# Petition — Linn v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0534%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1975 - **Citation:** 423 U.S. 836 ## Text i ooeulie if JUN, TH 13 F In the | ste CHY SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OcTOBER TERM, 1974 No. T4-) D959 JAMES P. LINN, Petitioner, VERSUS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JAMES P. LINN, pro se of LINN, Hetms & KIRK 410 Fidelity Piaza Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 June, 1975 UTTERBACK TYPESETTING Co., S19 W. CALIF... OKLAHOMA CiTy, PH. 2385-0030 375 — <0 eee TABLE OF CONTENTS —_——_ -—_ Statement Opinions and Orders Below Jurisdiction Questions Presented for Review 1. Whether the order denying Petitioner’s motion to expunge or alternatively seal his arrest record deprives him of his fundamental right of privacy and liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment concept of personal liberty and the Bill of Rights as a whole 2. Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Regulations Statement of the Case The Question Is Substantial Argument I. The order denying Petitioner’s motion to ex- punge cr alternatively seal his arrest record de- prives him of his fundamental right of privacy and liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment concept of personal liberty and the Bill of Rights as a whole _. 7 A. The collection and dissemination of records of arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation PAGE bo to to TABLE OF AUTHORITIES conteeses PAGE B. The Order Denying Expungement of Peti- tioner’s Record of Arrest is a deprivation of Petitioner’s right of privacy protected by the Constitution; more particularly, the Fifth Amendment concept of personal liberty and the Due Process clause , C. Where certain fundamental rights are in- volved, regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest 14 II. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing . 19 Conclusion — 20 APPENDICES Appendix A—Order Denying Petition for Rehearing i Appendix B—Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Filed April 9, 1975, Opinion of the United States Court of Appcals for the Tenth Circuit - li-vii Appendix C-—-Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma Deny- ing Petitioner’s Motion to Expunge or Alternatively Seal His Arrest Record Vii-viii Appendix D—Federal Regulation Title 28 C.F.R. $ 0.85 . _ 1x-xi Appendix. E—Petition for Rehearing Xi-xiii —iii— TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: PAGE Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 11-12 Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 156 (Col. 1972) . Doe v. Commander, 329 A.2d 35 (Md. Ct. App. 1974) =13 Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 354, 487 P.2d 211 I cranes _.. -..---. 13, 17-18 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’ s State Trials, 1029 ee, : keen, ae Gault, Application of, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) _. ceiut ae Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 15 Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718 (D.C. 1971) 8, 13, 18 Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 8,9, 13 Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969) . i) N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) . 14 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 12-13, 16 Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) 9 State v. Pinkley, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio Com. Pl, 1972) 13 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) 13 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: United States Constitution, Amendment V 3 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS: 28 U.S.C. § 534 os } 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) D 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 _. a 344 23 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) 7 —iv— AUTHORITIES CONTINUED ARTICLES: “Branded: Arrest Records of the Unconvicted,” 44 Mississippi Law Journal, 928 (1973) “Davidson v. Dill: A Compelling State Interest in Retaining Arrest Records,” 35 University of Pitts- burgh Law Review, 205 (1973) an “Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due to Arrest Records—Private Remedies,” 17 Villanova Law Review, 110 (1971) Gilt by Record, 1 Calif. Western Law Review, 126 (1965) Karabian, “Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain,” 3 Pacific Law Journal, 20 (1972) “The Arrest Record and New York City Public Hir- ing: An Evaluation,” 9 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 442 (1973) OTHER AUTHORITIES: House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitu- tional Rights of the Judiciary (February 26, 1974), Testimony of William B. Saxbe National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report on the Criminal Justice System PAGE 10 10 In the Supreme Court of the United States OcToBeR TERM, 1974 SI etccaesomsenonsio JAMES P. LINN, Petitioner, VERSUS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT To the Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: Petitioner prays for writ of certiorari to review the judgment and decree of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the case of United States of America v. James P. Linn. The judgment was entered on April 9, 1975. Rehearing was denied on May 12, 1975. - OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW The order of the United States Court of Appeals deny- ing the petition for rehearing is reproduced as Appendix A to this petition. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is not yet reported and is reproduced and appended hereto as Appendix B. The order of the United States District Court for the Western Districi of Oklahoma is not yet reported and is appended hereto as Appendix C. JURISDICTION Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Title 28 United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1254(1). The judgment sought to be reviewed was entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on April 9, 1975. A petition for rehearing was timely filed and was denied on May 12, 1975, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Whether the order denying Petitioner’s motion to expunge or alternatively seal his arrest record deprives him of his fundamental right of privacy and liberty in viola- tion of the Fifth Amendment concept of personal liberty and the Bill of Rights as a whole. 2. Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case for an evi- dentiary hearing. ining CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS Amendment V, United States Constitution: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless gn a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com- pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him- self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with- out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Title 28, United States Code (U.S.C.) § 534: “(a) The Attorney General shall— “(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve iden- tification, criminal identification, crime, and other records; and “(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions. “(b) The exchange of records authorized by sub- section (a) (2) of this section is subject to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving depart- ments or reiated agencies. “(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the functions authorized by this section.” Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 0.85 (fully set out in Appendix D) especially subsection (b), set forth below: ws “Subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall: (b) Conduct the acquisition, collection, ex- change, classification, and preservation of identifica- tion records, including personal fingerprints volun- tarily submitted, on a mutually beneficial basis, from law enforcement and other governmental agencies, railroad police, national banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC—Reserve—Insured Banks, and banking institutions insured by the Fed- eral Saving and Loan Insurance Corporation; provide expert testimony in Federal or local courts as to finger- print examinations; and provide identification as- sistance in disasters and in missing-persons type cases, including those from insurance companies.” STATEMENT OF THE CASE James P. Linn, Petitioner, an attorney-at-law licensed to practice in the State of Oklahoma and in the State of Texas, and seven others were indicted by a grand jury sit- ting in the Southern District of New York. The indictment contained sixty-five counts, charging, among other things, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, stock fraud, sale of un- registered securities, and the filing of false reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Stock Exchange. The Petitioner was a named defendant in fiftv-nine of the sixty-five counts in the indictment. Subsequent to the return of the aforesaid indictment, Petitioner was arrested and fingerprinted by the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York. Petitioner and four other defendants requested and were granted a change of venue to the Western District of _— = Oklahoma. Trial of the case was to a jury, and of the fifty- nine counts naming Petitioner as a defendant, nine were submitted to the jury. The remaming counts were either dismissed or consolidated with the nine counts submitted to the jury. On February 7, 1974, the jury acquitted Petitioner on each of the nine counts submitted to it. Petitioner then filed in the criminal proceeding in which he had been acquitted a motion requesting the trial court to expunge, remove and destroy, or alternatively seal, the record of his arrest. In this motion Petitioner alleged as grounds therefor: (1) that most of the charges against him had been dis- missed prior to and during trial; (2) that he had been acquitted by the jury on all remaining counts of the indict- ment against him; (3) that future misuse and improper dissemination of his arrest record was likely; (4) that the record of his arrest could be used to attack his character and reputation both as an individual and in his professional capacity as an attorney-at-law; (5) that his arrest record nowise serves to protect society, so that any conceivable public interest in retaming the record of arrest is clearly outweighed by the possible adverse consequences to him and his professional practice; and (6) that expungement of the record of arrest is necessary to insure his constitu- tional right of privacy. The Petitioner requested that should the District Court deem that more material or evidence was necessary for a just determination of the motion, he be granted an eviden- tiary hearing. No evidentiary hearing was granted or held. On May 29, 1974, the District Court denied Petitioner’s motion to expunge his record of arrest (Appendix C). enlfine An Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was properly perfected, briefs were sub- mitted and oral arguments heard. On April 9, 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the action of the trial court (Appendix B). A Petition for Rehearing was filed on April 25, 1975, seeking a remand for an evidentiary hearing. The rehearing was denied by order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the 12th day of May, 1975 (Ap- pendix A). THE QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL The present petition for writ of certiorari presents an important and unresolved constitutional question which has not been but should be determined by this Court. A decision by this Court is needed, particularly where fed- eral law and procedure followed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other data assemblying agencies provides a wholly inadequate means of safeguarding important constitutional rights. There is a growing body of conflicting decisions among State and federal courts in the area of expunging arrest records under the theory of a constitutionally guaranteed or protected right of privacy. In addition, the substantive issues in this case are novel issues of national import, affecting the lives of many thou- sands of American citizens each year who have been ar- rested and subsequently acquitted of the crimes charged. = ARGUMENT In the remainder of this petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioner will show that the question presented is substan- tial and merits review by the Court. Because of the nov- elty and complexity of the issue, and the limited function of the petition for writ of certiorari, this petition will not undertake to develop all arguments in depth. THE ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXPUNGE OR ALTERNATIVELY SEAL HIS ARREST REC. ORD DEPRIVES HIM OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND LIBERTY IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CONCEPT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS A WHOLE. A. The collection and dissemination of records of arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Identification Division, through the authority vested in the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation. under 28 U.S.C. § 534 and 23 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) re- spectively, maintains a criminal file for identification rec- ords, fingerprints and records of arrest. Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies submit fingerprints and arrest records of arrested persons or suspects in order to receive information on those persons’ prior criminal activi- ties. The Bureau reports such information and adds any new information received through its files. The Division also receives hundreds of “name check” requests from con- tributing and non-contributing sources asking for criminal records of individuals by name without submitting any ee individual fingerprints. Where possible and when the in- quirer gives what the FBI considers a legitimate reason for the request, the inquiry is processed and the record dis- seminated. Any local or state official is considered to be authorized to receive this information if he has something to do with law enforcement or if he is authorized by statute, ordinance or rule to fingerprint applicants for employment or for a permit or a license. Congressmen are also autho- rized. The division maintains a current list of contributing or participating agencies which numbers between 7,000 and 8,000, of which only 3,750 are local law enforcement agen- cies. See Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718 (D.C. 1971) at pp. 720-23 and Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), for excellent discussions of the operation of the Identification Division. The Division has little opportunity to supervise what is actually done with the arrest records it disseminates. It is apparent that the local agencies may on occasion pass on this information to private employers. The Division makes no regular inspection to prevent this, for it has neither furds nor sanctions, and accordingly responds only to com- plaints. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. at pp. 721-22. Con- sequently, private employers and anyone with the right kind of connections have access io these files. See “Guilt by Record,” 1 Calif. Western Law Review, 126 (1965). The likelihood that information will fall into unautho- rized and untrained hands is fairly substantial. A study on the effect of police records of arrest on employment oppor- tunities in the District of Columbia resulted in the publish- ing of the Duncan Report which found that the use of such records by prospective employers was widespread, and the —I— consequences severe, even if the charges were subsequently dismissed. The report found that institutional and other non-governmental employers in the District of Columbia area routinely required job applicants to obtain and pro- vide copies of their arrest records. In Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the District Court in the compliance hearing in that case found that a select group of about 50 pri, te companies were furnished arrest records routinely upon request. A total of more than 3,500 arrest records were disseminated weekly at the time the Duncan committee studied the problem. The widespread use of arrest records in this country for “non-criminal” purposes is a matter of general know]- edge and governmental! concern. In Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), Mr. Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion acknowledges this problem. In Menard v. Saxbe (supra) and Morrow v. District of Columbia (supra), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recog- nized and dwelt extensively gn this problem, as other courts have done. The legal community through publications in legal periodicals have recognized the problem. ' Even the former head of the Justice Department, Attor- ney General William B. Saxbe, has recognized the critical 1 The seriousness of the arrest record problem is now too well docu- mented to doubt. See some of the following: “The Arrest Record and New York City Public Hiring: An Evaluation,’ 9 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 442 (1973); Karabian, “Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain,” 3 Pacific Law Journal 20 (1972): “Branded: Arrest Records of the Unconvicted,” 44 Mississippi Law Journal 928 (1973); “Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due to Arrest Records— Private Remedies,” 17 Villanova Law Review 110 (1971); and “David- son v. Dill: A Compelling State Interest in Retaining Arrest Records,” 35 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 205 (1973). = nature of the problem and the need for prompt action. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary on February 26, 1974, he stated: “However, people are often denied employment on the basis of mere arrest records—records which are provided by criminal justice information systems. This is fundamentally unfair and must be stopped.” Saxbe goes on to quote the following excerpt from the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Stand- ards and Goals, Report on the Criminal Justice System: “No longer is it possible to rely on the inefficiency of information systems for the protection of privacy. Computer-based information systems require conscious planning for protection of personal privacy. Constraints must be imposed on the system to ensure the highest practicable level of protection is obtained.” Saxbe implied that the present system's security is not sufficient to protect the records and prevent unauthorized inputs and dissemination; hence, the need for comprehen- sive federal legislation. He then states: “It is, of course, readily apparent that where a sys- tem does not have the proper security there is a grave danger that the individual rights of privacy may be compromised.” The list of examples where arrest records are dissem- mated and then misused is practically endless; the point being, that the practice of disseminating arrest records is open and subject to great abuse, which has a severe and damaging effect upon an individual by circumventing a basic premise and foundation stone of our cr’minal justice ates system. Only a conviction should carry legal significance as to a person’s involvement in criminal behavior. Where an individual is found not guilty by a court of law, dissem- ination of his arrest record places him in an “extra judicial” double jeopardy by having him face a “second trial” in which he must prove his innocence to all with access to his record against a presumption of being associated with crim- inal behavior. Those having a record disseminated suffer a deprivation of rights and opportunities without a trial, without witnesses, without a chance to defend themselves— in short, without due process of law. B. The Order Denying Expungement of Petitioner’s Record of Arrest is a deprivation of petitioner’s right of privacy protected by the Constitution; more particularly, the Fifth Amendment concept of per- sonal liberty and the Due Process clause. The government’s continufng retention and the pos- sible dissemination of the record of arrest endangers a fundamental right of privacy long recognized as inherent in our constitutional form of goveinment. Referring to an earlier English case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765), the Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), at page 630 stated: “The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach further than the concrete form of the case then before the Court, with its adventitious circum- stances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and rummaging of his drawers, that consti- tutes the essence of the offense: but it is the invasion = of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,—it is the invasion of his sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judgment. * * * ” In the recent decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized that the right of privacy does exist under the Constitution. Mr. Justice Blackmun stated at page 152: “The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of per- sonal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In vary- ing contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1872-1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 88 S.Ct. 507, 510, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecti- cut, 381 U.S., at 484-485, 85 S.Ct., at 1681-1682; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486, 85 S.Ct., at 1682 (Gold- berg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guar- anteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amend- ment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be = deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.” Many of the above mentioned cases, or the basic prin- ciples found in these cases, have been cited in several recent state and federal decisions applytag the principle of the right of privacy in the arrest record area, particularly under the Fifth Amendment due process clause. Due process is an elusive concept and its exact bounda- ries are undefined; its content varies according to specific factual context. Mr. Justice Fortas in the Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), stated at page 20: “Due Process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.”’ In United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Court was concerned with the constitutionalitvy of a Con- gressional Act relating to subversive activities. In Footnote 11, Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote: “We recognized in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S., at 492, 79 S.Ct. at 1411, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377, that ‘the right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable govern- mental interference comes within the “liberty” and “property” concepts of the Fifth Amendment.’ ” * Doe v. Commander, 329 A2d 35 (Md. Cr. App. 1974); Daridson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 156 (Coil. 1972); State v. Pinkley, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971); Menard v. Mitchell, 328 FSupp. 218 (D.C. 1971); Men- ard v. Saxhe, AY8 F.2d 1017 (DC. Cir. 1974). aniline The opinion goes on to state at page 265: “It has become axiomatic that ‘|p]recision of regula- tion must be the touchstone in an area so closely touch- ing our most precious freedoms.’ ” Petitioner contends that the government's retention of his arrest record violates his rights of liberty, property, and privacy within the Fifth Amendment. His liberty has been infringed upon by placing him in an unequal position to other law abiding citizens. His property rights and freedom of practicing his chosen profession are jeopardized by the administrative practice of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion of disseminating arrest records; and his right of pri- vacy is threatened by such dissemination. C. Where certain fundamental rights are involved, reg- ulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest. Mr. Justice Harlan in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964), stated at page 307: “Th*» Court has repeatedly held that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. See [N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama] 357 U.S. at 463-464, 78 S.Ct. at 1172-1173. ‘ * * * |T)he power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.’ Cantwell v. Con- necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903.‘ * * * |E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liber- ties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.’ =— = Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231: (Footnote omitted).” In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Mr. Justice Douglas in writing the opinion of the Court, re- affirmed this holding of the Court at page 485 and extended it to the concept of right of privacy. Mr. Justice White in a concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut (supra) stated at 381 U.S., at 503: “The nature of the right invaded is pertinent, to be sure, for statutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty do, under the cases of this Court, require ‘strict scrutiny,’ Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110... .” Mr. Justice Goldberg, whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan joined, concurring, stated at page 497: “In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state pur- pose. ‘Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,’ Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480. The law must be shown ‘neces- sary, and not merely rationally related to, the accom- plishment of a permissible state policy.” McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196, 85 S.Ct. 283, 290, 13 L.Ed.2d 222. See Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155.” onlin The latest decision of the Court in this area is Roe v. Wade (supra), where Mr. Justice Blackmun issued a clear mandate with regard to legislation limiting fundamental rights—more particularly, the right of privacy. Mr. Justice Blackmun at page 155 stated: “Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ Kramer vy. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 299 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 485, 85 S.Ct., at 1682; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1664, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 904- 905, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US.. at 460, 463-464, 92 S.Ct., at 1042, 1043-1044 (White, J., concurring in result).” The United States Court of Appea!s for the Tenth Cir- cuit in its opinion in the case now brought before this Court on a petition for writ of certiorari avoided entirely the issue raised by Petitioner that the government must demonstrate a compelling state interest in retaining the arrest record under the statute and regulation authorizing retention. Instead, the Court of Appeals implied that the burden was on Petitioner to demonstrate an invasion of privacy suffi- cient to override the government's justification for retain- ing his record (App. B, page vi). = = The value of an arrest record and fingerprints depends upon two factors: an assumption that the individual arrested did in fact commit the crime for which he was arrested, and that his commission of this crime indicates a likelihood that other crimes will be committed. Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971). Petitioner’s acquittal negates both premises. He has committed no crime, he has been tound nc* guilty in a trial by jury, and retention of his rec- ord of arrest cannot be justified as criminal identification. The very nature of the crimes the Petitioner was charged with by the government are not of the clandestine type where records of arrest and fingerprints are necessary to facilitate future investigations. Criminal investigation and the interests of society are not subserved by the retention of Petitioner’s record of arrest. The Washington Court of Appeals in Eddy v. Moore (supra) stated at 487 P.2d at 217: “The courts have recognized in Kalish and Menard that following an acquittal, the scales of justice re- quired the balancing on one side of a plaintiff's legiti- mate concern over the improper use of, labeling, or existence of his fingerprints, photographs, and arrest records against the government's bald assertion of a right to hold them. We have now reached the point where our experience with the requirements of a free society demands the existence of a right of privacy in the fingerprints and photographs of an accused who has been acquitted, to be at least placed in the balance, against the claim of the state for a need for their re- tention. “We believe the right of an individual, absent a com- pelling showing of necessity by the gove:nmment, to the return of his fingerprints and photographs, upon an -_— acquittal, is a fundamental right implicit in the con- cept of ordered liberty and that it is as well within the penumbras of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights ‘formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance.’ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). “It will take a compelling showing on the part of the state to justify a retention of the fingerprints and photographs. * * * ” The systematic recordation and dissemination of infor- matiga on an individual is a form of surveiliance and con- trol which has a chilling effect on the freedoms upon which the government is founded—life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as well as due process under the law. Where the government engages in such conduct which clearly invades an individual’s right of privacy, its action cannot be per- mitted unlcss it can show a compelling public necessity in its action. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. at 726. While some conduct against society may properly sub- ject an individual to limitations upon his freedoms and right of privacy, such as conviction for criminal acts, where charges are made without adequate supporting evidence as tested by the judicial process, the records of arrest should not be indiscriminately broadcast under governmental auspices. Developments in technological ability to accumu- Jate and disseminate information on individuals is a grow- ing concern of society and the law which must be met by the courts with the constitutionally recognized right of pri- vacy to insure basic freedoms guaranteed by our democracv. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. at 725. =_—S THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE REMANDED THE CASE FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. Reproduced as Appendix E to this petition 1s the peti- tion for rehearing filed by Petitioner in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In said petition, the Appellate Court’s attention was called to that portion of the record on appeal indicating a request to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing which was in effect over- ruled by the District Court issuing its order denying ex- pungement (Appendix C). The Court of Appeals in its opinion (Appendix B) relied heavily upon the lack of showing of a demonstrated invasion of privacy in determining that the arrest record should not be expunged (App. B, page vi). Petitioner also brought to the Appellate Court’s attention the argument raised in Petitioner’s brief before it that the government had the burden of demonstrating a compelling state inter- est in retaining the record of arrest which could only be shown in an evidentiary hearing. There must be a showing on a case by case basis how far the government may infringe upon an individual’s right of privacy in the area of arrest records, and the Court of Appeals’ decision acknowledges such a method (App. B, page 5). Both sides must ke given a fair opportunity to present evidence in their own behalf, whether it be incum- bent upon the Petitioner to show a violation of his right of privacy and no governmental interest in retaining his arrest record as the Court of Appeals determined, or upon the = governmcnt to show a compelling state interest in retain- ing the record of arrest as the Petitioner contends. CONCLUSION For the rcasons stated, it is respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, JAMES P. LINN, pro se of Linn, HELMS & KIRK 410 Fidelity Plaza Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 June, 1975 APPENDIX A MARCH TERM — MAY 12, 1975 Before Honorable Jean S. Breitenstein, Honorable Robert H. McWilliams, and Honorable William E. Doyle, Circuit Judges UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vv. ) No. 74-1397 ) ) ) ) JAMES P. LINN, Defendant-Appellant. This matter comes on for consideration of appellant’s petition for rehearing filed April 25, 1975, in the captioned cause. Upon consideration whereof, the petition for rehearing is denied. s Howard K. Phillips HOWARD K. PHILLIPS Clerk a | APPENDIX B PUBLISH FILED APR 9 1975 HOWARD K. PHILLIPS Clerk, United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT NO. 74-1397 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) | United States ) District Court for V. ) the Western District ) of Oklahoma. JAMES P. LINN, ) (D.C. No. ) CR-73-131) Defendant-Appellant. ) Charles R. Hollen, Attorney, Department of Justice (Gary D. Jackson, Attorney, Department of Justice, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. James P. Linn (Linn, Helms & Kirk, and Mark A. Robert- son, Legal Intern, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant. Before BREITENSTEIN, McWILLIAMS and DOYLE, Cir- cuit Judges. —li— [APPENDIX] McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an order of the trial court de- nying the defendant’s motion to expunge, remove and de- stroy the record of his arrest. Under the circumstances disclosed by the record here before us, we affirm the ac- tion of the trial court. James P. Linn, an attorney-at-law licensed to practice in the State of Oklahoma, appears in this court pro se. Linn and seven others were indicted by a grand jury sit- ting in the Southern District of New York. The indictment contained some sixty-five counts, charging, among other things, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, stock fraud, sale of unregistered securities, and the filing of false reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Stock Exchange. Linn was a named defendant in fifty-nine of the sixty-five counts in the indictment. Subsequent to the return of the aforesaid indictment, Linn was arrested and fingerprinted by the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York. Linn and four other defendants requested a change of venue to the Western District of Oklahoma. This request was granted. Trial of the case was to a jury, and of the fifty-nine counts naming Linn as a defendant, nine were submitted to the jury. The remaining counts were either dismissed or in some manner consolidated with the nine counts submitted to the jury. The jury acquitted Linn on each of the nine counts submitted to it. Linn then filed in the criminal proceeding in which he had been thus acquitted a motion requesting the trial court to expunge, remove and destroy the record of his arrest. In this motion Linn alleged as grounds there- for that most of the charges against him had been dis- missed prior to and during trial, and that he had been acquitted by the jury on all remaining counts of the in- —iv— [APPENDIX] dictment. Linn further alleged in his motion to expunge: (1) that future misuse and improper dissemination of his record of arrest was “likely”; (2) that the record of his arrest “could be” used to attack his character and repu- tation both as an individual and in his professional capacity as an attorney-at-law; (3) that Linn’s arrest record in no- wise serves to protect society, so that any conceivable pub- lic interest in retaining the record of arrest is clearly out- weighed by the possible adverse consequences to him and his professional practice; and (4) that expungement of the record of his prior arrest is necessary to insure his con- stitutional right of privacy. No evidentiary hearing was held, or apparently re- quested, in connection with Linn’s motion to expunge, though the matter was fully briefed by both Linn and the Government. The trial court then denied Linn’s motion to expunge his record of arrest, and this appeal follows. Traditionally, courts have been of the view that the matter of expunging an arrest record where the arrestee has been acquitted was inappropriate for judicial action, and that the entire matter was more appropriate for legis- lative action. United States v. Dooley, 364 F.Supp. 75, at 79 (E.D.Pa. 1973). However, there are a number of com- paratively recent cases which indicate quite clearly that in a proper case the courts may themselves order an ex- punction of an arrest record. Requests to expunge have arisen in a variety of procedural settings. For example, re- quests to expunge are frequently made as a part of the relief requested in civil rights proceedings, of one type or another, brought against state or county officials. See Sulli- van v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Wilson v. Webster, 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972): United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966); Bil- ick v. Dudley, 356 F.Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F.Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on —y— [APPENDIX] other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); and Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F.Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Requests to expunge arrest records have also been frequently made in postconviction proceedings. See Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1972); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D.Mich. 1971); and Sever- son v. Duff, 322 F.Supp. 4 (M.D.Fla. 1970). Similar requests have also been made in actions brought directly against the actual custodian of the records sought to be expunged. See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gomez v. Wilson, 323 F.Supp. 87 (D.C.D.C. 1971); Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972); and Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211 (Wash.App. 1971). Finally, requests to expunge have been made, as in the instant case, in the criminal proceeding in which the arrestee was acquitted. See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C.Cir. 1969); United States v. Seasholtz. 376 F.Supp. 1288 (N.D.Okla. 1974); United States v. Dooley, 364 F.Supp. 75 (E.D.Pa. 1973); United States v. Rosen, 343 F.Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); and United States v. Kalish, 271 F.Supp. 968 (D.Puerto Rico, 1967). Under the authorities above cited it is fairly well estab- lished, then, that courts do possess the power to expunge an arrest record where the arrestee has been acquitted. However, there appears to be no definitive, all-purpose rule to govern requests of this nature, and to a considerable de- gree each case must stand on its own two feet. The cases above cited do indicate that the power to expunge an ar- rest record is a narrow one, and should not be routinely used whenever a criminal prosecution ends in an acquittal, but should be reserved for the unusual or extreme case. Certain of the cases call for a “balancing” of the equities between the Government’s need to maintain extensive rec- ords in order to aid in general law enforcement and the individual’s right of privacy. _—— [APPENDIX] Under the cases above cited, where the arrest itself was an unlawful one. or where the arrest represented har- assing action by the police, or where the statute under which the arrestee was prosecuted was itself unconstitu- tional, courts have ordered expunction. However, it would appear that an acquittal, standing alone, is not in itself sufficient to warrant an expunction of an arrest record. United States v. Seasholtz, 376 F.Supp. 1288 (N.D.Okla. 1974); United States v. Dooley, 364 F.Supp. 75 (E.D.Pa. 1973); and United States v. Rosen, 343 F.Supp. 804 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). Let us examine the facts of the instant case in the light of the authorities above mentioned. Linn's arrest was a lawful one, pursuant to an indict- ment returned by a duly constituted grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New York. The charges set forth in the indictment were lawful ones not subject to any con- stitutional infirmity. Although Linn was no doubt severely inconvenienced by the return of the indictment, there is nothing to indicate any harassing action, as such, by any governmental agency. On trial of the matter, the trial judge held there was sufficient incriminating evidence against Linn to require submission of at least nine counts to the jury. And in acquitting, the jury found, in effect, only that the Government had not proven Linn’s guilt bevond a rea- sonable doubt. Linn argues on appeal that the Government’s reten- tion of his arrest records is an invasion of his right of privacy. There was no showing, however, that the retained records have been, or will be, used improperly or intru- sively against Linn. In fact, the so-called “arrest” record now on file with the F.B.I. clearly shows Linn was found not guilty of the charges against him. Thus, there is no demonstrated invasion of privacy which overrides the Gov- ernment’s justification in keeping the records. So, the instant case really boils down to whether the fact that Linn was acquitted is in itself sufficient to require —vii— [APPENDIX] the trial court to expunge his record of arrest. We hold that it is not. Judgment affirmed. APPENDIX C FILED MAY 29 1974 Rex B. HAWKS Clerk, U. S. District Court By Zeta M. Cowan Deputy IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff; Vs. No. CR-73-131 JAMES P. LINN, EDWARD J. BOLKA, JIMMIE E. MADOLE, et al., ee eee eee Defendants. ORDER Each of the Defendants James P. Linn, Edward J. Bolka and Jimmie E. Madole has moved for an Order for the expunction or sealing of the records and all accompany- ing pertinent materials relating to records of his arrest con- cerning alleged criminal offenses under federal law which were dismissed prior to trial or of which he was acquitted after trial in the United States District Court for the West- ern District of Oklahoma in Criminal Case No. 73-131. They —viii— [APPENDIX] have filed exhaustive briefs in support of their respective Motions and in reply to the Government’s response. After thorough consideration of the Motions and briefs and after exhaustive research on the part of the Court and following a careful reading of the opinions in all reported federal cases, the Court finds that the Motion of each De- fendant to expunge or to seal the record of his arrest pres- ently in the hands of all governmental agencies should be denied. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the respective Motions of the Defendants James P. Linn, Edward J. Bolka and Jimmie E. Madole for an Order to expunge or to seal, in the hands of all governmental agencies, the record of their arrests for alleged crimes in violation of the laws of the United States and respecting which alleged crimes motions to dismiss were sustained or verdicts of acquittal were returned fol- lowing trial in criminal cause no CR-73-131 in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma, be and the same are hereby denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy hereof to counsel of record. DATED this 29th day of May, 1974. s Luther B. Eubanks Luther B. Eubanks United States District Judge ATTEST: A true copy of the original Rex B. Hawks, Clerk By s’ Judith E. Morgan Deputy =) APPENDIX D Subpart P—Federa! Bureau of Investigation Cross REFERENCE: For regulation pertaining to the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, see Part 3 of this chapter. $0.85 General functions. Subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall: (a) Investigate violations of the laws of the United States and collect evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, except in cases in which such responsibility is by statute or otherwise spe- cifically assigned to another investigative agency. (b) Conduct the acquisition, collection, exchange, classification, and preservation of identification records, including personal fingerprints voluntarily submitted, on a mutually beneficial basis, from law enforcement and other governmental agencies, railroad police, national banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC- Reserve-Insured Banks, and banking institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; provide expert testimony in Federal or local courts as to fingerprint examinations; and provide identification assist- ance in disasters and in missing-persons type cases, includ- ing those from insurance companies. (c) Conduct personnel investigations requisite to the work of t..e Department of Justice and whenever required by statute or otherwise. (d) Carry out the Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15 1953, designating the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take charge of in- -—X-— [APPENDIX] vestigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. (e) Establish and conduct law enforcement training programs to provide training for State and local law en- forcement personnel; operate the Federal Bureau of In- vestigation National Academy; develop new approaches, techniques, systems, equipment, and devices to improve and strengthen law enforcement and assist in conducting State and local training programs, pursuant to section 404 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 204. (f) Operate a central clearinghouse for police statistics under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, and a com- puterized nationwide index of law enforcement informa- tion under the National Crime Information Center. (g) Operate the Federal Bureau of Investigation Lab- oratory, to serve not only the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion, but also to provide, without cost, technical and scien- tific assistance, including expert testimony in Federal or local courts, for all duly constituted law enforcement agen- cies, other organizational units of the Department of Jus- tice, and other Federal agencies, which may desire to avail themselves of the service. (h) Make recommendations to the Civil Service Com- mission in connection with applications for retirement un- der 5 U.S.C. 8336(c). (i) Investigate alleged fraudulent conduct in connec- tion with operations of the Federal Housing Administration and other alleged violations of the criminal provisions of the National Housing Act, including section 1010 of title 18 of the United States Code. (j) Exercise the power and authority vested in the Attorney General by section 201 of the Department of Jus- tice Appropriation Act, 1973, Public Law 92-544, 86 Stat. 1115, to approve exchanges of identification records with —Xj—— (APPENDIX) State and local governments for purposes of employment and licensing. [Order No. 423-69, 34 F.R. 20388, Dec. 31, 1969, as amended by Order No. 498-12, 37 F.R. 25917, Dec. 6, 1972] APPENDIX E IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) -VS- ) No. 74-1397 ) ) ) ) JAMES P. LINN, et al., Defendants-Appellant. PETITION FOR REHEARING The appellant, James P. Linn, respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing of the above entitled cause with respect to remanding said cause to the Western District of Oklahoma for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of demonstrating a violation of appellant’s right of privacy and to show that there issno overriding Govern- ment justification for retaining appellant’s arrest record. James P. Linn reserves his argued position as to each of the points of appeal, but in this petition, addresses him- self solely to the issue of whether this Court’s opinion rests heavily upon the lack of evidence in the record directed towards the right of privacy issue and the Government’s interest in retaining arrest records issue, and whether ap- pellant should be granted a remand for an evidentiary hearing. —xii— [APPENDIX] This Court erred with respect to its statement on page 3 of its opinion that “no evidentiary hearing was held, or apparently requested, in connection with Linn’s motion to expunge. .. .” The appellant calls to the Court’s attention, Vol. I, page 82 of the Record on Appeal where the appel- lant states: “The ex-defendant, James P. Linn, therefore prays that the Court order expungement of his record of arrest on the basis of the above mentioned facts and cited authority. Further, the defendant requests that should the Court deem that more material or evidence is necessary for a just determination of this motion, he be granted an evidentiary hearing with sufficient time to prepare for it.” |Emphasis added | The District Court failed to act on appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing and by issuing its order denying the requested relief for expungement, it in effect overruled the request for an evidentiary hearing. This Court’s opinion relies heavily upon the lack of showing or demonstrated invasion of privacy in determin- ing that the record should not be expunged (page 6 of the opinion). The Government, by attachment as an Appendix to its Brief, introduced the arrest record on file at the F.B.I. without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing to de- termine its accuracy, its value to the F.B.I., or any over- riding Government interest in its retention. The appellant contends that the consideration of only the arrest record, without the opportunity for appellant to present evidence to support his position, denies appellant a fair opportunity to have his position justly adjudicated. Appellant contended in his appellate briefs and still contends that under constitutional tests propounded by the Supreme Court in recent years | Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 115, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)]| any regulations limit- ing fundamental rights may be justified only by a compcl- —xili— [APPENDIX] ling state interest. This can only be shown in an evidentiary hearing wherein the Government interest in arrest records is shown and balance against the individual’s right of priv- acy. There must be a showing on a case by case basis how far the Government may infringe upon the right of privacy of an individual citizen. This Court’s opinion supports this case by case method of determination (page 5) and in order to arrive at a just result, evidence must be presented. The appellant, James P. Linn, therefore states that a request for an evidentiary hearing was made by appellant but denied by the District Court, and that in order for a just determination of the issues before the Court and to be consistent with the Court’s opinion this action should be remanded to the Western District of Oklahoma for an evidentiary hearing. Respectfully submitted, s’ James P. Linn James P. Linn, pro se of LINN, HELMS & KIRK Suite 410 Fidelity Plaza Robert S. Kerr at Robinson Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 (405) 239-6786 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING This will certify that the undersigned mailed two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing to Mr. Charles R. Hollen, Attorney, U. S. Department of Justice, P.O. Box 14142, Washington, D. C. 20044, this 23rd day of April, 1975, with postage fully prepaid thereon. s/ James P. Linn James P. Linn CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that on the day of June, 1975, three true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed air mail, return receipt requested, to each of the following: The Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, Charles R. Hollen, Attorney, and Gary D. Jackson, At- tornev, United States Department of Justice, Box 14142, Washington, D.C. 20044. The above listed parties are all of the parties required to be served. James P. Linn + well --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0534%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.