# Opposition Brief — Robles v. Exxon Corp.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0936%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 490 U.S. 1051

## Text

No. 88-1381

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988

+

JOANNE ROBLES,

Petitioner,
Vs.

EXXON CORPORATION,
Respondent.

*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

-

MIcHAEL D. JONES

Suite 1895

800 Bell Avenue
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 656-3299
Attorney for Respondent

March 1989

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING C©O., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether juror testimony should be received after
discharge of the jury to explain the verdict unanimously
rendered by the jury.

LIST OF PARTIES

The affiliates and partially owned subsidiaries of
Respondent Exxon Corporation are listed in Appendix A
to this Brief in Opposition.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PREGENTED .....ssccwscsevessceenenas i
LIST GR PARTE ois oni cncesccdivedasastencaniuuen i
TABLE OF CONTENTS....... eet rer rrr. ii
TABLE OF ALPTHIORITIBD «oo. ..0 5 ccs csccscensceus iii
OCPINGOINGS DELGAW ook cicasassenecunvenetesesees 2
RULES INVOLVED)... 4c ssn ced ciceesanesae Cen cus 2
COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........... 3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERIRORARL 2... 0c ccs cccsenscwnscess 5

I. The case at bar is factually and legally
distinguishable from the precedent cited by
je PPPerPrerrr rer rk fr ear 5

II. The Court should deny the Application for
Writ of Certiorari because the reasoning in
Attridge is flawed and Attridge is an isolated

decision without support .............--5505. 8
A. The reasoning in Attridge is flawed...... 8

B. Attridge is an isolated decision without
SUPPOTt ..... cee ccc c cece eer cecsecceceeee 12
CONCLUSION 200s scvsscsaek es weer rer es er 17
APPENOIR A. occ bccessc cusses aperss sae App. 1

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Abatino v. U.S., 750 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1985) ........ 14
Audette v. Isaksen Fishing ae 789 F.2d 956 (1st
EE UES cage asc cdiche neh ndadkndieeaeds 15
Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
eR BE hy ree 7
Atiridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Technologies Int'l,
Inc., 636 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 19867) ............. passim
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. v. Speth, 404
Be RE eH) 17
City of Los Angeles, et al. v. Heller, 476 U.S. 1115
ES Pr ee 7
Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co.,
eS 0. 5 15

Davis v. United States, 865 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988) .... 13
E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc. v. Arnebergh, 775 F.2d

ivi Vecek eaves nvetcaawonas 15
Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 372
A hep kak babe as dédedenesesssecdens 7
Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, et al., 523 F.2d 140
NGG Anos kan 80054555 060 0x sexe. 14
Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073
een laren shee Aa KReM edn asses owas 14
Haley et al. v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., Inc., 802 F.2d
eer eee ee 15
Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 812 F.2d 482
ECE en ee ee 14
Helm v. Bunch, et al., __ F2d ___ (6th Cir. 1989)
Ts vob sie accas en apes cecucetasanse 15

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Martinez v. Food City, 658 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981) .... 15

Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 798
F.2d 764 (Sth Cir, 1986). ... 2... cc ccsccscscecceness 15

McNulty v. Borden, Inc. 542 F.Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa.
POE bade cnnedadaneetan dns db ecee EN chawekes ea o4.0 4% 17

Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985)....15

Morrison v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 546 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.
SOUT s ohh dnc cnbadacdnpesacsancacnseabissasbeeanssce 7

Multiflex, Inc. v Samuel Moore & Company, et al.,
709 F.2d 980 (Sth Cir. 1983).......... 2.0... eee eee 15

Nissho-Iwai Company, Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales
729 F.2d 1530 (Sth Cir. 1984)............0. ee eeeeee 16

Ohanian v. Avis Rent-A-Car System Inc., 779 F.2d
ie Ce oe. | Pe reenrerrr TT rr yrrr rr: trier 15

Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 807 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
SRO Fs Peon ene pire. 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17

Robles v. Exxon, 862 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1989) 2, 8, 15, 17

Scogin v. Century Fitness, 780 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir.
SO oi knacukedeknasadantjueea candid yAweanndnagae) 15

Shillcut v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. oy 13

Sims Crane Service, Inc. v. Ideal Steel Products, Inc.,
Be” Bi = Bea. Eo Sh, | Se ere eae 15

Singleton v. City of New York, et al., 632 F2d 185
ee ruse sh dae Neneh aud Rue eaees 14

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
Skidmore v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d.
CE WOE Kidde wedeutincdesPacdbaresceseedens vena 10
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 873 ....... 11, 12, 17
Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D.
i Pe ee ne ern err 15
Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., et al., 848
Fie ee CE I POs on a sh ona knee dpecdeccasdss 15
Stockton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F.2d 740
ee Pa saa hones ve dvauaninesuer tex eeeed 13
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)....... 12, 16

United States v. Arpon, 861 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988) .... 13
United States v. Bassler, et al., 651 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.

i POT UTER ET eer re es ony On enya D 14
United States v. Beltempo, et al., 675 F.2d 472 (2d.
Gah OD a sk hennegndenaceaus weit cecil a 14

United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1978) .... 13
United States v. Brooks, 677 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir.

SOA 6 ors ov vesededcvherieee eee 14
United States v. Buckhanna, 787 F.2d 230 (7th Cir.

PS 485 6b AH EK SR teR Eee ead Ee ee ee 13
United States v. Casamayor, et al., 837 F.2d 1509

CEO Gee Wi hah Reakoua eee ee 13
United States v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir.

1962), cert. denied 366 U.S. 924, 978.............. 16
United States v. D’Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.

BOTT 605565056060) 344008 2 eee 14

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
United States v. Davila, et al., 704 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
WU cuca bos eeeee0eekees6ns0eeekeh eee 14
United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.
Ey hn ncccccévaes ends tedecetee eee dee 14

United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980).... 14
United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1976) .... 14

United States Football League v. National Football
League, 644 F. Supp 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)........... 6

United States v. Ford, 840 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1988) .... 13
United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1984) .... 14
United States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1985) .... 13
United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980) .... 13
United States v. Gross, et al., 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.

1984) (unpublished) .........ccccccscccccecseceses 14
United States v. Hockridge, et al., 573 F.2d 752 (2d.

oe, PPPPPPTT TP Peee Terr re ere rere 14
United States v. Horton, et al., 646 F.2d 181 (Sth Cir.

BOE vnc 6000500 sacenbunkideesawetaasnacusosees 14

United States v. Jelsma, 630 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1980).... 14
United States v. Miller, 806 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1986) .... 13
United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1978) .... 13

United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.
TON acs nccanccdusneestskenak teqegayteastesesscet 13

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.
RUUD A Rnd Cs £004 SNEL ARES Ce ean ahead endeeneennhasen 14
United States v. Serido, 705 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1982)
EE Cah cas Acecmapdannaneccaeedeccaie ets 13
United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir.
oP PP te ne UT ae MEN ty SOE er 13
United States v. Sjeklocha, 843 F.2d 485 (11th Cir.
EN ion ek aged thn Ce edCudeneedN ks UWS bs bakin so: 13
United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.
i ARETE Tee eee TT TTT ET CeT eC CERT LETTE TTT Te 13
Young v. United States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947)
CURR: GME BE WE FOO ov vcccccciicsccccctcadacs 14

UNITED STATES STATUTES

Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 606(b), 28 U.S.C.A
RE PR ee LNT Se et ee 2, 5, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18

Fed. Rules Civil Proc. Rule 58(2), 28 U.S.C.A....2, 5, 7
Fed. Rules Civil Proc. Rule 49, 28 U.S.C.A......... 7, 18

Texas STATUTE

V.T.C.A. Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
RR eR Sa emer atric Sei ia top hsa tere Cha weg 6, 11

No. 88-1381

sa
.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988

*

JOANNE ROBLES,

Petitioner,
vs.

EXXON CORPORATION
Respondent.

.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR_A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

*

The Respondent, Exxon Corporation, hereinafter
“Exxon”, respectfully prays this Court to deny Peti-
tioner’s, JoAnne Robles’, hereinafter “Robles”, Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, hereinafter “Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari”.

*

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit entered on January 12, 1989 is reported at Robles v.
Exxon Corporation, 862 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1989) and has
been reprinted in the Appendix of the Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari.

a
-

RULES INVOLVED
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment.

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury’s delib-
erations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection
therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improp-
erly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any out-
side influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which
the juror would be precluded from testifying be received
for these purposes.

Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 58 (2)
Entry of Judgment

Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): -
ae (2) upon a decision granting other relief, or
upon a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied

by answers to interrogatories, the court shall promptly
approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall
thereupon enter it.

_—

>

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s lawsuit was tried before a jury on March
28 ana 29, 1988. After both parties rested, the court read
the Charge of the Court to the jury. The charge was
prepared by the court and no objection was raised by
plaintiff’s or defendant’s attorneys.

—

Several hours later, the jury announced that it had
reached a verdict. The court assembled the jury, the par-
ties, and the attorneys in the courtroom to receive the
verdict. The jury forewoman stated for the record that the
jury had reached a unanimous verdict and that she had
signed the verdict form indicating the jury’s decision. The
court then asked the entire panel to indicate whether this
was their verdict. All panel members nodded
affirmatively.

The clerk of the court took the jury form from the
forewoman and read the verdict into the record. The jury
found that both Robles and Exxon were negligent and
that said negligence was the proximate cause of the inju-
ries to Robles. The jury found Robles 51% negligent and
Exxon 49% negligent. The jury did not specify any dollar
amount for damages. Having received this verdict, the

court restated to the jury, as was indicated in the Charge
of the Court, that Robles would take nothing.

The court discharged the jury stating: “Now you may
talk about this case now to anybody you want to, the
lawyers or anybody else, but you don’t have to talk to
anybody. But you may. So now you are excused.” The
individual jurors then left the courtroom to go their way.
The court requested that the attorneys come to chambers.
While in chambers, the marshall/bailiff entered and
stated that the jury had apparently misunderstood the
charge. The court requested the marshall to bring the jury
back into the courtroom. The judge conducted an inter-
view of the members of the panel.

The judge specifically told the panel, “You are going
to have to tell us what the misunderstanding was.” The
jurors were not sworn and no questions were permitted
by either attorney. Various members of the panel, in
answer to the judge’s questions, explained what they
meant to do with their verdict.

The jury stated that they interpreted the charge to
mean that if they found the Plaintiff 51% negligent, the
judge would award damages instead of them. The jury
came to this conclusion despite the fact that the charge
specifically stated twice that a finding of more than 51%
negligence on the part of the plaintiff would preclude her
recovery.

After hearing this evidence and over the objection of
Exxon, the court requested that the jury re-deliberate
beginning the next morning. Following re-deliberations,
the jury found Robles 49% negligent and Exxon 51%
negligent and assessed damages against Exxon.

Exxon moved the court to enter judgment on the first
verdict pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
58(2). The trial court refused tc do so and entered judg-
ment for Robles on the second verdict.

Exxon appealed. The Fifth Circuit reversed and ren-
dered holding that the trial court should have entered
judgment on the first verdict pursuant to Rule 58(2) Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and that the colloquia with
the jury was impermissible under Rule 606(b), Federal
Rules of Evidence, as had been previously decided by the
Fifth Circuit in Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 807 F.2d 486
(Sth Cir. 1987).

a
vr

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I. THE CASE AT BAR IS FACTUALLY AND
LEGALLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE
PRECEDENT CITED BY PLAINTIFF

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit admitted that its decision in Peveto v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 807 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1987) was in irrecon-
cilable conflict with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decision in Attridge v. Cencorp Div.
of Dover Technologies Int'l, Inc., 836 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1987),
the case at bar is factually distinguishable from both
decisions and legally distinguishable from Attridge. The
causes of action in Peveto and Attridge were product lia-
bility causes of action rather than a negligence cause of
action as in the case at bar. In the product liability context
of both of these cases, “pure comparative fault” was
applicable. That is, the plaintiff's recovery was never

barred only reduced. In Peveto and Attridge, the juries
awarded sums to the plaintiffs allegedly intending that to
be the ultimate recovery by the Plaintiffs. These sums
were then reduced by application of pure comparative
negligence principles.

In the case at bar, the jury found Robles was 51%
negligent and consistent with the finding refused to
award damages as they were instructed. Later, the jury
disclosed their mental processes by explaining their
assumptions with regard to this verdict.

The court in Attridge found the juror interviews to be
proper because the interviews were designed to ascertain
what the jury decided and not why they did so. 836 F.2d
113, 117. In the case at bar, the jury allegedly found no
damages because the jury believed the judge would
award damages if the jury found Robles 51% negligent. In
fact, the judge did just that, he found no damages for
Robles as required by the Texas comparative negligence
statute, § 33.001, V.T.C.A. Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. In the case at bar, the judge inquired into “why”
the jury decided what they did. The Second Circuit
would prohibit this inquiry, as well, but would allow
testimony on what the jury decided.!

1 See United States Football League v. National Football
League, 644 F.Supp 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) where the Court would
not allow post trial statements by jurors to the effect that the
award of $1.00 in damages would then permit the judge to
decide on the damages. Presumably, the Second Circuit in its
later opinion in Attridge would have distinguished this case
from its Circuit if Attridge were to apply in a situation such as
presented in the case at bar and in the United States Football
League v. National Football League supra.

In the case at bar, the jury answered five special
interrogatories. None of the answers was inconsistent.2
Barring inconsistencies, the court was required to enter
judgment on this verdict and not to return the jury to re-
deliberate. Rule 58(2) and Rule 49, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,
372 U.S. 108, 83 S.Ct. 659 (1963); Morrison v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
546 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1977), because it is presumed that -
the jury acted in accordance with the instructions given
them. Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); City of Los Angeles, et al. v.
Heller, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).

In the case at bar, the jurors were polled and dis-
charged. The jurors unanimously agreed that the verdict
reported was the verdict agreed upon. The Trial Court
erred (1) by refusing to enter judgment on this verdict
and (2) electing to hear jurors’ post-verdict testimony.

2 In question No. 1, the jury was asked to consider the
evidence and based upon the evidence to determine if Robles
was negligent. The jury answered in the affirmative. In Ques-
tion No. 2, the jury was asked if this negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of her injuries. The jury answered in the
affirmative. The third interrogatory asked the jury to deter-
mine based on the evidence whether Exxon was negligent. The
jury determined Exxon was negligent. The fourth interrogatory
asked the jury if Exxon’s negligence was a proximate cause of
Robles’ injuries. Once again the jury answered in the affirma-
tive. Finally, the jury was asked to apportion negligence where
it found negligence and proximate cause on both parties. The
jury found Robles 51% negligent and Exxon 49% negligent. The
jury found Robles slightly more negligent than Exxon.

——— Sw

The case at bar differs from Attridge in the latter
aspect as well. In Attridge, the interviews were conducted
in-camera; whereas, in the case at bar, the jurors gave
unsworn testimony in open court.

The case at bar is sufficiently distinguishable from
Attridge to raise a significant doubt as to whether the
Second Circuit would have ruled any differently than the
Fifth Circuit ruled. In Robles, the jury found for the
Defendant; whereas, in Attridge, the jury found for plain-
tiff and the Second Circuit stated their rationale as ascer-
taining what the jury decided and not why they did so. In
the case at bar, the inquiry went to why the jurors found
Robles 51% negligent and not what the jurors decided.
Presumably, the Second Circuit would rule the same way
given this question.

Exxon agrees that Peveto and Attridge are in conflict
and Exxon urges the reasoning in Peveto. However, the
case at bar would have been decided by the Second
Circuit in the same manner as decided by the Fifth Cir-
cuit. As such, Robles does not have standing to urge this
Application for Writ of-Certiorari.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE APPLICA-
TION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI BECAUSE
THE REASONING IN ATTRIDGE IS FLAWED
AND ATTRIDGE IS AN ISOLATED DECISION
WITHOUT SUPPORT.

A. The reasoning in Attridge is flawed.

The reliance by Robles on Attridge is misplaced
because Attridge was erroneously decided. The Second
Circuit’s decision in Attridge cannot be reconciled with
the purported reasons to justify inquiry into the juror’s

mental processes. The Second Circuit claims to ascertain
what the jury decided, not why they decided the way
they did.

In Attridge, the jury was instructed to find what
damages Mr. and Mrs. Attridge had suffered. The jury
found they suffered $150,000 in damages.

The next jury questions required the jury to appor-
tion fault, just the opposite of the order of questions in
the case at bar. The jury apportioned fault between Mr.
Attridge and the Defendants and between the
Defendants.

After the jury was polled and discharged, a court-
room deputy learned from two jurors that the jury
intended the $150,000 to be the recovery for Mr. and Mrs.
Attridge. The trial court conducted in-camera interviews
with all six jurors. Each agreed that the $150,000 was to
be the net recovery after reductions.

The question on the verdict form to the jury was the
amount of damages suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Attridge
and not the amount of damages after reductions. If the
jury understood reduction of the verdict, then the jury
could have calculated the proper amount. The suggestion
of “reduction” was made by the judge in his in-camera
interviews with the jurors.

The more probable explanation is that prior to those
in-camera interviews the jury did not understand “reduc-
tion” and under New York law the defendant was denied
the application of the “pure comparative causation”
statue as applied to products liability. The jury was not
supposed to know the effect of the reduction. The jury

10

was to decide the facts and not which party they wanted
to win or what amount that party should receive. The
jury decided Mr. and Mrs. Attridge suffered $150,000 in
damages. This is all they were asked to decide. The use of
written interrogatories is designed to elicit fact findings
to which the law may be applied as opposed to the
introduction of Mr. Prejudice and Miss Sympathy in the
general verdict situation. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O. R.
Ce., 167 F2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948).

In the latter case, the court refused to reverse the trial
court’s reliance on the general verdict which the Second
Circuit characterized as result oriented, but clearly
expressed its preference for the use of interrogatories.
The use of interrogatories prevents the jury from ignoring
the law and preserves the equal application of the law to
all parties before the court.

In Attridge, Cencorp was denied the application of
the comparative negligence law of New York. The trial
judge did not determine if the jurors knew that damages
would be reduced or not. It is conceivable that the jurors
believed Mr. & Mrs. Attridge would be made “whole” by
an award of $150,000. Under the law of New York, Mr.
Attridge’s negligence “takes” some of this award away.
The New York Legislature made this decision, but the
Second Circuit allowed the jury to override that legisla-
tive decision in this instance. When the jury determined
that Robles was more negligent than Exxon in the case at
bar, Texas law dictated the result that she receive nothing
even if the jury wanted Robles to receive some money.

The Fifth Circuit did not allow the jury to override
the Texas Legislature in this instance or in Peveto. The

11

statute providing that a plaintiff cannot recover in a
simple negligence action if the plaintiff is more negligent
than a single defendant was allowed to operate in this
case. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.001.

The Fifth Circuit in reviewing the legislative history
of Rule 606(b) noted that there are only two situations
where juror testimony is allowed and neither was present
in this case. Those two situations are the improper receipt
by the jury of extraneous prejudicial information or the
imposition of an outside, improper influence on a juror to
influence his/her decisions. These two exceptions deal
with material not addressed in the courtroom, material
not subject to cross examination, tests of relevancy, mate-
riality or authenticity.

In the case at bar, there are no allegations that extra-
neous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury’s attention, nor are there allegations that jurors
were threatened or bribed. Rule 606(b) is clear that testi-
mony by these jurors should not have been elicited.

Nor is a distinction made in Rule 606(b) for unanim-
ity of the jurors. The trial court in the case at bar attempts
to distinguish Attridge from Peveto by stating that in both
Attridge and the case at bar the jurors were unanimously
mistaken as to the effect of their verdict. Similarly, the
trial court attempted to distinguish the case at bar from
Peveto and Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579
(5th Cir. 1974) by indicating that in both of those cases
several days passed before juror disagreement with the
verdict appeared; whereas, disagreement occurred within
minutes of the verdict in the case before the Court. The
Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as well noting that

12 -

the applicability of Rule 606(b) is determined solely by
the nature of the testimony and not the unanimity or
timeliness of the juror testimony.

The two exceptions to the receipt of juror testimony,
extraneous prejudicial information and improper influ-
ences brought to bear on jurors, are, as noted above,
necessary subjects of inquiry to insure the integrity of the
trial system. Any other exceptions open the door to end-
less inquiry into the jury’s decisional process.

This Court in its recent decision in Tanner v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987) reviewed the legislative
history behind Rule 606(b). At the time Rule 606(b) was
being considered by Congress, two versions were in exis-
tence. One was the current version based on the common
law rule while the other permitted inquiry into juror
misconduct during deliberations. Congress specifically
understood, considered, and rejected the version of Rule
606(b) that would have allowed jurors to testify on juror
conduct during deliberations including misinterpretation
of instructions, or intoxication as alleged in Tanner. See
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., supra, at 602 n.30, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873, where the Fifth Circuit stated that
“(W)hether or not the jury misunderstood the charge of
the court is not a question to be reexamined after the
verdict has been rendered.”

B. Attridge is an isolated decision without
support.

Robles would have this Court believe that the Cir-
cuits are evenly divided on the issue of what testimony

13

can be elicited from jurors and what testimony cannot be
elicited. Exxon’s research has found only the Attridge case
on the Circuit Court level for the proposition that Rule
606(b) permits juror testimony to determine what the jury
decided and not why the jury decided what they did. Of
fifty-one (51) opinions by the United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals involving juror testimony addressed by Rule
606(b), only Attridge allowed this inquiry. Thirty-six of
these cases were criminal cases. Eight of the criminal
cases allowed juror testimony under one of the excep-
tions contained in the rule, i.e. extraneous prejudicial
information or outside influence. See Davis v. United
States, 865 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988); Stockton v. Common-
wealth of Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Buckhanna, 787 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Serido, 705 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1982) (unpublished);
United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1978).

Twenty-five of the criminal cases did not allow juror
testimony whether it involved jurors pressuring other
jurors, to mistakes in interpreting instructions, to love
letters to the prosecutor or to partial deafness. See United
States v. Arpon, 861 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Sjeklocha, 843 F.2d 485 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Casamayor, et al., 837 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Ford, 840 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1988); Shillcut v. Gagnon,
827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Miller, 806
F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Shackelford, 777
F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d

14

325 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224
(3rd Cir. 1985); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d
1073 (3rd Cir. 1985); Abatino v. U. S., 750 F.2d 1442 (9th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Gross, et al., 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.
1984)(unpublished); United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221
(5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Davila, et al., 704 F.2d 749
(Sth Cir. 1983); United States v. Brooks, 677 F.2d 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); United States v. Beltempo, et al., 675 F.2d 472 (2d
Cir. 1982); United States v. Bassler, et al., 651 F.2d 600 (8th
Cir. 1981); Uniied States v. Horton, et al., 646 F.2d 181 (5th
Cir. 1981); Singleton v. City of New York, et al., 632 F.2d 185
(2d. Cir. 1980); United States v. Jelsma, 630 F.2d 778 (10th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. D’ Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Hockridge, et al., 573 F.2d 752 (2d.
Cir. 1978); United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.
1976); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, et al., 523 F.2d 140
(3rd Cir. 1975).

The Fifth Circuit has allowed juror testimony to clar-
ify what was decided as being different from the verdict
delivered in open court. United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d
1127 (5th Cir. 1987). After jurors telephoned and spoke
with the judge, the court sua sponte amended jury verdict
to reflect acquittal on one of ten counts. See also Young v.
United States, 163 F.2d 1&7 (10th Cir. 1947), cert denied 323
U.S. 770 (cited by Robles).

In two cases, one criminal and one civil, juror testi-
mony was permitted because the testimony went to the
fact that the jurors lied on voir dire. The testimony did not
involve inquiry into the deliberations of the jury. United
States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984) and Hard v.
Burlington Northern Railroad, 812 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987).

15

In the fifteen remaining civil cases, no juror testi-
mony was aliowed to explain the verdict or how damages
were calculated except Attridge. Robles v. Exxon, supra,
Attridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Technologies Int'l, Inc.,
supra. Sims Crane Service, Inc. v. Ideal Steel Products, Inc.,
800 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., supra, Ohanian v. Avis Rent-A-Car System Inc., 779 F.2d
101 (2d Cir. 1985); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th
Cir. 1985); Maultiflex, Inc. v Samuel Moore & Company, et all.,
709 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1983); Scogin v. Century Fitness, 780
F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985); or juror misconduct in disre-
garding instructions or pressuring other jurors, Helm v.
Bunch, et al., __. F.2d ___ (6th Cir. 1989)(unpublished);
Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 798 F.2d
764 (5th Cir. 1986); Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789
F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1986) and Martinez v. Food City, 658 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1981).

In two cases testimony on extraneous prejudicial
information was allowed, Stephens v. South Atlantic Can-
ners, Inc., et al., 848 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1988) and Haley et al.
v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., Inc., 802 F.2d 1532 (4th Cir. 1986)
and in one case the parties stipulated to receiving juror
testimony to explain the verdict. E. F. Hutton & Company,
Inc. v. Arnebergh, 775 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1985).

The cases cited by Robles or the trial court either
involved no jury interviews, Smith v. City of Seven Points,
608 F. Supp. 458, 462 (E. D. Tex. 1985) or involved inquiry
before the jury was discharged Continental Baking Co. v.
Oid Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973).

The situation presented in the case at bar would be
an inquiry into “why” and not into what was reported in

16

the courtroom. To allow an inquiry as urged by Robles,
would open the flood gates of appeals. All of the public
policy reasons for preventing such inquiry in the first
place would be swept aside and few, if any, verdicts
would be final. Tanner v. United States, supra, United States
v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 366
U.S. 924, 978.

In any event, there are other less intrusive mecha-
nisms to address any perceived problems. For example,
in Nissho-Iwai Company, Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales, 729
F.2d 1530 (Sth Cir. 1984), the jury returned its verdict and
answers to special interrogatories awarding the plaintiff
damages on the contract cause of action, no actual dam-
ages on the fraud cause of action, but punitive damages
on the fraud cause of action. The trial judge recalled the
jury and asked them if they knew that actual damages
must be awarded before punitive damages are proper.
The foreman said that he did not know that, and the
judge sent the jury back to the jury room for further
deliberation. The jury returned with a finding of actual
damages. Plaintiff and defendant both moved for judg-
ment on the respective verdicts, but before ruling on
either, the court sua sponte declared a mistrial and
ordered a new trial.

In the case at bar, Robles could have filed a motion
for new trial had the law been researched and recognized
that the juror testimony elicited in this case was a viola-
tton of Rule 606(b). One may ask why Robles would move
for a motion for a new trial where the trial judge indi-
cated his intent to enter judgment on a verdict favorable
to the plaintiff. Even though the judge was offering
Robles’s counsel a bite from this “second verdict apple”,

Ta

17

he, unlike Eve, should not have bitten from the forbidden
fruit but should have urged an entry of judgment on the
first verdict and moved for a new trial within the appro-
priate time limits. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. In
this case, the Fifth Circuit has been clear in its pronounce-
ments on this issue. The jurors’ mistake as to the instruc-
tions or the effect of their answers on the law is not an
area of inquiry once the jury has been discharged. Small-
wood v. Pearl Brewing Co., supra; Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad v. Speth, 404 F2d 291, 295 (8th Cir. 1968);
McNulty v. Borden Inc., 542 F.Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

a
oa

CONCLUSION

In the first instance, Robles is distinguishable from
Attridge, upon which the plaintiff relies. Robles is neither
Peveto nor Attridge, the two cases in conflict. Robles is a
much clearer case than either of those cases, according to
the Fifth Circuit, in that Robles does not involve what was
decided but why it was decided. As such, it must be
questioned whether Robles has proper standing to urge
this conflict between the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits
on the one hand and the Second Circuit on the other.

Secondly, Exxon urges this court to deny this Petition
for Writ of Certiorari because the Fifth Circuit’s decision
correctly interprets Rule 606(b) and recognizes all of the
many policy reasons for not inquiring into the jurors’
mental processes in arriving at a verdict. All of the cases
in which juror testimony has been received are distin-
guishable from the case at bar. These cases either
involved conflicting answers to special interrogatories,

18

which is addressed by Rule 49, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, receipt of testimony before the jury was dis-
charged, which is not prohibited by Rule 606(b), testi-
mony limited to the two exceptions to Rule 606(b), and
finally, receipt of testimony in limited circumstances to
determine what the jury decided as opposed to why they
reached the verdict reported in open court. Based on the
above and foregoing, Respondent, Exxon Corporation,
moves this Court to deny Robles’ Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael D. Jones
MicHaEL D. JONES
Attorney in Charge
Fed. Admin. No. 7699
P. O. Box 2180, Suite 1895
800 Bell Avenue (77002)
Houston, Texas 77252-2180
(713) 656-3299
Attorney for Respondent
Exxon Corporation

APPENDIX

App. 1

EXXON CORPORATION
Affiliates and Subsidiaries - Not Wholly-Owned*

Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited

Ace Polymer Co., Ltd.

Aditivos Orinoco, C. A.

Adria-Wien Pipeline Gesellschaft mit beschrankter
Haftung

Aircraft Fuel Supply B. V.

Aishin Sekiyu K. K.

Alberta Products Pipe Line Ltd.

Al-Jubail Petrochemical Company

Altona Petrochemical Company Limited

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company

Andian National Corporation, Limited

Arabian American Oil Company

Aramco Overseas Company

Aramco Services Company

Asakawa Sekiyu K.K.

Asociacion Civil “Colegio Internacional de Caracas”

Atlas Supply Company

Atlas Supply Company of Canada Limited

Australian Synthetic Rubber Company Limited

Aviation Services Saudi Arabia Limited

Awaji Gas Nenryo Kabushiki Kaisha

Azuma Sekiyu K.K.

BEB Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover

BT Asia Securities Limited

B.W.O.C., Inc.

Bangkok Aviation Fuel Services Limited

Bansu Ekika Gas K. K.

Bayerische Erdgasleitung G.m.b.H.

Beaverhill Resources Limited

Bel-Air Entreposage S. A.

BRIGITTA Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover

Bryan Woodbine Gathering Inc.

Byron Creek Collieries (1983) Limited

*Does not include companies with less than 5% Exxon .-
Ownership.

iii iia ell

App. 2

oo

Carlew Inc.

Carnduff Gas Limited

Cary Chemicals Inc.

Castle Peak Power Company Limited
Champlain Oil Products Limited

Changi Airport Fuel Hydrant Installation Pte. Ltd.
Chuo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Commercial Polymers Pty. Ltd.

Compania Minera Disputada de Las Condes S.A.
Comptoir Auxiliaire du Petrole

Comptoir Oxonnaxien des Combustibles (C.O.C.)
Computer Centrum Groningen B.V.

DFTG Deutsche Flussigerdgas Terminal GmbH
Daihatsu Sekiyu K.K.

Daiichi Kouyu K. K.

Demulsificantes Del Orinoco, C.A.

Depot Petrolier du Gresivaudan

Depots de Petrole Cotiers

Depots Petrolier de la Corse

Deudan-Holding GmbH

Deutsche Erdgas Transport G.m.b.H.

Deutsche Transalpine Oelleitung G.m.b.H.
Devon Estates Limited

Dixie Pipeline Company

Dukhan Service Company

E S F Limited

Eagle Kenso K.K.

East Japan Oil Development Company, Limited
East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company

Eiko Sekiyu K.K.

Elwerath Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover
Elwerath Erdol und Erdgas AG

Emirates Chemicals Company

Emori Sekiyu K.K.

Emsland-Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.

Energie Marketing Service GmbH (EMS)
Entrepot Petrolier de l’Aveyron (E.P.A.)
Entrepot Petrolier de Mulhouse (E.P.M.)
Erdgas-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Esso Chemical Alberta Limited

Esso Energie G.I.E.

App. 3

Esso Exploration and Production Angola Inc.
Esso Malaysia Berhad

Esso of Canada Limited

Esso Resources Canada Limited

Esso Resources N.W.T. Limited

Esso Resources Ventures Limited

Esso Societe Anonyme Francaise

Esso Standard Tunisie S. A.

Etablissements Cloarec

Exact Reisebyra A/S

Exxon Chemical Pakistan Limited

489061 Ontario Inc.

F. T. Giken Kabushiki Kaisha

F.T. Shyoji K.K.

Federated Pipe Lines Ltd.

Ferngas Nordbayern G.m.b.H.

Ferngas Salzgitter GmbH

Forjas de Colombia, S. A.

Fuji Kogyo K.K.

Gasunie Engineering B.V.

General Bussan K.K.

General Highway K.K.

General Petrochemical Industries Limited
General Sekiyu K.K.

General Sekiyu Okinawa Hanbai K.K.
General Sekiyu Overseas Ltd.

General Shipping Co. Ltd.

General Unyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Geobutane - Lavera

Gewerkschaft Brassert Erdol und Erdgas GmbH
Gewerkschaft Elwerath & Co. GmbH -
Gewerkschaft Erdol-Raffinerie Deurag-Nerag
Gewerkschaft Gute Hoffnung Erdgas und Erdol GmbH
Gewerkschaft Kuchenberg Erdgas under Erdol GmbH
Goroku Sekiyu K.K.

Grande Ecaille Land Company, Inc.
Groupement Immobilier Petrolier
Groupement Petrolier Aviation

Groupement Petrolier de la Cote D’Azur
Groupement Petrolier de Nantes
Groupement Petrolier du Finistere G.I.E.

|

App. 4

Hannoversche Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.
Hanshin Kyowa Sekiyu K.K.

Hayakawa Sekiyu K.K.

Heinrich Schneider Spedition GmbH
Hiroshima General Gas Juten Kabushiki Kaisha
Hoei Sekiyu K.K.
Hokushin Bussan K.K.

~Hokuyu Sekiyu K.K.

Home Energy Company Ltd.

Home Oil Company Limited

Houston Regional Monitoring Corporation
Hydranten-Betriebsgesellschaft
Hydrierwerke Poelitz Aktiengesellschaft
Imperial Oil Limited

Imperial Pipe Line Company, Limited, The
Inada Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha
Industry Promotion Enterprises Limited
Interprovincial Pipe Line (Alberta) Ltd.
Interprovincial Pipe Line (NW) Ltd.
Interhome Energy Inc.

Intamix Corporation

Intoplane Service Company Limited
Iranian Oil Participants Limited

Iranian Oil Services (Holdings) Limited
Iranian Oil Services Limited

Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited

Iraq Petroleum Pensions, Limited .
Japan Butyl Company Limited

Japan Coal Liquefaction Development Company, Ltd.
Jersey Nuclear-Avco Isotopes, Inc.

K.K. Aizu General

Daimaru

General Sekiyu Hanbaisho
Genetech

Heian Sekiyu

Kanagawa Sekiyu Shokai

Kyoei Agency

Kyoei Shosha

Kyowa Sekiyu Service

Marugo Izumasa Shoten

Marutaka Sekiyu

matatatatatatatals
RARARARAAR

App. 5

K.K. Nippatsu

K.K. Standard Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho
K.K. Toresen

K.K. Uwano Sekiyu Shokai

K/S Statfjord Transport A/S & Co.
Kabushiki Kaisha Sankyo Plastics

Kai Tak Refuellers Company Limited
Kanto Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai K.K.
Karlsruhe-Stuttgart Rohrleitung Gesellschaft mbH
Kawasaki Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha
Keiyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited

Kibo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Kimura Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Kinwa Sekiyu K.K.

Kobe Standard Sekiyu K.K.

Kowa Sekivu K.K.

Kowloon Electricity Supply Company Limited
Kygnus Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha
Kygnus Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha

Kygnus Marketing Service K.K.

Kygnus Sekiyu K.K.

Kyushu Eagle K.K.

LPL Investments, Inc.

Lakehead Pipe Line Company, Inc.

LEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur luzernisches Erdol
Les Docks des Petroles d’Ambes

Long Beach Oil Development Company
Maasvlakte Coal Terminal B.V.
Maasvlakte Olie Terminal N.V.

Magota Sekiyu K.K.

Mainline Pipelines Limited

Maple Leaf Petroleum Limited

Marugo Gas K.K.

MEGAL FINCO

MEGAL GmbH

Meiji Sekiyu K.K.

MESBIC Financial Corporation of Houston
Metro Fuel Co. Ltd.

Mikawa Bussan K.K.

Minerals Limited

il

App. 6

Mittelrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter

Haftung

Montreal Pipe Line Limited/Les Pipe-Lines
Montreal Limitee

Mr. Lube Canada Inc.

Mytex Polymers Incorporated

NAM - K 7 B.V.

NAM - K 14 B.V.

NAM - K 15 B.V.

NAM/CLOMS - K 8/K 11 B.V.

NAM/CLOMS - L 13 B.V.

N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie

NPC Services, Inc.

Nakabayashi Sekiyu K.K.

Nansei Oil Terminal K.K.

Nansei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Native Venture Capital Co. Ltd.

Near East Development Corporation

Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B. V.

Neptune Bulk Terminals (Canada) Ltd.

Nichimo Oil (Bermuda) Co., Ltd.

Nichimo Sekiyu Seisei Kabushiki Kaisha

Nikko Sangyo K.K.

Nippon Unicar K.K.

Nisku Products Pipe Line Company Limited

Nissei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Norddeutsche Erdgas-Aufbereitungs G.m.b.H.

Norddeutsche Mineraloelwerke Stettin G.m.b.H.

Nordrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter Haftung

Nord-West Oelleitung G.m.b.H.

Northward Developments Ltd.

Nottingham Gas Limited

107580 Canada Inc.

151742 Canada Inc.

158883 Canada Inc.

159129 Canada Inc.

160837 Canada Limited

Office Prive d’Assurances et de Courtages

aia

App. 7

Offshore Medical Support Limited

Oil Field Chemicals Company (Saudi Arabia) Ltd.

Oil Service Company of Iran (Private Company)

Oil Spill Response Limited

Oil Transport Company (Saudi Arabia) Limited

Oldenburgische Erdol Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Osaka Ashyu Nenryou K.K.

Osaka Propane Gas Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Osaka Sekiyu Gas Yuso K. K.

P.A.C. S.A.R.L. (Pinson Allegret-Causse)

P. T. Stanvac Indonesia

Pars Investment Corporation -

Peninsula Electric Power Company Limited

Petroleum Refineries (Australia) Proprietary Limited

Petroleum Services (Middle East) Limited

Petrosvibri S.A.

Pipe Line Services, Inc.

Plantation Pipe Line Company

Polder-Seehafeh-Harburg GmbH

Portland Pipe Line Corporation

Primaer Oel GmbH

Progas A/S

Raffinerie du Midi S.A.R.L.

Rainbow Pipe Line Company, Ltd.

Redwater Water Disposal Company Limited

Refineria Petrolera Acajutla, S. A.

Rheingas Erdgasleitungs-Geselischaft m.b.H.

Rochevert Inc.

Rotterdam Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Belgie)

Rotterdam-Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Nederland) N. V.

Ruhrgas Aktiengesellischaft

S.A. du Pipeline a Produits Petroliers sur Territoire

Genevois (SAPPRO)

S.A.R.L. Viain

SEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur schweizerisches Erdol
_ S.0.P. - Societa Oleodotti Padani S. p. A.

Saitama Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Sakurajima Futo K.K.

Sanko Oil Kabushiki Kaisha

Sanyo Sekiyu K.K.

Saraco S. A

4

ieee

App. 8

Saudi Arabian Lube Additives Company Limited

Schubert KG

Scurry-Rainbow Oil Limited

Seibu Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Seismic Industries A/S

Senpoku Oil Service K.K.

SERAM Societa per Azioni

Servacar Ltd.

Shehtah Drilling Limited

Shimoka Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Shimoyama Sekiyu K.K. .

Shin-Nihon Yukagaku Kogyo K.K.

Shinohara Oil K.K.

Shizuoka Kanesho Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Smiley Gas Conservation Limited

Sociedad Anonima “Escuela Campo Alegre”

Sociedad de Inversiones de Aviacion

Sociedad Nacional de Oleoductos Ltda.

Societa Italiana per l’Oleodotto Transalpino S.p.A.

Societa per Azioni Raffineria Padana Olii Minerali-
SARPOM

Societe Anonyme de Gestion de Stocks de Securite
(SAGESS)

Societe Anonyme de la Raffinerie des Antilles

Societe Anonyme des Hydrocarbures

Societe Anonyme “Produits Lubrifiants de Madagascar”
PROLUMA S.A.

Societe Belge de Transport par Pipeline

Societe Civile de Mustapha Algerie

Societe Civile de Participation pour la Destruction des
Dechets Industriels (SOCDI)

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Courcelles-Etoile”

Societe Civile Immobiliere de la Croix au Chene

Societe Civile Immobiliere du 195 Avenue de Neuilly

Societe Civile Immobiliere Khariessa

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Kleber-Etoile”

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Les Casseaux-Bougainville

Societe de la Raffinerie d’Alger

Societe de la Raffinerie de Lorraine

Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation
(S.M.C.A.)

App. 9

Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation Dakar-
Yoff, S. A.

Societe de Promotion et de Financement Touristique
(CARTHAGO)

Societe d’Entreposage de San-Pedro

Societe des Pipe-Lines de Strasbourg

Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipe Line

Societe d’Exploitation & de Developpement d’Operations
Commerciales

Societe du Caoutchouc Butyl (SOCABU)

Societe du Pipe Line de la Raffinerie de Lorraine

Societe du Pipe-Line Mediterranee-Rhone

Societe du Pipeline Sud-Europeen

Societe Esso de Recherches et d’Exploitation Petrolieres
Esso Rep

Societe Francaise Exxon Chemical

Societe “Geomines-Caen”

Societe Havraise de Manutention de Produits Petroliers

Societe Hoteliere de la Petite Campagne

Societe Immobiliere Paris-Niel

Societe Ivoirienne d’Operations Petrolieres S.A.

Societe Malgache de Raffinage

Societe Reunionnaise d’Entreposage

Socony-Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (Petroleum
Maatschappij)

Southern Natural Gas Development Pty. Ltd.

Standard Kosan Kavushiki Kaisha

Standard Service K.K.

Statfjord Transport A/S

Stockage Geologique de Gaz de Lavera

Suddeutsche Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter Haftung

Sun East Company Ltd.

Sydis, Inc.

Syncrude Canada Ltd.

Synergistics Industries Limited

System Plaza Kabushiki Kaisha

TAR-Tankanlage Rumlang AG

TBN Tanklager-Betriebsgesellschaft Nurnberg mbH

Taglu Enterprises Ltd.

Taihei Bussan K.K.

sain

App. 10

Taiko Sekiyu K.K.

Taisei Kogyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.
Takahama Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha
Taketsuru Yugyo K.K.

Tanaka Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.
Tankanlage A. G., Mellingen

Tanklager Altishausen A. G.

Tanklager Gesellschaft, Koln
Tanklager-Gesellschait Tegel

Tanklager Lechelles I S.A.

Tanklager Taegerschen AG

Tecnica Quimica Petrolera, S.A. de C. V.
Tecumseh Gas Storage Limited
THUMS Long Beach Company
Thyssengas G.m.b.H.

TIBA Speditions GmbH

Toa Nenryo Kogyo-Kabushiki Kaisha
Tohko Plastics Company, Limited
Tohpren Co. Ltd.

Toko Sekiyu K.K.

Tonen Energy and Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
Tonen Energy International Corp.
Tonen Maintenance K.K.

Tonen Properties Inc.

Tonen Sekiyukagaku Kabushiki Kaisha
Tonen Tanker Kabushiki Kaisha

Tonen Technology K. K.

Tonex Company Limited

Tophus Quen Pty. Ltd.

Towa Compounding Co. Ltd.

Towa Sekiyu K.K.

Toyoshina Film Company, Ltd.
Transalpine Oelleitung in Oesterreich Gesellschaft m.b.H.
Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company
Transgaz Lavera

Tsurumaru Unyu K.K.

Turkish Petroleum Company, Limited
UBAG - Unterflurbetankungsanlage Flughafen Zurich
United Industry Development Co., Ltd.
Van Salt Water Disposal Company
W.A.G. Pipeline Proprietary Limited

De le ee elt LO aA. rll

an eve eye

App. 11

Wako Jushi Kabushiki Kaisha

Wako Kasei Kabushiki Kaisha
Wartempomp Nederland B.V.
Westdeutsche Erdolleitungs-G.m.b.H.
Westgas G.m.b.H.

Westgastransport B.V.

Winnipeg Pipe Line Company Limited
Worex S.N.C.

Yasaka Sekiyu K.K.

Yellowstone Pipe Line Company
Yoshiki Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha
Yoshimi Gas Kabushiki Kaisha_

Yuai Sekiyu K.K.

Yugen Kaisha Nishi Kobe Bosai Center

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0936%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.