# Appendix — Roe v. Norton > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0139%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1975 - **Citation:** 422 U.S. 391 ## Text ae os 8 tat . ot, 5% wok 5 2 * aie . SS cr ye + APPENDIX Ocrozer Term, 1973 No. 73-6033 SHARON Rog AND Dororuy Pog, on Bear or THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLANTS v. NIcROLASs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY, AS COMMISSIONER OF WEL- FARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEHALF OF OrHeErs SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLEE ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT INDEX Relevant docket entries in case No. 15579. „ Relevant docket entries in case No. 15589 * Complaint and exhibits A and B * Designation of judges * Order for consolidation — in Ruling on application for a preliminary injunction_ Substitute complaint * Letter appointing counsel for the children. Notice of filing affidavits as evidence, together with eummary and categorization and affidavits of x 4 ———— 1 ii. “Rena Roe“ — 2 = H ‘ 1 i 8 888 ERES E 2 8 E 8 . 2 Page Answer of the defendant 1 . 55 Stipulations of the parties_...-....--.----------------------------- 56 Defendant’s exhibit A.....................--.---..--------------- 5 The children's exhibits 1 through 592 62 1. Deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M.D. oats ae 2. Deposition of Caroline Packard F 72 3. Deposition of John A. Nadolski 3 93 4. Deposition of Joseph Mancini 103 5. Affidavit of Edward Zigler.._.........-.---------~.------- — 123 Memorandum of decision, findings of fact and conclusions at law — 129 Judgment 159 Orders granting motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and noting vrobable jurisdiction 160 A Docker Entries Unver Doe v. Norton, CIWII No. 15579 — PROCEEDINGS 1/29 Complaint Request for 3-Judge Court, Affidavits of Raymond J. Kelly, Robert C. Beckman, Sally Smith, Motion for Permission to Proceed in Forma Pauperis an Order Permitting same (Blumenfeld, J.), Certificate of Counsel, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, filed and entered at Hartford. 1/29 Order to Show Cause entered for appearance at Hartford on Feb. 13, 1973 at 2:00 P.M. Blumenfeld, J. M-2/2/73 1/29 Summons issued and together with copies of same and of Complaint, Affidavits, Motions and Orders, handed to the Marshal at Hartford for service. 2/5 Marshal's Return Showing Service, filed—Summons, Complaint & osc 2/7 Appearances of James M. Higgins and Michael Anthony Arcari, Asst. Attys. General entered for defendant. 2/ 8 Motion to Separate Causes of Action, Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Motion, filed by defendant at Hartford. 2/13 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of their Motion for Temporary Relief, filed at Hartford. 2/13 Statement of Raymond J. Kelly re: Donna and Ellen Doe, filed at Hartford. 2/13 Motion for Protective Order Re: Identity of Named Plaintiffs, filed at Hartford. 2/13 Hearing on (1) Order to Show Cause; (2) Application to Convene a Three-Judge Court; (3) Defendant's Motion to Separate Causes of Action; and (4) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Decision Re- served on all 4 motions. Blumenfeld, J. M-2/14/73 2/21 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order, filed by plaintiffs. 2/26 Designation of Judges: Hon. William H. Timbers, C.J.; Hon. M. Joseph Blumenfeld, D.J.; Hon. Jon 0. Newman, D.J., entered. Friendly, C. J., U.S. C. A. M-2/26/73. Copies mailed to all counsel and to 3 Judges. Date 1973 2/26 2/28 37 5 3/ 9 3/9 8/12 3/12 3/19 3/19 3 PROCEEDINGS Order entered in Civil Action No. 15589 consolidating that action with Civil No, 15579. Newman, J. M-2/26/73. Copies mailed to all counsel and to 3 Judges. Ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injunction, entered. The application for a preliminary injunction is denied. However, the Court, as soon as it is designated, will expedite a hearing on the merits. So Ordered. Blumenfeld, J. Copies mailed from Hartford to all counsel. M-3/1/73. Copies to 8 Judges. Copies of file in Civil Nos. 15579 and 15589 mailed to 3 Judges. Substitute Complaint, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges. Incorporation of Exhibits, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Take Depositions by Means of a Tape Recorder, filed. Copies to 3 Judges. Copy of Letter from Judge Newman to Attorneys David Rosen, Esq. and Edward Dolan, Esq., appointing said attorneys to represent the children and enclosing copies of court's files, filed. Copies mailed to 3 Judges Copies to counsel. Notice of Hearing Re Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Take Deposi- tions by Means of a Tape Recorder, filed. Copies to 3 Judges. Motion to Permit Introduction of Plaintiffs’ Depositions, Notice of Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion, filed. Copies to 3 Judges. B DONNA DOE, LINDA LOE, RENA ROB, SALLY SMITH ind all others similarly situated vs. NICHOLAS NORTON, Ind. and is Com- missioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut. 3/26 4/16 4/16 77 2 (1) Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to take Depositions by Means of a Tape Recorder; (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Permit Introduction of plaintiff's Depositions—-calendar endorsement as follows: “Dis- posed of by conference.” Both motions endorsed as follows: “Off” Blumenfeld, J. M-3/27/73. Copies to all counsel. Summary of Affidavits, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges. Notice of Filing of Affidavits as Evidence, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges. Plaintiff's Brief, filed. Copies to 3 Judges. Stipulation filed at Hartford. Motion of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union te File Brief Amicus Curiae, filed at Hartford. . Brief on Behalf of Children, filed at Hartford. History of the Statute, filed at Hartford. Answer of the Defendant, filed at Hartford. Answer of the Defendant (Civil No. 15689), filed at Hartford. 3-Judge Court Hearing on the Merits. Argument by Counsel for Plaintiffa, State ( Deft.) and Children. Defendant's Exhibit A, filed. Children’s Exhibits 1 thru 5 filed. Decision Reserved. Timbers, C. J.; Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman, D. J. M-5/2/73. Motion of “Y” to Intervene as Plaintiff, Motion for Permission to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Affidavit, filed. Copies mailed to 3 Judges. Plaintiff's Response to HEW Regulation 45 CFR Sec. 233.90, filed. Copies to 3 Judges. Date 41973 97 5 117 6 12/28 4 PROCEEDINGS Memorandum of Decision Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed and entered. Application for a permanent injunction is denied and the case is dismissed. So Ordered. Timbers, V. S. C. J., Blumen- feld, U. S. P. J., Newman, I. . D. J. M-0/6/73. Copies mailed to ail counsel and 3 judges by Htfd. office. Copy to Judith Mears. Judgment entered that the application for a permanent injunction is denied and that this action be dismissed. Markowski, C. M-9/7/73. Copies mailed to all counsel and to 3 Judges. Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States filed by plaintiffs. Copies to all counsel and to 3 Judges. Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States filed by children of Donna Doe, Linda Loe, Rena Roe and Sally Smith plaintiff«. Copies to all counsel and to 3 Judges. Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges. Order entered on plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal granting same. Timbers, I. S. C. J., Blumenfeld, L. S. D. J., Newman, I. S. P. J. M 12/17/73. Copies mailed to all counsel and to 3 Judges. Docker Entaics Urn Roe v. Norton, CI. No. 15589 Complaint, Request for 3-Judge Court, Motion for Waiver of Fees and Order thereon granting same (Newman, J.) and Affidavits filed an entered, Summons issued and together with copies of same and of complaint, Motion, Order and Affidavits, handed to the Marshal for service. M-2/6/73 Application to Convene Three-Judge Court, filed by plaintiffs. Motion to Seal Affidavits, filed by plaintiffs. “Motion Granted Ex Newman, M-3/5/7 Copies Appearance of James M. Higgins and Michael Anthony Arcari, entered for defendant Nicholas Norton. Hearing on Application to Convene a Three-Judge Court. Decision Reserved, Newman, J. M-2/20/73 Order entered consolidating action with Civil No. 15,579, and denying application to convene a separate three-judge court as unnecessary. Newman, J. M-2/26/73. Copies matied to all counsel. Marshal's Return Showing Service, filed.—Summons & Complaint. Make docket entries in Civil No. 15579 5 Memorandum of Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed and entered. Application for a permanent injunction is denied and the case is dismissed. So Ordered. Timbers, U. S. C. J., Blumen- feld, U.S. D. J., Newman, U.S. 9. J. M-9/6/78. Copies mailed to all counsel and 3 Judges by Htf. office. Judgment entered that the application for a permanent injunction is denied and that this action be dismissed. Markowski, C. M-9/7/73. Copies mailed to all counsel and to 8 Judges. Wotiee of Aggest to the Bupeune Court of tho Culted Gtuten died by plaintiff. Copies to all counsel. Motion for Permission to Docket Appeal in Forma Sanpeste and Affidavit, filed by Plaintiffs. — — — e Filed 31, 1973 1 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil No. 15589 Suaron Roe, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON Benatr or Her Depenp- ENT Mrnor CHILD AND ON BEHALF OF ALL Orners SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS v. Nicholas Norton, INpIvIpUALLY, as CoMMISSIONER Or Wet- FARE oR State or CoNNectTicuT, AND oF BeHaLr OrnHers SIMILARLY SITUATED, DEFENDANTS Complaint 1. This is an action for and injunctive relief authorized by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured to the plaintiffs and all others similarly situated by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Amendent, all of the United States Constitution and the Social Security Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1352 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder. 2 2. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343. 3. This is a proper case for determination by a three-judge court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and § 2284, in that it seeks an injunction and declaratory jun nent to restrain the defendants from applying, enforcing and implementing Con- necticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) (1971 Public Act 439), on the grounds that said statute violates the right of privacy of the class of plaintiffs, and denies them equal protection of the laws. Copies of said statute and regulations issued there- — * attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibits 4. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. A person is similarly situated if she is the mother of any child born out of wedlock or the mother of any child born to any married woman during mar- — . to be iavee if the merriaes by any court of compete t jurisdiction. The persons in the class are so numerous as to make joinder impracticable; there are common questions of law and fact; plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class; and the representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The parties opposing the claims have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 3 5. Sharon Roe and Dorothy Roe are the pseudonyms of real persons, members of the class, adult citizens of the United States of Connecticut and residents of the City of New Haven; they and their families receive benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by the Connecticut State Welfare Department. , 6. Defendant Nicholas Norton, is Commissioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut, and in said capacity is charged with administering the welfare laws of the State of Connecticut. His claims and defenses which would be available to the selectment of any town and of any guardiano ad litem of children ap- pointed by any court of competent jurisdiction, all persons en- powered to act under C.G.S. § 52-440(b). 7. Plaintiffs Sharon Roe and Dorothy Roe are recipients of assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program operated by defendant Nicholas Norton. Each has given birth to a child who is not issue of a marriage, and each has been served with a citation prepared by his agent Sheldon Messinger under the authority of C.G.S. § 52-440(b). The Cireuit Court has not disposed of said citations to the date 8. To the date hereof, each named plaintiffs has refused to disclose the name of the putative father of her children, claim- ing that her right to privacy makes such information privileged. Unless enjoined by this Court from doing so, each of the 4 plaintiffs will be forced to choose between her privacy and being found in contempt of court. 9. If either plaintiff is found in contempt of court, imprison- ment for up to one year could follow; in all probability dis- memberment of their families and consequent termination of the plaintiffs eligibility under the AFDC program would result. COUNT I The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 are incorporated t. erein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full. 7 10. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the regu- lations issued by the Connecticut State Welfare Department violate plaintiffs right to privacy guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. COUNT II The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 are incorporated herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full. 11. The defendant welfare commissioner was enjoined from creating an additional condition of eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children through the use of a requirement that a mother name the pvtative father of her illegitimate child; Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dis- missed, 396 U.S. 488 rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 970 and Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (1969). 12. The practices and policies of the Connecticut State Wel- fare Department pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut General Statutes violate the following sections of the 5 Social Security Act of 1935 and related regulations in the following specifics: a. 42 C. F. R. 250.50(a) and 42 U.S.C.A. 602 which protect publie assistance recipients from the public disclosure of confidential information. b. 42 U.S. C. A. 602(a) (9), 42 CF. R. 206.10(a) (10) which of eligibility “will not result in practices that violate the individual’s privacy or personal dignity or harass him.” c. 42 U.S.C.A. 601 and 42 U.S. C. A. 602(a) (14) requiring encouragement of the care of dependent children in weir own or relative’s homes, to help maintain and strengthen family life, and to continue parental care and protection. See also, 42 C. F. R. 220.16 and related sections. 13. The practices and policies of the Connecticut State Wel- fare Department pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut General Statutes are not saved by or in compliance with 42 US.C.A. 602(a)(17) which requires the development of an agency program to establish paternity and support for AFDC children born out of wedlock since: a. C.GS. § 52-440(b) and the regulations issued there- under do not comply with other provisions of the Social Security Act as detailed paragraph 12 supra. 6 b. C. GSS. § 52-440(b) is not part of a general plan which has been submitted for approval under said subsection. e. The 42 U.S. C. A. 602(a)(17) requirement of a single agency organizational unit responsible for such a plan has not been met. d. C.G.S. § 52-440(b) threatens to remove the mother from the household in violation of the purposes of Title 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17). COUNT III The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 of the complaint are hereby incorporated by reference, the same as though pleaded in full. 14. C.GS. § 52-440(b) does not affect mothers or children born out of wedlock unless such persons are recipients of assist- ance from the State Welfare Department or general assistance. 15. Said statute invades the privacy of persons receiving such assistance, hereby denying them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Wherefore: Plaintiffs respectfully pray, on behalf of them- selves, their minor children and all others similarly situated, that this court: 1. Assume jurisdiction of this claim, convene a three-judge district court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2281 to deter- nh,, oe eae Sr Seay ng: 7 2. Certify, pursuant to Rule 23 F.R.C.P. that this claim may proceed as a class action; 3. Pending a hearing and determination by a three-judge court, grant temporary relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2284(3) restraining defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concert and par- ticipation with them trom causing irreparable harm to plain- tiffs by acting pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut Gen- eral Statutes and related policies and practices. 4. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions, pursuant to Rule 65 F.R.C.P. enjoining the defendant, his successors in in office, agents and employees from causing irreparable harm to plaintidis by esting pursuant to Section 2 mr dl. 2 — cut General Statutes and related departmental policies and ices. 5. Enter final judgment declaring Section 52440 (b) of the Connecticut General Statutes and all related state policy and practices invalid under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Social Security Act of 1935 and violative of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Social Security Act of 1935. 6. Pursuant to Rule 54(d) F.R.C.P., grant plaintiffs such additional relief, including payment of all monies wrong- fully withheld, as this Court may deem just, proper, and equitable. N 7. Such other and further relief as law and equity may provide. The Plaintiffs: (8) Frank Cocwrayn, 795 Grand Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut 06511 (203)-777-5428. Their Attorney, Certification (omitted in printing) 9 Exuisit A Sec. 52-440b. disclosure of name of putative father and institution of action. (a) If the mother of any child born out of wedlock, or the mother of any child born to any married women during marriage which child shall be found not to be issue of the marriage terminated by a divorce decree or by decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, fails or refuses to disclose the name of the putative father of such child under oath to the welfare commissioner, if such child is a recipient of public assistance, or to a selectman of a town in which such child resides, if such child is a recipient of general assistance, or otherwise to a guardian or a guardian ad litem of such child, such mother may be cited to appear before any judge of the circuit court and compelled to disclose the name of the putative father under oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity of said child. (b) Any woman who, having been cited to appear before a judge of the circuit court pursuant to subsection (a), fails to appear or fails to disclose or fails to prosecute a paternity action 10 may be found to be in contempt of said court and may be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both. (1971, P.A. 439, S. 4.) 10 Exuisir B (Connecticut State Welfare Department Social Service Pol- icies—Fublic Assistance: Manual Vol. 1, Effective 81-72) Euierpsrtity Provisions—Cuitp Born Our or Weplock— 3460.22 3460.22 RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT AND ESTAR!)ISHMENT OF PATERNITY If the mother decides to keep the child or to place him in a relative’s home, both parents are responsible for support and proceedings for the establishment of paternity are initiated. Information about the alleged father is obtained from the mother of the child. If he resides in the State, an interview is held to discuss the situation and to secure his Acknowledgement of Paternity. The mother is encouraged to name the father, by Affirmation of Paternity, under oath and to file a petition to establish paternity and support. If the mother is unwilling or unable to name the father, she is still eligible for assistance to meet her own needs, the needs of the child in question, and the needs of any other children in the family, provided all other eligibility requirements are met; however, if she is unwilling to name the father, she is informed that she is subject to be cited to appear before any judge of the Cireuit Court, be compelled to name the putative father and to institute an action to establish paternity of the child. In all situations, assistance is granted promptly when all eligibility requirements are met, whether or not Court action is pending to establish paternity or to secure support. In situations where the mother names the father, but then is unwilling or neglects to file a petition or to pursue a petition she started, the Department, under Section 52-440a of the Connecticut Statutes, institutes such proceeding. In this instance, the mother may be subpoenaed to testify and treated as a hostile witness. 11 11 2. Paternity Not Alleged by the Mother a. If the mother is unwilling to name the putative father she is informed by the worker that she will be cited to appear before any judge of the Cireuit Court and compelled to disclose the name of the putative father and to institute an action to establish the paternity of the child. The worker refers the matter to the Resource worker on a Form W-109. Central Office will provide a list of attorneys to each Resource Unit; re- ferral will be made to an attorney on the list for the purpose of citing te mother to appear before the Court. The fee for this service will be $75 if the mother names the father after the attorney prepares the petition and prior to a court hearing and $150 if the matter goes to a full hearing before the Court. The same fee prevails regardless of the number of children and/or fathers involved. If, after the hearing, the mother decides to cooperate and initiate the paternity action herself, she is of course free to contact an attorney of her own choice. A fee schedule has been established for attorney’s fees in connection with paternity proceedings when the mother has named the father (see Index No. 3460.24). If she refuses to cooperate, the Department will initiate a paternity action under the terms of Section 52-440a (see Index No. 3460.1). The same attorney who cited the mother into court will be used to bring the paternity action in such cases. b. When paternity is established and the Court has deter- mined the amount of support to be paid, payments are made to the Department of Finance and Control and the State Welfare Department meets the continuing needs of the eligible members fully. c. If the mother is unable to name the putative father, this is recorded in the case record. 3. Referral to the Circuit Court When the hospital cost has been paid by the Department, the worker directs a memorandum to the Medical Payments Sec- tion, Central Office, requesting a statement of hospital charges. The worker then forwards the following to the liaison worker of the Resources Unit by means of a Form W-109 for referral to the Circuit Court in which the mother resides: a. The executed Form W-161, “Acknowledgement of Pater- nity and Affirmation ef Paternity” ; 12 12 b. The amount of hospital charges; c. Form W-326, “Referral to the Family Relations Division of the Circuit Court“; d. The amount of assistance paid for the care of the child in question ; e. Pertinent information regarding the acknowledged father's financial circumstances. 4. Support Payments When paternity is established and the Court has determined the amount of support to be paid, payments are made to the State and the Department meets the continuing need of the eligible members fully. Effective 8-1-72 13 Filed, February 26, 1973 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Designation of Judges Civil No. 15,579 Donna Dor, LINDA Log, Rena Roe, SALLY SMITH AND ALL Oruers SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS U. NichotaAs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANT Having been notified by the Honorable M. Joseph Blumen- feld, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, that an application has been filed in the above matter for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2254, I hereby designate the following judges, in addition to the Hon- orable M. Joseph Blumenfeld, to hear and determine said cause as provided by law: Honorable William H. Timbers, United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and Honorable Jon O. Newman, United States 13 District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this order be filed in the above matter in the United States District Court for the Dis- trict of Connecticut. /s/ Hewry J. Farenp ty, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. New York, N.Y., February 20, 1973. 14 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil No. 15,589 SHaron Roe AND Dororny Por, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF or Orners SIMILARLY SITUATED v. Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND As COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEH *LF OF Orners SIMILARLY SITUATED Order for Consolidation Plaintiffs seek the convening of a three-judge court pur- suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 in a suit challenging, on constitutional and statutory grounds, the enforcement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-440(b), Public Act 439, 1971. Since a three-judge court has already been convened in Doe v. Norton, Civ. No. 15,579, to consider the same claims raised by these plaintiffs, this action is hereby ordered consolidated with Civ. No. 15,579, and the application to convene a separate three-judge court for Civ. No. 15,589 is denied as unnecessary as a result of the consoli- dation. Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 26th day of Febru- ary, 1973. (S) Jon O. Newman, United States District Judge. 14 15 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil No. 15,579 Donna Dog, ET AL. U. NicRolAs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injunction The plaintiffs,’ all allegedly eligible to receive public assist- ance from the Connecticut State Welfare Department, have initiated this suit to challenge the constitutionality of 16 Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-440b.’ This statute is part of a comprehensive statutory scheme whereby the mother of any illegitimate child may be compelled by the appropri- ate authorities to disclose the name of the child’s putative father, and to institute a paternity action. Failure to comply with this statute may result in a fine of not more than $200 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year. The defend- Because of the special circumstances of this case, plaintiffs sue under fictitious names. They are all mothers of illegitimate children who sue on their own behalf as well as on behalf of their minor children. * Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-440b provides : “(a) If the mother of any child born out of wedlock, or the mother of any child born to any married woman during marriage which child shall be found not to be issue of the marriage terminated by a divorce decree or by decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, fails or refuses to disclose the name of the putative father of such child under oath to the welfare commissioner, if such child is a recipient of public assistance, or to a selectman of a town in which such child resides, if such child is a recipient of general assistance, or otherwise to a guardian or a guardian ad litem of such child, such mother may be cited to appear before any judge of the circuit court and compelled to disclose the name of the putative father under oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity of said child. “(b) Any woman who, having been cited to appear before a judge of the circuit court pursuant to subsection (a), fails to appear or fails to disclose or fails to prosecute a paternity action may be found to be in contempt of said court and may be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.” 15 ant is the Commissioner of Welfare, Nicholas Norton, sued in his individual and representative capacity. The plaintiffs allege that, as applied to them, this statute violates their constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and privacy, and is inconsistent with and contravenes the underlying policies of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. They rely upon the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for a cause of action, and upon 28 U.S. C. § 1343(3) for this court’s jurisdiction. They seek the convocation of a three- judge district court, 28 U.S.C. § 2281; preliminary injunctive relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2284; certification of the suit as a class action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; and declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. ; 17 Turee-Jupce Districr Courr Because these plaintiffs seek to restrain the operation of a state statute, this case can only be decided by a district court of three judges, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, unless their claim is insub- stantial. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1934). The Supreme Court has recently reiterated the limited power of a district judge to dismiss as insubstantial a claim otherwise appropriate for consideration by three judges: A claim is insubstantial only if “its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this Court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.” Goosby v. Osser, 41 U.S.L.W. 4167, 4169 (Jan. 17, 1973) (citations omitted). There is little doubt that the constitutional claims herein presented are not “insubstantial.” * Accordingly, a three-judge district court will be convened to adjudicate the merits of this case. The motion to certify the class action aspect of this case will be reserved for the three-judge district court. Counsel for defendant Norton does not contest the need for a three judge district court. 16 18 II PRELIMINARY RELIEF It does not follow from the determination that the con- stitutional questions herein presented are not so “insubstan- tial” as to foreclose the need for a three-judge district court to resolve them that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. The standard which informs the exercise of judicial discretion in the award of preliminary relief focuses on different considerations. Though the defendant contests the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief in this case, the parties do not dispute the applicable standard which controls the proper resolution of this facet of the dispute. In this circuit, it is settled that: (t)he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to main- tain the status quo pending a final determination of the merits. It is an extraordinary remedy, and will not be granted except upon a clear showing of probable suc- cess and possible irreparable injury. However, the bur- den (of showing probable success) is less where the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the party requesting the temporary relief.” In such a case, the moving party may obtain a preliminary injunction if he has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, and difficult as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investiga- tion. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F. 2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). 19 The elements on which the issuance of a temporary in- junction depends will be considered separately. A. PROBABLE SUCCESS ON THE MERITS Since factual issues are minimal, the clear showing which the plaintiffs are required to make is that they will prevail on the issues of law which are presented by this case. In order to determine what they are, it will be helpful to delineate first what is not involved. Despite the plaintiffs’ facile invocation of the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, it does not appear that the operation of this statute violates those constitutional 17 rights. Their resort to the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination would similarly appear to be of no avail. For any action taken under the statute, immunity from crim- inal prosecution is granted to both the mother and the putative father for any act about which either testifies in such pro- ceedings, or for any statement made with respect to paternity prior to such proceedings. Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 52-435b, 435c. Nor are the statutory rights of the plaintiffs to welfare bene- fits jeopardized by the operation of this statute. A three-judge district court in this district has held that the state may not withhold AFDC benefits to an otherwise qualified child, Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal 20 dis missed, 396 U.S. 488, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 970 (1970), or to his“ mother, Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970), because of a mother’s refusal to comply with state regulations’ re- quiring her to reveal the name of the child's father or to par- ticipate in paternity proceedings against him. That issue is well settled. See cases cited in Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F. Supp. 165, 166 (D. N. Mex. 1972). With these threats to the eligibility of the plaintiffs to receive welfare benefits removed from the case, the only discernable interest which remains, and what the plaintiffs singled out in argument at the hearing as having alleged constitutional significance, is founded on the desire of each mother to keep secret the name of her child’s father. That a constitutional right of personal privacy exists 21 is not contested. Recent cases, e.g., Griswold v. Con- necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), demonstrate that (although) (t)he Constitution does not explicitly men- tion any right of privacy . . (there is) a line of de- cisions . . (wherein) the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas *For convenience, the masculine gender is used to refer to children of either sex. See Connecticut State Welfare Department Social Service Policies— Public Assistance: Manual Vol. 1, Index No. 3460.22 which presently pro- vides: “If the mother is unwilling or unable to name the father, she is still eligible for assistance to meet her own needs, the needs of the child in question and the needs of any other children in the family providing all other cligibility requirements are met: See also, Welfare Department Memoranda dated April 12, 1972, January 6, 1973, and February 13, 1973, reiterating this policy. 552-950--14——2 18 or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. . . These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela- tionships, and child rearing and education. Roe v. Wade, 41 US.L.W. 4213, 4225 (Jan. 22, 1973) (citations omitted). What is protected is the individual’s personal right to privacy, notwithstanding the fact that by its very nature the exercise of the right may require the par’ ‘ipation of another individual. Accordingly in striking dowr hibition on the access to the use of contraceptive devices as u denial of equal protection the Court in Fisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), noted: If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from un- warranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. (citation omitted). Thus, the constitutional question presented is whether at this time a mother’s desir. to keep the name of the child’s father secret is so “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept 22 of ordered liberty” as to require constitutional protec- tion. Roe v. Wade, supra, 41 U.S.L.W. at 4225. The contention of each plaintiff mother is that, because her par- ticipation in legal action to establish the paternity of her child may result in additional strains in family relationships within the home, or may unwisely force the permanent severance of relationships with his father, her right to decide for herself whether a paternity action should be brought is so “funda- mental” as to be included in the constitutional guarantee of personal privacy. This contention calls for further examination. The rights of a person arising out of a family relationship are necessarily interrelated with those of other members of the family. Whatever interest a mother may have in not disclos- ing her knowledge of the identity of her child’s father is inter- twined with, and has a material effect upon, the interests of her child. To discern more accurately the nature of a mother’s — it will be helpful to distinguish it from those of her child. 19 Some light is thrown upon the particular interest of the child by the way in which our society considers the plight of a child who has not been acknowledged by his father. Rather than branding it as manifestly evil, a theme which one must be prepared to concede is subject to the influences of changing social trends. the child’s relationship to his unnamed 23 father has been imbued with a sense of responsibility. The responsibility of a father to support his child, and a cause of action to enforce that responsibility, have existed in Connecticut from its earliest days.’ In obtaining support for their children, the plaintiffs do not hesitate to disclose publicly to the state and others that their children are illegitimate. At the same time, they argue that the failure to disclose the name of the father brings strength to the family, although that will shield the father against his obligation to support his own child. There is an inconsistency here in keeping two contradictory ideas in play at the same time. The legitimate children in the family unit, if any there are, are not disadvantaged, for they still have their father to look to for support. Whatever unique stigmata of suffering may be carried by a child because he has been denied the same charter that the other children in the family take from birth may not be wholly relieved by disclosure of the name of his father; but if paternity is not established, he is subjected to the additional risk thet he will be forever deprived of many rights he 24 is qualified to receive, even though an illegitim:ate child of his father. Except for special situations, e.g., to in- sure noble lineage and the stability of titles, and the prompt and definitive determination of valid distribution of property left by decedents, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), the trend of the law is to separate the label “illegitimate” from the word “child” to prevent their exclusion from benefits to chil- dren. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1971) (workmen’s compensation benefits); Glona v. American Guar- antee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful death statute); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 US. 68 (1968) (wrongful death statute); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.) (3-Judge District Court), aff'd, 41 U.S. L. W. 3345 (1972 In addition to this responsibility, it is not amiss to note that history and literature are replete with examples of the anguish suffered by illegi- timate children denied the satisfaction of knowing their parternity. See, e.. The Right of Ilegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 Harv. I. Rev. 337 (1962). Three bastardy actions are reported in the first volume of Con- necticut’s Reports. See Vol. 1 of Roots Reports 1789-08. (social security death benefits); Ballentine v. DeSylva, 226 F. 2d 623 (9th Cir. 1955) (copyright statute); Middletown v. Luchenbach S. S. Co., 70 F. 2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 293 US. 577 (1934) (death on the high seas, “children” includes illegiti- mates); Turner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 862, 133 Pac. 2d 859 (1943) (“children” in life insurance policy includes illegitimate children). In all of the foregoing cases the interest of the father was only tangential to that of his illegiti- mate child, for the benefit to the child was not at the expense of his father. But in Gomez v. Perez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4174 (Jan. 17, 1973), where the same interest of the father as in these 25 cases was at stake, the Supreme Court held that it was a denial of equal protection for a state to exclude illegiti- mate children from the obligation of a father to support his children. Assuming, arguendo, that the enforced disclosure by the plaintiffs of the names of the fathers of their illegitimate chil- dren results in an injury which is irreparable, the foregoing analysis of the relative rights of the members of their families persuades me that they have not made a sufficiently clear show- ing of probable success on the merits as to warrant preliminary injunctive relief under the traditional standard. However, since they have “raised questions going to the merits so serious, sub- stantial, and difficult as to make them a fair ground for litiga- tion . . I I turn next to consider whether the balance of hardships tips so decidedly toward them as nonethelese to war- rant the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 405 F. 2d at 323. B. BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS In balancing the hardships, it must be remeinbered that (t)he requirement that a party seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief necessitates more than a mere showing that the party seeking 26 relief will see its relative position deteriorate. Pre- liminary injunctive relief is extraordinary relief. It requires a convincing demonstration that the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the moving party. Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int'l, Dkt. No. 72-1878 (2d Cir., Dee. 4, 1972), slip op. at 715, 722 (citations omitted). — — — z :: ?—: 21 Normally the court is called upon to balance the harm which a plaintiff will suffer if an injunction is not granted against the harm that a defendant will sustain if it is. More is involved here. There are special circumstances in this case which make a great difference in considering hardships. As already indicated, the “right of privacy” is invoked by the plaintiff mothers to protect their desire to keep secret the name of their children’s father lest its disclosure have some adverse effect upon future relationships within the home. Not every one will agree on what are good amenities and conduct in such a situation. But if the family is to be taken into account, and it must be, hardship to the child cannot be left out of consideration. As noted above, these children stand to reap significant benefits if paternity is established. When the effect of the continued denial of the right to sub- stantial benefits accorded to children generally is balanced against the effect which disclosure of the name of a child's father will have on any future relationships with him, the hardships fall more heavily on the child than on his 27 mother. Another factor militating against the grant of a pre- liminary injunction is the presence of a statute of limitations which provides that a paternity suit must be brought within three years from the date of the child’s birth.’ Once the third birthday of a child has passed without action, the name of his father may never be disclosed to him. Even if it is disclosed thereafter, years may go by before there is an opportunity to make a claim to a benefit derived through his father, and the more stale such a claim is the more difficult it will be to prove it. The problems with respect to proof of paternity are formi- dable in any case. For the foregoing reasons, the application for a preliminary injunction is denied. However, the court, as soon as it is desig- nated, will expedite a hearing on the merits. SO ORDERED. Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 27th day of February, 1973. (S) M. Josarnx BLUMENFELD, Chief Judge. "The plaintiffs suggest that a temporary injunction by this conrt would effectively toll the state’s statute of limitations, but they have not furnished the court with any authority to support that proposition. 22 28 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil No. 15,579 Donna Dok, Er AL., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS U. Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE State OF CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANT Civil No. 15,589 SHA RON Rog, Er AL., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS v. Nicuo.tas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE State or CONNECTICUT, A ON BEHALF or Orners SIMILARLY SITUATED, DEFENDANT Substitute Complaint—Filed March 9, 1973 1. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief authorized by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation of rights privileges and immunities secured to the plain- 29 tiffs and all others similarly situated, by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment and the Ninth Amendment, all of the United States Constitution, and the Social Security Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1352 et seq., and regu- lations promulgated thereunder. 2. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343. 3. This is a proper case for determination by a three-judge court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and § 2284, in that it seeks an injunction and declaratory judgment to restrain the defendants from applying. enforcing and implementing Con- necticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) (1971 Public Act 439), on the grounds that said statute violates the right of privacy of the class of plaintiffs, and denies them equal protection of the laws, and constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment. Copies to be issue of the marriage by any court of competent jurisdiction. The persons in the class are so numerous as to make joinder impracticable; there are common questions of law and fact; plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class; 30 and the representative plaintiffs will fairly and ade- quately protect the interests of the class. The parties op- posing the class have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. 5. a. The plaintiffs, Donna Doe, Linda Loe, Rena Roe, Sally Smith, Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe and their children are all eligible to receive public assistance benefits from the Connecti- cut State Welfare Department. b. Plaintiff Donna Doe and the subclass of persons she rep- resents have been refused or have been threatened with refusal of public assistance for failure to comply with Section 52- 440(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes. e. The dependent children of plaintiffs Linda Loe, Rena Roe. Sally Smith, Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe, are in danger of having their parental care eliminated by the welfare department by virtue of a court citation subjecting their mothers to a maxi- mum penalty of one year’s imprisonment under Section 52- 440(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes. d. Each plaintiff is a resident of the State of Connecticut. e. The plaintiffs’ Affidavits, attached to the Complaint as Exhibits B, C, D, and E and incorporated herein by reference as if they were fully pleaded, detail their individual factual situations and the effects of the defendant's policies upon them. 31 6. Defendant Nicholas Norton, is Commissioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut, and in said ca- pacity is charged with administering the welfare laws of the 24 State of Connecticut. His claims and defenses which would be available to the selectmen of any town and of any guardian ad litem of children appointed by any court of competent juris- diction, the class of persons empowered to act under C. G. S. § 52-440(b). 7. Plaintiffs Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe are recipients of assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program operated by defendant Nicholas Norton. Each has given birth to a child who is not issue of a marriage, and each has been served with a citation prepared by his agent Sheldon Messinger under the authority of C.G.S. § 52-440(b). The Cir- cuit Court has not disposed of said citations to the date hereof. 8. The defendant welfare commissioner, through private counsel retained by the welfare department, has notified Linda Loe and Rena Roe that they will be subjected to court citation which would make them vulnerable to possible imprisonment and fine for their failure to name their children’s putative father. (See the department's notifications to the mothers. Ex- hibits F and G.) 9. To the date hereof, each of said named plaintiffs has re- fused to disclose the name of the putative father of her child. claiming it is in the best interests of both mother and child not to make the disclosure. Unless enjoined by this Court from doing so, each of the plaintiffs will be forced to choose between doing what she feels in the best interests of the family and being found in contempt of court. 32 10. The defendant welfare commissioner, through pri- vate counsel retained by the welfare department, has notified Sally Smith that she will be subjected to court citation and possible imprisonment for her failure to sign an acknowl- edgement of paternity form with the previously divulged name of her child's putative father. (See department's notification. Exhibit I.) 11. If any of these named plaintiffs is found in contempt of court, imprisonment for up to one year could follow; in all probability dismemberment of their families and consequent termination of the plaintiffs eligibility under the AFDC pro- gram would result. COUNT I The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are incorporated herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full. 25 12. In the event that plaintiffs Linda Loe, Rena Roe, Sally Smith, Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe are compelled to testify in the Cireuit Court, each of them may be asked any and all details of her sexual conduct, may be questioned about her relationship with the putative father, may be forced to insti- tute a paternity action or to testify in such an action brought by the Commissioner of Welfare; all of said possibilities being public record. 13. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the regu- lations issued under it remove members of the plaintiff class from the position of determining the best interests of 33 their children without requiring as a precondition, an individual due process hearing and finding that the child’s interests are being neglected by the plaintiffs. 14. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) is not re- stricted in application to those cases in which it may be possi- ble subsequently to bring a paternity action. 15. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the reg- ulations issued by the Conrecticut State Welfare Department violate plaintiffs right to privacy guaranteed by the First. Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. COUNT II The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14 are incorporated herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full. 16. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the reg- ulations issued by the Connecticut State Welfare Department constitute a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as ap- plied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. COUNT III The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are incorporated herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full. 17. The practices and policies of the Connecticut State Wel- fare Department pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut General Statutes violate the Social Security Act of 1935 and related regulations in the following specifics: a. 42 C.F.R. 250.50(a) and 42 U.S.C.A. 602 which protect public assistance recipients from the public dis- closure of confidential information. 26 34 b. 42 U.S. C. A. 602 (a) (9), 42 C. F. R. 206.10(a) (10) which requires that standards and methods for the determination of eligibility “will not result in practices that violate the individual's privacy or per- sonal dignity or harass him.” c. 42 U.S. C. A. 601 and 42 U.S.C.A. 602(a)(14) re- quiring encouragement of the care of dependent chil- dren in their own or relative's homes, to help maintain and strengthen family life, and to continue parental care and protection. See also, 42 C.F.R. 220.16 and re- lated sections. d. The department is creating an additional condi- tion of eligibility for mothers of dependent children who refuse to name putative fathers. e. The 42 U.S. C. A. 602 (4) (17) requirement of a single agency organizational unit responsible for such a plan has not been met. f. C.G.S. § 52-440(b) threatens to remove the mother from the household inviolation of the purposes of Title 42 U.S.C. § 60. COUNT IV The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are hereby in- * by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full. _ 18. C. GS. § 52-440 (b) has not been applied to and was not intended to apply to mothers of children born out of wedlock unless such persons are recipients of assistance from the State Welfare Department or general assistance. 35 19. Said statute invades the privacy of persons re- ceiving such assistance, hereby denying them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the United States Constitution. COUNT V The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are hereby in- — by reference the same as though pleaded herein in ull. 27 20. C. G. S. § 52-440b creates an irrebutable presumption that failure or refusal of a plaintiff mother to disclose the identity of her child's father is not in the best interests of the child, when in fact such disclosure may or may not be in the child’s best interest. Said presumption violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 36 WHEREFORE: Plaintiffs respectfully pray, on behalf of themselves, their minor children an all others similarly situated, that this court: 1, Assume jurisdiction of this claim, convene a three-judge district court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2281 to determine this controversy and set this case down for a prompt hearing: 2. Certify, pursuant to Rule 23 F.R.C.P. that this claim may proceed as a class action ; 3. Pending a hearing and determination by a three-judge court, grant temporary relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2284(3) restraining defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concert and participation with them from causing irreparable harm to plaintiffs by acting pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut General Statutes and related policies and practices. 4. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions, pursuant to Rule 65 F. R. C. P. enjoining the defendant, his successors in office, agents and employees from causing irreparable harm to plaintiffs by acting pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut General Statutes and related departmental policies and prac- tices. 5. Enter final judgment declaring Section 52-440(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes and all related state policy and practices invalid under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Social Security Act of 1935 and violative or regulations promulgated pursuant to the Social Security Act of 1935. 37 6. Pursuant to Rule 54(d) F.R.C.P., grant plaintiffs such additional relief, including payment of all moneys wrongfully withheld, as this court may deem just, proper, and equitable. A other and further relief as law and equity may By Fnaxk Cocnran, 169 Starr Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511 203-772-1873. Doveitas M. Crocker, Raymonp J. KIL x, 746 Main Street, Post Office Box D, Willimantic, Connecticut 06226 203-423-8425 Ropert BeckMAN, 342 Atlantic Street, Stamford, Connecticut 06901 Their Attorneys. 38 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil Action No. 15,579 Don, r AL., PLAINTIFFS v. NORTON, DEFENDANT Civil Action No. 15,589 Roe, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS V. NORTON, DEFENDANT Incorporation of Exhibits—Filed Mar. 9, 1973 1. Exhibit A to this Substitute Complaint consists of the ma- — —— A and B to the Complaint in Roe v. Norton, are hereby incorporated by reference the same — het by the as though 2. ibits B. C, D, and E to this Substitute Complaint con- sists of the materials with those designations to — 20 in Doe v. Norton, which are hereby incorporated by reference the same as though attached hereto. Plaintiffs: By Frank CocHRAN, Dove Las Crockert, RaymMonp KELLy, Rosert BECKMAN, Their Attorneys 39 Certification (omitted in printing). 40 Unrrep States District Court, District or CoNNECTICUT, Cuambers or Jupce Jon O. NEwMAN, Hartford, Conn., March 12, 1973. Re Donna Doe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,579. Sharon Roe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,589 Davip Rosen, Esa. AND Epwarp Do.an, Esq. 265 Church Street, New Haven, Conn. Dear Sms: I understand that you are willing to serve as counsel for the children in the above-captioned three-judge court cases. Enclosed please find copies of the Court's files. The Court appreciates your willingness to serve as counsel, and this letter is your appointment as such. Sincerely, Jon O. NEwMAN, United States District Judge. 41 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil Action No. 15,579; April 10, 1973 Donna Dor, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS v. NicHo.tas Nokrox, DEFENDANT Notice of Filing of Affidavits as Evidence Pursuant to the agreement reached by counsel for all parties in this action at the pre-trial conference presided over by Judge 7. Such other and further reli i bd relief as law and equity may The Plaintiffs: By Frank Coch Rax, 169 Starr Street 7 New Haven, Connecticut 06511 208-772-1873. Dove.ias M. Crockerr, Raymonp J. KxLLx, 746 Main Street, Post Office Box D, Willimantic, Connecticut 06226 203-423-8425 Rosert BeckMan, 342 Atlantic Street, Stamford, Connecticut 06901 Their Attorneys. 38 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil Action No. 15,579 Dog, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS v. NorTON, DEFENDANT Civil Action No. 15,589 Rog, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS v. NORTON, DEFENDANT Incorporation of Exhibits—Filed Mar. 9, 1973 1. Exhibit A to this Substitute Complaint consists of the ma- terials Exhibits A and B to the Complaint in Roe v. Norton, which are hereby incorpora attached hereto. ted by reference the same as though 2. Exhibits B, C, D, and E to this Substitute Complai C. P. a 8 plaint con- sists of the materials with those designations to the complaint 20 in Doe v. Norton, which are hereby incorporated by reference the same as though attached hereto. Plaintiffs: By Frank CocHRAN, DoudlAs Crockett, RaymMonp KELLY, Ropert BECKMAN, Their Attorneys 39 Certification (omitted in printing). 40 Unrrep States District Court, District or CoNNECTICUT, CuHaAMBers or Jupce Jon O. NEWMAN, Hartford, Conn., March 12, 1973. Re Donna Doe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,579. Sharon Roe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,589 Davin Rosen, Esa. AND Epwarp Do.an, Esa. 265 Church Street, New Haven, Conn. Dear Sirs: I understand that you are willing to serve as counsel for the children in the above-captioned three-judge court cases. Enclosed please find copies of the Court’s files. The Court appreciates your willingness to serve as counsel, and this letter is your appointment as such. Sincerely, Jon O. NEWMAN, United States District Judge. 41 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil Action No. 15,579; April 10, 1973 Donna Dog, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS v. Nicholas Norton, DEFENDANT Notice of Filing of Affidavits as Evidence Pursuant to the agreement reached by counsel for all parties in this action at the pre-trial conference presided over by Judge Blumenfeld on March 12, 1973, plaintiffs are filing as eviden affidavits of plaintiffs and others similarly situated. For — venience, attached to the affidavits is a Summary and Categori- — to relate the lengthy affidavits to the legal issues in this 43 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil Action No. 15,579; April 13, 1973 Donna Dos, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS v. NICHOLAS NORTON, DEFENDANT . Summary of Affidavits 1. No explanation by Welf ild’ sa pater — — y are Department of her child's Jo contact with father since mother became pregna 3. She feels that any further contact wi — be detrimental to her child and toher, a eres eee II. RENA ROE: 1. Noexplanation by Welf ild’ pa dae by Welfare Department of her child’s legal , er has mad i — 24 — e 8 threats of physieal harm to mother 3. No interest was sh Ps phen 2 own in the child by the father who 4. Mother has plans for a future marriage adoption of the child by her intended husband. ce III. LINDA LOE: * Her two illegitimate children were born over three years 2. She was divorced more than three years ago. 3. No paternal support or paternal — — 4. i a — by Welfare Department of children’s legal 31 IV.A: 1. One year old illegitimate child. 2. A is now planning to marry putative father and she .eels that Section 52-440b legal action could destroy the possibility of marriage. 3. A has written acknowledgement of paternity and is in the process of having the child’s name changed to that of the father. 4. No explanation to A by Welfare Department of her child’s legal paternal rights. V. MARY BROWN: 1. No explanation by Welfare Department of her child’s legal paternal rights. 2. Planning to marry man who is not the putative father but whom most believe to be the father. 45 4. Written acknowledgement of paternity by putative father. VI. MILDRED WALTER: 1. Gave name of putative father to Welfare Department. 2. Fears putative father because of prior beatings and phys- ical abuse. The father was arrested and plead guilty to assault against her. Afraid to place her own life and that of the child in danger by signing a paternity petition. 3. She has no objection to Welfare Department initiation of paternity action against putative father. 4. She has received four Welfare Department letters indicat- ing her welfare benefits will be terminated if she does not sign a paternity petition. VII. M. 1. Six month old illegitimate daughter. 2. M plans to marry the putative father. 3. Fears that paternity action will destroy possibility of marriage. 4. No explanation to M by Welfare Department of her child’s paternal benefits. VIII. DONNA DOE: 1. Seventeen month old illegitimate child and two other legit- imate children. 46 2. November, 1972, Doe’s application for AFDC was denied for failure to disclose putative father but since 32 the initiation of this action she has been declared eligible for welfare benefits. 3. No explanation from Welfare Department of her child’s paternal legal rights. 4. Stability of family from non-disclosure because : a. Doe and children are devout members of Seventh Day Adventist Church. b. Strong emphasis of church on family participation in Sabbath programs and services. e. Weekly attendance by Doe and family mutual family happiness and strength. 6. Putative father is Roman Catholic and opposes religious training that his child is now receiving and has expressed his feelings on matter to Doe. 7. Disclosure will jeopardize church membership—one of church’s prohibitions is premartial sexual intercourse. Violation is ground for disfellowship. Only a few church elders know real situation rest of Congregation is ignorant of the facts. IX. FRANCES FOE: 1. Does not know father but knows that her child is the re- sult of either an incestuous union or one with a mentally un- stable — whose whereabouts are unknown to er. 47 2. No explanation by Welfare Department of her child’s legal paternal rights. X. SALLY SMITH: 1. She has divulged the putative father’s name to the Welfare t. 2. Birth certificate signed by father and child bears his name. 3. Child supported by father and only receives Title XIX not 4. Welfare Department wants her to sign paternity petition. XI. DOROTHY POE: 1. Because she is undergoing psychiatrie treatment and has a possible heart condition she does not feel it is in her best in- terest or her child's to expose herself to the additional stress of testifying in court. 2. No explanation by Welfare Department of her child's legal paternal rights. * — —— XII. C: 1. She has told the welfare department that the father is one of three men. She has never refused to divulge those names to the department, but rather offered to submit all three names to the Welfare Department after tue birth of her child. 48 2. She has received a citation to appear in Circuit Court and a continuance was obtained until April 28, 1973. 3. The Welfare Department explained the potential social security benefits her child might be able to obtain if paternity was established. XIII. SHARON ROE: 1. She has received a citation to appear in Circuit Court but the matter is still pending. 2. She refuses to disclose the name of the child’s father be- cause of her right to sexual privacy, and the putative father has threatened to leave the state and thus sever the relation- ship with their daughter if his name is disclosed. XIV. D: 1. No explanation by the Welfare Department of her child’s potential legal paternal rights. 2. D’s illegitimate child is over 4 years old. 3. D worked a third shift to enable her te support and care for her child until her failing health prevented her from con- tinuing to work. 4. The three year statute of limitations on paternity actions has , 5. D feels disclosure of the father’s name would invade her privacy, interfere with her relationship with her daughter, and serve no useful purpose. 49 XV. KATHERINE LOPES: 1. Was forced by the welfare department to initiate a paternity action. 2. The paternity trial was a humiliating experience which forced her to publicly disclose details of her private sexual and personal life. 552-950—74——-3 50 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil Action No. 15,579; April 13, 1973 Donna Don, Er Al., PLAINTIFFS v NicHOLAS NorTON, DEFENDANT Affidavit Categorization I. The illegitimate child will not lose potential monetary rights from the putative father if a paternity action in the mother’s name is not initiated. A. The paternity action statute of limitations has run. 1. III 2. XIV B. The mother had a written acknowledgment of pa- ternity from father. Se » B Vv 3. X* 51 C. The mother has divulged or had offered to di- vulge the putative father’s name to the welfare department. The welfare department is able to bring a pa- ternity action in its own name. 1. VI“ 2. x° 3. XII D. The putative father’s name is unknown to the mother. . 2. XII“ If. The mother has made a decision based on reasonable grounds that divulging the putative father’s name to the wel- fare department or initiating a paternity action in her own name will not be in her child’s best interests. A. Mother fears physical retaliation from the father. . = 2. VI“ *The asterisk denotes the affidavit falls into more than one of categoriza- tions I and II. B. Future contact with father or public disclosure of status of illegitimacy would be detrimental to both mother and child. 1. I (father has never contacted mother since pregnancy ) 52 2. VIII (public knowledge of illegitimacy could cause excommunication ) 3. XI (mother’s psychiatrie and possible heart condition preclude paternity trial ) 4. IX“ (father a close relative or mentally un- stable) 5. XIII (paternity action could destroy father- daughter relationship) C. The mother intends to marry the father and believes that a paternity action would jeopardize the child’s chances and her chances for a warm and permanent relationship with the father. 1. VII 2. IV“ D. The mother intends to marry shortly and her husband would adopt the illegitimate child. A paternity action would va the chances for this arrangement. a 2. II“ III. i 1 of child's potential paternal legal rights. IV. Explanation of child's possible potential social security benefits. 1. XII Plaintiffs, By Dovcias M. Crocxerr, Their Attorney. See footnote p. 34. 36 o4 I AFFIDAVIT WiLurantic, March 1 2, 1973. State or ConNECTICUT, County of Windham, ss: B and her child reside in West Willington: Connecticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the Connecticut State Welfare Department. B received a letter dated Decem- ber 7, 1972, from an attorney retained by the Welfare Depart- ment which stated that legal action would be instituted against her if she failed to disclose the naine of her child’s father. No welfare department representative, employee, or attorney has ever explained to B that her child could obtain benefits from her putative father if paternity was established other than her social worker who informed B seventeen months ago that she would be entitled to receive support payments for her child. However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injunction which outlined support and other po- tential benefits was explained to her in detail. B has a verbal acknowledgement of paternity by her child’s putative father. In light of this verbal acknowledgement of paternity, B feels it is in her child’s best interest not to name the father and initiate a paternity action at this time. 55 She has had no contact with her child’s putative father since she became pregnant and feels that any future con- tact would be severely detrimental to both herself and her child. The individual referred to as B has personally appeared be- fore me, this day March 12, 1973, and under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statement. Dovetas M. Crockett, Commissioner of Superior Court. 37 56 II AFFIDAVIT = Witurmantic, March 12, 1978. STATE or CONNECTICUT, County of Windham, ss: RENA ROE and her illegitimate child reside in Willimantic, Connecticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the Connecticut Welfare Department. On December 7, 1972, RENA ROE received a letter from an attorney retained by the welfare department which stated that § 52-4406 legal action would commence if she failed to disclose the name of her child’s father. No welfare department representative, employee, or attorney has ever explained to RENA ROE that her child could obtain benefits from his putative father if paternity was established. However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Pre- liminary Injunction which outlined these potential benefits was explained to her in detail. RENA ROF feels it is in her child’s best interest that she and her child do not have any further contact with the father. The father has threatened RENA ROE with physical harm if she divulges his name. He has never shown any interest in his child and has consistently denied fathering the child. The 57 chances for financial recovery from the father are mini- mal since he works irregularly. RENA ROE hopes to marry at some time in the future and she hopes her husband would adopt the child. She feels it is in her child’s best interest to minimize any contact with the child's father. The father’s character is such that he would be a detri- mental influence on his child and on the mother/child rela- tionship. The individual referred to as RENA ROE has personally ap- peared before me and, under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statement. By Dovetas M. Crockett. Stamrorb, March 12, 1973. Strate or ConNECTICUT, County of Fairfield, ss: LINDA LOE, a plaintiff in this action whose real name and identity are known to me, appeared before me and swore to the truth of the following statements: 1. That she and her two children reside in Stamford, Con- necticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the Connecticut Welfare Department. 2. That her children were born more than three years ago, and are not the children of her former spouse from whom she was divorced more than three years ago. 3. That there has been no paternal support, or acknowledge- ment of paternity of her children. 4. That there has been no institution of any action to estab- lish the paternity of her children. 5. That on December 4, 1972, an attorney retained by the Connecticut Welfare Department sent her a letter stating that he would commence legal action if she failed to disclose the name of the father of her children. 6. That no representative, employee or attorney of the Con- necticut Welfare Department has ever explained to her what benefits her children could obtain if their paternity were estab- lished, but that her counsel has fully explained to her 59 such benefits as outlined in the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for Preliminary Injunction. 7. That after full consideration of the possible potential bene- fits to her children, the reasons she had previously chosen not to disclose the name of the father of her children, and the fact that actions may no longer be commenced to establish the paternity of her children because they are over three years of age, she believes it is in the best interests of her children that she not disclose the name of the father of her children at this time. Rosert C. BECKMAN, Commissioner of the Superior Court. 39 60 IV AFFIDAVIT Wiurmantic, March 12, 1973. State or CONNECTICUT, County of Windham, ss: A and her one year old illegitimate child reside with A’s mother in Willimantic, Connecticut, and are currently receiv- ing AFDC benefits from the Connecticut Welfare Department. On November 17, 1972, she received a letter from an attorney retained by the Welfare Department that Section 52-440b legal action would commence if she failed to disclose the name of her child’s father. A and the child’s father are planning to marry. She is afraid that if she discloses his name, subsequent legal action could jeopardize their relationship and the possibility of marriage. A has obtained a written acknowledgement of paternity from the father and is in the process of obtaining an application to have her child’s last name changed to the father’s last name. No welfare department official has ever explained to A that her child could obtain benefits from his putative father if pater- nity was established. However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injunction which outlined 61 these potential benefits was explained to her in detail. In light of her possible marriage and the possible change of her child’s last name, and the written acknowledge- ment of paternity, she feels that it is not in her child’s best interest to name the father to the Welfare Department. The individual referred to as A has personally appeared before me, and, under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statment. Dovdlas M. CrockKerr, Commissioner of Superior Court. 40 62 Vv AFFIDAVIT Wiuurmantic, March 12, 1973. State or CoNNECTICUT, County of Windham, ss: MARY BROWN and her child reside in Willimantic, Con- necticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the Connecticut Welfare Department. On February 9, 1973, MARY BROWN received a letter from an attorney retained by the welfare department which stated that legal action would com- mence if she failed to disclose the name of her child’s father. MARY BROWN is planning to marry a man who is not the father of her illegitimate child. Most people believe that this man is in fact the father of the child. MARY BROWN believes that after the marriage her husband will adopt the child. do welfare department representative, employee, or attorney has ever explained to MARY BROWN that her child could obtain benefits from his putative if paternity was established. However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Pre- liminary Injunction which outlined these potential benefits was explained to her in detail. MARY BROWN has an acknowledgement of paternity in writing by her child’s putative father. 63 In light of her possible marriage and her child’s possi- ble adoption and the written acknowledgement of pa- ternity, MARY BROWN feels it is in her child’s best interest not to name the father and initiate a paternity action at this time. The individual referred to as MARY BROWN has personally appeared before me and, under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statement. Dovetas M. Crockett, Commissioner of Superior Court. Fesruary 23, 1973. Srate or ConNECcTICUT, County of Tolland, Rockville, ss: I, Mildred Walter being first duly sworn according to law, hereby depose, swear and say: 1. That i live at 66 Union Street in Rockville and receive welfare assistance under the AFDC program for myself and my minor daughter Tammy Jean Walter. 2. That I have given the name of the father of my child to the Welfare Department, so they can institute paternity and support proceedings against him. 3. That due to the violent nature of Tammy’s father, I have refused to start paternity proceedings against him but have supplied the Welfare Department with all the information about this man. 4. That during the months of January and February 1973, I have received four letters from the Manchester office of the State Welfare Department informing me that unless I agreed to sign paternity papers and testify in court proceedings brought against the father of Tammy, they would cut off my welfare checks immediately. 5. I have tried to cooperate in any way possible with the Welfare Department concerning this matter, but I can- 65 not testify or sign papers that may place my life and that of my child in danger. 6. My fear of this man is due to the beatings and physical abuse he inflicted on me when he was in Rockville. 7. On one occasion, in January 1972, the father of Tammy, dragged me by the hair and kicked me down Union Street in Rockville when I was 9 months pregnant. 8. He was arrested by the Rockville police charged with as- sault, plead guilty and placed on two years probation for those acts against me. 42 9. Because of incidents like this which also occurred on other occasions in 1972, I am deathly afraid of this man and do not wish to be involved in any situation with him because of his e~plosive temper. ' 10. I do not feel the Welfare Department should place these unreasonable and distressing demands upon me where they have the father’s name and address in their files. MiLprep WALTER. Subscribed to and sworn before me this 23rd day of February 1973. Raymonp J. Ketty, Commissioner of Superior Court. 66 VII AFFIDAVIT RockviILLx, March 20, 1973. Strate or ConNECTICUT, County of Tolland: M and her six month old daughter reside in Manchester, Con- necticut and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the Connecticut Welfare Department. On February Ist, 1973, she received a letter from an attorney retained by the Welfare Department that told her she would be cited into Circuit Court to name the putative father of her child if she failed to disclose his name. The father of the child recently served seven months of a years sentence in Seyms Street jail for criminal non support. He has served time in jail for non support on two other occa- sions. Since his release from jail the father of the child has contacted an attorney to begin divorce proceedings against his present wife. M and the putative father plan to marry as soon as he is di- vorced from his present wife. M is afraid that if she discloses his name, subsequent legal action could jeopardize their relation- ship and the possibility of marriage. If the putative father’s present wife learns of this paternity action, she will attempt to frustrate any divorce action started by the putative father. M has an oral acknowledgment of paternity from the father. 43 Although M has been contacted by welfare workers to name the putative father of her child, no welfare department 67 official, or employee has ever explained to M that her child could obtain benefits from her putative father if paternity was established. However the Doe v. Norton ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injuction which outlined these potential benefits, were explained to her in detail. In light of her possible marriage, and the pending divorce action of the putative father M feels it is in her childs best interest not to name the father and initiate a paternity action at this time. The individual referred to as M has personally appeared before me and under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statement. RayMonpD J. Keiuy, Commissioner of the Superior Court. 68 Vill AFFIDAVIT Rockvitie, March 19, 1973. STaTe or CONNECTICUT, County of Tolland, ss: Donna Doe and her 17 month old illegitimate child reside in Manchester with her two other children by a previous mar- riage. She is currently receiving AFDC benefits from the Connecticut Welfare Department for her entire family. On November 3, 1972 Donna Doe’s application for welfare bene- fits was denied for failure to name the youngest child’s puta- tive father pursuant to Section 52-440b of the Connecticut General Statutes. Since that time the State Welfare Depart- ment has acknowledged its error in refusing Donna Doe bene- fits (see Defendant's affidavit of Nicholas Norton Welfare Commissioner February 5th 1973) and has placed her entire family on assistance. Since being placed on AFDC, plaintiff Donna Doe has been contacted by her caseworker to name the father of her youngest son, or she will be compelled to name the father in Court pusuant to 52-440b Connecticut General Statutes. — en waa GH *6 44 No welfare department representative, employee or attorney has ever explained to her that her child could obtain benefits from his putative father if paternity was established. However the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injunction which outlined support and other potential bene- fits was explained to her in detail. 69 Nonna Doe has a verbal acknowledgement by her youngest child’s putative father. Despite this verbal ac- knowledgement she feels her child’s best interest and the sta- bility of her family would be best served by non-disclosure for the following reasons: Donna Doe and her children are practising members of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. She and her family attend re- ligious exercises, community discussion groups, recreation and games for the children of Church members. Strong emphasis is placed by the Church on family participation in Sabbath pro- grams and services. Weekly attendance by Plaintiff Doe and her three children at these services has provided an atmosphere of mutual family happiness and strength for them. Donna Doe feels the religious experience and emphasis on family participa- tion that the Adventist Church encourages has been a strength- ening factor in her relationship with her children. Her two older boys presently attend an Adventist school. The putative father of Donna Doe’s youngest child is a Roman Catholic. He is very opposed to the religious training that is being provided to the youngest Doe boy. He wou'd rather the child be raised a Roman Catholic. He has made his feelings on this matter of religious up bringing made very clear to Donna Doe. It is because of the putative father’s opposition to the re- ligious training being given the youngest Doe child that Donna Doe does not wish to identify him. 70 Donna Doe is also concerned that the public disclosure of the illegitimacy of her youngest child will jeopardize their church membership. It has been explained to her by her Pastor that an illegitimate child reflects poorly on the moral character of the mother in the eyes of the Church. The Seventh Day Adventist Church does not permit premarital sex, smok- ing or drinking. Violation of these rules are grounds for “dis- fellowship” i.e. excommunication or expulsion from Church membership and services. Donna Doe fears that being com- 45 pelled to name the putative father will result in possible “dis- fellowship” from her Church, or at the very least injure her standing and reputation within the Church community. At the present time only a few Church elders know of her situation. All other Church members assume her three children are issue of her previous marriage. In view of the difficulties that naming the putative father would present to continued Church membership for Donna Doe and her family she feels it is in their best interest not to name the father of her youngest child. Disclosure of his identity could only lead to disruption of the family and Church life that have provided such strength and stability to them. The putative father’s expressed desire to raise the youngest child in an- other religion presents a source of disruption and anxiety to the entire family. It is Donna Doe’s firm belief that compliance with 52-440b will produce more harm than good to her young- est boy and the rest of her children. 71 The individual referred to as Donna Doe has person- ally appeared before me and under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statement. By Raymonp J. Key. 72 IX AFFIDAVIT Marcu 22, 1973. Strate or CoNNECTICUT, County of New London, ss, Norwich, Ct. FRANCES FOE, whose real name and identity are known to me appeared before me and swore to the truth of the fol- lowing statements: 1. That she and her minor child reside in Norwich, Connecti- cut and are recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program of the Welfare Departinent of the State of Connecticut. 2. That she was advised by her caseworker that she had to name the father of her child in order to receive welfare benefits. 3. That she has chosen not to give information regarding the paternity of the child because: (a) she is uncertain as to who the true father of the child is. (b) that the child was conceived either under incestuous conditions or by a person who is emotionally unstable and whose whereabouts are unknown to her. 46 (c) that neither of the persons involved are aware that conceivement took place as she left the area unaware that she had become pregnant. (d) that she chooses not to make the existence of her child known to either party and desires to complete her high school education and assume full financial respon- sibility of her child through gainful employment. 73 4. That her caseworker did not explain the benefits the child may some day be eligible for under the Social Security Act if paternity was established. 5. That I explained said rights of the child to said recipient and she continued to choose not to name the father of the child for reasons set forth in paragraph three section (d) on page one of this affidavit. Patricia Paquette, Notary Public. 74 X AFFIDAVIT I, SALLY SMITH, being duly sworn depose and say: 1. On or about December 8, 1972 I received a letter from Attorney Francis Foley, III of 22 Shetucket Street, Norwich, Connecticut advising me to make an appointment with his office for the purpose of ascertaining the name of the father of my child. 2. On December 19, 1972 I appeared in Mr. Foley’s office to be advised of my legal rights in that regard as per the implica- tion of his letter to me dated December 7, 1972. 3. On December 19, 1972 Mr. Foley advised me that if I did not sign “Acknowledgement of Paternity” papers which were available in his office that I would be brought to Court and made to sign the papers in the Court and answer under oath as to the name of the father of my child. 4. I indicated to Mr. Foley that I had previously named the father of my child in question to the State Welfare Department and that the father signed the birth certificate at the hospial. 5. Mr. Foley then checked his file and confirmed that the child carried its father’s legal name in the records made avail- able to him by the Department of Welfare. 6. I further advised Mr. Foley that the child in mention is not a recipient of Welfare under my AFDC Budget as the puta- 47 tive father is supporting the child, and that the only benefits I am seeking for the child are Title XIX, medical and dental benefits. 7. I feel this action by the State of Connecticut is an invasion of my privacy and in violation of equal protection under the civil rights laws. Sur Smiru, Pseudonym. Jaxu Ax 24, 1973. 75 Srarx or CONNECTICUT, County of New London, ss, Norwich: Personally appeared, SALLY SMITH, signer in the fore- going instrument, personally known to me and referred to in the foregoing affidavit as SALLY SMITH. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of January, 1973. Patricia PAQUETTE, Notary Public. XI AFFIDAVIT 70 «Strate or Connecticut, County of New Haven, ss, New Haven: I, DOROTHY POE (a pseudonym I have chosen in order to protect my privacy), being first duly sworn, depose and say: 1. I am a plaintiff in the case of Roe et al v. Norton, Civil Action No. 15,589 (United States District Court, District of Connecticut). 2. My children and I are recipients of assistance from the Connecticut State Welfare Department under the Aid to Fami- lies With Dependent Children Program (AFDC), a resident of New Haven, Connecticut, and a citizen of the United States and the State of Connecticut. 3. On January 24, 1971, my daughter was born. She is not issue of any valid marriage. On several occasions since her birth, various workers at State Welfare have asked me whether I wanted to name the baby’s father. I have declined to do so, and until December, 1972 I was never pressed further. 4. On December 19, 1972, I was served with a petition and subpoena requiring me, under authority of Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440b to appear in the Sixth Circuit Court and disclose under oath the name of my daughter's father. As of this date said petition remains pending in that court. 77 5. I have been informed by my attorney that the pos- sible penalties for refusing to so testify are a $200. fine and/or one year in jail. 6. My attorney has also informed me that there are possible advantages for my daughter and myself if I tell Welfare her father’s name, including possible financial support if I go off Welfare and benefits under Social Security and other govern- ment programs. Nobody at the Welfare Department had ever informed me of that. 7. After my first child was born, I gave the Welfare Depart- ment her father’s name. They have never taken any action to get him to pay support. I later realized that he would make a lot of trouble, had other dependents and had little money any- way. For those reasons I didn’t want to pursue him for support. The Welfare Department never took any action against him after I gave them his name. 8. The main reason I don’t want to give the Welfare De- partment my younger daughter’s name is that I am very nerv- ous. I go to a psychiatric clinie where I have been advised not to work because of my condition. I may also have a heart con- dition; the Doctor’s aren’t sure yet. For both psychiatrie and medical reasons I do not want to be put in a position of great pressure such as testifying in court. 78 9. In addition I feel that whether to pursue support from my child’s father is something I should be able to decide according to whether I think he will pay, whether he will make trouble for me, how likely we are to receive other . and how much strain I would have to go through to it. 10. I have been advised by the psychiatrie elinie J attend, that it is generally good for children to know who their father is. For reasons of my own I accept this advice in one case and reject it in the other. Dororrry Por, A pseudonym. : a to and subscribed before me this 26th day of March, Commissioner of the Superior Court. AFFIDAVIT Witurmantic, March 27, 1973. STATE OF — — nty of Wi , 88: i ; a — are two month old child reside in Willimantic, — necticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the i t. r C was informed by an > ployee of the Connecticut State Welfare Department at the time she was applying for AFDC benefits that if paternity — established, her child would be entitled to Social 8 : — fits from the putative father. However, the Doe * or — Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Application for a ä * — which outlined other potential benefits was explain vd in detail by a law clerk from this office. C told this . oy ; that there were three possible fathers of her child be — immediately after the birth of the child she would disc — three names to the Welfare Department. She was 3 a! the Welfare employee that paternity could not be esta — through blood tests and without direct knowledge or a wr acknowledgement of paternity, disclosure would be —— On or about February 27, 1973, C received a letter te Raymond J. Chabot, Esquire, a private attorney retain 81 by the Connecticut State Welfare Department, *r ing C to call his office. C telephoned Mr. Cha ö ad requested her to disclose to him the name of her child I ‘ tive father. At that time C told Mr. Chabot that A i pe know the identity of her — ie oc father and upon i ting that fact. ; eae igen — amk a petition compelling her appearance before the Connecticut Circuit Court for the 5 th Circuit and disclose the name of the child’s putative f 8 ad to institute an action to establish the paternity of = child pursuant to Section 52-440b of the Connecticut Gen Statutes. 1 e e Circuit Court for the Eleventh Cireuit gran . for a continuance of the Court's order to appear based 6626607. 50 upon the pendency of Doe, et al v. Norton, Ci (D. Conn.) until April 27, 1973. e lami e individual referred to as C above has ( personally a peared before me this 28th day of March, 1973, and, Ae oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statement. Dovuacias M. Crocxerrt, Commissioner of Superior Court. 81 XIII AFFIDAVIT Strate or CoNNECTICUT, County of New Haven, ss, New Haven: I, SHARON ROE, (a pseudonym I have ch . . , t my privacy), being first duly sworn, depose 2 9 en 1 2 onc ae — of Roe et al v. Norton, Civil . 15, ni tates Distri istri 8 District Court, District of 2. My children and J are recipients of assistan ce from th Connecticut State Welfare Department under the Aid to F — 1 wa) sg . — Children Program (AFDC), a resident of New Haven, Connecticut and a citi ni and the State of Connecticut. nme 3. On October 27, 1972, d i 3 — my daughter was born. She is not 4. Shortly after my daughter's birth, I appli i „applied for assist —— the AFDC Program. At that time, I was referred to the 2 r ao of the Sixth Cireuit Court in New n. There I was asked 0 2 to name my daughter's father and 5. On December 20, 1972, I was served with iti De , ‘ a petit — requiring me, under authority of 9 tatutes § 52-440b to appear in the Sixth Circuit Court * — ae <— 2 the name and whereabouts of my hter’s er. As of this date said petiti mains pending in that court. * 6. I have been informed by my attorney, that the possible penalties for refusi i may ae refusing to so testify are a $200. fine and/or one 51 7. My attorney has also informed me that there are possible advantages for my daughter and myself if I give her father’s name, including possible finaneial support when I go off Wel- fare and benefits under Social Security and other government programs. 8. I do know and could probably prove who my daughter’s father is. When she is older I plan to let her know as well, whether or not she is receiving financial support from him. 9. I have several reasons for refusing to give the name to the Welfare Department. First, the question of with whom I have had sexual inter- course is private; I don’t feel I should be forced to tell any go ‘ernment agency that, second, my daughter's father has no fixed address. My at- torney has informed me that if I so testify, I will be subject to unfriendly cross-examination and embarrassment in open court. Third, I have seen him since her birth and he has started to develop a good relationship with her; he plays with her. If I were to give his name he would leave the state and break off the relationship. 83 Fourth, the only reason I have been given that the Welfare Department wants to know his name is to try to get support money from him. He has irreguiar earnings at best and has said that he would leave the state if I push him. Furthermore, while I am on the State, I would receive the same amount of money for her total support whether or not he is contributing to it. : Finally, I think I have, and my attorney has advised ine that he thinks I have a constitutional right to decide whether it is worth while to seek financial support from iny daughter’s father. SHARON Rox. Pseudonym. Personally appeared the person known in these proceedings as Sharon Roe who is personally known to me, and subscribed and sworn to this affidavit before me this 31st day of March, 1973. Commissioner of the Superior Court. Apri 2, 1973. Staie or ConNECTICUT, County of Windham, ss, Killingly: D and her child reside in the Borrough of Danielson, Con- necticut, and are currently receiving A. F. D. C. benefits from the Connecticut State Welfare Department. D received a letter dated February 26, 1973 from an attorney retained by the Welfare Department which stated that legal action would be instituted against her if she failed to disclose the name of her child’s father. No Welfare Department representative, employee, or at- torney has ever explained to D that her child could obtain benefits from her putative father if paternity was established. However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Pre- liminary Injunction which outlined support and other potential benefits was explained to her in detail. D has worked the third shift (12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.) for three years to support herself and her child. D is no longer physically able to work the third shift and provide proper care for her child. D's child is four years old and the statute of limitations re- garding paternity has elapsed. 85 D has a verbal acknowledgment of paternity by her child’s putative father. To the best of her knowledge, the putative father no longer resides in the State of Connecticut. In light of the fact that D has supported her child for three years without the assistance of anyone, and in view of the facts that the putative father is most likely out of state and the statute of limitations has lapsed, D feels that instituting a paternity action would serve no useful purpose except that of invading her privacy and adversely affecting the family rela- tionship which she has fought so long to protect. The individual referred to as D has personally appeared be- fore me, the day of April 2, 1973, and under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the abo statement. Raymonp RicHarp Norko, Commissioner of Superior Court. 53 86 XV AFFIDAVIT State or ConNECTICUT, County of New Haven, ss: I, KATHERINE LOPES, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 1. I am the mother of two children who were born out of wed- lock. The same man fathered both children. 2. Their father acknowledged paternity of the older child, and the acknowledgement was filed with the Connecticut Cir- cuit Court for the Sixth Circuit. Enforcement of its support provisions is supposed to be handled by the Family Relations office of that court. 3. I have at different times since the birth of my last child applied for and r-ceived benefits from the Connecticut State Welfare Department under the Aid to Families with Depend- ent Children (AFDC) program. When my youngest child was born, five years ago, the Welfare Department made me reveal his father’s name in order to receive welfare benefits. 4. On at least two occasions, the Welfare Department has made me go to Family Relations to sign affidavits for non- support warrants. Although I have done so, to the best of my knowledge Family Relations has never had him arrested. I have not received any support money from him during the time I have not been receiving AFDC. 5. I was told that I must bring a paternity action, and given a list of three (3) local attorneys to choose from to represent me, which I did later, my son and I were ordered to go 87 to Yale-New Haven Hospital for a blood test. Although the people at the hospital were very pleasant, they knew we were there because of the paternity action, and said so in front of my son, who was then about two (2) years old. This made me feel uncomfortable. 6. My son’s father denied paternity and there was therefore a trial before the Sixth Cireuit Court (New Haven). The trial was held in the regular civil courtroom with several people present who had nothing to do with the case. 54 7. When I testified, there was a long cross-examination by Edward Dolan, the father’s lawyer. I don’t remember now ex- actly what he asked; I seem to have blocked it from my memory. It must have been about my sexual relationship with my son’s father and whether I had had other sexual relations during that time. 8. I remember that the judge who was hearing the case looked bored most of the time. I felt embarrassed and uncom- fortable ; for that reason I would drop my voice. But every time I did that the judge would tell me to keep my voice up so that everyone could hear. 9. My son’s father also testified, denying that he was the father. I felt both angry at him for lying and very humiliated. 10. A year later the judge ruled against me, so that we have received no support or other benefits as a result of that proceeding. 11. The whole experience left me feeling dirty, as though I were a bad person for having had, my son. At the time, I was worried about that feeling would make me feel and act toward him. Now, although I still feel embarrassed and humiliated whenever I think about it, I don’t think it has made me love him any less. 88 12. I don’t think I would be willing to go through that kind of experience again. Katuerine Lopes. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 31st day of March, 1973. Commissioner of the Superior Court. 55 89 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil No. 15589 SHaron Roe AND Dororuy Por, UNDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF or Oruers SIMILARLY SiTUATED v. Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEHALF or OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED Answer of the Defendant COUNT I Par hs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are admitted. 4 he — a 1, 2, 4, and 9, the defendant has insuffi- cient knowledge or information to form a belief, and leaves the intiffs to their proof. * * So much of paragraph 3 as alleges that this is a proper case for a three-judge court is admitted, but the remaining allegation is denied i.e. “. . . on the grounds that said statute violated . . . equal protection of the laws.” COUNT II 4. Paragraph 11 is admitted. ; 5. Paragraphs 12 and 13 are denied. 90 COUNT III . Paragraphs 14 and 15 are denied. : The Answers to paragraphs apply as they are incorporated in all counts. Defendant: By (s) James M. Hicarns, Assistant Attorney General, 75 Meadow Street, 1 a East Hart ſoru, Connecticut 06108, Tel. (203) 3 i f provided to counsel of record on April 30, 19 9 (s) James M. Hiccins, Assistant Attorney General. 56 91 Civil No. 15,589 Donna Don, LINDA Log, Rena Rox, Satty SmMirH, AND ALL Orners SimiILaRLy Surrep v. Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Civil No. 15,589 SHaron Roe AND Dororny Por, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF or OrHers SrmiLaRLy SIiTvuaTep v. Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEHALF OF OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED Stipulations It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties as follows: 1. It is the intent of § 52-440 b and the practice of the Con- necticut State Welfare Department in each and every case in which the mother of an illegitimate child fails or refuses to name the putative father of the child to retain an attorney for the purpose of citing the mother court if she persists in refusing to name the probative father. 2. § 52-440 b in the opinion of counsel for all the parties is a civil statute. A contempt committed under this section can be purged at any time by naming the putative father, i.e. putative father, in the opinion of counsel of record herein. 92 DerenDant’s ExR MTT A Strate DepaRTMENT oF HEALTH, Hartford, Conn., March 16, 1978. Mr. James Hiaorns, Office of Finance and Control, 76 Meadow Street, East Hartford, Conn. Dear Mr. Hiddixs: I enclose tables of resident live births in Connecticut by legitimacy. Table IV is a continuation of the time interval to the latest year available (1971). The percent- age of illegitimate births are broken first by age of mother sind by race. Very truly yours, Epwarp C. AvuBIN, Research Analyst, Public Health Statistics Section. Enclosure. CONNECTICUT BIRTHS BY RACE AND LEGITIMACY, 1950-65 MOTHERS OF ALL AGES Nonwhite births Legiti- mate All races Ihegiti- mate Year SESRSSERTEIESS 7 — * ‘ ' * nnn DIe Deen 1 TFF enen ‘ os 2 ee 2. ee oe en eee ae ee ; FBeetik SoC eee : — 8 . out on * ons ‘t ont vu 1 1 ory W W eeaaennanaennnnnnnaneds “pet oa wes o's 004 '8 5 0 2 mae me en uss wr 0am 99-0981 ** oy * ol ttt Wes mt b. * 8 1 o's 1 — — oust ow — r crs sul oes so.’ ecb 18 Li6 ol? Bae —— wet oe . ow — so * w os eo * olf * — 85 —ñõ 8581 ow us oe wwe 66 oe» een t tot ew ist dir uu 1581 oe we d A $6 Phe w.'t woo * rc eto wos GEG «-—=‘* tes wrnnncnnenonncnccooes 1961 4 7. 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LZ i 1 1 b * 89999%% ; ———75ðr eget 2 — cor ste 1 b 01 O62 wee 10% 0 910 1 ont hh gust 1 * los 2401 ott ius t ws te I S „rr ———— — AOVNAAL N HAGNA SHAHLON ee Ur: r c’ 25 ot me Nem 66 -e eae 2 — 1101 ** t. * vie e 0 9 or 7 0 N ow 56 1 r hr oust 10. 10¹ Z 1 1 6 rs 1 * wc M 0 6 810 1 — — cont 0 688 “I lr go's 6% sr ne ‘tt 2 e 4 „ 98 55 b Gù 3756 soot ow ee. ‘1 192 ‘8 0 * * * we'l ome ‘tr ore ‘be 7 2 ont 17 ow ‘ov acne eee 333 vjZ— 2081 one o eur syuiq “wuts ey o WU lu een eee o! ere S DDr m e e MeO eee “nae moL Wee eT lined | mio. 21 SUI 6vuαuνιiεεN vun CHUM N TV SAUV TIV 00 62 98-1 CHILDREN’s Exuisir 1 In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut Civil Action No. 15,579 Donna Don, Linpa Lon, Rena Rog, Satty SMITH, AND ALL OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS U. NickrolAs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND As COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANTS March 28, 1973 Civil Action No. 15,589 SHaron Roe anv Dororuy Por, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF or OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS V. Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF THE STATE or CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANTS Deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M. D. 982 Appearances ° For THE I NYERESTS OF THE CHILDREN: ROSEN AND DOLAN By: DAVID N. ROSEN, ESQ. EDWARD J. DOLAN, ESQ. 265 Church Street New Haven, Connecticut For THE PLAINTIFFS: RAYMOND KELLY, ESQ. 35 Village Street Rockville, Connecticut MICHAEL ANTHONY ARCARI, ESQ. 76 Meadow Street East Hartford, Connecticut 63 98-3 ALBERT J. SOLNIT, M.D. witness called pursuant to agreement, being, first duly sworn in the above cause, testified on his oath as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Rosen: Q. Doctor, by whom are you employed? A. Yale University. pa Q. And what is your position A. I’ma Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry, and Director of the Child Study Center, and Chairman of the Center for the Study of Education. 7 Q. And can you state briefly your educational background! A. Ves. I have a Bachelor's Degree from the University of California, a Master of Arts from the University of California, an M.D. from the University of California, and Honorary Master of Arts from Yale University. Q. And can you — 4 — professional background and professional 1 98-4 A. Yes. After completing my medical school educa- tion, I became fully trained in pediatrics, in psychiatry, child psychiatry, and psychcanalysis. I’m certified in psyehiatry and in child psychiatry. 6 I have the equivalency of—well, I’m called what's called board eligible in pediatrics, and I’m a member of both the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of Child Psychiatry. Im President of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, and the past President of the American Psychoanalytic Association and the Association for Child Psy- choanalysis ; also, the Secretary-General of the International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions. Q. Now, Doctor, have I acquainted you with t. provisions of Connecticut Statute 52-440b which relates to a requirement that mothers, certain mothers, be required to name the puta- tive father of children A. Yes. ; Q. —and institute paternity action? A. Yes, you have. 64 Q. And have you, through your training and experience, formed conclusions about what you think the implications of this statute would be in situations for the children of such mothers? A. Yes, I have. Q. And you can state in as much length as you think 98-5 is necessary what you feel the major implications of the statute may be in different situations for different chil- dren? A. Yes. I think the most important consequence of that act, in terms of what serves children best, is the threat it offers to the ability of the mother to provide care for the child by requir- ing the mother to institute a paternity—what would you call it Q. Aetion. A.—action. It seems to me that that action does not take into account what the child’s needs are in a particular situation. The child, from our best knowledge, requires a steady and affection- ate relationship on a continuous basis to at least one parent. And if this is jeopardized or stressed, then the most important needs of the child are placed in jeopardy. By requiring the mother to institute a paternity action in order to qualify for economic support, I believe, from my clinical experience and my work as a child psychiatrist, that that adds an unnecessary stress to the mother’s capability of caring for her child. The support for the child, the support for the intactness of that family, should not, in my opinion, be conditional upon such a requirement as that which the law has made necessary. Q. What de you see as the possible advantages and disad- vantages of such requirement with respect to the child’s re- lationship with the child’s father? 98-6 A. I would not be able to judge that categorically except in one way. A child thrives from an affectionate relationship to both parents, especially if both parents have a harmonious and an affectionate relationship to each other So that the child’s opportunity for a continuous and meaning ‘ul relationship to the father is very important, if it is not at the 65 it can in addition help — child have a better sense of himself i father is also involved. ’ 1 enor the law, it seems to me, doesn’t seem to . 415 a harmonious relationship between parents by requiring 1 * mother to institute legal action against a putative father. that sense it seems to me to work against the best n the child, and especially in connection with wanting him to have a good relationship to his father as well as his mother. Q. Do you think that there might be possibilities—strike that. Do you see a danger in some instances of fathers 8 resentful of mothers or children, and that being harmfu "Fo could see the father would avoid contact with the child which otherwise he might maintain, and he might 98-7 avoid contact with the mother which otherwise he might maintain, if he feels that the condition for the relation ship is one of economic—is one required by the law in yo’ to provide economic support for the mother and child, or mother *.* whe do you see as the implications for the child if a mother is sent to jail for refusing to give the name of a father ? A. That could be, and usually is, catastrophic. If there is a good relationship between the mother and child and the aged is truly the affectionate psychological parent, by putting 2 mother in prison we remove the most crucial support and gui ; ing influence to assure the sound and 228 development o i especially if it’s a young . N * say the ——— is catastrophic. can you give some estimate of how serious 4 — to a child to have a parent i ear of its life wee ake 4 the age of five or six to lose that person on whom they count for support, for guidance, for protection and for the stimulating, nourishing love on which a child — pends for development, exposes them to, first of all, a feeling o helplessness than which there is no more devastating feeling for a child to have—a feeling of depression, a feeling that you cannot count on your world to be a dependable or safe one. And then in proportion to the adequacy of a substitute for 98-8 the mother, which is not guaranteed by our society at this time, the child may have some recovery from that devastating impact, but the degree of recovery is never whole, it’s never a complete recovery, there's always some impairment, 552950 74 — 8 66 some vulnerability that is brought about with such an aban- donment, because that is how the child experiences it—a young child experiences that as an abandonment by the adult on whom they have counted. Chiidren of that age can endure other stresses, which I would like to illustrate, much better than they can the loss of the maternal love object, the meiernal loving person. They can endure hunger, they can endure bombing raids, they can endure natural catastrophies and come through them relatively un- scathed psychologically, if they are physically all right. But they cannot escape the devastating impact of the loss of the person who has taken care of them since they were born, helpless as an infant into this world. Q. Have you found it to be true in many instances that chil- dren who do not know who their father is are curious and have a psychological need to know the identity of their father? A. I would say it’s almost universal that a child whose father is absent is a child who is curious, who tries to imagine, tries to find ways directly and indirectly to understand who his father or her father is, what they were like, how they grew up, what they’re about, what they represent, and what kind of 98-9 guiding influence they could be for the child in future experiences. Q. Is it, in your opinion, invariably in the child’s best in- terest to be told the name of the father? A. No. I think there are instances in which it would appear that the knowledge of who the father is, of knowing the father’s name, is not guaranteed to serve the child’s best interest. There’s a difference between knowing the father’s name and knowing the father, and wanting to know who the father is, being cu- rious and trying to fill in through one’s imagination or through one’s sources of information who the father is and what he’s like. The difference is this: If you take the instance of adoption, of children who are adopted from the earliest infancy on, many of our societal customs, convictions are that it would be best, since the true psychological parents are now the adopted par- ents, to not complicate the child’s life or the lives of the two sets of adults involved, by expecting the child to know who the bio- logical parents were. Therefore, it is a custom, in some places a law, that the actual identity of the biological parents is a 67 confidential matter not to be given to cither the adoptive par- ents or the adopted children. I have found that that can work very well. And, indeed, if that's the way people prefer it an it works out better, there is no reason why a child cannot overcome and master and thrive, through mastery of that absent knowledge, so 98-10 long as the adequacy of the parents who are in charge of his upbringing from infancy on is an adequate one. So in that s [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0139%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.