# Motion to Affirm — Slone v. Deskins Branch Coal Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion to Affirm
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 428 U.S. 901

## Text

Supreme Court, U. $.
FILED

JUL 21 1975

] Wicandl RODAK, sn_cuene

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975
No. 74-1623

CHESTER SLONE, ETAL... _.-ss—(‘(‘i;tstsC~sC™S APPELLANTS
VS:

DESKINS BRANCH COAL
COMPANY, ET AL. aiienan _. APPELLEES

ON APPEAL FROM THE SPECIALLY CONSTITUTED
THREE JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

EARL M. CORNETT
General Counsel
Department of Labor
Plaza Towers
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

CYRIL E. SHADOWEN
Assistant Counsel
Department of Labor
Legal Arts Building
200 South Seventh Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Attorneys for Appellees

Hon. James R. Yocom,
Commissioner of Labor,
Commonwealth of Kentucky .

and Custodian of the Specia] Fund,
and Special Fund

INDEX

Page

STATEMENT OF THE
QUESTION PRESENTED ..............s00ee: 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 2, 3
EEE 4-13

THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE INSTANT CASE
DOES NOT PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL
QUESTION UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE IN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 4

A. THE LEGISLATURE HAS BROAD POWERS TO
CLASSIFY PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR WORK-
MEN’S COMPENSATION BENEFITS. THE SUB-
CLASSIFICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE OF
COAL MINERS ELIGIBLE FOR FEDERAL BLACK
LUNG BENEFITS IS VALID iephxpaece i

B. THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS HAS FOUND
THAT THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCE AND
CONDITIONS OF COAL MINERS JUSTIFY SPE-
CIAL TREATMENT REGARDING COMPENSA-
TION FOR PNEUMOCONIOSIS . ........... 162

© GREAT WEIGHT SH®ULD BE GIVEN TO THE
RULING BY THE KENTUCKY COURT OF AP-
PEALS THAT THE LAW IN —s IS CON-

STITUTIONAL ....----. __--. . a
DET, cibdscgecccccocccocecccesoce 13-14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................ 15.16

PE hts eeesedoededecedccececeeeccoes la-2a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
American Coal Co. v. Allegany County, |
128 Md. 564, 98 Atl. 143 (1916) ................ 7

Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 90 S. Ct. 153, 25 L. Ed.
ee CN ire 6'0'60k50h 6450445 dneeneeoedace 5, 6

Del Busto v. E. 1. Dupont De Nemours & Co.
167 Misc. 920, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (1938)
aff’d 259 App. Div. 1070, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 417,
appeal denied, 284 N.Y. 817, 29N.E. 2d 975 .... 8,9

Fid Chapman v. Eastern Coal Corporation
Ky., 519 S.W. 2d 390 (Feb. 7, 1975) ............ 12

Geduldig v. Aiello,
41 L. Ed. 2d 256, 94 S. Ct.

Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
160 C.C.A 417, 248 Fed. 407 (1918)
(affirming 1916) 5 Alaska 571 ............ ceccce 7

Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Board
255 U.S. 144, 65 L. Ed. 555, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.
Se GED cuiddacendeudbecnseundedhceneeeiode 7

McGowan v. State of Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101; 6 L. Ed. 2d

(1974) ...... 9, 10

Bet GUD u0dn6edéuseneecuccencusweusbouiase 5
Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Co.,

249 U.S. 152, 63 L. Ed. 527, 39 S. Ct.

Sa. CED encewesnn ds csctudesseneseodaeesuns 5

New York Central Railroad Co. v. White,
243 U.S. 188, 61 L. Ed. 667, 37 S. Ct. 247 (1917) 4, 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page

Otis Maggard v. International Harvester Company,
et al., Ky., 508 S.W. 2d 777, (Feb. 1, 1974 as modi-
fied on Denial of Rehearing April 12, 1974) .... 2, 3

Ross v. Moffitt,

...U.S....94S. Ct. 2437 (June 17, 1974) ...... 6,7
Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co,

143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844 Tenn. (1920) ........ 7

Ward & Gow v. Krinsky,
259 U.S. 503, 66 L. Fd 1033, 42 S. Ct.

SD CR, SEE HE cb cccscceseccsvoecesss 5
CONSTITUTION :
United States Constitution, Fourteenth
I yn ou 6 wactnneeneeens steenaae 3, 4, 12
STATUTES:
ERS S4BGSD 2. ccccccccesceces 4 and Appendix, p. la
Legislative Note ............ .... 2 and Appendix, p. 2a
Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969 .. 10, 12
Title 30 of U.S. Code Annotated Section 901 ........ 10
re 12
| err 11
a 11
| ae 11
| Pere 12
err 12
OTHER:
58 American Juris.
Workmen’s Compensation, Sec. 81, page 365 ...... 4
Larson, vol. 2, Sec. 65.40 .......eeeeeeeeereeees 7,8

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975

No. 74-1623
CHESTER SLONE, ET AL. _. _....... APPELLANTS
VS:
DESKINS BRANCH COAL
COMPANY, ET AL. , APPELLEES

ON APPEAL FROM THE SPECIALLY CONSTITUTED
THREE JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

Appellees move the Court to dismiss the appeal ‘here-
in or, in the alternative, to affirm the judgment of the
Specially Constituted Three Judge United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on the ground
that it is manifest that the issues on which the decision
of the case depends do not present a substantial federal
question.

2

STATEMENT OF THE
QUESTION PRESENTED

IS THE DEFFERAL OF PAYMENT OF IN-
CREASED STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS TO COAL MINERS DISABLED BY
PNEUMOCONIOSIS, WHO, AS A CLASS, ARE THE
ONLY PERSONS ENTITLED TO FILE CLAIMS
FOR ADDITIONAL OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
DISABILITY BENEFITS PROVIDED BY THE
FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY
ACT OF 1969, AS AMENDED, A VIOLATION OF
RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is an appeal from the Judgment of the special-
ly constituted Three Judge United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissing appellants
action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The issue
presented is whether there is a denial of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution to coal miners in Kentucky applying for state
workmen’s compensation benefits because of the occupa-
tional disease of pneumoconiosis popularly called “black
lung.” In 1972 the Kentucky General Assembly raised
the level of compensation benefits for those persons cov-
ered by the provisions of the workinen’s compensation act
excepting only those persons covered by the Federal Black
Lung Act who apply for benefits after January 1, 1973.
The applicable statute is set out in the appendix herein,
p. 2a.

In the consolidated cases of Otis Maggard v. Inter-

3

National Harvester Company, et al., Ky. 508 S.W.2d 777,
(Feb. 1, 1974 as modified on Denial of Rehearing April
12, 1974) the Kentucky Court of Appeals rendered an
opinion as to the construction and application of the 1972
amendmenis to the Kentucky Workmen’s Compensation
law. One issue in that case concerned the amount of com-
pensation to be received by coal miners who became totally
disabled subsequent to January 1, 1973 from the occupa-
tional disease of coal worker’s pneumoconiosis, commonly
called ‘black lung.’’ The Court held that the 1972 amend-
ments which increased workmen’s compensation benefits
so as to provide $81.00 per week for life to workmen’s com-
pensation claimants suffering permanent total disability
was deferred as to that class of claimants suffering from
pneumoconiosis stating as follows at page 785:

“As we construe Section 37, the increased benefits
payable to black-lung claimants under the Kentucky
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended by Senate
Bill 184, are deferred for such a period of time as
there is in existence a federal black-lung program.”

The appellant herein, Chester Slone and others, allege
that the interpretations of the law made by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in the Maggard case contravenes the
United States Constitution and is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
only coal miners suffering from the occupational disease
of “black lung” were denied increased benefits under the
1972 amendments by the Kentucky General Assembly.

4

ARGUMENT

THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE INSTANT CASE
DOES NOT PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL
QUESTION UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE IN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

A. THE LEGISLATURE HAS BROAD POWERS
TO CLASSIFY PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION BENEFITS.
THE SUB-CLASSIFICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE OF COAL MINERS ELIGIBLE FOR
FEDERAL BLACK LUNG BENEFITS IS VALID.

Compensation Acts are not ordinarily applicable to
all employments. Some are applicable only to certain oc-
cupations of a hazardous character. See 58 Am. Juris.
Workmen’s Compensation Sec. 81, page 635. Many states,
as is true in Kentucky, exempt domestic servants and per-
sons employed in agriculture. See KRS 342.650 in the
appendix, p. la. Many states impose a requirement that
there be a minimum number of persons working for a
single employer before there is coverage. Therefore, it is
abundantly clear that some employees, such as agricultural
workers, are discrminated against because they receive
no compensation benefits from work connected accidents
and diseases. The United States Supreme Court in the case

of New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,
61 L.Ed 667, 37 S.Ct. 247 (1917) as to the exclusion of
farm laborers and domestic servants from the scheme of
the New York statute at page 677 of 61 L. Ed. stated:

“Manifestly, this cannot be judically declared to be
an arbitrary classification, since it reasonably may be

5

considered that the risks inherent in these occupations
are exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar.”

In Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Co., 249 U.S. 152,
63 L.Ed. 527, 39 S.Ct. 227 (1919), the Court upheld the
exclusion of gin laborers on the same reasoning as applied
to farm laborers.

In Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 66 L.Ed.
1033, 42 S.Ct. 529 (1922), 28 ALR 1207, the Court stated
at page 1041 of 66 L.Ed. as follows:

” There is a strong presumption that a legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the needs of
its own people; that its laws are directed to problems
made manifest by experience; and that its discrimina-
tions are based upon adequate grounds.” Citing Mid-
dleton v. Texas Power & L. Co., supra.

The Court in the case of McGowan v. State of Mary-
land 366 US 420, 81S. Ct. 1101; 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961)
stated at page 399 of 6 L. Ed. 2d:

: State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that,
in practice, their laws result in some inequalty. A sta-
tutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it. 4

Mr. Justice Potter Stewart, speaking for the Supreme
Court majority in Dandridge v Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
90 S. Ct. 153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970) at page 501 of 25
L. Ed. 2d stated as follows:

“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State

6

does not violate the Equal Protection clause merely
because the classifications made by its laws are imper-
fect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis’,
it does not offend the Constitution simply because the
classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality.’
Lindsley vy. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,
55 L. Ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337 ‘The problems of gov-
ernment are practical ones and may justify, if they
do not require, rough accommodations — illogical,
it may be and unscientific.’Metropolis Theatre Co. v.
City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 57, L.Ed. 730, 734,
33 S. Ct. 441. ‘A statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.’ McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426, 1105, 6 L Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct.
1101.

a

In the case of Ross v. Moffitt, ...U.S...., 94

S. Ct. 2437 (June 17, 1974) at page 2444 of 94 S. Ct.
the Court stated:

“Despite the tendency of all rights ‘to declare them-
selves absolute to their logical extreme,’ there are
obviously limits beyond which the equal protection
analysis may not be pressed without doing violence
to principles recognized in other decisions of this
Court. The Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,’ San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 1, 24, 93 S Ct. 1278, 1291, 36 L. Ed. 2d
16 (1973), nor does it require the State to ‘equalize
economic conditions.’ Griffin v. Illinois, supra, 351

a ee

7

U.S. at 23, 76 S. Ct. at 592 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). It does require that the state appellant system
be ‘free of unreasonable distinctions,’ Rinaldi v.
Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305, 310, 86, S. Ct. 1497, 1500, 16
L. Ed. 2d 577 (1966) .. .”

There are several court decisions sustaining legislation
which put the coal mining industry in a separate class as
to State Workmen’s Compensation Laws In the case of
Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp., (1918) 160 C.C.A.
417, 248 Fed. 407 (affirming 1916) 5 Alaska 571, the
Court upheld the constitutionality, as against the objection
of class legislation, of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Law, which in terms applied only to mining concerns
employing five or more persons. The Court noted that
mining is the one great industry of Alaska.

In the case of Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial
Board, (1921) 255 U.S. 144, 65 L. Ed. 555, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 252 this Court sustained the Constitutionality of the
Indiana Workmen’s Compensation law where the law was
compulsory as to the coal mining industry but elective as
to other occupations.

See also, American Coal Co. v. Allegany County
(1916) 128 Md. 564, 98 Atl. 143 (1916) applying only
to those engaged in mining coal and clay in two counties
which the court ruled to be constituticnal.

In the case of Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co. 143 Tenn.
86, 223 S.W. 844 Tenn. (1920) the Court sustained the
constitutionality of the Workmen’s Compensation Law
that exempted coal operators and their employees.

Larson at vol. 2 Sec. 65.40 notes an instance where

8

an occupational disease statute permits an award for sili-
cosis only when it has reached the stage of total disability,
and that an employee suffering from partially-disabling
silicosis cannot sue at common law citing a New York
case, Del Busto v. E. I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 167
Misc. 920, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (1938) aff’d 259 App. Div.
1070, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 417, appeal denied, 284 N.Y. 817, 29
N.E. 2d 975. In that case the Supreme Court of Niagara
County in 5 N.Y.S. 2d 174 held that the compensation act
did not violate the fourteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States nor Section 6 of Article 1 of the
Constitution of the State of New York.

The questions before the Court were first, whether
or not the legislature took away from the plaintiff his
common law right of damages for partial disability: and
second, if such right of action was taken away, was it done
without providing another or different remedy, and thus
in violation of the Constitution of the United States and
of the State of New York.

In discussing the intent of the legislature to leave
to plaintiff the right to sue at common law for partial

disability the court stated at 5 N.Y.S. 2d page 176 that
it was:

ia

of the opinion that after further study of
the burden of the disease upon industry, the legisla-
ture decided that the employer should bear the effect
of total disability and that the employee should bear
the burden arising from partial disability.

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, Appel-
lant Division, Fourth Department 259 App. Div. 1070, 21

9

N.Y.S. 2d 417 affirmed the lower court, appeal denied
29 N.E. 2d 975.

Thus it is to be noted that the courts have consistently
held that the mining industry and its workers can be
treated as a separate class under state workmen’s com-
pensation laws and have also held that workers’ suffering
from silicosis can be put in a special classification for com-
pensation purposes.

This Court should take judicial notice of the fact
during the current energy crisis that Kentucky for some
years has been the leading coal producing state in the
nation. Because of this fact and because of the peculair
working conditions of the coal industry and because the
occupational disease of pneumoconiosis is developed only
after many years of exposure and because of the multitude
of compensation claims being filed thereunder during the
years 1972 when the law in question was enacted, it is
manifest that very special conditions existed which would
justify a special classification by the Kentucky legislature
in regard to coal miners.

See also the case of Geduldig v. Aiello, 41 L. Ed. 2d
256, 94 S. Ct. (1974) for one of the
most recent United States Supreme Court cases on the
subject of the Equal Protection Clause. In that case the
state of California had a disability insurance program for
private employees temporarily disabled from working by
an injury or illness not covered by workmen’s compensa-
tion. It was financed by an assessment of one percent of
the employee’s salary. The California program insured
against abnormal pregnancies but normal pregnancies were
excluded. The law’s constitutionality was challenged by a

10

woman having a normal pregnancy. This Court held that
a state is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to
sacrifice the self supporting nature of the program, reduce
the benefits payable for covered disabilities, or increase the
maximum employee contribution rate just to provide pro-
tection against another risk of disability, such as normal
pregnancy The Court declared that the equal protection
clause does not require that a State must choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all.

It is interesting to note that California under the
pregnancy classification had two sub.classes: Normal
pregnancies and abnormal pregnancies. (ne was com-
pensable, the other non compensable. In Kentucky, coal
miners suffering from injuries have a different classifica-
tion than coal miners suffering from black lung. This is
not an invidious classification in view of the legislatures
attempt to unify the joint state-federal program. Congress
itself had first created the separate classification for coal
miners suffering from black lung when it passed the Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.

B. THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS HAS
FOUND THAT THE PECULIAR CIRCUM-
STANCE AND CONDITIONS OF COAL MINERS
JUSTIFY SPECIAL TREATMENT REGARD-
ING COMPENSATION FOR PNEUMOCONIO-

The Congressional findings and declaration of pur-
pose in reference to Black Lung Benefits are set out in
Section 901 of Title 30 of U.S. Code Annotated and the

11

1972 amendments thereto. Their purpose was to insure
that coal miners and their dependants got adequate bene-
fits under the federal law, in cooperation with the States,
for deatii or disabilities due to pneumoconiosis.

Section 931 of the federal act as amended in 1972,
provides as follows:

“(a) On and after January 1, 1974, any claim for
benefits for death or total disability due to pneu-
mgeoniosis shall be filed pursuant to the applicable
state workmen’s compensation law, except that
during any period when miners or their surviving
widows, children, parents, brothers, or sisters, as
the case may be, are not covered by a State work-
men’s Compensation law which provides adequate
coverage for pneumoconiosis they shall be entitled
to claim benefits under this part.

The provisions of sub section “b,” then make pro-
visions for the Secretary to publish in the federal reg-
ister a listing of those states providing adequate cov-
erage and sets forth certain criteria that is to be used
by the Secretary as guidelines in making his determina-
tion.

Section 932 (a) as amended in 1972, provides that
during any period after December 31, 1973, that the
individual coal operators, in states not in compliance
as to adequate coverage are subject to the provisions
of Public Law 803, 69th Congress (44 Stat. 1424 ap-
proved March 4, 1927) as amended. [The Longshores-
men Act].

12

Section 932 (g) provides that any benefits payable
to disabled miners under the provisions of the Long-
shoresmen Act shall be reduced by the amount of any
compensation received under a State workmen’s com-
pensation law because of death or disability due to pneu-
moconiosis.

Section 933 requires coal operators to qualify
through insurance companies or as self-insurers to
meet all black lung compensation claims in states that
are not in compliance with the federal requirements.
Neither Kentucky nor any other state has met those
requirements.

Section 902 (c) as amended in 1972, gives jurisdic-
tion to the Secretary of Labor after January 1, 1974, in
reference to administering the federal black lung pro-
gram, part C.

C. GREAT WEIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE
RULING BY THE KENTUCKY COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE LAW IN QUESTION IS
CONSTITUTIONAL.

The same counsel prosecuting the present appeal
of the class action suit filed in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky rep-
resented a Kentucky coal miner who claimed a viola-
tion of his rights under the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution in the case of Fid Chapman
v. Eastern Coal Corporation, Ky., 519 S.W. 2d 390 (Feb.
7, 1975). No Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed
in that case and the decision ot the Kentucky Court of

13

Appeals holding the law constitutional has become
final. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in that case
traced the legislative and medical history of compen-
sation to coal miners for occupational diseases and
noted as follows at page 394:

“...all this we point out only to illustrate that sci-
ence, history and politics all have combined to put
black lung in a different class from other work con-
nected disabilities .. .”

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the Kentucky legislature could deny
benefits altogether for coal miners for pneumoconiosis
or black lung. If this is so it would seem that such ben-
efits could be frozen at present levels, In the area of
economic and social welfare the states have very broad
powers and the constitution is not offended simply be-
cause there is some inequality of benefits. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has found that medical science,
history and politics have all combined to put black lung
in a different class from other work connected disabili- —

14

ties. The law being settled on this issue, there is no
substantial federal question and the judgment herein
should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

_—

EARL M. CORNETT
General Counsel
Department of Labor
Plaza Towers
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

CYRIL E. SHADOWEN
Assistant Counsel
Department of Labor
Legal Arts Building
200 South Seventh Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Attorneys for Appellees

Hon. James R. Yocom,
Commissioner of Labor,
Commonwealth of Kentucky

and Custodian of the Special Fund,
and Special Fund

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Cyril E. Shadowen, one of counsel for appel-
lees, Hon. James R, Yocom, Commissioner of Labor,
Commonwealth of Kentucky and Custodian of the Spe-
oF es Special Fund, do hereby certify that on the
j2“ day of July, 1975, I served copies of the forego-
ing Motion to Dismiss or Affirm on the parties hereto
as follows:

1. On appellants Chester Slone, Abel Chapman,
Jr., Phillip Anderson, Cledis Kinney by depositing
three copies each of same, postage prepaid, addressed
to counsel for appellants C. Kilmer Combs, P. O. Box
112, Pikeville, Kentucky 41501

2. On Deskins Branch Coal Company, Kimper
Kentucky; on Kentucky-Elkhorn Coals, Inc., Mc-
Dowell, Kentucky; and on Kentucky Carbon Corpora-
tion, Phelps, Kentucky by depositing three copies each
of same, postage prepaid, addressed to their counsel,
Hon. William J. Baird, Baird & Baird, P. O. Box 351,
Pikeville, Kentucky 41501.

3. On Shelby T. Denton, Chairman, Alfred A.
Naff, George B. Simpson, Clyde Mullins, and Glen
Schilling, Members comprising the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Board of Kentucky, and Ed W. Hancock,
Attorney General of Kentucky, by depositing in a
United States Post Office three copies thereof in a duly
addressed envelope with first class postage prepaid
addressed to Thomas R. Emerson, Assistant Attorney

16

General, Capitol Building, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601,
their attorney of record.

4. All parties required to be served have been
served.

CYRIL E. SHADOWEN
Attorney for Appellees
Hon. James R. Yocom,
Commissioner of Labor,
Commonwealth of Kentucky
and Custodian of the Special Fund
and Special Fund

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

Applicable Kentucky revised statutes as amended in
1972.

¢

342.650 Exemptions. The following employes are
exempt from the coverage of this chapter:

(1) Any person employed as a domestic servant
in a private home by an employer who has less than two
employes each regularly employed 40 or more hours a
week in such employment.

(2) Any person employed, for not exceeding 20
consecutive work days, to do maintenance, repair, re-
modelling, or similar work in or about the private home
of the employer, or if the employer has no other em-
ployes subject to this chapter, in or about the pre-
mises where such employer carries on his trade, busi-
ness or profession.

(3) Any person performing services in return for
aid or sustenance only, received from any religious or
charitable organization.

(4) Any person for whom a rule of liability for
injury or death is provided by the laws of the United
States, except those persons covered under Title IV,
Public Law 91-173, 91st Congress, commonly referred
to as the Black Lung Benefits of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, or as amended.

(5) Any person employed in agriculture.
(6) Any person who would otherwise be coy-

2a

ered but who elects not to be covered in accordance
with the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Board. (1972, c. 78, § 5).

*“NOTE: Effective date. This Act shall be effec-
tive on January 1, 1973; and effective for all claims
filed on and after January 1, 1973; provided, how-
ever, that in the event federal law specifies that
claims covered by provisions of this Act shall be
filed with a federal agency such claims shall con-
tinue to be held as required by the federal law
until repeal or expiration of the federal law re-
quiring same; then, in that event, the increase in
benefits provided herein shall not apply to those
claims where benefits are awarded under the fed-
eral law. The benefits under the present law KRS
Chapter 342 shall apply to those claims. (1972, c.
78, § 37; effective date clause, not compiled.)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0596%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.