# Brief for Appellant — Chapman v. Meier

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for Appellant
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 420 U.S. 1

## Text

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Table of Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
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Constitutional Provisions Involved ..............
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Multi-Memver Districts ........ 2.2.66 eees

Population Variances Between Districts ............

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Population Variances Between Districts ............

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Chapman v. Meier, 372 F.Supp. 363 (1972) ........
Chapman v. Meier, 372 F.Supp. 371 (1974) ....1, 6, 20,24
Conaor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971) ... .3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12
13, 15, 17, 25
Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972) .............

Fortson v. Dorsey, 375 U.S. 433 (1965) ..............

Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) .......... 25

Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377
Se HOE» G.0 0:0 00000606900 0s000 bbe ben h nes 12

Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) . .3, 13, 14, 18, 20, 25
Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972) ..13, 15

Paulson v. Meier, 232 F.Supp. 183 (1964) .......... 3, 10, 11
Paulson v. Meier, 246 F.Supp. 36 (1965) . .3, 4, 10, 11, 18, 26
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ............ 3, 8, 25
State, ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53
PSS EET eee reer eT TTT TT TTT TT eT 11
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967) .............. 25
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 |
ED 6 69:064 66.6665 6056606800000 s 5600R600 046s 12
Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972) ............ 16
Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (1973) ............ 15
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) ...... 3, 12, 13, 15
White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) .......... 13, 14, 25
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973) .......... 15

Table of Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution ..... 2,7
Section 29, North Dakota Constitution ............... 9
Section 214, Article X VIII, North Dakota Constitution . 10
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-1406

DANIEL CHAPMAN and JACQUE STOCKMAN,
Appellants,

VS.
BEN MEIER, Secretary of State for the
State cf North Dakota,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Court below dated January 30, 1974, in-
cluding the dissent by Judge Bright, is reported at 372 F.Supp.
371. The Opinion and dissent are also printed at pages A-1
through A-53 of the Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement.
The Opinion of the Court entered June 30, 1972, including the
dissent by Judge Benson, is reported at 372 F.Supp. 363. The
Opinion, including the dissent, is printed at pages A-57 throngh

—_ so

A-67 of the Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement. The Order
of the Court filed May 22, 1972, has not been reported. The
Order is printed at pages A-54 through A-56 of the Appendix
to the Jurisdictional Statement. It has also been printed at pages
Al through A3 of the Appendix to the Motion to Affirm.

JURISDICTION

This is an injunctive action against the North Dakota Secre-
tary of State. The action was initiated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
$§ 1331, 1343, and 2281.

The Judgment appealed from is dated and was entered on
January 30, 1974. Notice of Appeal was filed on February 27,
1974, in the United States District Court for the District of
North Dakota. Appellants believe 28 U.S.C. § 1253 confers
jurisdiction on this Court.

The Judgment appealed from is a final one establishing a
permanent apportionment plan for the North Dakota Legisla-
ture based on the 1970 census. The Judgment denies plaintiffs
the injunctive relief sought under their Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs contend that the Court-fashioned reapportionment
plan adopted by the Judgment appealed from is Constitutionally
deficient and in conflict with the directive by this Court relating
to single-member legislative districting.

Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement was filed March 20, 1974.
Jurisdiction was noted by this Court on April 29, 1974.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. In the absence of unique factors as in Mahan v Howell,
410 U.S. 315, 333, and without any established state policy
supporting multiple-member legislative districts as in Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, was the District Court free to ignore
the general rule concerning the creation of multi-member legis-
lative districts as set out in Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690,
in fashioning a reapportionment plan for the North Dakota
Legislature?

2. Do the disparities in population among legislative districts
under the Court-fashioned reapportionment plan for the North
Dakota Legislature establish a per se violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution? If not, did the District Court enjoy the same
latitude and discretion as is afforded state legislatures under
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, in adopting reapportionment
plans containing population disparities among legislative districts,
or is the Court held to a stricter standard?

STATEMENT

In 1964, on the basis of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, a
three-member District Court rejected a 1963 North Dakota
legislative apportionment plan. The Court also voided Sections
26, 29, and 35 of the North Dakota Constitution upon which
the plan was based. Paulson v. Meier, 232 F.Supp. 183 (here-
inafter Paulson /). In 1965, the same three-member Court in-
validated a new plan adopted by the North Dakota Legislature
because of impermissible population disparities and ordered
into effect a plan designed by the Court based upon the 1960
census. Among other things, this plan created five (5) large
multi-member senator and representative districts. Paulson v.
Meier, 246 F.Supp. 36 (hereinafter Paulson //).

— oa

Upon the failure of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly
to apportion itself on the basis of the 1970 census, this action
was commenced in November of 1971 seeking a determination
that the Paulson /I plan was no longer valid under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and asking that the defendant be restrained
and enjoined from administering the laws pertaining to the
elections of members of the North Dakota Legislature under
the Paulson II plan. Plaintiffs requested the Court to design
a constitutionally valid reapportionment plan that would pro-
vide for single-member districts in accordance with the rule
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Connor v.
Johnson, 402 U.S. 690.

By Order of May 22, 1972, the Paulson II plan was stricken
as failing to meet Federal Constitutional standards. The Court
appointed a commission to prepare a plan that could be utilized
at the 1972 primary and general elections. Concerning the
question of multi-member districts, the Order said:

“We have considered the matter of ‘multi-member’ districts
and conclude there is insufficient time prior to the 1972
elections to fully explore and resolve the issues involved.
The matter of ‘multi-member’ districts will be studied in
depth by the Commission, and the results of that study be
made available to us.” (See pp. A-54-A-56, Appendix to
Jurisdictional Statement.)

By Opinion and Order filed June 30, 1972, an interim plan
was adopted (hereinafter “Dobson Plan”). Defendant Meier
was directed to conduct only the 1972 elections under the plan.
The Court retained jurisdiction to adopt a permanent plan
following the 1972 elections.

Concerning the issue of multi-member districts, the majority
stated:

anfian

“We briefly comment on the continuation of the five multi-
member senatorial districts in which are located the cities
of Fargo, Grand Forks, Minot, Bismarck, and Jamestown.
In the most populous 21st district, encompassing the Fargo
area, voters may be called upon to elect fifteen members
of the legislative assembly to represent that district, five
to serve in the Senate and ten to serve in the House of
Representatives. In each of the other multi-member dis-
tricts, the electors may also be called upon to elect a sub-
stantial number of representatives at a single election. If
each of the major political parties endorses a full slate of
candidates, the electorate in the largest multi-member dis-
trict could be called upon to judge the qualifications of
at least thirty candidates for state legislative office. In
such circumstances, the task confronting a voter in making
a considered choice among individual candidates would
appear to be most formidable.

“The five multi-member legislative districts were created
by the Federal District Court in Paulson v. Meier, 246
F.Supp. 36 (D. N.D. 1965), and not by enactment of the
Legislative Assembly. In light of subsequent Supreme
Court pronouncements, we believe it would be improper
for this Court to permit their continuation in a court-
fashioned plan. In Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690
(1971), the Court stated:

‘* * * (W)hen district courts are asked to fashion
apportionment plans, singie-member districts are
preferable to large multi-member districts as a gen-
eral matter. Id. at 692.’

The Supreme Court subsequently re-emphasized this rul-
ing in Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551 (Jan. 24,
1972). We feel constrained to permit multi-member dis-
tricts to continue during the 1972 elections, however to
avoid extreme disruptions in the elective processes. We

—_

recognize that political party organizational structure has
been formed, for elections subsequent to the 1965 appor-
tionment decision, along legislative district lines. See gen-
erally Ch. 16-17 NDCC. We recognize that it takes con-
siderable time for members of a political party to organize
and operate effectively for the benefit of the electorate,
following a change in district boundaries. We think it
inappropriate, therefore, to change the method of select-
ing the members of the legislative assembly in these multi-
member districts at this late date in light of the confusion
which such a change would likely precipitate. We feel
that the electorate will be better served by minimizing the
confusion surrounding the impending elections, than it
would be by the abolition of multi-member districts at this
eleventh hour.” (Author's emphasis.) 372 F.Supp. 363,
366.

Relative to population disparities among legislative districts,
the majority noted:

“We recognize certain weaknesses in the Dobson Plan,
namely, (1) some variance in population among the legis-
lative districts, which, in a few instances, seems substan-
tial; * * *” 372 F.Supp. 363, 366.

Because of infirmities in the Dobson Plan, the Court retained
jurisdiction of the case in order to adopt a different plan of re-
apportionment without being hampered by considerations of
the impending elections.

Contrary to the June 30, 1972, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, a reconstituted majority of the District Court issued an
Opinion on January 30, 1974, making permanent the 1972 in-
terim Dobson Plan, which included five (5) multi-member dis-

tricts containing up to fifteen (15) members, as well as providing . ;

for legislative districts with population disparities of more than
twenty per cent (20% ). See Chapman v. Meier, 372 F.Supp.
371.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Multi-Member Districts

Recognizing the inherent inequities in large multi-member
legislative districts, the United States Supreme Court, in Connor
v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, directed that as a general rule when
District Courts are required to fashion reapportionment plans
they should do so on the basis of single-member districts. The
State of North Dakota has neither Constitutional provisions nor
statutory enactments that conflict with the equitable remedy of
single-member districts. There are no unique factors that justify
the imposition of large multi-member districts for the urban
areas of North Dakota. Traditionally North Dakota has selected
its state senators from single-member districts. The plan fash-
ioned by the United States District Court for the District of
North Dakota includes five (5) large multi-member districts con-
taining up to fifteen (15) members and involving both houses of
the state legislature. The imposition of large multi-member dis-
tricts for North Dakota's urban areas under the Court-fashioned
reapportionment plan based on the 1970 census is arbitrary and
constitutes a breach of discretion by the District Court.

Population Variances Between Districts

The population disparity between the largest and the smallest
legislative district, under the Court-approved Dobson Plan of
reapportionment for the North Dakota Legislature, is more
than twenty per cent (20%) or a deviation ratio of 1.23-1.
Numerous other districts contain substantial variances, both
on a percentage and ratio basis. There are no natural geo-
graphical barriers that justify the population deviations among
the legislative districts. The guiding principle of equal repre-
sentation mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution has been discarded by the District Court.

Population deviations are beyond permissible Constitutional
limits; and the Dobson Plan per se offends the Equal Protection
Clause.

Population disparities among legislative districts are not inci-
dent to the effectuation of any discernible state policy, Consti-
tutional or statutory. The fact that North Dakota is sparsely
settled and is “barren” of electorally victimized minorities pro-
vides no support for imposition of the Dobson Plan. The basic
doctrine of “one man, one vote” promulgated under Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and reapportionment cases subse-
quent thereto was not principally formulated for the protection
of electorally victimized minorities. Rather, by assuring each
citizen equal voting power, it is designed to assure that the voting
majority will not be victimized by a minority whose votes are
accorded greater weight.

Absent unique factors or established state policies justifying
limited population variances, a District Court, in fashioning a
reapportionment plan, must do so upon the standard of a good-
faith effort to achieve absolute population equality among the
legislative districts.

ARGUMENT

Multi-Member Districts

In the face of Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), the
District Court refused to establish single-member legislative
districts in adopting a permanent apportionment plan for the
North Dakota Legislature. The majority justified their refusal
in these words:

“The issue of multi-member districts or single-member dis-
tricts is clearly a political issue to be resolved by the elec-
torate and the legislature. In devising a plan, this Court
will go no further than is required to formulate a consti-
tutionally sufficient apportionment plan for the State of
North Dakota, and will not intrude on the political realm.”
372 F.Supp. 371, 377.

Connor v. Johnson was discarded as a racial discrimination
case; and the majority enumerated decisions by this Court sub-
sequent thereto as justifying its holding.

Since statehood and until 1965, North Dakota had a clearly
articulated state Constitutional policy requiring single-member
state senate districts (See Section 29 of North Dakota Consti-
tution, Original and 1960 Amendment, p. 23, Single Appendix ).
Respondent, in his Motion to Affirm, suggests that the policy
of single-senator districts was part and parcel of a “little federal
system.” That contention is inaccurate in the extreme. Orig-
inally, Section 29 of the Constitution of North Dakota man-
dated that senatorial districts “. . . as nearly as may be, shall
be equal to each other in the number of inhabitants entitled to
representation.” The only impediment to absolute equality of
population among senate districts was the restriction that“. . .
no portion of any county shall be attached to any other county
or part thereof so as to form a district.” (See p. 23, Single Ap-
pendix )

=

Not only did the original North Dakota Constitution set out
standards for legislative districting, Article VXIII, Section 214,
of the North Dakota Constitution actually apportioned sena-
torial and representative districts. A review of the relevant por-
tions of Section 214 reveals that within the limitation prohibiting
attaching part of one county to all or part of another county, the
onginal apportionment was designed to establish senate districts
of equal population. Under Section 214, as many as four (4)
counties were joined together to form a single senatorial district.
Other counties were divided into as many as three (3) separate
senatorial districts. Not satisfied that substantial equality had
even then been achieved, the framers of Section 214 apportioned
as many as three (3), and in one case four (4), representatives for
certain legislative districts while limiting others to a single repre-
sentative. The allocation of representatives among the legisla-
tive districts on this basis was designed to further compensate
for unavoidable population imbalances among senatorial dis-
tricts.

The 1960 North Dakota Constitutional Amendments pertain-
ing to senate districting were designed to maintain the then
status quo and were not primarily directed toward the preserva-
tion of districts on a county basis. After 1960 as before, certain
senate districts constituted two or more entire counties while
other counties continued to have at least two separate senate
districts. Any connection between the pre-1965 system and a
“little federal system” is beyond appellants’ powers of observa-
tion.

In Paulson I, 232 F.Supp. 183, the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota purported to void Con-
stitutional provisions that mandated single-member senatorial
districts. In 1965, the same Court reapportioned the legislature
under a plan that for the first time created several large multi-
member senator districts. See Paulson I], 246 F.Supp. 36. In
1971, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed that neither

amended Section 29 of the North Dakota Constitution nor origi-
nal Section Section 29 retained any vitality. State ex rel. Stock-
man v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53.

Despite efforts at Constitutional revision and reform, the
state Constitutional provisions voided under Paulson /, supra,
have never been replaced. Putting aside historical considera-
tions, the very most that can be said in support of multi-member
senatorial districts is that at present they are not in conflict with
any current provisions of the North Dakota Constitution. Of
course, nothing in the state Constitution expressly or implicitly
suggests that such districting advances any state policy.

Nor is there any statutory policy in North Dakota that sup-
ports a system of large multi-member senatorial districts for the
state’s urban areas. The majority opinion cannot be justified on
the basis of implementing either a Constitutional or statutory
state policy.

Indeed, in an historical context, the action of the District
Court in Paulson //, supra, and the action of the majority of the
Court in this case should properly be viewed as an unwarranted
intrusion upon the long-standing legitimate North Dakota tra-
dition of single-member senate districts. In this context, the
Court's pronouncement that it will not intrude into the political
realm is indeed ironic. What appellants ask is simply this: That
in accordance with the traditions of North Dakota and the rule
enunciated by this Court in Connor v. Johnson, supra, the re-
apportionment plan for the North Dakota Legislature provide
for single-senator districts.

The majority opinion does not claim that multi-member sena-
tor districts advance any discernible state policy. The imposi-
tion of large multi-member districting has had a chaotic effect
on the political process in North Dakota. In light of the political
struggles over a ten (10) -year period relating to multiple-

—

member legislative districting, appellants ask what rule of law
permits the District Court to remand the people of North Dakota
to the “political realm” for relief from a system the Court it-
self, and not the political system, created?

In Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692, this Court stated:

“Where district courts are forced to fashion apportionment
plans, single member districts are preferable to large multi-
member districts as a general rule.”

The rule is phrased in simple and understandable terms and
ought not to be difficult to comprehend. It was re-emphasized in
Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551. Contrary to the ma-
jority opinion below, its application is not restricted to cases of
racial discrimination. The rule constitutes a superintending di-
rective from this Court to District Courts applicable when, be-
cause of Constitutional infirmities in existing legislative appor-
tionment plans, District Courts are required to invoke their equity
powers in fashioning Constitutionally valid reapportionment
plans.

The promulgation of such superintending direction through
the issuance of guidelines to District Courts is a long-standing
practice by this Court. See, for example, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

The reasons for the rule are articulated in decisions such as
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S.
713, 731 (1964), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,
157-160 (1971), detailing the undesirable and inequitable fea-
tures of large multi-member districts. As enumerated by Judge
Bright in his dissent, a single-member senate district plan for
North Dakota would correct a number of inequities observable
in the Dobson Plan and its predecessor. (See Chapman v. Meir,
372 F. Supp. 371, 391 (1974))

—

The majority opinion seeks to justify imposition of the mul-
tiple-member district plan on the authority of decisions by this
Court such as Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, Mahan v. Howell,
410 U.S. 315 (1973), White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972), and
Fortson v. Dorsey, 375 U.S. 433 (1965). Not any of these
cases are, in fact, supportive. The essential holding in Fortson
v. Dorsey, supra, is that multi-member districts do not per se
offend the Equal Protection Clause. That is not the issue here.
Note also that in Fortson, supra, multiple member districts were
established by Georgia law; and there is no comparable North
Dakota state statute.

In Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, the contention was that at-
large election of senators and representatives for Marion County,
Indiana, was Constitutionally impermissible. This Court, in
sanctioning a statewide legislative reapportionment by the Dis-
trict Court, rejected the division of Marion County into single-
member legislative districts on the basis that there was no
showing that a county-wide district deprived persons of Constitu-
tionally protected rights and because the Indiana State Constitu-
tion prohibited the division of a county for senatorial appor-
tionment. As already emphasized, there is no comparable
Constitutional provision in North Dakota, and thus no state Con-
stitutional policy that would justify avoidance of the Connor v.
Johnson rule. Whitcomb was issued four (4) days after Con-
nor. They are not in conflict. Connor articulates a general rule,
not an universal one. There are exceptions. Whitcomb identi-
fies and defines one of these exceptions, namely that absent Con-
stitutional grounds, a Court should not fashion a single-member
district apportionment plan in the face of a contrary state Con-
stitutional provision. ;

Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, at 331-332 (1973), actually
reaffirms the Connor rule. The decision states:

“The [district] court conscientiously considered both the
legislative policy and this court’s admonition in Connor v.

an Sita

Johnson, supra, that in fashioning apportionment remedies,
the use of single-member districts is preferred. But it was
confronted with plausible evidence of substantial malap-
portionment with respect to military personnel * * * and
the fear that too much delay would have seriously dis-
rupted the fall 1971 elections. Facing as it did this singu-
lar combination of unique factors, we cannot say that the
District Court abused its discretion in fashioning the
interim remedy of combining the three districts into one
multimember district.”

Mahan thus recognizes that the rule requiring single-member
legislative districts in Court-fashioned plans is a general one,
subject to exception when unique circumstances are present. In
Mahan, the combination of unique factors involved military
personnel; and the majority opinion simply acknowledges that,
under the particular situation, it was not a breach of discretion
for the District Court to combine three districts into one multi-
member district

Plaintiffs have indicated in their Jurisdictional Statement that
some type of multi-member districts may be required with re-
gard to the treatment of military personnel assigned to the
Grand Forks Air Force Base and to the Minot Air Force Base.
(See p. 12, Jurisdictional Statement). In contrast to the Dis-
trict Court in Mahan, the majority opinion below identifies no
unique factors justifying formulation of large multi-member
districts. The problem with regard to proper treatment of mili-
tary personnel was not even mentioned by the majority and
clearly does not warrant the imposition of the large multi-mem-
ber districts fashioned by the Court.

White v. Register, supra, in no way supports the majority
decision. White simply stands for the rule that state imposed
multi-member districts cannot be maintained upon a showing
that they result in a deprivation of Constitutionally piotected
rights.

—_—

Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, supra, holds that in fashion-
ing an apportionment plan, District Courts must not only con-
sider legitimate state Constitutional provisions (Whitcomb) but
also applicable state statutory law. (In this instance, statutory
provisions concerning the size of the legislature.) Of course,
North Dakota has neither Constitutional nor statutory provi-
sions that would provide an exception to Conner.

Appellants call attention to Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d
191 (1973) and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973).
The question as to whether these cases represent appropriate ap-
plications of White v. Register, supra, is beyond the scope of the
issues presented on this appeal. However, the decisions do re-
flect an appreciation by the Fifth Circuit that the Standard for
Federal Courts in fashioning reapportionment plans is the equita-
ble policy enunciated in Connor v. Johnson, supra. In Zimmer,
supra, at 1307-1308, the Fifth Circuit observed:

“We conclude our analysis in this case by returning to the
point at which we began when we noted that this is not a
case wherein a district court reapportionment plan approv-
ing at-large elections is challenged merely as an abuse of
discretion. Where such a challenge is registered, our start-
ing point would be Connor v. Johnson, supra, in which
the Supreme Court announced that single-member districts
are preferable to large multi-member districts. This prefer-
ence is not, however, an unyielding one. As the Supreme
Court admonished in Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U.S.
at 161, 91 S.Ct. at 1878, 29 L.Ed.2d 363, ‘[t}he remedial
powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task,
but they are not unlimited’. Lest our decision today be
misconstrued to narrowly circumscribe the discretion of a
district court in fashioning a reapportionment plan itself
free from constitutional infirmity, we would note that the
preference for single-member districts may yield in two
situations.

a thes

“Where a district court determines that significant interest
would be advanced by the use of multi-member districts
and the use of single-member districts would jeopardize
constitutional requirements, it can employ multi-member
districts. See Mahan v. Howell, supra, 410 U.S. at 334-335,
93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320. But these significant inter-
ests must not themselves be rooted in racial discrimination.
Cf. Taylor v. McKeithen, supra, 407 U.S. at 194, 92 S.Ct.
at 1982, 32 L.Ed.2d at 650, n. 3; White v. Weiser, 412
U.S. 783, 796, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2355, 37 L.Ed.2d 335, 347
(1973).

“The preference may also yield where a district court deter-
mines that multi-member districts afford minorities a greater
opportunity for participation in the political processes than
do single-member districts. In the process of making such
a determination, a court need not be oblivious to the exist-
ence and location of minority voting strength. While not
required to formulate a plan that assures the success of a
minority at the polls, a court may in its discretion opt for
a muiti-member plan which enhances the opportunity for
participation in the political processes.”

Note that since the District Court most assuredly did not
impose large multi-member districts in North Dakota to ad-
vance the voting strength of minorities, the validity of the Fifth
Circuit's second exception to the application of the equitable
policy of single-memb«r districting is not before the Court on

this appeal.

In a footnote to Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, at 194
(1972), this Court noted:

“3. Although similar in some respects, this case is not con-
trolled by Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124. To be sure,
in both cases the District Courts were writing on clean slates
in the sense that they were fashioning court-imposed reap-

ant 1 es

portionment plans. And, in each case the equitable remedy
of the court conflicted with a state policy. (There the state
policy favored multi-member districts whereas there the
policy favors maintenance of traditional boundaries.) The
important difference, however, is that in Whitcomb it was
conceded that the State’s preference for multi-member dis-
tricts was not rooted in racial discrimination, 403 US, at
149. Here, however, there has been no such concession
and indeed, the District Court found a long ‘history’ of bias
and franchise dilution in the State's traditional drawing of
district lines. Cf. id., at 155.”

Upon its Order of May 22, 1972 (pp. A-54-A-56, Appendix
to Jurisdictional Statement), the United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota had a “clean slate” upon which
to fashion a reapportionment plan for the North Dakota Legis-
lature. No state policy was in conflict with the equitable remedy
of establishing single-member districts in accordance with Con-
nor v. Johnson, supra. Since the majority opinion presents no
justification for not providing the equitable remedy directed by
this Court; and, in fact, there is no justification, the refusal to
at least fashion single-member senate districts, constitutes an
arbitrary breach of discretion by the District Court and requires
a reversal of the Judgment entered by the Court pursuant to
the majority opinion.

Population Variances Between Districts

Statistical information concerning the Dobson Plan discloses
population disparities far beyond any heretofore sanctioned by
this Court. On the basis of the 1970 census, the ideal senate
district in North Dakota consists of 12,112 persons per senator.
The maximum percentage variation between two (2) districts
under the Dobson Plan is 20.14% —the Fourth District being
under represented by 8.71%, and the Eleventh District being
over represented by 11.43%. The population ratio between

—_—

these two (2) districts is 1.23-1. The average percentage vari-
ance under the plan is + 5.07%. Seventeen (17) districts are
over represented by an average of 6.03%. Twenty-one (21)
districts are under represented by an average of 4.29%. Of the
thirty-eight (38) districts created by the plan, twenty-four (24)
exceed a 4% variance from the ideal. Fourteen (14) districts
exceed a 6% variance, six (6) districts exceed 8% , and three (3)
districts exceed a 10% variance from the ideal. See Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, for comparable data relating to the
Virginia apportionment plan as enacted by the Virginia General
Assembly. The Court-fashioned Dobson Plan for North Dakota
presents variances substantially beyond those present in Mahan.

To understand the circumstances under whicn the Dobson
Plan was first formulated, it is important to bear in mind that
the District Court was under the gun as far as the 1972 primary
and general elections were concerned. The Paulson // plan was
not voided until May 22, 1972. Because the political process
was already under way, the guidelines to the Special Masters
were drawn so as to minimize the impact of redistricting on the
upcoming 1972 elections. Accordingly, the Commission was
directed “. . . to try to conform new legislative districts to the
existing districts” (p. A-55, Appendix to Jurisdictional State-
ment). Bearing in mind that population disparities formed the
basis for the Order for reapportionment, except for the peculiar
circumstance of the proximity of the 1972 elections, such a
guideline would be both contradictory and self-defeating. That
the guideline was followed by Special Master Dobson is re-
flected by his report, which in pertinent part states:

“The proposed districts conform, both in boundaries and
in numbering, quite closely to the existing districts.” (p. A3,
Appendix to Motion to Affirm)

Infirmities in the Dobson Plan led a majority of the District
Court to adopt it on an interim basis for the 1972 election only.
The majority said:

—_ =n

“We approve the Dobson Plan of reapportionment at this
time for the 1972 election only. This court retains juris-
diction of this cause for the purpose of adopting a different
plan of reapportionment which will not be hampered by
considerations of impending elections.” Chapman v. Meier,
372 F.Supp. 363, 367.

The Court directed the Special Masters to conduct a study to

develop a permanent apportionment plan. Concerning that
study, the Court stated:

“The guiding principle of this study, of course, will be the
requirements of equal representation mandated by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Chapman v. Meier, 372 F.Supp. 363, 368.

Plaintiffs do not have any quarrel with the original guidelines
of the Commission relating to making no substantial changes
in the size of the legislature, observing natural geographical
barriers, and observing political subdivision lines (p. A-55, Ap-
pendix to Jurisdictional Statement). Nor do plaintiffs dispute
the additional guidelines set out in the Decision of June 30,
1972, as follows:

“The Special Masters should give additional consideration
to creating legislative districts along the lines suggested in
the Ostenson Plan, the boundaries of which should remain
as compact as possible while taking into account ease of
travel within each district, as well as the substantial iden-
tity of economic and social interests among its inhabitants.”
Chapman v. Meier, 372 F.Supp. 363, 367-368.

While all of these guidelines and directives appear appropriate
to the work of the Commission, no one of them reflects any
statutory or Constitutional state policy. Thus, neither the North
Dakota Constitution nor the North Dakota Century Code fixes
the size of the legislature or purports to secure the preservation

— mn

of political subdivision lines in legislative districting. Accord-
ingly, none of these guidelines are available to the District Court
as justification for adoption of the Dobson Plan with its large
population disparities among legislative districts. The Decision
of January 30, 1974, seeks to justify population variance under
the Dobson Plan in these terms:

“One of the unique features existing in North Dakota is the
Missouri River, which separates the state into two parts—
two-thirds to the east and one-third to the west. The river
traversing the state is crossed by only six highway bridges,
four of them located in the area of Williston and Bismarck.
This geographical reality, coupled with the difficulty of
achieving the goals of observing geographical boundaries
and existing political subdivisions, adds to the difficulty of
minimizing the variance. That it was substantially ac-
complished, as illustrated by the chart made a part of this
opinion, attests to the validity and soundness of the plan.
The population variance between the districts in most cases
is only a few hundred people. As a general rule, deviations
from the average population decreases if many county lines
are violated, and increases if few are split. The effort to
preserve urban-rural identities and county lines intact pro-
duce the variations which look large percentage wise, but
when applied to a sparsely populated state do not result in
significant population variances.” 372 F.Supp. 371, 377.

In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, Virginia was able to jus-
tify population variances between districts by directing attention
to Virginia Constitutional and statutory provisions establishing
state policies relating to the preservation of geographic bounda-
ries and existing political subdivisions. The majority’s attempt
to justify the Dobson Plan disparities on the basis of Mahan
ignores the essential distinction that in contrast to Virginia, the
State of North Dakota has no Constitutional or statutory policy
of preserving geographical boundaries and existing political
subdivisions.

SLL ee el A Et at ea te cn

-_

—~)

The District Court contends that the Missouri River is a
major cause of population variance. Concerning the river,
Special Master Dobson reported only:

“The plan observes natural geographic barriers, such as
the Missouri River.” (p. A4, Appendix to Motion to
Affirm )

As a geographic barrier, the Missouri River separates ap-
proximately the southwest one-third from the rest of North
Dakota. For convenience, legislative districts west and south
of the Missouri will be identified as “West River” districts.
Under the Dobson Plan, the West River districts are seven (7)
in number and are identified as Districts 33 through 39. The
number of senators from these districts is seven (7) out of a
Statewide total of fifty-one (51). The average percentage var-
iance for West River districts from the iGval senate district is
+ 4.19% as compared to a + 5.07 average percentage variance
Statewide. Neither the most over represented nor the most
under represented district included in the Dobson Plan is situ-
ated west of the river.

That the Missouri River presents no obstacle whatsoever to
fashioning legislative districts of alinost mathematical equality
is amply demonstrated by the report of Special Master Ostenson
accompanying his plan. In pertinent part, the report states:

“A legislative redistricting plan for North Dakota is
submitted herewith for the Court’s consideration. Some of
the important features of this redistricting plan and the
criteria used are as follows:

“(1) The natural boundary imposed by the Missouri
River should be recognized and any proposed legis-
lative district should not cross the river.

“(2) The magnitude of the deviation of a district
population, above or below the state average, should
be kept at a minimum.

_

“(3) Legislative district boundaries should coincide
with political subdivision boundaries to facilitate the
work of election officials at election time.

“(4) District compactness and avoiding elongated
districts should be considered.

“When criteria one and two above were studied, it be-
came apparent that the number of solutions that could be
suggested would be limited. According to the United States
Census, there were 86,184 people west and south of the
Missouri River in 1970 and 531,577 people east and north
of the Missouri River. The total state population was
617,761. Accordingly, the number of legislators in a plan
that most nearly equalizes legislative representation state-
wide is 43 senators and 86 representatives.

“Additional solutions are 50 senators and 100 repre-
sentatives; or 36 senators and 72 representatives. These
three solutions would make it possible to keep the average
number of people per senator on both sides of the river at
a uniform level.

No. of Senators 50° 43° 36°
Average (West) 12,312 14,364 17,236
Average (East) 12,362 14,367 17,147

Statewide Average 12,355 14,366.5 17,160

“® Seven senators west of the Missouri River and forty-three
senators east of the river.

“> Six senators west of the Missouri River and thirty-seven
senators east of the river.

“e Five senators west of the Missouri River and thirty-one
senators east of the river.”

(pp. 12-13, Single Appendix)

ee

> OPC

enien

Further illustrating that the Missouri River provides no
barrier to fashioning legislative districts of equal population, the
plan passed by the 1973 North Dakota Legislature, but rejected
by a vote of the people, called for fifty (S50) state senators,
including seven (7) from West River districts. The maximum
percentage variation from the ideal as far as West River dis-
tricts was concerned under the rejected legislative plan was 6.8 %
—District 31 being under represented by 3.3%, and District 33
being over represented by 3.5%. The average percentage vari-
ance under this plan for West River districts was only 1.4%.
(See p. A20, Appendix to Motion to Affirm).

To be sure, the Missouri River is a physical barrier of sub-
stantial proportion. However, this Court need not determine
whether a substantial physical barrier provides independent
justification for population variances under a Court-fashioned
reapportionment plan. The Court need not resolve the question
because as demonstrated by the foregoing, the Missouri River
presents no barrier at all to designing legislative districts through-
out North Dakota of almost exact mathematical equality.

The report transmitting the Dobson Plan to the District Court
contained the following observation:

“In its order of May 22, 1972, the Court did not address
itself to the matter of population deviation. However, I
feel that anything in the neighborhood of 1.25-1 is consti-
tutionally permissible in a rural state like North Dakota.
It results, in most districts, in a deviation of only a few
hundred persons from the mean. Such a ratio probably
would be excessive in a large urban state because it would
result in deviations running into tens of thousands.” (p.
AS, Appendix to Motion to Affirm)

That a meiority of the Court below ultimately came to accept

Mr. Dobson's observation about the relative unimportance of

population disparities among legislative districts in rural states

= =

is demonstrated by the following statement in the majority
Opinion of January 30, 1974:

“Where there are identifiable minorities or political groups
being forced out of the election process and their voting
strength is invidiously weakened, a plan proper in other
respects may require a further examination. As we view
the cases, deviations of 16% , 8%, and 10% have recently
been allowed in heavily populated states having significant
minority populations.

“Even greater deviations are permissible in a sparsely
settled state barren of electorally victimized minorities.”
(Author's Emphasis) Chapman v. Meier, 372 F.Supp. 371,
379.

Plaintiffs note that the assertion that deviations among dis-
tricts may be greater in a sparsely settled state is unaccompanied
by citation. In states with relatively small populations, it can
be fairly argued that an individual's vote is of greater signifi-
cance in terms of affecting the outcome of an election than the
individual who casts his ballot in a large metropolitan state or
district. The Equal Protection Ciause principle of “one man,
one vote” ought to be equally available to citizens of North
Dakota and of New York. While the numbers of people af-
fected by malapportionment in North Dakota may not seem
large on a comparative basis, the Court was not dealing with
such small numbers of citizens that the shifting of a handful
would significantly alter the percentage of population deviation
between legislative districts under the Court-fashioned plan.

Nor is the majority's unconcern for variances in a sparsely
settled state the only point upon which it cs# rightfully be
faulted. As reflected by the above quotativn, the Court also
insists that in the absence of electorally victimized minorities,
population disparities are not important. That thesis represents
a fundamental misconception of the “one man, one vote” prin-

PER OMNE Lse ...

OF oe ae OUT Ee

—

ciple enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, and sub-
sequent cases. The basic purpose of the rule is to assure that
the voting majority will not be victimized by a minority whose
votes are accorded greater weight.

The majority's reliance on Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315;
White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735, and Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967), is en-
tirely misplaced. The population disparities among districts
under the Dobson Plan are substantially beyond any hereto-
fore approved and are per se violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. In contrast to the cited decisions of this Court, popu-
lation disparities are not justified on the basis of any unique
tactors, such as geographic barriers or any discernible policy
of the State of North Dakota, Constitutional or statutory. In
the absence of such justification, the District Court was obli-
gated to fashion a reapportionment plan upon the standard of
a good-faith effort to achieve absolute population equality
among the leg slative districts.

CONCLUSION

On the basis that the issue of multi-member districts or single-
member districts was clearly political, the District Court denied
plaintiffs the equitable remedy of single-member districting re-
quired under the rule established by Connor v. Johnson, 402
U.S. 690. Speaking for the majority in Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735, Mr. Justice White observed:

“The very essence of districting is to produce a different—
a more ‘politically fair-—result than would be reached
with elections at large, in which the winning party would
take 100% of the legislative seats. Politics and political
considerations are inseparable from districting and ap-
portionment.”

— es

The political ramifications of reapportionment are inesca-
pable whether accomplished by a legislature, commission, or
Court. It is a fiction that by denying plaintiffs the “politically
fair’ remedy of single-member districts, the Court has avoided
the political realm. All that it has done is to continue an un-
just and unequal system which was originally designed by the
Court itself and not by the politicians or the people of North
Dakota.

The population deviations among the legislative districts cre-
ated by the District Court exceed tolerable limits. The Dobson
Plan per se offends the Equa! Protection Clause. Further, the
deviations are not justified by any unique factors, geographic
barriers, or any discernible state policy. In lieu of the guiding
principle of equal protection, the guiding principle for the Dob-
son Plan involved the formulation of legislative districts con-
forming as much as possible to existing districts. Since the

existing districts were the creation of the District Court in
Paulson II back in 1965, and considering that the necessity for
redistricting was population disparities revealed by the 1970
census, the “guiding principle” of conforming the new to the
old only maintains Constitutionally invalid population dispari-
ties among North Dakota legislative districts.

Plaintiffs ask for a reversal of the Judgment rendered Janu-
ary 30, 1974. The case should be remanded to the Distric‘
Court with directions to fashion a legislative apportionment
plan assuring equal representation and providing for single-
member senator districts.

Respectfully submitted

JOHN D. KELLY
6092 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 1389
Fargo, North Dakota 58102
Counsel for Appellants

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_0079%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
