# Opposition Brief — Harden v. Bert

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 489 U.S. 1079

## Text

—— S—

y
. Supreme Court, us |
| FILED
NO. 88-1201 cee Wf 1998
JOSEPH F. = |

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

DARREL G. HARDEN,

Petitioner,
vs.

C.W. BERT, D.M. EGLE, J.E. FRANCIS,
M.C. JISCHKE, T.J. LOVE, W.R.
UPTHEGROVE, Individually, and THE
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSTIY
OF OKLAHOMA, a subdivision of the
State of Oklahoma,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MICHAEL W. HINKLE - OBA #4227

MILLS, WHITTEN, MILLS, MILLS
& HINKLE

Suite 500, One Leadership Sq.

Oklahama City, OK 73102

SUSAN SEAMANS - OBA #8041
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

P.O. Box 20901

Oklahoma City, Oklahana 73190

PAGE DOBSON - OBA #2387

HOLLOWAY, DOBSON, HUDSON &
BACHMAN

Suite 900, One Leadership Sq.

Oklahana City, OK 73102

ATTORNEYS OF RECORD FOR
FEBRUARY, 1989 RESPONDENTS

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF

CONTENTS....-...e- a

TABLE OF

AUTHORITIES... cc cccccccccccececs

STATEMENT OF THE

ARGUMENT.......eee- eer cccccccccccs

PROPOSITION I:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAWS

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA......

PROPOSITION II:

IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE

DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE FOR
THIS COURT TO ADDRESS WHETHER
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS A CONSTI-

TUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT...... 14

PROPOSITION III:

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT
FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT
THIS COURT'S CONSIDERATION
REGARDING PETITIONER'S
ALLEGED DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL

DUE PROCESS... cc cccccccccccccee 17

ii
PROPOSITION IV:

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT

FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT

THIS COURT'S CONSIDERATION
REGARDING ALLEGED DISCRIM-
INATION....22c0- ee eoueeteceeseeens 19

PROPOSITION V:

THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED

THE ISSUE OF ELEVENTH

AMENDMENT IMMUNITY IN

ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE

DECISIONS OF COURTS OF

APPEALS IN OTHER CIRCUITS....... 22

PROPOSITION VI:

BECAUSE THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S
APPLICATION OF FED. R. CIV.

P. RULE 12 (b) (6) AND DENIAL
OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DO NOT
INVOLVE DECIDING A FEDERAL
QUESTION AND BECAUSE THE COURT
HAS NOT DEPARTED OR SANCTIONED
THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, THIS COURT'S
POWER OF SUPERVISION IS NOT
PUM Roce cbaeeeeseceeececes

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin

Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283
6. >) ree pee bee eet ede ecese 16

Clulow v. Oklahoma, 800 F.2d
1291, 1301 (10th Cir. 1983)......... 13

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
673 (1974). ccc cc eee cccenccccccces 24

Farmers State Bank of Ada
v. Keen, 66 Okl. 62, 167
Oe a 2 ED OY 2 eee 8

Gay Activists Alliance v. Board
of Regents, 638 P.2d 116,
BAe COEMs BEER Sc cccccccccccsccces 24

Gomez _v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980)...... eee ee eeeenee 15

Great American Federal Savings &
Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442
U.S. 366 (1979).......... coccccces 21

In Re: Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207,

1209 (Okla. 1976)... cccccccceee 13

iv

Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co.,
689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir.
St Perrper rye ty Prete PTC eT eT Tee 18

Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F.Supp.
963, 974 (W.D. Gila. 19735)... cece 13

Liberty National Bank of
Weatherford v. Lewis, 172 Okl.
103, 44 P.2d 127
fe Se ee ee ee ee eee 4

Muller v. United States Steel
Corp.,509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.
1975, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
BAe CAPO) ecb bh ee dnseewe bese bsensce 18

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
BS PPO KP PTT TT) CT rerrTreTe 25

Payne v. Travenol Laboratories,
Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 898
(5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 835 (1978)............... 26

Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,
483 F.2d 230, 235 (10th Cir.
1973) cccccccccccccccccccccccccces 13

Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp.,
637 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
Gem CRUE Ac cca snecbecssedrsscsesve 19

Vv

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. School
Board of Dade County, 666 F.2d
505 (llth Cir. 1982, cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 834, U.S.
BSE C1IGSS pa cccccccescecsesece 22,23,24

United Fidelity Life Insurance
Company v. Law Firm of Best,
Sharp, Thomas & Glass, 624
F.26 1465 (10th Cir. 1960)......2.- 10

U.S. v. American Friends Service l
Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974)...... 25

Weinberger v. Romero-Arcello,
BOGDOS Gels Wee CRRER pc eccescccesse 25

Wills v. Black & West Architects,
344 P.2d 581, 584 (Okla.

Re 0h 60466 606466 64% hE OOS 4S OR SRDE 13
STATUTES
42 UiS.G. Seetian 19Gb. escskese §
14
15
42 Y¥.8.C. Seetiem 19BG.ccccsccee 5
42 U.S.C. Section 1985 (3)...... 5
14
19
20
21
42 U.8.C. Seetiaom 1986... cceccseces 5

RITE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner filed a civil rights
case in the District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma on February
28, 1986. Respondents filed their
Motion to Dismiss on March 21, 1986, and
the District Court granted the Motion,
in part, on May 5, 1986.

Petitioner requested leave to file
his First Amended Complaint on May 14,
1986, which was denied as moot, because
on August 5, 1986, Petitioner requested
leave to file his Second Amended Com-
plaint which was granted. The Second
Amended Complaint was twelve (12) pages
long, and the allegations set out there-
in are summarized below.

Petitioner claimed that he was not

promoted in 1973, and that the reason

given him for his lack of promotion was

deceitful. He also complained that stu-

ale

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dents for which he was an advisor were
the subject of discriminatory discour-
agement. He did not claim that race,
religion, sex, age or national origin
was the animating force behind this
alleged discriminatory discouragement.

Petitioner also claimed that his
work load was high, and that the sub-
jects that he was asked to teach were
unpopular. He conceded that these
problems were remedied, at least in
part, as a result of his complaining to
the university president. He also
complained that he received poor evalua-
tions in his teaching and research.

In successive paragraphs of Peti-
tioner’s Complaint, he discusses his
grade dispute which was "worked out to
the satisfaction of the Plaintiff." He
asserted that he was deprived of re-
search facilities which, according to

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him, were normally and customarily
provided to engineering professors.
Petitioner asserted that in 1963,
his pay increases began dropping below
other staff members. He claimed that he
was the lowest paid faculty member in
the College of Engineering. Petitioner
complained that no action was taken with
regard to a requested sabbatical leave.
Petitioner alleged in another para-
graph of his Complaint that methods em-
ployed by some of the Respondents in
connection with the investigation into a
sexual harassment complaint were in
violation of the rules set forth in the
faculty handbook. He claimed that he
suffered embarrassment as a result.
Professor Harden complained that
the procedures employed in regard to the
promotion consideration in 1973 were
improper. Then, he complained that his

9

—————a~

methods and approach were not appreciat-
ed by his colleagues.

Petitioner complained that the Re-
spondents conspired to "constructively
Gischarge him from his tenured position
at the University of Oklahoma."

Professor Harden continued in his
Complaint to assert that the State of
Oklahoma, though normally immune from
actions in federal court, is neverthe-
less liable in this case because the
University purchased insurance.

Petitioner sought several millions
of dollars in damages in addition to
injunctive relief.

Respondents filed multiple Motions
to Dismiss on September 19, 1986. The
trial court entered an order on February
aa, 1987, granting the Defendants'
multiple Motions to Dismiss. On Septem-
ber 6, 1988, the United States Court of

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Appeals for the Tenth Circuit filed an

order affirming the judgment of the
District Court on the following bases:

i. That immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment was not waived to the
extent of liability insurance procured
by the University;

de That facts necessary to sup-
port the award of injunctive relief had
not been plead;

3 That claims under 42 U.S.C.
Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986, if any,
were barred by the statute of limita-
tions; and

4. That Petitioner's allegations
that the Defendants conspired to deprive
him of due process and equal protection
failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.

On October 20, 1988, the Court of
Appeals entered an order denying Appel-
lant's Petition for Re-Hearing en banc.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The issues involved in this case do
not rise to the level warranting issu-
ance of a Writ of Certiorari. First,
the central issue in this case is wheth-
er Petitioner's action is barred by the
statute of limitations. The Tenth
Circuit, applying state laws, rendered a
decision consistent with the laws of the
State of Oklahoma.

The Court of Appeals decision did
not conflict with decisions of other
federal courts of appeals on the same
matters. Nor did the Circuit's decision
involve important questions of federal
law. The Tenth Circuit did not decide a
federal question in a way in conflict
with applicable decisions of the Supreme

Court.

.
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ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION I

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAWS OF

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

Petitioner first urges this Court
to issue a Writ of Certiorari because
the Court of Appeals' decision finding
that this action is barred by the stat-
ute of limitations is contrary to the
laws of the State of Oklahoma. Without
question, state law regarding the stat-
ute of limitations is to be applied. It
is also agreed that the two year statute
of limitations is proper. However,
Petitioner suggests that the Statute
should have been tolled.

According to Petitioner, there
exists a fiduciary relationship or a
relationship of trust between the par-
ties which excuses the Petitioner from
exercising due diligence in discovering

a,

the existence of his cause of action.
The Oklahoma cases on which Petitioner
relies for this proposition are clearly
distinguishable.

First, according to Farmers State

Bank of Ada v. Keen, 66 Okl. 62, 167 P.

207 (Okla. 1917), in cases where a
relationship of trust or a fiduciary
relationship between the parties exists,
there is an exception to the general
rule that the limitations period in
cases of fraud begins when the fraud is
committed or when the defrauded person
with ordinary diligence might have
discovered it. The court in Farmers
announced that the principal in a trans-
action that is a matter of public record
has a right to rely upon the fidelity or
truthfulness of his agent and his duty
to disclose the true state of fact. In

such a situation, ordinary diligence
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does not require the principal to search
public records to discern the trust
relationship has been abused. Thus, the
principal in such a situation should not
be charged with constructive discovery
of the fraud even though facts which
would have revealed the fraud are mat-
ters of the public record. The rule is
set forth in dicta and was unrelated to
the facts in Farmers.

In Liberty National Bank of

Weatherford v. Lewis, 172 Okl. 103, 44

P.2d 127 (Okla. 1935), a bank acted as
the plaintiff's agent for the collection
of sums owed on a note owned by the
plaintiff. Though the bank received
final payment on the note, payment was
not credited to plaintiff's account.
Also, in response to repeated inquiries,
plaintiff was told that payment was not
received, thereby causing plaintiff/

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owner to postpone filing an action
against the bank for recovery of the
amount collected. The Court held that
since there existed between the parties
a fiduciary relationship, the owner was
not charged with constructive knowledge
of the fraud with regard to the running
of the statute of limitations.

United Fidelity Life Insurance

Company v. Law Firm of Best, Sharp,

Thomas & Glass, 624 F.2d 145 (10th Cir.

1980) involved an attorney malpractice
action in which attorneys plead the
statute of limitations as a defense.
The Court of Appeals held that a fiduci-
ary relationship between the attorneys
and their clients existed and that the
attorneys had a duty to keep their
clients apprised of the course of liti-
gation. Thus, the trial court was

correct in holding that there was will-

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ful concealment by the attorneys which
tolled the running of the statute of
limitations where the attorneys failed
to inform their clients that a judgment
was entered against them until three
months after its entry. Plaintiffs
brought their action more than two years
after the judgment was entered, but less
than two years after they were informed
of its entry.
In the cases cited by Petitioner,
tolling of the statute was proper where
the defendants were in a fiduciary
position and concealed facts which

prevented the plaintiffs from knowing
| they had a cause of action. In this
case, Professor Harden offers no
authority for his contention that the

university occupies the position of

fiduciary. Moreover, the Court of
| Appeals considered Petitioner's

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arguments and found that in this case,
"there waS no concealment as to the
existence of the cause of action."
Upon examination of the record, the
Court found that when the University
denied his promotion in 1973, Mr. Harden
was aware of all the necessary facts
which constituted his claims for depri-
vation of due process and conspiracy,
and that reasonable inquiry would have
led to the discovery of the claim.

It was not necessary for the Court
of Appeals to state that no fiduciary
‘relationship between Professor Harden
and the University existed as Peti-
tioner suggests. It is apparent that
the Court of Appeals considered Peti-
tioner's arguments and rejected them
because they were inapplicable to the
facts in this case. Instead, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision con-

al ta

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sistent with the laws of the State of
Oklahoma. That is, that the limitations
period is not tolled unless the Plain-
tiff could show "concealment of facts
which would prevent him from knowing
that he had a cause of action." Clulow

v. Oklahoma, 800 F.2d 1291, 1301 (10th

Cir. 1983). Moreover, failure to exer-
cise due diligence in discovering the
claims will prevent the limitations
period from being tolled where a reason-
able inquiry would have led to the

discovery of the claim. Sade v. North-

ern Natural Gas Co., 483 F.2d 230, 235

(10th Cir. 1973); Knudson v. Weeks, 394

F.Supp. 963, 974 (W.D. Okla. 1975); In

Re: Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Okla.

1976); Wills v. Black & West Architects,

344 P.2d 581, 584 (Okla. 1959).

= =

PROPOSITION II

IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE
DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE FOR
THIS COURT TO ADDRESS WHETHER

ACADEMIC FREEDOM Is A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHT.

Petitioner next contends that the
Tenth Circuit disregarded his allega-
tions of the violation of his right to
academic freedom, and asserts’ that
Certiorari should be granted to clarify
the issue of whether academic freedom is
a constitutionally protected right for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and
1985 (3).

The Tenth Circuit ruled that Re-
spondents were absolutely immune in
their individual capacities from suit
for conspiracy seeking money damages and
that allegations necessary for a per-
sonal capacity suit under Sections 1983

and 1985 were absent.

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According to Gomez v. Toledo, 446

U.S. 635, 640 (1980), the Plaintiff must

allege that some person deprived him of

a federal right and that the person

acted under color of state law. Deter-

mining that Petitioner's Complaint

lacked indications that the Respondents

acted in their individual capacities

under color of state law, it was not

necessary that the Court determine

whether Petitioner set forth facts

showing the deprivation of a federal

right. However, the Court determined

that Professor Harden's claims regarding

poor working conditions, professional

criticism and denial of raises, privi-

leges and promotions did not rise to the

level of fundamentally protected liberty
or property rights.

Even if it is assumed that Peti-

tioner asserted that some person de-

al@e

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prived him of his academic freedom, his
personal capacity suit under 1983 would
fail because, as the Tenth Circuit
determined, one of the essential allega-
tions would still be lacking from the
Complaint, i.e., indications that the
Defendants acted in their individual ca-
pacities under color of state law.
Thus, Petitioner asks this Court to
address a constitutional question that
is not essential to the disposition of
the case.

Deciding this question posed by the
Petitioner would be contrary to the
policy of the United States Supreme
Court to avoid unnecessary ajudication
of federal constitutional questions.

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin Castle,

Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).

atte

PROPOSITION III

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT

FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT THIS

COURT'S CONSIDERATION REGARDING

PETITIONER'S ALLEGED DENIAL OF

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

Petitioner contends that tenure is
a property right and that Respondents
deprived him of his constitutional right
when they allegedly “abrogated” his
tenure without due process. Assuming
tenure is a federally protected property
right, Petitioner has not stated facts
sufficient to show any infringement of
that right.

It is not alleged that Harden was

discharged from his position at the Uni-

versity. Nor was he constructively
discharged. Constructive discharge
occurs only when an employer

deliberately makes or allows the
employee's working conditions to become
so intolerable that the employee has no

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choice but to quit. Moreover, the
employer's actions must be intended by
the employer as an effort to force the

employee to quit. Muller v. United

States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825

(1975), Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co.,

689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982).
Petitioner did not quit. In fact,
he is still employed by the University.
Thus, he has not been actually or con-
structively deprived of his tenure. If
there is no deprivation of a
constitutionally protected property or
liberty right, there can be no question
for this Court to consider regarding the
deprivation without due process of that
right. Thus, Petitioner fails to assert
facts which would warrant this Court's
consideration regarding his allegations

of Fourteenth Amendment violations.

atte

PROPOSITION IV

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT

FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT THIS

COURT'S CONSIDERATION REGARDING

ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION.

The Court of Appeals found that the
Complaint was lacking in any allegations
that Professor Harden was the subject of
some invidious class based discrimina-
tion of a type envisioned by the framers
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which
allegations would be necessary to es-
tablish a conspiracy under 1985. In
order to support an action under 1985
(3), “the plaintiff must be a member cf
a statutorily protected class, and the
actions taken by the defendant must

stem from plaintiff's membership in the

class. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp.,

637 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981). rN

private feud is not within the intended

scope of the Act's coverage. Silkwood,

637 F.2d at 748.
ain

First, assuming that tenured teach-
ers comprise a class to be afforded
protection from invidious class. based
discrimination, Petitioner's Complaint
wholly failed to assert any facts which
could be construed as showing that the
actions were taken because he was a
member of the class of tenured teachers,
or that Respondents harbored a general
prejudice that transcended the private
disputes between the parties. Thus,
Professor Harden fails to state facts
sufficient to warrant this Court's
examination of the allegations regarding
class based discrimination.

The Court of Appeals did not state
or imply that dismissal of Professor
Harden's claims under 1985 (3) was
proper because his claims were for
deprivation of rights created by Title 7
as Professor Harden asserts. The opin-

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ion clearly states that dismissal of
conspiracy claims under 1985 (3) is
proper because the Complaint was devoid
of allegations necessary to state a
cause of action under that federal stat-
ute. The Court merely includes an addi-
tional possibility for the propriety of
the dismissal. This extra precaution by
the Court of Appeals is clearly warrant-
ed, given the shotgun approach of alle-
gations set forth in Petitioner's Com-
plaint. Thus, since it is not essential
to the disposition of this case, this
Court should not address the Tenth

Circuit interpretation of Great Ameri-

can Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v.

Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), as Peti-

tioner requests.

atte

PROPOSITION V

THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED THE

ISSUE OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

IMMUNITY IN ACCORD WITH APPLI-

CABLE DECISIONS OF COURTS OF

APPEALS IN OTHER CIRCUITS.

Petitioner asserts that if the
Eleventh Circuit had heard his appeal,
the Respondents would have been denied
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Petition-

er bases his conclusion on one case,

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. School Board

of Dade County, 666 F.2d 505 (11th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 834

(1982).

In Travelers, a school board

claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit by a performance bond surety on the
basis that the money to satisfy the
judgment might be derived from the State
by way of a bond issue for construction
of school buildings. The Eleventh

Circuit denied the school board Eleventh

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Amendment protection from suit on the
basis that the County Board of Educa-
tion, under Florida law, was not ordi-
narily considered a part of the State
for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and
where judgment against the board might
be satisfied with funds not in any way
derived from the State of Florida.

Travelers, 666 F.2d at 509.

Given the facts in Travelers, when

the Court states:
The Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion is available only if sat-
isfaction of judgment against
the state "agency" must under
all circumstances be paid out
of state funds,
it clearly refers to a judgment against
a governmental entity not considered to
be part of the state for Eleventh Amend-
ment purposes. In this case, it is
undisputed that the Respondents, the
Board of Regents, and six individuals in

their official capacities, are con-
«23=

sidered as an arm of the State. Article
XIII, Section 8 of the Oklahoma Consti-

tution, and Gay Activists Alliance v.

Board of Regents, 638 P.2d 116, 123

(Okla. 1981). Thus, Respondents in this
case are immune from liability in a suit
which seeks damages in federal court.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673

(1974). Tenth Circuit judgment on this
issue is in accord with judgments of
other federal courts of appeals, not-

withstanding Travelers.

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PROPOSITION VI

BECAUSE THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S

APPLICATION OF FED. R. CIV. P.

RULE 12 (b) (6) AND DENIAL OF

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DO NOT IN-

VOLVE DECIDING A FEDERAL QUES-

TION AND BECAUSE THE COURT HAS

NOT DEPARTED OR SANCTIONED THE

DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND

USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PRO-

CEEDINGS, THIS COURT'S POWER OF

SUPERVISION IS NOT NECESSARY.

The District Court and the Court of
Appeals both recognized that the Peti-
tioner alleged no facts from which it
could be inferred that he would suffer
irreparable harm absent the issuance of
an injunction or that there was not
adequate remedy at law. Both elements
are essential in order for an injunction
to be warranted in federal court.

Weinberger v. Romero-Arcello, 10456 U.S.

305 (1982), U.S. v. American Friends

Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974),

O'Shea _v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488

(1974). The Petitioner has pointed out

a2Se

a

no specific allegations in his Complaint
which would fulfill the requirements so
firmly set and recognized by the Court
of Appeals.

Moreover, Petitioner does not
specify what he wishes to be enjoined.
As the Court of Appeals instructed,
"obey the law" injunctions or injunc-
tions against discrimination in broad
terms are impermissible. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65 (f£); Payne v. Travenol Laborato-

ries, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 898 (5th

Cas. ), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835

(1978).

Ite

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Writ
of Certiorari should not issue in this
action.
Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL W. HINKLE - OBA #4227
MILLS, WHITTEN, MILLS,

MILLS & HINKLE
Suite 500, One Leadership Square
211 N. Robinson
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
(405) 239-2500

SUSAN SEAMANS - OBA #8041
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

Health Sciences Center

P.O. Box 20901

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190

PAGE DOBSON - OBA #2387
HOLLOWAY, DOBSON, HUDSON

& BACHMAN
Suite 900, One Leadership Square
211 N. Robinson
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
(405) 235-8593

ATTORNEYS OF RECORD
FOR RESPONDENTS

afJa

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