# Appendix — Quinn v. Muscare

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0772%3A02

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 425 U.S. 560

## Text

Supreme Court, U. & :

FILED
DEC 8 1975
APPENDIX MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
Ixy Tus

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Ocroser Term, 1975

No. 75-130

ROBERT J. QUINN, individually and as Commissioner
of the Chicago Fire Department,
Petitioner,

vs.

FRANCIS MUSCARE,
Respondent.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60601, Financial 6-3988

Petition For Certiorari Filed July 24, 1975
Certiorari Granted October 14, 1975

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ............ 1
EES ce ae aie a , 4
I a cchieeienneanisiiantias 15
Affidavit Evidencing Compliance with General Rule 39.. 16
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order .................. 17
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a |
Temporary Restraining Order ......2............--.--:--0-s00-0+- 23
Order Denying Motion for a Temporary Restraining
SII: seshasastaiesecethimameiaatandesinatesnacpanieeniticiahascibiisiiianinennntesenneenes 37
pS ee er a eT 37
Motion in Opposition to the Granting of a Preliminary
i ca inti aca ecrataaltitls 37
I eT Can oe ET 47
Transcript of Proceedings, March 19, 1974 .................... 48

Witnesses for the Defendant:

Leonard Johnson—

I lees 51
EE eee 59
Redirect Examination ~.............................0....-. 78
Recross Examination -......................-0-.-cossceses 80
Al Lundin—
PL RN 82
a 91
a 98

William F. Foley—
Direct Examination 99
Cross Examination —
Redirect Examination 105
Recross Examination ..... 107

Witness for the Plaintiff:

Francis Muscare—
Direct Examination 121
Cross Examination ....... - 129

Witness for the Defendant in Rebuttal:

William F. Foley—
| eI 131
Cross Examination .................... : ade 133

Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction ...... 137

Motion for Reconsideration and for Amendment of

Judgment Taken Under Advisement ...................-..--+ 138
Motion for Amendment of Judgment ......... ; 138
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsidera-

CBE axccosiscsccucssssesiiinsisssenntialinsennnnniniinnnn 139
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered oral-

Ae! 2 .. 146
Transcript of Proceedings, March 29, 1974 ‘a 150
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

and for Amendment of Judgment ........... - 153
Bates CE ABO occcccecscsccssicnnninnalael 154
Designation of Record on Appeal - 154

iii

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (Order No. 749) ..0......00cccccceecceeeeeeee 156
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Order No. 685) ..20.0.........cccescseceeeee 157
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Re-
versing and Remanding to the District Court ............ 167
Order of the United States Court of Appeals Denying
Defendant’s Petition for Rehearing ............0.0.0.0.0....... 167
Order of the United States Court of Appeals Staying
i esseteanonnneonnines 168
Order of the United States Court of Appeals Recalling
TINT dacicinetideescertereenencentestenteenenscncsennsonasnsenensenee 168

Order of the Supreme Court of the United States
Ee 169

ee

'
|
|
|
)
!

enlies

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT
DOCKET ENTRIES

In Tue Unrrep Srates District Court
For the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division.

No. 74 C 656

3-11-74—Filed complaint andcopy (JS5) $15.00
3-11-74— Filed Designation

3-11-74—Filed Affidavit regarding rule 39.

3-11-74—Filed Motion for a temporary restraining order.

3-11-74—Filed Memorandum in support of plaintiff’s mo-
tion for a temporary restraining order.

3-11-74—Motion for a temporary restraining order is de-
nied. Cause continued to March 19, 1974 at 2pm
for hearing on preliminary injunction. McGarr,
J.

3-19-74—Filed defendant’s appearance and that of his at-
torney.

3-19-74—Filed Motion in opposition to the granting of pre-
liminary injunction.

3-19-74—Cause called for hearing on preliminary injunc-
tion. Plaintiff rests on the complaint. Evidence
heard for defendant. Defendant rests. Rebuttal evi-
dence heard and concluded. Surrebuttal evidence
heard and concluded. Court enters its findings of
fact and conclusions of law from the bench. Mo-

—2—

tion for preliminary injunction is denied. Cause
continued to March 26, 1974 at 10am for status
report. McGarr,J.

3-26-74—Motion of Plaintiff for reconsideration and for
amendment of judgment is taken under advise-
ment. Cause continued to March 29, 1974 at 10
A.M. for ruling on plaintiffs motion to reconsider
previous ruling and further status report.—Mc-
Garr,J

3-19-74—F iled summons returned served.

3-26-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Motion for Amendment of judg-
ment.

3-26-74—Filed Memorandum in support of plaintiff’s mo-
tion for reconsideration.

3-29-74 Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and motion
for amendment of judgment, are both denied.
Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction will
be considered as a motion for a permanent in-
junction without further hearing and is denied.
MeGarr,J.

4-4-74Clerk’s file copy of Excerpt of proceedings had on
March 19, 1974, before Judge McGarr, filed by
an official court reporter.” ds

4-26-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Notice of appeal. P

5-9-74—“Clerk’s file copy of transcript of proceedings had
on March 19, 1974 before Judge McGarr, filed by
an official court reporter.” ds

5-15-74Filed Plaintiff’s Designation for the Complete
Record. ds

5-29-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 and 2. (Identified on
attached list) Y

-o

In Tue Unitep States Court Or AppEALs
For The Seventh Circuit

No. 74-1460

6-7-74—Record on appeal filed.

8-1-74—Appellant’s brief and appendix filed.
10-15-74—A ppellee’s brief filed.
11-15-74—Appellant’s reply brief filed.

1-16-75—Oral Argument heard. Cause taken under advise-
ment.

5-21-75—Judgment order entered, reversing and remand-
ing to District Court with directions. Per curiam
opinion filed.

6-17-75—Petition for rehearing denied.

6-24-75—Order entered staying mandate until July 24,
1975.

7-31-75—Mandate issued.
8-11-75—Order entered recalling mandate.

In Tue Supreme Court Or Tue Unirep States
No. 75-130

7-24-75—Petition for certiorari filed by defendant.
10-14-75—Order entered granting certiorari.

ites

In Tue Unitep States Districr Court
Northern District Of Illinois
Eastern Division

FRANCIS MUSCARE, »
Plaintiff,

Vs.

| No. 74C 656

eel Civil Action
ROBERT J. QUINN, individually and as

Commissioner, Chicago Fire Department,

D-* ndant. J

COMPLAINT
(Filed March 11, 1974)

1. This is an action by Plaintiff seeking to enjoin the
Chicago Fire Department from continuing his suspension
from his duties for alleged violations of §§61.001, 61.006
and 51.133, of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago
Fire Department; for declaratory judgment that §§61.001
and 51.133 are unconstitutional on their face, that §61.006
is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff in this case, and
that procedures of the Chicago Fire Department under
which Plaintiff was suspended are unconstitutional ; and for
back pay for the period of wrongful suspension.

2. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $1343, to
enforce rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. $1983, and under
28 U.S.C. §2201, et seq., and the Constitution of the United
States.

3. Defendant Robert J. Quinn is Commissioner of the
Chicago Fire Department and exercises sole and exclusive
control and management of the Fire Department and its

etfs

personnel. {Municipal Code of the City of Chicago, Ch. 12,
§4].

4. Plaintiff Francis Muscare has been a member of the
Chicago Fire Department since 1955. He currently holds
the rank of Lieutenant. Plaiutiff wears a small mustache
and short goatee. His hair is trimmed to medium length.

5. In December, 1973, Plaintiff’s superior officer, Chief
Morgan, warned him that he would not be permitted to
continue working as a fire fighter unless he shaved his
beard off. A few days thereafter Plaintiff was informed
that charges had been filed against him with the adminis-
tration authorities of the Fire Department.

6. Two and one-half months later, on Wednesday, Feb-
ruary 27, 1974, at 11:30 A.M., Second Deputy Lattice,
Third Division Fire Marshall Callahan and Third Battalion
Chief Swoboda entered the fire station where Lt. Muscare
was performing his duties as a fire fighter and ordered
him to turn in his equipment because he was being sus-
pended effective immediately. Plaintiff was informed that
he would receive a letter detailing the charges against him.

7. The appearance of Plaintiff’s face and the trim of
his hair has remained essentially the same from October,
1973, to the present. Photographs of Plaintiff taken March
1, 1974 and reflecting his appearance since October, 1973
and as of the date of Plaintiff’s suspension, are attached
hereto as Exhibits “A” and “B” and made a part hereof.

8. On March 4, 1974, Plaintiff received a letter bearing
the signature of Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, in-
forming him that he was accused of violating §§61.001,
61.006 and 51.133 of the Chicago Fire Department Rules
and Regulations and that his suspension was to last twenty-
nine days, beginning February 27, 1974. A copy of the
letter from Walter R. Braun is attached hereto as Exhibit
“C” and made a part hereof.

_

9. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:
Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All
members of the Chicago Fire Department shall present
a clean and proper appearance in personal care and
attire at all times. The face shall be clean-shaven, ex-
cept that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible. Mus-
taches shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular to
the corner of the mouth and the full upper lip must

be readily visible.
Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower

than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the

hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and

slope to the back of the neck. It will be gradually tap-

ered overall, in order to present a neat appearance.
A copy of §51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “D”
and made a part hereof.

10. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:

Part VI

OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES
IN RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE CHICAGO FIRE
DEPARTMENT

. * .
OFFENSES

Section 61.001. Conduct Unbecoming a Member or

Employee of the Chicago Fire Department.
A copy of §61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “EK”
and made a part hereof.

11. Section 61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the

Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:

= =

Part VI

OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES
IN RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE CHICAGO FIRE
DEPARTMENT

OFFENSES
Section 61.006. Disobedience of Orders.
A copy of §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “F”
and made a part hereof.

12. The twenty-nine day suspension of Plaintiff, a fire
fighter of twenty years’ service, without any prior notice
or opportunity for a hearing, is a violation of Plaintiff’s
right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

13. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department on its face prohibits Plaintiff
Muscare from determining the details of his personal ap-
pearance and violates Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights to
personal freedom guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.

14. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department, creating the offense of “Conduct
unbecoming a member or employee of the Chicago Fire
Department,” is so vague as not to give notice of the con-
duct it prohibits, depriving Plaintiff of his right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and is so overbroad as to infringe
upon Plaintiff’s Constitutionally protected right to personal
freedom.

oiiiies

15. Insofar as $61.006, creating the offense of “Dis-
obedience of Orders,” is applied by the Fire Department to
punish Plaintiff for the alleged violation of orders issued
under §§51.133 and 61.001, such orders were unconstitu-
tional and void, and as applied in this case, $61.006 is un-
constitutional.

16. The suspension of Plaintiff has deprived him of his
employment and the earnings used to sustain himself and
his family, has stigmatized him in his career as a fire fighter
and jeopardized his future ability to earn a living in his
chosen work. Unless Plaintiff foregoes his Constitutional]
rights, he will be subject to continued disciplinary actions
which will perpetuate the injury. This action of suspending
Plaintiff has thus caused and is continuing to cause him to
suffer immediate, irreparable injury.

17. If Defendant is enjoined from continuing the sus-
pension or taking any other disciplinary action against
Plaintiff for the alleged violations of $51.133, $61.001 and,
in this case, for alleged violation of §61.006, Defendant
would not be harmed thereby.

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court:

1. For a declaratory judgment that: (a) §51.133 and
§61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire
Department are unconstitutional on their face and void;
and (b) §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
eago Fire Department is unconstitutional as applied to
Plaintiff in this case; and (c) the suspension of Plaintiff
without a hearing or an opportunity to defend himself is
unconstitutional ; and :

2. To enjoin Defendant and any of his agents, employ-
ees, officers, lawyers, representatives and servants, prelimi-
narily and permanently from enforcing §§61.001 and 51.133,
and, insofar as related to orders issued under the aforemen-

ote .

:
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5
;
4
|

aliens

tioned, §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago
Fire Department against Plaintiff by means of suspension
from duty or any other means; and

3. For back pay to which Plaintiff would have been en-
titled if he had not been wrongfully suspended in violation
of his rights under the United States Constitution.

/s/ Francis Muscare
Plaintiff

/s/ Robert S. Sugarman

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff

(Affidavit of Francis Muscare).

—10— _—

EXHIBIT “A” EXHIBIT "B”

= =

EXHIBIT “C”

(Letterhead Of)
Chicago Fire Department
FIRE ACADEMY
February 28, 1974

Lieutenant Frank Muscare
4059 West Barry
Chicago, Illinois 60641

Subject: Suspension
Sir:

You are hereby notified that you have been, or will be,
removed from the payroll of the Chicago Fire Department
for violations of the Rules and Regulations, Practices and
Procedures of the Chicago Fire Department.

Recommended Duration of Suspension: twenty-nine (29)
days.
Dates of suspension:

From: 0800 February 27, 1974
To: 0800 March 28, 1974

You are accused of violations of the following sections
of the rules:

Sections: 61.001-61.006 and 51.133

1. You will report to the Personnel Department on March
27, 1974 to pick up your badge and other City property as-
signed to you, and to receive further orders. _

2. This suspension does not preclude the filing of these
charges against you by the Civil Service Commission. Un-
less previously notified you will contact the Chief of Per-
sonnel on to find out the disposition

of your case.

By order of
/s/ Walter R. Braun
Chief of Personnel

ec: 3rd Division Marshal

a ata

afin

EXHIBIT “D”

Section 51.131. Use of Vending Machines in Fire Sta-
tions. The vending machines, dispensing soft drinks and
candy, located in fire stations are for the use of Fire De-
partment personnel only. Under no circumstances will other
persons be allowed to use the facilities or products dis-
pensed by these vending machines. Cigarette vending ma-
chiues are not permitted in fire stations.

Section 51.132. Time Off Due to a Death in the Family.
Time off duty (one work day off) may be granted to all
members of the Chicago Fire Department when a death
occurs in the immediate family of the member. Immediate
family is defined as consisting of mother, father, husband,
wife, brother, or sister (including step or half) son or
daughter (including step or half) father-in-law, mother-in-
law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grand parents and grand-
children.

When someone in the “immediate family” dies, the mem-
ber will notify his immediate superior officer by telephone
and give all the pertinent information. The superior officer
will then relay the information through the chain of com-
mand so that sufficient manpower can be maintained.

Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All mem-
bers of the Chicago Fire Department shall present a clean
and proper appearance in personal care and attire at all
times. The face shall be clean-shaven, except that a non-
eccentric mustache is permissible. Mustaches shall not ex-
tend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner of the mouth
and the full upper lip must be readily visible.

Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower
than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the
hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and slope to
the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered overall, in
order to present a neat appearance.

Le

eniitinin

EXHIBITS “E” AND “F”

Part VI.

OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES IN

RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES AND

REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
OF THE CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT

Members or other employees who shall be found guilty
of infractions of any of the Rules and Regulations, Prac-
tices and Procedures of the Fire Department, shall be sub-
ject to the penalties hereinafter enumerated.

OFFENSES

Section 61.000

Section 61.001. Conduct unbecoming a member or em-
ployee of the Chicago Fire Department.

Section 61.002. Intoxication. ,

Section 61.003. Keeping or drinking intoxicating liquors
in or about premises of the Fire Department.

Section 61.004. Entering any tavern or bar while on
duty, or in uniform, except in the performance of assigned
duty.

Section 61.005. Neglect of duty.

Section 61006. Disobedience of orders.

Section 61.007. Inattention to duty.

Section 61.008. Immoral conduct.

Section 61.009. Making a false official report.

Section 61.010. Reporting for duty while incapable of
performing duties without a proper medical reason.

Section 61.011. Absence from duty without permission.

Section 61.012. Leaving a post of duty without being
properly relieved or without proper authorization.

Section 61.013. Violation of any law or ordinance.

Section 61.014. Insubordination or disrespect toward a
superior officer.

Section 61.015. Using coarse, profane or insolent lan-
guage or showing disrespect to, or willful maltreatment to-
ward any member of the department or any other person.

ee

niin

In Tue Unitrep States Districr Covurr
* * (Uaption No.74C 656) * *

DESIGNATION FORM—CIVIL
(Filed March 11, 1974)

A. Pending Related Cause, If Any:
Number ; Judge
Reason case deemed related (indicate by (X)):

1. ( ) Involves property included in earlier num-
bered pending cause.

2. ( ) Involves same issue of fact or grows out of
same transaction as earlier numbered pending
suit.

3. ( ) Involves validity or infringement of a patent
already in suit in earlier numbered pending
suit.

4. ( ) Involves both the same issue of law and the
same class as a pending suit and is brought
as a class action.

B. Indicate Basis Of Jurisdiction By (X):

1. ( ) United States is plaintiff or defendant.

2. (X) Federal question.

3. ( ) Diversity of citizenship.

C. Category Of Case (see reverse side of this form for
list of categories) :

Civil Rights—Federal Question
D. Is This Suit Brought As A Class Action?
( ) Yes (X) No

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Attorney at Law

—_ =

In Tue Unrrep Strares Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) °* *°

AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCING COMPLIANCE
WITH GENERAL RULE 39
(Filed March 11, 1974)

Affiant is the attorney of record for Francis Muscare and
has knowledge of the matters covered by this affidavit and
has read General Rule 39.

Affiant has not directly or indirectly solicited employment
by the above-named party or parties, and knows of no
solicitation of said party or parties by any person that has
resulted in the employment of the affiant, except (here state
all exceptions, or if none state “no exception”): No Ex-
ceptions

Affiant has not paid, or promised to pay, and knows of no
payment or promise of payment to the above-named party,
or parties, of the costs of this case, or of the medical, liv-
ing of other expenses of any party, or of any part of an
attorney’s fee, or of any portion of the recovery by suit or
settlement herein to any person whatever other than the
above-named party or parties and the attorneys of record
herein, except (here state all exceptions, or if none state
“no exception”) : No exceptions

Affiant has filed contemporaneously herewith a signed
copy of any written contingent fee agreement applicable
to his compensation for representing the above-named party
or parties in this action and represents that a signed copy
thereof has been furnished to each party whom he repre-
sents; if no copy of a contingent fee agreement is filed here-
with, affiant represents that his compensation for services
in this case is not on a contingent basis.

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Affiant

— | a

In Tue Unirep Srares Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER

(Filed March 11, 1974)

Plaintiff Francis Muscare, by his counsel Robert S.
Sugarman and Linda R. Hirshman of J acobs, Gore, Burns
& Sugarman, moves this Court pursuant to Rule 65(b),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a temporary restrain-
ing order restraining Defendant in the above captioned
case from continuing susper ding him under the provisions
of §$61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations
of the Chicago Fire Department, for the following reasons:

1. That Plaintiff has filed in this Court a Complaint
against the Defendant praying for a declaratory judgment
that §§61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Chicago Fire Department and his suspension
under those sections without a hearing and opportunity to
defend is unconstitutional and void; a preliminary and per-
manent injunction against the enforcement of §§61.001,
51.133 and, as applied in this matter, 461.006, of the Rules
and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department, and for
back pay for the period of Plaintiff’s suspension. The al-
legations of that Complaint are incorporated herein by
reference and made a part hereof.

2. That Defendant has not yet filed his Answer to said
Complaint but that, nevertheless, the material allegations
of that Complaint are true, and Plaintiff will be able to
substantiate the same by sufficient and competent evidence.

3. That the suspension of Plaintiff is causing him im-
mediate and irreparable injury by depriving him of his em-
ployment and the earnings used to sustain himself and his

—18—

family, stigmatizing him in his career, and jeopardizing
his future ability to earn a living as a fire fighter, and if an
injunction would be entered as prayed for in the Com-
plaint only after notice upon Defendant and a hearing,
Plaintiff will suffer continuing immediate and irreparable
injury.

4. That if a temporary restraining order would be en-
tered, Defendant would not be harmed thereby. .

Wherefore, Plaintiff requests that a temporary restrain-
ing order be entered, without bond, restraining Defendant
and any of his agents, employees, officers, lawyers, repre-
sentatives and services, from suspension of Plaintiff under
the provisions of §61.001 and §51.133, and, insofar as re-
lated to orders issued under the aforementioned, §61.006 of
the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department
and from taking any disciplinary action against him, pend-
ing further order by this Court; and for such other and
further relief as this Court may deem just.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert 8. Sugarman
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff

State Of Illinois
County Of Cook—ss.
AFFIDAVIT

Affiant Francis Museare, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and states as follows:

1. He has been a member of the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment since 1955, currently holding the rank of Lieutenant.

9. He has worn a small mustache, a short goatee, and
hair trimmed to medium length, as he presently appears,
since October, 1973.

—_——

ee

nine Aa LO AAR 1 ONE PEE cD ot ET RMN oe

Pet? Ae apitee bt ee at

4 —_ ee ae —

—19—

3. In December, 1973, his superior officer, Chief Mor-
gan, instructed him to shave his goatee off and, when he
declined to do so, was shortly thereafter informed that
charges had been filed against him with the administration
of the Chicago Fire Department.

4. On February 27, 1974, while he was performing his
duties as a fire fighter, Second Deputy Lattice, Third Divi-
sion Fire Marshall Callahan and Third Battalion Chief
Swoboda of the Chicago Fire Department ordered him to
turn in his fire equipment and leave the fire station where
he was on duty, »ecause he was being suspended from duty
as a fire fighter, effective immediately.

5. On March 4, 1974, he received a letter signed by
Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, informing him that
he was being suspended from duty until March 28, 1974
for alleged violation of §§61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department. A
copy of said letter is hereto attached as Exhibit “A” and
made a part hereof. Copies of §61.001, §61.006 and §51.133
of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment are hereto attached as Exhibits “B”, “C,” and “D,”
respectively and made a part hereof. |

6. Affiant was afforded no hearing or opportunity to
defend himself before his suspension.

7. Affiant is currently being deprived of the earnings
use to sustain himself and his family, the opportunity to
perform ‘his duties as a fire fighter with the Chicago Fire
Department, and present and future ability to pursue his
chosen career.

8. This action by the Defendant suspending Affiant from
his position as a fire fighter with the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment is causing Affiant to suffer, and will continue to cause
immediate, irreparable injury to the Affiant.

Further Affiant Sayeth Not.

/s/_ Francis Muscare

— =
EXHIBIT “A”

(Letterhead Of)

Chicago Fire Department
FIRE ACADEMY

February 28, 1974

Lieutenant Frank Muscare
4059 West Barry
Chicago, Illinois 60641

Subject: Suspension
Sir:

You are hereby notified that you have been, or will be,
removed from the payroll of the Chicago Fire Department
for violations of the Rules and Regulations, Practices and
Procedures of the Chicago Fire Department.

Recommended Duration of Suspension: twenty-nine (29)
days.

Dates of suspension:
From: 0800 February 27, 1974
To: 0800 March 28, 1974

You are accused of violations of the following sections
of the rules:

Sections: 61.001-61.006 and 51.133

1. You will report to the Personnel Department on March
27, 1974 to pick up your badge and other City property as-
signed to you, and to receive further orders.
2. This suspension does not preclude the filing of these
charges against you by the Civil Service Commission. Un-
less previously notified you will contact the Chief of Per-
IEE GU cnnccsnstieciincnsinasiceinntniniiinibiiie to find out the disposition
of your case.

By order of

/s/ Walter R. Braun

Chief of Personnel

ec: 3rd Division Marshal

a

EXHIBITS “B” AND “C”

Part VI.
OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES IN
RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
OF THE CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT

Members or other employees who shall be found guilty
of infractions of any of the Rules and Regulations, Prac-
tices and Procedures of the Fire Department, shall be sub-
ject to the penalties hereinafter enumerated.

OFFENSES

Section 61.000

Section 61.001. Conduct unbecoming a member or em-
ployee of the Chicago Fire Department.

Section 61.002. Intoxication.

Section 61.003. Keeping or drinking intoxicating liquors
in or about premises of the Fire Department.

Section 61.004. Entering any tavern or bar while on
duty, or in uniform, except in the performance of assigned
duty.

Section 61.005. Neglect of duty.

Section 61.006. Disobedience of orders.

Section 61.007. Inattention to duty.

Section 61.008. Immoral conduct.

Section 61.009. Making a false official report.

Section 61.010. Reporting for duty while incapable of
performing duties without a proper medical reason.

Section 61.011. Absence from duty without permission.

Section 61.012. Leaving a post of duty without being
properly relieved or without proper authorization.

Section 61.013. Violation of any law or ordinance.

Section 61.014. Insubordination or disrespect toward a
superior officer.

Section 61.015. Using coarse, profane or insolent lan-
guage or showing disrespect to, or willful maltreatment to-
ward any member of the department or any other person.

=

EXHIBIT “D”

Section 51.131. Use of Vending Machines in Fire Sta-
tions. The vending machines, dispensing soft drinks and
candy, located in fire stations are for the use of Fire De-
partment personnel only. Under no circumstances will other
persons be allowed to use the facilities or products dis-
pensed by these vending machines. Cigarette vending ma-
chines are not permitted in fire stations.

Section 51.132. Time Off Due to a Death in the Family.
Time off duty (one work day off) may be granted to all
members of the Chicago Fire Department when a death
occurs in the immediate family of the member. Immediate
family is defined as consisting of mother, father, husband,
wife, brother, or sister (including step or half) son or
davghter (including step or half) father-in-law, mother-in-
law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grand parents and grand-
children.

When someone in the “immediate family” dies, the mem-
ber will notify his immediate superior officer by telephone
and give all the pertinent information. The superior officer
will then relay the information through the chain of com-
mand so that sufficient manpower can be maintained.

Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All mem-
bers of the Chicago Fire Department shall present a clean
and proper appearance in personal care and attire at all
times. The face shall be clean-shaven, except that a non-
eccentric mustache is permissible. Mustaches shall not ex-
tend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner of the mouth
and the full upper lip must be readily visible.

Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower
than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the
hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and slope to
the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered overall, in
order to present a neat appearance.

rf

—23—

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I, Linda R. Hirshman, one of the attorneys for Plaintiff
Francis Muscare, Do Hereby Certify that on March 11,
1974, I attempted to give notice of this motion for a tem-
porary restraining order to the named Defendant by tele-
phoning him and the Corporation Counsel of the City of
Chicago personally at their official places of business and

' - @dvising them of the filing of this motion.

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff

In Tue Unitep States Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

(Filed March 11, 1974)

1.

FACTS

Plaintiff in this action, Francis Muscare, has been a fire
fighter with the Chicago Fire Department since 1955. On
February 27, 1974, while Plaintiff was performing his
duties as a fire fighter at his fire station, three of his su-
perior officers, Second Deputy Lattice, Third Division Fire
Marshall Callahan, and Third Battalion Chief Swoboda,
presented themselves at Plaintiff’s station and informed
him that he was being suspended as of that moment, to
turn in his equipment and identification. On Monday, March
4, 1974, Lieutenant Muscare received a letter signed by
Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, informing him that

—_— =

he was being suspended for a period of twenty-nine days
from February 27, 1974, for alleged violations of §$61.001,
61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department.

Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cage Fire Department provides:

Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance.

All members of the Chicago Fire Department shall pre-
sent a clean and proper appearance in personal care
and attire at all times. The face shall be clean-shaven,
except that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible.
Mustaches shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular
to the corner of the mouth and the full upper lip must
be readily visible.

Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower
than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the
hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and
slope to the back of the neck. It will be gradually
tapered overall in order to present a neat appearance.

Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department creates the offense of “conduct un-
becoming a member or employee of the Chicago Fire De-
partment” and Section 61.006 of the Rules and Regulations
of the Chicago Fire Department « eates the offense of
“disobedience of orders.”

Since October, 1973, Lt. Muscare has worn a small mus-
tache and a short, neatly-trimmed goatee. His hair is med-
ium in length. Plaintiff’s facial appearance and the length of
his hair has remained essentially the same from October,
1973 to the present. In December, 1973, one of Lt. Muscare’s
superior officers, Chief Morgan, informed him that he could
not work with a goatee and shortly thereafter, Morgan ad-
vised Plaintiff that charges had been filed against him.
However, it was not until February 27, 1974 that any fur-
ther action was taken against him.

- =

Lt. Museare was then suspended from duty without pay,
with the prospect of further disciplinary action if he did
not conform his personal appearance to the dictates of the
Chicago Fire Department.

Plaintiff has been and is continuing to be deprived of
his income, his chosen work, and his reputation as a fire
fighter by a summary procedure of the Chicago Fire De-
partment enforcing regulations which infringe upon his
Constitutional right to determine his personal appearance
as he chooses, and the suspension of Lt. Muscare can only
be conceived as an initial step in long-range disciplinary
measures aimed at forcing him to conform his appearance
to the dictates of the administration of the Chicago Fire
Department.

Il.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to redress the deprivation of
Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights protected by 42 U.S.C.
$1983, under 28 U.S.C. $1343 and 28 U.S.C. $2201, et seq.
The Court also has jurisdiction over actions arising di-
rectly under the United States Constitution itself. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946).

ITI.

ARGUMENT

A. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is an Unconstitutional Depriva-
tion of Plaintiff’s Right to Determine His Personal
Appearance.

Plaintiff’s right to determine the details of his personal
appearance free from arbitrary governmental interference
is protected by the United States Constitution. The Fire
Department may not condition Plaintiff’s employment upon

—26—

the requirement that he yield up this right. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit specifically
set out the Constitutional pretections for the right to de-
termine one’s appearance, particularly with regard to length
of hair, in Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7 Cir. 1969) :

The right to wear one’s hair at any length or in any
desired manner is an ingredient of personal freedom
protected by the United States Constitution . . . wheth-
er this right is designated as within the ‘penumbras’
of the First Amendment freedom of speech, see Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14
L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), or as encompassed within the
Ninth Amendment as an ‘additional fundamental right
. . . which exists alongside those fundamental rights
specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
Amendments” [cite Griswold], it clearly exists and is
applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

[419 F.2d at 1037].

In light of the Constitutional protections for this self-de-
termination, the Court of Appeals struck down as uncon-
stitutional a high school regulation prescribing the length
and appearance of hair for male students. Since the deci-
sion in Breen v. Kahl, both the Court of Appeals and the
District Court have consistently reiterated their commit-
ment to protect the right of the individual to decide what
the length and style of his hair will be. Arnold v. Car-
penter, 459 F.2d 939 (7 Cir. 1972), Crews v. Clones, 432
F.2d 1259 (7 Cir. 1970), Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F.Supp.
1022 (E.D.IIL., 1973).

The Constitutional protection of freedom to determine
one’s personal appearance protects public employees from
the enforcement of officially imposed standards. Absent the
showing of a compelling governmental interest of the most
serious nature, public employers may not dictate to their
employees the way in which they must groom themselves:

Oe

~~ =

It is now clearly established that the State does not
possess an absolute right arbitrarily to refuse oppor-

tunities such as . . . employment in public service .. .
[Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d at 1263, supra].

This protection was specifically applied to a fireman in 1971,
in Hunt v. Board of Fire Commissioners of Massapequa
Fire District, 327 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup.Ct. 1971), where the
New York Court struck down a fireman’s suspension for
violation of a grooming regulation, holding:
“there is as a matter of substantive due process a con-
stitutional right to determine one’s own hair style and
... the burden is upon the Board to show substantial
justification for the regulation it seeks to impose.
[327 N.Y.S. at 45].

Similarly, in the case of Lindquist v. City of Coral
Gables, 323 F.Supp. 1161 (S.D.Fla. 1971), the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida ordered
the Coral Gables Fire Department to reinstate with back
pay a fireman who had been suspended for violation of
hair regulations substantially similar to the ones involved
in the case at hand. Recently, in Black v. Rizzo, 360 F.Supp.
648 (E.D. Pa. 1973) the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania reiterated a fireman’s right to de-
termine his personal appearance despite regulations al-
most identical to those of the Chicago Fire Department and
reinstated the fireman with back pay. The Pennsylvania
District Court, after a survey of_the substantial body of
law that has evolved around this subject, concluded that:

Among other things, the plaintiff has argued that his
interest in wearing his hair in a style, manner, and
length of his choosing constitutes a Constitutional right
implicitly protected by the “liberty” assurance of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
[cites] ... The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has
demonstrated the existence of such a constitutionally
protected interest.

[360 F.Supp. at 651).

—28

The Court in Black v. Rizzo definitively rejected the argu-
ment that interference with that right could be justi‘ed on
grounds of a fire department’s disciplinary interest in regu-
lating the activities of its members. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently ruled that
even the unique public function of a Department of Po-
lice does not justify the interference with a policeman’s
right to determine his personal appearance, specifically
with regard to the style of his hair. Dwen v. Barry, 483
F.2d 1126 (2 Cir. 1973).

Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department reveals its constitutional infirmity
on its face. Without setting forth any reason for the rule,
the Fire Department has simply created a requirement
that its members present a “proper appearance in per-
sonal care and attire.” The standards of §51.133, including,
for example, “non-eccentric mustaches” can only be based
on some administrative officer’s subjective aesthetic pref-
erence. This patent attempt to impose the personal pref-
erences of administration of the Chicago Fire Department
upon the members of the Department is a violation of the
members’ Constitutional rights and cannot be sustained.
Such official attempts to dictate the details of personal ap-
pearance have been prohibited again and again by the
United States District Courts and Courts of Appeals, in-
cluding the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This
attempt once again to impose an official standard of ap-
pearance is directly counter to what is now a well-settled
body of case law. There can be no doubt that Plaintiff will
ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and the in-
jury he is now suffering for his exercise of his clear Con-
stitutional rights is illegal, irreparable and unjustifiable.

B. Continued Suspension of Plaintiff and the Likelihood
of Additional Action Against Him is Causing and Will

—29_—

Cause Additional Immediate, Irreparable Injury to
Plaintiff, and Restraint of Plaintiff's Suspension will
not Harm Defendant.

By action of the Chicago Fire Department on February
27, 1974, Lt. Francis Muscare was summarily ordered off
the premises of his employment and suspended from ac-
tive service with the Chicago Fire Department. Under the
terms of his suspension, as described in the Fire Depart-
ment’s letter of February 28, 1974, Lt. Muscare can only
anticipate further disciplinary action being taken against
him if he continues to exercise his Constitutional rights in
violation of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire
Department dictating the details of his personal appear-
ance. By its action suspending Lt. Muscare, the Chicago
Fire Department has deprived and is continuing to de-
prive him of the earnings current!y used to support him-
self and his family, the opportunity to pursue his career
as a fire fighter, his reputation in the community, and his
prospects for future successful pursuit of his chosen
career. Plaintiff is thus suffering extensive, immediate,
ongoing, irreparable injury every day that he remains
excluded from the fulfillment of his chosen work, and he
has no reasonable anticipation that the penalties currently
being imposed upon him will be mitigated in the future un-
less he yields his Constitutional rights to the Fire Depart-
ment. Unless this Court acts to remedy Plaintiff’s position
immediately, he will be irreparably injured.

Lt. Muscare has been performing as a fire fighter with
his personal appearance essentially the same as it is at this
moment since at least October, 1973. Nothing in the Rules
and Regulations of the Chicago Fire 1’epartment indicates
that any harm would come tc the Department if he were
to continue to do so. By contrast to the injury which Lt.
Muscare has suffered and is continuing to suffer, his rein-

— =

statement as a fire fighter will not harm Defendant in any
substantial manner. Indeed, unless the Chicago Fire De-
partment is employing superfluous fire fighters, one must
assume that Lt. Muscare’s suspension for twenty-nine days,
if anything, actually harms the Fire Department by depriv-
ing them of a qualified and experienced fire fighter, for no
substantial reason. Since the Chicago Fire Department
had been aware of Lt. Muscare’s appearance since at least
last December, it is inconceivable that his appearance cre-
ated a crisis of such urgent nature to warrant action against
him without any of the Constitutionally required procedures
for action against him.

C. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is Unconstitutionally Vague and
Overbroad. :

Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
eago Fire Department creates an offense denominated
“Conduct unbecoming a member or employee of the Chi-
cago Fire Department.” This prohibition is so general as
to be incapable of a reasoned interpretation in advance of
its application. Further, the wide scope of activities which
may be interpreted as “conduct unbecoming” a fire fighter
encompasses both Constitutionally protected activities and
those which may be beyond such protections, and thus the
regulation contains the potential for infringement upon
Constitutional rights. Such sweeping regulations are a vio-
lation of Constitutional standards and must be replaced
by more narrowly drawn rules. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960).

Absent any definition of conduct unbecoming a member
of the Chicago Fire Department, §61.001 is simply what
the administrators of the Fire Department say it will be in
any given ease. The person unfortunate enough to come

31S

within the purview of this section cannot predict what his
offenses may be. Such a rule violates the very fundamentals
of due process of law and chills the exercise of Constitu-
tionally protected rights.

In Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7 Cir. 1969), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ruled that a university could not undertake disciplinary
proceedings for violation of a rule proscribing “miscon-
duct” on the grounds that such proceedings were not based
on “standards of conduct expressed in reasonably clear and
narrow rules.” [418 F.2d at 167] The Court stated:

The use of ‘misconduct’ as a standard in imposing the
penalties threatened here must therefore fall for vague-
ness. The inadequacy of the rule is apparent on its face.
It contains no clues which could assist a student, an
administrator or a reviewing judge in determining
whether conduct not transgressing statutes is sus-
ceptible to punishment by the University as ‘miscon-
duct’.
Here, also the inadequacy of §61.001 is apparent on its
face. The impossibility of predicting what administrators
will determine to be “conduct unbecoming” is obvious. The
members and employees of the Chicago Fire Department
may not be forced to guess at what behavior will bring the
penalty of suspension or other discipline upon them any
more than any other citizen must be forced to guess at what
behavior will provoke the wrath of an unpredictable govern-
ment. The Constitutional infirmity of $61.001 is particu-
larly offensive because as in the instant case it can be
interpreted to prohibit conduct protected by the Constitu-
tion.

Even the military are restrained from ordering their in-
ternal affairs through means such as sweeping and vague
regulations. In Avrech v. Secretary of Navy, 477 F.2d 1237
(D.C. Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for

—32—

the District of Columbia Circuit struck down as unconstitu-
tional a conviction under Article 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice which provided:

All disorders and neglect to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the Armed Forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces, and
crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons sub-
ject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cog-
nizance of by a general, special, or summary court
martial, according to the nature and degree of the of-
fense and shall be punished at the discretion of that
court.

[477 F.2d 1237 at 1239].

See also: Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3 Cir. 1973). The
Court ruled that such a broad-brush prohibition fell far
short of the Constitutional requirements of fair warning
to the accused and an ascertainable standard for the judge.
Certainly, the Chicago Fire Department does not have a
freer hand in constructing its disciplinary system than the
United States Armed Forces. Section 61.001 of the Rules
and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department does not
approach the Constitutional requirements of due process
of law.

D. The Summary Suspension of Plaintiff Violates His
Constitutional Right to Due Process of Law.

The suspension of Lt. Muscare was carried out by means
of a verbal pronouncement from three of his superior of-
ficers in the Fire Department and a one-page letter from
the Chief of Personnel inferming him that he was “accused
of” violating certain sections of the Rules and Regulations
of the Chicago Fire Department. Plaintiff’s suspension be-
came effective immediately after the three superior of-
ficers entered his fire station on February 27, 1974. Plain-
tiff was afforded no opportunity to make a case on his own

—33—

behalf before the penalty of suspension was imposed upon
him.

It is well settled that the public employees have rights
in their employment which cannot be taken away without
procedural due process. Slochower v. Board of Higher Edu-
cation of the City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637
(1956). Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694
(1972).2 The protections of procedural due process apply
whether the penalty being imposed amounts to a perma-
nent discharge or a suspension from whatever public prop-
erty right is involved. Snead v. Department of Social Serv-
ices, City of New York, 355 F.Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
Soglin v. Kauffman, supra.

In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515,
Counties of Cook and Will, and State of Illinois, 471 F. 2d
488 (7 Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit set forth the procedure which must be
followed in order to afford a public employee elementary
due process:

We find that the resolution of these interests requires
that Plaintiff be given a notice of the charges against
him, notice of the evidence upon which the charges will

1 It is plain that this initial suspension is merely a prelude to
additional disciplinary action against Plaintiff unless he con-
forms to the administratior’. views of ‘‘proper personal appear-
ance.’’

2 The protections against be 1g deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of la. are so fundamental to the Amer-
ican system of ordered liberty that the requirements of elemen-
tary procedural due process has been imposed in cases involving
a wide range of interests including, for example, the right to a
hearing before consumer goods may be summarily repossessed,
Fuentes v. Schevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 8S. Ct. 1983 (1972) or welfare
benefits cut off, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011
(1970).

-

be based, a hearing before a tribunal possessing ap-
parent impartiality, and a chance to present witnesses
and confront adverse evidence at the hearing.

[471 F.2d 488 at 495].

Further, these procedures must be made available to the
government employee prior to the action against him. As
the United States Court of Claims pointed out in Ricucci
v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252, (Ct. Cl. 1970):

Few of them [government employees] earn more than
enough to pay their living expenses from month to
month, and when their salaries are cut off, they may be
in the same destitute circumstances as a welfare re-
cipient whose aid has been discontinued.

[425 F. 2d 1252 at 1256].

Just as a welfare recipient may not be cut off from the
basic necessities of life without a hearing prior to the ac-
tion, Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, or a citizen deprived of his
everyday consumer goods without judicial process, Fuentes
v. Schevin, supra, and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corpo-
ration, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969), this Court should
not permit a fire fighter with civil service status and twen-
ty years’ service with the Department to be summarily sus-
pended without prior opportunity to meet the charges
against him and present any kind of defense. Only the
most serious type of emergency would justify the procedure
used to suspend Lt. Muscare. The present case is hardly
such an instance, where the Fire Department utilized the
services of Lt. Muscare for a period of over two months
from the time he was initially reprimanded for wearing a
goatee. The manner in which Lt. Muscare was involuntarily
suspended from his employment only illustrates the abuses
which the right to due process is designed to avoid.

E. As Applied to Plaintiff in this Case, §61.006 of the
Rules and Reguletions of the Chicago Fire Department
is Unconstitutional.

=

Under §61.006, Plaintiff is being punished for failure to
obey orders which infringe upon his Constitutional rights
to personal freedom and due process of law. Just as the
Fire Department was exceeding its powers by ordering
Plaintiff to shave his goatee and thus forego his Consti-
tutional rights under $51.133 and §61.001, Rules and Regu-
lations, Chicago Fire Department, they cannot now punish
Plaintiff for failing to obey an unconstitutional order, ac-
complishing by indirection what they could not do directly.
The Court in Hunt v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra,
drew this obvious conclusion from its ruling that the Fire
Department had no right to dictate its members’ appear-
ance:

It follows that John Hunt’s promise to obey the de-
partment rules must be read as requiring only that he
comply with rules not in violation of his constitutional
rights and not as a waiver of such rights.
[327 N.Y.S. 2nd 36 at 41}.
Or, as the Seventh Cirenit recently affirmed in C.O.P. v.
Conlisk, ...... F.2d ...... (7 Cir. 1973):

The district court held that Rules 2, 5, and 6 were un-
constitutional as applied in this case. We agree with
this determination. Rules 2, 5, and 6 were used only
in conjunction with Rule 51 in discharging the six po-
licemen. The underlying ‘violation’ in each case was the
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination be-
fore the grand jury, which was prohibited by Rule 51.
Since we have found Rule 51 to be constitutionally in-
valid insofar as it denies the Fifth Amendment right
to a public employee where there is a possibility of
criminal prosecution, the use of Rules 2, 5, and 6 in
conjunction with Rule 51 in such a circumstance was
also invalid.

—36—

IV.

CONCLUSION

Since February 27, 1974, Lt. Francis Muscare, a fire
fighter who has devoted twenty years to the service of the
City of Chicago Fire Department, has been separated from
his employment, with accompanying loss of income, job op-
portunities, and reputation in the community. He has been
thus penalized for attempting to exercise his Constitutional
right to determine his personal appearance. The penalty of
suspension, with accompanying further penalties if Plain-
tiff does not forego his Constitutional rights, was imposed
upon him without even a semblance of the procedures re-
quired by due process of law. By virtue of his suspension
from the Chicago Fire Department, Plaintiff has been and
is continuing to be, subjected to irreparable injury. Plain-
tiff is thus being deprived of his Constitutional rights in
the most immediate, irreparable manner and for no justi-
fiable governmental reason. Only immediate action by this
Court can terminate the imposition of this injury on Plain-
tiff.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert S. Sugarman
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff

In Tue Unitrep States Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) ° *

Name of Presiding Judge, Honorable Frank J. McGarr
Cause No. 74C 656 Date Mar. 11, 1974
Title of Cause—Francis Muscare v. Robert J. Quinn, in-

dividually and as Commissioner, Chicago Fire Depart-
ment

- =

Brief Statement of Motion—Shall move the Court for a
temporary restraining order

Names and Addresses of moving counsel—Linda R. Hirsh-
man of Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman, 201 North
Wells, Suite 2122, Chicago, Illinois 60606

Representing—Plaintiff

Motion for a temporary restraining order is denied.
Cause continued to Mar. 19, 1974 at 2:00 P.M. for hear-
ing on preliminary injunction. McGarr, J.

In Tue Unitep States District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

APPEARANCE
(Filed March 19, 1974)

I enter my Appearance as Attorney for said Robert J.
Quinn.
Dated: 2-19, 1974
/s/ Richard L. Curry
Corporation Counsel
City Of Chicago
/s/ R.L. Curry by
/s/ Philip M. Sheridan
Asst. Corp. Counsel

In Tue Unitep States District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO THE
GRANTING OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(Filed March 19, 1974)

Now comes the Detendant, Robert J. Quinn, Commis-
sioner, Chicago Fire Department, by his attorney, Richard

—38—

L. Curry, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, and
moves this Honorable Court to deny plaintiff’s prayer for
a Preliminary Injunction and in support thereof states as
follows:

1. The plaintiff has failed to show that without such
relief he would be irreparably damaged. The so-called ir-
reparable injury that is alleged by plaintiff amounts to no
more than the suspension on his record and loss of salary
incurred as the result of the 29 day suspension. Even if
this Court were to find that he had been illegally “in-
jured”, nevertheless, such injury is not irreparable. Eco-
nomic injury, loss of income or employment does not en-
title an individual to injunctive relief. The plaintiff is not
injured in any manner that could not be readily rectified
if he is successful on the merits. For reasons that the de-
fendant will show at this hearing, the defendant submits
that it would not be in the public interest to issue a Pre-
iiminary Injunction.

The burden is clearly upon the parties requesting tem-
porary or preliminary injunctive relief to demonstrate that
they are entitled to such relief. Crowther v. Seaborg, (CA
10th, 1969) 415 F.2d 437; Weber v. Continental Motors
Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 365 F.Supp. 404. It is also settled
that the granting of a temporary or preliminary injunc-
tion is a matter of Judicial discretion. The propriety of its
issuance depends on the circumstances of a particular case.
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). Courts consider the effect
their actions might have on the public interest prior to is-
suing injunctive relief, see Yakus v. U. S., 321 U.S. 414;
Snively Groves v. Florida Citrus Commission, D. C. Fla.
1938, 23 F.Supp. 600.

—59—

2. There has been no prima facie showing by the plain-
tiff of reasonable probability that he will prevail on the
merits of the case.

It would appear the Federal Courts in the various cir-
cuits are divided about equally with respect to the consti-
tutional right of a student to choose the length of his hair.
See footnote 5 in Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th
Cir. 1972) cited by plaintiff and New Rider v. Board of
Education of Indiana School District No. 1, Okl., 480 F.2d
693 (10th Cir. 1973). These student-hair cases are not, how-
ever, controlling in the case before this Court.

The salient issue before this Honorable Court is wheth-
er or not the Chicago Fire Department was justified in
suspending plaintiff, a Lieutenant in the Chicago Fire De-
partment, because of his refusal to shave off his beard.
The factual situation in the case at bar is very similar to
that presented in the case of Yarbrough v. City of Jack-
son, 363 F.Supp. 1176 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The Fire Depart-
ment in that city had a grooming regulation with respect
to the prohibition of beards and limitations with respect
to the type of mustaches and length of hair that could be
worn by firemen similar to Section 51.133 of the Rules and
Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department. The plain-
tiff therein was discharged from his employment for re-
fusing to obey an order by a Fire Chief to trim his hair.
The plaintiff therein filed suit alleging an illegal infringe-
ment upon the constitutionally protected rights of free-
dom of expression of firemen.

The Court granted judgment to the City of Jackson for
two reasons. The first reason was that the Court was
unwilling to interfere with the reasonable conclusions of
the responsible officers in the Fire Department that there
was a rational relationship between longer hair and per-

—_— =

sonal safety of its firemen (longer hair more prone to
catch on fire, interference with seal of gus mask). The sec-
ond basis fcr the decision of the Court was its “firm con-
viction that it is not the function of the judiciary to inter-
fere with a fire chief’s reasonable notion as to what is
necessary to maintain discipline within a ‘quasi military’
organization for which he is responsible and which is dedi-
cated to the protection of the public and its property” (p.
1179). With respect to the second basis of its decision the
Court noted it was following the case of Stradley v. Ander-
son, 478 F. 2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973), rather than the case
of Owen v. Barry, 483 F. 2d 1126 (2nd Cir. 1973), because
it felt “there is a rational relationship between discipline
among firefighters and public safety and that it is not the
province of this Court to dictate its own philosophy as to
the best method to promote discipline” (p. 1181).

The recent Illinois ease of Hordorwich v. Board of Po-
lice and Fire Commissioners of Melrose Park, ...... Ill. App.
Re sein (No. 58652—Copy of Opinion attached), sustained
the discharge of a fireman who refused to follow a hair
regulation and refused a direct order to obtain a haircut.
After noting that the evidence substantiated that sideburns
interfered with the use of a smoke mask the Court stated
—‘Personal rights must be reasonably limited when the
safety of firemen and others is involved.”

On January 4, 1974, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
sustained in an Abstract Opinion (64 N.J. 142) the deci-
sion of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the case of
Manco v. Town of Irvington, 126 N.J. Super. 148 (1973).
The fireman therein had been suspended for violating a
directive of his department requiring him to have short
hair and a clean face so that a good face seal could be
obtained on face masks used in fighting fires.

= =

The defendant respectfully submits that the defendant
acted properly and was justified in suspending the plain-
tiff for his having the beard and his refusal to obey a di-
rect order to shave off his beard.

3. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the State Adminis-
trative and Judicial remedies available to him. Slayton v.
Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971), Seetion 10-1-18 of Chapter 24
of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 1971, provides no civil
service employee shall be suspended for over 30 days ex-
cept for cause upon written charges and after an oppor-
tunity to be heard in his own defense by the Civil Service
Commission. This Section also grants those in charge with
the administration of a department the power to suspend
an employee for 30 days or less and grants to said em-
ployee the right to have a hearing before the Civil Service
Commission concerning the propriety of that suspension if
said suspension was for more than 5 days or incurred
within 6 months of a previous suspension regardless of
the length of said suspension.

In Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
the Court refused to proceed on a case where a fireman was
suspended for violating a hair regulation and allegedly
threatened with additional disciplinary sanctions because
the Court felt that there was no immediate irreparable in-
jury that could not be redressed by the utilization of avail-
able administrative remedies and judicial review provided
for by city civil service regulations. The factual situations
before the Court would appear to be substantially the same.

Wherefore, the Defendant, Robert J. Quinn, Individually
and as Commissioner, Chicago Fire Department, prays that
this Honorable Court deny the request for a Preliminary

—42—

Injunction and for such other relief as this Honorable Court
may deem meet and just.

Richard L. Curry, Corporation Counsel
of the City of Chicago,
Attorney for Defendant,
Robert J. Quinn, Individually and as
. Commissioner, Chicago Fire Depart-
ment,
By: /s/ Philip M. Sheridan
Assistant Corporation Counsel
State Of Illinois
County Of Cook—ss

AFFIDAVIT

Philip M. Sheridan, being first duly sworn on oath, de-
poses and says that he is an Assistant Corporation Counsel
and in said capacity has been assigned to this cause; that
he has read the foregoing Motion by him subscribed and
that the same is believed to be well founded and that any
facts contained therein are correct and true to the best of
his knowledge and belief.

/s/ Philip M. Sheridan
Assistant Corporation Counsel

Subscribed And Sworn To
Before Me This 19th Day
Of March, A.D., 1974.

/s/ Barbara E. Hanses
Notary Public
(Seal)

— =
58652
Peter Hordorwich, 7
Appeal From
Plaintiff-Appellant,
— Circuit Court,
= . Cook County.
Board Of Police And Fire Commis- Hon.
sioners Of Melrose Park, et al., Edward F. Healy,
Presiding.
Defendants-Appellees. )

Mr. Justice Dieringer delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Circuit
Court of Cook County sustaining the plaintiff’s discharge
by the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the Vil-
lage of Melrose Park.

The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether the find-
ings and decision of the Board of Police and Fire Commis-
sioners of Melrose Park were based upon cause and sup-
ported by substantial evidence; (2) whether the Board’s
denial of plaintiff’s motion for continuance constituted
prejudicial error and deprived the plaintiff of a fair hear-
ing; and (3) whether the findings of the Board were ade-
quate to support the decision of the Board.

The plaintiff, Peter Hordorwich, became a fireman for
the Village of Melrose Park in 1967. On March 15, 1971,
Fire Chief Anthony Zito posted a General Order which
directed all Melrose Park firemen to be clean shaven and
to have their hair cut in conformity with an attached draw-
ing of a human head. In December, 1971, Chief Zito sus-
pended the plaintiff from duty for his failure to comply
with the General Order and insubordination in disobeying
a direct order to obtain a haircut. Chief Zito also filed
charges with the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners
of the Village of Melrose Park asking for plaintiff’s dis-

_

charge. A hearing on the charges was held on January 21,
1972. At the hearing counsel for plaintiff requested a
continuance for the reason that he was not yet adequately
prepared for trial. The motion was denied by the Board.
On February 28, 1972, the Board found that cause existed
for the discharge of the plaintiff from his position as fire-
man in that he “was not clean shaven nor did he have a
length of hair so as to be able to perform all of his duties
required as a fireman... [and in that he was] ... guilty
of insubordination in that on December 21, 1971, he did
violate a direct order of the Chief of the Fire Department
of the Village of Melrose Park to get a hair cut that would
place him within the purview of the General Order of March
15, 1971,” and he was thereupon discharged. He filed suit
in the Cireuit Court of Cook County and on November 17,
1972, a hearing was held on the plaintiff’s amended com-
plaint in administrative review. At the close of the hearing
the court sustained and affirmed the Board’s decision to
discharge the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s first contention is the findings and deci-
sion of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of
Melrose Park were neither based upon cause nor supported
by substantial evidence. The plaintiff argues the Board’s
finding plaintiff was “unfit for duty by reason of his long
hair” was insufficient. He relies on the decision in Gigger
v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, (1960) 23 Ill.
App. 2d 433, wherein the Appellate Court held it is im-
perative the record of an administrative hearing show that
an impartial inquiry into the facts was conducted.

We believe the findings and decision of the Board of
Police and Fire Commissioners were based upon cause and
supported by substantial evidence. The scope of review of
the final decision of an administrator agency is well set-
tled and succinctly stated in Davern v. Civil Service Com-
mission of the City of Chicago, (1970) 47 Ill. 2d 469, where-
in the Supreme Court stated:

—45—

“The Administrative Review Act provides that agency
findings on questions of fact are ‘prima facie true and
correct’ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, Ch. 110, par. 274.) We
have construed this provision to limit the function of
the reviewing court to ascertaining whether the find-
ings and decisions of the administrative agency are
against the manifest weight of the evidence .... The
courts will not reweigh the evidence, but are limited to
a determination whether the final decision of the ad-
ministrative agency is just and reasonable in light of
the evidence presented.”

In the case at bar the Chief of the Melrose Park Fire De-
partment promulgated a General Order which directed all
firemen to be clean shaven and to have their hair cut in
accordance with an attached drawing of a human head.
Failure to comply with the order would result in disci-
plinary action. Evidence submitted at the hearing before
the Board established that inordinate growth of hair and
sideburns could cause an inability to wear a smoke mask
required at certain types of fires and would be detrimental
to a fireman’s safety and the safety of others. It was fur-
ther established the plaintiff did not comply with the Gen-
eral Order and disobeyed the direct orders of his superior
to comply with said General Order. We conclude there-
fore, that the findings and decision of the Board were
based upon valid cause for removal of the plaintiff from
his duties and fully supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff's second contention is the denial of his
motion for continuance by the Board constituted preju-
dicial error and deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing. The
plaintiff bases his contention on the decision in Lindeen v.
Illinois State Police Merit Board, (1962) 25 Ill. 2d 349,
wherein the Supreme Court held the Board’s denial of a
motion for continuance deprived plaintiff Lindeen of a fair
trial.

—4G6—

We do not agree with the plaintiff’s contention. It is
well settled that the granting of a continuance is a matter
which rests in the sound discretion of an administrative
tribunal. (People ex rel. Egan v. Dunham, (1942) 314 II.
App. 110.) In the instant case, the plaintiff and his attor-
ney did not file a written motion for continuance prior to
the hearing but, rather, orally requested a continuance at
the hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel stated he was requesting a
continuance because he was not adequately prepared for
trial. At the hearing, however, counsel demonstrated he
was well versed in all facets of the circumstances giving
rise to plaintiff’s suspension and presented an admitted
expert in fire fighting devices. Under these circumstances
we couclude the Board did not breach its discretion in de-
nying plaintiff’s motion for continuance.

Plaintiff’s final contention is the findings of the Board
were inadequate to support its decision to discharge the
plaintiff. The plaintiff argues he was not insubordinate
and the order issued by Chief Zito to get a haircut could
not reasonably be construed as an order which the plaintiff
had to obey. In support of his contention the plaintiff re.
lies primarily on the decision in Lindquist v. City of Coral
Gables, (1971) 323 F. Supp. 1161, wherein the District
Court of Florida held a hair regulation was invalid as the
City had shown no relationship between sideburns and in-
terference with the proper functioning of the fire depart-
ment.

We believe the findings of the Board were adequate to
support its decision. A review of the record indicates the
plaintiff violated a General Order promulgated as a safety
measure to firemen as well as victims of fires. Furthermore,
the plaintiff violated a direct order of the Fire Chief to
obtain a haircut. Such insubordination cannot be condoned.
Rules designed for purposes of safety and efficiency must

— =

be followed. What if a fireman refused to wear his uni-
form, or boots, or fire hat, or ride the firetruck to the scene
of a fire, insisting upon doing as he pleased? Such results
could be chaotic and disastrous. Personal rights must be
reasonably limited when the safety of firemen and others
is involved.

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.
; Affirmed.
Adesko, P.J., and Burman, J., concur.

In Tue Unritep States District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * °

SUMMONS
(Filed March 19, 1974)

To the above named Defendant:

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon
Linda R. Hirshman of Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman,
plaintiff’s attorney, whose address is 201 North Welis
Street, Suite 2122, Chicago, Illinois 60606 an answer to
the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within
20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive
of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by
default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in the complaint.

/s/ H. Stuart Cunningham
Clerk of Court.
/s/ Dan H. Stevenson
Deputy Clerk.
[Seal of Court]
Date: March 11, 1974
Note :—-This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(U. S. Marshal’s Service showing date of service as 3-13-75)

1

4G...

In Tue Unitep Srares District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

had in the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable
Frank J. McGarr, one of the Judges of said Court, in
his courtroom in the United States Courthouse, Chi-
cago, Lllinois, on Tuesday, March 19, 1974, at the hour
of 2:00 o’clock p.m.
Present:

Messrs. Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman

(201 North Wells Street, Suite 2122,

Chicago, Illinois, 60606), by

Mr. Charles Orlove and

Mrs. Linda Hirshman,

appeared on behalf of the plaintiff;

Mr. Richard L. Curry,

Corporation Counsel,

City of Chicago

(City Hall, 5th Floor,

Chicago, Illinois, 60602), by

Mr. Philip M. Sheridan,

Assistant Corporation Counsel,
appeared on behalf of the defendant.

The Clerk: 74 C 656, Francis Muscare versus Rob-
ert J. Quinn, et cetera, hearing on preliminary injunc-
tion.

Mr. Orlove: Good afternoon, your Honor. Charles
Orlove and Linda Hirshman appearing for the plain-
tiff.

I see some—whom I think to be, perhaps, officials
from the Fire Department.

The Court: Who is the attorney for the defendant
in this case?

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, is this Muscare?

The Court: Yes.

=

Mr. Sheridan: Iam, your Honor. My name is Philip
M. Sheridan. I am an Assistant Corporation Counsel,
your Honor.

The Court: All right, Mr. Sheridan, I will give you
a minute to put your coat down.

Mr. Sheridan: Thank you, sir.

The Court: There has been no appearance filed for
the defendant. I assume you intend to do that, Counsel?

Mr. Sheridan: Yes, I would like to file an appear-
ance, your Honor.

I would also ask leave, your Honor, to file a motion
in opposition to the granting of a preliminary injunc-
tion.

The Court: Well, the case is set this afternoon, as
I recall, for hearing on a preliminary injunction. And
I intend to go forward with that.

Mr. Sheridan: Yes, I understand, your Honor.

The Court: You may file your motion, however,
and I will look at it.

Mr. Sheridan: I understand, your Honor.

The Court: And, perhaps, if it becomes appro-
priate, you can argue whatever basis you have for it.
But in the meantime, and I assume, Counsel, you will
file an appearance some time soon.

Mr. Sheridan: Before I leave the court, your Honor.

The Court: I will count on that.

In the meantime, I have set the matter today for
a hearing on such evidence as the plaintiff cares to
produce for a preliminary injunction. And I am ready
to co forward on that, if you are, Counsel?

Mr. Orlove: Fine, we are ready, your Honor, ex-
cept that, of course, the Court knows we have just
received a copy of this motion, we haven’t seen it be-
fore this minute.

—50—

Also, I would point out to the Court that we have
on file our complaint and the motion for a temporary
restraining order. The complaint is verified by the
plaintiff. And the motion for a restraining order is
also supported by an affidavit.

The Court: Those things are deemed—let’s assume
that the motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction is consolidated for all purposes.
Any evidence or argument made in support of one will
automatically be considered in support of the other.
Your affidavit, therefore, stands in support of the
motion for preliminary injunction and anything else
you have filed.

So that, I think, the spirit of the rules is that when-
ever possible we consolidate .the two. If you are en
titled to a T.R.O., you are probably entitled to a prelim-
inary injunction. Let’s assume we are going forward
for a hearing on the preliminary injunction issue. Any-
thing of record and anything mentioned earlier in the
case is relevant and will be considered.

Do you want to rely on your affidavit or do you have
additional evidence?

Mr. Orlove: We can rely upon that affidavit, your
Honor, as evidence in support of our case in chief.

The Court: And the affidavit contains pictures of
the plaintiff. So to the extent that we have to see the
dimensions of his beard, we have that in the record.

Are you prepared to argue the matter, assuming
this closes the evidence, Counsel?

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I would like an op-
portunity to present evidence.—

The Court: Fine.

Mr. Sheridan: —if I may?

aliens

The Court: All right. I assume that the plaintiff
rests on the pleadings and the affidavit, is that correct?

Mr. Orlove: Yes, that is correct, your Honor. And,
of course, we have an opportunity for rebuttal.

The Court: The defense may put in evidence. And
you, certainly, have rebuttal opportunity, if it becomes
appropriate.

Go ahead, Counsel.

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I have various wit-
nesses that will testify. Can I ask that they all be sworn
at the same time?

(Witnesses sworn.)

LEONARD JOHNSON, called as a witness on behalf of
the defendant, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Mr. Sheridan.

The Court: State your name, sir?

The Witness: My name is Leonard Johnson.

The Court: Your address, Mr. Johnson?

The Witness: 5747 West 64th Street.

The Court: Your business or occupation?

The Witness: I’m a drill instructor at the Chicago
Fire Academy.

The Court: All right. Go ahead, Counsel.
By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Mr. Johnson, can you tell us what subjects you
teach at the Fire Academy, please?

A. I teach the self-contained breathing apparatus,
manufactured by M.S.A. Company.

Q. During the course of the middle part of Feb-
ruary, did Lt. Muscare happen to be a student in one
of your classes?

op

—]25—

Q. And what was the result of this?

A. I removed the goatee.

Q. In any of those incidents—in any of the inci-
dents that you have just recounted with Johnson, with
Maley, with the group of your superiors, including
Chief Fokamer, did anyone ever say anything to you

with regard to the self-contained breathing appara-
tus?

A. No.

Q. Calling your attention to—I have just had this
marked as Exhibit No. 1—can you identify that docu-
ment?

A. This is a general order issued by the Fire De-
partment.

Q. Have you ever seen that order before?

A. Yes, I have. I read it at roll call.

Q. When did you read it at roll call?

A. I would say on or around the day it is issued,
maybe a month later.

Q. What does that order say?

A. “Proper Personal Appearance.”

(The document was thereupon marked Plain-
tiff’s Exhibit No. 2 for identification, 3/19/74.)

Mrs. Hirshman: Your Honor, I would move that
the Chicago Fire Department Order No. 685, I believe
it is, be entered as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.

The Court: Any objection?

Mr. Sheridan: Can I see it?

Mrs. Hirshman: Certainly.

Mr. Sheridan: No objection, your Honor.

The Court: It may be admitted.

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I say no objection, I
am objecting only in the respect that it is prior to the
suspension that we are here considering, your Honor.

—19—

The Court: It would have to be or we couldn’t sus-
pend anybody on the basis of it, I would assume.

Over objection, it may be admitted.

(The document previously marked Plaintiff’s
Exhibit No. 1 for identification was received in
evidence. )

The Court: This is substantially the same as the
regulation that is in issue here, is it not?

Mrs. Hirshman: Yes, your Honor.

By Mrs. Hirshman:

Q. Ihave just had this document marked Exhibit 2;

have you ever seen that document before?
102 e

Gentlemen:
As of this date order #625 ics rescinded and superseded by this order.

It has been noted, lately, that some members have adopted hair styles
which deviate from the uniform appoarance required by the Chicago Fire
Department. Therefore, limitations in this respect are heroby imposed as
follows:

A. Whon a motacho is worn it will not extend beyond a lino perpendicular
to the corners of the muth. The full upper lip must be readily
visible. (See Pigure 1.) Extreme styles are not authorized.

B. Bushy, mod, beatle, duck tail, bangs, or block style hair cuts are
not authorized. Sideburns will be torminated no lower than on an
iraginary line draun horicontally from the middle of the ear to the
corner of the cye. Neck hair will be no lower than one inch above
the collar. The hair outline will follow the contour of tho car
and slope to the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered
overall, in order to present @ noat appearance. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2
By order of
Lak YY oramer

Curtis W. Volkamor
Chief Fire larchal

Thie order jc to be read st the next chreo coneccutive roll calls. / 9

=

—157—

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2
(Filed May 29, 1974)

(Letterhead of)
HEADQUARTERS
CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT

Order No. 685

May 13, 1969
To: Officers and Members

Chicago Fire Department
Subject: Proper personal appearance

Gentlemen:

It has been noted, lately, that some members have adopted
hair styles which deviate from the uniform appearance re-
quired by the Chicago Fire Department. Therefore, limita-
tions in this respect are hereby imposed as follows:

1. The face shall be clean-shaven, except that a non-
eccentric mustache is permissible. The mustache may
not extend beyond the width of the mouth.

2. Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall not come
below a point midway between the top and bottom
of the ear.

3. Hair shall be worn neatly and closedly trimmed. It
shall be clipped at the sides and back so as to pre-
sent an evenly graduated appearance.

Any question of interpretation of this order may be pre-
sented by the individual for clarification and ruling by the
Uniform Committee, chaired by ist Deputy Chief Fire Mar-
shal Raymond Werner [3rd Platoon].

By order of
/s/ Curtis W. Volkamer
Chief Fire Marshal

Approved:
/s/ Robert J. Quinn
Fire Commissioner

This order to be read at the next three consecutive roll calls.

—158-

3n the

A, ited States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 74-1460
FRANCIS MUSCARE,
Plaintiff-A ppellant,

ROBERT J. QUINN, individually and as Commissioner,
Chicago Fire Dept.,

Defendant-A ppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division — No. 74C 656
Frank J. McGarr, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 16, 1975 — DECIDED May 21, 1975

Before CLARK, Associate Justice*, HASTINGS, Senior
Judge, and STEVENS, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM. Appellant-Muscare, a fireman with the
Chicago Fire Department since 1955, was suspended
from his duties for a 29-day period from February 27 to
March 28, 1974, on the ground that his “goatee violated

* Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, United States Supreme
Court (Ret.) is sitting by designation.

-159—-

the Department’s hair regulations.! On March 11, 1974,
appellant filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking in-
junctive relief and claiming that his constitutional right
to determine his personal appearance had been violated.
The district court held a hearing on the matter and
denied relief.

On this appeal, Lt. Muscare strenuously argues that
this circuit's decision in Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 398 U.S. 937 (1979), compels a
recognition of the “right to wear one’s hair at any length
or in any desired manner [as] an ingredient of personal
freedom protected by the United States Constitution,”
419 F.2d at 1037, and requires an invalidation of the
Department’s regulation, absent any showing of
“substantial justification” for the restrictions. The
Department argues that its regulation can be justified
on the basis of: (1) the need to insure the efficient
operation of gas masks which must at times be worn by
fire-fighters; (2) the need for discipline in a para-
military setting; and (3) the need to present a well-
groomed and uniform appearance or image to the
public. The sufficiency of these various rationales is a

' Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago
Fire Department provides:

Section 51.133, PROPER PERSONAL APPEARANCE

All members of the Chicago Fire Department shall pre-
sent a clean and preper appearance in personal care and
attire at all times. The face shall be clean-shaven, except
that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible. Mustaches
shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner
of the mouth and the full upper lip must be readily visi-
ble. Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no
lower than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and coy trimmed, and the
hair outline shal! follow the contour of the ear and slope to
the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered overal!
in order to present a neat appearance.

—160-

matter of considerable dispute in the decided cases;?
however, we find it unnecessary to resolve that con-
troversy in this case, for appellant was suspended
without procedural due process.

It appears that appellant’s goatee first came to the
attention of his superiors in December 1973, when Lt.
Muscare, along with the rest of his company, attended a
class at the Chicago Fire Academy, taught by one
Leonard Johnson, a drill instructor to train firefighters
in the use of self-contained breathing apparatus. At that
time, Instructor Johnson, using instructional materials
which had been provided him, informed Lt. Muscare’s
company that facial hair should not be worn with the

2 Some courts have upheld hair regulations solely on the
basis of “paramilitary” discipline or the need to present a
well-groomed image to the ee see Stradley v. Anderson,
478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973) (police); Yarborough v. City of
Jacksonville, 363 F. —. 1176 (M.D. Fla. 1973) Green
Akridge v. Barres, 122 N. J. Super. 476, 300 A. 2d (1973
aff'd, 65 N.J. 266, 321 A. 2d 230 (1974) (police); Matter o
Greenwald v. Frank, 70 Misc. 2d 632, d 40 A.D.2d 71
(1972) (police); ef. Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.
1971) (National Guard); other courts, however, have rejected
this view, see Dwen v. ~~ 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973)
(police); Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp. 648 —- 1973)
(distinguishing between police and firemen). More recently,
fire departments across the country have begun to justify hair
regulations on the basis of safety considerations, in particular,
the efficient use of gas masks. Though fundamentally a fact
uestion, most courts have accepted this theory, see Michino v.
izzo, 379 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.Pa. 1974), aff'd (3d Cir., decided
March 24, 1975); Hordorwich v. Bd. of Police and Fire Com-
m'rs, 18 Ill. App.3d 20 (1974) Manco v. Town te 126
N.J. Super. 148, 313 A.2d 219 (1973), aff'd, 64 N.J. 142, 313 A.
2d 204 (1974); Olszewski v. Council, Fire Dept, 70 Misc. 2d
603 eve. nly a few courts have found no basis for this
justification, see Lindquist v. City of Coral Gables, 323 F.
Supp. 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Hunt v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 68
Misc. 2d 261, 327 N.Y. S. 2d 36 (1971). In passing, we note
but without holding that the challenged hair regulation,
§51.133, does not appear to be co-extensive with the need for
safe and efficient use of gas masks and, if that is the sole
justification, might well be more narrowly drawn.

iain ee ati os

a en ee a See rat

—161-

self-contained breathing apparatus, since hair prevented
the wearer from obtaining a proper seal on the mask
portion uf the apparatus. Appellant disputed this,
saying: “Boston and New York have men with long
a and mustaches, and they are not concerned
about it.

During the course of instruction, each member of the
company was expected to don a mask and perform
various activities, including walking up five floors of the
training tower with the gas mask on, sealed, and func-
tioning. Although it is unclear whether Lt. Muscare, as
a senior officer, was required to participate in the train-
ing, it is clear that appellant did not put the apparatus
on and Johnson had no direct knowledge of whether or
not Lt. Muscare could obtain a proper seal. Appellant
testified that he successfully tested the mask portion of
the apparatus during the training and had never ex-
perienced any difficulty obtaining a satisfactory mask
seal in the past.

After class, instructor Johnson discussed Muscare’s
conduct with Chief Prohaska, the drillmaster, and stated
that he did not know whether Muscare, while wearing
his goatee, could get a good seal on a face mask. Later
that month, appellant’s superior officer, Chief Morgan,
warned him that he would not be permitted to continue
working as a firefighter unless he shaved off his beard.
A few days thereafter, appellant was informed that
charges had been filed against him with the ad-
ministrative authorities. Nothing more appears to have
taken place in regard to this matter for two and one-half
months. Then, on the morning of February 27, 1974,
three of Lt. Muscare’s superiors appeared at his duty
station and announced that he was being suspended as
of that moment and that he was to turn in his equip-
ment and badge.

On March 4, 1974, the Chief of Personnel sent
appellant a letter, informing him that he was being
suspended for 29 days for alleged violations of §51.133
(hair regulation), §61.001 (“conduct unbecoming a
member or employee of the Chicago Fire Department”),
and §61.006 (disobedience of orders). The instant action

—162-

followed, attacking not only the constitutionality of the
hair regulation, but also the summary suspension
procedures employed by the Department.

Appellant urges that due process requires that some
opportunity to respond to charges against him be made
available to the government employee prior to dis-
ciplinary action against him. See Hostrop v. Board of
Junior College District No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. den., 411 U.S. 935 (1973). The Department
responds that due process was satisfied since appellant
had actual notice of the charges against him and had a
statutory right to a post-suspension hearing before the
Civil Service Commission, which he failed to exercise.
We conclude that post-suspension review is insufficient.

Section 10-1-18 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1973, ch.24) provides in pertinent part as follows:

§ 10-1-18. Removal — Suspension — Retirement

Except as hereinafter provided in this section, no
officer or employee in the classified civil service of
any municipality who is appointed under the rules
and after examination, may be removed or dis-
charged, or suspended for a period of more than 30
days, except for cause upon written charges and
after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense.
* * * Nothing in this Division 1 limits the power of
any officer to suspend a subordinate for a
reasonable period, not exceeding 30 days except
that any employee or officer suspended for more
than 5 days or suspended within 6 months after a
previous suspension shall be entitled, upon request,
to a hearing before the civil service commission con-
cerning the propriety of such suspension.

The Illinois Supreme Court recently had occasion to ex-
amine the constitutionality of summary suspension
procedures used by the Chicago Police Department and
concluded that the demands of due process were met by
post-suspension review for suspensions of more than five
days and less than 30 days. Kropel v. Conlisk, No. 45670
(Ill. S.Ct., decided January 30, 1975). That court,
however, did not have the benefit of the United States

—163-

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Goss v. Lopez, 95
S.Ct. 729 (1975). Though Goss is a “school” case, it none-
theless points the way to our resolution of the present
case.

It can hardly be disputed that appellant, as a twenty-
year veteran of the civil service, has a protected proper-
ty interest in his employment, for “a state employee who
under state law, or rules promulgated by state officials,
has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
employment absent sufficient cause for discharge may
demand the procedural protections of due process.” 95
S.Ct. at 735. Nor can it be disputed that appellant’s
suspension for 29 days is not de minimis, and the
“Court’s view has been that as long as a property
deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to
the question whether account must be taken of the Due
Process Clause.” 95 S.Ct. at 737. It remains to answer
the question what process is due, for in each situation
the requirement is a flexible one.

As the Court has stated before and reaffirmed in Goss,
“many controversies have raged about the cryptic and
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing ap-
propriate to the nature of the case,” Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). In the cir-
cumstances of America’s high schools, the Court thought
that notice, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have, and an opportunity to present his side
of the story were sufficient to protect the student, and
we think that at least this much is required in the cir-
cumstances of a public employee’s suspension. Not only
are alleged transgressions justifying suspension often
more serious than school discipline problems, but the

—164-

corresponding penalties are potentially more damaging,
for reputations, careers, and substantial amounts of lost
pay are at stake.®

Public employees facing temporary suspension for less
than 30 days have interests qualifying for protection un-
der the Due Process Clause, and due process requires at
the minimum that they be granted a hearing prior to
suspension where they may be fully informed of the
reasons for the proposed suspension and where they may
challenge their sufficiency. Whether such persons should
be granted the full panoply of rights envisioned in III.
Rev. Stat., Ch. 24, § 10-1-18, for suspensions greater
than 30 days is a question which we need not now ad-
dress, since no hearing of any kind was accorded
appellant prior to his suspension.‘

3 Here, appellant lost some $1,400 in pay during the 29-day
suspension. Such a financial blow can be disastrous to many
civil servants. As Judge Skelton noted in Ricucci v. United
States, 425 F.2d 1252 (Ct.Cl. 1970):

Few [government employees] earn more than enough to
pay their living expenses from month to month, and when
their salaries are cut off, they may be in the same
destitute circumstances as a welfare recipient whose aid
has \ discontinued. [425 F.2d at 1257 (concurring
opn.).

* The Supreme Court’s disposition of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974), only confirms our analysis of the precise
question presented here. There, the Court rejected a due
pee attack on the discharge of a federal civil servant who

ad been provided, pursuant to the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, a

onth’s advanced notice of the reasons for his proposed dis-
.aarge, the materials on which the notice is b , and the op-
portunity to appear personally before the official having the
authority to make or recommend the final decision. Although
a ye gh prey expressed the view that the statute
which established the employment property right also es-
tablished the procedural safeguards to which the ———
was entitled, two other Justices concurred in the result solely
because they believed that the statute’s provision of notice and
an opportunity to be heard prior to discharge satisfied the

(Footnote continued on following page)

—165-—

We do not think that the requirement of presuspension
review will result in any unnecessary burden on the ad-
ministration of public services, nor will it shackle ad-
ministrators and prevent them from dealing with
emergency disciplinary problems, for, as the District of
Columbia once pointed out:

In a wide variety of situations, it has long been
recognized that where harm to the public is
threatened, and the private interest infringed is
reasonably deemed to be of less importance, an of-
ficial body can take summary action pending a
later hearing. [R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299
‘i > 131 (D. C. Cir.), cert. den., 370 U.S. 911
( ).

Here, we perceive no such justification for avoiding the
requirement of a pre-suspension hearing. Even if we
accept the Department’s contention that the rationale
behind its hair regulation is safety, a number of steps
short of summary suspension are available to the
Department pending a hearing on a violation of that
regulation. Moreover, there is merit to appellant’s com-
ment in his brief that:

The prese: * case hardly presents an emergency re-
quiring the Fire Department to act without any
prior process, where the Fire Department utilized
the services of Lt. Muscare for a period of over two
months from the time in December of 1973 when he
was initially reprimanded for wearing a goatee to
the time he was suspended on February 27, 1974.

4 Continued |

minimal requirements of constitutional due process. In dis-
sent, four other Justice would have gone further and required
additional safeguards such as an impartial hearing examiner,
the opportunity to present witnesses, and the right to conduct
cross-examination. It can hardly be said, codes. that
Arnett stands for the proposition that, by accepting
governmental employment, a civil servant is entitled only to
such procedures as are provided by statute.

—166-—

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand for further proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED
A true Copy:
Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

—167—

In Tue Unirep States Court Or AppreALs
* * (Caption No. 74-1460) * *
(Dated May 21, 1975)

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
the record from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and was
argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged
by this court that the judgment of the said District Court
in this cause appealed from be, and the same is hereby,
REVERSED AND REMANDED, with costs, in accordance with
the opinion of this court filed this date.

In Tue Unitep States Court Or Apprats
* * (Caption No. 74-1460) * *
(Dated June 17, 1975)

ORDER

In the petition for rehearing and suggestions for re-
hearing en banc or, in the alternative, for certification of
questions of law to the Supreme Court filed in the above-
entitled cause, it is suggested that there is a conflict be-
tween our decision and Brubaker v. Board of Education,
School District 149, Cook County, Ill., 502 F.2d 973 (7th
Cir. 1975). We note that in Brubaker on rehearing en banc
this court affirmed the distr,ect court judgment by an equal-
ly divided vote, 502 F.2d 1000, but failed to reinstate the
panel opinion. In addition, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975), which we decided was controlling in Muscare, came
down after Brubaker.

On consideration of the petition and suggestions, no
judge in active service having requested a vote thereon,
nor any judge having voted to grant the suggestions, and

—_168—

all of the members of the panel having voted to deny a
rehearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a rehearing in the
above-entitled cause be and the same is hereby DENIED.

In Tue Unitep Srates Court Or APPEALS
* * (Caption No. 74-1460) * *

(Dated June 25, 1975)

On consideration of the motion and affidavit of counsel
for the defendant-appellee for a stay of mandate,

IT IS ORDERED that the mandate of this court be, and
the same is hereby, STAYED to and including July 24,
1975, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 41(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In Tue Unitep States Districr Court
* * (Caption No. 74C 656) * *

Name of Presiding Judge, Honorable Frank J. McGarr
Cause No. 74C 656 Date Aug. 5, 1975
Title of Cause—Francis Muscare -vs- Robert J. Quinn, ete.

On Court’s own motion, order cause set for status re-
port on Sept. 5,1975 at 10:00A.M. McGarr, J.

In Tue Unirep States Court Or APPEALS
* * (Caption No. 74-1460) * *

(Dated August 11, 1975)

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of
defendant-appellee seeking to have this Court recall the
mandate in this appeal,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said motion be
GRANTED and that the Clerk of this Court be ordered

—169—

to recall the mandate in so far as said mandate was is-
sued in contravention of this Court’s order of July 31,
1975.

In Tue Supreme Court Or Tue Unirtep States
No. 75-130, October Term, 1975

Robert J. Quinn, individually and as Commissioner,
Chicago Fire Department,
Petitioner,
vs.

Tom C. Clark, Justice, et al.,
Respondents.

ORDER ALLOWING CERTIORARI
(Filed October 14, 1975)

The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of man-
damus is denied. The alternative petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (No. 74-1460) is
granted. The case is recaptioned in this Court as: Robert
J. Quinn, individually, and as Commissioner, Chicago Fire
Department, petitioner, v. Francis Muscare, to reflect the
true respondent in this case.

—170—

In Tue Unitep States District Court
* * (Caption No. 74C 656) * *

Name of Presiding Judge, Honorable Frank J. McGarr
Cause No. 74C 656 Date Nov. 18, 1975
Title of Cause—Francis Muscare -vs- Robert J. Quinn, ete.
Brief Statement of Motion—Motion for entry of order

granting defendants and printer leave to withdraw
record for purpose of having it reproduced for the
Supreme Court of U.S.

Names and Addresses of moving counsel—William R. Quin-
lan, Corporation Counsel of City of Chicago, 511 City
Hall, 121 N. LaSalle, Chicago, Edmund Hatfield, Asst.
Corp. Counsel

Representing—Robt. J. Quinn, ete.

Names and Addresses of other counsel entitled to notice
and names of parties they represent—Linda R. Hirsh-
man, Jacobs, Gore, Burns and Sugarman, 201 N. Wells,
Suite 2122, Chicago, Ill.

Enter order granting defendant leave to withdraw the
record on appeal from the Clerk in order to prepare Ap-
pendix for review by the Supreme Court of the United
States. (draft) McGarr, J.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM R. QUINLAN
Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago
511 City Hall, Chicago, Illinois 60602

Attorney for Petitioner

DANTEL PASCALE

EpMUND HATFIELD
Assistant Corporation Counsel

Of Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0772%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
