# Appendix — Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0315%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1976 - **Citation:** 426 U.S. 407 ## Text FILE K 8 APPENDIX r Supreme Court of the Anited States On, CHuemicat A&D Atomic WorkKERS InterwationaL UNION AFL-CIO anp Maritime Loca. Uxiox No. 8-801 Petitioners, v. Monn. On. Corporation Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT — — — PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED APRIL 4, 1975; CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 6, 1975. OP © Q. Well, aren’t you the man that sends that ship over there to pick up whatever it is going to pick up? A. Iam the man that operates the ship, yes, sir. Q. Well, you mean to say that your supervision over that MOBIL POWER doesn’t even cause you to know why the MOBIL POWER is going to Puerto Rico? A. I have subordinates that do watch these details. I don’t follow each cargo. Q. Do you know generally what type of cargo you pick up in Puerto Rico when you make that run? A. Yes, sir, as I told you, it is refined products. 122 What is that? Refined petroleum products. Refined petroleum products? Yes, sir. Where are those refined petroleum products taken? [134] A. Usually to the East Coast. Q. Usually to the East Coast. Generally speaking, how long does—how often does that trip to Puerto Rico take place? A. How frequently? Q. Yes. A. At no regular intervals. . Q. Well, give us your best estimate of how long that takes place. A. I would guess that last year we may have had eight such voyages. Q. Eight trips? Yes. Eight trips to Puerto Rico? O F r 2 A. Q. A. Yes, sir. Q. Now do your ships go foreign? A. Yes, sir, we were just talking about that. Q. Other than the ones we have been talking about? A. Well, any of them could. Q. Well— A. You mean are any others on charter now, no, sir. Q. What has been the practice in say the year [135] 1971? How many ships made trips to foreign ports? 125 A. I believe three. Q. What? A. I believe three. Q. Give us the name of the first one. A. I am sorry, without reference to my log I couldn’t tell you. Where did those three ships go? To Puerto Rico. We also had some military charters. Out to the Pacific? I believe these were to the West Coast. To the West Coast? Yes, sir. Would that be to the California ports? Yes, sir. All right, and then from the West Coast where? Back to the Gulf. Back to the Gulf? Uh-huh. Excuse me, we also had a voyage to Hawaii. A voyage to Hawaii? [136] A. Yes, sir. Q. Now can’t you give us your best estimate as to how much time was spent by those three vessels in traveling foreign, that is, from some port in the United States to some port in a foreign country? A. Ihaven’t tabulated it. Q. Well, can you give us your best estimate? A. Just off the top of my head I would say maybe fifteen percent of voyage time was in foreign voyages. Opopeoroaoroereore 124 Q. Does the ECLIPSE, the SS ECLIPSE sometimes go to Brownsville to pick up products for Providence, Rhode Island? A. Yes, sir. Q. This is a petroleum product, a component of asphalt? A. Yes, that’s correct. Wat is the source of that raw product, is it Mexico? A. Yes, itis Mexico. Q. How often does the ECLIPSE go to Brownsville to pick up this Mexican raw product to deliver up to Provi- dence? [137] A. Well, frequently, I would say at least once a month probabiy there is a cargo like that. . At least once a month. What is the duration of the trip that the ECLIPSE makes from Brownsville to Provi- dence? A. Well, that is a longer run, I would say that that probably is around an eighteen-day round trip at least. Q. Okay, now so far we have a situation where your typical run has a man in Beaumont, Texas twice a month from eighteen to thirty hours each time. but if we are going to go to the average that employee works we have to de- duct the LUBE which is on charter, we have to deduct the MOBIL POWER and we have to alter our figures for the ECLIPSE, don’t we? A. Yes, you want to make that sort of calculation you do. Q. Now let’s see, how do you pay these employees, do you pay them in cash at the end of the trip? A. Generally they are paid in cash for the period of time they are on the ship. Paid in cash by the Master. 125 Q. Do you pay them in cash because they are [138] sub- jectt o the Maritime Law and that is what is required for seamen or the seamen demand it? A. Yes, sir, if the seaman demands cash he must have cash. Q. Do you usually pay those men off in a northern port? A. Generally, yes, sir Q. That would be up in New York or Providence some- where? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you usually pay them every other trip? A. That is the general practice, yes, sir. Q. Incash? A. Yes, with one exception to that, if the employee would like to have a check sent to his bank or dependents, he can request that and the check will be sent to the extent that he receives the money by check, he doesn’t receive it in cash. Q. So then on your plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, which you identified under cash supplied, $1,994,000.00 let’s call that two million dollars, just for round figures, that’s close to two million dollars. That two million dollars [139] that you pay in cash in a northern port, you list it here as money paid in Texas, right? A. No, sir. Mr. Hambright: If it please the Court, that is not listed as money paid in Texas, it was developed on chief examina- tion that the money was picked up from the First Security Bank in Beaumont, in armored cars and taken and given to the Master aboard ship and so identified on direct testi- mony. 126 The Court: All right, you may make your objection, but it isn’t necessary for you to explain your objection. You object to the question that he asked the witness? Mr. Hambright: Yes, sir, because the question assumes what I interpret to be erroneous. The Court: The objection is overruled. This is cross examination. By Mr. Dixie: . In any event—I will rephrase it will be [140] better for you. Notwithstanding this Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, this particu- lar two million dollars in wages that we are talking about that is paid to the men in cash in Northern ports while they are working, correct? A. Substantially true, yes, sir. Q. Also Piaintiff’s Exhibit 3, as you told us, includes the salaries of licensed personnel and the Masters, is that correct? A. That’s correct, yes, sir. Q. We don’t know just what part of this exhibit really concerns wages paid to the employees involved in this law- suit, do we? A. That’s correct. Q. Now I want to ask you about Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 2. There are designated shipping ports that you have here. When a man goes to work for you, you require him to desig- nate Beaumont, New York, or Providence, a shipping port, is that right? A. Yes, sir, that is true. Q. And that means he can designate any port he wants to, regardless of where he lives? 127 1141] A. That's correct. Q. And the purpose of that designation is to give him his travel allowance, isn’t it? A. That’s correct. Q. Now do you have some of your employees that live in the State of California? A. Yes, sir, we do. Q. All right, now let us suppose that an employee who resides in California but works for Mobil has designated Beaumont as his designated shipping port and let us sup- pose he got off of the vessel at Tallahassee, Florida and he is going home, he goes home to California? A. Uh-huh. Q. Do you follow me so far? A. Yes, sir. 2. Then under this designated shipping port Mobil Oil will pay him transportation from Tallahassee, Florida to Beaumont, but not the rest of the way to California! A. That is correct, yes, sir. Q. Now if the man thinks he man make more money by designating Portsmouth or New York, he can do that, can’t he? 1142] A. Yes, sir. Q. Even though he is going to California? A. Yes, sir, that is true. Q. So that shipping port doesn’t tell us much about the man’s center of activities, does it? That just tells us where he got the— The Court: Just a minute. 128 Mr. Hambright: He isn’t giving the witness time to answer. The witness embarks on an answer and he starts on a new question. The Court: I don’t think counsel intends to interrupt him. We will sustain the objection, however, and let you start over. By Mr. Dixie: Q. Now as far as the residence of these men is con- cerned, what you have given us is the designation of resi- dence that they make on your records, have you not? A. Yes, sir. Q. You know some of the boys like to designate Texas as a residence so they don’t have to pay New York income tax, have you ever heard that? ; [143] A. It is a possibility, yes, sir. Q. Who is your immediate superior? A. Arthur E. Fisher. Q. What is Mr. Fisher’s title? A. He is manager, U. S. operations. Q. Of what department? A. Marine Transportation Department? Q. You are answerable to him for your conduct of these eight tankers? A. Yes, sir, I am. Q. This suit has been filed under the name of Mobil Oil Corporation, Marine Transportation Department, Gulf- East Coast Operations, you have already told us that you are the head man in the Gulf-East Coast Operations? A. That’s correct. 129 Q. And you are subject to Mr. Arthur E. Fisher, he is the head of the Marine Transportation Department, is that correct? A. No, sir. Q. What is he? A. He is head of U. S. Operations. Q. All right, who is Mr. Fisher’s superior? A. Henry J. Luck. [144] Q. L-u-c-k? A. Yes, sir. Q. What is his position? A. He is General Manager of Marine Transportation Department. Q. Is Mr. Arthur Fisher a part of the Marine Trans- portation Department? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right, so I gather that Gulf-East Coast Opera- tions is subject to the Marine Transportation Department, is that correct? A. Yes, sir, part of it. Q. And then in turn the Marine Transportation Depart- ment is subject to the corporate officers? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now in this suit you filed your complaint and you allege that Mobil Oil Corporation is a New York corpora- tion. Are you familiar with that? A. Am TI familiar that it is a New York corporation? Q. Yes. A. Yes, sir, I know it to be a New York corporation. 130 [145] Q. And then are the principal corporate officers headquarters in New York State? A. Yes, sir, they are. Q. And then are the principal officers of the Marine Transportation Department headquartered in New York State? A. The Marine Transportation Department? Q. Yes. A. Yes, sir. Q. They are. All right, now you have told us—let’s back up a minute. I believe you said that when you executed this contract, first on October 30, 1969, the execution was pre- ceded by a strike, is that correct? A. I don’t recall saying that, but there was a strike. Q. It was a six-month strike, was it not? A. No, sir. Q. How long was the strike? A. I believe seventy days. Q. Seventy days? A. Yes, sir. Q. And then preceding that seventy days did you nego- tiate for sixty days as required by the [146] Taft-Hartley Act? A. Ves, sir, I am sure we did. Q. And did you negotiate from time to time during the strike? A. Yes, sir. Q. How many negotiating sessions did you have? 131 A. I haven't the records, I would think thirty or forty, probably, you mean individual days! Q. Thirty or forty days? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was each and every one of those negotiating sessions conducted in New York City? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was any negotiations conducted in Texas? A. No, sir. Q. Why, if the head operation is down here in Texas, did you spend all of that time in New York, Mr. Knepper? A. That has been our pattern of relationship with this Union, primarily for the Union’s convenience. Q. Going back to 1942, hasn’t it? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right, and then, of course, you have [147] access to your corporate officers up there to advise with them when decisions are necessary, don’t you? We do have access to them, yes. So that is the reason you negotiate in New York. No, sir, it isn’t. What is the reason? Primarily for the convenience of the Union. Merely for the convenience of the Union you nego- tiate i in New York? A. Yes, sir. Q. Well, is the Union centered in New York? A. Yes, sir. OP oP er 152 Q. Why do you say that? A. Because they tell me that their main office is at Beekman Street in New York. | Q. Their main office in New York? A. Also the designation of their Local indicates that they are an East Coast Local and not a Gulf Local. Q. I wonder if you are familiar with the fact that this Union is certified to the Mobil Oil Corporation? [148] A. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that. Q. Not to the Gulf-East Coast Operations but to the Mobil Oil Corporation. You know that, don’t you? A. I know the wording of that, yes, sir. Q. And you know that this Union is certified by the New York office of the National Labor Relations Board, don’t you? A. Yes, sir, I know that. Q. That’s where the original elections were conducted, were they not? A. The original elections? Q. Yes. A. I doubt if they were conducted in New York. Q. Well, I mean that the office that supervised the elec- tion. A. I believe that’s probably true. Mr. Dixie: I offer in evidence Defendant’s Exhibit 1, which is the official certification. The Clerk: Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1. Mr. Dixie: I have exhibited that to counsel and we will offer that, [149] Your Honor. 133 The Court: All right, it will be accepted. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon it was marked Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for identification and received in evidence.) By Mr. Dixie: Q. We have already put in evidence the memorandum of understanding which you signed on October 30, 1969, at New York City. A. Uh-huh. Q. You remember that document? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you gentlemen up there made the contract effec- tive two days later, on November Ist, did yeu not? A. Yes, sir, uh-huh. Q. Correct? A. Yes. Q. That is provided the Union ratified it in the mean- time? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you started paying the wages on November [150] the Ist, 1969, did you not? A. That is correct, yes, sir. Q. When you came to sign this contrac: of November the 8th, 1969, you were already paying the increased wages, were you not? A. That is true, yes, sir. Q. Isn’t that then a situation that the signing that you made in Beaumont was a formality to put everything in tidy ——- ord r and your contract was effective upon ratification following October 30th, isn’t that the situation? 134 Mr. Hambright: We object, if it please the Court. I think he stated two questions in one. He said de you do it, do you put it in the form of tidiness——— The Court: I believe this witness might be able to. Mr. Dixie: Well, let’s get it this way. Q. Since your contract, since the contract was signed in New York, ratified and put in effect on November 1, 1969, does that mean that you considered you had a binding con- tract with the Union [151] as of that date and time? A. Yes, sir, I thought we had a binding meeting of the minds. Q. And the formal signing that took place on November the 18th, that was just to put everything in ship-shape order as a signed document, wasn’t it? A. More than just ship-shape order, I didn’t feel com- fortable until I had the agreement, meeting of the minds reduced to writing until I had that document sgined. Q. Oh, Mr. Knepper, I have a copy of this other docu- ment. You recognize this as your memorandum of under- standing executed on October the 30th? A. Yes, sir, this is basically the substance of the agree- ment, yes, sir. Q. I believe you told us when Mr. Perrio came in to sign it in November, his business was to proof-read the contract, is that right? A. Yes, sir. Q. That was to make sure that the final document said exactly what you signed in New York, correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now I will take the liberty to call the Court’s atten- tion to the fact that there is a decision [152] that I am fa- — — 135 miliar with because it cost my clients $20,000.00 to think otherwise. CCI Corporation vs. Steel Workers Union, by the Tenth Cirevit that says that the contract is effective in the labor situation upon ratification by the Union and the Union was not free to engage in striking after that, which they did to their sorrow. [153] I will give the Court that citation before we termi- nate the trial. Mr. Hambright: May it please the Court, on this point of ratification— The Court: I think this evidence is offered, I presume for the purpose of showing that the contract is duly consum- mated somewhere other than Beaumont, is that the purpose? Mr. Dixie: Yes, sir. The Court: All right. By Mr. Dixie: Q. Mr. Knepper, you had a habit of having periodic meetings with the Union to discuss your mutual business, did you not? A. Yes, sir, for a period of time we did that, yes. Q. Were those quarterly meetings? A. Yes, sir, roughly on the quarterly schedule. Q. All right, four times a year? A. Yes, sir. Q. How many years have those meetings been going on? A. I don’t really know, I think my predecessor [154] conducted such meetings and we conducted them during the first two years of this current contract and then we discon- tinued them. Q. All right, where did those meetings take place? 136 New York. All of them? Yes, sir. All of them in New York? Yes. Again, for convenience of the Union. How many arbitration cases have you had I believe there have been six while I have been man- ‘POP OO © 8 5 While you have been manager! Les. Have they all been conducted in New York? Yes, sir. Q. Have you checked arbitration cases before the six you had? A. Yes, sir, I have a listing up to nine from 1966. Before that I don’t know. Q. Were they all conducted in New York City? Pr OP © A. Yes, sir. Q. Why? [155] A. Because our agreement calls for them to be done under the auspices of the Triple A, and we had a pat- tern in the past of using Triple A, and that’s why we con- tinued. Q. You are surely not telling the Court that the Triple A causes you to arbitrate in New York? A. No, I am just saying that is the pattern we estab- lished and that’s why we go to the Triple A office. Q. I want to show you a letter dated July 19, 1971, to 137 the American Arbitration Association and ask you whether or not you sent such a letter? A. Yes, sir, I did. Q. Since it is only three lines long, would you please read it to the Court? A. Yes, sir. This says: “Gentlemen, in response to your letter of July 16, 1971, we designate New York City as our choice of locale for the arbitration hearings and appoint- ment of Mr. W. M. Gage as company arbitrator.“ Q. Have you sent that type of letter each time that you had an arbitration to hear? A. I don’t believe every time, no, sir. Q. I notice you say that it is the company’s [156] choice of locale to arbitrate in New York. Is there some reason why you say that in your letter? A. I suppose it is convenient for us to use. Q. Is it true? A. Yes, we chose, we weren’t dragged there. Q. Speaking of the convenience of the Union, when you had your quarterly meetings in New York did you pay transportation of Union officers to go up there? A. Yes, sir, we did. Q. Did you pay them lost time while they were in New York? A. Lost time? Yes, from their work. We paid their wages, yes, sir. You paid their wages? PrP OP © Yes, sir. 138 Q. So the company transported the Union Committee to New York and paid their wages? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you say you do that for the convenience of the Union? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now let’s talk about your grievance procedure. The contract contains a grievance and arbitration [157] proce- dure, does it not? A. Yes, sir. Q. Does it provide for a first step? A. Yes, sir. Q. Does it provide that the complaint of the man will be presented to his immediate superior? A. It does, yes, sir. Q. That would be either the Boatswain or the First Assistant Engineer or the Steward, is that correct? A. That’s correct, yes, sir. This is all done aboard ship? All people are aboard ship. On high seas? Or in port. Does it have a second step? Yes, sir. O r r r & And then what does the second step consist of! A. Well, then the second step is, failing at the first step, the dispute is then referred to the department head. Q. Is that aboard ship? 139 A. Yes, sir. [158] Q. So the second step would take it up one step either to the Chief Mate or Chief Engineer, correct? A. That’s correct. Where does the third step go? The third step goes to the Master of the vessel. All right, to the Master of the vessel? Yes, sir. Q. And that would be on the high seas if that’s where they happen to be? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where does the fourth step go? A. The fourth step is the Marine Superintendent or the Superintendent of Marine Maintenance and Engineering. 0 2 Q. The Marine Superintendent where? A. In Beaumont, Texas. Q. All right, now does that mean you only have one Marine Superintendent? A. That’s correct, yes, sir. Q. How is the matter presented to him? A. Usually verbally. Q. Verbally? [159] A. Yes. Q. By whom? A. Usually by some Union officer that is ashore. Q. Then the fifth step consists of writing a letter, is that correct? 140 A. Well, in the practice it consists of presenting me with a form, a grievance form with details of what has happened on all of the procedures. Q. The fifth step consists of them giving you a form properly filled out, showing what the grievance is about? A. Yes, presenting the grievance to me with a written form, yes, sir. Q. Now the contract doesn’t provide for any meeting in Beaumont after the formal grievance is presented, does it? A. No, that is the fifth step. Q. Then the next thing that happens is you go to New York to arbitrate? A. Or we settle the grievance. Q. Now you told us, you told the Court that you had as many as twenty hearings conducted on [160] grievances in Beaumont, Texas, and did I understand you right about that? A. I think what I said is that we had, I estimated that we may have had twenty written grievances at the fifth level in Beaumont. Q. Well— A. Some of which were presented personally by the Union officer that is located in Beaumont, and some come by mail to us from the New York office. Q. Some in person and some by mail. When you said twenty hearings you were including the receipt of mail, is that correct? A. I don c believe I said twenty meetings, hearings. Q. Didn’t you say twenty? A. I think I said probably twenty grievances at the fifth level. 141 Q. I am glad to be straightened out, but I understood you tu say that you had twenty hearings and only four of them went to arbitration, from which I assumed that you got sixteen settlements in Beaumont after a hearing and only four of them had to be tried. Is that not correct? {161} A. Yes, sir, that is basically right. Q. Well, if you had twenty hearings you ought to be able to give us the number of the grievances where you had such hearings, can you? A. No, sir, I can’t without going to my files and digging them out. Q. Did you keep minutes of those hearings? A. We kept memos and usually give a written reply to the grievance. Q. Do you keep minutes of hearings of the kind you are talking about? A. Well, I don’t know what you are talking about or what you mean by hearings. We don’t have a formal hear- ing procedure. Q. Well, isn’t it a fact, Mr. Knepper, that there are no formal hearings conducted in Beaumont under this griev- ance procedure at all, isn’t that a fact, no formal hearings? A. Well, I am at a loss as to what you mean by formal hearings. I meet with Mr. Perrio or whoever is in Beaumont, we sit down in my office and we discuss grievances. If this is an informal hearing perhaps. Q. Are you testifying that you had twenty meet-[162] ings with Mr. Perrio to settle formal grievances? A. Yes, sir, I would say approximately that, yes. Q. What is that? 142 A. 1 say approximately that number, I can’t say spe- cifically. Q. Do you have minutes of those you can show us? A. We would have some, we wouldn’t have complete minutes, we would have notes and memoranda data and so forth. Q. I would like to ask you to produce those between now and tomorrow, if we are still going tomorrow, because I would like to see what they are, if you please, Mr. Knep- per. A. Yes. Q. Now, if I understand your testimony right, about your arguments with the Union, you wrote them a letter in the spring of 1970, in which you told them that the clause was illegal and you told them how you were going to do things after that and you did do them that way after that, is that correct? A. That is true, yes, sir. Q. The Union never filed a grievance about that [163] with you, did they? A. No, sir. Or bring any suit against you? No, sir. Or make any written reply? No, sir. Is that right? No, sir. Q. Then about a year and a half later the Union sent a letter to its membership, correct? A. That is correct, yes, sir. - OO 143 Q. How did you get the letter? A. I don’t recall. Those letters often turn up on my desk. Q. Well, is it customary for the company to snoop around to find out what the Union is writing to its members about? A. If we see a Union paper we always pick it up and read it. It is not a confidential document. Q. So you got the letter by going and finding it and picking it up? A. Yes, sir. Q. The Union wasn’t talking to you at all, the [164] Union was talking to its members, wasn’t it? A. Yes, sir. . Its members had already joined the Union, hadn’t it? A. I don't know if they were members. Q. If they were members they already belonged to the Union, is that right? A. Well— = Mr. Hambright: We object to that question, the witness has testified he doesn’t know who is a member and who isn’t a member in all cases. The Court: I think it is pretty argumentative, Mr. Dixie. By Mr. Dixie: Q. All right. Anyway, you picked up the Union letter and that’s what brought on this lawsuit? A. Yes, sir. Q. In your discussions with the Union did you take the position that this clause was illegal in its entirety applied to any covered employee? 144 A. Yes, sir. Q. In other words, you told the Union that you 165 were advised by counsel that this agency shop clause is il legal as to any employee, even if that employee signed on in New Vork, and even if that employee never came to Texas, it was still illegal as to all of them. Mr. Hambright: We object, Your Honor, on the grounds that proof shows that there is no employee in that hypo- thetical status, that they all come to Texas, and some of them more than others. The Court: I think the question is probably improper. The objection will be sustained. By Mr. Dixie: | Q. I just want to establish the point that it was your position that the thing is illegal as applied to everybody of new employees, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Your position was it was illegal as applied to a resi- dent of New York State? A. Yes, sir. . Is that correct? [166] A. Yes, sir. Q. All right, you never did get down to any discussion with the Union as to whether or not it was illegal as to some employees and illegal as to other employees, did you? A. No, sir. Q. That wasn’t a part of your argument at all, right? A. Yes. The Court: This is duplicity, he has already answered the question once. I think we can shorten it a little bit, Mr. Dixie. 145 Mr. Dixie: All right, Your Honor. I am almost through, Your Honor. The Court: Just as a matter of inquiry, however, is the issue for the Court to decide whether or not the contract may be invalid as to some employees, all employees or any employees, or if it was, if it is invalid to any employees would it be—would it be an enforceable provision of the contract? I am asking you, Mr. [167] Dixie? Mr. Dixie: Well, Your Honor. The Court: In other words, you are asking him the ques- tion if it is applied to residents of New York, but if it applies to anyone, which would be a resident of Texas, of course, but if it is invalid as to anyone is it an enforceable provision? Mr. Dixie: Well, I think it is to the extent that it is valid and we have some Labor Board decisions in the summary judgment papers where the Labor Board, twenty-five years ago in a trucking situation said that it is legal as to these people but not legal as to these people. But the main point I want to say to the Court is that these parties have had no case or controversy touching the question of whether or not it is legal as to any specific employee and thereby to get the Court in a position where you are to render an advisory opinion about [168] some imaginary person that hasn’t come up yet and when we get in to that we run righi square into the teeth of what the courts are not supposed to do. The Court: I am not too sure about that. I mean I may—I am not too sure as to what the Court is supposed to do. That I am pretty sure about, but it seems to me that the issue rather than whether this is a Texas contract or whether it is a New York contract or some other contract from some other state, it is applicable to residents of Texas and do we not have to apply the Texas law. That is the point that sticks out in my mind. Now I don’t think the Court has to decide or I hope the Court does not have to 146 decide whether this is a Texas contract or whether it is a New York contract or whether it is a contract of some other state. But, wherever the contract is consummated [169] or finalized, if it is applicable to residents in Texas, is it not the responsibility of the Court to interpret the Texas law? Mr. Dixie: Well, the Court will have to cross several bridges to come to that result but— The Court: I just wanted your reaction to that and we will cross those bridges as we get to them. Mr. Dixie: But the point about that is this controversy has never isolated the question that you are now isolating. This complaint and these distinguished lawyers say that it is invalid in its entirety as applied to anybody. That’s all that they have ever said. The Court: That’s because it is a Texas contract? Mr. Dixie: I don’t know why they think it. The Court: Well, we will have to find out. We will have to find out, [171] but I don’t know. We will proceed on and maybe it will unravel as we get further into the trial. Mr. Dixie: Very well. I am almost through with this witness, if the Court will indulge me just a minute. The Court: All right. By Mr. Dixie: Q. Do these tankers each have a home port? A. Les, r. Q. Are they registered under the requirements of the Maritime Statute of the United States? A. Yes, sir, they are. Q. In what ports are these vessels registered? A. Some in Wilmington, Delaware, and some in New York City. 147 Q. Are any of them registered in the State of Texas? A. Not tomy knowledge, no. Q. Does Mobil Oil Corporation operate vessels other than the ones that are under your jurisdiction? A. Yes, sir. Q. And where are they, where do they operate? 172 A. Well, Mobil has a West Coast fleet, they have inland fleets of tugs and barges and small coastal tankers, they have an extensive foreign flag fleet. Q. All right, now are all of those under the jurisdiction of the so-called Marine Transportation Department? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Dixie: I pass the witness. The Court: Anything further, Mr. Hambright? Mr. Hambright: Yes, sir, I have some more questions. REDIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Hambright: Q. Mr. Knepper, let’s go back to New York on the mem- orandum signing day, when you wrote out those two sheets of handwriting, I believe this is October 30, 1969, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. I believe you have identified the second paragraph in there as stating that the labor agreement would become effective upon ratification [173] by the Union membership, is this correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now at the time you signed that handwritten memo- randum there had been no such ratification, had there? 148 A. No, not at that time, no, sir. Q. Now you told Mr. Dixie that you had a meeting of the minds as to the contents of these work sheets, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know as a man in your position, as manager of this corporation, of this organization, that very often labor contracts are agreed upon by the negotiators and then not ratified by the membership? A. Yes, sir, that happens. Q. And you have heard of that happening? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you know as a fact that-when that happens it goes back to the bargaining table? A. That’s correct, yes. Q. And the clauses and provisions might receive con- siderable changes and adjustments, is that correct? [174] A. I would think that would happen, yes, sir. Q. This labor contract we are talking about has a lot more in there beyond just the agency shop clause, does it not? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do vou count or do you know that it might have going over one hundred paragraphs and provisions? A. Yes, sir. Q. And had there been a non-ratification can you state as a fact that it would have been necessary to take up the pieces and negotiate some more? A. Yes, sir, that is true. 149 The Court: Where would you have to go to do the nego- tiating? I think that is important. Mr. Hambright: Could you have negotiated any last- minute changes in your office in Beaumont, as well as in New York? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you testify that you are now asking the Union to meet you here in Beaumont? A. Yes, sir. 1175] Mr. Hambright: Would the Court give us just one or two minutes, maybe we will be able to— The Court: Yes, I probably will give you until 9:30 in the morning. Is it the plaintiff’s contention that this is a Texas con- tract? Is their cause of action predicated upon this being a Texas contract? Mr. Dixie: Would the Court give me thirty seconds on that? The Court: I think you can think about that in the morn- ing and I would like to hear a little argument from both of you in the morning about this. It looks to me like this is the real meat in the lawsuit, the real basis for the lawsuit. If you contend that this is a Texas Contract, then I think your facts are a little light. If it isn’t necessary, then we might be able to proceed further, but you can tell me, give me the answer to that question in the morning. ]176{[ Mr. Hambright: Well, excuse me, Your Honor. The Court: That’s all I have to say. Mr. Hambright: I was just going to get the copy of the Taft-Hartley Section 14b, that I referred to this morning, it is our contention that if this contract was executed in Texas, then clearly it is in violation of the agency shop clause category. 150 The Court: I think that would be probably correct. Mr. Hambright: Which would be one hundred percent as to all these employees. On the other hand, if it is not exe- cuted in Texas, but is applied in Texas, then under the Taft-Hartley Act, Section 14b, likewise, it is void as to all employees if it receives application in the State of Texas, so that the need only be executed or applied. The Court: The exclusive applica- [177] tion in Texas? Mr. Hambright: No, sir, I do not think it has to be exclu- sive, but we come back to the time sequence. It is always receiving application in Texas, every day of the calendar, according to this witness. In view of the close ties to Texas, and actually the company, the organization appearing as the contracting party, the employer in that labor contract, is headquartered here in Beaumont, Pexas. I don’t think there is any doubt of that and there may be ships coming in and going but in a way it would be similar to an Ama- rillo company that had some shoe salesmen that went to Oklahoma a great bit of their time, still it is a Texas em- plover and the company is here all the time, the money is being handled heve, the payroll records are here, the unem- ployment insurance is here, and there is someone always in Texas subscribing to the contract, such as [178] these various vacationing people or people on ships or on standby or this sort of thing. So we are saying that if our proof does not satisfy the Court that the contract was executed in Texas, in view of this double ceremony of whatever they to call it, notice after ratification, still it was and is applied in Texas every day and receiving application here right along. The Court: Application might save you. In all sincerity, I don’t believe the Court could find that the contract is consummated in Texas. I think the contract was reached in New York. It may be finalized here, but again, according to the decision Mr. Dixie quoted there, that is more of a procedural aspect rather than substance. 151 Now if the application of it will bring into force the Texas law, then you may have some basis for your [179] lawsuit, but I think I would have to find that the contract was a New York contract. Of course, as a matter of infor- mation, I don’t—is the situation such that those who negoti- ated this contract for the plaintiff did not know that it was in violation of the Right-to-Work Law in Texas? Mr. Hambright: Yes, sir, that is correct. The Court: They did not know? Mr. Hambright: Yes, sir, the notification sent by Mr. Knepper to the other Union with the other contracts, I have seen that letter and it states that the company was acting in ignorance of the Texas law. The Court: And I suppose it doesn’t violate the New York law? Mr. Hambright: Yes, sir, that is correct, and there, of course, are other states involved, some with Right-to-Work laws, most of the southern states with them and most of the northern [180] states without them. The Court: Then we would get down to the question of whether or not the application in Texas would bring into effect the Texas law. Mr. Hambright: Yes, sir, that’s what we contend to be the constant, everyday application in the State of Texas, it is a Texas employer, the same as Mobil Refinery out here. We can show the Court, the Court will take judicial notice, I think, that after fifty years of the operation of this re- finery that it too is owned by Mobil Oil Corporation in New York City, but it nevertheless has labor contracts with OCAW Locals that are signed much like Mr. Knepper’s contract. It will say ‘‘Beaumont Refinery’’ above the Mobi! Oil Corporation. The Court: With headquarters in New York? 152 Mr. Hambright: The corporate headquarters are in New York, Your [181] Honor, but the operating divisions run the refinery and I think the analogy is very apt is very apt because no one would question that the Beaumont Refinery is not a Texas employer for the purposes of these provi- sions, having been before Your Honor as plaintiff and de- fendant in many lawsuits down here in Beaumont. The Mobil Refinery out there. So, we think— The Court: It wasn’t an employer to the extent of ne- gotiating a contract in Beaumont, they had to go to New York to negotiate the contract? Mr. Hambright: In this particular case prior to 1962 the operations that are now in Texas were conducted elsewhere and they developed this pattern and they—they have, labor relations change a little slower than the day-to-day logistic change, I am afraid, and so they have authority to negoti- ate but they have moved their business here and it was done. And I want the Court [182] to understand ten years ago, long before anyone knew that this controversy would arise and the East Coast operations were brought here in ’62, and this all began as a Texas employer at that time. And this was done without any intention of motive one way or the other in respect to the Texas Right-to-Work Law. The Court: But it is obvious that the parties at the time they negotiated this contract, that they didn’t intend to be affected by Texas law. Mr. Dixie: Your Honor, we have the section 11, I believe it is in there, which acknowledges that the contract may be invalid and it says in effect that if it should be held to be in part invalid the other one hundred percent section would go ahead. The Court: I understand that, but this would be a matter that would be so obvious to a Texas lawyer, that [183] would know anything about labor relations, labor law. Mr. Hambright: Judge, I have to tell the Court to my knowledge no Texas lawyers participated in that. 153 The Court: But if they intended for such law to apply, they would have to fix a law to apply— Mr. Hambright: I think they were subject to the lawyer and this law department, it determined that upon being presented with this finished product but I think— The Court: Well, we will get down to this proposition. The Court in all fairness, I can’t conclude that this is any- thing other than a New York contract, not a Texas con- tract. May even been consummated in New York, but it is applicable in Texas, and because of its applicability it would bring the Texas law into effect and cause the Texas law to apply then. Then I am willing to go forward with the trial [184] and let you pursue your remedy from that stand- point. I will be happy to hear from counsel early tomorrow morning in regards to the matter. In other words, Mr. Dixie, if you disagree with counsel to the effect that you do not think that Texas law would apply, even though the de- tails of the operation and so forth come through the Beau- mont office, then you can be prepared to present argument in behalf of your position in the morning. We will stand in recess until 9:30. The Marshal: Everyone rise, please. Reporter’s Note: Whereupon the Noon recess was taken and Court resumed on 6-27-72.) [185] MORNING SESSION The Court: Please be seated. We are ready to proceed. I think the proper procedure under these circumstances will be for both parties to offer such evidence as you wish to offer, after that why we will permit you to argue the case. So you may proceed, Mr. Hambright. Mr. Hambright: I would like to advise that Mr. Tucker’s absence is occasioned by the fact that he is in Dallas, at- tending the funeral of his wife’s brother-in-law, who was on that plane that crashed in New Mexico with those geolo- gists the other day. 154 The Court: I heard about that last night and I am sorry to hear it. Mr. Hambright: If it please the Court, we are prepared to go forward with Mr. Knepper without arguing the case on the merits, I did have a statement of position that I understood may [186] be helpful to the Court and the other parties, and if the Court would prefer, we will defer that but— The Court: It doesn’t matter, it may be just as well for you to go ahead and state your position. Mr. Hambright: Thank you, Your Honor. It necessarily requires a reference to an authority or two that Mr. Dixie mentioned about two that we have, but basically it is not a full discussion of the authorities by any means. I will state our position. Yesterday the Court inquired as to our opin- ion about this case. Given the proposition that the Court was not persuaded that this contract was executed in Texas, and from that point onward I would like to briefly give our position on those circumstances. It is the position of the plaintiff that regardless of the place of execution of this labor contract, contract provisions that are violative of the [187] Texas Public policy will not be enforced in the State of Texas. Now this is our basic position in the case. We did allege and plead the execution in Texas because of the dou- ble execution the Court is now familiar with. This was put in there as showing not only the place of execution but the place where the contract was applied and without re-open- ing that question and bearing in mind the Court’s an- nouncement of his feelings on that I would like to say that the fact that they did meet in Beaumont and approve, read it, if you will, and straighten out the things and it is printed in Beaumont independently of the place of execution, this is evidence, we think, that the contract was applied in Texas. It was meant to be applied here because this is where they came to do these things. This is where they came to proof- read it and print it and all the company officials signed it 155 here. So laying aside entirely the legal concept of where it was executed, [188] nevertheless we would urge the Court that this is the very strongest evidence that it was meant to be appiied here because this is where they came to do the deed and get it circulated and get it signed by the company officials and put it in final form. But turning now to the basic inquiry of the case, as we stated yesterday the Taft-Hart- ley Act in 14b speaks in terms of where a contract is ex- ecuted or applied and they used the disjunctive word ‘‘or’’, and we would like to advise the Court as late as May of this year the Government itself through its highest office of making announcements of the construction of these things to guide National Labor Relations Board field offices around the company made a determination reinforcing what I have just told the Court, and without going into this in any length, I would just advise the Court that the gen- eral counsel for the [189] NLRB in his May 30, 1972 quar- terly report of important case developments, members of the Labor Board, which I am sure Mr. Dixie has or I will make available to him, discussed the situation where a com- pany and the Union got in a fuss because they were bargain- ing for a contract and the Union insisted on a agency shop clause being put in there and the company said you can’t do that because it violates the State law, and the Union persisted, so the company filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union and the General Counsel for the N.L.R.B. was called upon to pass on the matter and he stated that the United States Supreme Court in the Shim- merhorn case holds that an agency shop clause does vio- late the State Right-to-Work law and it is properly pro- hibited by a state and I would like to read one sentence out of that: In a case before the General Counsel the highest [190] state court had not ruled on the illegality on the agency shop clause under the State Right-to-Work Law having declined to do so in the one case which this issue reached the Court, but the State Trial Court and the State Attorney General had both construed the law to include the agency shop clause as the prescribed form of Union 156 security and these opinions in the absence of disagreements from the state Supreme Court were viewed establishing that the state law prescribed the execution or enforcement of an agency shop agreement. I think that is important to us in several respects. The Court is aware that the Attor- ney General of Texas has so held. The opinion is in evi- dence and I have a communication from the Attorney Gen- eral’s office dated this year advising that that opinion is still in force and effect. This shows that the Government itself [191] acknowledges the validity of these and also the point I am addressing myself to is the prefaces that it is either the execution or enforcement of this labor contract within the borders of the state and so, again, in our case here it is our position that regardless if they had executed it in New Jersey or Arkansas or anywhere, if it is to be applied here and if it violates the public policy of the State of Texas, it should not be enforced here and this is recog- nized by the Government itself. Now in the case Mr. Dixie mentioned to Your Honor yesterday, the Mustang Aviation case about the extra-territorial effect of the Texas law, we think that is begging the question. It speaks of extra-terri- torial effect and this is not present in our case here. We would submit, for instance, in the Mustang Aviation case a man from Texas went up to Colorado and was killed in an air- [192] plane crash and the Supreme Court of Texas held that our Wrongful Death Statute does not have extra- territorial force, and that is acknowledged to be so and yet the Court went right on to say in headnote 2 of the opin- ion that this statute, this Texas Wrongful Death Statute, was intended to take care of the rights of a Texas citizen wherever he might die and wherever he might go and a cause of action arise. They pointed out that the legislature has vested rights in the Texas citizen and so in the case I think that is important for two reasons. First, it shows that Texas citizens are entitled to protection of the law, Texas residents, wherever they might go, but in our case bring it down to the Court’s remarks yesterday, the extra- territorial effect, where is this contract being applied, and I 157 think the truth the Court has heard heretofore establishes that the employees under this labor contract [193] are actually within the State of Texas, physically located here, frequently and repetitively. They all come here from time to time, some of them more than others. The proof shows that sixty percent of them were actually hired within the State of Texas. The active hiring took place here. The proof shows that one hundred percent of them, if their employment is severed, will be terminated in the State of Texas. One hundred percent of them will be actually ter- minated in the State of Texas when their employment is ultimately terminated, whether its because of retirement or what-have-you, the deed is done here in Beaumont, Texas. The proof shows that the employer’s manager and all of his staff in all of the departments are here, they live in the City of Beaumont, and they have a building out here where they conduct the business. Vacation payment, the checks are issued [194] here, the allotment checks are issued in Dallas, the U.S. income tax on every man is computed in Texas and handled in Texas, financial dealings totaling millions of dollars are done here, and this goes to the con- tention of Mr. Dixie that we are trying to apply a Texas statute in the extra-territorial manner and the point, our contention is that that is not correct because of the vast amount of business that is done here, particularly in the field of labor relations, as well as provisioning of the ships and taking care of the needs and physical needs of the business itself. Now we have shown also— The Court: I don’t think you need to emphasize the in- volvement of Texas in this operation. I don’t think you need to do that. I think the Court would have to make that finding. Mr. Hambright: Yes, sir. [195] The Court: You may Mr. Hambright: Well, may I advise the Court of one other statute? 158 The Court: The only question I had was the matter of application and you have explained it sufficiently to the Court, and I am willing to go ahead and proceed with the trial. In fact, I had already made up my mind to do so anyway, and I don’t want to curtail counsel in his argu- ment, I think there will be time for that at the conclusion of the evidence. Now since you have made your statement, in fairness to Mr. Dixie I think we should give him a chance if he wishes to. Frankly, I don’t know how you can en- lighten the Court any more at this time, it might be because I think we ought to go ahead with the evidence. Mr. Dixie: I think so. The Court: Then you may make your arguments later. Mr. Hambright: Thank you, Your [196] Honor. The Court: All right, you may proceed. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon Mr. Knepper resumed the witness stand.) REDIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Hambright : Q. Mr. Knepper, do you know whether or not this labor contract contains what is called a dues check-off clause? A. Yes, sir, it does. Q. Inessence what does this clause say? A. It provides that an employee who wishes to can notify the company through a prescribed form that he would like his initiation fee or Union dues deducted from his pay and forwarded to the Union. It also has annual escape clauses in it. . Does it have a form that the employee has to sign? A. Yes, sir, the form is prescribed in the agreement, labor contract. 159 Q. What page is that on, do you recall? [197] A. If I had an agreement I could find it for you. I don’t: have one in my hand. Q. Here is one, sir. A. On page 3 the format is given for the dues check-off letter. Q. All right, sir, does this authorization run from the employee to his employer? A. Yes, sir, it prescribes that it be addressed to Mobi! Oil Corporation Marine Transportation Department, Gulf East Coast Operations, P.O. Box 3444, Beaumont, Texas, 77704. Q. Are these dues check-offs sent to you here in Beau- mont by the employees? A. Yes, sir, we have a considerable number of them. Q. Do you have there after computed the monthly amount of money that you must send to the Union? A. Yes, sir, that is done. Q. Is that done by your office in Beaumont, Texas? A. Yes, sir, Mr. Shanigan’s personnel section. Q. All right, sir, do you then notify the Union of the correct amount and make payment to the Union? [198] A. Yes, sir, we prepare a letter to the Union and tell them what men are covered and what new additions there are and what releases. The Clerk: Plaintiff’s Exhibit 14. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon it was marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit 14 for identification. ) A. We send that letter along with an authorization to our Dallas payroll office to send the Union the proper 160 amount of money with a check, a check with a letter. Mr. Hambright: Your Honor, may I show this to counsel before the witness, the copies are not legible but he has the original in his file. The Court: All right. By Mr. Hambright: . Mr. Knepper, I show you what has been marked as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 14, with two sheets, will you tell us what that is? A. Well, the first sheet is also from my office over my signature to our payroll people in Dallas, and the topic is O-CAW dues. It instructs [199] them to draw a check on a certain amount, payable to the Local Union and mail it in with the letter which I am furnishing you in the envelope. Q. What is the date of that letter, please, sir? A. This is August 3rd, 1971, but this is typical of the letter that goes every month. Q. You do that every month? A. Yes, sir. Q. Allright, sir, how much is the amount of money? A. It says please draw a check in the amount of $2,253.00. Q. All right, and do I understand you to say that you sent this to Dallas and told them to draw the check in Dallas, and mail it to the Union. A. That is correct. Q. All right, on the second page of that exhibit what are those computations there appearing in that letter to the Local? A. Well, this is a letter to the Local which would ac- company the check. It says: ‘‘Enclosed is our check for 161 62,253.00“, and that it represents dues and initiation fees for all OCAW [200] members with authorized dues dedue- tions in force on January 1, 1971, and it tabulates how many members there were at $8.00, and how many initiation fees at $15.00, and what the total is and then we go on and tell them who the new people are on the list and also which names are deleted. Q. Is all of this body of work done in your office? A. Yes, sir. Q. It is done each month? A. It is monthly, yes. Q. Would you say that this two thousand some odd dollar sum is or is not fairly representative of the amount of money that goes off each month to the Union? A. Yes, sir, it is typical. Q. Typical? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right, sir. Thank you. Mr. Hambright: We offer as Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 14 this, Your Honor. The Court: All right. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon [201] Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 14 was received in evidence.) By Mr. Hambright : Q. Mr. Knepper, is this the only point of contact be- tween your company and the Union financial matters of this sort, your office in Beaumont, Texas? A. Yes, sir, this isn’t done anywhere else. Mr. Hambright: Mark that as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15. The Clerk: Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 15. 162 (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon it was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 15 for identification.) By Mr. Hambright: Q. I hand you what has been previously marked as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15. Would you identify that, please, sir? A. This is a photograph of the building in which my offices are located in Beaumont. Mr. Hambright: May we have this admitted, Your Honor, would you hand that up? The Court: Yes. [202] (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 15 was received in evidence. ) By Mr. Hambright: Q. Now, Mr. Knepper, yesterday Mr. Dixie asked you to give him some identification on a number of fifth level grievances that were handled in your office in Beaumont, Texas, do you recall that? A. Yes, sir, I do, sir. Q. Do you recall the estimate of the number of such occurrences that you gave Mr. Dixie, what number did you give Mr. Dixie yesterday as the approximate number of grievances that have been so handled? A. Well, I believe in response to your question, sir, I said about twenty. Q. All right, sir, you told Mr. Dixie about twenty and he asked you some identification and you promised to look into it? A. Yes. Q. All right, sir, have you looked into it and do you wish to change the number or clarify that number? A. Yes, sir, we have gone through our grievance 203 ~ 163 file and I find that during the course of this agreement to date we have had 26 formal fifth level grievances presented to my office in Beaumont. In addition we have had three let- ters which are not on a grievance form which I would con- sider fifth level grievances. Q. All right, sir, now, in addition to that I will ask you whether or not right after this contract was first placed into effect and before any actual number of grievances had risen you had an occasion to meet with Union representa- tives in your office in Beaumont, Texas, to discuss the ad- ministration of the labor contract? A. Yes, sir, that is true. Q. I will ask you if you have in your possession any type of personal notes or scratch sheets or whatever you might call it? | A. There is a number of notes in our grievance file. As I say, as I said to Mr. Dixie yesterday, we don’t keep for- mal minutes of the formal meetings, often we transcribe the notes after the proper action has been taken. I did find one that was dated in December of 1969. Q. All right, sir, would you please refer to [204] your notes of the December, 1969 meeting, when you find that? A. Yes, sir, I have a Xerox copy of a memorandum that I wrote in longhand. Do you want me to describe it? Q. Just let me ask you these questions and it might shorten it. What is the date of the meeting? A. This is dated December 12, 1969. Q. At that time your new labor contract had been in force approximately how long! A. A month and twelve days, I suppose. Q. Allright, sir, who was present at that meeting? A. The meeting, my notes show I met there with John Perrio and L. A. Papich in my office. 164 And is that Mr. Perrio who was served in this case as President of the Union? A. Yes, sir. Q. Mr. Papich is your— A. Maintenance superintendent. Q. All right, sir, would you tell the Court in your own words what was the subject matter of some of the high- lights of that meeting? [205] A. These notes are fragmentary, but I can recon- struct some of the things. One note says Siofic not paid for Labor Day overtime for 0000 to 1500 when strike began. Agreed to investigate. Then I have a note of overtime is payable and then another note personnel section. So I evi- dently advised the personnel section that they should take care of this matter. Q. Did this involve a dispute between the Union and the company as to the proper manner of payment of this individual or at least a dispute against vour hands? A. Yes, sir, I think it would be a dispute that would be a grievance if they hadn’t settled it at that time. Q. Did you make the decision? A. Icertainly did, yes, sir. Q. Did you talk about others at that meeting? A. Yes, there was also a note that said Siofic requested longshore rate for offloading cargo and my note after that says refused and the note out in the margin says no action required. This evidently is one that the Union didn’t care to carry further because I don’t find any records [206] of a formal grievance coming out of this one. Q. So I take it then that the last one was settled in the Union’s favor and that one was settled in the company’s favor? Is this a fair statement or have I oversimplified it? 165 A. No, I think this is correct. Q. Did you do any other business that day? A. I have a note here that says that S - fire and boat drill held on — — — those off duty. Agreed payable. This was a new clause in our new agreement which evidently wasn’t clearly under- stood by the officers on the ship that implemented griev- ances, implemented the contract, at least on a fifth level and so I have a note here, it says agreed payable. I also have a note L.A.P. discussed it with Master. This would be a case where I agreed that they had interpreted the con- tract correctly that we would pay the people and also that we inst i —— * our supervisors that they should comport them- Q. Do I understand that those initi Papicht | ose initials refer to Mr. A. Yes, sir. 207] Q. Do I interpret that that i you told him to tell th Master on the tankers henceforth to pay in —— with the rulings you made? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now this business of a fire drill or boat drill, is it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And the question is what ha i ppens if that on Saturday, is that it, when some people are off — A. Yes, sir. Q. Would you tell me if this mat over a chip might be sailing st theme? A. Yes, sir, wh ; + will erever they had a fire drill on Saturday, Q. All right, sir. 166 A. The Master is required to have periodic fire drills. Q. All right, now do you have any other business that day? A. Well, there is a note here pertaining to an employee missed ship, inquired about pay, says would be payable as soon as his voucher is [208] received from vessel, and that the man would like to be rehired and we would investigate it and Q. Well, that is enough. A. I can’t tell from this whether we did rehire him or what we did, but this, I don’t think was as much a grievance as a personnel problem, the man wanted some help with it. Q. All right, sir, thank you, Mr. Knepper. Now in re- sponse to Mr. Dixie’s request, once these formal grievances started coming in did you go through and compile a list of those last night? A. Yes, sir, we did. The Clerk: Plaintiff’s Exhibit 16. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon it was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 for identification. ) By Mr. Hambright : . I hand you a list of some 29 numbered items marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit 16. Was that what you looked up last night and had prepared? A. Yes, sir, I prepared this by going through my griev- ance file. Q. All right, I notice that the latest one on the list is dated February of 1972, and the earliest [209] one is dated February of 1970. So would you explain that? A. I believe, sir, the latest one—unfortunately these are not in exact order. I believe the latest one is really March 17, 1972. 167 Q. All right, sir. A. But the earliest one being in 70, I think the reason that there wasn’t any earlier, that the strike ended in November of 69, and there just wasn’t any that reached that stage prior to that time. Q. All right, sir, but in any event, all of these arose under the present labor contract beginning in about Feb- ruary of 1970 and coming on down to date? A. Yes, sir, that is correct. Q. And this is the period inquired about yesterday, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right, sir, were these matters submitted to you in the ordinary course of business of this employer? A. Yes, sir, these came to me some by hand and some by mail, some were discussed before they were [210] for- malized into a written grievance and all were answered from my office in Beaumont over my signature. Q. Did you and your colleagues in Beaumont, Texas, who—such as Mr. Papich or Mr. Shanigan, did you make the decision as to what happened to these 29 fifth level complaints? A. Very definitely, sir. Q. Do these 29 numbered items represent matters had they not been resolved at that meeting in your office in Beaumont, could have proceeded to arbitration? A. Yes, sir, these were all fifth level grievances and the next time would be arbitration if they weren’t settled. Q. I believe you testified yesterday about four had gone to arbitration under this new labor contract? A. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 168 Mr. Hambright: We offer Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 16, the list of 29 top level meetings, and Mr. Dixie yesterday re- quested that we produce minutes and I would like to state to [211] the Court and to counsel that we welcome any in- terrogation concerning any of those but the witness has tes- tified that he does not in all cases have notes about these, and so we are not offering any additional notes at this time, but— The Court: The explanation will be accepted. The Clerk: Plaintiff’s Exhibit 17. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon it was marked Plaintiff’s 17 for identification. ) y Mr. Hambright : Q. This Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 that has been marked, is that case sent you from the 23rd Region. May it please the Court, we offer in evidence what is marked as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 17, it gives a decision of the National Labor Rela- tions Board trial examiner in Houston, Texas, dated March 30, 1972, and it related to seafaring employees. May that be admitted, it was in our pre-trial order? [212] The Court: Sirf Mr. Hambright: May this be admitted? The Court: Yes, it may be admitted. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon Plaintiff’s Exhibit 17 was received in evidence.) Mr. Hambright : We pass the witness. The Court: Do you have any further questions? Mr. Dixie: Just a few, Your Honor. RECROSS EXAMINATION By Mr. Dixie: 169 Q. Mr. Knepper, do you have Plaintiff’s Exhibit 16 be- fore you? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. In the left-hand column you have the date of the grievance? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that the date on the grievance form? [213] A. Yes, sir, that is the date that appears next to the Union officer’s signature. Q. Then I notice in that left-hand column sometimes you have the word letter written under the date“, does that mean that the matter was submitted to you by a letter instead of by the regular grievance form? A. Yes, sir, that’s what that means. Q. Now in the next column is entitled submitted by“, does that show the name of the man who signed the griev- ance form or the letter? A. Well, generally there are two people that sign the grievance, the grievant himself and the Union officer that’s carrying the grievance for him, this is the signature of the Union officer who presented the grievance. Q. So that the submitted by means the signature on the form, right? A. The signature of the Union officer on the form. Q. Now the next column you give us the subject, in the next column you give us the name of the grievant, that is, the individual employee who was involved in the episode, is that correct? 1214] A. Yes. . And then the next column is entitled Date of Reply’’. Is that a date on a written communication from the Company to the Union? 170 A. It is, yes. Q. Now those are the five columns that you have given us here and I notice that you don’t have anywhere on here the date of these so-called hearings. Do you have dates of hearings in these matters? oe A. Sir, I have never said that we have formal hearings in these matters. Q. You never said. Now let’s see, your lawyer asked you had they not been resolved in fifth level meetings, they would have gone to arbitration, and you said yes. Now what is the date of these meetings or hearings or anything else you want to call them? A. I don't have an accurate record of when each one of these were discussed. e Q. Now then, when you had quarterly meetings in New York City the company prepared formal minutes, didn’t they? A. No, sir. [215] Q. Didn’t you send minutes to the Union of what you did and discussed? A. Not minutes, no, sir. Q. What did you send? A. Occasionally we would send them a letter telling them of what we agreed or disagreed with. We never have kept minutes, formal minutes that are kept, the notes we kept for ourselves. Q. Well, doesn’t this get down to the proposition that at Beaumont, from time to time, you discussed with Mr. Perrio your mutual business of problems that arise aboard ships, isn’t that what this comes to? A. Certainly we discussed from time to time mutual problems. We have always discussed grievances with him. 171 Q. f But the contractual grievance procedure takes place on ship, does it not, in the first three steps? A. Yes, sir, yes, indeed. Q. And it takes place in New York in arbitration, is that correct? A. Ithas, it doesn’t necessarily have to. Q. Well, doesn’t this get down to the iti proposition that in And the thing that happened in Beaumont is [216] t you receive letters and you answer by letter? A. And make decisions. Q. Is that correct? A. And make decisions. Q. And you make decisions. All right, may I see the file you are looking at when i . vou told us abo in 1969, with Mr. Papich. hs eg gues i A. Is it proper for me, Your Honor, there is a number of confidential company notices in the file. The Court: Maybe you had better check wi i ( th him, Mr. Hambright, and advise him in this regard. ee Mr. Hambright: Could I have that request again, please? Mr. Dixie: I want to see the file he examined when h told us that he found references to a meeting — thon and Mr. Perrio and Mr. Papich in December of 1969. Mr. Hambright : Well, that is his work sheet, I believe he read from his own notes there. I thought you were [217] asking for the entire series of confidential file. Mr. Dixie: I thought that’s where it , 2 it was. I thought that’s ; The Court: All richt, if you are referring to these notes if you have no objection to showing them to him you may 172 do so. If you have an objection you may state your ob- jection. Mr. Hambright: No objection, Your Honor. The Court: All right. (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon there was a short pause in the proceedings. ) By Mr. Dixie: Q. All right, now then, is this one piece of paper the only written reference you can find in your records of a meeting at Beaumont, between the company and the Union? A. That is the only piece that we turned up last night. Q. That’s the only one you turned up. All right, nothing for 1970? Nothing for 1971 or 1972 in your [218] records, right? A. I can demonstrate that some of these grievances were dated the same day that I received them, which clearly rein- forces my memory that Mr. Weeks and Mr. Perrio handed it to me that day. Mr. Dixie: I pass the witness. The Court: Anything further, Mr. Hambright? Mr. Hambright : No, Your Honor. The Court: All right, Mr. Knepper, you may step down. You may call your next witness. Mr. Hambright: If the Court please, the Plaintiff will rest. I would advise the Court that the pretrial order was signed earlier this morning. The Court: It may be filed. Were you sworn with the other witnesses yesterday? The Witness: Yes, sir. 178 The Court: Have a seat. You may proceed. [219] DONALD SANHUEZA, having been first duly cau- tioned and sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified as fol- lows: DIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Dixie: Q. Will you state your full name? Donald Sanhueza. How old a man are you? 32. Where do you live? New Jersey. A. Q. A. Q A Q. What position do you occupy with the Union? A. Financial Secretary. Q. And do you also work for the company? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. How long have you been working for the company? 60 A. Fifteen years. Q. Fifeen years, and in what capacity do you [220] work for the company? A. Oiler. Q. You are an oiler? A. That’s right. Q. Now then, I want to ask you a few questions. Has the Union ever asked the company to discharge a new em- ployee because he didn’t want to join the Union? A. No, we haven’t. 174 Q. Members of the Union except those who are new on board? A. That’s right. Wil you tell the Court how many of the people are on check-off? That is, how many of them have signed check- off authorizations to take out Union dues from their checks? Approximately 281. Do you have members who pay by hand? We do. Approximately how many members pay by hand? Approximately sume fifteen to twenty. Q. All right, Mr. Sanhueza, we already have evidence here that a man works approximately sixty days on board ship and then he has thirty [221] days off. Are you in a position to give us a little bit more precise figures on that? A. We work approximately 85 days and off approxi- mately 37. Q. On 85 and off 677 A. 37. Q. 37. That is the general pattern now. Now in the 85 days that a man is on board ship what hours of the day does he work? How many hours a day does he work? A. Eight hours a day. Q. Eight hours a day. Is that divided into watches? A. Watches, they work four hours and off eight, back for four. Q. Will you tell us where the people usually catch the ships that they are working on? Where do they board ship? A. Any port the ship may be, it varies as to what port they may be at. The Port of Maine, Portsmouth, Provi- PrP OPO Pp 175 dence, New York, New Je we really all of them. rsey, Corpus Christi, Beaumont, Q. Let us suppose that there is a man who lives i ho lives in Beau- — Texas, and let us suppose that he is [222] scheduled rab = a ship on the Ist day of July, and let us suppose t that ship is in the Port of New York, on the 1st day of July. Would you tell us how tha — maf ww) t man gets to New York A. The i the ship. company will fly the man to New York to meet Q. Does the company try to schedule these men so they catch the port—correction, catch : to their homes? n, the ship at the port closest A. Right. Q. They try to do that? A. Yes, sir. Q. Does it always work out that way? A. No, sir, it doesn’t. A. Yes, sir, they do. Q. What would be that occasion? A. Usually in creating—they wi ! y will call a man back sometimes just due to illness or emergeney — te seice. They will call other people back. [223] C. Are there cireumstances in i which a man i scheduled to work 85 days but doesn’t work his full 85 * X. There are some occasions. Q. What would be that type of occasi . * sion, would that be sickness or injury or family emergency? * 176 Surplus of men, that particular rating. What is your answer? Yes, sir, they would relieve him early. Now then, do you know whether the company pro- vides medical facilities in all of the ports to which its ships go? A. Subject to Public Health hospitals. Q. All right, now the company has one doctor to whom they refer or one or more doctors in the refinery to whom they refer the men when it is necessary. I want to ask you whether or not the company has doctors in New York to whom it refers the men when necessary? A. Yes, sir, they do. . Do you know about other ports? Providence, Rhode Island. Do you know about any others? r p I am not familiar with them. Now we have evidence before the Court here [224] that the MOBIL LUBE, the S/S MOBIL LUBE is on char- ter in the Pacific Ocean at this time. Will you tell us whether or not this is the only charter of this kind for for- eign voyages that you know about? S F Or 2 A. I believe they have one more. Q. Which one is that? A. The MOBIL FUEL. Q. Have they had charter ships, ships under charter before, before the MOBIL LUBE and the MOBIL FUEL, that you know about? Were there any charters last year or the year before is the question I am asking? A. I believe 066. 177 Q. What ships do you believe were under charter! A. I believe the MOBIL GAS was running a charter run. Q. What? A. MOBIL GAS. Q. To whom was the MOBIL GAS under charter, do you know? A. It is a firm in Texas City. Q. And what was the normal run of the MOBIL G at that time, while it was under charter! * [22] A. Texas City to Boston. L long did that charter arrangement last, approxi- A. Somewhere in the neighborhood of two months. Q. Do you have knowledge of the fleet of ships of this company involved in this case going on foreign voyages? Sir? In the past year? Yes. Would you tell us the extent of that? Usually they go foreign on a MFTS charter, plus the company sold two vessels which made offshore trips. Q. Where would they go, what part of the world they go to on the foreign voyages? — A. Well, two vessels that the company sold went to— I believe it was Spain, their destination point was Mr. Dixie: Your Honor, I am having trouble understand- ing my own witness. May I stand here? The Court: Yes, you may. POP oe Pp 178 [226] By Mr. Dixie: Q. What was your last answer, when they were on for- eign articles what part of the world would they go to? A. The two vessels that the company sold went all over Europe. The only thing I can remember, I think their final destination was Spain. Q. What was the name of the two vessels that the com- pany sold? A. The KOLINA and the SCIOTIC (phonetic). Q. Approximately when were they sold? A. About a year, a year and à half ago. . About a year and a half ago? Before being sold were those two vessels primarily engaged in foreign commerce? A. Yes, sir, they were. Q. Were they manned by people that were covered by your labor contracts? A. Yes. Q. All right, did you, at my request, make a study of the time spent in Texas ports by the eight ships here involved during the last month? A. Yes, sir, I did. Q. What materials did you have available to [227] make that study? A. From the logs that we receive from the company? Q. Would you show us one of those so the Court can see what it is? (Reporter’s Note: Whereupon there was a pause in the proceedings at this time.) Q. All right now this is regularly furnished to you by the company? 179 A. Yes, sir, it is. Q. What information is on this? A. It gives the date the work sheet was made up on this log and it has south and it has the name of the ship, dock- ing in Beaumont at 0740 on 6-22, estimated time of depar- ture at 1400 on 6-23, for Providence, Rhode Island. Q. So they give you the time of arrival of a ship in Beaumont, and they give you the estimated time of de- parture? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right, then do they give it for all other ports? A. Yes, sir. [228] Q. Both in the Gulf Coast and on the East Coast? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do they give you the time when the ship is on the high seas? A. No, sir, this is only the docking time. Q. But you know that the ship has to be on the high seas in the meantime? A. That’s right. Q. All right, now take your notes and give us the name of the ship, the period of time covered and the time that that ship was in the Port of Beaumont. A. Well, one work sheet I have, the MOBIL ARROW from May 9th to June the 11th, total days being 34, total time spent in the State of Texas, 42 hours. Q. 42 hours and 34 days for that ship? A. That’s right. Q. Now go to the next one, give its name. 180 A. Ihave the ECLIPSE, April 27th to June 22nd, total of 56 days, total time in the State of Texas, 99 hours. Q. By the way, that was all at Beaumont, or was [229] that— A. Different ports in the State of Texas. Q. Allright, go to the next one. A. The MOBIL FUEL, May 8th to June 7th, total days, 31; total time in Texas, 14 hours. Q. Give us the next one. A. The MOBIL GAS, June Ist to June 23rd; total days, 23; total time in Texas, 43 hours. Q. Give us the next one. A. The MOBIL LUBE, May 16th fo July 8th would be a total of 56 days. No time in the State of Texas. Q. All right, now then, from your knowledge, you come to Texas yourself regularly, do you not, when you are working? A. Ves, sir, I do. Q. Do you know from your own knowledge whether or not that time that you traced for the last month or so is typical of the normal operations of the company? A. Yes, it is. Q. All right, now let us say that a ship comes in to the Port of Beaumont for the purpose of [230] being loaded. Do the members of your crew perform any work other than aboard the ship? In other words, do they have any shore duties? A. No, wedo not. Q. All the work you do is aboard ship then? A. Yes. 181 Q. Do the men come ashore when the ship is in the Port of Beaumont? A. If you are not working, yes. Q. All right, how long would the men have shore leave to come ashore? A. Well, if the ship docks exactly at a good time for that individual, he would have eight hours. Q. Eight hours would be the maximum? Well, eight hours off is the maximum time off duty, is thet right? A. That’s right. Q. So the longest time that that individual could spend ashore would be eight hours, and that would be for his personal purposes? A. Right. Q. No duties to perform. Do you know whether or not the company provides stores and parts for their [231] ships in ports other than the Port of Beaumont? A. Yes, sir. Q. They regularly provide the necessary spare parts and repairs out of New York, as well as out of Beaumont? All over. All ports? And they take on provisions in all ports? Yes, they do. You have an office in New York? PoP Y Yes, sir. Q. Do you have dealings with the company in New York A. Yes, sir, we do. Q. What kind of dealings do you have with the company in New York? 182 A. We have all our meetings in New York. Q. How often do you have those meetings? A. Quarterly. Q. Four times a year? A. That’s right. Q. After those meetings are held does the company furnish you with any kind of summary or minutes of what was said and done at the meeting? [232] A. They usually answer to what we spoke about with regard to if they can’t settle a final grievance in New York, we prepare for arbitration. Q. You tell the Court that you discuss the final settle- ment of grievances in New York and not in Beaumont? A. Yes, sir, we do. Q. Do you know Mr. Knepper here? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. Have you ever come to Beaumont to discuss the settlement of grievances here with him? A. Ihave never. Q. Have you ever settled grievances that didn’t go to arbitration? Have you settled grievances so as to avoid arbitration? A. Yes, sir, we have. Q. With whom have you settled? A. With Mr. Knepper and his committee. Q. Mr. Knepper and his committee, and what did the committee consist of! A. Captain Papich, Mr. Dayton and Mr. Shanaghan. 183 Q. Do you know—are you the man who receives the dues, monies from the company each month? [233] A. Yes, sir. Where do you receive it? In New York. Where do you keep it? In New York. Is Local 801 a part of any administrative district of the Oil Workers International? A. Yes, sir, it is. What district does it belong to? A. District No. 8. Q. Where is District No. 87 A. Union, New Jersey. Q. Are you familiar with the fact that the Oil Workers District No. 4 is located down here in Texas? A. Yes, I am. Q. Do you belong to District 4 for any purpose? A. No, we do not. Q. Do you participate in District 4 activities for any purpose? A. We do not. Q. Do you have a staff man that helps Mr. Hambright: May it please the , * [235] Q. What is his name? A. Mr. Staggart. Q. Where does he live? PrP? © 184 A. Pennsylvania. Q. What district is he attached to? A. District No. 8. Q. Does he have anything to do with the Texas District administratively? A. No, sir, he does not. Q. Does he ever come to Texas to do business with the company that you know of? A. No, he doesn’t. ; Q. It has been claimed here that you have all of your meetings in New York for the convenience of the Union. Do you know why you have meetings in New York, Mr. Sanhereza? ¥ A. They have, Mr. Knepper has his staff of Mr. Fisher, his supervisor, and legal counsel. Q. Have you ever heard Mr. Knepper discu 88 with you that he intended to confer with his associates, like Mr. Fisher and Mr. Luck, before making some kind of a deal with you? A. The only time I ever heard that was at [236] negoti- ations, yes. Q. At negotiations. All right, are employees hired in New York? A. Yes. Q. Do you know if employees are fired in New York? A. If they are fired aboard ship it would be from New York, wherever the ship may be. Q. In other words, tell the Court what bas been the practice about what port a man will leave the ship from because he has been terminated by the Master. 185 A. The Master has the authority to dismiss anybody at any port. Q. All right, is that in fact done? A. Yes, it is. Q. Now we have in evidence here a letter written in July of 1971, a Union news letter to your members that discusses this agency shop. I want to ask you whether you addressed that communication to the company or whether you intended for the company to get it or see it? A. It was sent to the Union membership. [237] C. And was it sent to the Union membership only? A. That’s correct. Q. The statement has been made here that there is at least one of these ships in the Port of Beaumont one hun- dred percent of the time or maybe I have misunderstood it, do you know whether or not that is the truth, that there is at least one ship here one hundred percent of the time? A. No, sir. Mr. Hambright: May it please the Court, I did not hear that statement from any witness, and it was never uttered by me. I think it would be improper to use that question. The Court: There might be a misunderstanding there, Mr. Dixie. Mr. Dixie: Q. In other words, have you come in aboard a ship, into the Port of Beaumont and seer that there was no other Mobil Oil ships in port when you got there? A. Yes, sir. [238] Q. How often has that happened? A. Well, there is eight ships, they only reach Beaumont 186 approximately twice in a calendar month, so all the other days there wouldn’t be no ship in. The Court: I think we will have a little recess. We will stand in recess for fifteen minutes, that will be ten minutes after eleven by the clock in the courtroom. The Marshal: Everyone rise, please. ( Reporter’s Note: Whereupon a fifteen minute recess was taken and court resumed at 11:10 A.M.) The Court: You may proceed. You may resume, Mr. Dixie. By Mr. Dixie: Q. Mr. Sanhueza, I am going to show you a draft of a document here which bears on its front page the notation: „Pension Plan for Unlicensed Seamen of U. S. Flag Ocean- going Tankers of the Gulf, East Coast Operations of the Marine Transportation Department of Mobil Oil Corpora- [239] tion’’. Do you recognize that document? A. Yes, I do. Q. What is the source of that document? A. It describes the benefits that we receive of our pension plan and how it will be administered. Q. All right, and who is the author of that? The company. Do they present it to you? Yes, sir, they did. Did you agree to it? Yes. Do you sign it? > or oP oP We signed the financial benefits that we receive. 187 Q. Now will you look at page 13 of that document and read to the Court the sentence about the laws of which state will govern the pension plan? A. The plan shall be governed by and construed in ac- cordance with the law of the State of New York. Any inter- pretation of same by counsel of the corporation shall be exclusive as between corporation and it goes on and on’’. Q. Is that the pension plan that is in effect [240] for your people now? A. Yes, sir, it is. Q. I pass the witness. CROSS EXAMINATION By Mr. Hambright : Q. Mr. Sanhueza, I believe you testified a moment ago that you come to Texas regularly, is that correct? A. Aboard ship, yes, sir. Q. How long have you been employed with this em- ployer? A. Fifteen years. Q. For fifteen years. Have you been coming to Texas regularly? A. Aboard ship, yes, sir. Q. ; Now, I believe you testified that there was some physical examination conducted in New York and perhaps elsewhere, you know of your own knowledge, do you not, that the company has a medical department in Beaumont Texas also? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. And you know of your own knowledge that more [241] physical exams are conducted there than place, don’t you? 18 any other 188 A. No, I do not. Q. You testified that 281 employees were on check-offs. I take it this means the company is sending the Union money representing their dues? A. That is correct. Q. All right, sir, you know of your own knowledge that the money comes from Texas on the check-off letter, does it not? A. Yes, I do. It is addressed to you as financial secretary? No, it is addressed to the Local Union. Does it come to you as financial secretary? My name does not appear on it but I receive it. You do receive it? Yes, I do. Q. And over the period of the last two or three years have you ever found any error or discrepancies on that? A. Occasionally. Q. Where do you go to get that clarified? A. Usually I contact Mr. Shanaghan. [242] C. Mr. Shanaghan is in the courtroom, do you see him here today? A. Yes, sir. Q. You know him to be a resident citizen of Beaumont, Texas, do you not? A. Yes, Ido. Q. He works for Mr. Knepper out here at headqusrters office ? A. Yes. Orr 189 Mr. Shanaghan, I believe you testified that this so- calkd notice to employees went out to your membership and not to the company? A That's right. Mr Hambright: May I see Plaintiff's Exhibit 107 (Reporter’s Note: Clerk handing said exhibit to Mr. Hanbright.) By Mr. Hambright : Q. Is this Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 the notice we are talk- ing sbout? A. Yes. Q. That notice says in the second paragraph that if a new employee doesn’t join the Union in effect you will have him ired, does it not? [243] A. Yes, it does. Q. Now, Mr. Sanhueza, there wasn’t anything secret about that notice, was there? P ‘ A. I don’t really know what you mean by the word secret. Q. You implied to Mr. Dixie that you sent that to your members but you did not send it to the company manage- ment and I am asking if you had made any effort to make that or keep that a secret? A. No, it was addressed to the ship re i ’ presentative aboard ship for the sole purpose of Union members. Q. You know of your own knowledge, do you not, that that was posted on the bullein board aboard the vessels? A. No, I do not. Q. Ifa company representative in the room, courtroom today, testified that he had saw it posted on the bulletin — 190 board aboard ship, I will ask you this, would it be seen by members of the crew if it were on the bulletin board? A. Possibility. [244] C. That's why you have Union bulletin board, isn’t it? A. That’s right. Q. Would it also be seen by non-members of the Union were it in fact posted on the bulletin board? A. Yes, sir, it would. Q. Would it also be seen by company officials who might go aboard ship on that bulletin board? A. Yes, it would. Fou testified that in effect that notice says you were going to have the company fire a man that doesn’t join the Union. Now it means what it says, does it not? A. Yes, sir, it does. Q. You told Mr. Dixie, however, that you all had never requested the company to fire anybody under that notice, is that right? A. Yes. Q. I believe you also told Mr. Dixie that everybody was a member of the Union? A. Except new employees. Q. Except anyone in the last thirty days, but [245] lay- ing aside those, anyone more than thirty days I believe is a member of the Union, under your testimony? A. No, sir, there are some that is after thirty that join. Q. That some of them are delayed in joining? = A. That’s right. 191 Q. But it is a fact thon that if eve is i i but ryone is in the Union or else joins the Union within what you consider a reason- able time you, in fact, would have no reason to tell the company to fire anyone, would you? A. I would not. Q. All right, sir wl eno eet etn en = * * 2 joins the Union you don’t have any way of knowing — sonally, do you, Mr. Sanhueza, whether he did that volun- tarily or whether he did it because of this notice stating he would be fired if he didn’t? A. No, I do not. Q. Now I believe you testified that you had never bee down to Beaumont for the purpose of talking to Mr. Knepper about a grievance ! A. That's correct, sir. [246] C. Now actually you are the — yo financial secretary Yes, sir. You have other officers in the Union, don’t you? We do. Mr. Perrio is the President, isn’t he? Yes, sir. . And owledge n Ves, sir, I do. Do you have a man in there named Weeks? Yes, sir. Is he an officer? Yes, sir, he is. What is his official position? r Orr 192 A. Vice President. Q. Vice President? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge that he lives in San Augustine, Texas? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. Don’t you know of your own knowledge that he [247] has been to Beaumont to talk to Mr. Knepper about griev- ances? A. I believe so. Q. All right, sir, you wouldn’t have this Court believe that because you personally, as financial secretary, had never been to Mr. Knepper’s office to discuss grievances, that no one in authority in the Union has been to that office, would you? A. To discuss formal grievances, no, sir. Q. All right, sir, as a matter of fact, Mr. Sanhueza, you, yourself have been in the Beaumont office of this employer to discuss the administration of this very labor contract, have you not? A. Onee, sir. ; Q. And what gentleman did you meet with? A. Mr. Shanaghan. Q. And again, that Mr. Shanaghan is the personnel supervisor? A. Yes, sir. Q. And he works with Mr. Knepper here in Beaumont? A. Yes, sir. [248] Q. Mr. Sanhueza, it is a fact, isn’t it, that not only have you been here personally to talk to the company 193 officials, but you have mailed in many grievances . griev to Mr. Knepper in the Beaumont office? e A. Yes, sir. Q. You, yourself, personally have forwarded the formal, written grievance at the fifth level to Mr. Kne i Beaumont, Texas? elas A. Yes, sir. Q. You have done it at least eight times under this par- ticular labor contract, have you not? * A. Yes, sir. Q. Now I believe you told the Court that they had some quarterly grievance meetings in New York City that you attended, do you remember those questions from Mr. Dixie? A. Yes, sir. Q. You talked about whether or not they drew up a report or minutes and you had some discussion about the notes of those meetings, correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Mr. Sanhueza, I ask you if it is not a f act and don’t you know that those meetings were discontinued over a year ago? [249] A. Yes, sir. Q. And don’t you know they were discontinued at the * * of the defendant in this case, the Union in this A. Yes, sir. Q. And since the time they were discontinued year ago, since that time the grievance machinery re all ray as rg Rein = By ny to, with the fifth level aumont, Texas re has been change i procedure, has there? — 194 A. It followed all the steps, sir. Q. And the fifth step provides in Beaumont, Texas, on the face of the contract, does it not? A. Yes, we mail the final form to Mr. Knepper. Q. Or Mr. Perrio or Mr. Weeks or someone else could bring it in and discuss it, correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now you know this labor contract doesn’t say where you have to arbitrate, does it? A. Yes, sir. Q. It does not say where you have to arbitrate, is that correct? 250] A. That’s correct, yes, sir. Q. All right, it doesn’t say where you have the first four subordinate levels of grievance hearings, does it? A. No. Q. But the last grievance level before arbitration, that’s where we have the nut-cracking, isn’t it, Mr. Sanhueza, that is, the go or no-go, is it not? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you know of your own knowledge that this labor contract fixed the definite location for that meeting in Beaumont, Texas, does it not, the fifth level? The Court: I think this is argument, you have been over it once. By Mr. Hambright : Q. Mr. Sanhueza, you testified you sent in at least eight of these grievances to Mr. Knepper. You never sent one to anybody else, did you? A. No, I did not. 195 Q. Now in regard to the Master's dismissal or an em- ployee aboard ship, you told the judge—[251] you told this Court that this could happen anywhere, correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. That is not final, Mr. Sanhueza? A. No, it is not. Q. You know that a Master doesn’t have the authority to discharge a man from the employment of this employer? A. No, sir. Q. And if he should dismiss a man aboard ship this is appealable to the employer, is it not? A. Yes, sir, it is. Q. And when so appealed it goes to Mr. Knepper in Beaumont, Texas, does it not? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now you spoke of the International Union organiza- tion in the various sections and districts. You weren’t tell- ing this Court that the International Union of the OCA‘V has no interest in these crews on these vessels down here in the harbor at Beaumont, were you? A. Will you repeat that, sir? Q. Mr. Sanhueza, do you know a gentleman named Lefty Haven? [252] A. Yes, sir, I do. Is he present today in the courtroom? Yes, sir, he is. Is he an International representative of the OCAW? Yes, sir. S f r Was he served with process in this very lawsuit? 196 A. Yes, sir. Q. And he is a resident of Port Arthur, Jefferson County, Texas, is he not? A. I believe so. Q. And you know of your own knowledge that that gentleman has been aboard these tankers in the Port of Beaumont talking to the employees and working on labor relations, do you not? A. No, sir. Q. I will ask you whether or not Mr. Perrio, the Presi- dent of the Union, has not informed you that Mr. Haven has been aboard those vessels in Beaumont? A. I believe during the strike, sir. Q. So when you tell the Court you don’t know it, you are saying you have no personal knowledge, [253] but you have heard from Union officers that he has been there? A. Yes, sir. Q. Mr. Sanhueza, when you spoke to the Court about these ships’ locations and the computations you made of travel time and port time in Beaumont, you weren’t plot- ting in there the river time, were you? A. No, sir. Q. So that if a ship came to the bar and then passed through Sabine Pass and then came up to Port Arthur, and on through mid-county and up to Beaumont, it would actually be in the Neches River some appreciable amount of time, would it not? A. Approximately twelve hours or so. Q. And this would be true in Houston, or other ports where there are access places a ship must navigate, is this correct? 197 A. Yes, sir. Mr. Hambright: I pass the witness. The Court: Anything further, Mr. Dixie? [254] REDIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Dixie: Q. How have you been settling your grievance discus- sions since you discontinued your quarterly meetings? A. By mail, sir. Q. By mail? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Dixie: I pass the witness. RECROSS EXAMINATION By Mr. Hambright : Q. Did I understand you to say by the officers? A. By mail. Mr. Hambright: I am sorry, I thought you said officers. N * The Court: By mail. The Witness: By mail. The Court: All right. By Mr. Hambright : Q. And this mail has been addressed to Mr. Knepper in Beaumont, Texas, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. [255] Mr. Hambright: That's all. The Court: All right, sir, you may step down. 198 Mr. Dixie: Just one more short witness, Your Honor. Mr. Perrio. JOHN PERRIO, having been first duly cautioned and sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Dixie: Q. Your name is what? A. John Perrio. Q. And how long have you been working for Mobil Oil Company? A. Sixteen years. l Q. What capacity? A. Cook and steward. Q. Where do you live? A. IL live in Houston, Texas. Q. What position do you occupy with the Union? A. President. [256] Q. All right, now, Mr. Perrio, we have been over everything in this case and I want to ask you to tell the Court briefly what is the nature of your dealings with Mr. Knepper here in Beaumont, in carrying cut these Union contracts? A. I go aboard ship, the men come to me with a beef, I try to settle the beef, generally once a week with Mr. Knepper, sometimes by phone and the majority of the time by phone, informal, always informal, and if it is not settled there, then a grievance is gotten by the man up north, gen- erally on a ship by Mr. Sanhueza, then it is mailed, sent to me, I sign it, Mr. Sanhueza mails it to Mr. Knepper. 199 Q. After a grievance is filed and becomes a formal grievance instead of what you just called a beef? A. Itisa beef. Q. Do you have hearings of any kind in Beaumont to settle those grievances? A. At times there may be informal meetings. Q. And how often would that happen? A. Oh, I would say maybe once a week, maybe once [257] every three weeks. Q. Would you tell us how a majority of the grievances are disposed of? A. They are—when the grievance is sent to the com- pany by mail then we have a quarterly meeting, we act by quarterly meetings and we have all of the grievances that we do have then. Q. It has already been brought out that all of your quarterly meetings have been held in New York, is that right? A. That’s correct. Q. After you discontinued your quarterly meetings how have you gone about settling your grievances? A. Through the mail. Mr. Dixie: I pass the witness. CROSS EXAMINATION By Mr. Hambright: Q. Mr. Perrio, did I hear you say that you go aboard the ship yourself and receive grievances from the men? A. Beefs, not grievances written. Q. Well, do these beefs have to do with the [258] rights of the seamen under the collective bargaining agreement? 200 A. That’s right. Q. And you go and talk to — Knepper about this about once a week, you said? A. Just about, sometimes. Q. Is it to the Union’s best interest to get those matters settled at the first meeting with Mr. Knepper? A. I is best to be done aboard ship with the Master, then Mr. Knepper. Q. Assuming that it wasn’t settled by the Master and it got to be a beef, is it to the Union’s best interest and the best interest of the employee to get it settled when you go visit Mr. Knepper, isn’t that right? A. That would be right. Q. Sometimes you think it is the best interest of the company also, do vou not? A. I would think so. Q. As a matter of fact, sometimes you even state to Mr. Knepper that it would be to the best interest of the com- pany if he made a bargain with [259] them and settled their controversy. You have said that, have you not? A. Imay have. Q. And when you are out there talking to Mr. 8 once a week about these beefs, what is your bible, what documents do you refer to? A. The contract. Q. The labor contract, that is marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 in this lawsuit, is that it? A. That’s right. Q. That contract has over one hundred numbered para- graphs in it, does it not, Mr. Perrio? A. Approximately. 201 Q. And you have some members of the Union that re- side in the State of Texas, is that correct? A. That is right. Q. Over one hundred of them? A. More or less. Q. And then you—well, you have got more that live in Texas than anywhere else, have you not? A. No, I wouldn't say that. Q. You have got more that live in Texas than any other single state, do you not? A. All right, yes. [260] Q. You will go with me that far? A. Yes. Q. Mr. Perrio, as President of this Union I will ask you whether or not membership in your Union is voluntary in the State of Texas? A. It is. Q. Sir? A. I say it is voluntary. Q. Did you say it is? A. Itis. Q. All right, sir, what do you mean by the statement — me that Union membership is voluntary in the State of exas A. What do I mean by this? Q. Yes. A. I cannot go to the company and uest that th be discharged. 2 * Q. And why do you say that, Mr. Perrio? A. Sirt Q. Why can you not go to the company and insist on this discharge? A. Well, I would say it would be a violation of the Texas Right to Work Law. [261] Q. Have you known that of your own knowledge, haven’t you? A. No, we didn’t know this. Q. You found it out later? A. When Mr. Knepper told us about it and we didn’t know it was a violation then. Q. All right, as a matter of fact you heard Mr. Sanhueza testify that all the employees are in the Union or else get in the Union within a reasonable time. You heard that, didn’t you? A. That’s right. Q. So that if all of them are in the Union or get there eventually, you really have no cause to ask the company to fire anybody, do you? A. No, we would have no problem. Q. And when these people do join the Union you don’t know whether they are operating under this threat, this notice that was sent out by the Union, whether they really want to get in or not, do you? A. Well, the ship’s representative aboard ship is the man who contacts them before I do and the Union officers themselves would not be involved. Q. I show you Exhibit 10, and I will call your [262] at- tention to the part that’s got the blocks drawn around it, is that the Union notice that you put up on the bulletin boards? A. This is the Union notice but we do not put i the billetin boards. een Q. All right, sir. Well, it is a notice thut bli to allyour members? — A. That's right. Q. You gave it wide circulation, did you not? A. This is true. Q. And the part where the blocks are around it says we intend to exercise our right to have the emr'>yment of any unlicensed seaman terminated who does not join or pay dies to the Union, did you write that? A. No, I did not. Q. But you endorse it as being the message, don’t you? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. Does that say anything about exclusion of Texas employees, Mr. Perrio? A. It does not. Q. Mr. Perrio, if it is testified that that 263] notice h as been placed aboard, on the bulletin board aboard the vessels belonging to this employer manned by employees that are in your Union, you would not deny that, would you? A. No, I would not. Q. You have testified that you didn’t put it th self, is that right? e A. This is true. Q. Mr. Perrio, in this lawsuit you did receive servi and nctice of the case, did you not? 2 A. Les, sir, I did. Q. Was that delivered to you by the United States Marshal in your office in Beaumont, Texas? 204 A. Yes, sir, it was. Mr. Hambright : I pass the witness. The Court: Anything further? Mr. Dixie: No more questions, Your Honor. The De- fendant will rest. The Court: All right, Mr. Perrio, you may step down. Do you have anything further, Mr. Hambright? [264] Mr. Hambright: We have a very short, very short rebuttal which I think we can cover very quickly. The Court: All right. I believe we will wait until after lunch. Mr. Hambright : Yes, sir. N The Court: We are going to stand in recess until fifteen minutes until 2:00 o’clock. We will stand in recess until that time. The Marshal: Everyone rise. (Reporter 's Note: Whereupon the Noon recess was taken and court resumed at 1:45 P.M.) [265] AFTERNOON SESSION The Court: Please be seated. We are ready to proceed, Mr. Hambright. Mr. Hambright: If it please the Court, the defendant just before noon announced that they rested. The plaintiff would now likewise rest and ask if the Court would receive a closing statement? The Court: All right, you may proceed with your sum- mation. Mr. Hambright : Thank you. By Mr. Hambright: Your honor, the position of the plain- tiff in this case is that regardless of where this labor con- tract may have been signed by the parties that part of it in violation of the Texas Public Policy cannot properly be enforced in the State of Texas. The parties themselves recognize in their labor contract that part [266] of it may be invalid. They have got their savings clause or validity clause in there which talks about what might happen if a Court should determine that part of the contract is void. That’s on Section 11, page 6. United States Supreme Court had something to say about these savings clauses. In the case of Rockaway News it considered one of these savings clauses in a labor contract situation and Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, ap- proved the savings clause and he recognized the need for them and I would like to read one sentence which he wrote in reference to these validity clauses. He said, ‘‘The parties who could not foresee how some of the provisions of the statute would be interpreted proposed to go as far toward Union security as they are allowed to go and this is their right, but they proposed to go no further [267] and that is their duty.’’ We would submit to Your Honor that in this case the exact same thing happened. These parties proposed to go as far toward Union security as they had a right to go but they recognized that they had a duty not to step beyond that line and that is why they wrote the validity clause and that’s why they agreed to meet and talk some more if the Court held any part of the contract invalid. Now in our case, the Court has heard evidence which we submit establishes beyond any question of doubt that this labor contract is applied in the State of Texas. The Court is already aware of the disjunctive provision of law which states that if it is executed or applied here then the Texas law may control. We submit that it is applied here and 206 without rehashing two days of testumony we only have to recall the testi [268] mony of the Union president, Mr. Per- rio. He tells us that once a week he goes to Mr. Knepper’s office, they talk, they solve problems, and he says their bible is the labor contract. We submit that these transactions occurring in Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas, affecting every member of this unit directly under the labor contract before Your Honor transcends all other transactions and brings it down into one principal point of contact between this plaintiff and these unions because at that particular stage the labor contract is being applied by both sides as Mr. Perrio said, it is to the best interest of the Union and he has often stated it is to the best interest of the company because they know that what they do at that meeting is going to be the law of the contract between the parties and wages, hours, overtime, vacations, scheduling, seniority, what they eat, what they do aboard ship, [269] and he knows the Court has been advised by these witnesses that Mr. Knepper’s decisions flow back down the line of command. If he settled it in favor of the Union why Mr. Papich tells the Masters aboard the vessels and thereafter they admin- ister the labor contract in keeping with that decision. If the rule is in favor of the company or if Mr. Knepper or Mr. Perrio makes a compromise ruling, then the matter is settled to the contrary and we do know that out of the 29 specifie'formal grievances all but four of them were settled right here in Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas. Only four out of that particular group of twenty-nine had to be arbitrated. Now for convenience of the parties they did that in New York City, but we do not think this is controlling because the decisions were made here and 25 out of 29 were so con- cluded in beaumont. We do not think that this [270] griev- ance procedure is controlling and standing alone because there is a lot of independent evidence before Your Honor to show this contract receives its application in the State of Texas, but that each of these points which we will note in passing is enough standing alone to support findings of this Court that this labor contract is being applied in Texas, every day of the year it is being applied here. For instance, the proof shows that all employees of the plaintiff are in Texas frequently and repetitively. Mr. Sanhereza said he has been doing it for fifteen years. Moreover, the President of the Union, Mr. Perrio, is a Texas citizen. He has got a business office in Beaumont, Texas, where he was served by the Marshal in this case. Mr. Weeks is the Vice President of the Union, and he is a citizen of San Augustine, Texas. The proof shows without dispute that sixty [271] percent of the new employees hired in the last two years were hired in Beaumont, Texas. The point of hiring I would like to discuss, if I could digress a moment and advise the Court of one very recent de- cision made by government agency on this point of hiring. On March 30th, 1972, the NLRB trial examiner in Houston, Texas issued a decision in a labor case involving a seafar- ing International Union. The SIU had a strict rule that you have to belong to the Union or you can’t get a job aboard a ship. They have a hiring hall in Houston, Texas, they have got them all over the country, and in this particular case a seaman not a member of the Union was denied employment repeatedly aboard a ship so he filed a charge to the NLRB. The NLRB trial examiner held that it was an unfair labor practice for the Union to deny him employ- ment on this ship and in the [272] course of writing his opinion he had occasion to make this statement concerning Texas law: “Although in certain states it is lawful to require maintenance of Union membership or payment of equivalent dues or charges by employees within a fixed period of time after entering employment, through express provisions to that effect in a collective agreement this would not be true in a so-called right-to-work state such as Texas, where under no circumstances may the require- ment of Union membership or non-membership be made a condition of the employment or continued employment.“ I would advise the Court that that case went on to talk about the fact that there were hundreds of labor contracts involving the SIU members. They declared this practice illegal, it is of no moment to the National Labor Relations Board that this is a seafaring employee, and once [273] he gets outside the ten-mile limit he may be on the high seas. The important thing to these Government people that look at this is that the point of contact, the hiring point was in the State of Texas. I would advise the Court that that case is on appeal to the NLRB. I would further advise that I have spoken with the chief Government lawyer in Houston about that case and he says the Union is complaining about the way they posted the notice to give this effect of this ruling to the membership and, for what it may be worth to Your Honor, he tells me that the substantive rule as to the point of., contact is long- standing with the NLRB, and he recognizes and appreciates thought that that might be threatened on appeal. In any event, the point of it is, the point where a man is hired is recognized to be an important factor and in this particular case sixty percent of those people [274] are hired in Beaumont, Texas. Now in addition to the proof, the proof shows that all of the terminations for cause have to be appealed to Beaumont, Texas, and that there is a right to appeal every one of them. So again, I think that this shows application of the labor contract within the State of Texas and no- where else. The Texas unemployment insurance covers one hundred percent of these employees. There is no exception to that, regardless of what address he might turn in on a company record. The evidence shows that the employer’s business headquarters is located in Beaumc t, Texas, and I use the term employer, Your Honor, because Mr. Dixie repeatedly talked about this mammoth New York corporation known as Mobil Oil, but Mobil Oil also owns the refinery here and it owns hundreds of facilities all over the United States [275] and all over the world and I venture to say that there must be hundreds of labor contracts, but in the labor contract at bar the employer is defined as the Gulf Coast, East Coast operations, a sub- division operating entity of Mobil, and, therefore, that organization’s headquarters are in Beaumont, that what they may do for some of these meetings, like go to New York or elsewhere, is a mutual acquiesence of the parties, not required by their contract. The Court has heard evidence that literally millions of dollars change hands under this labor contract. Millions of dollars in vacation checks and allotments is disbursed from Texas. The vacation checks all come from Beaumont, and the allotment checks all come from Dallas. In addition, the Court has heard that there is over a million dollars in United States [276] income tax on these payments that is computed in Texas, and paid to the Government in Texas, and 1 think it is a reasonable inference to state that any dispute or adjustment or any question arising there would likewise be handled in Texas, where the money is handled. The Court has heard testimony about certain unfair labor practice cases filed in Houston, Texas, by Mr. Chris Dixie’s law firm, of two or three years ago. This is in evidence and it relates to a joint claim of some half a dozen or more employees asserting that the company has wrongfully acted in regard to their vacation benefits. If it please the Court, we would show that these New York NLRB proceedings that Mr. Dixie spoke of concerns either the elections among the employees whether they wanted a Union or the change of names of the Unions a few years later and both of those are non- [277] controversial matters before the labor board in the sense that the parties are not at each other’s throat. You turn from that und you find that when the Union has a complaint about the way the company is treating its employees and they want to take them to court but the only time they have done that was two years ago or whatever date is on that, 1969, and they did it in Houston, Texas, in the 23rd region of the NLRB. We think 210 that this is evidence supporting our contention that this labor contract is in fact applied within the State of Texas. I might digress one more time and say that this NLRB proceedings and the other ones to which I referred in no sense is a statement to this Court that the NLRB has any type of exclusive jurisdiction in this case and the Court has already squarely ruled on that about six months ago when the defendants asked that this case be dismissed as coming within the [278] jurisdiction of the NLRB. At that time we submitted to this Court memorandum of authorities which quotes the United States Supreme Court cases estab- lishing without any shred of doubt that this Court has full coneurrent jurisdiction to decide this case. This is the United States Supreme Court and not any other court which has made this statement. The labor contract also was shown, was actually signed in Texas for the purpose of putting it in force among the employees. I don’t want to repeat all that for the Court, I suffice it to say that they give it some attention here, they went through this later transaction of typing it up and correcting it and signing it and I think that is evidence that they intended to apply it in the State of Texas. Another important factor, without any controversy, is a matter of dues check-off. The proof shows that all [279] of the dues check-offs take place in Beaumont, Texas on a form agreed to by the Union in writing, addressed to this company, this employer at Beaumont, Texas. They are computed here, the amount is then sent to Dallas to get the money from a particular organization there that disburses some of the payments and from there it goes to Mr. Sanhereza up in New York, and he testified that when there is an error he adjusts it in Beaumont, Texas, through the mail, on the phone, but this is where he comes to get the extra money if it is short. This is without any controversy. The proof also shows that this employer has been physically located with its headquarters 211 in Beaumont, Texas for ten years. This is nothing that happened in any fashion connected with this lawsuit. The proof shows without any dispute [280] that the budgeting operation is conducted in Beaumont by various employees working for Mr. Knepper. The payroll, all the payroll records are here in Beaumont, and are administered here. All the personnel records on the individual employees are kept here, no matter where they may live. The orders to the Masters of the ships originate in Beaumont, and Captain Papich carries out the instructions of Mr. Knepper and relays that to the ship’s Master. The proof shows that the newspaper which is read by all of the employees and put out by the company entitled „Mobil Mariner,“ is actually printed in Beaumont, Texas, and distributed from Beaumont, and w [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0315%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.