# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Faux-Burhans v. Board of County Commissioners

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 488 U.S. 1042

## Text

88-910 ")

SUPreNe Cour, US.
In The FILED
DEC 2 1988
Supreme Court of the Anite tates,
CLER®
i
October Term, 1988
AMOS D. FAUX-BURHANS,
Petitioner,

vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FREDERICK
COUNTY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PAUL VICTOR JORGENSEN
Attorney for Petitioner
P.O. Box 850
215 West Main Street
Middletown, Maryland 21769
(301) 293-2212

“TTs0

*NJ (201) 257-6850(800) 3 APPEAL «NY (212) 840-4640°MA (617) 542-1114
OC (202) 783-7288°PA (215) 925-6500°USA (800) 5 APPEAL

Petitioner Amos D. Faux-Burhans re-
spectfully prays that a writ of certiora-
ri issue to review the judgment and
opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered in

this proceeding on September 9, 1988.

Question Presented

Does the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended, preempt a local
government from exercising its police
powers to enact zoning restrictions on
the use of navigable airspace at a

private airport?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented
Table of Contents
Table of Authorities
Opinions Below
Jurisdiction
Statutory Provisions
Statement of the Case

Reasons for Granting the
Writ j

1) The Fourth Circuit's
Holding That Federal Law
Does Not Preempt Zoning of
Navigable Airspace by A
Local Government Conflicts
With Decisions of the Courts
of Appeals of the Second,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits

2) The Court of Appeals

Has Decided An Important
Federal Question In Conflict
With Applicable Decisions

of This Honorable Court

3) The Court of Appeals

Has Decided An Important
Question of Federal Law In

a Way That Could Lead To
Disaster in the Skies and
Frustration of Congressional
Purpose

ii

28

Conclusion
Appendices

Appendix A: Decision
of the United States
Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit

Appendix B: Memorandum
Opinion of the United
States District Court
for the District of
Maryland

Order and Judgment
Appendix C: Denial of
Petition for Rehearing

with Suggestion for
Rehearing In Banc

Appendix D: Frederick
County Zoning Ordinance
Section 1-19-381

Certificate of Service

iii

A-1 to A-6

B-l1 to B-13

B-14 to B-15

C-1 to C=-2

D=-1 to D=-2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

A. Table of Cases

Case Reference

Allegheny Airlines v.
Village of Cedarhurst,
2738 F. 2d 812 (od Cir.

1956) 11,16

American Airlines, Inc.
v. Town of Hempstead,
72 F. Supp. 226, 232

(EDNY 1967) 11,15,16,17

Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624
(1973) 20,25,26

Faux-Burhans v. Board of
County Commissioners, 674 F.
Supp. 1172 (1987) ; 1

Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc. v. City of Burbank,
318 F. Supp. 914, 921

(CD Calif., 1970) 11,15,17

Northwest Airlines v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292
(1944) 23

Pirolo v. City of Clear-
water, 711 F. 2d 1006
(llth Cir. 1983) 10,21

San Diego Unified Port

District v. Gianturco, .

651 F. 2d 1306 (9th Cir.

1981) 10,21

iv

Schneideman v. ANR Pipe-
line Company, 56 USLW 4249
4254 (March 22, 1988) 29

United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946) 24

United States v. New
Haven, 447 F. 2d 972
(2nd Cir. 1971) 10,18,21

B. Statutory Authorities

Statute Reference
14 C.F.R. Part 157 13
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ei
28 U.S.C. § 1331 8
‘28 U.S.C. § 1343 8
42 U.S.C. § 1983 8
49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1301 2,14
49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1303 29
49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1304 3,11,14,29
49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1348 3,12,13,22
49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1350 $,i3
49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1508 6,11,13-14

U. S. Constitution,
Article VI. 1

Cc. Other Authorities

Authority Reference

H.R. 2360, U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 2,
pp. 3741-2 (1958) 12

H.R. Report No. 572, 69th
Cong. lst Sess., p. 10 ° 15

vi

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Fourth Circuit
(Appx. A, pp. A-1 to A-6) is unpublished.
The opinion and judgment of the United
State District Court for the District of
Maryland (App. B, pp. B-1 to B-15) are

published as Faux-Burhans v. Board of

County Commissioners, 674 F. Supp. 1172

(1987).

Jurisdiction

The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit entered its
opinion on September 9, 1988, and denied
Mr. Faux-Burhans' petition for reconsid-
eration on October 7, 1988. (App. C, pp.
C-1 to C=-2) This Honorable Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Statutory Provisions

U. S. Constitution, Article VI. Clause

2. Supreme law.

This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstand-

ing.

49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1301. Definitions.

a a

(5) “Aircraft” means any contrivance now
known or hereafter invented, used, or
designed for navigation of sr flight in
the air.
a a

(29) “Navigable airspace” means airspace
above the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations issued under

this Act,. and shall include airspace

needed to insure safety in takeoff and
landing of aircraft.

2.93.3

49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1304. Public right

of transit.

There is hereby recognized and declared
to exist in behalf of any citizen of the
United States a public right of freedom
of transit through the navigable airspace
of the United States.

Se 2 2 @

49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1348. Airspace

control and facilities.

(a) Use of airspace. The Administrator

is authorized and directed to develop
plans for and formulate policy with
respect to the use of the navigable
airspace; and assign by rule, regulation,
Or order the use of the navigable air-
space under such terms, conditions, and

limitations as he may deem necessary in

order to insure the safety of aircraft
and the efficient utilization of such
airspace. He may modify or revoke such
assignment when required in the public
interest.

e- 2.82. a

(c) Air traffic rules. The Administrator

is further authorized and directed to
prescribe air traffic rules and regula-
tions governing the flight of aircraft,
for the ‘navigation, protection, and.
identification of aircraft, for the
protection of persons and property on the
ground, and for the efficient utilization
of the navigable airspace, including
rules as to safe altitudes of flight and
rules for the prevention of collision
between aircraft, between aircraft and
land or water vehicles, and between

aircraft and airborne objects.

os @ 3

49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1350. Establishment

or construction of airports and landing

areas not involving expenditure of

Federal funds.

In order to assure conformity to plans
and policies for, and allocations of,
airspace by the Administrator under
section 307 of this Act [49 U.S.C.S. §
1348], no airport or landing area not
involving expenditure of Federal funds
shall be established, or constructed, or
any runway layout substantially altered
unless reasonable prior notice thereof is
given the Administrator, pursuant to
regulations prescribed by him, so that he
may advise as to the effects of such
construction on the use of airspace by

aircraft.

2 2

49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1508. Declaration of

national sovereignty in air space;

operation of foreign aircraft.

(a) The United States of America is
hereby declared to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sover-
eignty in the airspace of the United
States, including the airspace above all
inland waters and the airspace above
those portions of the adjacent marginal
high seas, bays, and lakes, over which by
international law or treaty or convention
the United States exercises national

jurisdiction.

Statement of the Case

Petitioner Amos D. Faux-Burhans'
airport is located on a 125 acre parcel
in a rural part of Frederick County,
Maryland. In 1977 Respondent Board of
County Commissioners of Frederick County

(referred to as "Frederick County")

enacted a zoning ordinance containing a
special exception for an “aircraft
landing and storage area” in agricultur-
ally zoned districts. This exception
restricted the user of a landing area to
its owner and two aircraft, required a
Minimum clear zone, limited the type of
aircraft that could use it, and prohibit-
ed use of the airfield for training or
instruction. (Appx. D, pp. D-l to D-2)

At the time Frederick County enacted
this ordinance, Mr. Faux-Burhans’ fa-
ther-in-law, Charles Rice, owned the 125
acre parcel. In 1980 Mr. Rice obtained
an exception for an aircraft landing and
storage area on the parcel and set up a
small airport. In 1983 Mr. Faux-Burhans
bought the property and further improved
the airport.

The FAA inspected the airport,

conducted an aeronautical study, and

granted Mr. Faux-Burhans approval for its
use. Noticing the improvements, county
inspectors warned Mr. Faux-Burhans that
the airport was governed by the local
zoning ordinance and that violations
could result ina civil penalty.

Mr. Faux-Burhans sued Frederick
County in federal district court for the
district of Maryland, invoking federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 &
1343. - Mr. Faux-Burhans sought a declara-
tion that the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended, preempts zoning re-
strictions on the use of navigable
airspace at his airport. He sought
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that the restrictions constitute action
under color of state law depriving him of
his right to freedom of transit through

navigable airspace.

The district court granted summary
judgment against Mr. Faux-Burhans, and
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed in an unpublished
decision. The Fourth Circuit's decision
did not attempt to distinguish its
holding from the many decisions by other
circuit courts and this Court ruling that
only the federal government may restrict

the use of navigable airspace.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1) The Fourth Circuit's
Holding That Federal Law Does
Not Preempt Zoning of Navigable
Airspace By a Local Government
Conflicts With Decisions by the
Courts of Appeals for’ the
Second, Ninth, and _ Eleventh
Circuits

The zoning provisions under chal-
lenge do not distinquish between
ground-based and flight activities at the
airport, such as landings and departures,

but restrict all uses. The district

court found that Frederick County's
zoning “regulates intensity of use (by
number of aircraft), the type of aircraft
that can use the facility (by takeoff
distance required), the clear zone at the
runway ends (by prohibiting building
thereon), . . . and the type of aircraft
operations (by prohibiting instructional
flights)." (App. B, pp. B=7 to B-=8).
These are all areas of aeronautical
‘regulation that other federal courts of
appeals have ruled are the exclusive
province of the federal government.

Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F. 2d

1006 (11th Cir. 1983); San Diego Unified

Port District v. Gianturco, 651 F. 2d

1306 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.

New Haven, 447 F. 2d 972 (2nd Cir. 1971),

on rem. 367 F. Supp. 1338 (D.C. Conn.,
1973), affirmed 496 F. 2d 452 (2d Cir.

1974) cert. den. & app. dism'd 419 U.S.

10

EE

958; Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City

of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (CD Calif.,

1970), affirmed 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.,

1972), affirmed 411 U.S. 624 (1973);

American Airlines, Inc. v. Hempstead, 272

F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), affirmed

398 F. 2d 369 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. den.

393 US 1017; Allegheny Airlines v.

Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F. 2d 812 (2d

Cir. 1956).

Congress has proclaimed that the
United ~ States government exercises
complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace of the United States. 49
U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1508(a). As part of the
exercise of this sovereignty, Congress
has guaranteed all citizens of the United
States a right of freedom of transit
through navigable airspace. 49 U.S.C.S.
Appx. § 1304. The term “navigable

airspace” is defined to include airspace

11

needed to insure safety in the departure
and landing of aircraft. 49 U.S.C.S.
Appx. § 1301(29).

The public right of freedom of
transit through such airspace is circum-
scribed only by the authority of the
federal government. 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. §
1348 confers on the FAA Administrator
plenary authority over the regulation and
management of all navigable airspace.
H.R. 2360, U.S. Code. Cong. & Admin.
News, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 2, Pp.
3741-2 (1958). |

Subsection 1348 (a) directs the
Administrator to develop plans for the
use of navigable airspace, and to assign
use of “navigable airspace subject to
appropriate conditions. Subsection
1348(c) orders the Administrator to pre-
scribe air traffic rules to govern the

flight of aircraft.

12

ened

The only government authority other
than the FAA Administrator that may exert
power over navigable airspace is the
military. Under subsection 1348(f), the
military may authorize deviation from the
Administrator's air rules when essential
to the defense of the United States
because of a military emergency.

In order to ensure conformity with
the Administrator's rules and allocations
of airspace under the ‘above provisions,
49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1350 requires prior
notice to the Administrator before any
airport such as that owned by Mr.
Faux-Burhans can be established. The
agency has implemented this requirement
in its regulations found at 14 C.F.R.
Part 157.

Size and form of ownership of
navigable airspace at airports does not

affect federal authority over it. 49

13

U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1508(a) states that the |
federal gévernment possesses and exercis- |
es “exclusive national sovereignty” over
all of the airspace of the United States,
not just regional airports serving major
airliners. And 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1304
declares a right of freedom of transit
through navigable airspace held by “any
citizen of the United States," not only
air carriers and users of passenger jets.
Indeed, the Federal Aviation Act defines
"aircraft" to mean "any contrivance now
known or hereafter invented, used, or
designed for navigation of or flight in
the air.” 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1301(5).
Federal preemption of navigable
airspace, originating with the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, applies to airspace
adjacent to private as well as public
airports. Legislative history of the Air

Commerce Act evidences Congress's intent °

14

ee

to impose a public right of transit
through navigable airspace “regardless of
the ownership of the adjacent or subja-
cent soil." H.R. Report No. 572, 69th
Cong. list Sess., p. 10.

The history of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 shows that Congress vested
"unquestionable authority for all aspects
of airspace management in the Administra-
tor of the new Agency [the Federal

Aviation Administration]." Lockheed Air

Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, supra,

318 F. Supp. at 921. As one court has
noted:

"It would be difficult to
visualize a more comprehensive
scheme of combined regulation,
subsidization and operational
participation than that which
the Congress has provided in
the field of aviation."
American Airlines, Inc. v. Town
Of Hempstead, supra, 272 F.
Supp. at 232.

Every federal court of appeals that

has examined the Federal Aviation Act and

15

OO

its predecessors has concluded that
Congress has preempted state and local
governments from using their police
powers to regulate aircraft use at local

airports. In Allegheny Airlines v.

Village of Cedarhurst, supra, 238 F. 2d

812, the Second Circuit ruled that a
local township's ordinance prohibiting
flight below 1000 feet over the village
was preempted by federal law. The court
rejected the argument that exclusive
federal sovereignty attaches only to
airspace above normal flight altitudes,
ruling that federal control also extends
to take-off and landing approaches at
airports. Id. at 815.

In American Airlines, Inc. Vv.

Hempstead, supra, 398 F. 2d 369, the

Second Circuit affirmed an injunction
against the enforcement of an airport

noise ordinance which would have diverted

16

SF 6 ee ee ee

aircraft from their normal approaches to
Kennedy Airport. The court ruled that
the local ordinance was preempted, since
compliance would conflict with federal
flight patterns.

Shortly after American Airlines, a

federal court in California struck down
an ordinance enacted by the City of

Burbank prohibiting nighttime takeoffs.

Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of

Burbank, supra, 318 F.. Supp. 914. After

carefully studying the legislative
history of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, the court concluded "that Congress
intended to centralize full and dominant
control of the navigable air space in the
Federal Government" and that Burbank's
curfew, enacted in a good faith effort to
control noise, was barred by the Commerce

Clause. Id. at 318 F. Supp. 925, 928.

17

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the pervasiveness
of federal regulation in air commerce,
the national interest, and the nature of
air commerce coalesce to the conclusion
that state and local regulation of air
commerce is preempted by federal law:

"In this case, we have
found the conclusion of federal
preemption ‘unavoidable. '
Furthermore, the Federal
Aviation Act also _ contains
language of exclusivity. 49
.U.S.C.S. § 1508 declares that
the United States possesses and
exercises ‘complete and exclu-
sive- national sovereignty in
the airspace of the United
States ....-*° That is the
same type of expression which
the Supreme Court found in the
Federal Tobacco Inspection Act
to evidence Congressional
intent to establish a wholly
federal system which States
were powerless even to supple-
ment. Campbell v. Hussey, 368
0.8. <d@at, Ge 8.CG. Say, 7
L.Ed.2d 299 (1961)."

Id. at 457 F.2d 675.

In United States v. New Haven,

supra, 447 F. 2d 972, East Haven had sued

18

New Haven in Connecticut state court
alleging New Haven had acquired land for
its clear zone at the Tweed New Haven
Airport illegally under state law. The
state court agreed and issued an injunc-
tion forbidding flights over the disputed
clear zone. This decision was upheld by
the Connecticut Supreme Court.

The United States sued in federal
district court to reopen the runway and
to enjoin enforcement of the state ‘court
injunction. The federal court issued a-
preliminary injunction against the state
court order, and the Second Circuit
affirmed, ruling that the federal govern-
ment alone has the authority to restrict
use of navigable airspace, including
airspace needed for landing and departure
at local airports. Id. at 447 F. 2d 973.

On remand, the district court issued

a permanent injunction against the state

19

court order.

affirmed, stating:

"It is quite evident, as
Chief Judge Blumenfield found,
that the airspace above the
East Haven land acquired by New
Haven is within the meaning of
‘clear zone' as defined by 14
C.F¥.R. 151.90). The clear
zones, as part of the navigable
airspace, are subject to
federal regulations, and the
orders of the Connecticut
courts infringed upon the
federal power.

* * * *

"State legislation opur-
porting to deny access to
navigable air space would
therefore constitute a forbid-
den exercise of the power which
the federal government has
asserted, ' 447 F. 2d 972 at
973.

Thus, East Haven cannot enforce
its rights under Connecticut
law by obtaining a state court
injunction which infringes on
federal regulation of navigable
airspace."

Id. 496 F. 2d at 454.

The Ninth Circuit has rejected an
argument that the State of California

could circumvent the holdings in Burbank

Again the Second Circuit

20

and City of New Haven by claiming that it

was acting as “airport proprietor” of an
airport owned by a local port authority
when it enacted curfew limitations. San

Diego United Port District v. Gianturco,

651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir., 1981). More
recently, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
federal law preempted a municipality's
attempt to regulate an airport leased to

a private operator. Pirolo v. City of

Clearwater, 711 F. 2d 1006 (11th Cir.

1983).

The local concerns in the above
cases, often affecting urban populations
of millions, were certainly as great as
Frederick County's interest in restrict-
ing flight activities at airports operat-
ing in farmlands and industrial dis-
tricts. But the Federal Aviation Act

preempts any local regulation that

21

ca |

intrudes into the exclusive federal
domain of navigable airspace.

The Fourth Circuit has not
explained why it has disregarded the
teachings of the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits in this case. For this
reason alone, writ of certiorari is

justified.

2) The Court of Appeals i
Has Decided an Important
Federal Question In Conflict
with Applicable Decisions of |

This Honorable Court
The Frederick County ordinance has
the purpose and effect of restricting use
of navigable airspace at local airports
by ‘number or aircraft, aircraft owner-
ship, aircraft performance parameters,
and purpose of flight (non-training
only). These are exactly the type of
restrictions Congress has empowered only

the FAA Administrator to impose. 49

U.S.C.S. § 1348. But the Fourth &

22

Circuit's ruling grants to local zoning

authorities concurrent power to regulate
navigable airspace. This unprecedented
ruling contradicts relevant holdings of
this Honorable Court.

In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,

322 U.S. 292 (1944), Justice Jackson
stated:

"Air as an element in which to
navigate is even more inevita-
bly federalized by the commerce
clause than is navigable water.
Local exactions and barriers to
free transit in the air would
neutralize its indifference to
space and its conquest of’ time.

Congress has recognized
the national responsibility for
regulating air commerce.
Federal control is intensive
and exclusive. Planes do not
wander about in the sky like
vagrant clouds. They move only
by federal permission, subject
to federal inspection, in the
hands of federally certified
personnel and under an intri-
cate system of federal com-
mands. The moment a ship taxis
onto a runway it is caught up
in an elaborate and detailed
system of controls. It takes
off only by instructions from

23

ey

the control tower, it travels
on prescribed beams, it may be
diverted from its intended
landing, and it obeys signals
and orders. Its privileges

rights, and protection, so far
as transit 1s concerned, it

owes to the Federal Government .
alone and not to any _ state

government." [Underscoring

added. }

Id., 322 U.S. at 303.

The impact of Congress's deliberate
decision to create a "public easement" in
navigable airspace was the basis for a
Supreme Court decision finding the
federal government liable in an inverse

condemnation action brought’ by the

neighbor of an airport. United States v.

Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The airport
neighbor claimed loss of property value
in his 2.8 -acre residence and chicken
farm due to the landing and taking off of
military aircraft directly over his
property. The Court said:

"It is ancient doctrine

that at common law ownership of a)
the land extended to the

24

periphery of the universe -

Cujus est solum ejus est usque
ad coelum. But that Tectrine

has no place in the modern
world. The air is a public
highway, as Congress has
declared. Were that not true,
every transcontinental flight
would subject the operator to

countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the
idea. To recognize such

private claims to the airspace
would clog these highways,
seriously interfere with their
control and development in the
public interest, and transfer
into private ownership that to
which only the public has a
just claim."

Id. 328 U.S. at 260-261.

More recently in Burbank v. Lockheed

Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973), this

Honorable Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's determination that Burbank's
ordinance prohibiting landings and
departures at night was preempted by
federal law. The United States, not a
party to the prior proceedings, filed a

brief arguing against preemption of local

noise ordinances. The Court responded:

25

"The Solicitor General,
though arguing against pre-emp-
tion, concedes that as respects
‘airspace management’ there is
pre-emption. That, however, is
a fatal concession, for as the
District Court found: ‘The
imposition of curfew ordinances
on a nationwide basis would
result in a bunching of flights
in those hours immediately
preceding the curfew. This
bunching of flights during
those hours would have the
twofold effect of increasing an
already serious congestion
problem and actually increas-
ing, rather than relieving, the
noise problem by increasing
flights in the period of
greatest ‘annoyance in the
surrounding communities. Such

'a result is totally inconsis-
tent with the objectives of the
the federal statutory and
regulatory scheme.'”

Id. at 627-628.

The balance of this Court's decision

in Burbank was devoted to an analysis of

the impact of the Noise Control Act of
1972 on local governments’ power to
regulate aircraft noise at airports.
Based on its study of legislative histo-

ry, the Court concluded that Congress did

26

- a

not intend to disrupt the earlier case
rulings upholding absolute federal
control over airport and aircraft noise.
Id. at 635-637. The Noise Control Act
was designed to address the very serious
problem of aircraft noise at the federal
level, and the Court refused to ascribe
any intention to open the door to regula-
tion by local governments:

"We are not at liberty to

diffuse the powers given by

Congress to FAA and EPA by

letting the States or Munici-

palities in on the planning.

If that change is to be made,

Congress alone must do it.”

Id. at 640.

As this Court has declared, the air
is a public highway. Airports approved
by the FAA, whether private or public,
are the citizens’ egress and ingress to
that highway. And only the FAA may

impose restrictions on airspace at such

airports.

27

3) The Court of Appeals

Has Decided An Important

Question of Federal Law In a

Way That Could Lead to Disaster

in the Skies and Frustration of

Congressional Purpose

The consequence of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ unprecedented
decision to permit local regulation over
navigable airspace could lead to an
explosion of local regulations on naviga-
ble airspace at airstrips and airports
throughout the Fourth Circuit. Each
state, county, and municipality will be
free to legislate its own airspace
regulations whenever the local government
decides that the FAA rules are not as
restrictive as it likes. Pilots will
have to check with local governments to
ensure compliance with such local regula-
tions whenever they land.

Unchecked regulation of navigable

airspace by diverse authorities will lead

to the "imminent possibility of

28

me

collision”. See Schneideman v. ANR

Pipeline Company, 56 USLW 4249, 4254

(March 22, 1988) (Such “imminent possi-
bility of collision” between federal and
state regulation is evidence of federal
government's complete occupation of regu-
lated field). And this “collision” of
law could lead to real collisions in the
air as pilots grapple with conflicting
air control authorities.

Such chaos will frustrate the
federal goal of uniform control and
regulation over navigable airspace, and
impair the public's right of access to
navigable airspace. 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. §§
1303, 1304.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, it is
respectfully submitted that this petition
for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

29

AUL VICTOR JORGENSEN
Counsel of Recon’ for
Petitioner
215 West Main ae
Post Office Box 850
Middletown, Maryland
21769
(301) 293-2212

30

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 88-3929

Amos D. Faux-Burhans,
Appellant,

versus

Board of County Commissioners of
Frederick County,
Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, at
Baltimore. Frederick N. Smalkin, United ©
States District Judge. (CA-87-2556-S)

Argued: July 7, 1988
Decided: September 9, 1988

Before WINTER, Chief Judge, and MURNAGHAN
and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges

Paul Victor Jorgensen (Leland Ronald
Jorgensen on brief) for Appellant.
Lawrence Edward Speelman (Joseph E.
Emerson on brief) for Appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Amos Faux-Burhans appeals the
judgment of the district court granting
summary judgment against him on his two
federal claims and dismissing his pendent
state action. In his action against the
County Commissioners of Frederick County,
Faux-Burhans demanded a declaratory
judgment and injunction against the
enforcement of a county zoning ordinance
preventing certain activities at his
private airstrip in the county. Alleging
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he also
demanded damages. We affirm.

Faux-Burhans' airport is located on
his 125 acre property in a rural part of
Frederick County, Maryland. At the time
of the passage of the zoning ordinance in
1977, Faux-Burhans' father-in-law,
Charles Rice, owned the property. In

1980 Rice obtained an exception to the

ordinance for an “aircraft landing and
storage area." Rice and Faux-Burhans
erected a hangar after which Faux-Burhans
inspected and repaired airplanes on the
property on a part-time basis. In 1983
Faux-Burhans bought the property and made
improvements on the airstrip. In 1985
County inspectors, noticing the improve-
ments, warned him that he was governed by
the local zoning ordinance and that
violations would result in 4 ees.
satatée. |

The ordinance imposes the following
restrictions on airports such as the one
owned and operated by Faux-Burhans:

(a) Minimum Size: Twenty-five
(25) acres.

(b) Principal User: Owner of
parcel.

(c) Intensity of Use: No more
than two (2) aircraft may use
the airfield or storage area.

(d) Aircraft: Limited to
those which at ninety-five

(95) degrees Fahrenheit
require a maximum of one
thousand eight hundred

(1,800) feet oor less of
runway surface as recommended
by the specific aircraft
manufacturer.

(e) Clear Zone: Must_ be
provided at both approach and
departure end of runway.

Such zone shall be a
symmetrical trapezoid with a
length of one thousand

(1,000) feet and with the
parallel sides being’ one
hundred seventy-six (176)
feet (adjacent to end of
runway) and three hundred
seventeen (317) feet
respectively.

No structures are permitted
within the clear zone. The
clear zone must be under the
ownership of the airfield
owne:s.

(f) Area of Operation: No
operation will be permitted
within one hundred (100) feet
of a property line, or one
thousand (1,000) feet of any
public or private institution
devoted to education or human
care.

(g) Use Limited: The airfield
will not be for the use of
instruction or training.

PAA Tine EW A

Frederick County Zoning
Ordinance § 1-19-381 (1977).

Faux-Burhans asserts that the
limitations imposed by the ordinance in
effect prohibited: regular use by his
neighbor for commuting to work in
Pennsylvania; frequent use for aircraft
inspection and repair; restoration and
collection of vintage aircraft; use by
high performance aircraft; instruction in
airplane repair and maintenance; and
storage of airplanes. He attempted to
obtain a public airport exception from
the County, but his request was denied.

During the course of construction at
the airport and his attempts to obtain
County approval, Faux-Burhans’ sought
Federal Aviation Administration and state
approval for the operation of his air-
port. Both the FAA and the state agency
inspected and contingently approved the

site. The FAA conducted an aeronautical

study and required him to reach a flight
plan agreement with a neighboring air-
port.

Faux-Burhans has not, however,
identified any federal statute or
regulation explicitly or implicitly
sciiiehion the regulations imposed by the
county ordinance involved here nor has he
demonstrated any actual conflict between
federal statutes or regulations and
county requirements. The district court,
ina well-reasoned opinion, reached this
conclusion and also held that
Faux-Burhans had presented no cognizable
Claim under § 1983. It also dismissed
his pendent cause of action.

Agreeing with the reasoning of the
district court, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

a = rete ah shat he

Dieta tsct Bas

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Civil No. S 87-2556

AMOS DENSLOW FAUX-BURHANS
Vv.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FREDERICK COUNTY

Paul Victor Jorgensen, Esq., Middletown,
Maryland, for plaintiff.

Lawrence E. Speelman, County Attorney,
and Joseph E. Emerson, Deputy County
Attorney, Frederick, Maryland, for
defendant. ;

Smalkin, District Judge.

Filed: December 17, 1987

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a case within the federal
question and civil rights enforcement
jurisdictions of this Court, 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1343, in which the plaintiff,

owner-operator of a small private

airfield in Frederick County, Maryland,
challenges the County's zoning restric-
tions on private airfield operations as
set forth in § 1-19-381 of the Frederick
County Zoning Ordinance. The challenge
is based on three grounds. First,
plaintiff claims that the County Zoning
Ordinance, insofar as it attempts to
regulate his airfield, is pre-empted by
federal law. (Plaintiff's complaint does
not identify the allegedly pre-empting
statute(s), but his summary judgment
opposition does.) Second, plaintiff
claims that application of the County
Zoning Ordinance to him constitutes state
action which has deprived him of federal
rights, giving him a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for “devaluation of his
property, loss of investments, lost past
and future income, and emotional distress

and mental anguish." Third, and finally,

a

plaintiff asserts a state-law based
claim, viz., that the Frederick County
Zoning Ordinance's regulation of private
airports is pre-empted by Maryland state
law (Md. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 5-601 -
5-617 (1977)). The defendant has moved
for summary judgment and has supplemented
its motion as directed by the Court, and
the plaintiff has filed a consolidated
response. No oral hearing is necessary.
Local Rule 6, D. Md.

The facts alleged in the plaintiff's
complaint are entirely uncontested. In
1980, a special exception was granted to
plaintiff's father-in-law to operate,
within an agricultural zone, a private
airfield in accordance with the the
restrictions on use and operation of such
airfields as set forth in the Frederick
County Zoning Ordinance, at § 1-19-381

(1977). (These restrictions are

discussed post in some detail.) [In 1983,
plaintiff's father-in-law conveyed the
airport parcel of his property to plain-
tiff, a federally licensed aircraft
mechanic and inspector. Even before this
conveyance, plaintiff had been using the
field (on which he had erected a hangar)
as a facility to inspect and repair
general aviation (private) aircraft.
After the conveyance, plaintiff paved the
runway and improved the _ hangar. He
registered the facility as a private
airport with both the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Maryland State
Aviation Administration. When he was
informed in 1985 by Frederick County
authorities that his use of the improved
facility was still subject to the re-
strictions of § 1-19=-381, he applied for,
but was denied, a public airport special

exception (which would have allowed

greater use of the field than permitted
under § 1-19-381). He also proposed an
amendment to the County Zoning Ordinance,
which was rejected. The plaintiff was,
however, allowed to continue operating in
accordance with the 1980 special excep-
tion, permitting use of the field as a
private airport in conformity with the
restrictions of § 1-19-381. This suit
. followed the denial of che public airport
special exception. It does not challenge
that denial, but, instead, ‘a ‘aimed
directly at the use restrictions imposed
on private fields by § 1-19-381.

The Court first addresses’ the
federal pre-emption issue. Pre-emption
of state and local regulation of a
particular subject matter by
Congressional enactment is a well-known,

but infrequently encountered, phenomenon

of American constitutional law, with

ancient (at least by American standards)

origins. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens,

53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852). It poses
entirely a question of federal statutory .
construction, depending for its
application in a particular case upon
ascertainment of the intent of Congress
to enact a pervasive scheme of regulation

of the subject matter. City of Burbank

v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.

624, 633 (1973). In the City of Burbank

case, the Supreme Court found federal
pre-emption of local regulation of
aircraft noise emissions at airports by
federal statute, viz., the Federal

Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as

amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972,
86 Stat. 1234, and the regulations |
promulgated pursuant thereto in 14

C.F.R., pts. 71, 73, 75, 77, 91, 93, 95

SEE

and 97. In City of Burbank and cases

that have followed it, e.g., Pirolo v.

B-6

————————————

City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006 (11th

Cir. 1983), the local noise regulations
in question clearly infringed upon the
federally pre-empted regulation of
navigable airspace, by directly affecting
the manner in which, and the type of
aircraft by which, flight operations were
to be conducted from airports that were
otherwise open to air traffic in general.

In the instant case, plaintiff can
point to no federal statute or regulation
explicitly or implicitly pre-eaptine the
broad areas of regulation of the size,
scope, and manner of operations at a
private airport such as his. The ordi-
nance in question does not regulate noise
emissions or the actual conduct of flight
operations within navigable airspace.
Rather, the Frederick County zoning law

regulates intensity of use (by number of

aircraft), the type of aircraft that can

use the facility (by take-off distance
required), the clear zone at the runway
ends (by prohibiting building thereon),
the locale of operation (by set-back *
requirements), and the type of aircraft
operations (by prohibiting instructional
flights.) Certainly, these are all areas
of valid local regulatory concern, none
of which is federally pre-empted, and
none of which inhibits in a proscribed
fashion the free transit of navigable
airspace. And, just as certainly, no
federal law gives a citizen the right to
operate an airport free of local zoning

control.

Nothing in City of Burbank itself

requires a finding of federal pre-emption
in this case, in view of its limited
holding (extending only to regulation of
noise emissions by operating aircraft).

Indeed, the legislative history quoted in

B-8

teres

(now Chief) Justice Rehnquist's dissent-
ing opinion shows an intent by Congress
not to restrict "the authority of units
of local government . . . through the
exercise of land use planning and zoning
powers." 411 U.S. at 650. The plaintiff

can point to no case law extending the

pre-emption holding of City of Burbank to
the lengths he now would seek to stretch
it, and this Court holds that the ordi-
nance in question is not federally
pre-enipted.

Plaintiff's second set of claims,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is likewise
meritless. First, to the extent that a
claim is attempted to be asserted for an
unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's
property without just compensation, the
Court simply notes that, under the 1987

trilogy of land use cases decided by the

Supreme Court, plaintiff has no claim.

He has not been deprived of "all use” of
his property, because he continues to
operate it (although not on the larger
scale he would like) under and in
conformity with the special exception
granted his father-in-law in 1980. First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.

County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 1378

(1987). There has also been no taking in
the sense of a non-consensual acquisitian
of public rights in, - imposition of a
public easement upon, plaintiff's private
property, given the County's legitimate,
substantial interest in regulating the
land used for airports, an interest that
implicates safety and land-use (develop-
mental) considerations far transcending
the questions of noise and airspace
regulation that may be beyond County
control. Certainly, the County has a

legitimate, substantial interest (which

was referred to in the plaintiff's zoning
cases) in planning the future development
of the presently agricultural area
surrounding plaintiff's property, and it
may properly decide that the Zoning
Ordinance's use restrictions on private
airfields promote the overall development
scheme of the County. Thus, there has
been no constitutional taking of plain-

tiff's property. Nollan v. California

Coastal Com., 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987);

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass. w.

DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). To

the extent that plaintiff argues depriva-
tion of a federal right to free transit
of airspace, the argument fails (in the
context of the challenged Ordinance) for
reasons discussed ante in connection with
his pre-emption claim. Even if this
right were infringed because of pre-emp-

tion, a concept flowing from the

Constitution's supremacy clause, there is
no right of action recognized under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the

supremacy clause. Chapman v. Houston

Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).

For the reasons stated, then, summary
judgment will be entered for defendants
on plaintiff's first two causes of
action.

Finally, because plaintiff's federal
claims are patently. meritless, it is
appropriate to dismiss his third, pendent
state-law based cause of action. United

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715

(1966).
There is no need to discuss the res

judicata argument raised by defendant.

For the reasons stated, an order
will be entered separately, granting
summary judgment for defendant, against

plaintiff, on the plaintiff's first two

causes of action, and dismissing his
third cause of action for want of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h) (3).

/s/
Frederic N. Smalkin
United States
District Judge

B-13

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Civil No. S 87-2556

AMOS DENSLOW FAUX-BURHANS

Vv.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FREDERICK COUNTY

Order and Judgment

Filed: December 17, 1987

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

For the reasons stated in the
foregoing Memorandum Opinion, IT IS this
17th day of December, 1987, by the United
States District coaet for the District of
Maryland, ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

l. That defendant's motion for
summary judgment BE, and the same hereby
IS, GRANTED, on the plaintiff's first two

causes of action;

B-14

2. That judgment BE, and the same
hereby IS, entered in favor of defendant,
against plaintiff, on plaintiff's first
two causes of action;

3. That plaintiff's third cause of
action BE, and the same hereby TIS,
DISMISSED for want of federal subject
matter jurisdiction; and

4. That the Clerk mail a copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and of
this Order and Judgment to counsel for

the parties.

/s/
Frederic N. Smalkin
United States
District Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 88-3929

Amos D. Faux-Burhans,
Appellant,

Vv.
Board of County Commissioners of

Frederick County,
Appellee.

On Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion
for Rehearing In Banc.

The appellant's petition for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in
banc were submitted to this Court. As no
member of this Court or the panel
requested a poll on the suggestion for
rehearing in banc, and

As the panel considered the petition
for rehearing and is of the opinion that

it should be denied,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for

rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in
banc are denied.

Entered at the direction of Judge
Sprouse, with the concurrence of Chief
Judge Winter and Judge Murnaghan.

For the Court

/s/John M. Greacen
CLERK

APPENDIX D

Frederick County Zoning Ordinance Section
1-19-381. Aircraft landing and storage
areas in A, LI and GI districts.

(a) Minimum - Size: Twenty-five (25)
acres.

(b) Principal User: Owner of parcel.

(c) Intensity of Use: No more than two
(2) aircraft may use the airfield or
storage area.

(d) Aircraft: Limited to those which at
ninety-five (95) degrees Fahrenheit
require a maximum of one thousand eight
hundred (1,800) feet or less of runway
surface as recommended by the specific
aircraft manufacturer. ~—

(e) Clear Zone: Must be provided at both
approach and departure end of runway.
Such zone shall be a symmetrical
trapezoid with a length of one thousand
(1,000) feet and with the parallel sides
being one hundred seventy-six (176) feet
(adjacent to end of runway) and three
hundred seventeen (317) feet
respectively.

No structures are permitted within the
clear zone. The clear zone must be under
the ownership of the airfield owner.

(f) Area of Operation: No operation will
be permitted within one hundred (100)
feet of a property line, or one thousand
(1,000) feet of any public or private
institution devoted to education or human
care.

(g) Use Limited: The airfield will not
be for the use of instruction oor
training.

(Ord. No. 77-11-78, § 40-72(A=-5), 1-24-77)

Certificate of Service

I CERTIFY that on this Second day of
December, 1988, I served three copies of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari by first class United States
mail, postage prepaid, on Lawrence E.
Speelman, County Attorney, Winchester
Hall, 12 East Church Street, Frederick,
Maryland 21701 in accordance with

Supreme Court Rule 28.3.

Counsel of Ré
Petitioner / a

215 West Magh Street
Post Office Box 850
Middletown, Maryland

21769
(301) 293-2212

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0519%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
