# Amicus Brief — Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1049%3A07

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 423 U.S. 1025

## Text

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Iw THE OCT 22. 1975
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75—415
PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION, An Illinois
Not-For-Profit Corporation,

Petitioner,
v.

ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent,

MEDUSA CORPORATION, NORTHWESTERN
STATES PORTLAND CEMENT CO.,

Intervenors.

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN PAPER INSTITUTE, INC. AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Cuartes L. STEWART

161 East 42nd Street

New York, New York 10017
Counsel for the

American Paper Institute, Inc.

Of Counsel:

MicHaet B. Wem

CurIsToPHER W. ConGALTON
Dunnincton, BartHotow & MILLER
161 East 42nd Street

New York, New York 10017

October 22, 1975

Supteme Court, U.&

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interest Of The American Paper Institute, Inc. .....
Reasons For Granting The Writ ...................

I. The Clean Air Act Mandates That Stationary
Source Standards Be Reasonably Related to
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II. Failure To Observe The Statutory Mandate
That Standards Be Reasonably Related To Cost
Would Have A Serious Detrimental Effect ....

III. The Court Should Determine The Cost-Benefit
Issue Presented In This Case ................

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List oF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Portland Cement Association y. Administrator, En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 513 F.2d 506
(D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
—— (U.S. Sept. 15, 1975) .......... ccc eeuee

Union Electric Co. v. E.P.A., 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir.),
cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Oct. 7,
in SICEVell ait deemed ns wadeWk wae ans ices con
Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. .............

Miscellaneous:

“Excerpts From EPA Response To Remand,” Peti-
tion For a Writ of Certiorari, A-61 ............

PAGE
1

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75—415

+.
a

PortLanp CEMENT ASSOCIATION,
An Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation,

Petitioner,
Vv.
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent,
Mepvusa Corporation, NoRTHWESTERN STATES PoRTLAND

Cement Co.,
Intervenors.

=
bs

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN PAPER INSTITUTE, INC. AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN PAPER
INSTITUTE, INC.

The American Paper Institute, Inc. (‘‘API’’) is the
national trade association of the pulp, paper and paper-
board industry. Its 200 member firms provide more than
90 percent of all the pulp, paper and paperboard manufac-
tured domestically. The paper industry ranks among the
ten largest industries in the United States. Last year it
produced 61 million tons of paper and paperboard and

2

shipped $40 billion worth of goods. The industry em-
ployed more than 700,000 people, and in 1974, its outlay
in wages, salaries and benefits came to $9 billion.

The economy of the domestic paper industry could be
significantly affected by the standards imposed on paper
companies under the Clean Air Act.’ That industry
worked with Congress in drafting the 1970 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act and the industry continues to sup-
port the goals of this legislation. However, the API be-
lieves that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this
case* raises serious problems which may jeopardize ful-
fillment of the legitimate goals of the Act.

The court below affirmed the determination by the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(‘‘EPA”) that a cost-benefit analysis is not required in
setting stationary source standards under section 111 of
the Clean Air Act.’ The API believes this decision is in-
consistent with the purpose of the Clean Air Act and will
have serious adverse consequences for the paper industry.
Accordingly, the API addresses this brief to the Court in
support of the position of the Portland Cement Associa-
tion (‘* Petitioner’’) that in promulgating stationary source
standards under section 111 of the Clean Air Act, the
EPA Administrator must consider the cost of pollutant
control in relation to expected environmental benefit and
publie welfare.

*42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq.

*513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
—— (U.S. Sept. 15, 1975).

*42 U.S.C. § 1857¢-6.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Clean Air Act Mandates That Stationary
Source Standards Be Reasonably Related to Cost.

Section 1ll(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act defines the
term “standard of performance” as follows:

a standard for emissions of air pollutants
which reflects the degree of emission limitation
achievable through the application of the best system
of emission reduction which (taking into account the
cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated.

The court below in this case acknowledged that the EPA
Administrator was required under that section “to take
into account the cost of achieving the emission reduction
he prescribes” ;* however, the court declined to require the
preparation of a quantified cost-benefit analysis. The
API concurs with Petitioner and the other industries
filing as amici curiae in this case in urging the Court to
recognize that failure to relate benefit to cost under sec-
tion 111 of the Clean Air Act will foster the imposition
of excessive cost burdens on the many industries subject
to the Act without providing a corresponding benefit
to the public.

There is virtually no guidance available in the form
of legislative history evidencing Congressional intent with
respect to consideration of cost under section 111(a)(1)
of the Clean Air Act. We are therefore compelled to
look solely to the terms of the statute in order to deter-
mine the degree of limitation which Congress intended
by the reference to cost in that section.

*513 F.2d at 508.

4

In this connection it is important to note that the entire
thrust of the statute is toward the imposition of pollu-
tion controls and the requirement that industry sustain the
cost necessary to provide such controls. The only section
in the Clean Air Act which explicitly recognizes the neces-
sity to temper that requirement with a consideration of
the costs involved is section 111(a)(1). Its solitary in-
clusion emphasizes a Congressional determination that
stationary source standards must be established with ref-
erence to cost; the clear import of that section should
not be diminished by overly conservative construction of
the statutory terms.

Section 111(a)(1) requires the EPA Administrator to
take into account the cost of achieving pollution reduction
in determining emission standards. Thus, the considera-
tion of costs is specifically mandated by the statute. Cost
cannot be considered in a vacuum; to do so is meaningless.
The only factor with which cost can be reasonably juxta-
posed in the context of a statute designed to reduce pollu-
tion is the measure of reduction achieved. The amount
of pollution control and the public benefit derived there-
from must be balanced against the expenditure required
to accomplish it. This reduces essentially to a cost-benefit
analysis.

The EPA Administrator acknowledges the validity of
a very limited application of the principle that benefits
must be weighed against the costs required to produce
them. He cites two conditions under which he would be
forced to abate a stationary source standard on the basis
of excessive cost. First, he admits:

Where the cost of meeting such standards would be
so great that the industry could not bear the cost and
survive, such standards could not be implemented. . . .°

°“Excerpts from EPA Response To Remand,” Petition For A
Writ Of Certiorari, A-61.

co. ez

b)

The API submits that consideration of cost only in relation
to the ability of the industry to survive ignores the only
rational test as to whether a particular cost is warranted;
i.e., that the benefit being derived merits the expenditure.

The EPA Administrator also concedes:

. . . Where a reduction in emissions that would be
achieved by a particular contro] technique would be
so grossly disproportionate to the cost of the control
technique . . . it would not be required.*

He does not reveal how, in the absence of a definitive cost-
benefit analysis, that test is to be applied. The API asserts
that it is totally meaningless to discuss the concept of
‘gross disproportion” between benefit and cost in the ab-
sence of a quantitative analysis measuring those factors.
If the concept of ‘‘gross disproportion’’ is to have any
meaning, it must be predicated upon a detailed measure-
ment of the elements involved.

By rejecting the cost-benefit data proffered by Peti-
tioner and recognizing only the two highly subjective tests
discussed above, the EPA Administrator effectively ignores
the statutory directive that cost must be considered in
determining appropriate stationary source standards.

Failure To Observe The Statutory Mandate

That Standards Be Reasonably Related To

a Would Have A Serious Detrimental
ect.

The term ‘‘stationary source” is defined under the
Clean Air Act to include ‘‘any building, structure, facility,
or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.’”
Thus, the emission standards applicable to stationary

* Id.
"42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6.

6

sources under the Clean Air Act directly affect a substantial
segment of the nation’s industrial facilities.

The importance of cost-benefit consciousness in develop-
ing standards of pollution control for stationary sources
is particularly critical since this section is directed at new
or modified industrial structures. New industrial construc-
tion to increase production capacity is necessary for a
healthy economy. The direct correlation between such new
industrial construction and business expansion, including
the creation of new jobs, cannot be disputed. If such con-
struction is seriously impeded or curtailed because of un-
realistic pollution control standards applicable thereto, the
nation will suffer a substantial and unjustified economic
blow.

To seriously handicap the nation’s productive resources
without providing a concomitant improvement in pollution
control would be antithetical to the express purpose of
the Clean Air Act:

to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s
air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population.
(Emphasis supplied)*

That statement of purpose makes clear that the Clean Air
Act was intended to foster the public welfare in general,
including its economic vitality. Achievement of that goal
would be frustrated by the adoption of pollution control
standards which are not reasonably related to the costs in-
volved in meeting such standards.

Compliance with stationary source performance stand-
ards will obviously be a costly matter for the many indus-
tries affected. To a large extent the consumer will share
the burden of these costs, both directly and in the form of
product shortages. To the extent that the goal of re-

®42 U.S.C. § 1857.

7

ducing the serious pollution problems facing this country
is advanced, these costs are justified. Congress never
intended, however, that large expenditures be required to
achieve minuscule improvements in air quality.

The EPA Administrator is charged with the duty of
determining where the line of reasonable relation between
cost and benefit is crossed. The only means by which he
can make a reliable determination of this important matter
is by a quantitative analysis of the cost involved vis a vis
the benefit conferred. It is urgent that the Court make
explicit the EPA Administrator’s duty under section 111
of the Clean Air Act to consider the cost-benefit relation-
ship in the formulation of stationary source standards.

The Court Should Determine The Cost-Benefit
Issue Presented In This Case.

This case affords a strong factual context in which the
Court can establish the important principle raised by Peti-
tioner; i.e., that promulgation of appropriate standards
for stationary sources under the Clean Air Act must be
based upon cost-benefit analyses. The evidence presented
by Petitioner indicates that a twenty-percent increase in
cost would be required to accomplish an emission reduc-
tion of one-tenth of one percent required under the stand-
ard at issue; the ratio of cost to benefit thus adduced is
in excess of 100 to 1.

It is diffeult to contend, even on the basis of the mar-
ginal test which the EPA Administrator acknowledges
to be necessary, that these figures do not present a “gross
disproportion” between benefit and cost. The clear in-
ference must be that the EPA Administrator failed to
consider the cost-benefit evidence before him in this case.
The Court cannot condone such a clear refusal to give
meaningful consideration to the statutory mandate that

cost of pollution control be balanced against the benefit
to be derived therefrom.

The Court has implicitly recognized the importance of
including cost considerations as an element of administra-
tion of the Clean Air Act by granting certiorari in Union
Electric v. E.P.A.° The API submits that the instant case
presents another important aspect of the cost issue which
should receive direct clarification by the Court at this
time.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is respectfully
requested to grant Portland Cement Association’s
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Cuartes L. Stewart

161 East 42nd Street

New York, New York 10017
Counsel for the

American Paper Institute, Inc.

Of Counsel:

Micuaet B. Wem

CuristoPpHEeR W. ConGaLTon
DunninoTon, BartHoLow & MILLER
161 East 42nd Street

New York, New York 10017

October 22, 1975

°515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3178
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1049%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
