# Opposition Brief — World Color Press, Inc. v. Dole

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 489 U.S. 1011

## Text

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

WORLD COLOR PRESS, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.

ANN MCLAUGHLIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND GRAPHIC
COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 554

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

GEORGE R. SALEM
Solicitor of Labor
ALLEN H. FELDMAN
Associate Solicitor
MARY-HELEN MAUTNER
Counsel for Appellate Litigation i
JEFFREY A. HENNEMUTH
Altorney

Depariment of Labor
Washington, D.C. 20210

QUESTION PRESENTED

In this case, the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission overruled its earlier decision allowing the
Secretary of Labor, in citation enforcement proceedings
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, to use
non-federal experts to conduct discovery inspections of
the cited employer’s workplace, subject to a comprehen-
sive administrative protective order that guards against
improper disclosure of employer trade secrets. The ques-
tion presented is whether the Commission’s action was
properly set aside by the court below for failure to provide
an adequate explanation for overruling that prior
decision.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SII oS 0 vo th S04 Caw OS coe esas aes ease eee oa
aR Ci Pa. s tea eWha bere hr CReCa tii oat banat e
ee et Wt ae eae ak da tka Aen RE CCR EER OME S
Ea Ua wet h 6 te ky a ks KRU NOs CAT ORS eee kee eae
PEP Py ee EEE COOLER Ty eer
DM Uis chakae cheneaeeade ee bee aake CEE Cee Et L ecu

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1147, [1979]
ee es os we ccpkcwausas
American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1947, [1979]
Fe. GROG. Cae DT BOO on nc cw pescscsccucess ,
Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d
I ew a al oe anak une né das 6 San
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948)... 0.00...
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S.
SR EEN ay pp oer ag! ba. 9g re ape ae
Emerson Elec. Co., Upland Indus. Div., 7 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1454, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,640 .....
Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340
SUE cutd dessa scdeecskod cekeauketedcarten secede
Fred’s Frozen Foods, Inc., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1271,
tog, pee 2 Re eo & F e
Hercules, Inc. v. NLRB, 833 F.2d 426 (2d Cir 1987).....
Aaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
1486, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,662 ...........
Kama Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1056, [1979] O.S.H.
i ee sa waudee es
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) .........
Maxwell Wirebound Box Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1995,
[ideas ©.3.88. Dec. GOCH F 26758 oi. cc vce eens
Metal Container Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1202,
toe Cie Re ee ee |
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979)... 22...
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Se. a Se EG ED 6 dco ob eo kk ccs bb cunees

(III)

IV

Cases — Continued: Page
National Mfg. Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1435, [1980]
obs @ Rew LPS rrr rrr 7

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. OSHRC,
671 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905

ST Jc ses calcu ceeeahenuKd hha Weed SORE ewe eke y
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2162, [1978]

ok § os Le Sera ner 3, 6
Raiston Purina Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1201, [1979]

Ce es ee I fs bocce a nccuakvceawae de 7
Reynolds Metals Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1496, [1980]

att RR eb op Pp ! : Se rere 7
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) ...... 10
United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165

SE dca aa kare oe ka ae on ea ome ee 12
United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.

PCN tn uie 1c uh daca beak chat eRe hae ae 7
Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,

SP ee EE ecko ce lee hcun bak ewan anes 11
World Color Press, Inc., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1084,

[1977-1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¢ 22,358 .......... 4

Statutes, regulations and rule:

Administrative Procedure Act, § U.S.C. 551 ef seq.:
rr Le tae Oly cee ae kup ake ees es 7)
Pee EE ok cee bac vasveschs be akucde 9
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
651 ef seq.:

§ Sadi). 29 U.S.C. GS44aMl) .............. - 2
e Jk A ot Bee Peers y
§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. 659%(c) ..... epee re non’ y
§ 11(cM2), 29 U.S.C. 660(cy2) ........... 1]
Bee pik tl eee are )
§ 12(i), 29 U.S.C. 661i)... ... es 11
Bie. 2p ty |) ee AP 11
eee. 2 RY eee” Se 5,9, 10, 11
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905 2
29 C.F.R.:
Section 2200.2(b) ......... y

Section 2200. 11(f) ..... ve 8, 10

cara r

ete ee ee eee ee eee ee

-

V

Regulations and rule — Continued:

ie SR occ cg a a nak oe Oo Ba dene e A
Ractind SE SEED occ ccvascasctasswssesaeun¥.
Riis SN. os ud eae ss hae Rea bbe eae aeen

en AG a Re Se | een reraretr re. rate pw are eee

Miscellaneous:
116 Cong. Rec. 38,708 (1970) ........--- 6. eee ee eee

51 Fed. Reg. (1986):
ST | EAR ere ee eters eee errr
pp. 32,009-32,010 . 22... e eee c cece ccc e er erenes
Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) ..........-..

8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
CO, ieeecan Dene Seek eee eee were core

’

Page

ty 6 (OO

ee er AS

§Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-778

WorRLD COLOR PREsS, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.

ANN MCLAUGHLIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND GRAPHIC
COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 554

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-A12)
is reported at 843 F.2d 1490. The decision of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, dated
September 3, 1986 (Pet. App. Al2-A25), is reported at 12
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2143 and [1986-1987] O.S.H. Dec.
(CCH) § 27,697.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
April 15, 1988. A petition for rehearing was denied on
June 23, 1988 (Pet. App. A26-A28). The petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed on September 21, 1988. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).

(1)

ys

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner’s Salem-Gravure Division operates a
printing facility in Salem, Illinois. In May 1983, the Secre-
tary of Labor (the Secretary) issued a citation charging
Salem-Gravure with a serious violation of the “general du-
ty” clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1).' The citation al-
leged that employees in the bindery department were ex-
posed to the hazard of “undue repetitive motion trauma”
when required to feed the binding machines using repeated
hand and wrist movements. Petitioner contested the cita-
tion and the matter was docketed with the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission)
for adjudication. Pet. App. A4.

During pre-hearing discovery, the Secretary sought to
have a private consultant inspect the machinery and work
procedures in the employer’s bindery. The consultant, an
ergonomics expert and mechanical engineer, needed to
observe the workplace firsthand in order to evaluate the
feasibility of abating the cited hazard. Petitioner opposed
the discovery request on the ground that a non-federal ex-
pert posed a significantly greater risk of trade secret dis-
closure than a tederal employee, who is subject to,criminal
sanctions under the Trade Secrets Act.? The Secretary then
moved the Commission’s administrative law judge (ALJ)

The “general duty” clause of the OSH Act requires an employer to
turnish employees “employment and a place of employment * * * free
trom recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to [its] employees * * *.” 29 U.S.C.
654(a)(1).

> The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905, prescribes fines and/or
unprisonment and removal trom office for federal emplovees who,
without legal authorization, divulge trade secrets and other conti-

denual information obtained by them in the course of their duties.

for an order compelling discovery. Pet. App. A4-AS,
Al4-A15; App., infra, la.?

After a hearing, the ALJ found that legitimate trade
secrets existed in the bindery department, and ordered that
the inspection be carried out subject to a protective order
including the precautionary measures required by the
Commission in Owens-Illinois, Inc., 6O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
2162, [1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,218 (Pet. App. AS;
App. infra, 3a, 11a). Chief among the measures the ALJ
required were (1) a non-disclosure agreement between the
Secretary and the consultant that makes the employer a
third-party beneficiary of the agreement with the right to
recover damages in the event of a breach; and (2) a require-
ment that the expert surrender all notes and photographs
from the inspection to the Secretary’s counsel (Pet. App.
A5, AlS-A16; App., infra, 4a, lla).4 The ALJ found no
Statutory basis for a categorical exclusion of outside experts
and held that the Secretary’s need for the consultant’s serv-
ices outweighed the employer’s “speculative” fear of trade
secret disclosure (App., infra, 9a-10a).° Petitioner sought

3 Petitioner’s appendix omits the decision of the administrative law
judge concerning the Secretary’s discovery request. We have therefore
reproduced that decision in an appendix to this brief.

+ The other precautions required by the ALJ under the ees
Illinois decision included: (1) affording the employer an opportunity to
examine the expert’s resume for any past or present affiliation with the
employer’s competitors; (2) requiring the expert to sign and comply with
a written non-disclosure oath; and (3) framing the protective order in
broad enough terms to include within its coverage the Secretary and her
representatives, and to indicate that sanctions for a violation of the
order apply to anyone acting on the Secretary’s behalf (App. infra, 4a).
See Owens-Illinois, Inc., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2165, 2167-2168,
[1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,218, at 28,071, 28,072-28,073.

* The ALJ also rejected petitioner’s argument that the Secretary is
barred by collateral estoppel trom relitigating the issue of whether an

4

and the Commission granted interlocutory review of this
ruling (Pet. App. AS, Al6).

2. The Commission vacated the ALJ’s order and
remanded with directions to stay the proceedings to enable
the Secretary to apply to a federal district court for a
search warrant or “other appropriate order” authorizing
the inspection of the Salem-Gravure bindery and contain-
ing non-disclosure provisions applicable to the outside ex-
pert (Pet. App. A23-A25). In the Commission’s view, its
authority to enforce protective orders was insufficient to
deter violations of those orders by outside experts, and the
contractual remedies available to an aggrieved trade secret
owner under an Owens-/ilinois protective order were in-
adequate as compared with the “swift and sure” contempt
sanctions that a court could impose (id. at A21-A23). The
Commission accordingly overruled the Owens-Illinois
decision to the extent that the decision upheld the use of
administrative protective orders in this context (id. at
A21-A22).* However, to “strike a balance” between the
competing interests of the Secretary and the employer, the
Commission provided that the Secretary could use an out-
side expert if a search warrant or similar order of a federal
district court authorized the entry with appropriate pre-
cautions (id. at A23).

outside expert can be used to conduct a discovery inspection of its
premises by virtue of an earlier ruling in World Color Press, Inc., 6
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1084, [1977-1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 22,358,
affirming an ALJ's order limiting the Secretary to using federal
employees in conducting discovery in a facility operated by another of
petitioner's divisions (App., infra, 6a-8a).

* The Commission emphasized that collateral estoppel (see note 5,
supra) played no part in its decision. (Pet. App. A22 n.7). Tae Com-
mission Observed that a prior decision rendered erroneous by an in-
tervening change in the law cannot form the basis for applying col-
lateral estoppel, in a subsequent action, against a party to that earlier
case (bid.).

Upon remand to the ALJ, the Secretary declined to seek

judicial authorization for the discovery request and, thus
lacking the necessary expert testimony, elected not to pro-
ceed to a hearing on the citation (Pet. App. A6). As a
result, the ALJ granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
case (ibid.). The Secretary then sought appellate review of
this final Commission decision (ibid.).
- 3. The court of appeals reversed the Commission’s rul-
ing on the discovery issue as arbitrary and capricious, and
vacated its dismissal of the citation enforcement case (Pet.
App. A4, All-A12). The court held that the Commission
had failed to supply a reasoned explanation for departing
from Owens-Illinois and had improperly relied, without
supporting evidence, on a presumed inability to impose
meaningful sanctions against private consultants and a
belief that confidentiality agreements are ineffective (id. at
A10-A11).’ The court further observed that the Commis-
sion’s decision “interposes courts to perform a duty Con-
gress expressly empowered the Secretary and the Commis-
sion to perform, namely ‘issu{ing] such orders as may be
appropriate to protect the contidentiality of trade
secrets’ ” (id. at A9-A10 n.3, citing 29 U.S.C. 664). The
court concluded that Congress did not envision a Commis-
sion with such limited powers as to require “repeated
federal [court] interventions” at the discovery stage of ad-
ministrative proceedings (id. at Al2).

’ As a threshold matter, the court of appeals agreed with the Com-
mission that because Owens-I//linois had changed the governing law,
the Secretary was not precluded by the earlier World Color Press deci-
sion from seeking to use an outside consultant in discovery pro-
ceedings in this case (Pet. App. A8-A9).

6

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other
court of appeals. Accordingly, further review is not war-
ranted.

1. The court of appeals correctly rejected the Commis-
sion’s attempt to overturn its earlier decision allowing
discovery inspections by non-federal experts. In Owens-
Illinois, the Commission thoroughly evaluated the com-
peting interests of employers in their trade secrets and of
the Secretary in achieving swift and effective abatement of
workplace hazards, and it took into account its unsatis-
factory experience under prior Commission rulings that
barred the use of outside experts in workplace inspections
(6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2165-2167, [1978] O.S.H. Dec.
(CCH) § 23,218, at 28,071-28,072). In holding that
employer trade secrets could be protected most ap-
propriately in discovery entries by non-federal experts
through administrative protective orders, the Commission
struck a balance that would “avoid imposing * * * ex-
cessive constraints on the Secretary’s prosecution of cases
While at the same time adequately protecting employers’
legitimate interests in preserving the confidentiality of
their trade secrets” (6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2166, [!978]
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) € 23,218, at 28,071). The Commis-
sion’s Owens-Illinois decision thus overruled past deci-
sions (including one involving another division of World
Color Press, see note 5, supra), that generally limited the
Secretary to using federal employees in conducting dis-
covery inspections where trade secrets could be found.

During the eight years following Owens-I/linois, protec-
tive orders of the kind outlined in that decision were used,
with apparent success, in nearly a dozen citation enforce-
ment cases where Outside experts conducted workplace

-

discovery on the Secretary’s behalf.* And in similar con-
texts, at least three circuits have found such measures, par-
ticularly the use of confidentiality agreements, to be an
adequate safeguard for trade secrets disclosed to private
consultants and other persons not employed by the federal
government. Hercules, Inc. v. NLRB, 833 F.2d 426, 429
(2d Cir. 1987); United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d
728, 743 (3d Cir. 1985); Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc
Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1981).

In choosing to abandon this settled approach to the
issue in the present case, the Commission was obliged to
supply “a reasoned analysis * * * beyond that which may
be required” if the issue were being confronted in the first
instance. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). Here, the
Commission’s rejection of administrative protective
measures in the trade secret context was neither well-rea-
soned nor supported by legal theory or empirical evi-

§ See Maxwell Wirebound Box Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1995,
[1980] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 4 24,758; Reynolds Metals Co., 8 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 1496, [1980] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) € 24,607; National Mfe.
Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1435, [1980] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) € 24,519;
American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1947, [1979] O.S.H. Dee.
(CCH) 4 24,066; Aaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1486, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) §¢ 23,662; Emerson Elec. Co.,
Upland Indus. Div., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1454, [1979] O.S.H. Dec.
(CCH) § 23,640; Fred’s Frozen Foods, Inc., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
1271, [1979] O.S.H. Dee. (CCH) § 23,461; Metal Container Corp., 7
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1202, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,384;
Ralston Purina Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1201, [1979] O.S.H. Dec.
(CCH) § 23,383; American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1147,
[1979] O.S.H. Dee. (CCH) § 23,385; Kama Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1086, {1979} O.S.H. Dee. (CCH) § 23,296. Although peti-
tioner rejects our reliance on this history as “naive[ ]” (Pet. 19), there
have been no allegations in these cases that any Commission protec-
tive Order was ever violated by the Secretary's expert.

8

dence.’ Indeed, as the court of appeals pointed out, “the
Commission c[ould not] point to a single case where [the
Owens-Illinois protective order] was insufficient,” nor did
it provide “evidence * * * to disprove the efficacy of
similar confidentiality agreements applied by federal
courts” (Pet. App. All).'° The Commission instead ig-
nored its past success with Owens-Illinois protective orders
and based its policy reversal on unsubstantiated fears of
unauthorized disclosure and on a supposed need for penal
sanctions as a deterrent. “[T]his conjecture,” the D.C. Cir-
cuit properly concluded, “cannot substitute for a reasoned
explanation” (/bid.).

* Petitioner erroneously contends (Pet. 11, 31-32) that the Commis-
sion’s new rules of procedure “codif[y]” its ruling in this case, permit-
ting it to abandon the Owens-/ilinois precedent without further ex-
planation. First, under the new rules, an ALJ is empowered, but not
required, to prohibit disclosure of information to “persons against
whom the Commission could not enforce [a protective] order,” and
also to stay proceedings to allow a party “an opportunity to seek an
order of a court or search warrant with protective conditions” (29
C.F.R. 2200.11(f/)). By contrast, the Commission's decision in this
case Would require such action in every instance where an employer
demonstrates that trade secrets might be uncovered. Furthermore, the
rulemaking record provides no support for such a requirement. Faced
with strong objections to a warrant requirement on grounds that a
tederal district court would lack jurisdiction to issue such a warrant
and that such a requirement would lead to disruption and delay in en-
torcement proceedings, the Commission left the matter for “adjudica-
use resolution.” and thus simply deferred its obligation to address
those objections ($1 Fed. Reg. 32.002, 32,009-32,010 (1936)).

* We also note that the Commission's new rules of procedure (see
preceding note) authorize the ALJ to require written confidentiality
agreements that provide tor liquidated damages (29 C.F.R. 2200.11¢f)
'. Thus, the Commission's rejection of such agreements as an effec-
e Means Of protecting trade secrets information in this case is diffi-

cult to square with the Commussion’s own regulations.

9

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 15-25) that the Secretary
should be required to obtain a search warrant from a
federal district court in order to conduct discovery inspec-
tions with outside consultants. This contention erroneous-
ly assumes that the district courts have authority to issue
such a warrant, but consideration of that matter by this
Court is not appropriate because the decision below did
not definitively address it. In rejecting the inadequately ex-
plained departure from Owens-Illinois, the court of ap-
peals merely noted its doubts that the district courts
“possess[ed] authority to issue discovery orders while a
citation enforcement proceeding is pending.” Pet. App.
A9 n.3.

We note, in any event, that the court of appeals’ skepti-
cism regarding the warrant requirement is well founded.
Section 15 of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 664) plainly em-
powers the Commission to “issue such orders as may be
appropriate to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets.”
Indeed, the Act established the Commission as a “neutral
arbiter” with functions similar in nature to a district court.
See Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474
U.S. 3, 6-7 (1985); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’]
Union v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 652 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 905 (1982); 116 Cong. Rec. 38,708 (1970)
(remarks of Rep. Steiger). It accordingly possesses a wide
array Of quasi-judicial powers and generally follows the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the conduct of its pro-
ceedings. See 29 U.S.C. 659, 661; 29 C.F.R. 2200.2(b),
2200.52(a)(1). As in the case of other formal adjudications
under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Commission
here has broad authority to direct the hearing process. See
29 U.S.C. 659(c) (incorporating by reference 5 U.S.C.
554(c)(2), 556(c)). This authority, recognized in the Com-
mission’s own rules, enables it to authorize and compel the
use Of pre-hearing discovery methods in citation enforce-

10

ment proceedings, and includes the power to issue protec-
tive orders to safeguard trade secrets based on a showing
of good cause by the owner of the information and a fair
balancing of the “competing needs and interests of parties
affected by discovery” (29 C.F.R. 2200.11(f), 2200.52(d);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,
467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).!!

By refusing to enforce any discovery request involving
outside experts and possible trade secrets, and relying in-
stead on district courts to authorize and control that seg-
ment of its proceedings, the Commission abdicated a key
portion of its adjudicatory function to the courts, which
have hitherto played no role in pre-hearing discovery
under the OSH Act. As the court of appeals correctly
noted (Pet. App. A9 n.3), neither the Commission nor
petitioner has cited any statutory or decisional support for
their assumption that district courts may exercise such
authority and control.'? The OSH Act itself supplies no

'! Contrary to petitioner’s assertions (Pet. 13-14, 15-19), Congress
did not guarantee employer trade secrets automatic and complete im-
munity from disclosure in Commission adjudications. “As with most
evidentiary and discovery privileges recognized by law, ‘there is no ab-
solute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential informa-
tion.’ ” Federul Open Mkt. Comm. vy. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362
(1979) (quoting 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 2043, at 300 (1970)). Although Section 15 of the OSH Act
affirms the need to prevent unauthorized disclosures of trade secret in-
formation obtained by the Secretary and her representatives, and it in-
corporates for that purpose the criminal sanctions available under the
Trade Secrets Act (see note 2, supra), neither that provision nor the
Trade Secrets Act prohibits the Commission from requiring employers
to allow discovery of trade secrets by private individuals. See 29
U.S.C. 664.

'? Petitioner cites several district court decisions (Pet. 22-23, 24-25)
regarding administrative inspection warrants and protective orders for
trade secrets. Those cases are inapposite, however, because none of

~

support for such a proposition: with only carefully cir-
cumscribed exceptions,'? the Act envisions that questions
related to the enforcement of the Secretary’s citations will
be adjudicated solely before the Commission, with subse-
quent review available in the courts of appeals. Congress’s
failure to specify a judicial role in pre-hearing discovery,
and its granting of broad adjudicatory powers to the Com-
mission (including explicit authority to “issue such orders
as may be appropriate to protect the confidentiality of
trade secrets” (29 U.S.C. 664)), certainly imply—as the
court below recognized (Pet. App. at A10 n.3)—that “Con-
gress did not contemplate that the Commission would
delegate these duties to the federal judiciary.” See Whitney
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S.
411, 422 (1965) (where there is “a specific statutory scheme
for obtaining review * * * the statutory mode of review
[must] be adhered to notwithstanding the absence of an ex-
press statutory command of exclusiveness”).

3. Finally, although petitioner contends (Pet. 32-33)
that collateral estoppel barred the Secretary from even
seeking to conduct discovery with an outside expert, we
note that the court of appeals, the Commission, and the

them involved pre-hearing discovery in an ongding Commission pro-
ceeding; they instead arose in the context of pre-enforcement in-
vestigations and other circumstances where the Commission has no
statutory jurisdiction. Unlike this Court’s decision in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Commission's new search
Warrant requirement for discovery inspections was not prompted vy
constitutional concerns; the Commission in fact assumed that “prob-
able cause” would always exist in such cases (Pet. App. A24).

'* The OSH Act expressly creates jurisdiction in the district courts
to enforce subpoenas issued by the Commission during citation en-
forcement proceedings (29 U.S.C. 661(i)); to restrain and remedy em-
ployer retaliation against employee “whistleblowers” (29 U.S.C.
660(c(2)); and to restrain preliminarily any conditions that create an
immediate danger of death or serious physical harm (29 U.S.C. 662).

12

ALJ all rejected that assertion, and that even the peti-
tioner does not raise the issue as an independent ground
for review. The decision in World Color Press (see note 5,
supra), on which petitioner relies, was overruled by the
Commission in Owens-Illinois. Collateral estoppel, as this
Court has long recognized, is available only where the “ap-
plicable legal rules remain unchanged.” Comunissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1948). See also United
States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 169, 170
(1984); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155
(1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(2)
(1982). The court of appeals was therefore correct in re-
viewing the propriety of the Commission’s decision in this
case.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

GEORGE R. SALEM
Solicitor of Labor
ALLEN H. FELDMAN
Associate Solicitor
MIAKY-HELEN MAUTNER
Counsel for Appellate Litigation
JEFFREY A. HENNEMUTH
Attorney
Department of Labor

JANUARY 1989

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

Docket Number 83-509
SECRETARY OF LABOR, COMPLAINANT
Vv.

SALEM GRAVURE DIVISION, WORLD COLOR
PRESS, INC., RESPONDENT

(Mar. 5, 1984]

ORDER
Procedural background

1. World Color Press has moved for a protective order
guarding against the disclosure of certain trade secrets and
commercial information under Commission Rule 11, 29
C.F.R. § 2200.11. -

2. The Secretary of Labor requested entry of his repre-
sentatives at the Salem Gravure plant at Salem, Illinois,
“for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, testing, survey-
ing, photographing or sampling Respondent’s bindery de-
partment” for determining abatement measures available
to reduce employee exposure to repetitive motion trauma.
The employer objected, and the Secretary of Labor filed a
document that was construed as a motion to compel.
Thereafter the employer filed the aforementioned motion
for protective order.

(la)

2a

3. The employer has no objection to the entry of full-
time government employees, but seeks to bar the entry of |
any independent or private consultants. The Secretary
wishes to use as a representative a Dr. Armstrong, who is
an ergonomist and mechanical engineer (Tr. 162, 169),
and who is an independent consultant. It is represented
that the only ergonomist who is a full-time federal em- |
ployee who might be available is a Dr. Stevens, who is em-
ployed in Washington by OSHA itself (Tr. 169). Dr.
Stevens’ availability is questionable (Tr. 168).

4. The motion for protective order was accompanied
by the single affidavit of Mr. Paul McDaniels, the plant
manager at the Salem Gravure Division, who swore to the
truth of the facts stated in the supporting brief. The mo-
tion indicated that, if a fuller description of the alleged
trade secrets were desired, request was made for a closed
hearing. That request was granted. A closed hearing was
held in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 7, 1984.

5S. Incensidering what is a “trade secret”, World Color
Press relies upon the definition in the Restatement on
Torts (Ist Restatement) (Tr. 5). This is a commonly used
definition. See Words and Phrases, Trade Secret. It shall
be applied here. It is as follows:

A trade secret may consist of any formula, process,
patent, device or compilation of information which is
used in one’s business and which gives him an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it. Restatement, Torts, § 757,
comment b.

In addition to the requisite degree of secrecy and lack of
knowledge of other competitors, in proving a trade secret
it must be shown that material has been retained in secrecy
and not disclosed in the conduct of business without ade-
quate protection. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, § 7.07.

6.

3a

Trade Secrets

World Color Press has sustained its proof of trade

secrets in the bindery department regarding the foliowing:

a.

b.

m.

7.

Stream Feeders, which are unique in the way stock
is delivered to the binder (Exhibit SA, Tr. 36-38);
A mail bagging system, with

i. around table, and

ii. bagging chute (Exhibit 5B, Tr. 38-41, 111);
“Long book” rejector systems for binding equip-
ment (Exhibit 5C, Tr. 41-44);

“Micro-Sert” processor (Exhibit 5D, Tr. 44-47);
Sucker arm modifications (Exhibit SE, Tr. 47-50);
“One up-two up” drive system (Exhibit 5F, Tr.
50-53);

A modification of the Signode strapper (Exhibit
5G, Tr. 54-56);

Automated polyfilm imprinter (Exhibit 5H, Tr.
56-58);

In-line jogging system (Exhibit 51, Tr. 59-60);
Modified caliper system (Exhibit 5J, Tr. 61-64);
Magnetic imprinters (Exhibit 5K, Tr. 64-67);
Silicone sprayer and applicator (Exhibit 5L, Tr.
67-69);

Crewing or manning table (Exhibit 7, Tr. 70, 71,
73-74).

A major contention of the Secretary is that the

trade secrets were not adequately protected. There was
heavy reliance upon testimony to the effect that company
practice permitted the entry into the plant of persons in-
cluding members of the public, family members of em-
ployees, a labor union group, and sundry truck drivers.
The record supports this (Tr. 97-98, 113, 121, Exhibits C-2
and C-3). However, the record shows no close scrutiny of
the bindery department by the visitors (Tr. 100), nor ob-

4a

servation by persons having engineering expertise (Tr.
99-100). Nor is there any indication that trade secrets have
been revealed to any competitors. Also, the record shows a
consistent prohibition on the taking of photographs by
visitors within the plant and innovations constituting trade
secrets (Tr. 83, 100, 105-106, 130, 144, 150).

8. Official notice is taken of the fact that ergonomics
is the study of the interaction of persons within an engi-
neered environment. It is an emerging science, and pres-
ently almost all knowledge and theory that it entails can be
regarded as 4 derivative of more established disciplines.

Protective Order Issues

9. In opposing the barring of outside consultant, the
Secretary of Labor argues that this case is controlled by
Owens-Illinois, 1978 CCH OSHD § 23,218; 6 BNA OSHC
2162 (Rev. Com. 1978), and subsequent cases following its
teaching. These permit entry for discovery purposes on
behalf of the Secretary of Labor of an expert who is not a
full-time employee of the federal government subject to
the foliowing minimum conditions: (1) that the expert
swear in writing to keep any secrets made known to him;
(2) that the employer should have a chance to challenge the
selection of the expert on the ground that the expert is
closely aligned with a competitor of the employer; (3) that
there be included in the Secretary of Labor’s contract with
the expert a confidentiality provision as well as one ex-
pressly making the employer a third-party beneficiary of
that provision; and (4) that the protective order indicate
that any sanctions for a violation of its terms will apply to
_ anyone acting on behalf of the Secretary of Labor.

10. World Color Press argues that Owens-I/linois is
not controlling. Its first argument is that the Secretary of
Labor is precluded by the doctrines of collateral estoppel

Sa

and res judicata from re-litigating the question of whether
there may be entry by an expert who is not a full-time
federal employee into the Salem Gravure plant. It is
argued that the question was fully litigated in World Color
Press, Inc., Docket No. 76-2005 (ALJ dec., 7/6/77). The
administrative law judge (Judge Wienman) had held that
no good cause had been shown by the Secretary of Labor
for the use of an outside consultant and, therefore, the
Secretary was limited to the use of full-time federal em-
ployees in the conduct of a discovery inspection in order to
protect adequately the employer’s trade secrets. That case
involved a discovery inspection in which the Secretary
sought to use an outside (non-federal) acoustical engineer
concerning allegations of excessive noise at World Color
Press’ workplace in Effingham, Illinois. The purpose of
the inspection was to discover facts regarding the feasi-
bility of reducing allegedly excessive noise in the press
room.

11. Judge Wienman’s decision was reviewed by a
Review Commission which then consisted of two
members. The two members reached an impasse concern-
ing action, and agreed therefore to affirm the judge’s deci-
sion. But they assigned it the precedential value of an un-
reviewed judge’s decision. World Color Press, Inc., 6
BNA OSHC 1084 (Rev. Com. 1977). An unreviewed ad-
ministrative law judge’s decision is not considered prece-
dent binding upon the Review Commission itself because
it does not necessarily indicate approbation of the judge’s
action. See Leone Construction Co., 3 BNA OSHC 1979,
1975-76 CCH OSHD § 20,387 (Rev. Com. 1976). Thus,
for precedential purposes the weight io be accorded an un-
reviewed administrative law judge’s decision depends upon
the intrinsic merit of that decision. Nothing more.

12. The Secretary of Labor filed a petition for review
of the Commission action in the Seventh Circuit, and later

6a

moved to withdraw the petition for review stating only
that it had been “subsequently concluded that the case was
inappropriate for appellate review”. The motion was
granted.

Res Judicata and collateral estoppel arguments

not now re-litigate before the Commission precisely the
same issues that were decided against him in previous ac-
tion, Which for convenience shall be referred to as World
Color Press, |. This begs the question of precisely what
was litigated almost seven years ago. Also, the application
of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to
an exercise of adjudicative discretion is not squarely ad-
dressed. Determining the scope of a protective order in-
volves an exercise of much discretion by an administrative
law judge.

14. It is generally held that the doctrine of res judicata
or, Where applicable estoppel, does not apply to a decision
on a motion with the same strictness as to a judgment and
that an order made in a pending action on a motion in-
volving a question of practice or the discretion of the trial
court is not an adjudication barring a subsequent motion
on the same ground. 56 Am.Jur., Motions, rules, and
orders, § 30. See also American Surety Co. v. Baidwin, 53
S.Ct. 98, 102 (U.S. 1932).

15. It is unclear what options for experts were avail-
able to the Secretary in World Color Press, |. Here, the
Secretary's only option on the record is the possible use of
a Dr. Stevens, who is employed by OSHA itself. This nar-
row choice of experts within the government could plainly
atfect drastically the experi aid to the Secretary in con-
ducting his case.

13. World Color Press argues that the Secretary can-

7a

16. In asupplemental brief filed at the closed hearing,
World Color Press argues that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in U.S. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., __ U.S. ____ (Jan.
10, 1984), which was decided after the briefs were filed in
this case, supports its argument with respect to collateral
estoppel. Stauffer Chemical concerned two EPA inspec-
tions conducted two weeks apart. EPA tried to inspect a
Stauffer phosphorus plant in Tennessee under the Clean
Air Act using private contractors in addition to full-time
EPA employees. Stauffer refused entry to the private con-
tractors because the private contractors refused to sign a
non-disclosure agreement concerning trade secrets. There
.was a similar refusal of an attempted inspection under
similar circumstances of a Stauffer phosphate plant in
Wyoming. The Wyoming case was litigated as far as the
Tenth Circuit which held, among other things, that the
private contractors were not “authorized representatives”
under the enabling legislation, the Clean Air Act. The
Tennessee case was subsequently litigated in the Sixth Cir-
cuit which held that the United States was estopped from
re-litigating the “authorized representative” question be-
cause the United States had previously litigated the
Wyoming case in the Tenth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit deci-
sion was affirmed. In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist the
Court considered any factual differences between the two
cases, such as the difference in location of the plants and
the difference in the private contracting firms, to have no
legal significance in resolving the issues. While eschewing
an exception to the collateral estoppel rule concerning an
issue Of law in Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147 (1979), the
court noted that in Montana it was determined that the
issue Of law exception was inapplicable because of the
“close alignment of time and subject matter, between the
two court actions”. In this case there is no close alignment
of time. Almost seven years separate World Color Press,

8a

I, from World Color Press, 11. Collateral estoppel is
generally said to have three purposes: to “relieve parties of
the cost and vexation of multiple law suits, conserve
judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent deci-
sions, encourage reliance on adiudication”. (Concurring
Qpinion) (Sl. Op. 3). The time elapsing between the cases
Suggests a lack of vexatious litigation and no undue drain
upon the agency’s adjudicative resources. Concerning con-
sistency of decisions, collateral estoppel has been applied
in only a limited fashion to questions of law. It has been
recognized as manifestly unjust to apply one rule of law
forever as between the parties and to apply a different rule
to all other persons. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judg-
ment, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 7 (1942) (article cited with ap-
proval in concurring opinion). The doctrine of collateral
estoppel is intended to provide litigants the benefit of prior
litigation. This is not the same as insuring litigants the
benefits of a prior ruling. (Concurring opinion) (Sl. Op.
8). Here, World Color Press seeks to preserve the benefit
in a different case of a “good cause” ruling by Administra-
tive Law Judge Weinman almost seven years ago in a diff-
erent case involving different expertise, even though there
is some Overlap in the trade secrets involved.

Discretion in entry of protective order

17. Worid Color Press also argues that a proper exer-
cise of discretion in entry of a protective order in this case
is to limit inspection of the plant to federal employees.
Cases such as Triangle Ink and Color Co., Inc. v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 61 F.R.D. 634(N.D. Ill. 1974), are noted in

‘which disclosure of trade secret information was restricted
to the plaintiffs trial attorney, although the attorney
could consult an independent expert provided the parties
mutually agreed upon an independent expert. The cases

. 9a

are cited in support of the reasonableness of Respondent’s
proposed use of a federal employee expert. But World
Color Press still opposes categorically the disclosure of
trade secret information to an independent expert who is
not employed by the federal government. This is so even
though it has not been shown that Dr. Armstrong, the
Secretary’s outside expert, is aligned with any competitor
of World Color Press.

18 U.S.C. section 1905 and section 15 of OSHA

18. World Color Press argues that the OSHA statute
and 18 U.S.C. 1905 require protection of World Color
Press’ trade secrets by limiting inspection to full-time
federal employees. Section 1905 of Title 18 U.S.C. pro-
vides for criminal penalties for any federal employee who
divulges “to any extent not authorized by law” any infor-
mation coming to him in the course of his employment
concerning trade secrets of any person. The statute does
not provide that access to trade secrets will be given only
to federal employees. It only provides sanctions for the
disclosure of trade secrets in the possession of federal
employees. Owens-Illinois, Inc., supra at 2166. Section 15
of OSHA places no additional restrictions on the disclo-
sure of trade secrets. Rather, it adds two exceptions: (1)
disclosure to other offices or employees concerned with
carrying out the OSHA Act, and (2) disclosure when rele-
vant in any proceeding under the Act. Owens-I/linois,
Inc., supra at 2166. Compare Louisiana Chemical Asso-
ciation v. Bingham, 550 F.Supp. 1136, 1144 (W.D. La.
1982). This case falls plainly within the second exception
in Section 15.

19. World Color Press argues that under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure incorporated by reference in
Commission proceedings that, if it is established that con-

10a

fidential information is being sought, the burden is on the
party seeking discovery to establish that the information is
sufficiently relevant and necessary to his case to outweigh
the potential harm of disclosure. Reliance is placed upon
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil,
§ 2043, at pages 300-302. The reliance is well placed. The
treatise, however, in turn relies fully upon a statement by
the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence that reads
as follows:

The need for accommodation between protecting
trade secrets, on the one hand, and eliciting facts re-
quired for full and fair presentation of a case, on the
other hand, is apparent. Whether disclosure should
be required depends upon a weighing of the com-
peting interests involved against the background of
the total situation, including consideration of such
factors as the endangers of abuse, good faith, ade-
quacy of protective measures, and the availability of
other means of proof.

The competing considerations have been weighed and
the listed factors have been considered. There is no
asserted lack of good faith on the part of the Secretary or
his outside expert. The only danger of disclosure that has
been mentioned is a possible mental lapse by the expert at
some time in the future and this could result in a revelation
of a trade secret (Tr. 163). This seems somewhat specula-
tive. Moreover, a full and fair presentation of the Secre-
tary’s case may turn on his ability to use Dr. Armstrong.
Finally, as noted previously there is no indication that Dr.
Armstrong is allied with any competitor of World Color

- Press.

22% Ogee

eee ee

lla

ORDER

Accordingly, the employer is ORDERED to permit en-
try of the Secretary’s Outside expert at its Salem Gravure
plant within thirty (30) days from the date of this order
subject to the following conditions: (1) the protective
measures Outlined in Owens-//linois shall be used; (2) the
entry shall be limited to the area of the citation and not in-
clude the entire bindery department; and (3) any notes or
photographs taken in the course of the discovery inspec-
tion shall be surrendered to the Secretary’s counsel at the
completion of Dr. Armstrong’s participation in this case
and any such material shall remain in the possession of the
Secretary’s agents and thus subject to the strictures of 18
U.S.C. § 1905.

/s/ Paul A. Tenney

PAUL A. TENNEY
Judge, OSHRC

Dated: March 5, 1984
Washington, D.C.

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING Or FICE 1969- 241-699'00056

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0411%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
