# Petition — Tucker v. Neal > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0789%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1975 - **Citation:** 423 U.S. 893 ## Text + IN THE Ss SUPREME COURT OF TH UNITED) ST§PR ort &. & October Term, 197 . / ED No 75-14 Juc 26 1975 MIGHAEL RODAK, JRCLERK | STANLEY V. TUCKER, Petitioner Va JEAN NEAL, et al. Respondent PZTITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THz SECOND CIRCUIT STANLEY V. TUCKBR / Box 35 Hartford, Conn 061lvul Page Table of Authorities ii Prior Action By This Court i Citation To Opinions Below 1 Jurisdiction 2 Question Presented 2 Constitutional & Statutory 3 Provisions Statement of Factual Background 3 SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT I, THE DECISION BELOW IS IN 5 CONFLICT WITH OTHER CIRCUITS AND OTHER DISTRICTS Ae OTHER CIRCUITS 6 B. OTHER DISTRICTS 9 II. THE DECISION DENYS FUNDAMENTAL 13 DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UPHELD IN DECISIONS OF U S SUP. CT. III. CONN NEWLY ADOPTED, UNIFORM 16 ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT PROHIBITS THE LIENS AS "PHONEY" CONCLUSION 17 Decision 2nd Ce. Ae Al Ruling on Cross Motions A 2 For Summary Judgment .. rt ee ae TABLE OF ORIT Page 28 Us¢ L54(lLhecevcccccccccsesese 2 28 USC 1963) ceeeccccccsccccvees 14,16,17 FRCP Rule 4. seccccccsee 293965798 FRCP Rule 5 esccccsccesesceseess FY FRCP Rule 7eccccccccccscccscsees 9 F. 2P Rule 4 deccccccccccccecees 5 FRCP Rule O4eeccseceseeecveseetsie7 98 FRCP Rule Ssecccec.coeccsceeees 9 FRCP Rule 69 sevccseveeseceees 29398 STATE SPATUTES Conn Ge Se 49mbYsscccveccveveeecy dy LY Conn Ge Se 52-604 to ee 5» 16 (Pe Ae 73-498) Calif Civil Code Procedure 170.6 6 ad ° - ° 410,10 6 _ 8 . . 415.40 6 -iii- PEDERAL CASES Page Chemical Bank NY v Pug 10 51 FRD 147 Griffin v Griffin 13,14, 15, 17 327 US 220 Henderson 66 v Harvison 12 58 FRD 408 Metanuska Valley v Moliter 15 365 F 2d 358 Nelson v Swing A Way 9 266 F 2d 184 Rumsey v Failing 8 333 F 2d 960 Sapphia v Lauo Lines 9 130 F Supp 810 Stanford v Utley | 15 341 F 2d 265 Veek v Commodity Ent 657 487 F 2d 423 White v Secretary HEW 12 56 FRD 499 USA For Use of Tanos v St Paul 7 361 F 2d 838 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1975 No STANLEY V. TUCKER, Petitioner, -V=- JEAN NEAL, ET AL, Respondents Sa 9 ee PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRUCIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THi SECOND CIRCUIT petioner prays that a writ of certiorari — issue to review the juugment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered April 30th, 1975. PRIOR ACTION BY THIS COURT This cace has not been before this Honorable Court before, CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is print ed in the Appendix hereto, infra Al, o-2@ JURISDICTION The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28 USC 1254 (1) QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Is the California federal judgment void due to service not complvine. with mandatory statutory require oe service by federal marshall, FRCP Rule 4c? Are the multitudious liens recorded by respondents maliciously and with bad faith void for failure to comply with statutory requirments for recording by federal marshall? Rule 64 @& 69 FRCP, Did the district Court err in applyin res judicata to issues not litigated , in California? Are the multitudious liens prohibited by Connecticut's newly enacted P.A, 73-498 prohibiting "phoney judgments"? Are the California judgments upon Which respondents base their liens "phoney judgments?" Did the District Court err in granting Summary judement where mineled issues of fact and law were diSputed7 Did the District Court err in denying motion to amend complaint to challenge constitutionality of Conn G. S. 49-44 Is notice and hearing required on "Pr2g- nirtetne evra a federal judgment since it creates a new judgment with new rights Yemedies, and limitations in fovun miata. ae CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS This action involves the validity of federal judgments rendered in violation of statutory requirments, failure to make ser- vice by federal marshall, Rule 4c FRCP, This action involves the validity of 14 liens recorded in Connecticut in violation of Connecticut's newly enacted Phoney judg- ement act and in violation of statutory requirments for service by federal marshall 9. This action involved an amendment to the qomplaint denied by the court to challenge on due process and equal protection grounds the constitutionality of Conn G. S. 49-44, A consistent series of decisions by the court of appeals have held as void as Withoyt jurisdiction judgments rendered in actions without Rule 4c comphiance and the deciion bébow 18 Contrary to est- ablished law, STATEMENT OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND The factual background leading to this action is that Petitioner is a resident of Connecticut since 1961 and Jean Neal is the sister of former wife of Petitioner both residing in California. Divorce proceedings started in California in 1959 and vindicative and malicious acts took place persistently over years including concealment of Petition er's children in other counties or cities in California wnen Petitioner exercised his vacation and/ or visitation rights. aban Approximately 40 litigations of all types both civil and criminal were brought against this Petitionrr in the California state courts over the decade from about 1959 to about 1969 by Respondent, her relatives and/ or her attorneys. All of thise actions were dismissed except two or three like this action were Calif state court judgments were rendered under con-= ditions of denial of due process and thus with out jurisdiction. Petitioner's sole activity randomely con- ducted in Californie was to exercise his first amendment. right to travel across state lines to visit his minor children dom= iciled in California and to vindicate their rights in court, The claims of Jean Neal come from a Judgment made in the Superior Court in Ventura @n April 23, 1959. Petitioner claims the state judg- ment as invalid due to denials of due process and trial judge disqualified for prejudice under statute California Civil Code of Pro- cedure S 170.6.’ Jean Naal filed in the federal courts of San Francisco a div ersity complaint on the California state judgment rather than in the federal courts of Connecticut as she should have. Service of summons and cnme plaint was made under the Califormia long arm statute (CCP 410.10) wnder the provision for service by air mail requiring return re= ceipt (CCP 415.40). At this point Petitioner contends Respondent committed a FATAL ERROR in that service was made by a peYrsS5o0n Specie fied in CCP 414,10 ( a person over 18 yrs and not party to action) whereas the fed- ‘eral rule FRCP 4c mandates that service must be by federal marshall, Petitioner contends the complaint served in the San Francisco federal court lacked a jurisdictional basis and was fraudulent in that an ex parte two page jurisdictional ~ basis was filed with the court but never served. Petitioner received this document two years later in mails from 9th C,. A. THUS THE DEFECTIVE SERVICE VIOLATING RULE 4e WAS UNKNOWN TO PETITIONER AND NOT LIT- IGATED IN THE CALIFORNIA PROCEEDINGS. Subsequently_without notice or hearing to Petitioner Respondent “registered” her California federal judgment in the federal courts of Connecticut and sete or hearing proceeded to record about 14 liens thus immobilizing all of Petitioners assets during most cryeial years of intense in- flation in interest rates, The lack of notice in recording liens and the nature of judgments rendeged without due process caused the judgments and liens to fall wnder the "phoney judgement" prohi- bition of Connectcut*s newly enacted P,A, 73-498, “Uniform Recognition of Fereign Judgments Act” SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER CIRCUITS AN (ER DISTRIC The many factual circumstances under which different actions were litigated invol- ving Rule 4c and application of 4 d(7) have resulted in a fairly consitent flow of de- cisions that Service by the federal marshall is mandatory unless a court order is obtained for Strvite by an indifferent person. Re- peatedly other districts and other circuits rejected for lack of jurisdiction service not made by the federal marshall or without court order. =-6= FRCP RULE 4 cs"SERVICE of all process shall be made by a U. S. Marshall or some person specially app ointed by the court for that I.A,OTHER CIRCUITS Purpose” The recent 9th C,. A. case of Veek v Commodity Enterprises, 487 F 2d 423, Nov th, 1973 unequivocably settled this ques- tion under a factual background remagkably analagous to this action. VEEK P 4253 {1,2] The district court was per- suaded that the mandatory language of Rule 4(c) could be cireumvented by Veeck'’s syllogistic argument. We disa- gree. When personal service of original process is made pursuant to Rule 4(e), it must be made by a person specified by Rule 4(c). See 2 J.Moore, Federal Practice, § 4.08, at 1009-1011 (2d ed. 1970); 4 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1092, at 353 (Wright ed. 1969); cf. United States for Use of Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 842-843 (C.A. 5, 1966) (dissenting opinion). According- ly, since Howes was not a person speci- fied by Rule 4(c), he lacked proper au- thority to serve the district court’s sum- - mons upon the appellants. It is undisputed that Jean Neal's attorney, Robert R. Anderson, acting on his own “self-help” without any court order — service of summons and complaint by ma -7@ Veek P 426: [4] The district court’s lack of in personam jurisdiction over the appel- lants renders void its default judgment against them. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 726-728, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). Accordingly, the district court should have granted their motion to set aside that void judgment. Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug Co., 261 F.Supp. 648, 657 (S.D.N.Y., 1966); Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c) and 60(b) (4). . The 5th C.A. ruled consistent with the 9th C.A. decision in Veek, supra. See_USA Dr the U of os v_ St Paul MM I sO 361 F 2d 838 1966, Page 838: "Writ of garnishment should have been served by the U.S. marshall and not by Forida county sheriff" FRCP Rules 4c, 64 Page 8395 "The federal rules of civil pro- cedure have statutory effect and Rule 64 provides that “any existing statute of the United States governs to the extent to which it is app- licable," Under this later case the 14 liens recorded by Respondent , Robert R. Anderson, are void as well as the federal court judgment ren- dered in San Francisco federal court, The district court in this action and the 2nd C. A. ruled contrary to the 9th Cede oa the = C. Ae and thus ample grounds exist for this Court to grant th writ of certiorari, ; B= The 10th C. Ae consistent with the 5th and 9th decisions makes service by the U. S. Marshall mandatory or the pro=- ceeding is void. Rumsey v i 333 F 2d 960 1964, P 962:1"We are of the opinion in supplemental proceedings FRCP with respect to the method of service and to the person who may make service control rather than general provisions of state's practice and procedure." P 96l:"FRCP have force and effect nempapssinaiia of statute, FRCP Rule 69a” While the Courts of Appeal are consistent in their requirement for compliance with the statutory rules the Respondents have repeatedly violated the rules both in their void judgment, obtained in California and in the many illegal liens recorded in the State of Connecticut. 1. FRCP RULE 4 cs Requires service by Us. Se Marshall in serving summons, Respondents used “self-help” and made own service, 2, FRCP Rule 4 c s Requires recording of judgment liens by U. S. marshall, Again Respondents use "self-help” and filed 14 “illegal liens causing great damages to this Petitioner, 3. FRCP Rule 64: Respandents violated Rule . 64 in filing their 14 liens, 4, FRCP Rule 69: Requires writ of execution unless court orders other wise. Respondents used “self help" -J= 5+ FRCP Rule 7 : Requires application for ' orders to be in writing and part of the notice of hearing, Yet in the California federal court Respondents applied "ex parte" and never served their jurisdictional statement, 6. FRCP Rule 8 1s No jurisdictional statement was served by the Respondents with their Califormia federal complaint, 7+ FRCP Rule 5s Requires service of every - order and application, The application containing the jurisdictional statement was never served as required by the rules, The issues raised in the Connecticut federal court as to the avalidity of the California federal judgment by reason of violations of numerous statutory rules was not litigated and is properly litigated on collateral attack on the validity of the judgment at this time. Nelson v_ Swing A Way Mfg 266 F 2d 184 th CeAe 1959 "The court must look to the pleadings and determine the questions essential to the former decision" I. B. THE DECISION CONFLICTS WITH OTHER DISTRICTS An early case that clearly and unequivocably resolves the identical question briefed herein comes from 1955 N.D. Ne Y, Sapphia v_ Lauro Lines 130 F Supp 810 -l0@ -S2apphia P 810s Federal Civil Procedure 505 In action for injuries sustained while aboard ship on high seas, service of process attempted to be made on opera- tor of ship by delivering copy of sum- mons and complaint to operator's agent for sale of passage tickets for the ship, would be vacated on his motion therefor where plaintiff failed to prove that ticket agent was in fact authorized by appoint- ment or by law to receive service of proc- ess, and where there was no showing or even contention that plaintiff’s counsel, who attempted service under New York practice, was specially appointed to make that service, as required by Federal Rules. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 4(c), In 1970 the Nevada Dist even further to Plaintiff’s attempted service under New York Civil Practice Act, § 229-b was also abortive despite F.R.Civ.P. 4(d) (7), 28 U.S.C.A. Only “a United States marshal * * * his deputy,or * ®* some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose” may serv: process." we --- rict Court went é refuse a litigant who had 'registered" a federal suthanatth respondents "registered" an order permitting a Co serve a lien upon ground (just as in Connecticut unty Sheriff to Ss the numerous statutory protections afforded by the marshall plus statutory application of the rules made servi ce b = po Mey y marshall man Chemical Bank NY trust Co Pug §$ & GC 51 FRD 147 a -ll- Chemical Bank Page 148 Federal Civil Procedure C2586, 606, 2697 Judgment creditor who had regis- tered judgment with clerk of district court was not entitled under rule relating to persons entitled to serve all process to designation of a person other than Unit- ed States marshal to make service and levies of writs of execution, attachment and garnishment, and term “all process” as used in rule was not intended to en- compass writs authorizing or requiring property to be seized and taken into cus- todia legis. Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc. rule 4(c), 28 U.S.C.A, , While process which functions only as notice to a litigant or third party, the obligations of the process server being completed when service is made, may appropriately be accomplished by any qualified person under court au- thorization, this is not so with respect ‘o process which invokes other duties and responsibilities subject to court super- vision and governed by federal statutes. The statutory requirements for bonding a United States Marshal and his deputies (28 U.S.C. § 564), and statutory require- ments regarding collection and account- ing for fees (28 U.S.C. § 572), the charg- es for levying upon and keeping seized properties (28 U.S.C. § 1921), and the obligations with respect to judicial sales (28 U.S.C. § 2001, et seq.), for examples, are inapplicable to a person whose sole official connection with court adminis- tration is a designation under Rule 4(c) as a person qualified and authorized to make service. BES COPY AVAILABLE In 1972 the ND NY reviewed the same issue with the same results where "“atempted sere vice" outside the rules was made just as in this action respondents made an"atempted service"outside the rules, Whit Secretary of Health, Edu tin ¥Welfare 56 F R D Aug 9, 197 Page 4998 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 pro- vides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court; Rule 4(a) further provides that upon the fil- ing of the complaint the clerk Shall issue a summons and deliver it for service to the Marshal or to a person specially ap- pointed to se-ve it and Rule 4(c) pro- vides that service of all process shall be made by a United States Marshal, by his deputy or by some person specially ap- pointed by the court for that purpose, There was, therefore, no authority al- lowing plaintiff to attempt service as he describes, ~~ The latest case reported is from the District of Texas where a de“ault judgment was set aside in favor of a_trial on the merits. nderson 66 Sales Inc v Oo 58 FRD 408 1973, 14 6] While “a party should not be Page 4121. permitted to flout [the rules] with impunity,” * and a default judgment should only be set aside upon a showing that there “was good reason for the default,”5 it is clear that any doubts should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits. This Court is not of the opinion that evidence adduced at an ex parte hearing which forms the founda- tion for a default judgment, even though of a probative nature and introduced in ! good faith, should preclude later scruti- «4 ny _ oes IZ. THE DECISION BELOW ACTS TO DENY FUN- DAMENTAL DUE PROCESS UPHELD IN DE-= CISIONS O E T UPRE A leading Supreme Court case in which the right of a debtor to notice and hearings (and to present orderly defenses) was up- held where liens were recorded on out of state judgments was oleae 327 Ue Se 220 Feb 25th, 2946, The Griffin supra case involved the validity of a foreigm (NY) judgment as to full faith and credit where execution was commenced within the District of Columbia. The District Court upheld the lien( as in this action). The Court of Appeal upheld the District Court (just as in this action). The UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT granted certiorari and reversed holding that due process was offended where lir Griffin had his assets seized or executed on by reason of an out of state judgment when he contended he had valid defenses including that the foreign state judgment was invalid due .o denial of due process. Griffin P 228: Because of the, omission, and to the extent that petitioner was thus de- prived of an opportunity to raise defenses pcan 2 to him under the law of New York against the doce oe of judgment for accrued alimony, there was 4 esa judicial due process, and henee want of that juris ee over the person of petitioner prerequisite to the hn ; ; of x judgment in personam against hina. Me yn Po Mabce, 243 U.S. 90; ef. Webster v. Reid, i1 Mow. 437,499. Grif Pa 283 It is plain in any case that a judginent am personam directing execution to issue against petitioner, and thus purporting to cut off all available defenses, could not be rendered on any theory of the State’s power over him, without so.ne form of notice by personal or substi- tuted service. +N uchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18-20; Restatement of Conflict of Lays, § 75; and compare Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457. Such notice cannot be dispensed with even in the case of judgments in rem with respect to property within the jurisdiction of the court reudering the judgment, Roller v. [/olly, 176 U.S. 398, 40y, The_Griffin, supra, case is remarkably factually similar to this action where the 14 liens were recorded in Connecticut with out notice or hearing on a out of state judgment that Petitioner claims is invalid due to denial of due process, District Judge Clarie was wrong in not permitting amendment of the complaint to challenge on constitutional grounds Connecticut Ge. Se. 49-44 permitting the recording of judgemant liens, Perhaps the fault is with the registration statube 28 USC 1963 in oon ae the creating of brand new judgments in the forum state without notice or hearing. Judge Clarie used the argument that a hearing is not essential in that one was granted presumably in the rendering state. This argument is specious since in the forum state by “registration” creates a brand new judgment with new rights, new duties and new time limitations, See Vi u Valley Lines v Mol 9th CA 1966 os 5 F 2d 358 —— Stanford vy —tley Btn CA 341 F 2d 265 Both Metanuska and Stanford, supra, are consistent that the “registration” of a foreign federal judgment creates a brand. new federal judgment in the state of rendition, IF THIS IS UNQUESTIONABLY SO THEN NOTICE AND HEARING ARE NANDATORY TO SCREEN OUT “PHONEY JUDGMENTS” NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. In light of above cases it appears this instant action is factually app- ropriate for petitioning for a three- judge federal court to hear the consti- tutional challenge to 28 USC 1963 in light of Griffin, Metanuska and Stanford SUPTA. AN ENLIGHTENED REVIEW BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WILL BE OF GREAT BENEFIT TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL AND TO THE DISTRICT COURTS AND ELIMINATE NEED FOR A THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT, III. CONNECTICUT’S NEWLY ADOPTED, UNIFORM RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT ———PROHIBITS THE LIENS AS "PHONEY’ Effective October 1, 1973 Connecticut adopted the "Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act" G. S, 52-604 thro 609. is a model act adopted by many states, Of great significance is that this model act requires notice to the alleged debtors GS, 52-605 c “within 30 days after filing of the "tae 1 creditor shall ma notice ese. to the debtor” In addition there is a right to pre sent defenses, Ge Se 52-606sb"tf the debtor shows the court any ground upon which enforcement shall be stayedeees the court shall stay enforcement” A comparison of the "Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act" with G supra shows this act meets the cemstttutional test and vides fe) to debto A comparison of 28 USC 1963 with Griffin siipra shows 28 USC 1963 DOES NCT MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS. In light of the above startling compar- ison it is most important that certirr ari be granted and these issues be re- viewed for guidance and illumination for all the courts, This Court is asked to consider the conflict in the decisions between the courts below and other courts briefed in light of the constitutional standard set forth in Griffin supra and to summarilly reverse, In the alternate the serious consti- tutional faults in 28 USC 1963 as exposed by the ” i = litigated herein are grounds for notang probable jurisdiction to review on their merits the nation- wide issues for the benefit of all the courts, Respectfully Submitted: STANLEY V. TUCKER -A le UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT STANLEY V. TUCKER 7 Plaintiff- Appellant A -V- ° 74—21921 JEAN NEAL ET AL Defendant- Appellees 2 Before HAYS,GURFEIN, and GRAAFEILAND Circuit Judges Appeal for the USDC -Connecticut ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now ordered, adjuszed, and decreed that the judgment of said District Court be and hereby is affirmed on the opinion of Honorable T. Emmet Clarie, Chief Judge, eh 2a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTIBU STANLEY V. TUCKER -V- No H=8 JEAN NEAL,et al RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The Plaintiff, Stanley V. Tucker, commeneed this pro "civil rights action", seeking monetary damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunce tive relief against the individual defendants, who are citizens of the State of Califormia, =~ and the California based law partnership of Anderson & Anderson. The thrust of the come Plaint is the plaintiff*s contention that the defendants conspired to cause, and did in fact cause, to be recorded upon the land records in various towns in which the plaintiff owns property, 14 judgment liens which the plain- tiff variously describes as "false", "fraud- ulent", and “pretended.” The defendants have counter=claimed, seeking a foreclosure of .s many liens as may be required to satisfy their judgment, together with costs. The parties have filed cross=motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, FRCP. The Court having considered the numerous memoranda, affidavits, and papers filed in connection with the pre- cent action, finds that tne plaintiff Tucker’ motion for summary judgment should be denied, end that the defendant's motion for summary “judgment should be granted, -A 3- I A brief statementof the factual background of this case is essential to an understandin of the posture of the parties respective claims, The defendant, Robert R. Anderson, is a Calif attorney am a member of the law firm of An- derson & Anderson, Attorney Anderson's affidavit © represents that he first met the plaintiff in California in 1966 furing his representation of the vlaintiff'’s former wife after her divorce from the plaintiff. The affidavit further states that subsequent to that time Attorney Anderson saw the plaintiff Tucker on numerous occasions, usually in connection with pro se litigation commenced by him “in Calif courts for Los Aageles to San Jose”, The affidavi:. of Attorney Anderson states, the plaintiff does not dispute that one of the plaintiff's numerous pro se actions in the State of California was a $215,000 damage suit filed in the Santa Barbara Superior Court ageinst Jean Neal, a defendant in the present action. According to the Anderson affidavit, that suit ultimately dismissed, but “when lir Tucker sued Mrs Neal again, this time in Santa Clara County for 3292,000" he advised her to bring a legal action for malicious prosecution. Following her counsel’s advice birs Neal filed suit against the plaintiff Tucker in Ventura Superior Court No 50686. The acfidavit further represents, and the plaintiff dces not dispute shat a 341,000 counter claim was filed by him, and that her personally and without counsel perticipated in all stages of this litigation, including a jury trial which was held during the latter part of April 1969. That trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of Mrs Neal in the amount of $20,723.61, Judgment was accordingly entered upon that verdict and it thereafter became finalized, In July of 1971 Jean Neal brought an action on her state court judgment in the USDC-ND of California CA 71=-1447-AJZ. The purpose of this action was to establish a judgement registrable pursuant to 28 USC 1963 and hence enforceable against the plaintifff Tucker's assets in the State of Connecticut, The Anderson affidavit represents that the Plaintiff was served by registered mail in that: action; that he admitted service; and that he appeared specially to contest the Court's jurisdiction in personam, The Court, however, rujed adversely to him both on his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and again in passing upon Mrs Neal‘s motion for summary judgment which was granted July 21, 1972 approx a year after commencementof the action in the N.D. of California, judg- ment was entered on that same day. On Sept 25,1972, over two months after the entry of summary judgment in Mrs Neal's favor, the plaintiff Tucker filed with the Clerk of th N.D. an "Application for ex- tension of Time to File Notice of Appeal.” Para (6) of that application concedes that the plaintiff failed to file a timely appeal of the order of summary judgment entered a against him. It states, "(as) a result of pre-cccupation (sic)... Defendant (Tucker) missed getting a notice of appeal in within . the time prosecribed (sick) by Rule 4 a FRAP” Thic application for an extension of time withint which to appeal the entry of summary judgment was denied on Oct 20, 1972, On Nov3, 1972 notice . was given that the Plaintiff intened to appeal the order of Judge Zirpoli denytnge his request for an extension of time within’ which to appeal, An vappeal was ultimately taken to the 9th CaA eA Se where it was dismissed March 27, 19 for lack of appellate jurisdiction, mg A. Me tiff Tucker than filed a petition for a writ of certi: vari to the U. S. Sup. Ct, The writ however was denied Oct 9, 1973. See Tucker v Neal, US___, 94 S CT 49 (1973). I the meantime,, on Sept 5, 1972, Mrs Neal filed with the Clerk of the District for Conn, a certification of Judgment of $25,141.70 which she had obtained against Tucker in the N.D of California, Therefter the defendants recor- ded irs Neals judgment liens in the Connecticut land records of the Towns of Hartford, Bristol, - Torrington where the plaintiff owns prop- ervve _ On April 10, 1973 the plaintiff brought this action seeking inter alia the nullifica- tion of those iiens as well as monetary damages, Over the defendant's objections, this court permitted an amendment to the complaint allow- ing the plaintiff to add a "second cause of action” attacking on due process grounds the = in basis for the California judg- ment, Il The legal issues before the court are far less complex than the plaintiff would make them. Ruel 56 c of the FRC? directs that summary judmg.ent “shall enter forthwith if the Pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and ad- missions on file, together with the affidavifs, if any, show that there 1s no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment” at Ge The purpose of the rules in part is to protect both litigants and the court from frivolous claims and defenses, and to defeat attempts to use formal pleadings as a means to delay the recovery of just demands, Engl Aetan Life Ins Co 139 F 2d 469, 47 2.07 3 ( 2 Cir 1943). Although the party moving for summary judgment must sustain the burden of showing * the non-existence of factual issues which are both material and genuine, Boyce _v_Merchants_ Fire Insurare’ Co 204 F Supp 31l;, 313, (D= Conn 1964), it is clear that an unsupported contention that such an issue does in fact exist is insufficient to defeat summary judgment, Boyce v Merchants Fire Insurance Co, Supra. A e Also see Waldron v British Petroleum Co 8 FRD 170, 173 (SDNY 1905 } aff'd 361 F 2d 671 ( 2 Cir 1966) aff'd sub nom, First National Bank o ARizona v Cities Service Co 391 US 253 (196 Not only has the plaintiff Tucke: failed to set forth "svecific facts or evidentiary data”"seeeee (Or) concrete particulars,” showing there is an issue to be tried, Dressler v i, V Sandpiner, 331 F 2d 130, 133 ( 2 Cir 1964) he nas also neglected to "adduce factual mat- ere .1 which raises a substantial question of the veracity or completeness of the movant’s showing or presents countervailing facts.” Beal v Lindsay 468 F 2d 287, 291 ( 2 Cir 1972). Any dispute between the plaintiff and the def- endants is purely one as to the law and is, therefore well-suited to summary disposition, See generally 6 J, “Moore, Federal Practice, S 56.15 (1.02) at 2291-2297 (1972 ed). Iil Several arguments are advanced by the plaintiff in support of his present claims.. The first of these, a multi-pronged consti- tutional argument which is never fully or -A 7= clearly developed by the plaintiff, attempts to equate the recordation of a lien based on a judgment obtained in another forum with the type of property deprivations with which the Court was concerned in Snaidach v Famil Finance Corp, 395 US 337 (1969); Lyne e= | Hold Finazce Corp, 405 US 538 (19 arr and | Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67 (1972). This equation fails for several reason,.s To the extent that plaintiff claims_Snaidach Lynch, and Fuentes require a hearing/ before the recordation in one jurisdiction of a ¢..W~ judgment lien arising from a constitutionalll valid judgment in another jurisdiction, he is plainly wronz, The Fuentes decision, like Snaidach and Goldbers v helly, 397 US . 254 (1970) mark no radical departure from established Principles of procedural due process, "Those decisions were in the main- stream of past cases, having little or nothing to do with the absolute "necessities" of life but establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes effect. E, G, 0 Cotto Mills v Administration, 3512 US at 152-153; Wiwiobiinois Ce 291 area ee Sourther R, Co v Virri JS 190 wientrol or Ceorvie v wrisht 207 US 1273 security rust tov Lex ancotn, 203 US 323, Bibbin v Smith, 191 Us 310, Glidden v Herrincton, 189 US 255" Fuents v_ Shevin, 407 US at 88-89" "Due process” is an elusive conceyt Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and soe Sees eee according to the specific actual contexts” Hanneh vy Larche, 363 US 420, 442, (1960); Hill Const v Conn 366 F Sup 737 ( D-Conn 1973). While its very nature is such as to preclude the univeraal application of a single, inflexible procedure, id at 742, in a Fuentes-like context "due process is affordedeesee by the kinds of “notice and herring” that are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before * he can be deprived of his property..."_Fuentes v_ Shevin, 407 US at 67, In the present case, the uncontroverted affidavit of the Defendant Robert ANderson establ..shes, and this Court finds, that the plaintiff Tucker appeared and participated in the California trial which resulted in the’ underlying state court oo in favor of Mrs Neal. That affidavit further represents and this court also finds, that the plaintiff was also given the opportunity for a hearing, and did in fact have a hearing, in the USDC for the ND of Calif in an action on the underlying state court judgment. Not only does the rationale of Fuentes and Snaidach not apply to the set of facts at hand, but it is difficult to conceive of how the plaintiff could have been afforded a more meaninglul opportunity to be heard, The plaintiff, in sum, not only had a adequate opportunity to be heard, but enjoyed a full scale trial in the state court and a subsequent hearing in USDC as well, The plaintiff next argues that his con- stutional rights were violated by the liens in question being recorded prior to the time that the judgment upon which they were based became final. Until such time as the under lying judgment became final, the plaintiff maintains, the judgment was not registrable pursuant to 28 USC 1963, and the liens’: in - A Je- question could not, therefore, be recorded on the Connecticut land records. The chief difficulty with the plaintiff's argument is — it ignoree the facts and disregards the law. By its terms 28 USC 1963 permits the registration of only those judgments which have become "final", but recognizes that finality may result either "by appeal” or by expiration of the time for appeal”, The foregoing phrase, which must be given its "ordinary, usual, and natural interpretation” Abesslen v surphen 94 F Supp 483, 486, + CD Utah 1950) simply means that a judgment is not final, and hence not enforceable iunder 28 USC 1963 until a direct chalienge to its validity is "disposed of" on appeal, or the time within which an appeal mgy be lodged has lapsed. _Aberztlen v Burnham, ~ supra, Restatement, Conflact of Laws, comment at 519, (1934) Here the uncontroverte@d facts indicate, and this Court accordingly finds, that neither the underlying state court judgment against the plaintiff Pucker nor the order of the USDC - ND of Calif, granting the defendant Jean Neal's motion for summary judgment on the underlying state court judgment were ever appealed, There is, therefore, simply no fasis in law or fact for plaintiff's contention that the judg= ment against him was registered in Conn before it became final within the meaning of 28 USC 1963. The only thing appealed by the plaintiff Tucker was the post-judg ment order of Judge Zirpoli, denying the plaintiff an extension of time within which to file an appeal, Far from being an appeal of the original order entering judgment against him, the plaintiff's appeal -A 10- merely sought review of the Court's ruling on his Sept 25, 1972 “Application for an Extention of Time to File a Notice of Appeal”, Para (6) of the applicati on concedes that the plaintiff failed to file a timely appeal from the order of summary judgment itself, There is no merit to the plaintiff's argument that his appeal of Judge Zirpolis "Order Denying Application For extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal": deprived either the underlying state court judg- ment or the subsequent federal court judgment of finality. If an otherwise final judgment could be deprived of dfinal- ity by the lodging of an appeal from a postejudgment order denying a litigant an extension of time within which to appeal that judgment , then there is no logical reason why the finality of a judgment should not also be made to await the out come of appellate review of other post- judgement orders. If this were the case the strong puhlic policy favoring the ter- mination of litigation throught the finality of judgments, see e g Baldwin v Iowa. State Traveling Men's Asso 253 US 522, 524= 526 (1931) would be far too easily frus- tratted by the simple filing of a poste judgment motion. Logically, a judgment could never truly be fi al as jong as the possibility existed that a post judgment motion might be filed, . since the appeal from any ruling on such a motion would be deemed to have enmeshed the underlying judgment itself in an appeal, thereby de- priving it of finality. THe law wisely rejects the plaintiff's hypothesis, The plaintiff's application for an extension of time within which to appeal the entry of summary judgment against -A ll- him wag filed well after the time for the filing of a notice for the appeal had ex- pired. Para (6) of the"Application" itself admits that timely notice of appeal was not given, Plaintiff's request for an extension of time, therefore, enjoys no greater status and stands on no stronger footing than does, for example, a motion to vacate the judgment or a motion for a new trial. It is settled beyond peradventure that such motions do not destroy the finality of an underlying money judgment. v_ Banks 77 US 583. Loever v Schroeder_149 US 580, 585. See also Restetement, Judgements S 41, comment d at 163-164 (1942), The second count of the complaint launches a collateral attack on the jur- isdictional basis for the California ie ement._Thomspon_ v Whitman 85 US 458 (1873). The plaintiff argues that the judgment of the USDC for the Nd of Calif is void since the Court lacked jurisdiction over his per- son, The defendants doe not dispute the general proposition that "proceedings in a COUrtecseee to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom the court does not have jurisdiction, do not constitute due process of law." Pennoyer. v Neff, 95 US 714, 733 (1878). Rather, the defendants argue that plaintiff's contacts with the State of California were more than adequate to establish in personal jurisdiction and that, in any event, principles of res judicata preclude a collateral attack on the jurisdictional basis for the judgment, Taking the defendants second argument first, this Court finds that res judicata does preclude collateral attack on the California judgment, and that the plaintiff's position is in reality no different than that of the respondent Association in —aldwin_ v Lowa State 283 US 522 (19321) -A 12- In that case the Court held that the res pondent, an Iowa corporation which had insuccessfully challenged the in personam jurisdiction of a Missouri court and there after permitted its judgment to become final, was precluded from later collaterally attacking the jurisdictional basis of that jv»dgment. In addressing itself to the res- pondents claims , the Court said” "The respondent.. insists that to d. prive it of the defense which it made in the court below, of lack of jurisdiction over it by the Missouri District Court, would be to deny the due process guaranteed by the l4th Amend, but there is involved in that doctrine no right to litigate the same question twiceeeccece” See alsa Durbee vy Duke 375 US 106;_Trenies. ine liinine Co 308 US 663 Southard vw Sourthard.305 F 2d 730. Restatement, Judgments S 5 comment j, at 35 (1942), The uncontroverted facts indicate that the plaint iff appeared specially before the Calif federal court, that he contested that courts jurisdiction over his person by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, that the proceedings were determined adversely to him, with an order for summary judgment being entered agains t him on July 21, 1972, and that by reason of the plaintiff's failure to appeal, it became a final judgment. On these facts, the Court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff, Stanley TUcker, is precluded from collaterally attacking either the judgme net or the jurisdictional basis for the judgment of the USDC for the ND of Cali onria,. -A 13- There is absolutely no merit to the plaintiff's contention thitthe District Court never determined or otherwise passed upon his jurisdictional challenge, The Court's entry of summary judgment | against the plaintiff was a tacit rejec tion of his jurisdictional challenge and a finding, albeit implicity, of “all the facts necessary to sustain the jdugment” Fayerwather v Ritch, 195 US 276, 302, Shana la lley-fiectri cov Rai iracd Com. 251 US 366 » 372-373 (1919). No explicity finding of in personam jurisdiction and certainly no memorandum of decision re- jecting the plaintiff's jurisdictional claims, is necessary. See_Yates y US. 354 US 298, 336. Nelson v Swing-Away Mfg Co 266 F 2d 184 ( Cir 1959 Although non-essential to its de- termination that the judgment of the USDC = ND Calif is valid in all respects, see_Chicaso Life v Cherry 244 US 25, this Court also finds that the plaintiff's cont tacts with the State of California were more than sufficient to satisfy "traiditonal notions of fair play andsubstantial justice: Internal Shoe v State of Washington -- 326 US 310. The uncontroverted affidavit of the defendant Robert Andesson details the Plaint2ff's attiffities in California. At the very least that affidavit paints the pore trait of a person who has on a mininum of 36 occasions purposely availed himself of fhe privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. Hanson vy Denckla 355 US 220, Surely the plaintiff's maintenance of over 36 pro se lawsuits within California is no less a significant contact with that forum than is the defendants simple “A l4- allegedly tortious recordation of their judgment liens in Connecticut, the plain tiff's authority to the contrary is in apposite. The Court has considered the remainder of the plaintiff's arguments and finds them to be without merit and underserving of further comment. The plaintiff Stanley Tucker's motion for summary judgment is denied. The def- endant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. An order may enter giving judg ment to the defendant Jean Neal in the amount of $25,141,70 plus interest and taxable costs; the de“endants are entitled to a judgmert of foreclosure, supplemental proceedings will be held to determine which of the plaintiff's parcels of property will be sold to satisfy the defendant Jean Neal's judmment, SO ORDERED Dated at Hartford, Conn this 5th day of March 1974, T. Emmet Clarie United States District Judge. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0789%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.