# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 492 U.S. 920

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,

88-1868 ¢ FILED

No. MAY 18 1965
+} — Sosa. SPANIOL, JR,
‘ CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Cut of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

FRAGRANCE MATERIALS ASSOCIATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, et al.,
‘. Petitioners,
WILLIAM VAN NOTE, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

DANIEL R. THOMPSON
Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL R.
THOMPSON

1620 “I” Street, N.W.

Suite 925

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 293-5800

JOHN P. MCKENNA

DANIEL F. SHEA

McKENNA, SHEA & CRISMAN
1200 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 602

Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 293-7010

Attorneys for Petitioners

WILSON - Epes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

We erwramienic

QUESTION PRESENTED

Do the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
and the workplace container !abeling provisions of
OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard expressly pre-
empt the provisions of the New Jersey “Worker and
Community Right to Know Act” that require employers
to label containers in the workplace?

(i)

'

il
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The following is a complete list of all parties in the
proceedings below :

a. Plaintiffs:

Fragrance Materials Association of the United
States, Inc.;

Flavor & Extract Manufacturers’ Association of the
United States, Inc. ;

Bush Boake Allen, Inc.;

Dragoco, Inc. ;

Firmenich, Inc.;

International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.;

Isogenics, Inc.;

H. Kohnstamm & Co., Inc.;

Mane USA, Ine. (formerly V. Mane Fills, Inc.) ;

Noville Essential Oil Company, Inc.;

Polarome Manufacturing Corp. ;

Roure, Ine. (formerly Roure Bertrand Dupont,
Ine.) ;

Takasago International Corp. (USA) ;

Ungerer & Co.;

Universal Fragrance Corporation.

Union Camp Corporation is the parent corporation of
petitioner Bush Boake Allen, Inc.; Universal Foods Cor-
poration is the parent corporation of petitioners H.
Kohnstamm & Co., Ine. and Universal Fragrance Cor-
poration; F. Hoffman LaRoche & Co. is the parent cor-
poration of Roure, Inc.; and Takasago (Japan) is the
parent corporation of Takasago International Corpora-
tion (USA).

b. Defendants:

William Van Note;
J. Richard Goldstein;
Robert E. Hughey.

C.

Intervenor-Defendants:

Joseph H. Rodriguez;

New Jersey State Industrial Union Council, AFL-
CIO;

Citizen Action of New Jersey;

Philadelphia Area Project on Occupation Safety &
Health;

New Jersey Environmental Lobby;

New Jersey State Firemen’s Mutual Benevolent
Association;

International Association of Firefighters, New Jer-
sey AFL-CIO;

Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO;

District Three, International Union of Electronic,
Electrical, Technical, Salaried and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO;

International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union,
AFL-CIO;

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, Central and South Jersey Joint Board;

United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-
CIO;

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, AFL-
CIO, Locals 8-149, 8-760, and 8-5570;

United Auto Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Local 502;

Chemical Workers Association, Inc.;

Independent Oil Workers Union;

Trenton Education Association;

Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, Local 514-G;

Pennsylvania Federation Brotherhood of Mainte-
nance of Way Employees, AFL-CIO;

Coalition Against Toxics;

League of Conservation Voters (New Jersey ) ;

Clean Water Action (Washington, D.C. and New
Jersey) ;

Student Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey ;

iv

Environmental Action ‘Washington, D.C.) ;

League of Women Voters of New Jersey;

Sierra Club (New Jersey) ;

American Lung Association of New Jersey;

New Jersey Tenants Organization;

New Jersey Association of County Health Officers;
New Jersey Health Officers Association.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW Scidestaaka se barebenseneseniesinsevecieeusckaenee

I oa conscheciciaesintctnnwswokareremneuecnssabivcnnarrls

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Dial heteel pan Monabianes

1.
2.
3.

4.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act ..........
The Hazard Communication Standard................

The New Jersey Worker and Community Right
iy en CN 2 scudeanbonorasanioeuasesitineninaii

Proceedings Below ..........................-..------ ice ates

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...................
I. The Third Circuit’s “Purpose” Test Conflicts

II.

with Prior Decisions of this Court and Would
Permit the States to Nullify the Preemptive
Effect of the Hazard Communication Standard..

The Third Circuit’s Decisions Undermine the
Role of OSHA in the Statutory Preemption
STEER CRI OBE. NLD TAO IA LILA DRI

Sa ener cite is cates thereat ia com senacenihaucemsasceasisnidcs

Page

14

21

25

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES a Page
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504
(198 1 ) .....nnensninssisesnisssileccaiieeeianaliatn nanan enn naar Che Anan: 17
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Brock,
S62 F.2d GS (Bee Si re cceacccseees eases cacenaceces 4
Chevron, U.S.A., Ine. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).............. 22
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,
108 S.Ct. S166 CURR coi ee ee 1
City of New York v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 108 S.Ct. 1687 (2068) ............................ 22
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. SBS (Reece ccccce meee reaeeteeeceene eee 22
Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York,
855 F.2d 48 (2E Ci Be cicccecceccetceceaeteetetoeee 21
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co.,
240 U.S. 361 (RRR ei ace eee: 1
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987) ......<.:csccascncaeseeeaeeesielan iene mania aes 16, 17, 24

Manufacturers Ass’n of Tri-County v. Knepper,
801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108

S.Ct. 66 (1967): ctieuseeebedeeeneene ae 18-20
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471

U.S. 724 (1966) acc ee, 14
New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 868

F.2d 621 (30 (ae, Bee ee passim
New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774

F.2d 587 (3d Cink, Tees ee passim
New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600

F. Supp. 606 (Bide Rae eine passim

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Comm’n, 161 U.S.

190 (1963)... ccccccsselcen eee enemies 17
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 687 (1971) ................. 17
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 5682 (1933).......................... 1
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).. 15
United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 764

F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985) ....... Serre RSE SOOS a eee 4
United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass,

819 F.2d L268 CBG Ce Bae i vccc cries sasctesencvcceeei ss 4

United Steelworkers of An. ‘rica v. Pendergrass,
855 F.2d 108 (Gq Cam, Ry cee 4

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Page
ST I Tos vc nc cdacsumtaessnwscsaoienthynebiaasaaacinnvieens 2
STATUTES
Federal
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543....... Nets ee 18
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-
Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq...................... 18
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
IL UE Ee Oe OM COED aire sinsnecnnsenssnssnsrseennniews 15, 17-18

Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651 et seq.

§ 2(b) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 651 (b) (3)...................... 3
nos scinhicanabuissaienanasuabadanicbe 3
eR Be ee Tye) ines 3
2 SR Gtk See Ed |) rn passim
BL LARA eT | yg 0) cee 4, 15, 22
OT we. ORR oe Ey tC: | ee 4
OR ee 8 Re Dy 6 t ) er 4
Railway Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 434 ............... ASeae 18

State

New Jersey Worker and Community Right to
Know Act, Tit. 34, § 5A-1 et seq.

a sce ici wcnksbiamakerishachpilenke 9
he ARNE ee 10
LS aR Rime Ree ee 8, 9, 12
8 EEG ee OTE ee ae EEE TE RCE 9
AO Ee ae ee ee 10
EN ee cc ag tl a Lett ae 10
a cuca elwavettuaden 10, 11
§ 14(a), 34:5A-14(a)............... ecaieats cunccas cata passim
Oe I MOON iio nn sch cencexcctassanaeashabans passim
Pennsylvania Worker and Community Right To
Know Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301 et seq......... 19-20

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

REGULATIONS Page

ee A SF, Oe ee 21

Bre ai Ae I OU oc cesnaa ca varacnsancnsvassvacessyaseasceessane 21

ek EE passim

MISCELLANEOUS

Federal Register:

GE BU, Te, SE CGD aca en a since scnescasss 24

OU re Us Be CE vn csivns cesses 5, 24

48 Fed. Reg. 58280 (1988) .................................. passim

BS Om. Beem, SIGGE CEOS) qn... cc cccecccnne cnc csnncc.ss 4

H. Rep. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)... 15

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No.

FRAGRANCE MATERIALS ASSOCIATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, et al.,
. Petitioners,
WILLIAM VAN NOTE, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioners respectfully request that a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals entered in this case on 28 February 1989.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the court of appeals are reported as
New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d
621 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Hughey II’), and New Jersey
Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1985) (“Hughey I’).! They are reprinted beginning at
pages 1 and 85 of the separately printed Appendix filed

1Certiorari exposes the entire case to review, including the
decision of the court in Hughey I. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt
Industries Operating Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178 (1988); Rogers v.
Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 586-88 (1933); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.
Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916).

i , |

2

in No. 88-1845 by the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce
petitioners. The district court’s original opinion is re-
ported as New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,
600 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1985) (25a). The district
court’s opinions on remand from Hughey I (112a, 121a)
are not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
28 February 1989 (la). A timely Petition for Rehear-
ing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Bane was denied
on 7 April 1989 (155a). By orders of 1 and 9 May 1989,
the court of appeals stayed the issuance of its mandate
(158a).

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. $1254(1). The district court’s jurisdiction was
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the
United States, Article 6, clause 2, provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof:
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, un-
der the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.

Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. $667, the Hazard Communication
Standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration in November 1983, 29 C.F.R.

* Petitioners herein adopt that Appendix and hereafter will pro-
vide parallel citations to it in parentheses, e.g., “(la)”.

D al

§ 1910.1200, and the New Jersey Worker and Commu-
nity Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 34:5A-1 et seq., are
reproduced beginning at pages 168, 466, and 173 of the
Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners are trade associations of flavor and fra-
grance manufacturers, and certain individual members
thereof, who brought suit in the United States District
Court in New Jersey to enjoin enforcement of the New
Jersey Worker and Community Right to Know Act by
the respondent state officials. The action was consolidated
with one instituted by the New Jersey Chamber of Com-
meree and others. Petitioners charged that certain pro-
visions of the New Jersey Act are preempted -by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act and the federal
Hazard Communication Standard.

1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (hereafter
“OSH Act’) directs the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (hereafter OSHA”) to promulgate man-
datory national occupational safety and health standards
applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce.
See 29 U.S.C. $$ 651(b) (3), 655. Until OSHA has prom-
ulgated a standard, the states are not preempted from
regulating. Jd. §667(a) (168a). Once such a standard
has been promulgated, however, the states are precluded
from enacting standards “relating to” the matters cov-
ered by the federal standard without first obtaining
OSHA’s specific consent :

Any State which, at any time, desires to assume re-
sponsibility for development and enforcement therein
of occupational safety and health standards relating
to any occupational safety or health issue with re-
spect to which a federal standard has been promul-
gated under Section 655 of this title shall submit

A

a state plan for the development of such standards
and their enforcement.

Id. § 667(b) (169a).

Recognizing that state laws that “relate to” matters
covered by a federal standard could impair the effective-
ness of the standard, Congress further provided that
states could regulate under the authority of a “state plan”’
only if OSHA is satisfied that the state requirements will
be “at least as effective’ as the OSHA standard, will
“not unduly burden interstate commerce,” and are “re-
quired by compelling local conditions.” Jd. § 667(¢) (2)
(169a). OSHA may reject a proposed plan only after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, and its decision is
subject to review in the courts of appeals. /d. § 667(d)
and (g) (170a, 172a).

2. The Hazard Communication Standard

In November 1983, OSHA promulgated its “Hazard
Communication” Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200; 48
Fed. Reg. 53280." The standard originally applied only
to employers in the manufacturing sector such as peti-
tioners, but was extended to all employers in 1987. See
52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (503a).

* Hereafter, the standard will be cited only to the appropriate
subsection. The original standard is reproduced in full in the
Appendix beginning at page 466, and the preamble beginning at
page 217. The validity of the standard was upheld, with modifica-
tions, in United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 764 F.2d 728
(3d Cir. 1985). Subsequently, in United Steelworkers of America
v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987), the court directed
OSHA to extend the standard to employers beyond the manufactur-
ing sector. For further litigation regarding the scope of the
standard, see United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass, 855
F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1988), Associated Builders and Contractors,
Inc. v. Brock, 862 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1988). Certiorari petitions were
filed by various parties in the last two cited cases. See Nos. &88-
1070, 88-1075, 88-1385, 88-1434. On May 15, the Court granted the
government’s petition in No. 88-1434, and denied the petitions in
Nos. 88-1070 and 88-1385.

-

a

The standard is perhaps OSHA’s most ambitious un-
dertaking. Rather than dealing with the hazards of a
single chemical or specific group of chemicals, as OSHA
standards normally do, it deals comprehensively with
all chemicals in the workplace. OSHA considered the
matter for more than 6 years, and conducted an exten-
sive two-year rulemaking with hearings throughout the
country.

One of the principal motivating forces behind the
hazard communication standard was OSHA’s concern
about the “proliferation” of state and local labeling and
right to know laws and the consequent “potential for
contradictory and cumulatively burdensome requirements

..” 47 Fed. Reg. 12092, 12108 (March 1982). When
OSHA proposed the standard in March 1982, only nine
states and one locality had such laws, but OSHA ex-
pressed its concern that others—including New Jersey—
were considering them. Jd. at 12095. A comprehensive
federal standard, said OSHA, “would eliminate this con-
flict, decrease the cumulative burden of compliance, and
ensure basic protection for all employees.” Jd.

These concerns remained paramount in November 1983
when OSHA promulgated the final standard. It noted
that the number of states and localities with such laws
had increased since the standard had been proposed, as
had the number considering such legislation, and that
such laws “cover different lists of substances, have dif-
ferent reporting requirements, serve different purposes,
have different labeling and material safety data sheet
requirements, and have different educational and train-
ing requirements.” 48 Fed. Reg. at 53284 (235-236a).
OSHA stated forcefully its intention to preempt such
laws and reduce their regulatory burden, id. at 53284
(236-237a), 533822 (399a), 53329 (426-427a), and 53334
(444-445a), and emphasized its determination “to scru-
tinize carefully any state law or regulation submitted”
as part of a state plan in order to insure “that any ad-

es

6

ditional requirements contemplated by the state do not
conflict with or adversely affect the effectiveness of
OSHA’s standard,” id. at 53322-323 (399-400a). Sce
also id. at 53334 (445a).

Accordingly, the standard starts out:

This occupational safety and health standard is in-
tended to address comprehensively the issue of eval-
uating and communicating chemical hazards to em-
ployees in the manufacturing sector, and to preempt
any state law pertaining to this subject. Any state
which desires to assume responsibility in this area
may only do so under the provisions of § 18 of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. 651
et seq.) which deals with state jurisdiction and state
plans.

Subsection (a) (2) (467a).

The standard proceeds to designate lists comprising
more than 2300 chemicals that employers must treat as
“hazardous.” Subsection (d) (476-478a). See also 48
Fed. Reg. at 53299 (298a). Employers also must evalu-
ate, by means of tests, literature searches, and review of
other available data, all other chemicals present at their
facilities to determine whether they present any physical
or health hazards. /d.

Information regarding these hazardous chemicals and
their specific hazards must be communicated to employ-
ees by an integrated program of container labeling, Ma-
terial Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs), and employee train-
ing pursuant to subsections (f), (gi), and th) of the
standard (479-486a). Because OSHA decided that the
container label should serve as an “alert mechanism,” 48
Fed. Reg. at 53327 (416a), “an immediate warning of
hazards in the workplace,” id. at 53301 (306a), and not
as the repository of technical information, the standard
mandates simply that labels contain warnings of the
specific hazards posed by a substance (e.g., “hazardous

7

to lungs if inhaled’’) and the “identity” of the contents.
See Subsection (f)(4) (480a). And because the only
purpose of the “identity” on the label is to refer one to
the correct MSDS, OSHA decided that the “identity”
may be any designation that the individual employer
wishes to use, including common names or code numbers
familiar to its employees, so long as the same identity is
used on the corresponding MSDS for the substance or
mixture. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 53301 (306a), 53303
(317a).

The MSDS is the “primary vehicle for transmitting
detailed hazard information.” Jd. at 53305 (327a). In
addition to the identifier which corresponds to that used
on the label and thereby “links” the two for the employ-
ees, the MSDS must include the proper chemical name
of the substance, its physical and chemical characteris-
tics, and both its physical and health hazards. Subsection
(g) (2) (i)-(iv) (481-482a). The MSDS also must state
the signs and symptoms of exposure, primary routes of
entry, permissible exposure limit, precautions for safe
handling and use, protective equipment, and emergency
and first-aid procedures, and must be readily available to
employees. Subsection (g)(2)(iv)-(x) and (8) (482-
484a).

Finally, the standard mandates an employee training
program that must include instruction in the detection
of hazardous chemicals, the specific hazards of the chem-
icals with which the employees work, protective measures,
and an explanation of the labeling system and the MSDS.
Subsection (h) (485-486a). Training in the manufactur-
ing sector was completed by May 1986 when compliance
with all provisions of the standard was mandated. Sub-
section (j) (49la). Thus, all manufacturing sector em-
plovees have been working under the OSHA system for
the past 3 years.

The standard also requires employers to label “down-
stream” shipments, 7.e., shipments from the plant, and to

occas aati iia

8

include with such shipments the corresponding MSDSs.
Subsections (f)(1) and (g) (6) (479-480a, 484a). The
labeling requirements are the same as the in-plant re-
quirements with the addition of the name and address
of the manufacturer. The downstream provisions of the
federal standard are not involved in the instant case
because the New Jersey Act does not require downstream
labeling.

3. The New Jersey Worker
and Community Right to Know Act

Almost simultaneously with the OSHA standard, New
Jersey enacted its “Worker and Community Right to
Know Act.” N.J.S.A. § 384:5A-1, et seg. (1738a). The
Act applies only to workplace operations and deals, as che
district court found in its original opinion, “with pre-
cisely the same subjects in the workplace as are regulated
by the OSHA Standard.” 600 F. Supp. at 618 (52a).

The Act directs the State Department of Health to
compile a list of all “workplace hazardous substances”
that constitute “a threat to the health or safety of an
employee,” including any substance on an “environmental
hazardous substance list’? to be compiled by the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection. See §5(a) (188a).
There are approximately 2150 chemicals on the “work-
place” list, 161 of which are taken from the “environ-
mental” list.

The workplace container labeling requirements are the
central feature of the Act and the only provisions directly
at issue here. They appear in § 14 of the New Jersey Act
(191-193a) and apply, as does the federal standard, to all
containers in the workplace. There are two phases to
the labeling. First, subsection (a) of $14 requires that
“every container ... [of] a hazardous substance shall
bear a label indicating the chemical name and [CAS]

9

”
.

number‘ of the habardous substance. “Hazardous
substance” is defined in § 3(m) as any substance on the
“workplace” hazardous substance list (178a). This label-
ing originally was required to be completed within 6
months of the effective date of the Act.

Subsection (b) provides that 24 months after the effec-
tive date of the Act, “every” container in the workplace
must bear “a label indicating the chemical name and
[CAS] number of the substance in the container,” and, if
there is a mixture in the container, the chemical names
and CAS numbers “of the five most predominant sub-
stances in the mixture. ” This second-stage labeling
has been referred to at times as “universal”’ labeling be-
cause it covers substances that the State has not deter-
mined to be hazardous.

A flavor or fragrance plant typically has between
50,000 and 70,000 containers, not including samples, that
range in size from 4 ounces to 55 gallons (133a). Com-
mon or trade names, not chemical names or CAS num-
bers, are routinely used by fragrance and flavor com-
panies in the plants and on their OSHA labels (id.). The
difference may be illustrated by an example cited by the
lower court. A substance now labeled by plaintiffs under
the OSHA standard merely as ‘“‘Galaxoide” would have to
be labeled under the New Jersey system as: “1, 3, 4, 6,
7, 9—hexahydro—4, 6, 6, 7, 8, 8—hexamethyl cyclopenta
gamma 2 benzopyrene,” together with the CAS number
(id.).

Section 7 of the New Jersey Act (185a) requires em-
ployers to complete a “workplace survey” on which they
must report any “hazardous” substances present at their
facilities, §5(¢c) (184a), and an “environmental survey”
on which thev must report information about “environ-

4+“CAS” its an acronym for “Chemical Abstracts Survey,” a
scientific reference manual that assigns numbers to chemical
substances.

10

mental” hazardous substances at their facilities, § 4
(182a). After receiving a completed ‘‘workplace” sur-
vey, the Department of Health must transmit to the em-
ployer a “hazardous substance fact sheet for each haz-
ardous substance present in the employer’s workplace.”’
$8(a) (186a). The fact sheets, which are prepared by
the Department for each substance on the state’s work-
place list, $ 5(d) (184a), are the functional equivalents
of MSDSs and must be made available to employees, § 12
(189a). In another parallel to the OSHA standard, § 13
of the Act (189a) requires a comprehensive education
and training program for employees.

New Jersey has not obtained OSHA approval of any
of the state’s workplace requirements as part of a state
plan.

4. Proceedings Below

The district court held that the New Jersey Act was
preempted in its entirety in the manufacturing sector
because its essential provisions ‘related to” the matters
covered by the federal standard. 600 F. Supp. 621-22
(57-60a). The court noted, inter alia, that the major
provisions of the New Jersey Act deal with “hazard
communication in the workplace, the identification of
hazardous substances, labeling, and workplace training
and educational programs, the precise issues covered by
the Standard....” Jd. at 618 (5la).

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part, re-
versed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Without discussing either the statutory “relating to” lan-
guage, the state plan procedure, or OSHA’s statements
regarding the preemption of state right to know laws,
the court stated that the ‘preemptive effect of the OSHA
Act and the Hazard Communication Standard is narrow,”
774 F.2d at 598 (106a), and used a “purpose” test to
determine whether the New Jersey provisions were pre-

11

empted. The “purpose” in question, however, was not
that of Congress, but rather that of the state. A provi-
sion of the New Jersey Act would be preempted, held
the court, only if the “primary purpose” of the provision
were the protection of workers. /d. at 595 (100a).

Applying this purpose test, the court held that the
provision that employers complete ‘workplace’ surveys
was expressly preempted, together with the requirement
that employers furnish to employees copies of the “fact
sheets” compiled by the Department of Health for sub-
stances on the “workplace hazardous substance list.” Id.
at 594-95 (99-100a).°

Because the Hughey I court never specifically discussed
the express preemption of ‘universal’ labeling,® the pre-
cise scope of its holding with respect to express preemp-
tion of New Jersey’s workplace labeling requirements was
not definitively resolved until Hughey IJ. Read together,
the decisions hold that:

1. The labeling requirements of subsection (a) of § 14
are not preempted as applied to the 161 substances on
the state’s “workplace hazardous substance list” that are
also on the state’s “environmental hazardous substance
list,” * but are preempted as applied to the remaining

5 The court did not address the employee training requirements
of § 13 of the Act, presumably because the state had conceded that
they were preempted. The court also held that employers could be
required to complete the state’s “environmental” surveys. /d.

® One of the issues in Hughey I] was whether the decision in
Hughey I had ruled upon the express preemption of “universal”
labeling. Despite considerable misgivings about the point, the
court held that the panel had resolved the issue on the first appeal.
See Hughey II, 868 F.2d at 626-27 (13-16a).

7™The court in Hughey I referred to “environmental hazard
labeling” as though it were a separate category of labeling under
the New Jersey Act. See 774 F.2d at 596, 598 (101-102a, 107a).
In fact, the Act contains no provision dealing with “environ-
mental hazard labeling.” As noted above, substances on the

12

substances on the “workplace’’ list because the “primary
purpose” of the labeling is communication to “workers.”
See 774 F.2d at 595-96 (101-102a).

2. The “universal” labeling mandated by subsection
(b) of section 14 is not preempted because its primary
purpose is to communicate information to firemen, police-
men, and the public at large. See 868 F.2d at 627 (15-
16a).*

3. Moreover, even though labeling substances on the
“workplace” list is preempted, such substances must be
labeled under subsection (b) because the “primary pur-
pose” of that subsection is communication to firefighters.
emergency personnel, and members of the public. See
868 F.2d at 627-28 (16-17a). In other words, labeling
of the identical substances is preempted under subsection
(a) because it deals with substances on the “workplace”
list, but not under subsection (b) when called by another
name.

The Hughey II panel adhered to the “purpose” test
adopted in Hughey I, and held that the prior panel’s
resolution of the express preemption issues was binding.
868 F.2d at 625-28 (11-18a). The panel also affirmed
the district court’s determination, on remand, that the
New Jersey labeling provisions were not “impliedly” pre-
empted. See 868 F.2d at 628-31 (18-23a). Rehearing
in bane was denied (155a!, but imposition of the state’s
labeling requirements was stayed by the court pending
application for a writ of certiorari (158a).

state’s “environmental” list must be labeled only because § 5(a)
of the Act specifically directs that they be included as a subset
on the list of “workplace” hazards. In other words, the legislature
determined that any substance that could be hazardous to the
environment would, when concentrated in a workplace container,
be hazardous to the employees working with it.

* See note 6 supra.

13

By making the “relating to” test mandated by Con-
gress turn upon a state’s “purpose,” the court of ap-
peals virtually eliminated the preemptive effect of the
hazard standard and sustained intact the New Jersey
workplace labeling requirements. Under the court’s rul-
ing, it will no longer be sufficient to label containers in
accordance with the federal standard. Employers will
have to add to the OSHA labels information that OSHA
expressly decided should not be required—the proper
chemical names and CAS numbers of the contents, in-
cluding (pursuant to New Jersey’s “universal” labeling
provision) the chemical! names and CAS numbers of even
non-hazardous substances. The simplicity and cohesive-
ness of the OSHA system will go by the boards merely
because the state claims that its labeling of workplace
containers is directed not at workers, but at an audience
that is not even present in the workplace.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The matter of immediate concern here is the preemp-
tive effect of the OSH Act and the Hazard Communica-
tion Standard upon New Jersey’s workplace labeling re-
quirements. The case has far broader implications, how-
ever, for the integrity and continued vitality of uniform
regulation of workplace hazard communication. By mak-
ing preemption turn upon how the state or local govern-
ment elects to characterize the “purpose” of its law
rather than the intent of Congress and the substantive
content of the law in question, the Third Circuit has
given the states a virtual primer on how to circumvent
the preemptive effect of this and other OSHA standards.
Under the court’s purpose approach, state hazard com-
munication laws would be upheld routinely and employers
would be subjected to numerous and diverse state re-
quirements, each having the potential for interfering
with the effectiveness of the federal program and increas-
ing the regulatory burdens upon domestic industries.

i4

The Third Circuit also has effectively ousted OSHA
from its statutorily prescribed role of passing upon state
and local legislation that may impinge upon the federal
program. Under the OSH Act, Congress directed that
OSHA would cecide whether state programs should be
allowed once a federal standard has been promulgated.
Under the court’s decision, however, a state need not be
concerned about OSHA scrutiny. All the state need do is
ascribe to its program some purpose other than “worker’
protection and the threat of preemption disappears. In
much the same vein, OSHA’s pronouncements regarding
the preemption of state and local laws have been swept
aside without discussion, much less deference.

This Court has been sensitive to the need for Congress
to specify the preemptive effects of its statutes in order
to avoid the ambiguity that otherwise attaches and the
need for a difficult search for an elusive Congressional
intent to “‘oceupy the field” or the existence of a “con-

flict.” Here, Congress has done so, but its intentions

‘

have now been subordinated to those of state legislatures
across the country.

I. The Third Circuit’s “Purpose” Test Conflicts with
Prior Decisions of this Court and Would Permit the
States to Nullify the Preemptive Eifect of the Hazard
Communication Standard

The touchstone to preemption analysis is, of course, the
intent of Congress. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985). Here, Con-
gress has specified the preemptive effect of a standard
issued pursuant to the OSH Act. Once a standard has

been promulgated :

Any State which, at any time, desires to assume re-
sponsibility for development and enforcement therein
of occupational safety and health standards relating
to any occupational safety or health issue with re-
spect to which a federal standard has been promul-

15
gated under Section 655 of this title shall submit a
state plan for the development of such standards
and their enforcement.

29 U.S.C. §$ 667(b) (169a). As this Court has empha-

sized in another context, “{t]he breadth of |the statute’s |

preemptive reach is apparent from” the “relating to

language. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,

96 (1983) (ERISA). The courts “must give effect to

this plain language unless there is good reason to believe

age to have some more

that Congress intended the langu
restrictive meaning....” Jd. at 97.

No such reason exists here. To the contrary, the broad

. . . |

preemptive scope of the language is confirmed by the
nt} Va ton ba £ th va’ +3 el . TT1Q1N) R > TaAbate. that
entirety ol le preemption provision. LecOognNnIZINeE wnat

| standards would frequently dis-

Ll
‘

the issuance of federa
place state police power to a significant degree,” Con-
gress provided a safety valve whereby states can con-
tinue to regulate through the instrumentality of a “state
plan” if OSHA itself is first satisfied that the effective-
ness of its standard will not be undermined by the state
system. 29 U.S.C. §$ 667(¢) (2) (169a). Had Congress
intended OSHA standards to have only the narrow pre-
emptive reach found by the Third Circuit, there would
have been no need for such a carefully crafted procedure

for agency review of state regulations.

Under the statutory scheme established by Congress,
the states can seek to achieve legitimate state purposes
in ways that do not
federal standards, or they can follow the state plan route
and submit their programs for evaluation by OSHA, the
by Congress and best equipped to evaluate
the impact of state regulation upon the federal standard.

é *

“relate to” the matters addressed in

‘Congress rejected a more narrow preemption proposal that
would have allowed States lo impose standards more stringent than
those adopted by OSHA. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d

‘el 12 (1970

16

Now, by virtue of the gloss put upon the statute by the
Third Circuit, the states need do neither.

The “relation” of the New Jersey labeling to the OSHA
standard was never really challenged by the state. As
the Court noted in Hughey II, “|d|jefendants concede the
obvious areas of overlap between the state and federal
requirements... .” 868 F.2d at 626 (13a). The rela-
tion is, in any event, obvious. Both the OSHA and New
Jersey standards address precisely the same thing—
labeling of containers in the workplace—and do so for the
same reason—to communicate information about poten-
tial hazards. Indeed, as we show below, OSHA specific-
ally considered imposing the essential ingredients of the
New Jersey system (i.e., chemical name and universal
labeling) as part of the federal standard, but decided
that the system would be more effective without them.’°

The Third Circuit, however, read the statutory lan-
guage to require a “primary purpose” analysis. By fo-
cusing upon the purpose of the state rather than that of
Congress, the court issued an open invitation to semantic
evasion of the preemptive effect of OSHA standards. By
simply manipulating the ostensible “purpose” of their
legislation, the “States could do indirectly what they
could not do directly. . . .” International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987). As the district
judge so aptly concluded when the case was first before
him, the purpose test ‘“‘would permit ready nullification of
the Section 18 preemption provision.” 600 F. Supp. at
622 (59a).

109 The “implied preemption” evidentiary hearing that was held
on remand after Hughey I also demonstrated a relation as a matter
of fact. Thus, the witnesses for both sides agreed, and the district
court found (144-145a), that the New Jersey labeling would so
impact the OSHA standard as to necessitate special label design
and positioning programs and the revamping of the OSHA employee
training program to minimize interference with the effectiveness
of the federal standard.

17

The same kind of “purpose” analysis was emphatically
rejected in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504 (1981), a case that also involved a New Jersey law
and a comparable preemption provision in ERISA (29
U.S.C. § 1144 (a)) applicable to state laws that “relate
to” employee benefit plans. In ERISA, Congress specified
the object of the “relating to” language (i.e., employee
benefit plans), while in the OSH Act Congress left iden-
tification of the object to OSHA—.e., any issue addressed
in an OSHA standard. The preemption test itself is,
however, the same.

This Court held in Alessi that the New Jersey Act was
preempted, “whatever [its] purpose or purposes” and
even though it addressed “‘a matter quite different from
pension plans,” because it nonetheless “related to” the
matter covered by the federal statute. Jd. at 524. Rejec-
tion of the “purpose” test was necessary, said the Court,
to prevent the states “from avoiding through form the
substance of the preemption provision.” Jd. at 525. As
the Court earlier had noted in Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 652 (1971), an implied preemption case, a
‘“nurpose” test would permit states to avoid preemption:

. .. by simply publishing a legislative committee re-
port articulating some state interest or policy—other
than frustration of the federal objective—that would
be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.

See also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, supra, 479
U.S. at 498-99, n.19 (“effect rather than purpose of a
state statute governs preemption analysis’).

When Corgress wishes to preempt according to “pur-
pose,” it knows how to do so. See Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-
ment Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (Atomie Energy
Act; states may regulate for “purposes other than” those
underlying the federal regulation). In the OSH Act,
however, Congress chose not “purpose” language, but

18

rather the broad “relating to” language also used in
ERISA (supra) and in other federal statutes.”

Significantly, OSHA itself has taken issue with the
Third Cireuit’s approach. When certiorari was sought in
Manufacturers Ass’n of Tri-County v. Knepper, No. 86-
1102, this Court, sua sponte, solicited the views of the
United States. In its amicus brief, the government agreed
that the Third Circuit had “erred” and that its purpose
analysis was “incorrect.” See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 9, 13, 14. The proper inquiry, said
the government, was whether a state law “related to”
the matters addressed in the OSHA standard in either
“primary purpose or effect.” Jd. at 13 (emphasis in
original).

Even so, the Solicitor General recommended that the
Court “postpone” consideration of the issue. Jd. at 14.
The government expressed its hope (id. at 10, 15, 18)
that the Third Circuit would reconsider its position '* and
that the states would reconsider the wisdom of their
right to know laws in light of the expansion of the OSHA
standard to non-manufacturing industries in 1987 and
the enactment of Title III of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (codified as the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42
U.S.C. § 11001 et seg.).'* Unfortunately, that has not

11 See, e.g., Railway Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. $434 (“relating to
railroad safety”); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (“relating
to the control of [motor vehicle| emissions’’).

12 The Solicitor General perceived some _tension between the
Knepper and Hughey I decisions. See Amicus Brief at 15 n.13.
With the decision in Hughey II, it is clear that the tension was
illusory.

13J7t should be noted that this recent federal legislation has
nothing whatever to do with container labeling, either in-plant or
downstream. The Act does, however, require that firemen and
emergency personnel be provided with comprehensive information
about hazardous chemicals in forms other than labeling. E.g., id.

19

happened. Neither New Jersey nor the Third Circuit has
receded from its position, and review by this Court is
now appropriate.

The fundamental inadequacy of the “purpose” test is
strikingly illustrated by the anomolous results that it has
produced in the instant case. For example, as noted
earlier, the requirement that substances on the state’s
“workplace” hazardous substance list be labeled was
deemed preempted while the court simultaneously upheld
the application of the state’s “universal” labeling require-
ment to the very same substances. In other words, the
court preempted the labeling requirement under subsec-
tion (a) of $14 of the New Jersey Act and then rein-
stated it under subsection (b). The only difference is
that the labeling is called one thing in subsection (a) and
another in subsection (b).

The point is underscored by comparing the instant
case with Manufacturers Ass’n of Tri-County v. Knep-
per, 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
66 (1987), involving the Pennsylvania Worker and Com-
munity Right to Know Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301
et seq. The workplace labeling provisions in the Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey Acts are essentially the same.
The Pennsylvania statute also contains both a labeling
requirement for “hazardous” substances and a “univer-
sal” labeling provision applicable to “the top five sub-
stances by volume” in a container. See id. § 7306(a) (1)
& (4). And yet, Knepper affirmed the district court’s
holding that all of the workplace labeling was preempted
because communication to employees was the “chief”
purpose of the labeling, 801 F.2d at 140, while Hughey

at § 11021-22 (employers must provide “hazardous chemical inven-
tory forms” and allow “on-site inspection[s]’’).

14 Moreover, the “hazardous” substance labeling requirement in-
cludes, as does New Jersey’s, substances on the State’s “environ-
mental” hazards list. See id. § 7303(d).

20

refused to preempt the virtually identical labeling provi-
sions in the New Jersey Act.'’ A test that produces such
diametrically opposed results is, we submit, both obviously
and seriously flawed.

The issue here is whether a state’s ostensible “purpose”
should be the measure of federal preemption, not whether
the court of appeals’ reading of the purpose of the New
Jersey labeling is correct. Nonetheless, the court’s read-
ing of the New Jersey law illustrates the imprecision
and indeterminate nature of the “purpose” test. There
is not a word in either §14(a) or (b) about the public,
firemen, emergency personnel, or the environment; only
“employees” are mentioned, and they are mentioned re-
peatedly. E.g., “will enable an employee to readily make
a cross reference”; “will provide the employee with a
chemical name and |CAS] number”; “allow the employee
access to this information’; “shall be available to the
employee at close proximity to his specific job location”
(191-193a) (Emphasis added).’® Labeling workplace
containers is, moreover, by its very nature “primarily”
for the benefit of employees who are the only ones rou-
tinely exposed to the containers and their labels.

Indeed, if the New Jersey labeling can survive, it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which a state dissatis-
fied with the federal system would not be able to superim-
pose its own merely by representing that it is intended
for the protection of firemen, other emergency personnel,
and the public. Nor is there any reason why the same
kind of purpose analysis could not be used by states to

15 To compound the confusion, the court in Knepper held that the
state’s “downstream” labeling requirements were not preempted
even though the OSHA standard addressed the “downstream” issue
as well. See 801 F.2d at 139, 140 n.8. As noted above, the New
Jersey Act has no downstream component.

16 The court in Hughey II expressly acknowledged “the force” of
our arguments challenging Hughey I’s construction of the labeling
section of the New Jersey Act. See 868 F.2d at 627 (16a).

21

impose other workplace requirements in circumvention of
OSHA standards. The “firemen” and “emergency per-
sonnel” ploy used so effectively here could be applied with
equal and perhaps greater justification to almost any
workplace regulation. Note, for example, Environmental
Encapsulating Corp. v. New York, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1988), where the court employed a purpose test to sus-
tain New York City’s mandatory training program for
asbestos workers in the face of a federal standard cov-
ering the identical matter.'

This is not to say that th» “nurpose” of a state law
or regulation are necessarily irrelevant. “Purpose” may
be a factor indicating that a state law “relates to” the
matters covered by the federal standard. Thus, if the
purpose is to any extent to inform workers, the law would
seem to “relate to” the issues covered by the hazard com-
munication standard. But mere attribution of a differ-
ent or additional purpose should not save a state law if,
in “effect,” it nonetheless “relates to” matters covered by
the standard, as the New Jersey labeling so clearly does.

II. The Third Circuit’s Decisions Undermine the Role of
OSHA in the Statutory Preemption Scheme

The Third Circuit has dismantled, without discussion,
the carefully crafted scheme whereby Congress has des-
ignated OSHA' as the arbiter of which state laws
should survive the expansive “relating to” preemption.
The court has also swept aside, again without a word
of explanation, OSHA’s pronouncements that it intended

7 The court abandoned as unworkable the “primary” component
of the test, thereby converting it into an “any” other purpose test.
Id. at 57. The Third Circuit seems to have done the same in prac-
tice, as the panel in Hughey II appears to have recognized. See 868
F.2d at 627 (16a) (court noted that Hughey I panel ended its
inquiry upon finding a purpose other than furnishing information
to workers).

18 The powers of the Secretary of Labor under the Act have been
delegated to OSHA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1901.7, 1902.1(a) (1988).

Zz

the federal hazard communication standard to preempt
state right to know laws, and more specifically, their in-
plant labeling requirements. The result is ‘“ ‘a serious
evisceration of a congressionally crafted scheme. . .’”
and the denial of the deference due to an agency’s rea-
sonable statutory interpretations. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 840, 844-45
(1986); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).

Section 18 of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (168a),
creates a detailed administrative structure for states de-
siring to escape preemption and enforce a Jaw that “re-
lates to” an issue, such as in-plant container labeling,
addressed by an OSHA standard. Subsection (b) re-
quires a state to submit a ‘State plan” to OSHA, and
subsection (c) provides guidelines for the agency to fol-
low in determining whether to permit an otherwise pre-
empted law to be enforced, (169a). To survive, a state
law must be “at jeast as effective” as the related OSHA
standard, must “not unduly burden interstate commerce,”
and must be “required by compelling local conditions”
(id.). And cognizant of the centrality of its role in the
Congressional plan, OSHA expressed its intent “to scru-
tinize carefully any state law” submitted as part of a
state plan “to assure... that any additional require-
ments contemplated by the state do not conflict with or
adversely affect the effectiveness of [the] standard.” 48
Fed. Reg. at 53322-323 (399-400a)."

The district court relied heavily upon this “State plan”
construct, and New Jersey’s avoidance of it, in conclud-

19 Cf, City of New York v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 108
S.Ct. 1637, 1645 n.5 (1988) (“state and local authorities remain
free” to avoid express regulatory preemption by “petition|[ing] the
Commission for an individualized waiver that would permit them
to ‘impose additional or different requirements,’ which they may
seek to obtain by demonstrating that particular local conditions
create special problems that make the federal technical standards
inadequate’”’).

23

ing that the New Jersey Act was expressly preempted.
600 F. Supp. at 618 (52a). The court of appeals, how-
ever, simply ignored the Congressionally mandated pro-
cedure, thereby effectively excising it from the statute.
Rather than having OSHA pass upon the extent to which
a state law may adversely affect a federal standard or
unduly burden commerce, the courts will now do so us-
ing the wholly unsatisfactory and clumsy tools of court
process and “implied”? preemption analysis. The courts
will assume OSHA’s role as the guardians of the integ-
rity of the federal program, a role that neither suits
them nor was conferred upon them by Congress. OSHA
will be relegated to the status of a bystander.

The Third Circuit decisions are also devoid of the def-
erence due to OSHA’s statements concerning the preemp-
tion of state right to know laws and in-plant labeling.
The district court, on the other hand, relied upon OSHA’s
expressed intent “to address comprehensively the issue of
evaluating and communicating chemical hazards to em-
ployees in the manufacturing sector, and to preempt any
state law pertaining to this subject ....” 600 F. Supp.
at 617 (51a). As we pointed out in our discussion of the
standard, OSHA was specifically concerned about the
“proliferation” of conflicting state and local right to
know laws and the regulatory burden which they im-
posed, and emphasized the need to preempt such laws in
order to reduce this burden and insure nationwide uni-
formity. See supra at 5-6.

OSHA also made careful and pointed policy judgments
in regard to the very “chemical identity” and “universal”
labeling of in-plant containers required by the New Jer-
sey Act. During the lengthy rulemaking, OSHA eare-
fully considered and rejected proposals to require em-
ployers to use chemical names and CAS numbers on
workplace labels and to label all substances rather than
merely those that are hazardous.

OA
aie

Thus, when OSHA proposed a revised standard in
1982, it concluded that ‘chemical identity’ labeling should
not be imposed because it could inhibit the effectiveness
of hazard communication. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 12109-
110. OSHA again rejected chemical identity labeling
when it promulgated the final rule in 1983. See 48 Fed.
Reg. at 53301-302 (306-31lla), 53325-326 (415-416a).
“Universal” labeling was rejected in 1981 when OSHA
first proposed a standard, and again in 1983 when the
final standard was issued. See 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4427;
48 Fed. Reg. at 53292 (271a). It is highly unlikely, to
say the least, that OSHA would have engaged in such a
painstaking process had it thought that states would
nonetheless remain free to impose the rejected require-
ments. Cf. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, supra,
479 U.S. at 497 (“It would be extraordinary for Con-
gress, after devising an elaborate permit system that
sets clear standards, to tolerate common-law suits that
have the potential to undermine this regulatory struc-
ture.”’).

CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit’s decisions in this case are the lead-
ing ones in the field of OSHA preemption of state and
local workplace regulation. Because of their prominence,
they can only have a normative effect and greatly en-
courage the states to impinge even further upon OSHA’s
Congressionally conferred domain.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL R. THOMPSON
Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL R.
THOMPSON

1620 “I” Street, N.W.

Suite 925

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 2938-5800

JOHN P. MCKENNA

DANIEL F. SHEA

MCKENNA, SHEA & CRISMAN
1200 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 602

Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 293-7010

Attorneys for Petitioners

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_1377%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
