of whether an evidentiary hearing should be held to elicit the substance of such conversations. On December 4, 1972, there was filed an Amended Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus, to which respondent, on December 8, 1972, filed his return in traverse of all claims for relief. Again it is noted that no issues of fact, with tne possible exception recited above, are raised. The parties lodged with the Clerk of the Court the Documents referred to above (or copies thereof deemed authentic) and, pursuant to certificate of counsel establishing that the record is complete, the Court is of the understanding that the full agreed record has been lodged; the entirety thereof has been fully reviewed by the Court. The agreed record is comprised of the following: 1. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES H. OLDER on June 30, 1971. 2. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE and AFFIDAVIT OF JUDGE CHARLES H. OLDER, dated September 21, 1971. 26 Leh ict ell 3. RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR HEARING in The Supreme Court of the State of California. 4. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, in the Supreme Court of the United States (included are Appendices A through 1): Appendix A - Reporter's Transcript of In-Chamber’s Procededings of October 8, 1970; Reporter's Transcripts of Hearings of June 3, 1971, June 30, 1971, and July 19, 1971; Order Re Publicity filed by the Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Los Angeles on December 10, 1969, and Declaration of William Farr, executed by him on may 28, 1971. Findings and Order Adjudging Con- tempts; Order of Commitment; Order to Show Cause, dated May 5, 1971; Declaration of Donald K. Byrne and Robert K. Steinberg; 7 The Opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One; reported at 22 Cal. App. 3d 60 (1971); Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F 27 Appendix G - Order of Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, Modifying Opinion and Denying Petition for Rehearing, reported at 22 Cal. App. 3d 60 (1971); Appendix H - Order Denying Hearing - California Supreme Court; Appendix | - California Evidence Code § 1070. 5. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One. 6. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS in the California Supreme Court; 7. SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS in the California Supreme Court. 8. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETI- TION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI in The United States Supreme Court. 9. REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING BEFORE JUDGE CHARiES H. OLDER on November 17, 1972. 10. REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING BEFORE JUDGE CHARLES H. OLDER on November 27, 1972. From the agreed record it appears that this petition for writ of habeas corpus arises out of the trial in the Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Los Angeles of Charles Manson and his codefendanis 28 bow. CarBuatty isi pointe . on charges involving two sets of multiple murders. Upon a finding by the Superior Court that “the dissemination by any means of public communication of any out-of- court statements’1/ relating to the Manson trial might prejudice the Manson defendants’ right to a fair trial, Judge William B. Keene entered an Order Re Publicity effective December 10, 1969. In substance, “(t)he order prohibited any attorney, court employee, attache, or witness from releasing for public dissemination the content or nature of the testimony that might be given at trial or any evidence the admissibility of which might have to be determined by the court.”2/ On October 5, 1970, a written statement by Virginia Graham, a potential witness, relating confessions made to her by her cellmate, Susan Atkins, a Manson codefendant, was obtained by Stephen R. Kay, a Deputy District Attorney assigned to the Manson case. The statement implicated Manson and revealed purported plans of the Manson “family” to murder several show business personalities. Pursuant to the trial court's order, each attorney of record and the trial court judge received one copy of the statement. No other copies were released. Petitioner, who was then a reporter for the LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER received two copies of the Graham statement on October 7, 1970. He obtained another the following day, October 8, 1970. Upon learning from Virginia Graham's attorney that Farr nossessed the statements, the Honorable Charles H. Older, who was presiding over the Manson trial, called petitioner Farr into his chambers. Before requesting Farr to reveal voluntarily his sources of the Graham statement, Judge Older stated: “Another aspect, Mr. Farr, if | were to call you to the witness stand, for example, or someone would subpoena you to testify to these matters, you could of course assert, or refuse to disclose your news under 1070, which provides that you cannot be adjudged in contempt by a court for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured for publication and published in newspapers. “It does not say you cannot be called. The point I’m making is this, while | could not order you, that is, effectively order you to disclose the source, there is nothing to prevent you in the interest of justice and in aid of the administration of justice from voluntarily revealing it without waiving any right in the future to assert that immunity or privilege.’3/ Petitioner advised Judge Older that he would have to defer answering “because | feit it probably will be something that the company (The Los Angeles Herald Examiner) prefers that | ask the company attorney.”4/ Judge Older also requested that the Herald Examiner not publish anything pertaining to any of the Manson defendants as revealed in the Graham statement. Neither request was complied with and the next day, October 9, { 1970, a story bearing Farr’s by-line and entitled, “Liz, Sinatra on Slay List - Tate Witness,” was published in the Herald Examiner. Inciuded in the published articles were portions of the Graham statement theretofore ruled by the Court as inadmissible against the Manson defendants. Seven months later, after judgment of guilty had been entered in the Manson case, Judge Older issued an Order to Show Cause on May 5, 1971, commanding petitioner to “show cause why he should not be compeiled to disclose which person or persons released to him the transcript of the statement of Virginia Graham on or about October 3, 1970."5/ Petitioner, with his counsel, appeared at Hearings held on June 3, June 30, and July 19, 1971. Farr, no longer employed as a reporter, revealed that he had received transcripts of the Graham statement from two of the six attorneys of record in the Manson case and one from another source who was subject to the Order Re Publicity. Petitioner refused to identify by name or in any further manner his sources. On July 28, 1971, petitioner was found in contempt of court and was ordered committed to the Los Angeles County jail until he agreed to divulge his sources. Execution of the commitment order was stayed by order of the trial court pending appeal. Petitioner then sought a writ of review with the California Court of Appeal. An alternative writ issued and 31 after oral argument a written opinion of the Court of Appeal affirmed Judge Older’s Judgment of Contempt. The court based its affirmance upon its finding that California Evidence Code § 1070, if applied to grant Farr immunity, would unconstitutionally infringe upon the inherent power of the court to control its own proceedings.6/ On March 20,1972, a Petiiion for Hearing by the California Supreme Court was denied.7/ On July 12, 1972, a Petition for Rehearing was denied by the California Court of Appeal.8/ Thereafter, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, was sought before the United States Supreme Court. On November 13, 1972, that, too, was denied.9/ On November 14, 1972, Judge Charles H. Older issued an order vacating the stay of execution of the Order of Commitment and ordered Farr to appear before Judge Older on November 17, 1972, either to purge himself of contempt or surrender himself into custody pursuant to the terms of the Order of Commitment. On November 16, 1972, Farr appeared, again refused to disclose his sources of the Graham statement and was remanded into custody. | That same day, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Court of Appeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One. That court ordered Farr released on his own recognizance pending its determination. On November 21, 1972, Farr's 32 ; | habeas corpus petition was denied and Farr was ordered remanded to custody. The same day, Farr’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed with the California Supreme Court, together with a petition to release Farr on his own recognizance pending determination of the application for the writ; the Supreme Court took no action on the pendente lite application. However, Judge Older, on November 21, 1972, issued a stay of execution of sentence a ‘ ordered Farr and the attorneys of record in the Manson trial to appear before him on November 27, 1972. Each attorney, under oath, denied giving Farr the Statement, each denied having exacted from Farr any promise of confidentiality, and each expressly released him from any such confidentiality. Thereafter, Farr again refused to reveal his sources of the Graham statement and he was, thereupon, remanded to custody. On November 29, 1972, the California Supreme Court denied Farr’s habeas corpus petition without opinion. On November 30, 1972, Farr filed in this Court his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court has reviewed independently and in detail the entire record and finds that petitioner has failed to establish any right to relief here. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES Before a United States District Court can act on any Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus it must be satisfied that the petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is properly before the Court. Unquestionably, petitioner is a person in custody pursuant to a Judgment of a State Court; also, he has alleged that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of The United States of America, Addition- ally, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) requires: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.” And, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (c) provides: “an applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” The above requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are based on the legislative judgment that “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the State courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr vs. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (overruled in other respects, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Exhaustion of remedies is a doctrine of comity and not one of jurisdiction. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). 34 So The petition (and amended petition) for writ of habeas corpus and the agreed record in this case must be sifted to determine what issues are here presented, and of those, which have and have not been previously raised and determined in the State courts. Vonsiserations of comity arise in this connection. In his amended habeas corpus petition Farr asserts the following four grounds for relief: (a) The Order adjudging petitioner in contempt is void because he was denied a fair trial before an impartial court as required by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. (b) Petitioner was deprived of his First Amendment constitutional rights by being adjudged guilty of contempt for refusing to provide information that was protected by that Amendment. (c) The record in this case reveals the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the trial judge and a shocking denial of due process — convicting petitioner for invoking an immunity which the trial judge clearly advised was available to him. (d) Petitioner is being deprived of his liberty without due process of law because he can no longer purge himself by supplying the requested information, the court no longer having the ability to prosecute for a contempt those subject to its Order Re Publicity. Having reviewed the record herein, the Court is satisfied that grounds (b), (c) and (d) have been fairly 35 presented to the California State Courts so as to meet the exhaustion prerequisite. Although it appears from the record that ground (a) was argued on direct review in briefs filed by amici curiae in the California Court of Appeal and by petitioner in his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari submitted to the United States Supreme Court, the record reveals that petitioner has never properly raised ground (a) before the California State Courts. In fact, Grant Cooper, Esq. then counsel for petitioner, at the Hearing held on June 3, 1971, expressiy waived any challenge to Judge Older presiding over the contempt proceedings. Moreover, the California Court of Appeal suggested that objections by amici curiae to Judge Older presiding over the contempt proceedings were not properly before the court as no objection on that ground was made in the trial court.10/ In his amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this Court petitioner asserts that ground (a) was first raised in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One. In that petition for writ of habeas corpus Farr relied upon the following grounds: “(1) Inasmuch as the Statute of Limitations now bars a prosecution for contempt as against those persons who were subject to the Order re Publicity which was the purpose for which the Order to Show Cause proceeding, with which we are herein involved, was instituted, it is no longer in petitioner's power to 36 perform the act he was previously ordered to perform. Consequently, petitioner's continued con- finement is in violation of his right under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the cases cited herein. “(2) The petitioner has been incarcerated without Due Process of Law in that the trial court was without jurisdiction to institute contempt proceed- ings and to thereby convict petitioner for his refusal to answer questions that the same trial court previously advised him he had a right to refuse to answer. “(3) The said William T. Farr was not at any time during the proceedings in question nor was he at any time during the In-Chambers Proceeding, of which was admitted into evidence in the within proceed- ings apprised by the trial court of his right to refuse to testify under the California Constitution or the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution.” The second ground recited above cannot be said even remotely to equate with a contention of bias and lack of impartiality. In fact, as the argument shows,11/ Farr was not contending that Judge Older was biased or prejudiced but that Farr was entrapped by Judge Older’s statements made on October 8, 1970, that he could not be forced to reveal his sources of the Graham Statement. In no sense can this be considered the substantial equivalent of a contention that the trial judge was 37 disqualified to hear and decide the contempt pro- ceedings. It appears that petitioner first presented the issue of lack of impartiality in his supplemental petition for habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court on November 29, 1972. Viewing petitioner's charge of bias and lack of impartiality most favorably to the petitioner, it is arguable that Judge Older’s alleged bias revealed itself, for the first time, at the November 27, 1972, Hearing before Judge Older. Allegedly, Judge Older’s conduct at that Hearing indicates that he had assumed an adversary posture. In retrospect, giving this revelation and the history of these proceedings, other supportive indica- tions of impartiality may allegedly be gieaned from the record. Assuming this to be the case, it is also arguable that Farr had no chance to raise the impartiality issue before the California courts except in his supplemental petition for habeas corpus filed with the Supreme Court of California. By November 27, 1972, the California Court of Appeal had denied Farr’s petition for habeas corpus and Farr had filed his petition for habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. Assuming all of the above to be true, since the California Supreme Court denied Farr’s petition for habeas corpus without an opinion on November 29, 1972, it is obvious that that court could not have considered Farr's allegations of impartiality filed the same day. Assuming the lack of impartiality issue had been considered by the California Supreme Court, the exhaustion of State remedies stil! would not have been satisfied. As pointed out above, the lack of impartiality issue was first raised in Farr’s supplementary petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. That Court denied the writ without an opinion. California appellate courts have the discretion to refuse to exercise jurisdiction when a habeas corpus petition presents issues not raised in the appropriate lower court. See In re Hiilery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293, 294, 20 Cal.Rptr. 759 (1962). Thus, when a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court presents an issue not raised in the California Appellate Court, as here, and the California Supreme Couri denied the writ without an opinion, the Federal courts must presume that the denial was premised on the procedural deficiency and not the merits. Rogers v. Nelson, 300 F. Supp 421, 422(N.D. Ca. 1969); See Baskerville v. Neison, 455 F. 2d 430 (9th Cir. 1972); Turner v Lloyd, 439 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1971). Consequently, this issue should not properly be considered here, even assuming that the lack of impartiality issue was presented to the California Supreme Court. It is noted that petitioner asserted in these proceedings the right to an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether conversations between Judge Older and the Deputy County Counsel showed a disqualifying bias on 39 the part of the judge who made the finding of contempt and imposed the Order of Commitment. This question having been reserved by this Court it is now ordered that no such hearing is necessary or proper and that none be held. For this Court to engage in a first instance inquiry into the conduct of a State Court trial judge, where none was requested or had in the State tribunals, would constitute the grossest affront to the fundamentals of comity. If there is to be such a hearing, let it be held as a necessary part of petitioner's State remedy. Upon a record made in the State court petitioner might conceivably have emerged with a claim of constitutional dimension as it relates to the alleged impartiality of the trial judge. If so, a California tribunal should first have had an opportunity to consider it. Thereafter, it might be appropriate for consideration here. Even the view most favorable to petitioner of the record here and of the proferred showing of conversations between Judge Older and the Deputy County Counsel leaves him far short of such a claim. He reiies on Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), and Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971). They are inopposite to the case at bar. The record here and any presumed result of an evidentiary hearing suggests no basis of personal embroilment or grievance on the part of the judge; he was neither reviled nor insulted by the contemnor. He exercised no discretion in making his order of commitment — he applied the classic and only 40 appropriate order in a case of civil contempt. No constitutional question is thereby presented in this proceeding. In any event, petitioner has failed in the required exhaustion of his State remedies on this issue. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). THE ISSUES HERE CONSIDERED ON THE MERITS The remaining issues raised by petitioner were adequately pursued in the State courts. They are now considered. Petitioner's ground (b), as alleged in his Amended Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus, claims the protection of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In effect, petitioner asserts that as a “newsman” he has a constitutional immunity against compelled disclosure of his news sources. He recognized that the Supreme Court has recently held to the contrary, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1971). He seeks to distinguish and make inapplicable here this case by pointing out a claimed difference between Grand Jury interrogation of a newsman’s sources and inquiry, as here, by a Court concerning the violation of its Order. It appears to the Court that Branzburg applies here a fortiori. For here we have posed the question of whether, assuming some form of First Amendment protection for the newsman’s source, it must not yield to a higher value, i.e., to the due process guarantee of a fair trial to a defendant in acriminal case. 41 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), at 359, laid upon State court trial judges in the most stringent terms the obligation in a first degree murder trial “to control the releases of leads, information and gossip to the press by police officers. witnesses and counsel for both sides.” The trial court’s failure to do so in Sheppard resulted, on a habeas corpus proceeding, in reversal by the Supreme Court twelve years after petitioner's conviction. The trial court's failure to control the dissemination of news presented a compelling case, the Court found, of the defendant’s deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes concluded that the Grand Jury's need for a newsman’'s testimony was essential to initiate a possible criminal trial. How much greater is the requirment that a trial court be able to compel a newsman’s disclosure to insure the Court's ability to nreserve the integrity of its own process in the conduct of an actual criminal trial in accordance with the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The Manson trial, involving charges of two multiple murders, was the subject of much sensational notoriety. The “news” as to which petitioner claims disclosure of his source is constitutionally protected was contained in the statement of a potential witness which recited in substance: “that Susan Atkins, a codefendant in the murder prosecution, had confessed the crimes to Mrs. Graham in 42 } } ‘ , a ; . ; Winn ici inci. he ee Debt tha Ses lurid detail and implicated Manson; that the defendants planned after the murders to cross the country by bus and in the course of their travels to murder people at random; that Miss Atkins purportedly told Mrs. Graham that she and her codefendants had planned to murder a series of show business personalities each in a particularly vicious and bizarre manner; that, inciuded in the list of intended victims were Elizabeth Taylor whose eyes were to be removed and mailed to her (ex)husband; Richard Burton who was to be castrated; that Frank Sinatra was to be skinned alive whie hanging from a meat hook, and that Tom Jones’ throat was to be cut while he was engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with Miss Atkins at knife point if necessary. Steve McQueen was also mentioned as a potential victim.” See Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App. 3d 60, 64, 99 Cal.Rptr. 342, 344 (1971). lf some test of “lurid details” be necessary to bring the Manson case within the purview of Sheppard, the record is not lacking in this regard. No case could present a more compelling need to protect the defendant against prejudiciai publicity. Sheppard is conclusive on peti- tioner’s First Amendment claim. Further, as Branzburg makes clear — "the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.” Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 685 (citing cases). Petitioner claims denial of due process in that the trial judge entrapped him. He claims that his refusal to answer the questions put to him was done in reliance upon a 43 newsman's privilege under the California Evidence Code, of which Judge Older advised him. The record discloses, aS noted above, that Judge Older, on the day before newspaper publication of the material obtained by Farr, advised him that under the California Evidence Code there could be no compulsion for him to disclose his source. However, on the occasion some seven months later when petitioner (no longer a newsman) refused to answer concerning his source, he had the advice of counsel and the Court itself told petitioner that his refusal to answer was on pain of contempt and commitment. The disposition of this issue by the California Court of Appeal based on an interpretation of a California Statute, its legislative history and the finding of non-application to petitioner, raises no constitutional issue here. The finding there, based on a full record, is dispositive here. Unlike Raley v. State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1950), where the contemnor was Clearly misled, the petitioner here was found in contempt for refusing to answer questions as to which he was expressly told by the Court he had no right to refuse. He was, on two occasions after his claim of privilege and immunity had been rejected by California Appellate courts, again afforded the opportunity to answer and thereby purge himself. His refusals then constitute the contempt for which he is committed. Petitioner presents no constitutional claim on this issue. Petitioner claims a violation of his constitutional right 44 to due process of law in being required to answer questions concerning violations of the Court’s Order Re Publicity because no action can now be taken against those who allegedly violated the Order. This is a question exclusively within the competence of State tribunals. It was raised by petitioner before the California Court of Appeals in his petition for writ of habe. s corpus and also in his similar petition before the California Supreme Court. Treating this issue as having been properly presented in the State courts it was there disposed of. There is no showing here that the contempt proceedings were or are moot or idle. It is for the California Courts to determine whether petitioner's responses are relevant and necessary in connection with residual significance of the Order Re Publicity and action with regard thereto. No constitutional question is presented by petitioner in connection therewith. For all of the foregoing reasons, iT iS ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be and the same is hereby denied as is the application for release of petitioner on his own recognizance. IT 1S FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter this Order and thereupon to serve upon counsel for petitioner and for respondent a copy thereof. DATED: Decmeber 18, 1972 Robert J. Kelleher United States District Judge 45 FOOTNOTES: 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ ORDER RE PUBLICITY, Appendix “C”, Farr's Petition For Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court at p. 163. Farr v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.App. 3d 60, 63, 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (1971), hearing denied, California Supreme Court, March 20, 1972, cert. denied. 41 U.S.L.W. 3274 (November 13, 1972). Reporter's In-Chamber’s Transcript, October 8, 1970, Appendix “A”, Petition of Certiorari in The United States Supreme Court at p. 7. Supra, at p. 8. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, May 5, 1971, Appendix “E”, Petition for Writ of Certiorari in The United States Supreme Court at p. 200. Farr vs. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.App.32d at 70, 71, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 349, hearing denied, California Supreme Court (March 20, 1972), cert. denied 41 U.S.L.W. 3274 (November 13, 1972). Appendix “H”, Farr’s Petition for Writ of Cerii- orari in The United States Supreme Court ai p. 226. Appendix “G”, Farr’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court at p. 225. 46 9/ 10/ 11/ Farr v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), hearing denied, California Supreme (March 20, 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3274 (1972). Appendix “A”, Farr’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in The United States Supreme Court at p. 29. Farr’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Court of Appeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, at pp. 18.21. 47 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT : ’ A 7 FARR, ae Pctitioner-Appellant, vs. LNo. 72-3171 ‘2 J. Prrcuess, Sheriff of Los Angeles County, OPINION a Respondent-Appellee. ; { August 7, 1975} Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Before: BROWNING and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and McNICHOLS,*® District Judge MeNICHOLS, District Judge: i al presents the no-loager novel question regarding P., paths yr ninaiian afforded by the First Amendment “f press” provision to a newspaper reporter who reninta judicialls ordered disclosure of his news sources. William 5. I arr. pd Jant, is a newsman who was sent to jail by a California State Court after being adjudged in contempt for refusing to name the allegedly confidential supplicrs of certain information. Z — cessful in obtaining relief in the state courts, he sought a rit 0 Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court. senda tion was denied and the instant appeal ensued. Jurisdiction be 2 was based on 28 .U.S.C. §2254; our jurisdiction 1s found in U.S.C. §1291. The controversy initially arose against a background of - widely publicized Los Angeles trial of Charles Manson and he “family” for first-degree murder. The state trial judge, min c of his obligation to take such steps as the circumstances wee gee to insure a fair trial to the defendants, undertook to control t ; release of prejudicial information. To avoid publication of one . court statements, an order was promulgated prohibiting any at- *Honorable Ray MeNichols, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Idaho, sitting by designation. 48 = a Se Se WRREESCEOE I SEA. WS: William 7. Farr ws. torney, court attache, or witness from releasing for public cissem- ination the contents or nature of proposed trial testimony or other evidence. Subsequent to the entry of this order, and during the early course Of a lengthy trial, the Deputy District Attorney, having responsibility for the prosceution, obtained the written statement of one Virginia Graham, a potential witness. This statement pur- ported to report a confession made to Graham by Susan Atkins, a Manson co-defendant. The confession, as related, implicated’ Man- son and revealed plans by Manson and others to murder, in a most bizarre manner, several show business personalities, Pursuant to court directives, cach attorney of record and the judge were provided a transcript of the Graham statement. No other copies were to be released. The court found the statements to be inad- missible as evidence against the defendants. Enter the petitioner-appellant, William T. Farr, then a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, assigned to cover the Manson trial, A few days after the Groham statement had been delivered to counsel and determined to be inadmissible as evidence, Farr obtained two copies, apparently from two, separate indi- viduals. Word of this breach of security was somehow communi eated to the trial judge who summoned appellant to his chambers. An extensive co!loquy ensucd, the details of which are not. rele- vant here, in view of the disposition we make of the ease. It is sufficient to note that. Farr rejectod the invitation ef the Judge to disclose the name or names of these from whom he reecived COop- ies of the Graham statement. Farr indieated that he had promised confidentiality to the two persons involved. The following day’s edition of the Herald Examiner carried Farr's by-line over a story with full and lurid details curried from the supposed confession disclosed in the Graham statement. Seven months later, and one month after a jury verdiet against the Manson defendants had been entered, the trial judge formally ordered appellant to appear and show cause why he should not he compelled to diselose the names of the persons who had sup- plied him with copies of the Graham statement. The purpose of this proceeding was to uncover the identity of those persons vio- lating the publicity order. After a series of hearings at which the then living attorneys involved cach denied, under oath, having given the material to the newsman, and at which Farr continued 49 | Peter J. Pitchess to refuse to answer specific questions as to identity, appellant was adjudged to be in contempt and ordered incarcerated until he divulged the names. Appellant's brief raises four separately stated constitutional erounds for relief on each of which it is contended the trial judge erroneously ruled. We have determined that only the First Amendment issuc involving the construction and effect of the free press provision merits discussion.? Farr contends that, under the facts of this case, he had a right, protected by the First Amendment provision regarding free press, to refuse to disclose to the court the names of the individuals who had furnished him newsworthy information under a promise of confidentiality. In taking that position he concedes, as he must, that the persons, whose identity he protects, were, to his knowl- edge, forbidden by court order to supply the very information he reccived. It likewise must be accepted factually that the ostensible purpose of the court order was to protect the right of the Man- son defendants to a fair trial, free of prejudicial publicity. The pertinent language of the First Amendment to the Constitu- tion of the United States provides: “Congress shall make no laws ... abridging the freedom of specch or of the press; ... .”. Until, very recent times, it was not seriously thought by most that this provision of the First Amendment gave any personal right to a newspaper reporter to keep confidential his sources of informa- tion. Historically, freedom of the press, as guaranteed by the con- stitution, meant absence of restrained-upon publication usually prior to publication, i.c., eensorship. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir, 1958). A change has been in the making in more reeent times. Several states have enacted legislation aimed at carving out a privilege 1(a) Appellant contends he was deprived of his right to a fair trial because of the bias and prejudice of the state judge. (b) Denial of due process is predicated on a claim that the same trial judge misled and misinformed Farr as to the effect of an existing California State immu- nity statute. (¢) Denial of due process is purportedly bottomed on an argument that, because of the running of the statute of limitations, those who furnished the information to Farr can no longer be prosecuted for disobeving the court order against publicity, and appellant should no lonzer be required to purge himsclf of contempt. To the extent that these issues were properly before the district court, that court correctly found the reeord was clearly contrary to appellant’s contentions. 50 William T. Farr vs. against disclosure of news sources. The Congress of the United States has flirted with such legislation. More in point, the Su- preme Court of the United States has considered the question and appears to have fashioned at least a partial First Amendment shield available to newsmen who are subjected to various demands to divulge the source of confidentially secured information. Branzburg v. Ilayes, In re Pappas, and United States v. Cald- well, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), form a trilogy of cases reported to- gether and gencrally hereafter terminated Branzburg, wherein the Supreme Court faced the question of the right of the grand jury to require disclosure by newsmen. Justice White wrote for four justices and the short concurrence of Justice Powell was needed to obtain a plurality. The Branzburg court dealt precisely with the First Amendment free press provision as it affected testimony sought to be produced before a grand jur>v. However, the opin- ion appears to teach broadly enough to be applied to other civil or criminal judicial proceedings as well. Recent cases have so held. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D. C. Cir. 1974), petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 417 US. 938 (1974); United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf. Bursey v. United Statcs, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) at 1090, et seqy., on motion for rehearing. It is clear that Branzburg recognizes some First Amendment protection of news sources. The language of the ease likewise indi- cates that the privilege is a limited or conditional one. The pre- cise holding of Branzburg subordinated the right of the newsmen to keep secret a source of information in face of the more compel- ling requirement that a grard jery be abie to seeure factual data relating to its investigation of serious criminal conduct. The application of the Branzburg holding to non-grand jury cases seems to require that the claimed First Amendment privilege and the opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in light of the surrounding facts and a balance struck to determine where lies the paramount interest. The trial judge accurately read Branzburq and succinctly set the issue in his well-reasoned Memorandum of Decision and Order (at page 183 of the Clerk’s Transcript) : “It appears to the court that Branzburg applies here a fortiori. For here we have posed the question of whether, assuming some form of First Amendment protection for 51 Peter J. Pitchess the newsman’s source, it must not yield to a higher value, e., te the due process guarantee of fair trial to a defendant in @ criminal case.” As he prepared to conduct the trial in the Manson case, the state court judge issued an order regulating certain acts of the attorneys and court. personnel before him. The order, in the opin- ion of the judge, was necessary to preserve a fair trial for the defendants charged with a capital offense. The validity of that order was not questioned, but the order was flagrantly disobeyed. The court, in an attempt to discover which of the proscribed per- sons had violated the order, formally and fairly ordered the appellant to furnish the names of the violators. He unequivocally refused. This constituted a direct challenge to the power and duty of the court to protect its processes and to guarantee due process to the accused person. Thus, the First Amendment protection announced by Branzburg collided head-on with a compelling judicial interest in disclosure of the identity of those persons frustrating a duly entered order of the court. Thus, also, is presented the specific question raised by this appeal—which of these conflicting rights is paramount? In a criminal ease the trial judge has a duty and obligation’ to attempt to protect the right of the defendants to a fair trial, free of adverse publicity. Where the case is a notorious one, that burden on the court is heavy. The most practical and recom- mended procedure to insure against dissemination of prejudicial information is the entry of an order directing that attorneys, court personnel, enforcement officers and witnesses refrain from releasing any information which might interfere with the right of the defendant to a fair trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The language of the Sheppard court is not equivocal. The duty of the court to enter such orders and the authority for enforcement are spelled out: “If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must re- member that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regu- lation that will protect their processes from prejudicial out- side interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers 52 William T.. Farr vs. coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be per- mitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between coun- sel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly ecnsurable and worthy of diseiplinary measures.” Shep- pard v. Marwell, supra, at 363. As indicated, the purpose of climinating collaboration between counsel and the press is to protect the constitutionally guaranteed right of the ck fendants in criminal eases to due process by means of a fair trial. That constitutional right cannot be so pro- teeted if the authority of the court to enforce its orders is diluted. If the newsman’s privilege against disclosure of news sources is to serve as a bar to disclosure of the names of those who disobey the court order, then the court is powerless to enforce this method of eliminating encroachment on the due-process right of the de- fendants. The district court properly considered the factual situation, and struck a balance between the protection afforded appellant by the First Amendment and the necessity that the newsman’s source be revealed so that meaning could be given to the power and duty ot the court to enter enforceable orders to proveet the due-process right of accused persons. The court below concluded that the newsman’s privilege must yield to the more important and com- pelling need for disclosure. We hold that, under the facts presented by this record, the paramount interest to be protected was that of the power of the court to enforce its duty and obligation relative to the guarantee of due process to the defendants in the on-roing trial. Farr, therefore, was not constitutionally protected in his refusal to identify those who violated the proper order of the court. His ultimate decision to act on his mistaken belief and refusal to comply with the direct and proper questions directed to him by the court constituted contempt of a lawful order of that court. His subsequent incarceration was not in violation of any federally guaranteed constitutional right. The trial court did not err in dismissing the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Affirmed. EXHIBIT “C” FINDINGS AND ORDER ADJUDGING CONTEMPTS: SENTENCE PURSUANT TOC. C. P. 1218; ORDER OF COMMITMENT. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. In the Matter of William T. Farr, In Re Contempt. No. A 253,156. Original Filed: 8-6-74. This matter regularly coming on for hearing on punish- ment (Code of Civil Procedure Section 1218) before this court on July 29, 1974, pursuant to the court's order of June 21, 1974, and HURWITZ AND HURWITZ by MARK E. HURWITZ appearing as attorney for WILLIAM T. FARR, and argument, both oral and written, having been made on behalf of William T. Farr as to why he should not be punished for contempt and good cause appearing therefor, the court hereby finds: /. Upon noticed motion of this court, hearings were held on June 3, 1971, June 30, 1971, July 19, 1971, November 16, 1972 and November 27, 1972, for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person or persons who violated the court’s Order Re Publicity made 54 and entered in the case of People vs. Manson, et al., A253,156. 2. On July 19, 1971, William T. Farr in the course of the court's inquiry, refused to answer 13 separate questions after being directly ordered by the court to answer said questions under penalty of contempt for failure to do so. Said questions and William T. Farr’s statements in refusal to answer are set forth in the Findings and Order Adjudging Contempts made and entered by this court on July 28, 1971 (attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth). William T. Farr was held in contempt of the court for refusing to answer each of said thirteen (13) questions and on July 28, 1971, the court imposed a coercive sentence of confinement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1219 for the purpose of compelling the compliance of William T. Farr to the court's order. 3. The California Court of Appeals in Farr vs. Superior Court, 22 CA3d 60, affirmed the adjudication of contempt for William T. Farr’s refusal to answer the aforesaid thirteen (13) questions of the court and affirmed the imposition of the coercive sentence imposed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1219. 4. Since the original affirmance of the contempt adjudication, William T. Farr has pursued numerous appeals. There is currently an appeal pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 73-3171. William T. Farr served 46 days in coercive confinement until released by Justice William O. Douglas 55 of the U. S. Supreme Court pending disposition of his appeal before the Ninth Circuit. 5. This court's inquiry into the violation of the Order Re Publicity is a continuing one and has not been terminated. There presently exists a compelling and material need for the testimony of William T. Farr identifying the violators of the court’s order. This Superior Court in its memorandum decision filed on June 20, 1974, found that since the Manson case is still on appeal, any significant supplementation of the trial record (as this court has sought to do herein by identifying the violators of the Order Re Publicity) would still be useful. Therefore, this court finds that its inquiry is still relevant, material and viable. 6. The California Court of Appeal again upheld the adjudication of contempt in the case of Farr v. Pitchess, 36 CA3d 566. In this opinion, the Appellate Court ruled that if in a subsequent proceeding before the Superior Court, William T. Farr could establish that his continued incarceration pursuant to Code Civil Procedure Section 1219 would not accomplish the purpose of the order requiring him to reveal the identity of the persons who violated the trial court order prohibiting prejudicial pre-trial releases, then that commitment would cease to serve its coercive purpose. 7. On June 20, 1974, William Levit, Judge of the Superior Court presiding in Department 21 thereof, found that the order of commitment issued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1219 was no longer coercive in nature as there was no substantial likelihood that the confinement would produce the desired compliance. A hearing was thereupon set for July 29, 1974, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 64 for the purpose of determining whether William T. Farr should be punished for his contempts pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1218. 8. Each and every question asked William T. Farr set forth in Exhibit A is relevant and material to the issue before the court. William T. Farr had the knowledge and ability to answer each and every question at the time it was asked and had knowledge of the court’s order to answer each of said questions. William T. Farr willfully refused to answer said questions in disobedience of said orders. 9. That William T. Farr’s contempts in willfully refusing to answer said questions were a!l committed in the immediate view and presence of the court. 10. That William T. Farr by wilifully refusing to answer said relevant and material questions of the court, actively, knowingly, and willfully, interfered with and obstructed the lawful proceedings of the court. 11. During the hearings conducted on November 16th and 27th, 1972, William T. Farr was given the opportunity to purge himself of his contempts by answering the thirteen (13) questions during the hearing held on May 20th and 21st, 1974, before Judge Levit. 57 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that William T. Farr, having committed contempts of court for his willful refusal to answer the thirteen (13) questions set forth in the Findings and Order Adjudging Contempts entered by this court on July 28, 1971, shail, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure Section 1218, be punished for said contempt by imprisonment in the County Jail of Los Angeles County for a period of five (5)days and shall pay a fine of $500.00. In the default of the payment of said fine of $500, William T. Farr shall be imprisoned in the County Jail of Los Angeles County for an additional period at the rate of one day for each $20.00 of said fine; said sentence is to run consecutive to the five (5) day term of imprisonment heretofore imposed, above. IT iS FURTHER ORDERED that William T. Farr is committed to the custody of the Sheriff cf Los Angeles County for execution of said sentence. DATED: August 6, 1974 /s/ Charles H. Older CHARLES H. OLDER Judge of the Superior Court Findings and Order Adjudging Contempts Committed in the Immediate View and Presence of the Judge; Order of Commitment. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. In the Matter of William T. Farr, In re Contempt. No. A 253,156. Original Filed: 7-28-71. Upon noticed motion of this Court, hearings were held on June 3, June 30, and July 19, 1971, for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person or persons who committed acts in violation of the Court’s Order Re Publicity made and entered in the case of People vs. Manson, et al., A253,156. After considering the evidence introduced at said hearings, affidavits filed with the Court, and the Order Re Publicity, the Court makes the following findings and order: 1. On December 10, 1969, the Court made and entered an Order Re Publicity in the case of People vs. Manson, et al., A253,156. The aforesaid order spe- cifically prohibited any attorney for any part to that case, court employees or attaches, or witnesses from releasing for public dissemination the contents or na- ture of testimony that might be given in the trial. This order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Court finds that said Order was in force at all times mentioned herein. 2. The following named persons were attorneys of record on October 7, 1970, in the case of People vs. Manson, et al., A253,156, and at that time were sub- ject to the provisions of the Order Re Publicity made and entered in that case: Stephen R. Kay, Deputy District Attorney Vincent Bugliosi, Deputy District Attorney Donald A. Musich, Deputy District Attorney Daye Shinn, Atiorney for Susan Atkins I. A. Kanarek, Attorney for Charles Manson Paul J. Fitzgerald, Attorney for Patricia Krenwin- kel Ronald Hughes, Attorney for Leslie Van Houten 3. On October 5, 1970, a transcript of the pro- posed testimony of Virginia Graham, a prospective wit- ness for the prosecution in the case of People vs. Charles Manson, A253,156, was prepared by Stephen R. Kay, Deputy District Attorney. This transcript was prepared prior to any testimony by Miss Graham in open court and contained statements by Miss Graham that would be her probable testimony in the proceed- ing. Copies of this transcript of the complete statement of Virginia Graham were made and distributed to cach of the aforesaid attorneys of record in the case. Aside from the copy given to the Court, the aforesaid attor- neys were the only parties who received a copy of this transcript. At the time the copies of the transcript were distributed to the attorneys of record. the admissibility of the statements therein had not been determined by the Court. In fact, certain portions of said transcript contained statements by Miss Graham that implicated Susan Atkins and other co-defendants in the case of People vs. Charles Manson, ct al.. A253,156. that were not subsequently testified to by Miss Graham when she testified in open court on October 10. 1970. The Crder Re Publicity prohibited all of the aforesaid at. 60 torneys from revealing or releasing all or any portions of said transcript for public dissemination. 4. It appeared to the Court after considering the testimony of William Farr in chambers on October 8, 1970, and upen reading the affidavits of Donald Byrne and Robert Steinberg, that the Order Re Publicity had been violated by one or more of the attorncys in the case subject to the Order and that good cause existed for a further inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of said person or persons. On October 8, 1970, William Farr was employed as a newspaper reporter. It was not until after the con- clusion of the trial in People vs. Charles Manson, et al., that the Court learned, on or about May 5, 1971, that William Farr was no longer employed as a newspaper reporter but was, in fact, currently employed by the District Attorney’s Office. It therefore appeared to the Court that Mr. William Farr possessed relevant personal knowledge of the identity of said person or persons and that William Farr should be ordered to appear be- fore the Court as a witness. 5. Upon notice duly given, hearings were held on June 3, 1971, June 30, 1971, and july 19, 1971, for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person or persons acting in violation of the Court’s Order Re Publicity. Mr. William Farr appeared and testified pur- suant to Order of the Court on June 3 and July 19, 1971, and was represented by Counsel. 6. At the hearing on June 3, 1971, Mr. Farr intro- duced into evidence a Declaration in which he stated that prior to October 8, 1970. he obtained from con- fidential sources a transcript of the complete testi- mony of Virginia Graham taken on October 5. 1970. Mr. Farr further stated in said Declaration that he 61 was no longer employed as a newspaper reporter but was presently employed as the Press Secretary for the District Attorney of Los Angeles County. 7. On June 3, 1971, Mr. Farr testified under oath in court as follows: Reporter's Transcript, page 32, lines 20-27. Q. “Mr. Farr, by way of clarification of the previous question, you stated in your Declaration that you obtained from confidential sources the transcript of Miss Virginia Graham’s testimony. Did you receive the information from one or more of the attorneys of record in this case? A. “Yes, I did.” 8. On June 30, 1971, all of the aforesaid attorneys of record in the case of People vs. Charles Manson, et al., A253,156, with exception of Ronald Hughes, who was deceased, appeared in court and testified under oath in the matter. Each of said attorneys denied re- leasing or giving to William Farr any transcript of Vir- ginia Graham’s testimony of October 5, 1970. 9. On July 19, 1971, William Farr testified under oath in court as follows: Reporter's Transcript, page 13, lines 26 thru 32, page 14, lines 1] thru 9. QO. BY MR. STEWART: “By way of clari- fication, then, Mr. Farr, at least two of the sources of Virginia Graham’s transcript were attorneys of record in the case of People versus Manson? A. “That would be correct. Q. “By attorney of record. are you referring to an attorney who is actually on the record as having made a personal appearance in this court in the case of People versus Manson? A. “Yes. T am. 62 THE COURT: “Specifically; are you referring to those six attorneys I named just a few moments 2go? A. “I am specifically referring to that group.” Reporter's Transcript, page 16, line 24, to page 17, line 3. Q. “And all three copies of the transcript from the three different individuals you testified to were received prior to the time you wrote your article in the Herald-Examiner on October 9th? A. “That is correct. Q. “Which was also prior to the time that Virginia Graham testified in open court. Is that correct? A. “That would be correct also.” Reporter's Transcript, page 23, line 25, to page 24, line 2. THE COURT: “What he asked you was wheth- er or not the two copies you received on October 7th were received from the attorneys of record in the case. “Is that right, Mr. Stewart? MR. STEWART: “That is correct. THE WITNESS: “Yes, sir, they were.” Reporter's Transcript, page 45. THE COURT: “Mr. Farr, the Los Angeles Examiner published the story regarding the Man- son trial, and specifically based upon the state- ments of Virginia Graham, in October of 1970. is that true? 63 THE WITNESS: “Yes, your Honor, it is. THE COURT: “Did you write that story? THE WITNESS: “Yes, your Honor, I did. THE COURT: “And was the information con- tained in that story obtained solely by you from the statements that were given to you by who- ever these persons are that you have been talking about here today? THE WITNESS: “The story is generally based on the transcript. There is some information in the article that is not contained in that transcript. MR. COOPER: “That you obtained from an- other source. THE WITNESS: “From another source or sources. THE COURT: “Well, specifically I seem to re- call that in that Los Angcles Examiner article there were some references to some celebrities: Elizabeth Taylor, Frank Sinatra, and some other people whose names I do not now recall. “Were the namcs of these celebrities contained in the statements that you obtained from the two attorneys of record that you have testified to, and this third person, whoever that might be? THE WITNESS: “Yes, the names of Frank Sinatra. Elizabeth Taylor, Richard Burton, Steve McQueen and Tom Jones were included in that transcript. 10. From the foregoing testimony and the affidavit of William Farr, the Court finds that the Court's order Re Publicity has been willfully violated by one or more of the individuals subject to said Order; that William Farr has personal knowledge of the identity of said persons who gave him a copy of the transcript of Vir- 64 ~ ginia Graham’s proposed testimony in violation of the Order Re Publicity; and that William Farr has the pres- ent ability to reveal to the Court the identity of said persons. 11. On July 19, 1971, Mr. Farr testified under oath in court as follows: Reporter's Transcript, page 4, lines 21-27 BY MR. STEWART: Q. “Mr. Farr, at the hearing on June 3rd, 1971, I believe you testified that you were no longer a reporter employed by a newspaper. A. “That is correct. Q. “Now, is that correct today as well? A. “That is still correct, yes.” From the foregoing testimony of Mr. Farr, the Court finds that at the time of the hearing on July 19, 1971, Mr. Farr was not a newspaper reporter connected with or employed upon a newspaper, nor was he a news- paper reporter in any capacity. 12. On July 19, 1971, while the Court was in ses- sion and while William Farr was being examined under oath as a witness, the following questions were asked Mr. Farr, and each and every question he refused to an- swer. In each instance as indicated below, the Court ordered Mr. Farr to answer the question and warned him that his failure to do so would be a direct con- tempt of the Court. Mr. Farr refused and continues to refuse to answer said questions. Reporter's Transcript, page 8, lines 5-25 Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Did you receive them all at the same time? A. “The answer is no. 65 Q. “Did you receive them all the same day? A. “To the best of my recollection, yes. Q. “Did the transfer take place in this build- ing, The Hall of Justice? A. “Ll respectfully decline to answer pursuant to the provisions of Section 1070 of the Evidence Code and on the further ground that it is an im- pingement on the First Amendment. THE COURT: ‘I order you to answer the question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. MR. COOPER: “If your Honor please, I will stipulate that the same question has in fact been propounded to the witness again, and again, in the light of the Court's admonition, he will still respectfully decline to answer on the same grounds. THE WITNESS: “That is correct. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court, Mr. Farr, for failing to answer that ques- tion—for refusing to answer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 16, lines 1-18. THE COURT: Q. “Was the third person from whom you received the statement also an attorney of record in the case? THE WITNESS: “I respectfully decline to an- swer on the previously stated grounds. THE COURT: “I can’t see any basis whatever for refusing to answer that question. You already Stated that two of them are attorneys of record. “I order you to answer the question, Mr. Farr. under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. 66 MR. COOPER: “I will stipulate that the same question has been propounded to the witness and that he has declined to answer on the same grounds, your Honor. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court for failing and refusing to answer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 18, line 25, to page 19, line 25. OQ. BY MR. STEWART: “Was the actual transcript given you by the three sources trans- ferred to you personally, Mr. Farr? A. “Yes, it was. Q. “Was it a face-to-face encounter with cach of the three sources? A. “In one instance it was not. Q. “So, in two instances it was a face-to-face encounter with the individual in question? A. “That is correct. Q. “In the third case was it transferred by messenger or left— “First, was it transferred by messenger? A. “No, it was not. Q. “Was it left at a place where you could pick it up? A. “Yes, it was. Q. “Where was it left? A. “I respectfully decline to answer the ques- tion on the grounds previously stated. THE COURT: “I order you to answer the ques- tion, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of court for failing to do so. MR. COOPER: “If your Honor please. I will stipulate that the question has been propeunded 67 to the witness, and he has again declined to an- swer on the same grounds. THE COURT: “Do you refuse to answer the question on the same grounds? THE WITNESS: “Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: “All right. I find you in direct contempt of court for failing and refusing to an- swer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 30, line 17 to page 31, line 3. Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Well, then, did Mr. Fitzgerald give you a copy of the transcript of Virginia Graham’s testimony? A. “I respectfully decline to answer on the same ground as previously stated. THE COURT: “lI order you to answer the question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WiTNESS: “And I must again respectful- ly decline to answer on the prevous grounds. MR. COOPER: “If your Honor please, I will of- fer to stipulate that the same question was pro- pounded to him, and he gave the same answer. THE COURT: “Very well. I find you in direct contempt of Court for refusing and failing to an- swer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 33, line 20 to page 34, line 6 Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Mr. Farr, did you obtain a copy of the transcript of Virginia Gra- ham from Mr. Shinn? 68 A. “I respectfully refuse to answer that ques- tion on the grounds previously stated. THE COURT: “I order you to answer the question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “I repeat the refusal on the grounds previously stated. MR. COOPER: “I stipulate, if your Honor please, that the same question was propounded by the Court to the witness, and the witness again respectfully decline to answer the question. THE COURT: “Very well. I find you in direct contempt of Court, Mr. Farr, for failing and refus- ing to answer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 34, lines 7-20. Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Did you seceive a copy of the transcript of Virginia Graham from Mr. Kanarek? A. “I respectfully decline to answer on the grounds previously stated. THE COURT: “I order you to answer that question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found ‘in contempt of court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “I again must respectfully decline to answer on the grounds previously stated. MR. COOPER: “I offer to stipulate, if your Honor please, that the same question was in fact propounded to the witness, and he again declined to answer for the same reasons. THE COURT: “Very well. I find you in di- rect contempt of Court for failing to answer that question, Mr. Farr.” 69 Reporter's Transcript, page 34, line 21, to page 35, lirte 6. Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Did you obtain a copy of the transcript from Mr. Kay, Mr. Farr? A. “I respectfully decline to answer on the previously stated grounds. THE COURT: “I order you to answer the question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “I again respectfully decline to answer on the previously stated grounds. MR. COOPER: “TI stipulate, if your Honor please, that the same question was again pro- pounded to the witness, and he again respectfully declined to answer On the same grounds. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court, Mr. Farr, for failing to answer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 35, lines 7-21 Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Did you receive a copy of the transcript of Virginia Graham’s testi- mony from Mr. Bugliosi? A. “I respectfully decline to answer on the previously stated grounds. THE COURT: “I order you to answer the question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “Your Honor, I must again respectfully decline to answer on the previously stated grounds. MR. COOPER: “TI stipulate, if your Honor please, that the same question was again pro- 70 pounded to the witness, and the witness again re- spectfully declined to answer on the same grounds. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court, Mr. Farr, for failing to answer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 35, line 22 to page 36, line 7. Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Did you obtain a copy of the transcript of Virginia Graham’s testi- mony from Mr. Musich? A. “I respectfully decline to answer the ques- tion on the previously stated grounds. THE COURT: “I order you to answer the question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “I again must respectfully decline on the previously stated grounds. MR. COOPER: “I stipulate that the same question was again propounded to the witness, and the witness again respectfully declined to an- swer for the same reasons. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court, Mr. Farr, for failing to answer the ques- tion.” Reporter's Transcript, page 36, lines 8-23 Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Mr. Farr, who were the parties that were the sources of the transcripts of the testimony of Virginia Graham that you received on October 7th and October 8th. 1970? A. “I respectfully decline to answer on the previously stated grounds. 71 THE COURT: “I order you answer that ques- tion, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “I must again respectfully decline to answer on the previously stated grounds. MR. COOPER: “Stipulate that the same question was agaii propounded to the witness, and the witness again gave the same answer for the same reasons. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court for failing to answer that question, Mr. Farr.” Reporter's Transcript, page 40, line 18 to page 41, line 22 MR. STEWART: “Let me ask you a question that is limited directly then to the Virginia Graham transcript incident. Q. “Did you have a discussion with any of the attorneys of record to the effect that if they gave you a copy of Virginia Graham’s testimony, you would not reveal the source of the informa- tion? MR. COOPER: “I would object to that, if your Honor please, on the ground it has been asked and answered. “The witness has stated in connection with at least three occasions, with three attorneys of rec- ord, he did have such conversations. THE COURT: “I think it’s been covered, Mr. Stewart. Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Which attorney was it then, Mr. Farr? 72 A. “I respectfully decline to answer on the grounds as previously stated. MR. COOPER: “I think that has implicitly been asked and answered before, if your Honor pleasc. THE COURT: “Well, I will order Mr. Farr to answer that question, and I will change the ques- tion slightly. “Which attorney or attorneys was it? THE WITNESS: “Again, your Honor, I must respectfully decline to answer on the grounds pre- viously stated. THE COURT: “I order you to answer that question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “And I reiterate that I must refuse or decline to answer on the grounds pre- viously stated. MR. COOPER: “I will stipulate that it may be deemed that the same question has been pro- pounded to the witness, and he has again respect- fully declined to answer on the same grounds. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court, Mr. Farr, for failing to answer that ques- tion.” Reporter's Transcript, page 41, line 23 to page 42, line 15. MR. STEWART: “I have no further ques- tions, your Honor. MR. COOPER: “Does your Honor have any questions? THE COURT: “Yes I do, Mr. Cooper. “Did you receive any of the Virginia Graham 73 statements, Mr. Farr, from someone who was an associate of an attorney of record in the case? MR. COOPER: “May I check—if your Honor please. “I think you'd better decline to answer that. THE WITNESS: “I respectfuiiy decline to an- swer the question on the grounds as previously stated. THE COURT: “I order you to answer that question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being founda in contempt of Court for failing to do so. THE WITNESS: “I repeat my declination to answer on the previously stated grounds. MR. COOPER: “I will stipulate, if your Honor please, that the same question was pro- pounded to the witness, and he again declined to answer for the reasons heretofore stated. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court, Mr. Farr, for failing to answer that question.” Reporter's Transcript, page 42, line 16 to page 43, line 3. THE COURT: “Did you receive a copy of the Virginia Graham statement from anyone in the Office of the District Attorney of Los Angeles County other than the attorneys of record in this case, Mr. Bugliosi, Mr. Kay and Mr. Musich? THE WITNESS: “I respectfully decline to an- swer on the previously stated grounds. THE COURT: “I order you to answer that question, Mr. Farr, under penalty of being found in contempt of Court for failing to do so. 74 THE WITNESS: “I again repeat my refusal on the previously stated grounds. MR. COOPER: “I will stipulate, if your Honor please, that the same qucstion was put to the witness, and he again respectfully declined to answer for the same reasons. THE COURT: “I find you in direct contempt of Court for failing to answer that question, Mr. Farr.” The Court finds that each and every question asked William Farr as set forth above was relevant and material to the issue before the Court; that William Farr had the knowledge and ability to answer each and every question at the time it was asked; that William Farr had knowledge of the Court’s Orders to answer said questions; and that William Farr willfully refused to answer said questions in disobedience of said orders. The Court finds that at the time the above questions were asked, Mr. Farr was not a reporter con- nected with or employed upon a newspaper, nor a re- porter in any capacity, and that he is not entitled to claim immunity provided in Evidence Code Section 1070 and, further, that he is not entitled to refuse to answer the above questions on the basis of either Evi- dence Code Section 1070 or the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 13. On June 3, 1971, William Farr testified under oath as follows: Reporter's Transcript, page 10, line 25 to page 11, line 17 Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Now, Mr. Farr, were you covering the trial for the Herald-Examiner from its very beginning? 75 A. “Yes, I did. Q. “And you were familiar with the Order Re Publicity issued by the Court? A. “Yes, I was. Q. “Did you know whether or not the source of your information, as stated in your Declara- tion, was subject to the Order Re Publicity at the time he gave you the transcript? A. “May I confer with counsel? THE COURT: “Yes.” (Off the record discussion between the witness and Mr. Cooper.) MR. COOPER: “May we have that question re-read? THE COURT: “Read the question.” (Whereupon the reporter reads the pending question. ) THE WITNESS: “I think I can answer that by stating that I was aware that the attorneys in the case were subject to the gag order.” On July 19, 1971, William Farr testified under oath as follows: Reporter's Transcript, page 17, line 23 to page 19, line 5. MR. STEWART: “I don’t believe I asked him if the source of the information knew he was sub- ject to the order. I wanted to know if Mr. Farr knew the person was one of the parties covered by the order. MR. COOPER: “I would stipulate, if your Hon- or please, that he was covered by the order. THE WITNESS: “I misunderstood the ques- tion. Yes, I did know that. 76 Q. BY MR. STEWART: “You know that the third source of information was covered by the Court’s Order Re Publicity? | A. “I presume so. Yes, I did have knowledge.” Reporter's Transcript, page 20, lines 3-15. Q. “In any of the three cases, three instances where you received a copy of the transcript, did you initially contact the source and request a copy of the transcript, or did the source first contact you? MR. COOPER: “Pardon me, if your Honor please, I think I want to state this on the record with your permission. “I have instructed the witness that he could de- cline to answer this question on the ground that his testimony might tend to incriminate him, but he decided to waive that. I shouldn’t say waive it, but he is not going to urge that ground. THE WITNESS: “In all three instances, I made the initial approach.” Reporter's Transcript, page 9, line 11 to page 10, line 12. Q. BY MR. STEWART: “Mr. Farr, in your Declaration that you filed on May 28th, 1971, you stated that you gave your explicit promise to said sources that ‘I would never divulge the source of my information, and, implicitly, the promise of my said newspaper.” “Is that statement correct? A. “Yes, it is. 77 Q. “Did you give this exclusive promise face to face with the source of the information? A. “The answer would not be the same to all parties involved. Q. “Well, to any of the parties involved, was your promise made face to face with that person? A. “Yes, it was. Q. “As to how many of those parties was your promise made face to face? A. “Two of the three. Q. “And was the third one made by telephone or some means of communication? A. “This was made by telephone. Q. “And were these promises made prior to the receipt of the transcript of Virginia Graham? A. “Either prior to or— MR. COOPER: “—contemporaneously? THE WITNESS: “—contemporaneously. I don’t specifically recall, but certainly within a very short period of time. Q. BY MR. STEWART: “But as to all three of the sources of your transcript, you did make an explicit promise not to reveal the source? A. “Yes, sir, that is correct.” Reporter's Transcript, page 24, line 28 to page 25, line 9. | Q. “When you received the copies from the source or sources, rather from all three sources, was it with the understanding between you and the source that you would make a copy of that transcript and return the original to the party? A. “Yes, it was. 78 Q. “Did all three sources insist on that as a condition for giving you the transcript? A. “I don’t believe so. I think I simply sug- gested that that would be the best method.” 14. From the foregoing testimony of William Farr, as well as from the testimony set forth elsewhere in this Order, the Court finds that William Farr at all times had knowledge that each of the parties from whom he received the transcript of Virginia Graham’s testimony of October 5, 1970, were subject to the Order Re Pub- licity and had knowledge that by giving him said tran- script said parties willfully violated the Order Re Pub- licity in contempt of the Court. The Court further finds that William Farr, with full knowledge that each of the parties that released to him a copy of the tran- script was subject to the Order Re Publicity and was specifically prohibited by said Order from releasing or revealing to him the contents of said transcript, ac- tively solicited and requested each of said parties to give him a copy of said transcript in violation of said Order Re Publicity. The Court further finds that Wil- liam Farr entered into an explicit agreement with each of said parties wherein he promised each of them that he would, if they gave him a copy of the transcript of Virginia Graham’s testimony, refuse to reveal the source of said transcripts and would conceal the iden- tity of each of said persons acting in willful violation of the Court’s lawful Order Re Publicity. By so doing, the Court finds that William Farr, knowingly and will- fully, actively aided, assisted, abetted and participated with each of said parties in procuring the copies of said transcript in violation of the Court’s Order Re Publicity. 15. The Court finds that William Farr, by soliciting the transcripts as aforesaid and by assisting and par- ticipating with said persons subject to the Order Re Publicity who were committing acts in violation of said Lawful Order, willfully and knowingly interfered with the proceedings and lawful orders of the Court which the Court finds in each instance interfered with the due administration of justice. 16. The Court finds that William Farr, by commit- ting the acts as set forth above, and by soliciting a willful violation of a lawful court order, and by as- sisting and participating with three parties subject to the lawful Order of the Court in willfully violating said Order, may not now refuse to disclose the identities of said parties when ordered to do so by the Court and is not entitled to refuse to answer said questions or to claim or be entitled to an immunity pursuant to the provisions of Evidence Code Section 1070 regardless of his status as a reporter on the date he received the transcripts or any other date and time mentioned in these Findings and Order. 17. THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED | that William Farr, by his willful refusal to answer each of the aforesaid questions set forth in para- graph 12 herein in disobedience of the Court's orders to do so and with full knowledge of said orders, committed as to each question that he refused to answer a separate, direct contempt of the Court in the immediate view and presence of the judge; William Farr is hereby held to be in direct contempt of the Court for cach and every question that he willfully refused to answer as set forth in paragraph 12 herein. 80 18. The Court finds that William Farr has the pres- ent ability and power to perform the act, or acts, of answering each of the aforesaid questions that he has refused to answer; that since each of said contempts by William Farr consists of an omission to perform an act which is yet in the power of William Farr to perform, it is THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that William Farr be imprisoned until he shal! consent to appear in court and to answer under oath each and every question specifically set forth below, and as specifically set forth in the following Order of Ccmmitment. } CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER ONE Q. Did the transfer (of the transcripts you re- ceived from the parties subject to the Order Re Pub- licity) take place in this building, The Hall of Justice? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER TWO Q. Was the third person from whom you received the statement (transcript of Virginia Graham’s testi- mony on October 5, 1970) also an attorney of record in the case? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER THREE Q. Where was the copy of the transcript of Vir- ginia Graham’s testimony of October 5, 1971, that was not personally given to you by the source, left for you to pick up? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER FOUR Q. Did Mr. Fitzgerald give you a copy of the tran- script of Virginia Graham's testimony? 81 CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER FIVE Q. Did you obtain a copy of the transcript of Vir- ginia Graham from Mr. Shinn? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER SIX Q. Did you receive a copy of the transcript of Virginia Graham from Mr. Kanarek? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER SEVEN Q. Did you obtain a copy of the transcript from Mr. Kay? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER EIGHT Q. Did you receive a copy of the transcript of Virginia Graham’s testimony from Mr. Bugliosi? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER NINE Q. Did you obtain a copy of the transcript of Vir- ginia Graham’s testimony from Mr. Musich? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER TEN Q. Who were the parties that were the sources of the transcripts of the testimony of Virginia Graham that you received on October 7th and October 8th, 1970? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER ELEVEN Q. Which attorney or attorneys of record was it that you told that you would not reveal the source if they gave you a copy of the transcript of Virginia Gra- ham’s testimony? CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER TWELVE Q. Did you receive any of the Virginia Graham statements from someone who was an associate of an attorney of record in the case? 82 CONTEMPT FINDING NUMBER THIRTEEN Q. Did you receive a copy of the Virginia Graham statement from anyone in the Office of the District Attorney of Los Angeles County other than the at. torneys of record in this case, Mr. Bugliosi, Mr. Kay or Mr. Musich? DATED: 7-28-71. CHARLES H. OLDER Judge of the Superior Court 19. Pursuant to the foregoing Findings and Orders, the Court hereby makes and issues the following Order of Commitment: ORDER OF COMMITMENT The People of the State of California to the Sheriff of Los Angel [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1075%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.