# Opposition Brief — Finn v. Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0711%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1989 - **Citation:** 489 U.S. 1054 ## Text om No. - 2 IN THE | get — aa Supreme Court of the Unitéd’ States MARTIN A. FINN, Petitioner, e; CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., Respondent. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI HELSELL, FETTERMAN, MARTIN, TODD & HOKANSON By Thomas W. Huber Attorneys for Respondent Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 1500 Washington Building P.O. Box 21846 Seattle, Washington 98111 (206) 292-1144 aBCD Legal Primers. Seattle. Wesiuagton TABLE OF CONTENTS Ea Introduction -- The Issues BR Tee DAMP aSe GORE cnc kc ecaee a II. Statement of the Case ......... 2 III. Finn's Misstatement of Facts Re Re 5 a ae 12 IV. Reasons For Denying eR Ee ee ee 17 A. The Court of Appeals Heeded The Limitations On Appeals Set Forth In Federal Civl ET de a a be 6 ae ee 3 6 17 B. The District Court's Holding Concerning Notice Was Based On A Misapprehension Of Law; Affirmance Of Such Ruling By The Court Of Appeals Would Be In Conflict With Decisions By Other pg Re 22 Cc. The Court of Appeals Gave Effect To The Congressional Purpose Underlying The Petroleum Marketing BEGGGROND GGG 0.456 0s ene naes 26 TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) CORR EMOAES. 0 nk vi eH OEE SRE OR Appendix A. Statutory Provisions Violated by POCZESOROE FEM acces ce as incense Appendix B. Chevron's Ex. 4 Summary of Finn's Outside Fuel PUPCRAROD 620 si dio aha kes Appendix C. Termination Notice Given By Finn BO GROUEGE 6 ccc ese ee bathe wrcuss a TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES American National Bank of Austin v. United States, 421 F.2d 442 (Sth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819, 91 S. Ct. 36, OES ee ere Amoco Oil Co. v. D.Z. Enterprises, Inc., 607 F. Supp. PN EMEGMPaMte a BOWED dec ccecccscecases Bullock v. Tamiami Trail zours, iIn¢., 266 F.2d 326 RE ee ee District of Columbia v. Seven-Up Washington, Inc., 214 E.ae aur €3.C.« Cis. 1954), cert. denied, 74 S. Ct. 851, ee aes es We Bes, Ms, BABS onc ccces Escobar v. Mobil Oil Corp., 522 F. Supp. 593 (D. Conn. 1981) Gruber v. Mobil Oil Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ..... Official Creditors Committee of Fox Markets Inc. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 S. Ct. 1342, 380 U.S. 978, DS eg a a -iii- 22 23 CASES (Cont'd) Ritter v. Morton, 513 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947, 96 S$. Ct. 362, G6 be. BG. BE BGS CASIO) cosescccccce Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 90 S. Ct. 1696, 398 U.S. 905, 26 L. EG. 24 64 ...... TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968), 20 L. Ed. 2dl.... United States v. O'Brien, 273 ¥.24 495 (3d Cir. 1959) ........ United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948) United States v. Washington Water Power Co., 793 F.2d 1079 ee A a Pe PU a cies Waiters v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1979) Wisser Co., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 730 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1984) STATUTES ae U.B.0s> SEROCA: sc ewer e ce scwwn ones Be Gc iGr BESSCE). cc cewccvasverivwves OP Are eee ee ee ee ee 22 20 ai 20 19,21 25 23 24 STATUTES (Cont'd) 15 U.S.C. 2802(b)(2)(A)(i) ....-.20e- We OA a ac eee ee Oe We RO sOOe cece esnscerneceteseanenua MISCELLANEOUS GCSWAs DSO Bates © 560k 65 4RS eo hehe RSS 1978 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News 892 ...... I. INTRODUCTION -- THE ISSUES IN THE DISTRICT COURT This suit involves the termination of a service station operation by a refiner because of the dealer's violations of federal law, state criminal law, and breach of contractual obligations. The dealer was selling fuel to the motoring public under the guise that it was Chevron fuel, when in fact it was not. The legal issue at trial was whether the refiner's termination notice to the dealer was timely under the requirements of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801 et seg. (Petition Appendix D). The PMPA provides that a notice of termination must be shied within 120 days after the refiner learns of the facts constituting the ground for termination. The District Court found that the notice to the dealer was not timely. The Court of Appeals, based on admitted facts, concluded that the District Court deter- mination was erroneous, and reversed. at. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner Martin Finn (Finn) was an independent service station operator leasing a station from Respondent Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), under the terms of a Dealer Lease and a Dealer Supply Contract, each with an effective date of November 1, 1981. (Pltf's Ex. 1 & 2, Excerpt of Record (ER) pp. 95-129.) On sixteen separate occasions during the period January 6 through October 17, 1982, Finn purchased a total of 96,002 gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel from Crown Petroleum, an independent jobber not con- nected with Chevron. (Chevron's Ex. 4, ER 134.) Finn put this fuel into Chevron's tanks, commingling it with Chevron fuel, pumped it out through Chevron's pumps, and sold this fuel under Chevron's logos and trademarks, i.e., passed it off to the motoring public as Chevron fuel. (Pretrial Order, Admitted Facts 11-18, ER 213 & 22.) These practices violated sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a); and violated two Washington criminal law pro- visions, RCW 9.16.040, which prohibits displaying goods with a false trademark, and RCW 9.16.080, which prohibits the sale of improperly labeled petroleum products. (Appendix A to this brief contains these statutory provisions. ) aa These actions also violated paragraph 6(b) of Finn's Dealer Lease, which prohi- bits using Chevron trademark equipment for non-Chevron products; and violated three provisions of Finn's Dealer Supply Contract: 2(b), which requires compliance with all applicable federal and state laws; 4(a), which prohibits the sale of non-Chevron products under the Chevron trademark and prohibits commingling of products; and 4(b), which prohibits use of Chevron's signs in connection with the sale of non-Chevron products. (ER 99, 114 and 116.) The actions were grounds for ter- mination of the Dealer Lease under paragraph 7(b)(5), which provides for ter- mination for "willful adulteration, com- mingling, mislabeling or misbranding of motor fuels or other violations by Dealer of trademarks utilized by Chevron;" and paragraph 7(b)(8), which provides for ter- mination for "unlawful, fraudulent or deceptive acts or practices or criminal misconduct by Dealer relevant to the operation of the premises." (ER 100.) The actions were grounds for termination of the Dealer Supply Contract under paragraph 7(b)(4), for knowingly failing to comply with federal or state laws rele- vant to the use or operation of the premi- ses; 7(b)(5) for willful adulteration, commingling, mislabeling or misbranding of motor fuels or violation of Chevron trade- marks; and 7(b)(7), which provides for termination for engaging in unlawful, fraudulent or deceptive acts or practices or criminal misconduct. (ER 119.) At trial there was no dispute with regard to these violations by Finn. In the Admitted Facts section of the Pre- Trial Order, Finn acknowledged that all pumps, tanks and containers at the station were supplied by Chevron; that he understood that such pumps, tanks and con- tainers were to be used solely for the storing, handling and dispensing of Chevron products; that during the period January 6, 1982 through October 7, 1982 he received delivery of sixteen loads of fuel from Crown Petroleum totaling 96,002 gallons; that he put this fuel into Chevron's tanks and sold it through pumps bearing the Chevron trademark; that the fuel was commingled with Chevron fuels; and that when selling the fuel he did not use any device to block out the Chevron trademark. (Pre-Trial Order, Admitted Facts 11-18; ER 21-22.) At trial there was no issue concerning Chevron's right to terminate Finn for the above-described violations. The District Court Judge stated in her oral decision: That Finn did indeed buy non- Chevron products and sell them without changing the Chevron names on the pumps and at his station is clear from the facts. That that is indeed a violation of the terms of the lease is also clear from the facts and really is essentially undisputed. Petition for Certiorari, Appendix B, page B-3. The legal issue at trial was whether Chevron's notice to terminate Finn was given in timely fashion. The PMPA provi- des that a failure by the franchisee (dealer) to comply with any provision of the franchise is a ground for termination "if the franchisor first acquired actual or constructive knowledge of such failure not more than 120 days prior to the date on which notification of termination is given." 15 U.S.C. 2802(b)(2)(A)(i). (Petition, Appendix D, pp. D-11 and D-12.) Chevron's evidence showed that no one at Chevron had notice or knowledge con- cerning Finn's outside fuel purchases until December 1983. The three Chevron retail sales representatives responsible for working with Finn each testified that they never received any notice or had any knowledge. (Westphal, Transcript of Record, Vol I, TRI 37-50; Downs TRI 51-53; and Lettich TRI 54-60.) Chevron Area Retail Manager William Wynn testified that he had no knowledge until early December 1983 when he was advised by by Chevron's landlord (Chevron was leasing the property and subleasing to Finn) that there was information Finn had purchased fuel on the outside. (TRI 62-63.) Wynn questioned Finn about such purchases. Finn denied them. (TRI 63.) Confirmation and details concerning the purchases were received December 21, 1983, during a deposition of a Crown Petroleum employee in an unrelated lawsuit. (TRI 17 and 29; Chevron's Ex. 4, Summary of Purchases, ER 134; Appendix B to this brief.) Chevron's termination notice was deli- vered to Finn on February 28, 1984. (Pre-Trial Order, Admitted Fact 19; Pltf's Ex. 3, ER 22 and 127.) Thus the ter- mination notice, according to Chevron's evidence, was timely under the require- ments of the PMPA, since it was given within 120 days after Chevron received notice of Finn's violations of the contracts. Finn testified that on March 28, 1981 he had a meeting with Chevron represen- tative Westphal concerning Chevron holding up a delivery because of Finn's credit problems, and Finn testified the conver- sation included his statement that he "might" get fuel elsehwere if he could not get it from Chevron. (RTI 86-91.) This conversation was over seven months prior to the November 1, 1981 effective date of the Dealer Lease and Dealer Supply Contract at issue in this case, and over nine months prior to Finn's first outside purchase of fuel on January 6, 1982. Finn also testified that he informed Westphal «%0. concerning the first five outside purcha- ses of fuel which occurred January 6 and 24, February 15 and 17, and April 22, 1982. (TRI 94-96, 111-113; Summary of Purchases, Chevron's Ex. 4, Appendix B to this brief.) It is undisputed, however, that Chevron never was advised about the next 11 purchases of outside fuel which occurred between April 29 and October 7, 1982. Finn's deposition testimony, read into the record at trial, is as follows: A. From six to sixteen no, I. did not. Q. We are talking about the deliveries six through six- teen which appear on Exhibit 4? A. Yes. Q. Your're telling me as to each of those deliveries you did not inform anyone at Chevron? hea. A. Right. (June 20, 1984 Deposition of Finn, p. 81, lns. 13-19; Read by Trial Court, TRI 14-29.) The trial court concluded that even though no notice had been given to Chevron of the last 11 purchases of outside fuel, Chevron could not terminate Finn based on such purchases because Finn over a year earlier had advised a Chevron represen- tative that he "might" make future outside purchases of fuel, and thus, under the PMPA, Chevron's termination notice was untimely. The Court of Appeals determined that such conclusion was erroneous and reversed. os # FINN'S MISSTATEMENT OF FACTS IN THE PETITION ee On page 4 of his petition for a Writ of Certiorari Finn asserts that after 12. the Ninth Circuit reversal Chevron ter- minated the contracts. The fact is that Finn terminated the contracts. Appendix C to this brief is a true copy of Finn's October 20, 1988 notice to Chevron by which he terminated the Dealer Lease and Dealer Supply Contract. Bs On page 5 in the petition Finn asserts he purchased outside fuel because Chevron repeatedly failed to deliver fuel to him. Finn fails to mention that his difficulty in getting fuel. from Chevron was the result of Chevron's reluctance to deliver fuel to him on credit, because of Finn's continued delivery of nonsufficient fund checks to Chevron in payment for fuel, 31 checks in all, each of which was in the thousands of dollars. (TRI:86, 110-111, and 167.) .. ae On page 5 of the Petition Finn asserts that the contracts required him to purchase and sell only Chevron products. Both contracts, however, had provisions for the selling of other companies' fuels. (Dealer Lease, 7 6(b), ER 99; Dealer Supply Contract, 4 2(a), ER 114.) The only restriction was placing another com- pany's fuel in Chevron's tanks and selling it through Chevron's pumps using Chevron logos. Chevron's Exhibit A-5 is a memorandum from Finn's files, prepared by a Finn employee, which sets forth Chevron's policy that outside fuel could be purchased so long as steps were taken to protect the integrity of Chevron's tanks and the Chevron logos were covered. (ER 135-136; RTI 182.) 4. On page 6 of the Petition Finn asserts that Crown Petroleum was another yo Chevron dealer. Admitted Fact 12 in the Pre-Trial Order recites that Crown Petro- leum does not distribute its own products, purchasing products from other companies for resale. (ER 21.) Chevron's area retail manager testified that Chevron does not sell to Crown Petroleum. (RTI 62.) The general manager of Crown Petroleum testified it purchased its fuel from Disoro, Tosco, PRI, Union, Shell, Arco and Texaco. (RTI 138-139.) SD. On pages 7 and 8 in his Petition Finn states that the meeting at which he told the Chevron representative he might purchase outside fuel whenever Chevron was unable to fill his orders took place in January 1982, at the time such outside purchases commenced. Finn testified at trial, however, that this conversation «itn took place March 28, 1981, almost 10 months prior to the first such delivery. (RTI 86, lns. 19-24, and p. 90, ln. 25 through p. 91, ln. 2.) 6. Finally, on page 8 in his Peti- tion, Finn states that in January 1982 he handed a Chevron sales representative a copy of an invoice "showing these outside purchases," implying Chevron was given notice then of all 16 purchases. Only the first two of the 16 purchases occurred in January 1982. (See Summary, Appendix B.) Finn testified at trial that the January meeting involved only the invoice for the first purchase. (TRI Finn June 20, 1984 Deposition read at trial, pp. 72-74.) Finn admitted he told no one at Chevron about deliveries 6 through 16. (Finn June 20, 1984 deposition, p. 81, read at -16- trial, TRI 14, quoted on page 11 of this brief. ) IV. REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION A. The Court Of Appeals Heeded The Limitations On Appeals Set Forth In Federal Civil Rule 52(a). With regard to appellate review of a non-jury trial Civil Rule 52(a) provides: Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The District Court found, on disputed evidence, that Finn advised Chevron con- cerning his first five purchases of non- Chevron fuel. The Court of Appeals accepted this finding of fact. With regard to the next 11 purchases of outside fuel, the four Chevron representatives x, testified that they had no knowledge, and Finn admitted that he told no one at Chevron concerning such purchases. In the face of this undisputed evidence the District Court concluded, based on Finn's testimony that 10 months prior to the first purchase he told a Chevron represen- tative he might make purchases of outside fuel, that Chevron was on notice as to all such future purchases. In so concluding the District Court ignored settled case law that each new breach of a contract by a dealer is a new event justifying ter- mination under the PMPA. (The case law is discussed below at pp. 22-24.) The Court of Appeals correctly disagreed with the District Court's conclusion and held, based on the undisputed facts, that Chevron's first notice of the 11 sub- ~~" @ sequent purchases was on December 21, 1983, when the Crown Petroleum deposition took place, and thus Chevron's February 28, 1984 notice was within the 120 days required by the PMPA. This ruling by the Court of Appeals is supported on a number of grounds. Re The District Court's conclu- sion was clearly erroneous. "A finding is "clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766 (1948). 2. The District Court's conclu- sion was a ruling on a mixed question of « 19. fact and law which is freely reviewable on appeal. Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 90 S. Ct. 1696, 398 U.S. 905, 26 L. Ed. 2d 64; Official Creditors Committee of Fox Markets Inc. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 S. Ct. 1342, 380 U.S. 978, 14 L. Ed. 2d 272; and U.S. v. Gypsum, supra. z: The District Court's ruling concerning notice is not a finding on basic facts but an inference derived from the basic facts. Where facts are undisputed and credibility of witnesses is not involved, and the trial court's ruling is an inference drawn from the facts, the appellate court may freely draw different inferences. United States v. O’Brien, 273 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1959). Where the trial - 20- court's holdings are "ultimate facts" which "are simply the result reached by processes of legal reasoning from, or the interpretation of the legal significance of, the evidentiary facts, they are sub- ject to review by this Court free from the restraining influence of the 'clearly erroneous’ rule ... ." Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 336 (Sth Cir. 1959). 4. The District Court's conclu- Sion was based on an erroneous interpreta- tion of law, as discussed below at pp. 22-24. Where the trial court has operated under a misapprehension of the law that affects its findings, the "clearly erro- neous" standard no longer is applicable. U.S. v. Gypsum, supra. at 333 U.S. 394; TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson, 390 U.S. «#4. 414, 444-445 (1968) 20 L. Ed. 2d 1; Ritter vy. Morton, 513 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947, 96 S. Ct. 362, 46 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1975). 5. The District Court's holding also was a conclusion of law and the "clearly erroneous" test does not apply. District of Columbia v. Seven-Up Washington, Inc., 214 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 74 S. Ct. 851, 347 U.S. 989, 98 L. Ed. 1123; and American National Bank of Austin v. United States, 421 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819, 91 S. Ct. 36, 27 L. Ed. 2d 4 (1971). B. The Trial Court's Holding Concerning Notice Was Based On A Misapprehension Of Law; Affirmance Of Such Ruling By the Court Of Appeals Would Be In Conflict With Decisions By Other Federal Courts. The District Court treated Finn's March 28, 1981 statement that he might o 22 purchase outside fuel in the future as constructive notice of all future viola- tions involving commingling and misbranding of fuel. It is well established, however, that under the PMPA each separate violation of a dealer franchise agreement is an event which con- mences the running of a new 120 day period for termination. Gruber v. Mobil Oil Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Escobar v. Mobil Oil Corp., 522 F. Supp. 593 (D. Conn. 1981); Walters v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1979). In Amoco Oil Co. v. D.Z. Enterprises, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) the dealer, like Finn, sold non-Amoco gasoline through the Amoco branded pumps violating the Amoco trade- mark, violating both the Landham Act and «23. state law. The court stated: "Where there are repeated occurrences of the violative conduct, each new event is a ground for termination." Finally in Wisser Co., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 730 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1984) passing off gaso- line from another refiner as Mobil's was ground for termination of the franchise and the court quoted from the legislative history: "[T]he time limitations are not intended to stop a franchisor from exer- cising termination ... based upon a future event which constitutes a ground for termination ... , even if such future event is a repeat occurrence of an event with respect to which the previous exercise of termination ... rights was waived." 1978 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News at 892. = 24- On page 22 of his petition, Finn argues that his March 26, 1981 conver- sation with the Chevron representative was an ‘enkicwatory repudiation" of his contractual duties. It is difficult to understand how one can repudiate a contractual obligation by stating that he "might" violate it in the future. It is clear that a statement of intent is not proof that the actor will follow through. United States v. Washington Water Power Co., 793 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, both the Dealer Lease and the Dealer Supply Contract contained an express provision that Chevron's waiver of any breach or default was "not to be deemed to be a waiver of any other or con- tinuing breach or default ... ." (ER 101 and 120.) - 25- C. The Court of Appeals Gave Effect To The Congressional Purpose Underlying The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. At page 27 Finn argues that the primary pur- pose of the PMPA is to protect gas station owners from unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory termination. Chevron does not dispute this state- ment. Finn then goes on to assert that in some way the Court of Appeals decision allows an oil company to ignore the 120 day notice requirement. The Court of Appeals decision, however, does just the opposite. It enforces the requirement of the 120 day notice. The opinion also enforces the congressional intent, set forth at p. 24 in this brief, that the "time limitations are not intended to stop a franchisor from excercising termination based upon a future event which constitutes a ground for termination." . = V. CONCLUSION The District Court was clearly erro- neous in concluding that Finn's statement to Chevron's representative, that he might purchase outside fuel in the future, was notice to Chevron concerning 11 future instances in which Finn violated federal law, state law, and contractual provi- sions, by commingling fuels and by selling outside fuels to the motoring public under the guise that it was Chevron's product. Further, for the reasons set forth on pp. 20-22 of this brief, such District Court conclusion was freely reviewable by the Court of Appeals. Finn's petition, there- fore, fails to meet the criteria for issuance of a writ of certiorari, and must be denied. 27 Respectfully submitted. f DATED this JZrelday of January, 1989. HELSELL, FETTERMAN, MARTIN, TODD & HOKANSON sz By Plewae Wi Vrle Thomas W. Huber Attorneys for Chevron U.3.A., t86. 9TWH3 /84- 0314 = 28- APPENDIX A Statutory Provisions Violated By Petitioner Finn lie Sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act 15 U.S.C. #1114(1) and 1125 (a) § 1114. Remedies; infringement; innocent infringement by printers and publishers (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution. or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a regis- tered mark and apply such reproduction, counterzeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacies or advertisements intended to be used in commerce Upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribu- tion, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with Which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, Or %o deceive. *hall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) of this sectior, the reg- ‘strant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is in- tended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de- Ctive. -—_ ee § 1125. False designations of origin and false descriptions for. bidden (a) Any person who shail affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods. a false des. ignation of omgin. or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shail with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of ongin Or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported Or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used. shail be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representaticn. ae Title 9, Revised Code of Washington, Crimes and Punishments; Chapter 9.16, Brands and Marks, Crimes Relating to: 9.16.040 Displaying goods with false trademark. Ev- ery person who shail knowingly sell, display or advertise, or have in his possession with intent to seil, any goods, wares, merchandise, mixture, preparation or compound having affixed thereto any label, trademark, term, de- sign, device, or form of advertisement lawfully filed for record in the office of the secretary of state by any per- son, corporation, association or union, or the exclusive right to the use of which is guaranteed to such person, corporation, association or union under the laws of the United States, which label, trademark, term, design, de- vice or form of advertisement shail have been used or affixed thereto without the written authority of such person, corporation. association or union, or having af- fixed thereto any forged or counterfeit representation, likeness, similitude, copy or imitation thereof, shail be guilty of a misdemeanor. [1909 c 249 § 345: RRS § 2597.} 9.16.080 Sales of petroleum products improperly la- beled or by wrong grade. It shall be uniawful for any person, firm or corporation: (1) To use, adopt, place upon, or permit to be used, adopted or placed upon, any barrel, tank, drum or other container of gasoline or lubricating oil for internal com- bustion engines, sold or offered for sale, or upon any pump or other device used in delivering the same, any trade name, trademark, designation or other descriptive matter, which is not the true and correct trade name, trademark, designation or other descriptive matter of the gasoline or lubricating oil so sold or offered for sale: (2) To seil, or offer for sale. or have in his or its pos- session with intent to sell, any gasoline or lubricating oil, contained in, or taken from, or through any barrel, tank, drum, or other container or pump or other device. so unlawfully labeled or marked. as herernabove provided: (3) To sell, or offer for sale, or have in his or its pos- session with intent to sell any gasoline or lubricating oil for internal combustion engines and to represent to the purchaser, or prospective purchaser, that such gasoline or lubricating ot] so sold or offered for sale. is of a quai- itv, grade or standard, or the product of a particular gasoiine or lubricating oil manufacturing, refining or distributing company or association, other than the true quality, grade, standard, or the product of a particular gasoline or oil manufacturing, refining or distributing company or association, of the gasoline or oil so offered APPENDIX B ER 134 Plaintiff's Ex 4, Summary of Finn's Outside Purchases of Fuel, Sewoeer esse ecoecoeoroeceeeecoecococoans TOO Ff ee eeeeeee Oouxey ooenay ooenay ooexay uoyug uojyun uorun volun uojzun uvoyun uoyun uoyun 1ud 1ud Tre4s 1ud tl9us 1ud 1ud ud ud 1ud 1184s 1ud oos8oL Iud o2804 o280L ooo. orsoL lud oouv 1ud sa} [ddng e51n0sS ee es SOO POCO R OOS CODE OS SOC OHS SOT OSSOSESCeseceeeesesce 970762 970707 czat “GO 6600 aa Ta td TCOLuz 911L0E 9ttcoe cttt *a 000s TOTScS tuiscs S9PLOS OoPces Cspot *D 00sz s60ses S$60SLS °9 0008 OSseces OSeces SSet *9 COS 6e6el 68681 *D o0sez 6e6at ee66t sOct *9 000€ 460ceo c60ceo *9 o00c 909990 909990 90ze 907% *9 ooot 6P09T 6bo9t octt *a OOSP 6cCct 6itct "2 osiz eLcct wcCct ony “Oo oste 4zist Cztst lud ltd “ad oose bez70Co0 prz0L0 “a cose ziciz zictiz 120 tz0¢ *9 oost *a 00S) se9re °9 0002 Suor7e w7z [aa 4 “9 OOP€ stosta Siogta 9660 0666 *a 00S *d t00z TSele TSb16 tt *D 10s? sete TSwté tet tt °“D 109c "ad 0062 operse odulé ott ott *D 0008 TcEUlot ao i) “ad 0006 eecsee se ‘ Lecsee cecsee 696 698) @ 0006 @ 399512) «6@DyoauL 10 ~JUawnd0g B8>a;0Auy 30 [2801G-q 322390) «0adye2ay VO eD3N0y UO qadjalay uo 8eo-y § WHOTL § 22p30 # 42Pp30 Wonposg 32333, 3° twoe'se t8e9 00z’o9 ‘128910 700'96 'suottep [e204 te-2-ot creat “ot te-$7-e@ curt “st te-st-e@ Coot *or te-t-6 Soot “tt t8-07%-¢ oct “er te-<4-9 c9tt-907%¢ “se t8-I-9 OCtt “or te-92-¢ 6Itt "6 t6-12-5 690T-tud *e te-tt-s StOt-tz0¢ “- t0-62-) ctot-erre “= te-¢t-» t660 a te-ct-2 tS-seté-2 *? te-st-2 TL90-9E bs te-er-t toso ~ t0-9-1t ccvo ;" eieg 23qunn Arsay ag @syoauy unos) Qa0 APPENDIX C Finn's October 20, 1988 Notice to Chevron Terminating the Dealer Lease and the Dealer Supply Contract Truck Village, Inc. | 1511 S. 348th Federal Way, Washington 98003 October 20, 1988 TO: Chevron, and its sarketing representative, Larry Hills Deer Sirs: Pursuant to Section (7) of the Deeler Lease that has been in effect since Novesber 1, 1981, you ere hereby given this notice of ay termination of the Dealer Lease and the Supply Contract for the presises at 1511 S. 348th, Federal Way, Washington, 98003, effective at OOO1 hrae, October 31, 1988. Any further comeunications following that tise way be sade through sy attorney, Gregory 0. DeBay, 2755 S.W. 323rd St., Federal Way, WA 98023, phone nueber (206) 838-4404. Yours very truly, Vnwt.rl p> Martin A. Finn LEASE TERMINATION --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0711%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.