# Opposition Brief — Jenkins v. Georgia Power Co.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0363%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 488 U.S. 1007

## Text

C

No. 88-723

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

MARK JENKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT L. PENNINGTON

TROUTMAN, SANDERS,
LOCKERMAN & ASHMORE

1400 Candler —

127 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1810

(404) 658-8000

Counsel for Respondent

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Is a question of state tort law involving no federal
constitutional issues which has been decided by the highest
state court in which a decision could be had as of right of
sufficient importance to warrant review by this Court?

il

LIST OF AFFILIATED CORPCQURATIONS

Respondent Georgia Power Compan®y is a wholly owned
subsidiary of The Southern Company, a j Publicly held corpo-
ration which is traded on the New York ¢ Stock Exchange.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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LIST OF AFFILIATED CORPORATIONG...............
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REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE
TERE SIRS eRe ON Oe ee a

I. THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS
CORRECTLY HELD THAT ELECTRICITY
IS NOT AN ULTRA-HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCE UNDER GEORGIA LAW................

Il. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CERTIFY OR
REMAND WITH DIRECTIONS TO CERTI-
FY BECAUSE THE COURTS BELOW AP-
PLIED AND FOLLOWED CLEAR CON-
TRE TED © PRRRIE FEES ccccrccnseccssecccsccccnseoes

IIT Talo iis sendtusbohasuniasadactesnedensésansmenstoouies

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Allen v. Cooper, 145 Ga. App. 555, 244 S.E.2d 98
Gira WU dinkchasasbiuasensasaasedeechabacenistaranitastaatenanemmanee eit

Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73
ane tee

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)..............

Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 78, 176
a Fe I ininiiccinctes masiosdinenacabsanansasiethdenenasennieiinsios

Georgia Power Co. v. Maxwell, 52 Ga. App. 430, 183
Fe RT EDA Rees Roel SA A SR ee

Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) ........0... cee.

Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga.
1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (Sth Cir. 1979)...

Horn v. C.L. Osborn Contracting Co., 423 F. Supp.
801 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 318 (Sth Cir.
Fi nssssuntoicscisaineseddsacentanina bacuseaabiaatedand deisel

Jenkins v. Georgia Power Co., 668 F. Supp. 1574
(N.D. Ga. 1987), rev'd, 849 F.2d 507 (11th Cir.
PUIED icincheccbtsneiciatsnabtesanpimeicedtaddmeanitgemeiaaalantscacsdies

Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940)
West v. American T&T Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940).......

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS:

Article VI, Section V, Paragraph III of the Georgia
I a ealine

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Be as Se danacesiecsnndinninlomscobnccnceesbboaueseaniaoesionen
MISCELLANEOUS:

Rule 37(a), Georgia Supreme Court.......................00002

Page

2,3,4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

MARK JENKINS,
Petitioner,
Wa
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The Respondent Georgia Power Company respectfully
requests that this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari,
seeking review of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in this case.
That opinion is reported at 849 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1988).

JURISDICTION

Invoking federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of
citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the petitioner
brought this suit alleging negligence in connection with a
personal injury in the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta
Division. The disposition of this matter in the Northern

2

District and the Eleventh Circuit is set forth in the petition
for a writ of certiorari.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment of
the Eleventh Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent respectfully directs the Court’s attention to
the statement of the facts in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion,
which it incorporates herein by reference, for an accurate
statement of all of the facts material to consideration of the
question presented.

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

I. THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS COR-
RECTLY HELD THAT ELECTRICITY IS NOT
AN ULTRA-HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE UNDER
GEORGIA LAW.

The sole Question Presented in the petition (p. 1) ts
whether the Eleventh Circuit so erred in its application of
Georgia law that this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is called
for. The answer to this question is no, because the Eleventh
Circuit properly followed and applied state law in this diver-
sity case in accordance with the principle of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

The courts below recognized that Georgia tort law holds
that electricity is not so ultra-hazardous a substance as to
automatically implicate the inherently dangerous work doc-
trine. In Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788,
794, 176 S.E. 786 (1934), the Georgia Court of Appeals held,
“[wje are unwilling to hold that electricity is a substance so
inherently dangerous that a power company may not contract
for the building of power lines with an independent contractor

3

and absolve itself from liability for an injury which occurs
solely because of the negligence of such independent contrac-
tor in the doing of the work.” The courts below correctly
applied this principle to reject petitioner’s argument that
respondent is liable for the negligence of petitioner's indepen-
dent contractor employer. Jenkins v. Georgia Power Co., 668
F. Supp. 1574, 1577 n. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 849 F.2d 507, 509 (11th Cir. 1988).

Contrary to Petitioner’s representation to this Court,
Gillespie is not an aberration standing in splendid isolation
but rather has been cited and followed by both Georgia courts
and federal courts applying Georgia law. F.g., Horn v. C. L.
Osborn Contracting Co., 423 F. Supp. 801, 809 (M.D. Ga.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 591 F.2d 318 (Sth Cir. 1979);
Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (M.D. Ga.
1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (Sth Cir. 1970); Allen v. Cooper,
145 Ga. App. 555, 556, 244 S.E.2d 98 (1978); Georgia Power
Co. v. Maxwell, 52 Ga. App. 430, 434, 183 S.E. 654 (1935).
The case cited by Petitioner as redefining the Gillespie doc-
trine, Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73
S.E.2d 119 (1952), merely distinguishes Gillespie and does
not overrule it. Since Williams was decided, the courts have
continued to cite Gillespie as support for the principle that
an employer is not liable for the torts of his independent
contractor where work which is not inherently dangerous of
itself becomes dangerous when performed negligently. E.g.,
Horn vy. C. L. Osborn, supra; Hodge v. United States, supra;
Allen v. Cooper, supra.

There is, accordingly, no basis for the exercise of this
Court's extraordinary power of supervision, since the decision
below follows clear precedent and this Court generally “‘ac-
cept[s] a reasonable construction of state law by the court of
appeals.” Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314 n. 8 (1983).
Respondent respectfully submits that this is not a case requir-
ing reconsideration on the merits.

Lea QxnNHaEP

4

Il. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CERTIFY OR
REMAND WITH DIRECTIONS TO CERTIFY BE-
CAUSE THE COURTS BELOW APPLIED AND FOL-
LOWED CLEAR CONTROLLING PRECEDENT.

Federal courts are bound by the decisions of a state’s
intermediate appellate court unless there is persuasive evi-
dence that the highest state court would rule otherwise. E.g.,
Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West
v. American T&T Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940). The decision of
the Georgia Court of Appeals in Gillespie is a controlling
precedent by an appellate court which is binding on all
Georgia courts except the Supreme Court of Georgia. Article
VI, Section V, Paragraph III of the Georgia Constitution of
1983.' Because a clear controlling decision by the Georgia
Court of Appeals exists, there is no basis for certification
under the plain language of Georgia Supreme Court Rule
37(a). See, Petition for Certiorari at 4-5.

Petitioner’s assertion that “[t]he authority of Gillespie is
undercut by Williams, leaving no clear controlling precedent”
conveniently ignores all those cases following Gillespie since
Williams was decided. Petition for Certiorari at 5. As shown
above, Gillespie is good law which the Georgia Court of
Appeals, the Georgia district courts, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals con-
tinue to cite and follow. Hence, no basis exists for certifying
the question posed by petitioner to the Georgia Supreme
Court inasmuch as a line of authority citing Gillespie has
considered and decided the issue adversely to petitioner.

'The Georgia Constitution of 1983 provides in relevant part as
follows: “The Court of Appeals shall be a court of review and shall exercise
appellate and certiorari jurisdiction in all cases not reserved to the Supreme
Court or conferred on other courts by law. The decisions of the Court of
Appeals insofar as not in conflict with those of the Supreme Court shall
bind all courts except the Supreme Court as precedent.”

5
CONCLUSION

The issue raised by the instant petition presents a ques-
tion of state tort law which is not of sufficient importance
beyond the litigants themselves to warrant review by this
Court. The courts below followed an unbroken line of
authority and correctly rejected petitioner’s argument that
his work was inherently dangerous as contrary to the law of
Georgia. For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari
should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT L. PENNINGTON

TROUTMAN, SANDERS,
LOCKERMAN & ASHMORE

1400 Candler Building

127 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1810

(404) 658-8000

Counsel for Respondent

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0363%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
