# Opposition Brief — Davis v. Himmelfarb

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_1089%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 490 U.S. 1067

## Text

| Sweceme Court, U.S.
j FILED

| APR 19 189
No. 88-1554 41S soccer F. SPANIOL, J
4 CLERK

INTHE (&
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

VINCENT E. DAVIS,
Petitioner,

VS.

HENRY HIMMELFARB; CHARLES T. HAYS;
RICHARD A. EDWARDS; GOLDEN ARROW

GAS ENERGY CORPORATION; JIM KITCHENS;
RONALD G. MILLER; RUTAN & TUCKER;
ROBERT PIKE; EMPIRE EQUITIES;

RONALD GARRETT,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

DAN L. LONGO
MURCHISON & CUMMING

680 Wilshire Place, #200
Los Angeles, California 90005
(213) 382-7321

Counsel of Record for Respondent
HENRY HIMMELFARB

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

= Is a secured note, the terms of
which were negotiated by all parties to the
transaction a security as defined by
section 3(a) of the Securities & Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 USC §78 (c)(a)?

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2. Does a Federal District Court have
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retion to dismis: state laims, whether
lllary or pendent, after the resolution

f the federal clain

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No. 88-1554

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1988

VINCENT E. DAVIS,
Petitioner,

V.

HENRY HIMMELFARB; CHARLES T. HAYS;
RICHARD A. EDWARDS; GOLDEN ARROW GAS
ENERGY CORPORATION; JIM KITCHENS;

RONALD G. MILLER; RUTAN & TUCKER;
ROBERT PIKE; EMPIRE EQUITIES;
RONALD GARRETT,
Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 858

F.2d 515 ("Danner, et al., v. Himmelfarb,
et al. and related cross-actions", Pet.
App. A 22-59 +/

1 "pet. App." refers to Petitioner’s
Appendix.

The memorandum opinion f the United

tates District Court for the Central

District of California (Pet. App. A1-19)
has not been ff illy reported

JURISDICTION

ne juagment f the Court of Appeals

“ entered on eptember 28, 1988.

Petitioner’s petition for rehearing was

denied on December 15 1988 (Pet.

App.

A60-6] The jurisdiction o

bh

the Court is

invoked by Petitioner unde? 28 Uswst

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

By perceiving a departure from f

anchored securities precedent by the Court

of Appeal, where no departure exists,
Petitioner challenges a well thought out
and reasoned opinion of the court. Until
now, a party could not be held liable under

federal securities law in relation to the
issuance of a note which bears none of the
long established characteristics of a
security. The issue posed by Petitioner’s
application is whether these longstanding
principles of securities law should be

abrogated by holding a note a security by
proving only the document itself. The
facts of this case do not demonstrate a
further refining of securities law in the
area of the issuance of notes and the
petition should be denied. Further, this
Court has repeatedly recognized a federal
court’s wide latitude to decide ancillary
Or pending questions of state law. The

state law claims were properly dismissed

Tr é 1t I I TNe T€ lé ra 44
I action ind for tl reason the
lild be 1enl1ied
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i be w presented by Petitioner ls
eT 4 ‘ an’ Y ¢ , Ly - F > ‘ ¢ i ¢ ta) ng
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Statement of Facts
t yreat lenaths

facts of this case from

ummarize the i ts f
inception. The summarization includes
number of extraneous facts and the

rt’s attention is respectfully directed

which form the basis for the

ng procedural] motions and

before the Court of

for |! pe Davis declined
f fer } he later declined the
t t exchange his pesos Lor. @
f the profit from the Mexican
Em r¢ wa pursulng Davis
negotiated t recelve from
promi: r note n the principal
, , payable in United States
with yuarterly interest to be
in annual rate of prime plus one
witt nterest payments to commence
184 in exchange for his pesos.
sted that the note be secured by
en deed of trust Empire agreed
ed Davis 2 lien on property in
avis did not realize that this
Subordinate to the liens of the
plaintiff: in this action (the
ida I and an OkKlahoma

The Proceedings Below

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Addit na J, Himmelfart isked
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Himmelfarb’s motion for summary judgment in

its entirety and held

"The court concludes’ that
the application of the risk
capital test as to the undisputed
acts of this case preclude a
finding that the transaction at

issue 1S ae security." (Pet.

>

9p. ALS

In reaching this conclusion, the court
made the following finding; (1) Davis’ note
was a privately negotiated transaction
secured by real property uncontradicted
testimony indicated that Davis rejected
other forms of structuring the deal, (2)
the defendant’s right to substitute
collateral rendered the importance of
collateralization of the loan insignificant

for the purposes of characterizing the

transaction, (3) the Obligation at issue
appeared to be a garden variety privately
negotiated loan. Davis had unambiguously
disclaimed any interest in Empire’s Mexico
investment and affirmed that Empire’s

obligation to Davis had no relationship to

Empire’s success or failure in that ven-
ture. (4) Davis looked to the collateral
to secure repayment, not to Empire’s
entrepreneurial efforts. (5) Davis did not

view repayment of his note as dependent on
the success of any venture of Empire and
(6) the circumstances surrounding Davis’
deal with Empire belied any and all analogy
to a public offering. Davis conducted
extensive negotiations and participated
actively in determining the structure of
the transaction. Moreover, it was Davis
who demanded that the note be secured by a
lien on real property. Additional

uncontroverted testimony suggested that the

10

payment schedule on the note was set up to

accommodate Davis’ personal tax

Finally, the court held that there was
no reason to retain jurisdiction over the
state causes of action and dismissed then.
While noting that the procedural posture of
this action rendered the question of the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
the remaining claims somewhat complex, the
court found that the assertion of

jurisdiction was discretionary and after

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ancing considerations of judicial
economy and fairness to the parties,

lieclined to retain the state claims.

Petitioner appealed the entry of
Summary judgment in favor of respondents to
the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit. On that appeal, (Danner, et

>

Capitai appreciation or a
f the earnings from a
venture formed with the
j capital. (Citations)
lid not ‘lend’ Empire

except to the extent that

e of an asset in exchange

romissory note represents
lers loan to the buyer of

I r tne purchase price.

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The Peculiar Facts Of This Case Do Mot

Warrant Reexamination Of Federal Securities

Law And This Writ Should Be Denied.

S.Ct.2297, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985) to the

question of whether a note should be deemed
a security based solely on its title and

characteristics. In Landreth, this Court

rejected the sale of business doctrine in
relation to the determination of whether
stock should be treated as a "security"
and held that the particular
characteristics o f stock made it
Susceptible to a plain meaning approach in
determining whether or not that stock was a
"Security." In persuasive dicta, this
-Ourt pointed out several reasons why stock
was distinguishable from most, if not alli,
of the ether categories listed in the Acts

definition of security.

First, traditional stock

"represents to many people both

trained and untrained in business

matters the paradigm of a
security." ... Second, as we
made clear in Forman, "stock" is
relatively easy to identify
because it lends itself to
consistent definition. (Id. at

6 9 3 )

On the other hand, the court pointed
out that a "note" should be viewed as a
relatively broad term that encompasses
instruments with widely varying
characteristics, depending upon whether
issued in a consumer context, as commercial
paper, or in some other investment context.

(Landreth Timber Company Vv. Landreth,

Supra, at pp. 693-694) Clearly, as the
facts of this case highlight, a note is not
a category of instruments in the Acts

definition that might be shown by proving

L 7

only the document ltself. Moreover,

while holding that "stock" was particularly

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le to being proved by its
fnharacteristics, the court noted that it
was still important that the context of the
transaction sought to be placed within the
ope of the securities laws be examined
wnen deciding whether’ some financial
instrument Lis 4 "security". (Landreth
Timber Company v. Landreth, Supra, at 687)
fhus, the court’s approach in Landreth did
not require the Court of Appeals to ignore
tne economic realities in the context of
l€ underlying transaction in declining to

abel Empire’s note to Davis as a security.

-ircuit Courts have used different methods
of analysis’ for determining whether an
instrument ls a "security", the great

mayority of CaseS examine the context of

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1 of trust Petitioner did
his mone in Empire or
Mexican venture. He did
+ — y +ho conce of either
r rt ; Share of the
uSiness venture formed
} capital. Oo! did
re money, except to the
ile I il in
missory note represents
the buyer of a portion
price. Whether this
mined under the Ninth
-ai" tess or if it is
the sontext f the

tne result is the same

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NOW! r j , reason
1 reexamine the holding

Whether The State Claims Are Ancillary
Or Pendent, The Decision To Exercise
Jurisdiction Remains a Discretionary

Function.

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hesitate to exercise
jurisdiction over state claims,
even though bound to apply state
law to them..." iG, at 726 (fn.

and citation omitted).

The District Courts have applied the
analysis developed in Gibbs, a pendent
jurisdiction case, to suits like the
present case that raise questions about the

retention of ancillary jurisdiction after

dismissal of the federal claims. See,

e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686
F.2d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 1982), Cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 880; Waste Systems, Inc.

v. Clean Land, Air and Water Corporation,

683 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1982), United States

v. Zima, 766 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir., 1985).

Moreover, the Federal Appeals Courts

in general have indicated a= strong

na

preference for the dismissal of pendent or
ancillary claims whenever the District
Court disposes of the federal claim or
claims prior to trial. Indeed, in cases
involving complex or novel issues of state
law, the appellate courts have held that it
is an abuse of discretion to retain
jurisdiction after the federal issue is

disposed of at trial or even on appeal.

See, e.g., Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine
Insurance Company, 597 F.2d 798, 811 (2d
Cir. 1979); Hodge v. Mountain State

Telephone & Telegraph Company, 555 F.2d 254

(9th Cir. 1977); American National Bank &

Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577, 581 (7th

Cir. 1984).

It is therefore clear that whether
these claims are viewed as pendent or

ancillary makes no difference to _ the

determination of whether or not the court

= -

should have retained jurisdiction over the
state claims. As the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the decision
to exercise jurisdiction is always
discretionary. The trial court properly
examined the relevant factors and
determined that, on balance, it should
exercise its discretion and decline to
retain the state claims. (Pet. App. A58-
59) Petitioner has shown no good reason
why this court should reexamine _ the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit nor has petitioner showed a
gross deviation from the guidelines

enunciated by this court in United Mine

Workers v. Gibbs. For these reasons, the

Petition for Writ should be denied.

ee

CONCLUSION

No matter how many different

under which this transaction 1S exar

ined,

the fact remains that in the particular

circumstances and sontext of

transaction, the note in question was
security. Nothing in the particular

of this case warrants uprooting

decision. Moreover, following the dec

this

not a

facts

this

1sSion

of this Court in United Mine Workers Vv.

Gibbs, the lower courts have uniformly

that the qadecision whether to

jurisdiction over pendent or anc

claims is a matter left tc the
qadiscretion of the tria court.
nothing in the peculiar facts of th

warrant uprooting this time honored

lS

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held

retain

,
A

c

7

llary

sound

regqoing reasons, the
on + - - “Krad!
f Certiorari should be
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pect f inpmitted,
Z i
A o y,
/ y ,

L. Longo

son & Cummilr

ire Place #200
(

Angeles, CA 3S

Henry Himmelfarb

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_1089%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
