# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ketchum v. Administrator, Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 489 U.S. 1020

## Text

an. Supreme Court, US,
\ } FILED
S84, 1894) on™
eee ANIOL, JR
CLERK

Inu The
Supreme Court of the United States

@rctober erm, 1988

WALTER M. KETCHUM,
Petitioner,

vs.

ADMINISTRATOR, ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

WILLIAM J. MARTIN

WILLIAM J. MARTIN, LTD.
1010 Lake Street, Suite 604
Oak Park, Illinois 60301
(312) 848-2100

Attorneys for Petitioner

Pandick Technologies, Inc., Chicago @ (312) 236-0200

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

I. Are the due process or ex post facto principles as
construed in Bouie v. Columbia violated where a State
Supreme Court finds a disciplinary rule vague and amends
it in a court decision and then retroactively applies the
newly created rule to suspend an attorney’s law license?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ..............--e 2005: i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........-.cceeecees iii
| Ree reer ee ces 1
CPTI TLIO «wn wn ccc ccc aces seunses 1
Po rr errr eee ee ea 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............-------; 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION:

I THIS PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED
SINCE THE DECISION BELOW STANDS IN
DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S
PRIOR HOLDING IN BOUIE V. COLUMBIA.... 7

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page
Boute v. Columbia, 376 U.S. 347 (1964)........ passim
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798) ................ 8
Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1987)........ 10

Connally v. General Const. Co, 269 U.S. 385 (1926) .. 10
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867).......... 8
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) ............ 8

In re Corboy, 124 I1.2d 29, 528 N.E.2d 694
NE SORE OS es passim

In re Mark E. Jones, Jr., __ Tll.2d __ , __ N.E.2d __
(Ill. Sup. Ct. No. 66227, Slip Opinion,

Ee a 7,9
In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1972) .......... 8
Lanzetta v. New York, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)......... 10
Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 Ill. 187, 36 N.E. 2d 227

ee ede Ske knee essed se see cee 8
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)......... 7
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ............ 7
Miller v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 2446 (1987) ........... 8
Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1985) ..... 10
Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 (1941)......... 7

Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 788 F.2d 998 (3rd
he a 10

iv

Cases: Page
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
Pe a ere rr re ren rr ra ee rae we 9
United States v. Godheim, 651 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir.
| ee er ree eee ey eerie 10
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)........ 4
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)............. 8
CONSTITUTION:

is Be ee re re ee passim
eS rere eres yer ee passim
STATUTES:

SR I or cw Ske chen Scan thease ees ees 2
107 TE.De Hate FERGIE) 2 wa cece cesens passim
Oy ee Dg cc ke execs cucaeeees 5, 6
OF PE 6 nas oso scce ste e nc ckaws 4
107 THESE Bale TERM) «w= 2 2c ccc sce vcesenns 3

No.

In The
Supreme Court of the Hnited States

@ctober Term, 1988

WALTER M. KETCHUM,
Petitioner,

v8.

ADMINISTRATOR, ATTORNEY REGISTRATION
AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

PRAYER

Petitioner Walter Ketchum respectfully prays that a
writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and order
of the Illinois Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court is reported
at 124 [11.2d 50, 528 N.E.2d 689 and is attached hereto in
the Appendix.

2

JURISDICTION

On June 20, 1988, the Dlinois Supreme Court entered
an order suspending the petitioner from the practice of law
for two years. Petitioner filed a timely petition for rehear-
ing in the linois Supreme Court. On October 3, 1988,
the Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for rehear-
ing. This petition is filed within ninety days of the order
denying the petition for rehearing and is thus timely. This
Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The ex post facto clause of the United States Constitu-
tion provides, “No State shall... pass any .. . ex post facto
law.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10.

The due process clause of the United States Constitu-
tion provides, “nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Since the 1960’s, Walter Ketchum (“Ketchum”) and
Richard LeFevour were good friends and neighbors.
LeFevour and Ketchum were attorneys and also main-
tained a professional relationship in which they referred
cases to each other. In addition, members of the LeFevour
and Ketchum families were extremely friendly, grew up
together and went to school together.

In 1968, LeFevour became a judge in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois. Eventually, LeFevour was
appointed the chief judge of Chicago’s traffic court. In 1981,
LeFevour was elevated to chief judge of the First Munic-
ipal District in Cook County. Ketchum’s law firm had a
substantial number of personal injury cases pending in the
First Municipal District, although neither Ketchum, nor
any members of his law firm, ever appeared before Judge

LeFevour.

3

From time to time, Ketchum loaned money to
LeFevour, both before and during LeFevour’s tenure as
a judge. The loans were informal in that no interest
was charged, no notes were drawn and discussions regard-
ing repayment did not occur. In short, the loans were
motivated out of charity and friendship. Before LeFevour
became a judge he repaid the loans. The complaint charged
that Ketchum loaned LeFevour $8,300.00 over approxi-
mately four years, a period in which LeFevour was a judge.
Although these loans were not repaid, Ketchum repre-
sented LeFevour’s wife and three sons in a personal injury
case which Ketchum believed would provide an ultimate
source of repayment.!

In December of 1981, LeFevour contacted Ketchum
and stated that he needed $10,000.00 so that he could pay
the hospital bills of his sickly mother. LeFevour stressed
that he needed the money so that his mother could be
released to spend the Christmas holidays at home and be
readmitted after the holiday season for additional hospi-
talization. Ketchum responded that he lacked the funds
to make the entire loan, but volunteered to contact other
attorneys to request that they assist in paying the hospital
bill. Ketchum then contacted six attorneys; four of them
agreed to make loans to Lefevour. Each drafted a $1,000.00
check payable to Richard LeFevour. Ketchum also loaned
LeFevour $2,000.00 at that time.

In 1984, Judge LeFevour was indicted by a grand
jury sitting in the Northern District of Illinois on mail
fraud, tax fraud and racketeering charges. The charges
were a part of the Operation Greylord investigation into
corruption in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Dur-

‘The actual recovery in the personal injury case amounted to
an initial judgment of $29,350.00 - more than enough funds to
repay $8,300.00 in loans — and still remains intact today subject
to Ketchum’s lien in a trust account at $10,000.00. (Hearing
Board Transcript, p. 172).

+

ing LeFevour’s trial, evidence relative to attorney loans,
including Ketchum’s, was introduced in the form of a stip-
ulation by the government.

Based on the evidence introduced at the LeFevour tri-
al, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Dis-
cipline Commission filed a complaint against Ketchum. In
the Illinois disciplinary system hearing panels, which com-
prise a Hearing Board, are empowered to “conduct hear-
ings on complaints filed with the Board and on petitions
referred to the Board. The panel shall make findings of
fact and conclusions of fact and law, together with a rec-
ommendation for discipline, dismissal of the complaint or
petition, or nondisciplinary suspension.” 107 [1l1.2d Rule
753(c)(3). A hearing panel concluded that Ketchum had
violated Rule 7-110(a) of the Illinois Code of Professional
Kesponsibility. This rule provided, in pertinent part, that
an attorney “shall not give or lend anything of value to
a judge.” 107 Ill.2d Rule 7-110(a). The hearing panel
ruled that Ketchum should be censured, finding that the
loans were not made with the intent to influence LeFevour
in his judicial capacity (nor did LeFevour yield any such
influence), that the loans were motivated by friendship,
and that no breach of judicial propriety occurred as a result
of the loans. The matter was then referred to the Review
Board, the next tier in the Illinois disciplinary system. The
Review Board “may approve the findings of the Hearing
Board, may reject or modify such findings as it determines
are not established by clear and convincing evidence, may
make such additional findings as are established by clear
and convincing evidence, may approve, reject or modify the
recommendations, may remand the proceeding for further
action or may dismiss the proceeding.” 107 I1l.2d Rule
753(e)(3). In considering the Hearing Board proceedings,
the Review Board did not dispute the findings that the
loans were motivated out of friendship and not made with
the expectation of judicial favor, but nonetheless, concluded

coon since manasa

5

that Ketchum should be suspended from the practice of law
for one year. Both parties appealed to the Illinois Supreme
Court.

In the mean time, the Administrator had instituted
disciplinary charges against the four attorneys who loaned
LeFevour money at Ketchum’s request. In addition to
these four attorneys, the Administrator also filed charges
against two other attorneys who had loaned money to
LeFevour. One of these attorneys loaned LeFevour
$2,500.00 in 1981 and $2,000.00 in 1982. The other attor-
ney, Patrick Tuite, loaned LeFevour $5,000.00 in 1982.
Tuite’s law firm, like Ketchum’s, had numerous cases pend-
ing in the district over which LeFevour presided.

The disciplinary charges against the foregoing
six attorneys ultimately reached the [Illinois Supreme
Court.? In a consolidated opinion, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted that Rule 7-110(a) lacked clarity and required
amendment. In re Corboy, 124 I1l.2d 29, 528 N.E.2d 694,
701 (1988). The court thus amended Rule 7-110(a) to be
read in conjunction with Rule 65(C)(4) of the Illinois Code
of Judicial Conduct.’ The court found that the all six attor-

? The six attorneys are prominent members of Illinois bar. The
Illinois Supreme Court deemed them “outstanding attorneys.”
Corboy, 528 N.E.2d at 701.

3“Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his
household should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from any-
one except as follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testi-
monial to him; book supplied by publishers on a com-
plimentary basis for official use; or an invitation to the
judge and his spouse to attend a bar-related function
or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice;
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his
household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift,
bequest, favor or loan from a relative; a wedding or
engagement gift; a loan from a lending institution in its
(Footnote continued on the following page)

6

neys committed violations under the amended rule pro-
hibiting loans to a judge. The court, however, discharged
the disciplinary charges against the six attorneys finding
that they “were sailing in uncharted waters” and that “[iJt
would be unfair to apply the limitation we have today for
the first time defined to the respondents’ conduct in 1981.”
Corboy, 528 N.E.2d at 701.

On the same day that it discharged the forego-
ing six attorneys, the [Illinois Supreme Court suspended
Ketchum’s law license for two years. When read in juxta-
position, the two opinions issued on the same day read as
if they were decided by two different courts in two differ-
ent eras. Moreover, there is an invidious discrimination
when Ketchum’s law license is suspended for two years
for loaning LeFevour $3,300.00 more than Patrick Tuite,
while the complaint against Tuite, whose firm also had a
substantial number of cases pending in LeFevour’s district,
was discharged. Although Ketchum, like the six attor-
neys in Corboy, had never appeared before LeFevour while
LeFevour was a judge, the court based its decision on the
possibility that Ketchum might curry judicial favor from
LeFevour in the future. In re Ketchum, 124 Tll.2d 50, 528
N.E.2d 689, 693 (1988); App. 5. The court reached this
factual conclusion although the administrative fact find-
ing boards had not. Yet, while Ketchum was suspended

3 (continued)

regular course of business on the same terms generally
available to persons who are not judges; or a scholar-
ship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied
to other applicants;

(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his
household may accept any other gift, bequest, favor or
loan only if the donor is not a party or other person
whose interests have come or are likely to come before
him, including lawyers who practice or have prac-
ticed before the judge.” 107 Ill.2d Rules 65(C)(4)(a),
65(C)(4(b), 65(C)(4)(c).

7

for two years for loaning $8,300.00 to his long-time friend,
before whom he never appeared, the Illinois Supreme Court
subsequently discharged the complaint against an attor-
ney who had loaned $15,000.00 to Judge Reginald Holzer,
a judge before whom he never appeared but with whom
he “enjoyed a casual, friendly relationship.” In re Mark
E. Jones, Jr.,__Tl.2d —_,__N.E.2d__, (Ill. Sup. Ct.
No. 66227, Slip Opinion, December 6, 1988, p. 2.) In
Jones, the court found that because Jones had not appeared
before the judge, “the Administrator asks us to infer that
the respondent was willing to risk $15,000.00 in exchange
for the chance that, on some unspecified occasion in the
future, Holzer would be in a position to repay the favor.”
Jones, Slip Opinion, p. 7 (emphasis added).

Ketchum filed a Petition for Rehearing in the [linois
Supreme Court. The Court denied rehearing. Ketchum
now petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THIS PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED
BECAUSE THE DECISION BELOW
STANDS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH
THIS COURT’S PRIOR HOLDING IN
BOUIE V. COLUMBIA.

In Bouie v. Columbia, 376 U.S. 347 (1964), this Court
found that the due process clause forbids “unforeseeable
and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise
statutory language.” Jd. at 351. Bouie also recognized that
the due process clause prohibits retroactive judicial clar-
ification and expansion of ambiguous and vague statutes.
Id. See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)
(judicially created obscenity test announced in Miller v.
- California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) could not be applied retroac-
tively under the Fifth Amendment due process clause.);
Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 (1941) (‘judicial
enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war
with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes

8

must be defined with appropriate definitiveness.”) In Bouie
this Court also noted that objections to vague statutes
“could not be cured retrospectively by a ruling either of
the trial court or appellate court, though it might be cured
for the future by authoritative judicial gloss.” 378 U.S. at
353.

The pronouncements in Bouie were explicitly grounded
in ex post facto concerns.‘ In Bouie, this Court found that
the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws
fully apply where a court provides standards of conduct:

If a State legislature is barred by the Ex Post
Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must
follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by
the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely
the same result by judicial construction.

Id. at 353-54.

Here, the conclusion is inescapable that the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court stands in patent and inexcus-
able violation of this Court’s unequivocal pronouncement
in Bouie. The Illinois Supreme Court conceded that the

*In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), this Court provided a
seminal statement on the intent and meaning of the ex post facto
clause:

lst. Every law that makes an action done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law
that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexted to the crime, when commited.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense,
in order to convict the offender.

Id. at 390 (emphasis omitted). See also Miller v. Florida, 107 S.
Ct. 2446 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 US. 24, 29 (1981); Dob-
bert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977); Cummings v. Missouri,
4 Wall. 277, 325-26 (1867).

Shake aa Gs:

9

disciplinary rule alleged to be violated by Ketchum was
ambiguous. In fact, the rule was so ambiguous that the
court sua sponte amended the rule in the companion Cor-
boy decision. In re Corboy, 124 I11.2d 29, 538 N.E.2d 694,
701 (1988). Consistent with the uncertain terms of the
former rule, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that it
would be unfair to punish the Corboy respondents for a vio-
lation of the amended rule forbidding loans to judges. /d.
With respect to Ketchum, however, the [Illinois Supreme
Court retroactively applied the rule and deprived Ketchum
of his law license for two years.® Such a course of action
is plainly inconsistent with the principles announced in
Bouie. Moreover, to the extent, if any, that Ketchum has
been punished for a violation of the old version of Rule
7-110, the ruling below is nonetheless in violation of due
process since the unamended version of Rule 7-110 was
concededly void for vagueness.® (It is well-established that
the due process clause forbids imposition of sanctions under
void statutes. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954);

5 Petitioner undoubtedly was entitled to the protections and
guarantees of the due process clause. A law license, of which
the petitioner was deprived, is a property interest for purposes
of the due process clause. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th
Cir. 1972); Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 Tl. 187, 195, 36 N.E. 2d 227,
231 (1941).

6 During the hearings below, Ketchum interpreted Rule 7-110
to forbid loans to judges where an attorney appeared before the
judge. Although this construction was advanced in Corboy, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, rejected
it. The court reasoned that although a judge may preside over
a court in which an attorney does not practice, the judge, in
the future, could be transferred to a tribunal in which an attor-
ney practices. Corboy, 528 N.E.2d at 700. The Illinois Supreme
Ceurt, however, appears to have abandoned this one-time hold-
ing by its language in In re Mark Jones, Jr.: “the Adminis-
trator asks us to infer that the respondent was willing to risk
$15,000.00 in exchange for the chance that, on some unspecified
occasion in the future, Holzer would be in a position to repay the
favor.” Jones, Slip Opinion, p. 7.

10

Lanzetta v. New York, 306 U.S. 451(1939). See also Con-
nally v. General Const. Co, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (a
statute is invalid under the due process clause where it is
not “sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to
its penalties”).) Thus, the deprivation of Ketchum’s law
license under either the unamended or the amended ver-
sion of Rule 7-110 is certainly violative of the due pro-
cess clause. Moreover, the decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in this case clearly is inconsistent with a host of deci-
sions which have remained faithful to Bowie. See, e.g., Cole
v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 418-419, (7th Cir. 1987); Pringle
v. Court of Common Pleas, 788 F.2d 998, 1003, (3rd Cir.
1985); Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253, 1254-55, (8th Cir.
1985); United States v. Godheim, 651 F.2d 1294, 1297-1298,
(9th Cir. 1981).

In sum, the decision of the court below is in direct
conflict with a prior holding of this Court and is in conflict
with decisions from courts across the nation. The depri-
vation of the petitioner’s law license stands in violation
of the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United
States Constitution. This petition should thus be granted
to rectify the injustice, correct the defiance of this Court’s
authority, alleviate the split between the holding in this
case and others, cure the constitutional violations associ-
ated with the deprivation of Ketchum’s law license and to
clarify standards regarding retroactive application of judi-
cial constructions.

ee ee ee ne et

11

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Walter Ketchum respectfully prays that a
writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and order
of the Illinois Supreme Court.

sea Dock’

WILLIAM J. MARTIN LTD.
WILLIAM J. MARTIN,

1010 Lake Street Suite 604
Oak Park, Illinois 60301
(312) 848-2100

Attorney For Petitioner

APPENDIX

A-1
IN RE KETCHUM

Cite as 124 Ill.Dec. 1, 528 N.E.2d 689 (111.1988)
528 N.E.2d 689
124 Ill.2d 50
In re Walter M. KETCHUM

Attorney, Respondent.
No. 65431.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
June 20, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 3, 1988.

On appeal from disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme
Court held that making loans to and soliciting loans for
circuit court judge or judge’s mother violates disciplinary
rule prohibiting lending anything of value to a judge and
warrants two-year suspension.

Suspension ordered.

Attorney and Client

Making loans to and soliciting loans for circuit court
judge or judge’s mother violates disciplinary rule prohibit-
ing ]) nding anything of value to a judge and warrants two-
year suspension. Code of Prof. Resp., DR 7-110(a), S.H.A.
ch. 110A, foll. #774.

William J. Martin, Ltd., William J. Martin, Oak Park,
for respondent.

Malcolm C. Rich, Executive Director, Chicago Coun-
cil of Lawyers, Chicago, for Chicago Council of Lawyers,

James J. Grogan, Atty. Registration and Disciplinary
Com’n, Chicago, for Adm’r.

PO

A-2
PER CURIAM:

Richard LeFevour, then presiding judge of the first
municipal district of the circuit court of Cook County, was
indicted in 1984 on charges of mail fraud, tax fraud, and
racketeering. During the course of his trial, the govern-
ment introduced evidence of certain financial transactions
between LeFevour and Walter M. Ketchum, the respon-
dent in this case. LeFevour was convicted in 1985 and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In the wake of
LeFevour’s conviction, the Administrator of the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) filed a
two-count complaint charging the respondent with viola-
tions of Rules 1-102(a)(2), 1-102(a)(5), and 7-110(a) and
Canon 9 of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
(107 I11.2d Rules 1-102(aX(2), (a)(5), 7-110(a), 9-101 et seq.).
After a hearing on the matter, in 1986 the hearing panel
concluded that respondent had violated Rule 7-110(a) and
recommended that respondent be censured. Both respon-
dent and the Administrator appealed to the Review Board,
and in 1987 the Review Board agreed with the hearing
panel that respondent had violated Rule 7-110(a), but rec-
ommended a one-year suspension. On June 24, 1987, this
court granted respondent leave to file briefs and present
oral argument. The issue in this court is whether respon-
dent’s conduct in making loans to and soliciting loans for
LeFevour or his mother violated Rule 7-110(a) and, if so,
what sanctions are appropriate. Rule 7-110(a) provides in
pertinent part that an attorney “shall not give or lend any-

thing of value to a judge.”

Respondent was a long-time friend and neighbor of
LeFevour, whose residence was across the alley from
respondent's. Their families were extremely friendly and
their children grew up together, went to school together,
and played together. Before LeFevour became a judge,
he sometimes referred personal injury cases to respon-
dent, and respondent sometimes referred criminal cases

A-3

to LeFevour while LeFevour was still in private prac-
tice. LeFevour continued to refer personal injury cases to
respondent after LeFevour became a judge in the traffic
court in 1968, but the Administrator did not charge wrong-
doing on this account. In testimony before the hearing
panel, respondent described LeFevour as a good source of
business. LeFevour was named presiding judge of the first
municipal district in 1981. During the period in question
in this case, a large number of respondent’s personal injury
cases were pending in that district—at times as many as
50% of the cases he had on file.

Before LeFevour became a judge, respondent made
loans to him from time to time. These loans were always
repaid by LeFevour. After LeFevour became a judge,
respondent continued to loan him money. These loans fol-
lowed the same pattern: LeFevour would ask for a loan,
whereupon respondent would write LeFevour a check from
his business account. The loans were always interest-
free, were never evidenced by a note, and times for repay-
ment were never discussed. Respondent recalls neither
the circumstances surrounding these loans nor the rea-
sons LeFevour needed the loans. None of these loans,
with the possible exception of the first one, were repaid by
LeFevour.

The first loan, for either $1,000 or $2,000 (respondent
cannot recall which), was made sometime after LeFevour
became a judge but before February 1978. Although he
cannot recall the circumstances, he claims that LeFevour
repaid the loan. Between February 1978 and September
1982, respondent made five additional loans to LeFevour,
totalling $5,300. Four of these loans, totalling $4,300, were
made after LeFevour became the presiding judge of the first
municipal district. None of these loans were repaid.

Respondent claims that four of the five loans made
between 1978 and 1981 were advances on account of a
tort action in which the respondent represented LeFevour’s

A-4

wife, his two sons, and two other individuals not related
to LeFevour. A review of the respondent’s office records
indicates that these payments to LeFevour, contrary to
respondent’s assertion, were not advances. Where monies
were loaned by the respondent to his clients, the loans
were recorded in cost ledger sheets kept by respondent’s
office in the regular course of business. We note, howev-
er, that the Administrator brought no charges against the
respondent with respect to such loans. For the purpose of
this proceeding, it is significant that there were no entries
of any advances or loans on the cost ledger sheets which
referred to LeFevour or the tort action that respondent was
handling for the LeFevour family.

Respondent made two more loans to LeFevour in
December 1981. On December 21, 1981, LeFevour called
respondent and told him that his mother, Evelyn, with
whom the respondent was acquainted, was hospitalized.
Because of a dispute with his mother’s insurance carrier,
LeFevour needed to raise $10,000 to pay the hospital bill
so that she could be released to spend the Christmas holi-
day at home and yet be readmitted to the hospital shortly
thereafter if she required further hospitalization.

Although respondent had sufficient funds to loan
LeFevour the amount requested, he responded to Lefevour
that he was not able to make the loan. Instead he volun-
teered to contact other attorneys, using Judge LeFevour’s
name to request that they contribute to a fund to pay the
hospital bill. LeFevour consented to the respondent’s sug-
gestion. Although the respondent did not tell LeFevour
the names of specific individuals he would solicit, he told
LeFevour he would call attorneys.

That same day the respondent spoke to six Chicago
attorneys and asked each to contribute $1,000 to the hos-
pital bill. One attorney refused outright, and later another
attorney informed the respondent that he would not con-
tribute because his wife objected. The other four attor-

A-5

neys each delivered checks to respondent in the amount
of $1,000 payable to Richard LeFevour, the way in which
the respondent told them he was making his own check
payable. The respondent then wrote his own check to
Richard LeFevour in the amount of $1,000 and delivered
the five checks to LeFevour’s bailiff. None of these loans
were secured by notes, nor were provisions for repayment
made.

LeFevour cashed respondent’s $1,000 check. He
deposited the other four checks in his personal checking
account and within the next four weeks LeFevour expended
these funds for a variety of purposes, but not for repayment
of his mother’s hospital bill.

On December 24, 1981, LeFevour requested $1,000
more from the respondent, which respondent loaned
LeFevour interest-free and without a note by a check from
his business account. Finally, respondent made a similar
$1,000 loan to LeFevour in September of 1982. None of
these loans were repaid.

In sum, in the time that LeFevour was a judge, respon-
dent made LeFevour at least nine loans totalling at least
$9,300. Only two loans, totalling either $2,000 or $3,000,
were made in the 13 years LeFevour served as a judge in
the traffic court. The loans increased in frequency after
LeFevour became presiding judge of the first municipal dis-
trict: seven loans, totalling $7,300, were made in the 20-
month period after LeFevour became presiding judge.

The first count of the complaint filed by the Admin-
istrator against respondent relates to the loans made vy
respondent to LeFevour both before and after he became
the presiding judge of the first municipal district. The sec-
ond count relates to the respondent’s solicitation of other
attorneys to contribute funds for repayment of Evelyn
LeFevour’s hospital bill. As previously noted, only alleged
violations of Rule 7-110(a) are before this court.

A-6

The hearing panel, in reviewing the respondent's con-
duct, found that although the evidence suported a conclu-
sion that the respondent did not make loans to LeFevour
with an intent to influence or obtain judicial favor, several
factors necessitated sanctions against respondent. Among
other things, the panel found that respondent was an expe-
rienced practitioner who admitted being aware of Rule 7-
110(a) at the time the loans to LeFevour were made. The
panel noted that respondent had more than a social rela-
tionship with LeFevour, because LeFevour referred busi-
ness to him. Also, the panel found that respondent's
contention that his payments to LeFevour represented
advances toward recovery in a personal injury case rather
than outright loans was not “candid and forthright,” and
that LeFevour never repaid nor did respondent make any
effort to collect the loans. Therefore, the panel concluded
that respondent had violated Rule 7-110(a) and recom-
mended that the respondent be censured.

The Review Board agreed that the respondent had vio-
lated Rule 7-110(a). In arriving at its decison, the Review
Board stressed the vital function of Rule 7-110 in our sys-
tem of justice, noting that the rule is designed “to preserve
and protect the integrity of our Judicial System and to pre-
serve and maintain an independent and impartial Judicia-
ry. The practice of attorneys making loans to sitting judges
erodes and destroys the confidence of the public in the Bar,
the Judiciary, the entire legal system.”

The Board interpreted 7-110(a) as a per se rule—an
absolute prohibition against lending or giving anything
of value to a judge (except, of course, campaign contribu-
tions permitted by Rule 7-110(a)) regardless of the pur-
pose of the gift or loan, or whether the attorney benefitted
or anticipated gaining any benefit from his gift or loan.
The Board acknowledged that LeFevour and the respon-
dent were long-time friends, but concluded that “[wJhat
may well have begun with innocuous loans between friends

A-7

struggling to begin practices developed into a festering sore
whose infection spread and engulfed numerous other attor-
neys.” Because respondent’s action “was not one single iso-
lated incident” but a “calculated, continuing wrong and a
blot upon our profession and our system of Justice,” the
Review Board felt that censure was too light a sanction,
and recommended a year-long suspension from the practice
of law.

In this court, the Administrator argues that Rule 7-
110(a) is a per se rule and therefore that each of the
loans the respondent made to LeFevour, as well as the
respondent’s solicitation of loans from other attorneys on
LeFevour’s behalf to raise money to pay LeFevour’s moth-
er’s hospital bill, constitutes a disciplinary violation with-
out regard to whether the respondent received any benefit
from his conduct. The Administrator asks that the respon-
dent be suspended from the practice of law for a substan-
tial period of time. Respondent argues that 7-110(a) is not
a per se rule and that his actions were never motivated by
a desire to influence the administration of justice or curry
judicial favor, but solely by his friendship and desire to
help the LeFevour family in their times of need.

Although the issue raised here by the parties is
whether Rule 7-110(a) is a per se rule, our opinion in Jn
re Corboy (1988) 124 Ill.2d 29, 124 Ill.Dec. 6, 528 N.E.2d
694, has already dealt with this question to the extent nec-
essary to give adequate guidance to the bench and bar of
this State. In that opinion, we held that evidence of dis-
honest intent and motive is not necessary to justify impo-
sition of discipline. (In re Corboy, 124 I1l.2d at 39, 124
Il. Dec. at 11, 528 N.E.2d at 699, citing In re Clayter
(1980), 78 Il.2d 276, 283, 35 Ill. Dec. 790, 399 N.E.2d 1318.)
We further held that evidence showing a lack of dishonest
intent is usually only appropriate to determine the nature
and severity of the sanction imposed. (Jn re Corboy, 124
[l.2d at 39, 124 ll. Dec. at 11, 528 N.E.2d at 699, citing

A-8

In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill.2d 276, 35 Ill.Dec. 790, 399
N.E.2d 1318.) It is unnecessary for us here to determine
whether the per se construction urged by the Administra-
tor is applicable. In In re Corboy, we declared that Rule 7-
110(a) must be read in conjunction with the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct, Rule 65(C)(4)(a) (107 Il.2d R. 65(C)(4)(a)),
and we directed an amendment to Rule 7-110(a) to that
effect. By reading the amended rule as we have strictly
construed it in In re Corboy, the limited extent to which
an attorney may make a gift or loan to a judge will be
apparent. However, under any analysis of Rule 7-110(a),
respondent’s loans were improper. The evidence supports
the conclusion that respondent intended to and did in fact
receive an actual benefit from the loans made to LeFevour.
Therefore, we cannot accept respondent’s contention that
he had no intent to receive a benefit from his conduct. At
all times relevant to his proceeding the respondent had a
large volume of cases pending in the district over which
LeFevour presided; the Review Board noted that at all
times from 20% to 50% of the respondent’s practice con-
sisted of cases in that district. (Cf. In re Corboy, 124 Il].2d
at 48, 124 Ill. Dec. at 14, 528 N.E.2d at 702 (Board found
attorney Tuite’s firm had a number of cases in the first
municipal division, but also found there was absolutely
no evidence that attorney Tuite’s loan was an attempt to
gain favor in any way).) Although neither the respondent
nor any of his associates in this case ever appeared before
LeFevour, in view of the large volume of cases the respon-
dent had in the first municipal district, as well as the fact
that LeFevour was a good source of business for respon-
dent, it was to respondent’s advantage to maintain an ami-
cable relationship with LeFevour, the administrative head
of that branch, in the event it ever became necessary for
him or his associates to appear before the presiding judge
in a case or to make a request of the presiding judge, who
in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities may
have been of assistance to lawyers who had cases pending
there.

A-9

It is obvious that the respondent’s loans to LeFevour
were a means of cementing and maintaing his relationship
with his old friend, who had been elevated to the leadership
of the district of the court in which he and lawyers in his
office appeared frequently in a large number of cases. See
In re Schwarz (1972), 51 I11.2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689 (mo-
tive and intent must ordinarily be inferered from conduct).
Therefore, although it appears there had never been an
occasion when LeFevour had actually favored him in the
past, there was certainly the appearance of impropriety.
Given this, and the fact that, at times, fully half of respon-
dent’s practice was in the division over which LeFevour
presided, there was the real possibility that the respondent
might be the beneficiary of LeFevour’s favor in the future.

For that reason, we view the loans made to LeFevour
and the solicitations the respondent made on behalf
of LeFevour’s mother as conferring a benefit on both
LeFevour and the respondent. LeFevour benefitted
through the receipt of the loans and respondent’s services
as solicitor of loans from other attorneys. Respondent
intended to benefit and did benefit by the continuance and
guarantee of a favorable relationship with the judge, which
might prove to be valuable to respondent in the future.

That maintaining this benefit was the primary reason
behind the loans is illustrated by the incident in which
LeFevour asked the respondent for $10,000. Although
the respondent had enough money to loan LeFevour the
$10,000, and LeFevour was apparently in a situation where
his family was in great need of the money to assure con-
ti: aued medical care for LeFevour’s mother, respondent
claimed not to have the money. This highlights that friend-
ship and concern for LeFevour’s family were not the under-
lying motives for the loans. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that although respondent claims that all loans
were made for purely friendly purposes, respondent has
admitted that he actually could not remember the purpose

A-10

of any of the loans to LeFevour. Also, the marked increase
in frequency of loans from respondent to LeFevour in the
period after LeFevour became presiding judge suggests a
purpose behind the loans other than friendship. Clearly,
the respondent was not concerned about the financial need
of LeFevour’s family, but made the loans simply because
he did not want to run the risk of incurring LeFevour’s
wrath and losing his favor by refusing to lend him money.

We conclude that under the circumstances of this case,
it was a violation of Rule 7-110(a) for the respondent to
make loans or give anything of value—in this case the
respondent’s services in soliciting other lawyers—to the pre-
siding judge of a court or « division of a court in which the
respondent had pending a substantial volume of the cases
he was handling, even when the judge had never been per-
sonally involved in any of the cases.

This court has not had the occasion to decide the proper
sanction for a violation of Rule 7-110(a). In determining
the appropriate sanction for a disciplinary violation, each
case must be decided on its own facts. (Jn re Halil (1983),
96 I1l.2d 371, 69 Ill.Dec. 370, 447 N.E.2d 805.) Respondent
argues that the appropriate sanction, if any, is a private
reprimand, based on several cases from other jurisdictions.
These decisions are distinguishable because they involved
isolated incidents of misconduct, not the kind of continuing
pattern of misconduct at issue in the present case.

This case is far different from the cases consolidated
in In re Corboy, where the attorneys’ conduct constituted a
violation of Rule 7-110(a) only because of the construction
we placed on Rule 7-110(a) in that case. Here, respondent's
conduct constituted a violation of that rule even without
the strict construction we have placed on the rule in ques-
tion. ,

Considering the seriousness of the disciplinary viola-
tions in this case, the repeated nature of the violations, and
the fact that respondent is an experienced practioner who

A-11

knew of the prohibitions of Rule 7-110(a) at the time the
loans were made, we feel respondent’s conduct warrants a
more severe sanction than censure. Accordingly, respon-
dent is suspended from the practice of law for two years.

Respondent suspended.

Justice STAMOS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0765%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.