# Appendix — Bowen v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0145%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 422 U.S. 916

## Text

———

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED

—— DEC 11 1974

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CUERE

Supreme Court o1 the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-6848

JOHN LEE BOWEN,
Petitioner,

= _

UNITED STATES,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JUNE 7, 1974
CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 15, 1974

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-6848

JOHN LEE BOWEN,
Petitioner,

—

UNITED STATES,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page
I a rn nelanateipnnenennninnnaadie 1

' Minutes of the United States District Court, Southern Dis-
} I A” III» anes aelneeeinnsnsenneisenbaaniinntioneeeines 2
era eT ee TN 23

, Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence Pursuant
to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ...... 25
Opposition to Motion to Suppress ......................cecccesceeeeeenees 30

— hommes of ——* held August 23, 1971,
TED ccnscccssncemsseitssnsticecnesssdenensimmmenmsmmneesnsemeniinmnateimieeemnmaenn 57
I Ny CIID... cnnsstnensnenineiepeeenticsasianmbdeunsenmeninenstaes 58
CG 60
Designation of Record on Appeal .......................----.ccesceeeeeeeneees 62

Affidavit to Proceed with Appeal in Forma Pauperis ............ 64

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Order Permitting Appeal in Forma Pauperis and Order Di-
recting that Expense of Record on Appeal be Paid by the
a aa I uiaeiniiisiietnenions

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Bowen, dated June 16, 1972 ......

Order of vacation and remand of United States Supreme
Court in Bowen Vv. United States 2.000...

Order for en banc hearing by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ..................2......c.cccsccssseeseseeenes

Dissent to Order for en banc hearing by Judge Chambers .....

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Bowen, dated May 9, 1974 .......

Order granting certiorari from United States a
i 2a Se ASS eR FLEE OR

Page

67

A A

1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

D.C. No. 10576

D.C. Judge Gordon Thompson, Jr.
Notice of appeal filed 10/6/71

485/1388
5000 Fd 960

462 Fed. Rep. 2nd. P 347
Date filed in DC—1/27/71
72-1012

EXPEDITED APPEAL
CRIMINAL—DC, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v8
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

For Appellee: Harry D. Steward, US Atty
For Appellant: Michael D. Nasatir, Esq.

DATE
1972 APPELLANT’S ACCOUNT

Jan. 3 FP

READY DATE: Feb. 14, 1972
FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

Jan.

Jan.

Jan.

Jan.

Jan.

Jan.

Feb.
Feb.

Feb.

Feb.

22

FILED NOV 17, 1971, APPELLANT’S MOTION
FOR BAIL PENDING APPEAL. ORIG & 3.
FP

FILED DEC 6, 1971, ORDER (C & E) RE-
QUESTING US ATTY TO RESPOND WITHIN
14 DAYS TO THE APPLICAION FOR BAIL
FILED NOV 17, 1971.

FILED DEC 10, 1971 APPELLANT’S AFFIDA-
VIT AND STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR BAIL
PENDING APPEAL TO: C & E.

FILED ORIG CERT TRANSC OF RECORD ON
APPEAL IN TWO VOLUMES, ORIG & 2 COP-
IES. VOL I: PLEADINGS. VOL. II: RPTR’S
TRANSC. FILED ORIG EXHIBITS IN LPS.
(Copy of two vol record sent to aplt counsel
NASATIR by DC)

DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEAR-
ANCE OF COUNSEL.

Set briefing schedule. Aplt brief due Jan 19, 1972.
Aple brief due Feb 3, 1972. Aplt reply brief due
Feb 8, 1972.

FILED 5 APPELLEES BRIEFS
FILED 25 APPELLEES BRIEFS

FILED RESPONSE OF APPELLEE TO MOTION
FOR BAIL. (Recvd. 12/30/72) see order

FILED ORDER (C-E) Granting appellee permis-
sion to file late response to motion for bail and
granting appellant’s application for bail, etc.
CALENDARED 4/7/72

Recvd orig & 3 aplt reply briefs; sent F.L. #39,
brief is late.

3
DATE
1972 FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

Feb. 28 Filed orig & 3 of aplt’s mot for late filing of reply
brief and order therein. (M, G, McNichols) Copy
of Late reply brief also sent to panel

Feb. 28 Filed order (M) granting leave to file Appellant
Reply Brief.

Feb. 28 FILED 4 APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEFS (MG &

April 7

April 18

June 16

June 16
June 16
June 28

July 24

July 31

Aug. 7

Aug. 24

Aug. 24

Aug. 25

MeNichols)

CAUSE ARGUED & SUBMITTED TO MERRILL,
GOODWIN, CJJ, LYDICK, DJ bb

Recvd. letter of 4/11 from atty Nasatir re: domestic
marijuana (panel)

ORDERED OPINION (PER CURIAM) FILED &
JUDG TO BE FILED & ENTD (JN)

Filed opinion Affirmed (jn)
Filed & Entered Judgment (pn)

FILED ORIG & 24 OF APPELLANTS PETITION
FOR REHEARING & SUGGESTION FOR RE-
HEARING EN BANC. rh

Filed order (M & G, CJJ & Lydick, DJ) denying
petition for rehearing and rejecting suggestion
for rehearing en banc. rh

Filed orig & 3 appellant’s application for stay of
mandate (M) bb

Filed order (M) staying issuance of mandate to
August 24, 1972. Mc

Filed orig. & 3 of appellant’s application to stay the
mandate to (M) -Mc-

Recvd. motion as submitted to the S.C. for ext of
time in which to file petition. rh

Filed order (M) staying issuance of mandate to
9/7/72. -Me-

DATE
1972

FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

Aug. 28 Recvd. copy of pet for writ of cert as filed in the

S.C. F

Sept. 5 Recvd SC Notice of 8/28 of filing of pet for cert SC

Sept. 7

Sept. 8

1973
July 3

July 23

July 26

July 26

Aug. 16

Aug. 20

Aug. 20

Sept. 13

Sept. 13

72-5329. ps

Recvd letter of 9/6 from Sol Gen re: Matter doc-
keted in SC. ps

Reevd notification from Applt counsel Nasatir of
docketing matter in SC. ps

Filed applts motion for bail (panel of 7/16—serv-
ice 7/2/73) rh

Filed order (Hu & Cy) remanding cause to District
Court for hearing to determine appropriate con-
ditions of release, pending reconsideration of this
appeal on remand from the Supreme Court.

Filed copy of S.C. order of 6/25/73 granting pet for
writ of certiorari

Filed certified copy of judgment of the S.C. (6/
25/73) vacating Court of Appeals & remanding
to same for further consideration (panel). Pre-
pared JS-34 Reopened case (jn)

Filed orig & three of appellee motion requesting
leave to file supplemental brief. (M G Lydick)

Filed order (G) granting the filing of appellee sup-
plemental brief. rh

FILED ORIG & 24 APPELLEES SUPPLEMEN-
TAL BRIEF. (panel) abs

Filed orig & 3 appellant’s motion for leave to file
supplemental brief (Panel). bb

FILED O?PICG & 24 APPELLANTS SUPPLE-
MENTA RJEF. (panel) abs

DATE
1973

FILINGS—-PROCEEDINGS

Oct.

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

23

. 21

. 30

10

11

Filed order (C,M,K,Br,D,E,Hu,W,T,Cy,G,W3,S)
taking case en banc. Hearing set for December 11,
1973 at 1:30 p.m., Courtroom #1, San Francisco.
If counsel desire to submit added briefs, such
briefs must be filed by November 15, 1973. bb
Judge Chambers will file a dissent.

Filed dissent of Judge Chambers to the order of
Oct. 23rd.

Recvd orig & 3 of applt’s motion for bail pending
appeal (to C,G). ty

Rec’d an orig. & 3 copies Applts. Supplemental
briefs; sent C.O. 24 re additional copies cr

FILED (25) SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS OF AP-
PELLEE. cs (to all active Judges)

FILED (25) SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS OF AP-
PELLANT. (to all active Judges) es

Filed orig & 3 copies appellee’s motion for per-
mission to use display map at oral argument; to
—~ cs

Filed order (G): Applt John Lee Bowen to be ad-
mitted to bail in an amount and under terms
to be fixed by the dist. court. ty

Recvd orig & 13 copies appellee’s add’l citations &
14 copies of opinion of the Dist. Ct. for the South-
ern Dist. in USA v. BACA, et al. (to all active
judges) cs

Recvd 4 copies of applts add’l citations; insufficient
copies. ty

Argued and submitted to the court en bane mi

April 15 Filed aple’s motion to file additional authority (to

C and all active judges) cl

yr —_ ‘y Se 1? ee ko ; 3 Fu f" wT S ya *
,° i , ~
April 26 Filed aplt’s response to additional authority filed _ Patricia ifcRostie% - a % ,,

; ‘ 2

HARRY Ral NeCUE * Ban's

PUTY CLERK Tati.
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siticn of sentence suspended and probation for years
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_5910(a) ; yt.

Scmmitted to custody tte ey General for r
ents '
__ Treatment and supervisioa under 5010(b) ‘a
Imprisonment for a period of 4203(a) (2) 365) Jail type inst

for

of (_ salance) sentence suspended and prob for
. ; . — al > ;

n ordered ve : ° >

m each count POrAL FIL S$

Commtd pend pymt fine, exec stayed smtil

U.S. Atty _ remataing counts __Indictrent —___iInfo, disaissed
merated _ on surrender to Marshal -___uvon payment of fine.
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4, 2

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_aiver of Indictuent filed __Consent to Juv Delncy filec

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_ ‘er and Plea continued to

_Lefendant states i/.! to Le

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te her and Plea) _ Cuilty (count__)._L“lot Cuilty (count__) R°
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_Shange Plea) __‘iolo Contendre (count__) __Adait _ Deny Juv Delocy ate
ra - ’ y 4 4 ?, Z Pa . = =ssesc sess

JULG: a %

Iimosition of sentence suspended and nrobation for years 010(a)

Ca.mitted to custody Attorney “cneral for :
‘ Observation and study 5010(e) __ 4202(c) N252
¥ ‘reatrent and surervision under 50100) ;

Balininr ® % Imprisonment for a period of __4200(a)(2) __ 3051 jail type inst for
’ Lxecution of (__Jalence) sentence suspended and nrob for
scone —

“estitution order:

, Mine * an cach — YORAL TIE
i a ae __Conmtd nend pywt fine, exee stayed until
Indict” cnt Info, disicissed

On rotion U.%. Atty reralnin’ counts
™“jond Lxonerated on surrender to !.ars)al

unon pavnent of Cine.

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“Richard I Bellman __RoL. if i ay ale ,
—Titivey an iobinson “= Purples | _-loria Prandle ae

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As st. U, Ss. Attornev Nay ho 22. -%; ———

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PPOCEEDINGS —fptd tS Fetid

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_ ail Review __Contd to_ Affirmed Neduced to

_Nefendant not appearing, on mot US Atty bond forfeited and B/! issue a

_ B/) recalled _ Forfeiture set aside Bond reinstated

‘’aiver *r | y ‘
_ aiver of Indictrent filed _information filed _ Consent to Juv Deloev fil

_‘4rr and Plea continued to

_Defendant states T/il to be

+
_'rr and Plea) _ Cuilty (count) lot muiltw (count ) ;
__ Chane Plea ) _ iJOlo Contendre (count ) hanit Deny Juv. Delacv

rial peal) —. Continued to f-17-7/ 7’ ,
__settr _ “ort Disnosition ~ :
_ “Lied waiver of Jury trial - vi »
nea oi
ef to P/0 for TAX, end sentence continued to
*
_ ting Rent P/O and sent continued to

_ Probation report waived (SLE JUDUREIY BELO.) Provetion renort sealed

__hevocation of probatian _ femit "env Probation revolied (SED JUDAILIN)
__continued on nrobation
_OFMER:
"eSeeseeeeeeescseeeeeeneennesensunesace = & f& &@ Ses « =
JUDG Er _"ollorins study
__ Imposition of sentence susmended and nrobation for vears 5010(a)
_Committed to custody /ttomev General _

Observation and stuc 591% e) 1208 (c) 4252

‘reatment and sunervisiai under s0IT (6) ork

_ Inmmrisanrent for period of a _ N08 (a)(2) | _3¥51 jail tyme inst for -

_Jelance) sentence suspended and prob for

festitution ordered ”
TOTAL Pua:

3

“ane on ench count

_Comittend nendin’ nayrent fine, exec ¢ stavec until

renainin~ counts Tndictment Ino.

—_ di suissed
__™ surrender to Iarsbal

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_Pond Exoneratecd _wmon navaent of fine

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~ “Richarni I.fellman —_t.L.Robinson *’’—— Jan Puegles
“Tih lvey Maver wee

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fttorney for Defendant WTA EE

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_Anptd _!

PNUCEEDINGS : Soe

_ Ball Neview _ Contd to

_ Aff irmed

__Teduced to __

Defendant not appearing, on mot US Attv bond forfeited and BA! issue

_B/l recalled _ Forfeiture set aside

_‘lalver of Indictment filed _ Information filed
__frr and Plea continued to |

_Defendant states T/il to be Nac} ; , Ri #0 OP ite
__f/rr and Plea)

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_Chanre } Plea)

_ Cuilty (count)
_ Nolo Contendre-(Ccount_) _ Admit

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Sette

* "iled vaiver of Jury trial

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Ref to [/0 for-IM, and sentence continued to

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. llr Rept P/O and sent continued to
_ Probation renort watved (SLE JUDG ILI? BELDO.!)
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evocation of “mere Aemit

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JUDG Lr

Imposition of sentence suspended and probation for ____

Committed to custody Attorney Cencral for
Observation and stuc, — 5019(e) 4208 (c)

Treatment and sunervisio: under 5010 (b)
~Imprisav-ent for period of ——___ 208 (a)(2) |

__ Execution of )

_"estitution ordered

Tine ‘ on each count TOTAL PINE

__ Continued to

__Probetion yenort

_ Balance) sentence suspended and prob for —

__Bond reinstated

Cansent to Juv Deiccv flied

lot muiltv (count)

‘Ten’ Juv, Delnacy

_J ufetnd ?

——s meee ae

sealed

_ Probation revol:ed (SEE JUDG LIT)
— ~ continued on nrobation
ot Bagguar -- ent tb o- 23-74 4°30

"olla rine study

veers __5010(a)

4252
_351 jail tyme inst for _

remainin~ envae” “Tndictment

om eemaaine to liershal

Om motion US Atty
~ 2ond Exonerated

__uron nanwnt of Cine

Camittcnd pendine payment fine, exec Stayec until -

Info, dismissed

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'.N. Zinn “Gloria Frandle ° © ay ys ye “. ; a
€ pw eichard I Bellman Jan Ruggles. Assistant U.S. Attorney » 4
“i. Hal H Kennedy =, hake dl a 4 ‘ ee ey wk
. mn __ Mel Mayer # - Wes 7 ee” ae . me, &. Yd “3 mary
*_» Vie Mohler " ree # , co AGE
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AR on __ Piled waiver of Juyrtrial
7 - |. | , re rts
a 1 sti “a . s aan Ruggles
Milvoy Mayer | Linda Strasser mae ~ pi vey Mayez “ % Linda Strasser os
P* s 4. Vietor Mohler “+ « “7 @ldria Frandle bn, ke, -¢ jZ Victor Mohler -Glerta Frandle_ .: %
Robert Robinson Dorothy Albright y ——obert Redinsor ad Dorothy Albright .
:; Donald Pellaton = : . ..Bonald Pellaton :
4 nsf Ris — + 9 owe “a
& Asst. U.S. Attorney wf «fh PEP | cone Ast, U. S. Attorney | 4 f YY: 2 then - L Au -j_-
I, - 7. - Pls mS ; = : e : ;
: Atty for Defendant 77 tates "
,~ Imprisonment r period of 7 792? wa uf ene. .
. 4208 a : 3651 jail type inst for _.Arr and Plec) |. _cuthey (count __) __Not guilty (count )
~. — ys — i. ) wa
. Defendant 1 _ Change Plea )} _ Nelo Contendre (count_ ) _ Admit — Deny Juv. Delacy
Defendant 2° id i i _sCont to fo P-L VS Ay
Sette ~_ for disposition Ton /- Y
; Jd .
Execution of (__balance) sentence. suspended and prob for - yited-weiver ef jury tris} pow a fil
Restituti dered Den aneinbne
- ——— ef to P/O for I/R, and ecentence cont to yor"

Fine §$ on each count TOTAL FINE $

_Hrz Rept P/O and sent continuted to
Committed pending payment fine, exec stayed until

__¥robation report waived __Probation report sealed
On motion U.S. Atty __ Remaining counts __ Indictment a ra

~_— Safewmetion dhanlased iS ..evecation of probation Acmit — Deny _ Probation revoked =

% a __ continued on probation __hearing continued
.” Bond exonerated __ on surrender to Marshal ___upon payment of fine ae

r. - . ye __fSitorney ers relieved ~

ATs.” 7 . cea CP ap a 4 =

i.” t~ Other ane A‘ EXON, AS -3/- “a Ar OY Avil imc
4 ad Ccate orcin g a- 37 1 dgtemanatng kz on motions cont _ _ BEST Copy AVAILABLE
5 mal : ne
: ;..On motion US Atty bond exonerated. ers:
‘ , _. Utiier

~~ OCT & 1971 =metemest a ~~ ,

WEA, vo Aye te Ahn ep No. 77> ¢:-
resent’ _¢ iu Custedy — On Bond 0/R NA

ty 7 im “hele:
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yet KON, EDWARD J." SCHWARTZ"! °s: HONS HosianD B.’ TURRENTINE’ , scot MES |
SON. J. SLUFFURD WALLACE’ “HON. ‘GORDON THOMPSON, JR. ti hae os 0 OR
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23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

November 1970 Grand Jury
No. 10576 Criminal

{Filed Jan. 27, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of California, Cynthia M. Freeman}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
v.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT
INDICTMENT

Title 21, U.S.C., Sec. 176a—Smuggling and Transporting
Marihuana; Title 21, U.S.C., See. 331(q) (3) (B) —Pos-
session of Depressant and Stimulant Drugs

The Grand Jury charges:
COUNT ONE

On or about January 19, 1971, within the Southern
District of California, defendant JOHN LEE BOWEN,
with intent to defraud the United States, knowingly
smuggled and clandestinely introduced into the United
States from Mexico approximately 356 pounds of mari-
huana, which marihuana should have been declared; and
knowingly imported and brought into the United States
from Mexico said marihuana contrary to law, in that
said marihuana had not been presented for inspection
entered and declared as provided by United States Code,
Title 19, Sections 1459 and 1461; in violation of Title
21, United States Code, Section 176a.

RPR:mr
1-26-71

24
COUNT TWO

Title 21, U.S.C., Sec. 176a

On or about January 19, 1971, within the Southern
District of California, defendant JOHN LEE BOWEN,
with intent to defraud the United States, knowingly re-
ceived, concealed, and facilitated the transportation and
concealment of, approximately 356 pounds of marihuana,
which marihuana, as the defendant then and there well
knew, had been imported and brought into the United
States contrary to law, in violation of Title 21, United
States Code, Section 176a.

COUNT THREE

Title 21, U.S.C., Sec. 331(q) (3) (b)

That on or about January 19, 1971, within the South-
ern District of California, defendant, JOHN LEE BOW-
EN, did willfully and knowingly possess 158 benzadrine
tablets in violation of Title 21, United States Code,
Section 331(q) (3) (B) and 360a(C) (2).

A TRUE BILL:

/s/ Carl White
Foreman

/s/ Harry D. Steward

HARRY D. STEWARD
United States Attorney

By /s/ [Illegible]

25
Law Offices
NASATIR, SHERMAN & HIRSCH
Suite 806

9720 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California 90212
Telephone (213) 278-4584

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 10576

[Filed Jul. 28, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, South-
ern District of California. By [Illegible], Deputy Clerk]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
v8.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
PURSUANT TO RULE 41 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

To The Clerk Of The Above-Entitled Court And To The
United States Attorney For The Southern District Of
California:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 9, 1971, at
the hour of 1:30 P.M., in the United States District
Court, Courtroom No. 1B, United States Courthouse,
325 West “F” Street, San Diego, California, defendant
JOHN LEE BOWEN will move to suppress all evidence
obtained by law enforcement officers in the above-entitled
case.

Said motion will be made on the ground that the search

and seizure of all evidence in the above-entitled case

violated defendant’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well

as his rights under Federal and State Law.

26

Said motion will be based upon the files and records in
this case, this Notice of Motion and Motion, the Affidavit
of John Lee Bowen submitted herewith, and the Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities attached hereto.
DATED: July 26, 1971.

Respectfully submitted,

/8/ Michael D. Nasatir
MICHAEL D. NASATIR of
NASATIR, SHERMAN & HIRSCH
Attorneys for Defendant Bowen

27
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN LEE BOWEN

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss
CouNTY OF Los ANGELES )

JOHN LEE BOWEN, being first duly sworn, hereby
deposes and says:

1. That he is the defendarit in the above entitled
action.

2. That on or about January 19, 1971, affiant had
been lawfully present in a 1970 Ford Pickup Camper on
highway 86 near Salton City. At approximately 10:00
P.M. agents of the Federal Government conducted a
search of this camper without a search warrant.

3. Affiant is informed and believes, and in reliance
thereon alleges that said search was without probable
cause; without lawful warrant as required by the Con-
stitution of the United States; and violated defendant’s
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

DATED: June 8, 1971.
/s/ John Lee Bowen
JOHN LEE BOWEN
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8th day
of June, 1971.

/s/ Victor Sherman
Notary Public

[SEAL |

Official seal, Victor Sherman, Notary Public—California.
Principal office in Los Angeles County.

My Commission Expires May 10, 1974

28
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I

THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CON-
STITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND ALL EVIDENCE GAINED THERE-
FROM MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, Chief
Justice Taft said:

“Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an in-
ternational boundary because of national self-pro-
tection reasonably requiring one entering the country
to identify himself as entitled to come, and his be-
longings and effects which may be lawfully brought
in. But those lawfully within the country, entitled
to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there
is known to a competent official authorized to search,
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.”

Absent constant surveillance of the vehicle from the
time it crosses the border to the time of search, see
Castillo-Garcia v. United States, 424 F. 2d 482 (1970),
a search of a vehicle may not be upheld as a “border”
search which allows a vehicle to be entered without prob-
able cause. See Contreras v. United States, 291 F. 2d 63
(1961). Thus, without any history of suspicious be-
havior at the border followed by surveillance or pursuit,
the government must justify the search on the ground that
it was reasonable under the circumstances; that is, that
- — inspector had probable cause to conduct

e search. Cervantes v. United States
(9th Cir. 1959). ea

The Court in Cervantes, supra, held that while the car
was legally stopped in order to determine the nationality
of its occupants, the subsequent search of that car could
not be justified under the rubric of “probable cause.”

EE err

29

In Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States, 425 F. 2d 1170
(1970), the Court held that although the driver of a
car appeared nervous and showed a temporary alien
pass to the inspector, there was not sufficient probable
cause to allow a search of the vehicle. The Court cited
Contreras, supra, and emphasized that where there was
no logical connection between the examination of the
vehicle and the determination of the driver’s citizenship
of any other occupant of the car, and absent probable
cause, the search must be found unlawful and the evi-
dence suppressed. In Roa-Rodriguez v. United States,
410 F. 2d (1969), immigration inspectors had arrested
a non-resident alien about 90 miles north of the Mexican
border. Noting that this was not a border search by
customs officers at a point of entry or checkpoint, and
that there were no suspicious actions by the occupants
of the car at the border or otherwise, and no hot pursuit
from the border, the Court held that a subsequent search
violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The
Court emphasized that the immigration inspectors were
justified in stopping the car but not in conducting a
general search for law violations. Citing Plazola Vv.
United States, 291 F. 2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961), and Con-
treras v. United States, supra.

II
CONCLUSION

For the reasons cited above, the evidence obtained in
the warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle must be
suppressed, and the indictment dismissed.

DATED: July 26, 1971.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael D. Nasatir
MICHAEL D. NASATIR of
NASATIR, SHERMAN & HIRSCH
Attorneys for Defendant

30

HARRY D. STEWARD
United States Attorney

ROBERT H. FILSINGER
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
SHELBY R. GoTT
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Courthouse
325 West F Street
San Diego, Calif. 92101
Telephone: 293-5619

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 10576 Criminal

[Filed Aug. 6, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of California. By Cynthia M. Freeman, Deputy]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
Vv.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Comes now the Plaintiff, UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, in opposition to the defendant’s motion to
suppress. Said opposition is based on the files and records

31

of this case as well as on _the attached statement of
facts and points and authorities.
DATED: August 6, 1971.

SRG /lld
8-6-71

Respectfully submitted,

HarrY D. STEWARD
United States Attorney

ROBERT H. FILSINGER
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

/s/ Shelby R. Gott
SHELBY R. GOTT
Assistant U.S. Attorney

32
STATEMENT OF FACTS

At about 10:00 p.m. on January 19, 1971, the defend-
ant, John Lee Bowen, arrived at the regularly established
immigration checkpoint on Highway 86, near Salton
City, California, as the driver and sole occupant of a
rented 1970 Ford pickup with a camper.

While checking the interior of the camper for illegal
aliens, the officers detected the odor of marihuana.

Further search of the camper revealed 162 kilogram
packages of marihuana under the mattress in the forward
portion of the camper. The marihuana was also covered
with burlap bags that were from Mexico.

Search of Bowen’s clothing incidental to the arrest
disclosed 158 benzedrine tablets in his jacket pocket.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Immigration officers are empowered by statute to stop
and search vehicles for aliens without probable cause

within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the
United States.

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1357(a) (3);
Title 8, C.F.R., 287.1;

Fernandez v. United States (9th Cir. 1963), 321

F.2d 283;

Miranda v. United States, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.
1970) ;

Fumigali v. United States, —— F.2d ——~ (9th Cir.
1970).

If while performing these duties they smell the odor
of marihuana, the officers then have probable cause to
search for the marihuana.

Fernandez v. United States, supra.
CONCLUSION

The motion to suppress should be denied.

33

[5] SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA;
MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 1971

AFTERNOON SESSION

THE CLERK: 21 on calendar, 10576, U.S. vs. John
Lee Bowen, for hearing motions.
MR. GOTT: Shelby Gott, in that matter.

(Discussion off the record. )

MR. NASATIR: Michael D. Nasatir for Mr. Bowen,
your Honor.

THE COURT: Let’s proceed. =,

MR. NASATIR: Your Honor, I believe it will be stipu-
lated between the Government and defense that there
was no warrant in this case, in which case it is the
Government’s burden.

THE COURT: All right. You may proceed, Mr.
Gott, with your evidence.

MR. GOTT: Yes.

May it please the Court, very briefly, this is a Border
Patrol check point case. I will call as my first witness
Frank Ortmeier.

MR. NASATIR: Your Honor, I believe there are
other witnesses in the courtroom. I would ask that they
be excluded.

THE COURT: They may be excluded. Would you
[6] please step outside before you are called.

FRANK R. ORTMEIER,

called as a witness by and on behalf of the Government,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
THE CLERK: Would you take the stand, state your
full name and spell your last name for the record, please.
THE WITNESS: Frank R. Ortmeier, O-r-t-m-e-i-e-r.

ee a ee ee ee

34
DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. GOTT:

Who do you work for?

Border Patrol in El Centro.

How long have you been so employed?
Approximately four and a half years.

- Have you ever had occasion to meet a person you
now know as John Lee Bowen?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What date and time did you first meet Mr. Bowen
if you recall?

A. About 10:05 p.m. on January 19 of this year.

Q. And what specifically were you doing when you

first met Mr. Bowen?
(7] A. We were—my partner and I were holding down
an Immigration check point at the junction of State
Highway 86 and 78, which is between Brawley and Indio
on Highway 86.

Q. Is that a regularly established check point?

A. Yes, sir. Most of the time, with the execption of
a few shifts, while we are short handed we don’t have
men there.

Q. Is there some kind of a building at that check
point?

A. Yes, sir, there is.

Q. Would you describe that very briefly.

A. A building which we call our office and we have
a detention room in there. We write up aliens. It is
approximately the size of this room here, this courtroom,
and we have a little shack, so to speak, that we stand
underneath to talk to in the vehicles who are coming
through the check point.

Q. When the check point is open, are all vehicles
required to stop?

A. Yes, sir, we have traffic cones on the highway
which follows the traffic off the highway through our
check point.

Q. What was the condition of traffic on this par-
ticular date, January 19, about 10:05 p.m.?

OPO Po

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ete em es art

35

[8] A. The traffic was very slow at that point, hardly
—I would say maybe one or two cars every 10 minutes
or so.

Q. Would you estimate for us approximately how far
from the California~-Mexican Border this check point is
as the crow flies?

A. As the crow flies, I would estimate about 45 miles.

Q. And do you know how far it is by highway?

A. 55 to 60 miles, I would guess.

Q. Where does this north-south road go that the check
point is maintained on?

A. We check northbound traffic. It goes—if they turn
left on State 78, they can go to Julian, California, or else
up through Indio, Riverside, Los Angeles, and points
north.

Q. On what highway would that be?

A. Highway 86.

Q. Now when you met the defendant, was he in a
vehicle or on foot?

A. He was in a vehicle, in a 1970 Ford pickup with a
camper.

Q. What direction was he traveling?

A. Northbound.

Q. Did you have some sort of signals or stop [9]
signs or something prior to him coming to the check
point that he would have passed?

A. There were about five signs warning the vehicles
to keep to the right and not pass, and prepare to stop
ahead at our check point. We have a very large stop
sign with the red blinking lights on it.

Q. Did you observe anyone else in the vehicle?

A. No, sir.

Q. On arriving at your check point did you have a
conversation with the defendant?

A. Yes. I identified myself as an Immigration Officer
and asked him to state his citizenship, and he stated—
I believe it was an American citizenship. However, I
determined that he was an American citizen. I don’t
remember the actuai words he told me.

Q. At least you became satisfied that he was legally
in the country?

36

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, what did you do then?

A. I asked him to open up the back of the camper
for a search for illegal aliens.

Q. Did he open the back of the camper?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. What did you observe, if anything, upon him [10]
opening the rear of the camper?

A. First of all, I noticed a strong odor of marijuana
coming from the back of the camper.

Q. What did you do at that time?

A. I got into the camper. There were no lights in the
camper but I had my flashlight. I saw what appeared
to be bedrolls or someone laying upon the mattress that
is over the cab of the pickup.

Q. Are you referring to the cab-over, a portion of
the camper?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I walked closer to it and shined the flashlight in
there and it turned out to be two back-packs, I believe
it was.

At the same time I notice what I observed to be kilo
bricks, dark-blue cellophane-wrapped packages, stacked
neatly underneath the mattress, and I could see about a
three-inch portion of it between the edge of the mattress
and the cardboard—not the cardboard, the plywood struc-
ture of the camper itself where the mattress lays on.

Q. Did you move the mattress prior to seeing those?

A. No, sir.

[11] Q. Was it in plain sight upon shining your light
in that direction?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you recognize those packages as something you
had seen in the past?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they appear to you to be?

A. They appeared to be packages—kilos of marijuana.

Q. Did you perform any tests on those at that time?

A. Yes, sir, I took a key that I had hanging on my

37

belt and punched a hole in one of the packages and it
appeared to me to be marijuana.

Q. Then what did you do, if anything?

A. I got out of the camper and placed Mr. Bowen
under arrest and advised him of his rights to remain
silent.

Q. You put him in handcuffs?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what then happened, if anything?

A. I then had called for assistance from my partner
to come and help with the traffic and to take care of this
matter.

Q. Was that Mr. Carosco who was working with you?
[12] A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was anyone else working with you at that check
point at that time?

A. No, sir.
Q. Did Mr. Carosco come to the scene?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you do then with the defendant, as far
as Mr. Carosco is concerned, at that point?

A. First of all, I drove the vehicle—as soon as Mr.
Carosco got there I drove the vehicle off to the side,
while he observed Mr. Bowen and again, I think—as I
can recall at this time, I advised him of his rights, again,
to remain silent, and I proceeded to make a more thorough
search of the camper and searched for contraband—

Q. (Interposing) What else did you find?

A. I found approximately 158 to 160 kilos of mari-
juana,

—-also underneath the cupboards below the sink and
the refrigerator and seats on both sides of the camper
and found two or more burlap bags, I believe with the
name “Product of Mexico” written on the burlap bags.
And also, as I can recall at this time, I believe there was
a jacket laying in the passenger compartment of the pick-
up with some pills in it. also [13] an aerosol tear gas can,
a Kleenex box in the driver’s compartment on the dash-
board, along with a slip, a sales slip for a nine-millimeter
pistol that had been purchased recently. I don’t remember
the exact date.

38

Q. Did you find any papers in there, about the vehicle,
to show ownership of it?

A. Yes, sir. I found a rental agreement paper show-
ing that that vehicle had been rented to Mr. Bowen.

Q. Did you find anything else of any consequence ?

A. That I can recall at this time, no, sir.

MR. GOTT: Nothing further from this witness at this
time, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Nasatir.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. NASATIR:

Q. I take it from your testimony the check point is
shut down at certain times, is that right?

A. When we are short-handed, maybe once or twice
a week through an eight-hour shift. We don’t have
enough men to keep it open.

Q. So approximately 16 hours a week it is not open,
is that right, sir?

A. I can’t give you an exact date. It just depends
on how the schedule falls. I have no specific [14] knowl-
edge of when it is open and when it isn’t, only by
searching through past records.

Q. I am not asking you for exactly. The red light—
is that attached to a fixed piece of property, or is that
portable, sir?

A. It is attached to a little building that we stand
underneath for shade.

Q. So it is affixed to the building, is that right?

A. Yes. It is removed when we don’t have the check
point in operation.

Q. Do you remember what day of the week this
arrest was, Mr. Ortmeier?

A. I don’t remember what day of the week, no, sir.
It was the 18th or 19th, as far as I can recall.

Q. Is the traffic fast or slow on different days of
the week?

A. Yes, sir. _

Q. And sometimes it is fast and sometimes it is slow
is that correct, sir?

39

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But you remember definitely of your own memory
at this point that the traffic was slow on this particular
day?

[15] <A. Yes, sir, it was slow.

Q. But you don’t remember the particular day of
the week it was?

A. No, sir.

Q. Could it have been Sunday?

A. I don’t know, sir.

Q. If it was Sunday, the traffic would have been fast,
is that correct, sir?

A. Not necessarily so. It varies.

Q. Would you say that the traffic was heavier on
Saturday or Sunday then other days of the week?

A. That again depends on if there is some activities
in the Valley or sports events or something of that
nature. It is rather hard to say, really.

Q. What highway is this check point on, sir?

A. Highway 86.

Q. Highway 86. Is there a connection into Highway
86 from San Diego?

A. Yes, sir. Interstate 8 intersects Highway 86.

Q. Interstate 8 leads directly to Highway 86, does
it not?

A. Yes, sir. It is a Border Interstate.

Q. Excuse me, sir?

A. It is the Border Interstate, Interstate 8 [16] from
San Diego through E] Centro and on east to Yuma.

Q. So that the highway also comes—or is there a
lead-in to Highway 86 from El] Centro also?

A. Highway 86 goes right through El Centro.

Q. Right through El] Centro?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What other American cities does Highway 86
pass through, sir?

A. It originates—it goes through Heber. It goes
through #1] Centro, Brawley, Imperial—Brawley—West-
moreland, Indio.

Q. Is it possible to get to your check point directly
from San Diego, California, without passing through the
Mexican Border?

40

A. Yes, sir, it is possible.

Q. Does your check point stop every car, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Every single car that goes through when you are
open?

A. That again depends on the volume of traffic and
the manpower that we have. Some people who we ob-
viously know by sight who come through every day we
don’t stop, generally.

Q. There are people who you don’t know who you
don’t stop, depending on the circumstances, though, is
{17} that correct?

A. Depending upon the volume of traffic. Sometimes
it is bumper-to-bumper and we are rather busy on holi-
day weekends.

Q. You check Mr. Bowen’s citizenship when he ar-
rived, is that right, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. You found nothing unusual, did you?

A. No, sir.

Q. And looking at the camper, there was nothing un-
usual about that, was there?

A. Not really, other than it appeared to be a rental
camper.

Q. How did that appearance strike you, sir?

A. Well, there was nothing inside the camper other
than a jacket and a—

Q. (Interposing) Prior to your looking inside the
camper.

A. No, I am talking about the compartment where
Mr. Bowen was sitting.

Q. The driver’s seat, is that right, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Nothing in there other than what?

A. A Kleenex—well, a Kleenex box and jacket, it was
later determined, but generally when a privately [18]
owned car comes through they have all sorts of things
in there.

Q. That would depend on the person, wouldn’t it?

A. Right.

41

Q. A person neat and clean might have less than a
person who was dirty, is that correct?

A. I guess.

Q. There is nothing really suspicious about there just
being a jacket there, is that right?

A. No, sir.

Q. Nothing on the outside of the camper in the way
of a sign of the source of that camper to identify it as
a rental camper, was there?

A. Sometimes there are, but I didn’t notice about this
particular camper. They have a little sticker on the
windshield.

Q. Other than the fact there was a jacket on the
front seat with Mr. Bowen, there was nothing unusual
about that camper, was there?

A. Not about the passenger compartment at that time,
no.

Q. And Mr. Bowen got out of the camper willingly,
did he not?

A. Yes, sir, I assume willingly.

Q. He cooperated with you in every way concerning
[19] citizenship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He opened the door of the camper for you, did he
not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now as soon as he opened the door of the camper
was it then that you smelled the marijuana?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you standing, sir?

A. I was standing right alongside of him when he
opened it.

Q. You were outside the camper, were you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You have to step up quite a ways to get inside
the camper, do you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Isn’t that correct? And you hadn’t taken any steps
up to the step up into the camper yet, had you?

A. No, sir.

_— —

42

_ Q._ The door opens outside and prevents you from do-
ing that, does it not?

A. Right.

Q. How far from the camper would you say you
were when you smelled the marijuana, Mr. Ortmeier?

A. Less than three feet.

[20] Q Okay. Was it old marijuana or fresh mari-
juana?

A. That is hard to say. I cannot say it was old
marijuana. I can’t distinguish the odor between old
and new. I can distinguish what marijuana odor does
smell like, though.

Q. Was it smoked marijuana? Can you distinguish
between marijuana having been smoked and marijuana
that hasn’t been smoked?

A. Smoked and unsmoked marijuana, yes, I can dis-
tinguish those.

Q. Are they very distinguishable odors?

A. Yes.

Q. Was this wet marijuana or dry marijuana that
you smelled?

A. If you are asking before I looked into the pack-
ages—

Q. Before you looked into the camper, sir.

A. I did not give it a thought.

Q. You didn’t give it a thought?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now, you stated your smelled marijuana in othe
— Mr. Ortmeier. Have any of those cases gone to
ria

A. Yes, sir.

[21] Q Approximately how many, sir? How many
have resulted in convictions, let’s make it?

i. I have several cases pending that are over a year
)

Q. Have any of your cases resulted in a conviction?

A. Yes, sir.

2 re mae | of those, if you know?

on’t—I can’t tell you for sure is ti
There have been several. a

43

Q. What training have you had in the smell of mari-
juana, Mr. Ortmeier?

A. We don’t have any specific training other than we
have a Customs Agent come every once in a while to
talk to new trainees and let them smell marijuana.

Q. Does he bring marijuana with him?

A. And look at other substances, yes.

Q. Does he bring marijuana with him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At these training sessions is it not a fact, sir,
the agent allows you to smell marijuana from up close,
is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. He takes it up to you and you smell it [22] right
in front of your nose, just about?

A. You can if you wish. You don’t have to.

Q. Right. This agent does not go through a train-
ing period that allows you to smell marijuana from in-
side a vehicle and from the outside, does he, sir?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Ortmeier, after you entered the vehicle, was
it then that you searched this drawer in the vehicle?

A. No, sir.

Q. What is the first thing you did after you entered
the vehicle?

A. I walked to the forward points of the camper to
determine what was on the bunk, or the bed-type, that
is over the cab of the pickup.

Were the lights on or off inside the vehicle?

They were off.

Did you have your flashlight?

Yes, sir.

Did you shine it up there, sir?

Yes, sir.

How were the backpacks placed?

They were just laying on the bed.

. Were they alongside each other or on top [23] of
each other? How, sir?

A. They were not on top of each other, no. I can’t
recall for sure. I can’t tell you exactly how they were
laying at this time.

OPOPOPOPO

44

Q. Did you really confuse those backpacks, Mr. Ort-
meier, with a human being?

A. At first sight when I first stepped in the camper
it could have been the body of a person laying there.

Q. Those backpacks?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the backpacks full or empty, sir?

A. They were empty but they were of the design
that kind of held the canvas out, so to speak.

Q. They were in plain sight?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Nothing covering them?
A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. When did you first realize they were back-
packs? How far inside the door were you when you
first realized they were backpacks and not a human
being?

A. I made about two steps. After I stepped up into
the camper about two steps toward the front of the
camper.

[24] Q. Okay. And after you took those two steps
you realized that they were not a human being but a
backpack?

A. Right.

Q. After you stepped into the camper were you look-
ing for human beings or were you looking for marijuana?

A. I was looking for human beings.

Q. Still looking for human beings?

A. Yes, sir. That is our primary purpose.

Q. After you took your two steps you determined
it was not a human being on top of that mattress, is that
right, sir?

A. Right.

Q. Now the mattress in that type of camper—could
you hold up your hands and estimate approximately how
thick that mattress portion is from the inside of the
camper? Let me ask it this way. That mattress portion

‘of the cab-over portion, as Mr. Gott calls it, is less than

a foot wide, is that right, sir?
A. You mean the mattress itself?
Q. The mattress.

—

ee ee

45

A. Where the mattress lays on the camper?

Q. Where the mattress lays on the camper, sir.
[25] A. How deep it is or how wide?

Q. How deep it is; less than a foot deep, is it not?

A. It is considerably less than a foot deep, I would
say the edge that holds the mattress from sliding back
is about that—was about that—

THE COURT: Indicating three or four—

TH" WITNESS: —three or four inches deep.

BY MR. NASATIR:

And that was the thickness, is that right, sir?

To hold the mattress, yes.

And the mattress fits into that holder, does it not?
Yes.

It doesn’t extend over that holder, does it?

. It is higher when—I would say it might have
been an inch or two higher than that three or four-inch
holder when it is placed down in there without anything
underneath it.

Q. Now the mattress was placed down in there, is
that right, sir?

A. It was laying in that area. It was not all the way
down in.

[26] Q. Now how far above the holder is the mat-
tress, then, Mr. Ortmeier, in this case?

A. The mattress—about an inch or an inch and a
half of the mattress was actually below that three or
four-inch space. However, it was about that far pushed
ahead of that piece of the plywood that holds the mattress
from sliding back.

Q. All right. Now the piece of plywood you are
talking about is the holder, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. So that what you are saying then—we are talking
just about the deepness—that the mattress stuck up above
the holder approximately two inches, is that right? Is
that fair to say?

A. More or less.

Q. More or less two inches. So the total thickness,
then, was five inches, is that right, sir?

POPrPore

46

A. I cannot tell you for sure how many inches. I
mean I didn’t measure it. It was immaterial to me at
that time.

Q. You estimated about five inches?

A. More or less.

Q. Okay. Now then you say the mattress was pushed
toward the front of the cab. Am I right, sir?

A. It was about two, three or four inches. [27] I
don’t recall at this time—further ahead from that thing
that holds the mattress from falling on the floor in the
camper.

Q. Right. So there was as much as a four-inch space
between the mattress and the holder, is that correct?

A. More or less.

Q. More or less. Now how many steps, after the
two steps that you took in and you discovered the back-
packs were not human beings, did you have to take in
order to reach that area, actually?

A. Like I say, the two steps that I took in there,
I could see the kilo bricks. |

Q. After taking two steps inside the cabin?

A. After taking two steps with the flashlight, and
the flashlight just shined on them, before I determined
what the backpacks were.

Q. Were not the kilo bricks in between the mattress
and the mattress holder, sir?

A. Right.

Q. Were not the kilo bricks underneath the thickness
of the plywood that comprises the mattress holder?

A. If you looked at the mattress at eye level you
could not see the kilo bricks.

[28] Q. Okay. How far away from the mattress were
you when you spotted these kilo bricks?

A. I would say one step, step and a half.

Q. A step and a half away?

A. Maybe. Maybe a step and a half at the most.

Q. These kilo bricks were not sitting on top of the
mattress, were they?

A. No.

Q. Lying beside it, were they not?

A. They were lying underneath the mattress.

} |

47

Q. Underneath the mattress?

A. Yes.

Q. The mattress was partially covering the kilo bricks?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the two kilo bricks wrapped in, sir?

A. In kind of a dark-blue cellophane plastic-type
paper.

Q. You couldn’t see through the dark blue cellophane?

A. No.

Q. They were covering bricks and you couldn’t see into
them?

A. Each individual brick was wrapped separately
[29] from all the others.

Q. Right. You couldn’t see inside the wrapping?

A. Inside the brick, no, without touching them.

Q. Right. How much of the bricks’ surface would you
say was showing?

A. Of each brick?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I would say three to four inches of maybe eight
or ten bricks.

Q. Three to four inches of eight or ten bricks, is
that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Three to four inches apiece?

A. Yes, sir. The bricks in order like this, about three
inches or so of maybe eight or ten bricks. I didn’t count
how many I first saw.

Q. How wide is a brick of marijuana usually, sir?

A. Oh, I would say about four to five inches; six
inches, maybe.

Q. Okay. Now how many bricks were underneath the
mattress, Mr. Ortmeier?

A. Around 120, I believe it was.

. Was anything like burlap discovered with them?
(30! A. No, sir. The burlap bags and the rest of
the marijuana was found underneath the cupboards,
underneath the sink and refrigerator, and one of the
seats, I believe.

Q. Was there any writing on any of the packages of
these kilo packages?

48

A. The kilo packages?

Q. Yes.

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Okay. What did you do after you found these
kilo packages?

A. After the first encounter?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. First of all, I called for my partner.

Q. Second of all?

A. After he arrived and he got the traffic moving
again, we called Customs and told them we had an un-
determined amount of contraband so that they would
respond as fast as possible.

Q. Then what did you do? Did you discover the
other 160 kilos underneath the cupboard?

A. The total of 160 more or less.

Q. You discovered them yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you describe how they looked upon [81]
discovery?

A. Underneath the cupboard they were stacked in
there, as many as they could hold.

Q. Blue cellophane, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And where was the burlap in relation to the blue
cellophane kilos?

A. The burlap bags were in, I believe, as you are
looking forward, the right-hand compartment in one of
the cupboards.

Q. In one of the cupboards?

A. Yes.

Q. Those burlap bags were not physically present on
the kilos of marijuana, were they, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. All right. And what relationship were they? Were
they wrapped in it?

A. No, the burlap bags were empty, laying on to
of the kilos, some of the kilos, in the er right-hand
cupboard.

Q. Was there any other type of covering down there?

A. No, sir. There was a cupboard door.

49

Q. Were there any bags on anything else?

A. Not that I saw.

[32] Q. Did it look like these marijuana—excuse me.

Did it look like these burlap bags were being used
for anything in your opinion, or were they just laying
on top of the kilos?

A. Do you want my opinion of what I thought they
were?

Q. Were they laying just on top of the kilos?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you found some more underneath the seat,
is that correct?

A. Yes, on the left-hand side. The seat was on the
left-hand side, I believe.

Q. Were there any burlap bags underneath that seat?

A. No, sir. I don’t believe there was on the left-
hand side.

Q. What did the burlap bag say?

A. I believe it said—I believe one or possibly two of
the bags said, “Product of Mexico.” I can’t be too sure
about it. I believe that is as far as I can recall at this
time, that is what they said.

Q. How many burlap bags were there, in all?

A. At least two. I am not sure whether there [33]
were more or not.

Q. There were no burlap bags with the kilos dis-
covered in the mattress?

A. Not underneath the mattress, no.

Q. Were there any burlap bags above the mattress?

A. No.

Q. Were there any burlap bags discovered underneath
the seat?

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

Q. The only burlap bags you found were those that
were used to cover those in the cupboard; is that right?

A. I don’t know if they were used to cover the ones
in the cupboard. They were laying on top.

. They were laying on top?
A. Like they had just been thrown in there.

a |

50

Q. Now how many times have you gone through this
course with the agent where he allows you to smell a
brick of marijuana?

A. I believe I have been present twice. We don’t
really call them training sessions.

Q. Just an informal meeting-type thing?

A. Right. They put a notice on the bulletin board.
Anyone wishing to come to this thing, they will have a
Customs Agent in our squad room at a [84] certain
date and time, and anyone who wants to partake in it
can come. It is not compelled that we take it.

Q. Did you actually participate twice?

A. Yes, I believe it was twice.

Q. Actually smell marijuana twice?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You had no training in Immigration Agents School,
did you, in the smelling of marijuana?

A. I don’t recall at this time whether—we had a few
pills shown to us but I don’t recall if we had marijuana
at the Academy or not.

Q. If you did, you have forgotten about it at this
time; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And of course you are not a marijuana user or
smoker yourself, are you, sir?

A. No, sir, I never have.

Q. Approximately how many trials have you testified
in concerning marijuana, the smell of marijuana? Now
I am limiting you to the smell of marijuana.

A. I would say at least a half a dozen trials.

Q. At least six trials?

A. Yes, sir.

[35] Q. Do you know whether these trials have yro-
ceeded to conviction?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have they been finally convicted?

A. Not all six of them, no. I can recall one case
that was a spare-tire case that was dismissed.

Right. It was dismissed, so now five cases you
could testify to?

A. Yes.

51

Q. The rental contract was rented in Mr. Bowen’s own
name, was it not, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

Did you check the address on the rental slip with
the address on his driver’s license?

A. If I did I don’t recall at this time.

Q. You noticed nothing unusual then if you did?

A. This was after he had been placed under arrest.
I did not look at his driver’s license before he was
arrested?

Q. I just have one final question.

Approximately how far, in terms of feet, would you
say it is from the door of that camper to the place where
the mattress holder is, sir?

A. Eight or ten feet, from the back door to [36] the
front of the camper where the cab of the pickup fits
back against the camper.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I would estimate eight or ten feet. I am not
sure. I couldn’t say for sure.

Q. Did you find anything else that would indicate
where this marijuana was from other than what you
have already told us? Mr. Bowen made no statement,
did he?

A. No, sir. He was even reluctant to give his name.

Q. But he gave you his name, did he not?

A. When Customs Agents arrived, yes.

Q. You didn’t find a pistol, did you?

A. No.

Q. There was nothing other that would indicate that
Mr. Bowen had come from Mexico, was there, other than
what you have testified to so far?

A. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

MR. NASATIR: Nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NASATIR: With the Court’s indulgence, may
I have one more question?

THE COURT: Yes.

52

[37] BY MR. NASATIR:

Q. You discovered the pills in the coat, did you not,
sir?

A. Yes, sir. ,

Q. You did yourself and you discovered all this mari-
juana yourself, did you? Is that right, sir?

A. Yes, sir, initially.

. Right. .

Now the pills were discovered after the marijuana
was discovered, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the pills were where?

A. I can’t be too sure at this time.

I believe it was in the passenger compartment of the
truck, laying on the seat, in the middle of the seat.

Q. Are you absolutey sure about that?

A. I cannot be sure at this time. He was either wear-
ing the jacket or else it was laying on the front seat.

Q. The pills were in a jacket, is that right?

A. Yes, sir, in a jacket pocket.

Where was Mr. Bowen at the time that you found

the pills? He was in custody, was he not?

A. Yes, sir.
[38] Q. He was immediately placed in custody upon
your finding the marijuana in the mattress, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was in handcuffs?

A. What time are you referring to?

Q. At the time you found the pills he was in hand-
cuffs?

A. Yes, sir. So it had to be in the compartment,
the passenger compartment of the pickup.

Q. Lying on the seat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What were the pills contained in?

A. Customs Agents informed me that they were
bennies.

. No. What were they contained in, sir?
A. In a kind of a plastic bag or a sandwich bag-

type of deal, or somethiig like that. I am not sure at
this time.

53

Q. Could you describe very briefly how big a package
the pills were in, in your best estimation?

A. About like a sandwich bag, something like it.

Q. How many pills were in there?
at A medium-size handful of pills, about like [39]

is.

Q. Indicating it was approximately three inches
around?

A. Something similar to that.

Q. At most?

A. More or less. I cannot say for sure.

Q. Was it basically a round shape, is that correct?

A. As you hold the bag up, kind of an oblong shape,
maybe.

. When you found it, had Mr. Bowen already been
taken to the building?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you found the rental contract with Mr.
Bowen’s name on it, had he already been taken to the
building?

A. Yes, sir. The building is only a few feet away
from where the camper was sitting. However, there is a
window there so we can look out and observe our partner,
our respective partners, checking the traffic coming
through the check point.

Q. He was with your partner, was he not, Mr. Bowen?

A. When ! found the pills?

Q. Yes. He was in your partner’s custody?

{40} A. Yes.

Q. And the only thing that you discovered before Mr.
Bowen was taken into custody was the marijuana in the
mattress, am I right, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

MR. NASATIR: Nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Gott?

MR. GOTT: No, your Honor.

Government rests.

THE COURT: You may step down, sir.

Mr. Nasatir, do you have any evidence to produce
at this time?

54

MR. NASATIR: Call the defendant for purposes of

this motion.
THE COURT: Alli right.

JOHN LEE BOWEN,

the defendant herein, called as a witness in his: own be-
half, having been first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as foilows:

THE CLERK: Take the stand. State your full name
and spell your last name for the record, please.

THE WITNESS: My name is John Bowen.

(41) DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. NASATIR:

_ Mr. Bowen, were you present on January 19 of
this year at 10:00 p.m. at the Customs—excuse me, at
the Immigration Station on Highway 86?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Did you see Mr. Ortmeier at that time?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Mr. Ortmeier is an Immigration Agent, is that
right, sir?

A. Yes.

Now on that day, Mr. Bowen, had you been to
Mexico at all?

A. No.

@. And, Mr. Bowen, can you tell me what happened
from the time—you met Mr. Ortmeier, is that correct,
sir?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did he tell you?

A. He asked me what my citizenship was. I told him.
lle asked me if I would open up the back of the camper.
Q. Did you do so?

A. Which I did.

Q. Okay. Now prior to entering the camper—

2] Did you open the door for Mr. Ortmeier?
A. Yes.

6 Te beer mete =

55

Q. Did he indicate to you that anything was unsuaul
at that time?

A. No.

Q. And what then happened, sir, in your own words?

A. Well, then he got into the camper, and the first
thing he did was open up—it was a chemical toilet, as
you go right in on the righthand side. He opened that
up. Then he went and opened up a few drawers. There
is a seat on each side of the camper. There are some
drawers above there. He opened those up.

Q. Did he ever indicate to you prior to that time that
there was anything unusual about the camper?

A. No.

Q. Could you proceed, please?

A. Then he went through several drawers. There was
a blanket on top of the mattress. He lifted that off.

2 Ls there anything else on top of the mattress?

0.

Q. Did you have a couple of knapsacks in [43] the
back of the camper?

A. Yes. They were back under the seat by the table.
How far is the seat and the table from the bed?
A. About seven feet.

Q. Were these knapsacks full or empty?

A. Empty. They were just laying there on the seat.

Q. And what was on top of that mattress?

A. Just a blanket, maroon blanket.
Q.
A.
and

©

What then happened, sir?
Well, he shined the light up on top of the blanket
then he lifted up the mattress.
Q. He lifted up the mattress?
A. Yes. He lifted up the blanket, then the mattress.
Q. What was under the mattress?
A. He said there were packages of marijuana.
Q. They were under—
A. He just turned around and said, “You are under
arrest.”
Q. After he lifted up the mattress?
A. Right.
MR. NASATIR: I have nothing further, your Honor.
[44] THE COURT: All right.

56

Which direction were you traveling in?

THE WITNESS: North.

THE COURT: Is this a side-entrance camper or a
rear-entrance camper?

THE WITNESS: Rear entrance.

THE COURT: Mr. Gott, do you have anything?

MR. GOTT: Yes.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. GOTT:

Q. Where had you been if you hadn’t been to Mexico?
A. I was in Winterhaven.
. Did you smell any marijuana?

A. Did I smell any marijuana? No, I didn’t.

MR. GOTT: Nothing further, your Honor.

MR. NASATIR: Nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT: You may step down.

Mr. Nasatir, do you have anything to state to the
Court in the way of any statements you desire to make?

MR. NASATIR: No, your Honor; only that I am
sure this Court is well aware that an alien search must
be for aliens.

57

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 10576—Criminal

{Filed Aug. 81, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, South-
ern District of California. By V. C. Mahler, Deputy)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
v8.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT
VERDICT

We, the jury in the above-entitled cause, find the de-
fendant, JOHN LEE BOWEN, guilty of smuggling
marihuana as charged in count one of the indictment and
guilty of transporting marihuana as charged in count
two of the indictment and guilty of possession of depres-
sant or stimulant drugs as charged in count three of the
indictment.

/s/ [Illegible}
Foreman of the Jury

Dated: August 31, 1971
San Diego, California

58

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE .
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 10576—Criminal

[Oct. 7, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern District
of California, By V. C. Mohler, Deputy |

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Vv,
JOHN LEE BOWEN

On this 6th day of October, 1971 came the attorney
for the government and the defendant appeared in per-
son and’ by counsel, Michael D. Nasatir.

Ir Is ADJUDGED that the defendant upon his plea of *
not guilty and a verdict of guilty has been convicted of
the offense of smuggling marihuana in violation of 21
USC 176a as charged in count one of the indictment,
transporting marihuana in violation of 21 USC 176a
as charged in count two of the indictment, and possession
of depressant or stimulant drugs in violation of 21 USC
331(q) (3) (B) and 360a(c) (2) as charged in count three
of the indictment in three counts, and the court having
asked the defendant whether he has anything to say why
judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient
cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the
Court,

It Is ADJUDGED that ou counts one, two and three the
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

Ir Is ADJUDGED that on each of counts one and two
the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
Attorney General or his authorized representative for im-
prisonment for a period of * seven (7) years, said sen-
tence as to counts one and two to run concurrently.

1Insert “by [name of counsel], counsel” or without counsel; the
court advised the defendant of his rights to counsel and asked him

nel

59

It Is ApJUDGED that on count three the imposition of
sentence is suspended and defendant placed on probation
for a period of five (5) years on condition that he obey
all laws, Federal, State and Municipal, that he comply
with all lawful rules and regulations of the Probation
department, that he not possess or use narcotics, mari-
huana, LSD, or dangerous drugs in any form, that he
not associate with known users of or dealers in narcotics,
marihuana, LSD, or dangerous drugs in any form, that
he not enter Mexico nor approach the Mexican border,
and that he submit to search of his person or property
at any time when requested by a law-enforcement officer,
said probationary order as to count three to run con-
secutively and not concurrently with the sentence imposed
as to counts one and two.

Ir Is ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy
of this judgment and commitment to the United States
Marshal or other qualified officer and that the copy serve
as the commitment of the defendant.

/s/ Gordon Thompson, Jr.
GORDON THOMPSON, JR.
United States District Judge

WILLIAM W. LUDDY

By: /s/ V. C. Mohler
V. C. MOHLER
Deputy Clerk

Filed: October 6. 1971

whether he desired to have counsel appointed by the court, and the
defendant thereupon stated that he waived the right to the as-
sistance of counsel.” * Insert (1) “guilty and the court being satis-
fied there is a factual basis for the plea,” (2) “not guilty, and a
verdict of guilty,” (3) “not guilty, and a finding of guilty,” or (4)
“nolo contendere,” as the case may be. * Insert “in count(s) num-
ber ” if required. * Enter (1) sentence [illegible]

60 61

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT } Note: Designation of Record must be filed within 5 days
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA after the filing of the Notice of Appeal or coun-
sel must appear for a conference with the Clerk

Trial Judge Hon. Gordon Thompson, Jr. | on the 6th day. (Mimeographed forms are avail-

able )
No. 10576 Crim.

Counsel must comply with the Federal Rules of
dure. Particular attention is
[Filed Oct. 6, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern a ak ts awa
District of California. By [Illegible], Deputy] ’

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF

vs.

JOHN LEE BOWEN
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that John Lee Bowen defendant
above named, hereby appeals to the United States Court ,
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the (check one)

(*) Final Judgment
( ) Order (describe)

entered in this proceeding on the 6 day of October 1971
Dated: 11-6-71

/s/ John L. Bowen

NOTES: NOTICE OF APPEAL MAY BE SIGNED By:

(1) the defendant, or
(2) defendant’s attorney, or

(3) the Clerk on instructions from the Court.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY

— Retained | — Appointed

62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 105-76

[Filed Oct. 6, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of California. By [Illegible|, Deputy |

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
vs
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT

In Pro Per
Attorney for Defendant

Howard B. Frank
Assistant U.S. Attorney

DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL

The following documents indicated by a check (*) mark

are hereby designated to constitute the Record on Appeal
in the above case.

— Commissioner’s /Magistrate’s Record of proceedings in-
cluding — Complaint — Warrant — Search Warrant —
Other:

* Indictment or Information

* All Minutes of Court — O/H Action Taken From
* Government’s Requested Instructions

* Defendant’s Requested Instructions

* Court’s Instructions (if filed)

* Verdict

* Judgment and Commitment

* Motions, Affidavits, ete. and Orders (if other than

Minute Order) granting or denying.
* Suppress

— Production
* Dismiss
— Severance
— Other:
* Notice of Appeal

* Designation of Record on Appeal

— Other:

* All exhibits (except contraband)

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT

PLEASE CHECK ALL PROCEEDINGS TO BE INCLUDED IN

TRANSCRIPT

— Arraignment and Plea

— Omibus Hearing
— Continuance

* Proceedings on Motions
* Voir dire interrogation of prospective jurors

* Opening statements
* Closing statements
* Instructions

* Sentencing

DATED: 10/4/71

/s/ Michael D. Nasatir
For John Bowen, In Pro Per
Attorney for Defendant

/s/ Howard B. Frank
Assistant U.S. Attorney

64
(6/24/71)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 10576

[ Filed Oct. 6, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of California. By [Illegible!, Deputy]

Plaintiff or Petitioner
Us

JOHN LEE BOWEN
Defendant or Respondent

AFFIDAVIT TO PROCEED WITH APPEAL
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

I, John Lee Bowen being first duly sworn, depose and
say that I am the Defendant-Appellant in the above-en-
titled case; that in support of my motion to proceed on
appeal without being required to prepay fees, costs or
give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty
I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to
give security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to
redress; and that the issues which I desire to present on
appeal are the following:

i. Whether denial of Judgment of Acquittal was erroneous
Absent evidence of Smuggling.

ii. Whether evidence was sufficient as to knowledge of
importation.

iii. Whether evidence should have been suppressed.

I further swear that the responses which I have made to
the questions and instructions below relating to my ability
to pay the cost of prosecuting the appeal are true.

1. Are you presently employed? No.

a. If the answer is yes, state the amount of your

salary or wages per month and give the name and
address of your employer.

65

b. If the answer is no, state the date of your last
employment and the amount of the salary and
wages per month which you received. October 1970,
655 /mo.

2. Have you received within the past twelve months and
income from a business, profession or other form of
self-employment, or in the form of rent payments,
interest, dividends, or other source? No.

a. If the answer is yes, describe each source of in-
come, and state the amount received from each
during the past twelve months.

ii.
3. Do you own any cash or checking or savings account?
Yes.

a. If the answer is yes, state the total value of the

items owned.
$65—bank.

4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, auto-
mobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordi-
nary household furnishings and clothing) ?

a. If the answer is yes, describe the property and
state its approximate value.

i. No.

ii.

5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for
support and state your relationship to those persons.

WHEREFORE affiant prays that he may proceed in
forma pauperis pursuant to Title 28, USCA, Sec. 1915,
and that counsel be appointed to prosecute his appeal.
(Strike if inappropriate)

I understand that a false statement or answer to any
questions in this affidavit will subject me to penalties for

perjury.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6 day of Oct.,
1971.

William W. Luddy, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of California.

Presented by:

/s/ John L. Bowen
Affiani
/s/ Michael D. Nasatir
Attorney for Petitioner

67

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 10576 Crim.

[Filed Oct. 11, 1971, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of California. By [Illegible}, Deputy}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
Vv.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT

ORDER PERMITTING APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND
ORDER DIRECTING THAT EXPENSE OF RECORD ON APPEAL
Be PAID BY THE UNITED STATES

IT IS ORDERED that the said JOHN LEE BOWEN
be and he is hereby permitted to prosecute his appeal as
a poor person without being required to prepay fees and
costs of this court or the Court of Appeals, or give se-
curity therefor.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the expense of
printing the record on appeal, if such printing is re-
quired by the Appellate Court, be paid by the United
States, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C.A. § 1915.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an original and
two copies of the stenographic transcript be prepared for
use of the defendant at the initial expense of the United
States, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C.A. § 753(f), to be
paid from the appropriation of the Judiciary, Administra-
tive Office U.S. Courts; and if the United States pre-

vails on appeal, the costs of the appeal shall be taxed
against the defendant.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MICHAEL D.
NASATIR, 9720 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, Cali-
fornia 90212, Telephone No. (213) 278-4584, is appointed
counsel to prosecute said appeal; and counsel heretofore
appointed for the trial is hereby relieved.

68

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that bail pending appeal
is set in the amount of $20,000 cash or corporate surety.
DATED: October 14, 1971.

/s/ Gordon Thompson, Jr.
GORDON THOMPSON, JR.

United States District Judge
Copies to:

Petitioner—John Lee Bowen
Michael D. Nasatir, Esq.

9720 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 806
Beverly Hills, California 90212

U.S. Attorney

69

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-1012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
v.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
June 16, 1972
REHEARING DENIED JULY 24, 1972

The United States District Court for the Southern
District of California, Charles M. Merrill, J., found de-
fendant guilty of smuggling and transporting smuggled
marijuana and of possessing depressant and stimulant
drugs, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals
held, inter alia, that question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support smuggling charge on count 1 did not
have to be reached since the sentences on counts 1 and
2 were identica! and concurrent.

Judgment affirmed.

Michael D. Nasatir (argued), of Nasatir, Sherman &
Hirsch, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Shelby R. Gott (argued), Asst. U.S. Atty., Stephen
G. Nelson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Harry D. Steward, U.S. Atty.,
San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MERRILL and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and
LYDICK,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

John Lee Bowen appeals his conviction, following a
jury trial, for violation of 21 U.S.C. 176(a) and 21

*The Honorable Lawrence T. Lydick, United States District
Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

70

U.S.C. 331(q) (3) (B) (smuggling and transporting smug-
gled marijuana and possession of depressant and stimulant
drugs).

While searching Bowen’s rented camper for aliens,
Immigration Officer Ortmeier first smelled and then found
in the camper nearly 356 pounds of marijuana bricks
of the type and packaged in the manner that usually
comes from Mexico, along with backpacking equipment
and burlap bags marked Product of Mexico. One hundred
fifty-eight benzedrine tablets were found in the pocket
of a jacket in the cab of the camper.

Questions raised on appeal are whether the search
and seizure were lawful, whether there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that the marijuana
had been unlawfully imported by appellant and whether
appellant knew it had been unlawfully imported when he
transported it:

[1-3] The search and seizure were plainly lawful.
The circumstantial evidence of knowledge of unlawful
importation on Count 2 of the Indictment, though not
overwhelming, was clearly sufficient to support the jury
verdict. The questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the smuggling charge of Count 1 need not be
reached since the sentences of Count 1 and 2 were identical
and concurrent. United States v. Aranda, 9th Cir., 1972,
457 F.2d 761.

The judgment is affirmed.

71
No. 72-5329
JOHN LEE BOWEN, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES

Facts and opinion, 462 F.2d 347.

June 25, 1973. On petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and pe-
tition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated
and case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
consideration in light of Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.,
US. , 93 S.Ct. 2535, 36 L.Ed.2d —— (1973).

72

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-1012

&
[Filed Oct. 23, 1973, U.S. Court of Appeals, .
Clerk |

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE
vs.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, APPELLANT

ORDER

Before: CHAMBERS, MERRILL, KOELSCH, BROWN-
ING, DUNIWAY, ELY, HUFSTEDLER,
WRIGHT, TRASK, CHOY, GOODWIN, WAL-
LACE and SNEED, Circuit Judges.

A majority of the judges of this court in active service
have voted to hear the above case en bane on December
11, 1973, at 1:30 P.M. If counsel desire to submit ad-
ditional briefs, such briefs must be filed in the Clerk’s
Office of this Court no later than November 15, 1973.

Argument will be in Courtroom No. 1 in the United
States Court of Appeals and Post Office Building, Seventh
and Mission Streets, San Francisco.

Circuit Judge Chambers will file a dissent to the
foregoing order.

73
No. 72-1012

[Filed Oct. 30, 1973, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Clerk]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
v.
JOHN LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent from the order for en bane. At issue is the
retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 411
U.S. 903 (1973). Also involved in Bowen under Almeida-
Sanchez is the status of an intermittent but fixed check-
point.

I would let the panel decide the case. None of the
earmarks of the normal case for en banc are here.

It is inescapable that the Supreme Court will decide
the questions here. They are too big and too far reach-
ing for that Court to ignore them.

This en banc hearing results in about a three-months’
delay in the case getting to the Supreme Court. Mean-
while, two or ‘three district courts are almost choked
with the retroac::ve question. Thus, knowing our de-
cision means little in this instance, I was prepared to
live with any decision the panel might render.

Taking this case en banc is simply flying off into the
air without a payload.

/s/ Richard H. Chambers
United States Circuit Judge

74

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-1012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JOHN. LEE BOWEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

[May 9, 1974]

Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Southern District of California

Before: CHAMBERS, MERRILL, KOELSCH, BROWN-
ING, DUNIWAY, ELY, HUFSTEDLER,
WRIGHT, TRASK, CHOY, GOODWIN, WAL-
LACE and SNEED, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is before the court upon the remand of the
Supreme Court, Bowen v. United States, 413 U.S. 915
(1973), vacating 462 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1972).

Bowen was convicted of smuggling and transporting
marijuana and of possessing depressant and stimulant
drugs. The evidence of the violations was discovered
during a routine search for illegal aliens of a camper
truck at a permanent border-patrol checkpoint on Cali-
fornia State Highway 86 approximately 36 air miles and
49 highway miles north of the Mexican border. Highway
86 is a principal route from Mexacali to Los Angeles
by way of Indio and Riverside.

On June 21, 1973, the Supreme Court held in Almeida-
Sanchez Vv. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), rev’g 452
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971), that border-patrol agents on

75

roving patrol cannot stop and search cars pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1857(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 without probable
cause or warrant.

Two separate issues are presented here: (1) How
does Almeida-Sanchez affect searches conducted at a fixed
checkpoint? (2) If fixed-checkpoint searches, as well as
roving-patrol searches, are included within the ambit of
the Almeida-Sanchez ruling, should that ruling be ap-
plied to fixed-checkpoint searches conducted by border-
patrol agents prior to June 21, 1973, in cases pending
on appeal on that date?

For the reasons set forth in Part I of the opinion of
the majority of the court here, we hold that the rule
announced by the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez
does apply to searches at fixed checkpoints. However, for
the reasons set forth in Part II, we also hold that Al-
meida-Sanchez will not be applied to fixed-checkpoint
searches conducted prior to June 21, 1973.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

PART I

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

According to the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the government
has been conducting three types of alien searches pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1857(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1: (1) searches
at “[pjermanent checkpoints * * * maintained at cer-
tain nodal intersections”; (2) searches at “temporary
checkpoints * * * established from time to time at various
places”; and (3) searches carried out by “roving patrols.”
413 U.S. at 268. The government argued in Almeida-
Sanchez that all these searches conducted “within a rea-
sonable distance from any external boundary,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1857(a) (3), could be considered border searches, and
thus be carried out with neither a warrant nor probable
cause. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154
(1925).

The search condemned in Almeida-Sanchez was of the
“roving patrol” type. It was conducted 25 miles north

76

of the Mexican border, on a California east-west high-
way that lies at all points at least 20 miles north of the
border. 413 U.S. at 267-68, 273. The search of Bowen’s
camper, however, was a fixed-checkpoint search, a type
of search reserved from the Almeida-Sanchez decision.
The checkpoint, on California State Highway 86, was
between the major population centers of the Imperial
Valley and Indio.

The opinion’ in Almeida-Sanc.cz, delivered by Mr.
Justice Stewart, leases little doubt that traditional Fourth
Amendment standards apply to fixed-checkpoint searches
as well as to roving-patrol searches. Early in the opinion,
after listing the three types of surveillance conducted by
the Border Patrol along inland roadways and noting that
the government argues that “[ijn all these operations
* * * the agents are acting within the Constitution when
they stop and search automobiles without a warrant,
without probable cause to believe the cars contain aliens,
and even without probable cause to believe the cars have
made a border crossing,” the Court stated that “[t]he
only asserted justification for this extravagant license to
search is § 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1857(a) * * *.” 413 U.S. at 268.

‘Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion is explicitly identified as “the
opinion of the Court.” It was approved by a majority of five jus-
tices, including Mr. Justice Powell, who stated, “* * * I join the
opinion of the Court * * *.” 413 U.S. at 275. Mr. Justice Powell
has demonstrated elsewhere that he understands the difference be-
tween concurring in an opinion and concurring only in its results.
Compare Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412
U.S. 609, 637 (1973) (“I concur in Part II of the Court’s opinion
* * *. As to Part I * * * I concur only in the result * * *.”) with
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. 4186, 4192 (U.S.
Jan. 21, 1974) (“I concur in the Court’s result, but I am unable
to join its opinion.”) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691
(1973), (concurring only in judgment). The language of Mr. Jus-
tice Powell’s concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez strongly suggests
that his concurrence was not limited to the result. Moreover, his
concurring opinion was written primarily to elaborate his views
on an issue not presented by the facts of Almieda-Scnchez and
not reached by the other justices (but see 413 U.S. at 270 n. 3):
whether a roving search would be sustainable if it were based on an
area search warrant.

77

Moreover, the government in Alimeida-Sanchez sought
to justify roving-patrol searches on the basis of 8 U.S.C.
§$ 1357(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2). Here, the
government seeks to justify the fixed-checkpoint search
by reference to the same statute and regulation. But,
when the Supreme Court held that this statute and reg-
ulation could not exempt searches carried out pursuant
to them from traditional Fourth Amendment scrutiny,
see 413 U.S. at 272, the government’s statutory justifica-
tion for fixed-checkpoint searches as well as for roving-
patrol searches vanished.

Finally, at the very end of its opinion, 413 U.S. at
274-75, the Court quoted from Carroll v. United States
as follows:

“* * * Tt would be intolerable and unreasonable if
a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to
the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.
Travellers may te stopped in crossing an interna-
tional boundary because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his be-
longings as effects which may be lawfully brought
in. But those lawfully within the country, entitled
to use the public highways, have a right to free pas-
sage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official authorized to search,
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise * * *.”
267 U.S. at 153-54.

It would be strange indeed for the Court to quote this
language if it meant to leave intact the government’s
asserted right to established fixed checkpoints anywhere
within 100 miles of the border. Surely, searches at these
checkpoints, like searches by roving patrols have the effect
of violating the “right to free passage without inter-
ruption or search” of “those lawfully within the country
* * * Such searches, therefore, must meet constitutional

78

standards regardless of their utility in carrying forward
the difficult mission of the Border Patrol.

To be sure, Mr. Justice Powell in his concurrence and
Mr. Justice White in his dissent both correctly pointed
out that Almecida-Sanchez did not present a question of a
fixed-checkpoint search. See 413 U.S. at 275-76, 288.
Nonetheless, these disclaimers do not override clear in-
dications in the opinion of the Court that any distinction
between fixed and movable checkpoints will be meaning-
less unless the distinction can be based upon reasoned
Fourth Amendment considerations.

The government argues that there are, in fact, signifi-
cant constitutional differences between roving patrols and
fixed checkpoints. First, since fixed checkpoints often in-
volve a stop and inspection of every car passing through
them, they provide much less opportunity for the un-
fettered discretion of the police officer that was con-
demned in Almeida-Sanchez. See 413 U.S. at 268. Second,
being stopped on a lonely road at night in a sparsely
populated part of the country (Almeida-Sanchez) is more
burdensome to the traveler than a stop at an identified
and lighted checkpoint (Bowen). The government con-
tends once again that the Constitution does not forbid
all searches, but only “unreasonable” ones. In support
of the validity of arguably “reasonable” fixed-checkpoint
searches, the government cites a number of judicial de-
cisions upholding roadblocks established for the purpose
of checking drivers’ licenses and registrations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir.
1070) ; People v. Washburn, 265 Cal. App. 2d 665, 71
Cal. Rptr. 577, 581 (2d Dist. 1968); State v. Smolen,
4 Conn. Cir. 385, 232 A.2d 339 (App. Div.), pet. for
certification for appeal denied, 231 A.2d 283 (Conn.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); State v.
Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968).?

* But see Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875
(1973), in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a
routine check of a motor vehicle to determine whether it and its
operator were properly licensed violates the Fourth Amendment.
See also State Vv. Cloman, 254 Or. 1, 6 n. 2, 456 P.2d 67, 69 n. 2
(1969), in which the Supreme Court of Oregon expressly reserved

79

We agree with the government that a fixed-checkpoint
search that does not entail significant delay is probably
less offensive than a roving-patrol search. Being asked
to stop at a fixed checkpoint is not frightening to a
seasoned traveler. Being flagged over to the side of the
road by a roving patrol might be traumatic. Also, an
officer on roving patrol probably has more discretion in
deciding which cars to stop than one stationed at a fixed
checkpoint, although the difference might be less than the
government contends. Since not all vehicles passing
through a checkpoint are stopped, and since not all ve-
hicles stopped are searched, the officer at the checkpoint
still retains a good deal of discretion to “single out” some
travelers for stops or intrusive searches.

Nonetheless, even conceding that a fixed-checkpoint
search might be jess of an imposition on domestic travelers
than a roving-patrol search, we are able to find nothing
in the opinion of the Court in Almeida-Sanchez which
suspends Fourth Amendment standards in dealing with
immigration searches at fixed checkpoints.

Moreover, the government’s reliance on judicial de-
cisions upholding automobile stops for the purpose of
checking drivers’ licenses is misplaced. Although the
government has cited only roadblock stops, there is a
parallel line of decisions upholding roving-patrol stops to
check for valid license and registration. See, e.g., Lipton
v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1955); State
v. Ream, 19 Ariz. App. 131, 505 P.2d 569 (Div. 1, Dept.
B, 1973); Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim.
1973). In other cases, courts did not even find the fact
that the stop may have been at a roadblock rather than
incident to a roving patrol significant enough to men-
tion. See, e.g, United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234,
237 (10th Cir. 1972); Myricks v. United States, 370
F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), pet. for cert. dismissed, 386 U.S.
1015 (1967). Hence, since this line of vehicle-registra-
tion-check decisions was as relevant in Almeida-Sanchez

ruling upon “the right to stop and examine the driver’s operating
license or the right to stop at a general roadblock.” See generally
Note, Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of
the Person, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973).

y/

80

as here, we do not find these decisions to be an ap-
propriate means for distinguishing Bowen’s search from
that of Almeida-Sanchez.

What is more, the rationale for the drivers’-license
decisions will not support the government’s position here.
For example, in Lipton v. United States, supra, in which
this court upheld a stop by a motorcycle police officer of
a youth driving an automobile, we reasoned that there
was no way for a police officer to determine that a
driver had a valid license permitting him to operate a
motor vehicle other than by stopping him and asking
him to produce his license. We noted:

“* * * A contrary holding would render unen-
forceable the State statute requiring that automobile
drivers be licensed.” 348 F.2d at 593.

We are not persuaded that laws prohibiting illegal im-
migration will be rendered similarly unenforceable should
we deny to the government the power to stop and search
automobiles, without probable cause or warrant, at fixed
checkpoints.

_ We hold, then, that fixed-checkpoint searches, like rov-
ing-patrol searches, even though conducted within a “rea-
sonable distance” from the border, are not necessarily
exempt from the traditional Fourth Amendment require-
ment of a warrant or probable cause. This holding, how-
ever, merely shifts the focus of our inquiry. The opinion
in Almeida-Sanchez does not require that a border search,
to be constitutional, be at the border itself: rather, a
legitimate border search may also be conducted “in cer-
tain circumstances” at the border’s “functional equiva-
lents.” 413 U.S. at 272. The search conducted in the
present case was obviously not at the border itself; nor
was it at a “functional equivalent” of the border.

The “function” of the border checkpoint is to regulate
border crossings. Thus, in attempting to clarify what
would constitute a “functional equivalent” of the border.
the Court in Almeida Sanchez offered two examples:

“* * * For example, searches at on established
station near the border, at a point marking the

81

confluence of two or more roads that extend from
the border, might be functional equivalents of bor-
ders searches. For another example, a search of the
passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St.
Louis airport after a nonstop Sight from Mexico
City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a
border search.” 413 U.S. at 272-73. (Emphasis
added. )

These examples are then contrasted with the search con-
ducted in Aimeida-Sanchez:

“* * * |Tihe search of * * * [an] automobile by a
roving patrol, on a California road that lies at all
points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border,
was of a wholly different sort * * *” 413 U.S. at
273.*

In other words, if a search takes place at a location
where virtually everyone searched has just come from
the other side of the border, the search is a functional
equivalent of a border search. In contrast, if a search
takes place at a location where a significant number of
those stopped are domestic travelers going from one point
to another within the United States, the search is not
the functional equivalent of a border search. One
need only contemplate the volume of domestic travel be-
tween Buffalo and Rochester, New York, to see why a
checkpoint between those two cities could not be the func-
tional equivalent of a border checkpoint even though the
checkpoint could be less than twenty miles from an in-
ternational border.

In addition to the two examples of a functional equiva-
lent of a border search provided by the Court in Almeida-
Sanchez, other examples may be drawn from two series
of decisions of this court. Representative of the first line
of authority is Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d
379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966). In that

3 Mr. Justice Powell in his concurrence also noted: “The search
here involved * * * was not a border search, nor can it fairly be
said to have been a search conducted at the ‘functional equivalent‘
of the border.” 413 U.S. at 275-76.

case customs officials, acting upon a tip from an informer,
placed the defendant’s automobile under surveillance when
it crossed the border, and kept it under almost continuous
watch as it made suspicious movements through the streets
of a border city. In hoiding that a subsequent search
by customs officials was properly called a border search,
the court stated:

“Where * * * a search for contraband by Cus-
toms officers is not made at or in the immediate
vicinity of the point of international border crossing,
the legality of the search must be tested by a de-
termination whether the totality of the surrounding
circumstances, including the time and distance
elapsed as well as the manner and extent of surveil-
lance, are such as to convince the fact finder with
reasonable certainty that any contraband which might
be found in or on the vehicle at the time of the search
was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry into the
jurisdiction of the United States * * *.” 362 F.2d at
382."

In a second line of our own cases, this court has treated
a search north of the border as the equivalent of a border
search, where it appeared with reasonable certainty that
the vehicle searched contained either goods which have
just been smuggled or a person who had just crossed the
border illegally. See, e.g., United States v. Weil, 432
F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947
(1971), in which this court held:

* See also United States v. Mejias, 452 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Terry, 446 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971) ; Castillo-Garcia vy. United States, 424
F.2d 482, 484-485 (9th Cir. 1970); Bloomer v. United States, 409
F.2d 869, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1969); Gonzales-Alonso v. United
States, 379 F.2d 347, 379-50 (9th Cir. 1967); Rodriquez-Gonzales
v. United States, 378 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1967): Leeks v.
United States, 356 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir. 1966); King v. United
States, 348 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926
(1965); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960).
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 946 (1964).

ee

83

“* * * {I)f customs agents are reasonably certain
that parcels have been (a) smuggled across the border
and (b) placed in a vehicle, whether the vehicle has
itself crossed the border or not, they may stop and
search the vehicle. Similarly, if agents are reason-
ably certain that a person has crossed the border
illegally, and has then entered a vehicle on this side
of the border, we think that they may stop and search
the vehicle and person. They can assume that he

may have brought something with him.” 432 F.2d
at 1323.°

In both of these pre-Almeida-Sanchez lines of Ninth
Circuit authority, as well as in the two examples offered
by the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez, although the
search was not conducted precisely at the border, it still
was directly related to a recent entry from across a
border. See United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d
at 463 (dissenting opinion of Browning, J.), rev'd, 413
U.S. 266 (1973).

It is clear that the search conducted in the present case
lacks the vital connection between the vehicle stop
and a reasonable certainty, or even a probability, that
it or its contents had recently crossed an international
border. The checkpoint was approximately 36 air miles
and 49 highway miles north of the Mexican border. Sev-
era! significant population centers and highways, includ-
ing Interstate 8, a major east-west freeway that con-
nects the Southwest with the West Coast, lie between
the checkpoint and the border. Under these circumstances,
border-patrol agents had no reason to believe that virtualiy
all or even most of the cars passing through their check-
point had recently, or ever, crossed the border. More-
over, there was neither the continuing surveillance from
the border nor the dependable intelligence from other

5 See also United States v. Vigil, 448 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Markham, 440 F.2d 1119, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1971).
See generally Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of Border
Search, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 53 (1974) ; Note, In Search of the Border:
Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigration Officers,
5 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Politics 93 (1972).

84

uired to fit this case into the Alexander line
7 denies nor was there the reasonable certainty that
the vehicle contained either recently smuggled goods or
aliens required under the Weil line. See United States
v. Petersen, 473 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1973) : United States
v. Mitchell, 472 F.2d 67, 68 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973). Hence,
the record in this case clearly indicates that the search
conducted was not the functional equivalent of a border
search. Were the record more equivocal, we would not
hesitate to remand the case to the district court for a
determination of functiona! equivalency. Where the record
is as clear as it is here, however, we see no need for a
remand."

At its last line of defense, the government argues
that fixed checkpoint searches, even if not the functional
equivalent of border searches, should be upheld simply
because they are urgently needed. The government's
difficulty in detecting and repatriating illegal aliens
along our southern boundary needs no new documenta-
tion here. The short answer to this argument, however,
is that necessity alone cannot override the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures. A similar argument was made and rejected in
Almeida-Sanchez itself. See 413 U.S. at 293 (dissenting
opinion of White, J.). Mr. Justice Powell in his con-
curring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez suggested that war-
rants based on area-wide conditions could be employed
to resolve the contending interest. of law enforcement and
Fourth Amendment safeguards. 413 U.S. at 275-85; see
generally The Supreme Court—1972 Term, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 55, 200-04 (1973). Since the government did not

®*Cf. United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973). Both
cases held that a warrantless search, without probable cause, of an
automobile at the checkpoint in Truth or Consequences, New Mex-
ico, violates the Fourth Amendment unless a search at that check-
point could be deemed the functional equivalent of a border search.
Both cases were remanded to the district court for determination
of that issue. However, beyond directing the district court to
interpret the phrase as it was used in Almeida-Sanchez, the opinions
offer no guidance in defining the functional equivalent of a border
search.

85

seek such a warrant in this case, we need not now ex-
press an opinion on a hypothetical search conducted pur-
suant to a judicial warrant authorizing searches for a
limited time at a specific checkpoint. We refer to Mr.
Justice Powell’s opinion here merely to suggest to the
government that procedures less offensive to the Fourth
Amendment than judicially unapproved checkpoint
searches might be devised and implemented to supple-
ment its program for enforcing immigation laws.

Our conclusion that Almeida-Sanchez is as applicable
to fixed-checkpoint searches as to roving-patrol searches
is consistent with that reached by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Speed, 489 F.2d
478 (5th Cir. 1973). There, the court held that a border-
patrol search at a temporary checkpoint on a north-south
highway approximately 65 to 75 miles north of the Mexi-
can border was neither a border search nor a functional
equivalent of a border search and, hence, was uncon-
stitutional. The court commented, “The distinction be-
tween a checkpoint and a roving patrol is not important.”
489 F.2d at 480.

Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
has heid that a warrantless search, without probable
cause, of an automobile at the checkpoint at Truth or
Consequences, New Mexico, violates the Fourth Amend-
ment unless a search at that checkpoint could be deemed
the functional equivalent of a border search. United
States v. King, 485 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Maddow, 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973).

We hold here that under the rule announced by the
Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez the search of Bowen’s
camper truck violated the Fourth Amendment because
the search was not the functional equivalent of a border
search and was authorized neither by warrant nor by
probable cause.

Judges Merrill, Browning, Duniway, Ely, Hufstelder
and Trask coneur in this majority opinion (Part I).

“86
[Part I]

WALLACE, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

I respectfully dissent to Part I of the opinion pertain-
ing to the applicability of Almeida-Sanchez to searches con-
ducted at fixed checkpoints.

With one fell swoop, the majority in Part I hews down
a law enforcement procedure used for 44 years to curtail
the ever-increasing tidal wave of illegal aliens. The use
of fixed checkpoints has been neither secret nor clandes-
tine. The procedure has come before our court on nu-
merous occasions' with no hint that the practice was
constitutionally infirm. For us to reverse ourselves at
this late date requires clear and convincing reasons.
See Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 465 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960). I fail to see
them in the majority decision. The only apparent change
is the opinion, or better said opinions, in Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). A careful analysis,
therefore, is required to see if that case dictates our re-
versal of a long-standing and accepted police practice.

The majority concedes that Almeida-Sanchez is a case
involving stops and searches by roving border patrol
officers. But by some mystic bridging, it holds that
Almeida-Sanchez also requires that we outlaw searches
at fixed checkpoints. The Opinion of the Court was de-
livered by Justice Stewart and concurred in by Justice
Douglas. Brennan and Marshall. That opinion becomes
the majority only with the added vote of Justice Powell.
Justice Powell wrote:

While I join the opinion of the Court, which suf-
ficientiy establishes that none of our Fourth Amend-
ment decisions supports the search conducted in this
case, I add this concurring opinion to elaborate on

my views as to the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment in this context.”

413 U.S. at 275 (emphasis added). Justice Powell’s
concurrence, therefore, adds a fifth Justice, and thus a

1 See cases cited in note 1 of Part II of majority opinion, supra.

87

majority, only to that part of the Justice Stewart opinion
which invalidates the type of search “conducted in | that}
case’”’—a roving patrol search.’

This critical distinction is brought into even closer focus
by Justice Powell’s demarcation of the four areas where
searches typically occur:

| The search of Almeida-Sanchez’ automobile| was not
a border search, nor can it fairly be said to have
been a search conducted at the “functional equiva-
lent” of the border. Nov does this case involve the
constitutional propriety of searches at permanent or
temporary checkpoints removed from the border or
its functional equivalent.

413 U.S. at 275-76 (emphasis added). Thus, one could
infer from his statement that searches can constitutionally
occur at (1) the border, (2) functional equivalents of
the border, (3) permanent checkpoints and (4) tem-
porary checkpoints. He emphasized that the search in
question did not occur in any of the four categories.
His concurrence, therefore, cannot be said to give any
weight to projecting Almeida-Sanchez to cover searches
for aliens at fixed checkpoints. He specifically and em-
phatically limited his concurrence to answering the ques-
tion of “whether and under what circumstances the Bor-
der Patrol may lawfully conduct roving searches of
automobiles in areas not far removed from the border
for the purpose of apprehending aliens illegally entering
or in the country.” 413 U.S. at 276.

Our brothers of the Tenth Circuit were faced with a
question similar to that presented in this case in United
States v. Bowman, F.2d (10th Cir. Nov. 29,
1973). which involved a stop at a fixed checkpoint located

2In footnote 1 of Part I of the majority opinion, it is contended
that Justice Powell’s concurring opinion joins in the entirety of
Justice Stewart’s opinion. The grammatical structure of the sen-

tence qualifies his statement. The majority quotes him, “. . . I
join in the opinion of the Court ....” But he stated, “While I
join in the opinion of the Court, ... I add this concurring opinion

...’ If he had joined without any qualifications, his concurring
opinion would have been for naught.

88

a few miles north of Truth or Consequences, New Mexi-
co. Although they arrived at their conclusion by an al-
ternate route, they discussed the effect of Almeida-Sanchez
on the validity of the initial stopping of the defendant’s
vehicle and held: ‘We therefore do not read the | Almeida-
Sanchez| decision as challenging the right of immigra-
tion officials to make routine inquiries as to an indivi-
dual’s nationality.” * The Tenth Circuit apparently has
recognized that Almeida-Sanchez does not resolve the
validity of immigration stops and searches at fixed check-
points.

Ignoring the significance of Justice Powell’s limited

concurrence, the majority relies basically upon the lan-
guage quoted by Justice Stewart from Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 182 (1925), and contends that that lan-
guage demonstrates that Almeida-Sanchez also controls
the question of searches at fixed checkpoints. However,
here the majority falls into the trap of failing to realize
that Justice Powell’s concurrence does not necessarily
make the language in the Justice Stewart opinion a pro-
nouncement by a majority of the Court.

Because of the close fragmented vote and because Jus-
tice Stewart’s opinion must be limited in application to
roving patrols, great insight can be secured from the dis-
senting opinion of Justice White in which the Chief
Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred.
Justice White, after noting that the Court in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. at 154, recognized that neither
a warrant nor probable cause is required to stop and
search at the borders, stated this right was undisputed
in Almeida-Sanchez. He also, with the concurrence of the
three other Justices, concluded: “Neither, apparently, is it

8 F.2d at ——-; but see United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353
(10th Cir. 1973), which invalidated a search at a fixed checkpoint
unless it is a functional equivalent of a border. Bowman, King
and United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973), sug-
gest that our brothers of the Tenth Circuit may have adopted a
two-step approach: The initial stop at the checkpoint and inquiry
as to citizenship may be made without probable cause or a warrant;
but if the officer is going to search beyond what is in plain view,
he must be at a functional equivalent of the border or have probable
cause.

89

disputed that warrantless searches for aliens without prob-
able cause may be made at fixed checkpoints away from
the border.” 413 U.S. at 288. Thus, four Justices have
specificaily taken a position diametrically opposed to that
adopted by the majority in this case. As Justice Powell
has limited his opinion to the facts of the roving search,
we are left to speculate as to his approach to the fixed
checkpoint issue.‘ Suffice it to say that based on the
Almeida-Sanchez opinion, four Justices have concluded
that searches for aliens at fixed checkpoints are not con-
stitutionally infirm and that there is no majority con-
sensus to the contrary. I, therefore, fail to see how
the majority in this case can draw comfort from the
Almeida-Sanchez decision.

After concluding that the search of Bowen’s vehicle
could be justified if it were conducted at a “functional
equivalent” of the border, the majority holds that as a
matter of fact, this checkpoint is not a functional equiva-
lent. Justice Stewart acknowledges in Almeida-Sanchez
that border searches may be conducted at the functional
equivalents of the border and gives us two examples.
413 U.S. at 272-73. But the examples give us precious
little by way of definition. The majority attempts to
expand that definition by referring to border extension
cases where the vehicle involved has been under surveil-
lance since it crossed the border, or where it is reasonably
certain that persons had just illegally entered, or goods
were just illegally smuggled into the United States. These
cases are far different from checkpoint cases. They com-
pare like apples and oranges. The only real assistance
comes from the two examples in Justice Stewart’s opinion.
Yet, with this little guidance, the majority makes a
factual finding that the checkpoint in this case was not
a functional equivalent. How is this done? The majority
merely states, based on “the record.” The record in this
case, however, only tells us where the fixed checkpoint
is, how far it is from the border, that several highways

*It is noted that the four dissenters agree with Justice Powell
that an area search warrant would satisfy the Fourth Amendment
for a roving patrol. A fortiori, it would appear five Justices would
also approve such a practice for fixed checkpoints.

90

intersect Highway 86 before the checkpoint, that there
are several cities along the Highway before the check-
point, that Bowen was stopped to see if any aliens were
aboard his vehicle and that during the stop, contraband
was discovered. There is no evidence as to the amount
of traffic that comes through the checkpoint from the
border area, the number of illegal aliens arrested at the
checkpoint, or other information that would seem to bear
on this question. The imprudence of deciding this issue
on an incomplete record looms even larger in view of the
fact that a district court, after taking extensive testi-
mony, concluded that the Route 86 checkpoint was a func-
tional equivalent of the border. United States v. Baca,
F.Supp. (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1974). We would
be far better advised to test the majority’s theories on a
factual record such as that developed in Baca rather than
to make factual assumptions which may or may not be
correct.

This leads to the real question: What test does the
majority apply to determine whether a fixed checkpoint
meets the strictures of the Fourth Amendment?

It says that the government cannot justify searches
made at fixed checkpoints without a warrant or probable
cause on the basis of 8 U.S.C. § 1857(a) (3) and 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.1(a) (2) because the statute and regulation were
vitiated in Almeida-Sanchez. But, once again, the ma-
jority fails to realize that the Justice Powell concurrence
limits the Opinion of the Court so that it cannot be
construed to apply to fixed checkpoints. But even if one
ignores the significance of Justice Powell’s concurrence,
Justice Stewart did not state that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)
and the regulations issued pursuant to it were uncon-
stitutional on their face, but merely that the statute could
not vindicate a search that is otherwise in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Consequently, when the majority

5 The Tenth Circuit, erroneously, I think, has also applied a lim-
ited Fourth Amendment test to a fixed checkpoint but did remand
for a factual determination on the question of whether the check-
point was a functiona! equivalent. United States v. King, 485
F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361
(10th Cir. 1973).

91

invalidates searches at fixed checkpoints simply because
they too are conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)
without independent consideration of whether such
searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
they bridge a gap overnight rather than sound legal
reasoning.

After finding as a fact that the checkpoint on High-
way 86 was not a functional equivalent (in spite of there
being no record upon which such a conclusion could be
based) and after holding that the statutory power has
been dissolved by Almeida-Sanchez (when there was no
majority of the Supreme Court so holding), the majority
concludes that the Fourth Amendment was violated be-
cause (1) “the search was not the functional equivalent
of a border search” and (2) it “was authorized neither
by warrant nor by probabie cause.” ° The majority’s test
is incomplete. Four Supreme Court Justices have con-
cluded that warrantless searches for aliens without prob-
able cause may be mde at fixed checkpoints. Their test
was one of balancing the appropriate interests to de-
termine whether the search was reas

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0145%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
