# Opposition Brief — In re Solerwitz

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 488 U.S. 1004

## Text

\y

No. 88-502 JOSE F. SPANIOL, JR

| CLERK

Supreme Geutt, U.S. ]
FILED ;

BEC 44 1988

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

IN RE JACK B. SOLERWITZ

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

DONALD B. AYER

Acting Solicitor General

JOHN R. BOLTON

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID M. COHEN
SANDRA P. SPOONER
Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether an attorney who prosecuted 142 frivolous
appeals, notwithstanding repeated warnings from the
court that such conduct would subject him to sanctions,
engaged in “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar”
within the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 46(b) and was
therefore properly subjected to the sanction of a one-year
suspension from practice before that court.

2. Whether an attorney subjected to disciplinary pro-
ceedings under Fed. R. App. P. 46(b) is entitled to have
the decision made by a tribunal other than the court before
which the misconduct occurred.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
a od iis bo died anemia os dees © kee l
Ea ag 2 Su ora a ae ear PP a l
OGLE fees ES ny ra ge me l
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eee aia suka se hee e Wane bees ake aes 20
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adams v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d

488 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) ..... 4,5
Amodeo vy. Department of Transportation, FAA, 788

F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 849

Ns a aad plese es wwe Oe 5
Anderscn v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 2537 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

Te ae aca eS abc ek bx cas ws vO 4
Bithoney, In re, 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973) ............ 15, 17
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) ............0.... 17
Brown v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

ee re 13
Burr, Ex parte, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824) .......... 17

Campbell v. Department of Transportation, FAA,
735 F.2d 497 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881
na Soe ag ok bike ed- ack xe 6's 4
Chandler, In re, 450 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1971) ....0...... 17
Des Vignes vy. Department of Transportation, FAA
791 F.2d 142 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853
Sie AIOE ig ar ean Lor SNP RA, Cones atte ge
DiMasso vy. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735
F.2d 526 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
GRE S Se sisi niod Te Da eg 4

IV

Cases — Continued: Page

Dorrance v. Department of Transportation, FAA,

735 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

SE Sa-cu cess choad aa ne eeee Lh Rees eeeersinieant< 4
Garland, Ex parte, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) ......... 17
Martel v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 504 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

SOU cs xo i dk xk ooking ob tase es aed e eae an ose RS 4
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) ......... 18
Moylan v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 524 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

GR Se oo esin eae sk Sea cee eee a eek ek ee 4, 13
Novotny v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

oe bP Be ke AR a oe 3
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) ............. 18

Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, FAA,
735 F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

EN css hed ses Sad SAREE ON eh awed Oona ae eas 2, 4, 13
Snyder, In re, 472 U.S. 634 (1985) ..............-4-. 16, 17, 18
Tatum, In re, 587 F.2d 682 (Sth Cir. 1979) ............. 17
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) ..............-... 17-18
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S.

EE oa ae val ad eke cress Rea he wae se 17

Statute and rules:

a ae ewe age Cae eS are a ei 3
Fed. Cir. R.:
Sa SO aren ates OR oe mtiey OA ge UR caer ene wee ma ery 5
oe cn od ae waa aie ene ain Gee Aer 6
Fed. R. App. P.:
SOD ee EE ER RR Bis fe BANU Da Pes oe he hea 5
Ea eae ae tear ie Se nei Ae my tans scree ke 6
ee ea Sth os uh kt aracie ips nee ia We Re 19
A Se Rc ia WER RRO Recah Seat ee her erm 7, 11, 19
DN sb ge n'a Ware eed bk arse katy Wik Soe 16
SARIS eet ae doe reer OM ae We et 2, 8, 10, 11
Fed. R. Civ. P.:
NG Se ee ke a eee ad eas 19

EEE Ac koe cu ea okt be ne be ae nn ee CRN 19

Rules — Continued: Page
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983):

ik Rr er ee mar aera elem het 15

| PEP SP Oe ita Pee ten © oe 15

ae ha the vata cc iedea eee 15, 16

CANOE ond ss nade vase Re eee 15, 16

MP OEE PPPS ep rey rrn ae at. 14

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-502

IN RE JACK B. SOLERWITZ

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL GEARCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
A163-A201) and its opinion denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration (Pet. App. A202-A206) are reported at
848 F.2d 1573.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
June 17, 1988, and a petition for reconsideration was
denied on July 20, 1988 (Pet. App. A202-A206). The peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 16,
1988. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENI

Petitioner is an attorney who was found by the court of
appeals to have filed more than 140 frivolous appeals from
decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB),

(1)

2

after having been repeatedly warned by the court that such
conduct would be improper and would subject him to
sanctions. In these distinct proceedings, the court of ap-
peals found that petitioner’s litigation practices con-
stituted “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar”
within the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 46(b), and it
therefore suspended him from practice before that court
for one year.

1. More than 11,000 air traffic controllers were
removed from their positions for having participated in
the illegal nationwide strike called by the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization in August 1981. More
than 10,000 of the former controllers appealed their
removals to the MSPB, and more than 4,600 filed peti-
tions for review of adverse MSPB decisions in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Pet. App.
A165-A166).'

By order dated February 24, 1983 (App. A, infra,
la-3a), after consultation with counsel who elected to par-
ticipate, the court of appeals designated seven of the ap-
peals raising controlling legal issues as “lead cases.” It
scheduled those cases for expedited briefing, oral argu-
ment and decision, and suspended proceedings in the re-
maining appeals by directing the clerk to withhold
docketing. The lead cases consisted of the two cases
already pending before the court that had received full
MSPB review and five others then pending before the
MSPB that the MSPB itself had designated as lead cases.’

| A discussion of the strike and the litigation it spawned may be
found in Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735
F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).

2 Because some of the petitioners involved in the seven lead cases re-
tained different counsel on appeal, the original seven cases ultimately
resulted in eleven different lead cases before the court of appeals. See
Pet. App. AS-A7 n.3.

a |

The court believed that it was appropriate to “determine
the common controlling legal issues as soon as possible
and thus avoid repetitious and unnecessary decision of the
Same issues in many cases” (App., infra, 2a). See Pet.
App. A166-A167. Petitioner was counsel in one of the lead
cases (id. at A167; see Novotny v. Department of
Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 521 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), and
he also represented between 800 and 1000 former con-
trollers before the MSPB and filed petitions for review in
the court of appeals on behalf of 736 individuals (ibid.).?

On May 18, 1984, a five-judge panel of the court of ap-
peals decided the lead cases. See 28 U.S.C. 46(b). On the
same date, the court sent notices to counsel and petitioners
in all pending air traffic controller appeals, enclosing
copies of the lead-case decisions and stating that counsel
and the petitioners would be notified upon “final disposi-
tion” of the lead cases and would be requested at that time
to state their intentions with respect to maintaining their
appeals (App. B, infra, 4a). Counsel and petitioners were
cautioned about the impropriety of maintaining frivolous
appeals and were furnished with citations to decisions in
which the court below had imposed sanctions for such
conduct. /bid.; see Pet. App. A167-A168.

In a notice dated December 10, 1984, the court of ap-
peals informed all counsel and petitioners in the pending
controller cases that this Court had denied review in the
lead cases in which certiorari petitions were filed and that
mandates had been issued in those cases to the MSPB

> Petitioner’s standard fee was $750 for representation in ad-
ministrative proceedings through the regional level of the MSPB and
$2500 for all subsequent appeals, although petitioner apparently
waived that fee for some of his clients. Pet. App. A23-A24 & n.7,
Al7S.

4

(App. C, infra, 5a-6a).* Each recipient of the notice was
informed that the suspension of non-lead cases would re-
main in effect until January 10, 1988, and that before that
date, the recipient must either withdraw his then-present
petition for review or file a renewed petition; if the reci-
pient did neither, the pending petition would be dismissed.
The court also once again warned counsel and petitioners
of the impropriety of maintaining frivolous appeals.
Finally, the notice informed the recipient that if a new
petition was filed on or before January 10, 1985, the ap-
peal would be docketed on the date of receipt and the peti-
tioner’s brief would be due 60 days thereafter. [bid.,; see
Pet. App. A168-A169.°

2. a. Petitioner had initially filed a total of 154 peti-
tions for review on behalf of the 736 former controllers
whom he represented (Pet. App. A167). After the lead
cases were concluded and the suspension lifted, petitioner
filed renewed petitions for review in all of those cases (id.

4 Petitions for writs of certiorari were denied in Schapansky v.
Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Adams v. Department of Transporta-
tion, FAA, 735 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
(1984); Campbell v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d
497 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984); Martel v. Depart-
ment of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 504 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Dorrance v. Department of Transportation,
FAA, 735 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984);
Moylan v. Department of Transportation, FAA; 735 F.2d 524 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); DiMasso v. Department of
Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 526 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 us.
1018 (1984); and Anderson v. Department of Transportation, FAA,
735 F.2d 537 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).

5 On July 12, July 31, and August 30, 1985, the court again advised
all counsel to review the propriety of maintaining their appeals in light
of the need to avoid abuse of the judicial process resulting from
frivolous appeals (Pet. App. A8).

at A10). Petitioner’s three-person law firm had difficulty
in meeting the court’s 60-day deadline for filing briefs in
that large number of cases, although petitioner at the same
time filed motions to exceed the 50-page limit for briefs
under Fed. R. App. P. 28 and Federal Circuit Rule 13,
which were denied (id. at A10-A11). Petitioner also failed
to file an appendix in 51 of the cases within the time
allowed by the court, even though the court granted one
extension of time (id. at Al2-A14).

b. On May 2, 1986, the court of appeals decided Des
Vignes v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 791 F.2d
142 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986), one of
petitioner’s air traffic controller cases.6 The court first
reviewed each of petitioner’s arguments and found them to
be either patently frivolous or foreclosed by decisions that
no reasonable attorney could expect to be overturned,
modified, or withdrawn (791 F.2d at 143, 145): his con-
stitutional challenge to the court of appeals’ efforts to
manage its docket in the face of the extraordinary caseload
occasioned by the air traffic controller cases was not sup-
ported by citation to any legal authorities and was con-
trary to settled law; his statutory arguments had been re-
jected in the lead cases and yet were advanced without any
effort to distinguish those precedents; and his factual

* Ten of petitioner’s appeals arose out of the same MSPB pro-
ceeding that produced one of the lead cases, Adams v. Department of
Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1018 (1984). In its lead-case decision in Adams, the court of appeals
observed that the issues presented by that case appeared to have been
decided in the lead cases, and that the other ten appeals would be
dismissed unless the court received notification that the appeals would
be pursued. Petitioner decided to pursue the appeals, and they were
among those found to be frivolous. Amodeo vy. Department of
Transportation, FAA, 788 F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 849 (1986).

6

arguments were unsupported by evidence in the record or
even by any references to the record, as required by Fed.
R. App. P. 28(a)(3) and Federal Circuit Rule 13(a). See
generally Pet. App. A1l43-A145.

The court of appeals in Des Vignes then proceeded to
review the briefs petitioner had filed in his other air traffic
controller cases, which also were before the same panel
(791 F.2d at 145-146). It noted that except for a paragraph
or two relating to individual controllers, the briefs in 107
of those cases were identical and that the remaining cases
were divided into two categories in which the briefs were
also essentially identical to one another (id. at 145 & n.3).
The court observed that “[e]Jach [brief] contains the same
type of patently frivolous constitutional arguments, re-
jected contentions, and unsupported assertions of fact”
(id. at 146) and that “{ajll 131 briefs reflect violations of
the court’s rule requiring citation to the record” (id. at 145
n.3, 146). The briefs did not attempt to persuade the court
that its decisions in the lead cases were wrong; they simply
made the same arguments that had been rejected in those
cases (id. at 144, 146). Moreover, petitioner did not in-
form the court of appeals that his briefs were identical,
thereby forcing the court to review every one to ensure
against the possibility that it might contain a meritorious
argument (id. at 146).

The court in Des Vignes also pointed out that
petitioner’s conduct imposed a substantial burden on
government counsel in their representation of the Federal
Aviation Administration, the respondent in the court of
appeals (791 F.2d at 146):

Respondent prepared briefs in response to each of
counsel’s 131 virtually identical briefs. Counsel’s
failure to refer to the record forced Respondent to do
the work incumbent upon counsel. Counsel’s failure
to supply an appendix in some cases forced Respond-

ent to do so in those cases. Respondent cited the
frivolous, rejected and unsupported contentions
discussed above. Respondent also cited counsel’s fre-
quent, repeated, and brazen violations of this court’s
rules. [Petitioner’s] reply briefs simply ignored those
citations, merely stating that the earlier cases were
distinguishable (but citing no distinguishing facts), ig-
nored Respondent’s charge that he had failed to cite
to the record, and stated that the appeal was filed to
give Des Vignes access to the court. Faced with clear
and insurmountable indication that all 131 appeals
were frivolous, [petitioner] has continued to maintain
this and the other 130 appeals.

On the basis of these findings, the court held that peti-
tioner’s conduct in Des Vignes “constitute[d] a flagrant
and totally inexcusable abuse of the judicial process,” and
it therefore ordered petitioner to pay the government a
monetary sanction in the amount of $1000 (791 F.2d at
146).’

Thereafter, the court of appeals issued decisions in all of
the remaining appeals prosecuted by petitioner. It general-
ly found them to be frivolous and imposed monetary sanc-
tions under Fed. R. App. P. 38 totalling $78,300 (plus
costs totalling $11,843.94) for such conduct as filing
frivolous appeals, abuse of the judicial process, failing
even to attempt to distinguish controlling precedent, and
violating the court’s rules. Petitioner did not contest either
the imposition of these sanctions or their amount. Pet.
App. Al7.

’ Petitioner sought review in this Court of the court of appeals’
holding in Des Vignes that the appeal was frivolous, but the petition
for a writ of certiorari was denied. 479 U.S. 853 (1986). As we pointed
Out in Our memorandum in opposition in Des Vignes, the certiorari
petition was out of time.

8

3. On January 21, 1987, the court of appeals entered
an en banc order requiring petitioner to show cause why he
should not be suspended from practice before the court of
appeals for two years under Fed. R. App. P. 46(b) for
“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court”
(App. D, infra, 7a-10a).§ The order recited petitioner’s
conduct in the air traffic controller discharge cases
discussed above and noted that despite the sanctions im-
posed in those cases, petitioner was subsequently sanc-
tioned for filing three more frivolous appeals in cases that
involved the rehiring of controllers (ibid.). Petitioner's
motion to disqualify all of the judges of the en banc court
was denied (Pet. App. A20), and the matter was referred
to Senior Judge Bennett for a hearing and recommended
decision (id. at A20-A21). At the hearing, testimony was
received from petitioner’s wife and former law partner,
three former air traffic controllers, and three expert
witnesses on legal ethics. Petitioner did not testify, relying
instead on an affidavit he had submitted in support of his
motion to disqualify the judges (id. at A173).

On December 10, 1987, Judge Bennett issued a written
opinion (Pet. App. Al-A99) and extensive findings of fact
concerning petitioner’s actions (id. at Al100-A162), in-

8 Rule 46(b) provides:

Suspension or Disbarment. When it is shown to the court that any
member of its bar has been suspended or disbarred from practice
in any other court of record, or has been guilty of conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar of the court, the member will be
subject to suspension or disbarment by the court. The member
shall be afforded an opportunity to show good cause, within such
time as the court shall prescribe, why the member should not be
suspended or disbarred. Upon the member’s response to the rule
to show cause, and after hearing, if requested, or upon expiration
of the time prescribed for a response if no response is made, the
court shall enter an appropriate order.

9

cluding an extensive list of examples of individual cases in
which the Federal Circuit had imposed monetary sanctions
on petitioner (see id. at A105-A113). Judge Bennett noted
the court’s conclusion in Des Vignes regarding petitioner’s
conduct and performance, and he found those conclusions
“confirmed by an independent review of [petitioner’s]
briefs as part of this [disciplinary] proceeding, which in-
dicates, by clear and convincing evidence, that his at-
tempts to comply with the court’s notices, rules, and in-
structions were dramatically deficient in each of the
respects” identified in the order to show cause (id. at A67).
Judge Bennett further found by “clear and convincing
evidence” that petitioner’s “continued course of conduct in
filing and maintaining multiple frivolous appeals in the
face of this court’s orders, notices, instructions, rules,
precedents, and previous sanctions constitutes conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit” (id. at
A84-A85). Finding it “certain” that petitioner “was con-
sciously aware of the court’s rules and orders regarding
overlong briefs, the filing of appendices, citations to the
record, and the need to cite and distinguish the lead cases”
(id. at A92), Judge Bennett recommended that petitioner
be suspended from practice before the court of appeals for
two years, but that enforcement be suspended pending
petitioner’s demonstration of good behavior during a
period of probation (id. at A97).

After receiving petitioner’s exceptions to Judge
Bennett’s findings and recommendations, the court of ap-
peals issued an en banc decision on June 17, 1988, agree-
ing with and adopting Judge Bennett’s determination that
petitioner had engaged in conduct unbecoming a member
of the bar of the court (Pet. App. A163-A201). The court
concluded, however, that the suspension should be for only

_—

10

one year and that imposition of the suspension should not
be delayed beyond the time permitted for filing of a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari (id. at A164). The court denied
petitioner’s petition for reconsideration on July 20, 1988
(id. at A202-A206).

ARGUMENT

The court of appeals acted well within its authority in
suspending petitioner from practice before that court for a
period of one year on the ground that his handling of
numerous frivolous appeals and abuse of the judicial proc-
ess constituted “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar
of the court” (Fed. R. App. P. 46(b)). The en banc court’s
unanimous decision to impose that limited sanction does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or of another
court of appeals, and it presents no issue of general impor-
tance warranting review by this Court.

1. Petitioner first contends (Pet. 23-32) that the ap-
peals he filed were not actually frivolous and that the court
of appeals’ decision therefore effectively requires lawyers
to become gatekeepers for the courts by screening out
cases that their clients are entitled to have heard by the
courts. This contention is without merit for a variety of
reasons.

a. It is too late for petitioner to contend that he did
not prosecute frivolous appeals or otherwise engage in
conduct that warrants suspension from practice before the
court. Prior to the decision of the en banc court of appeals
in these proceedings, the court of appeals had already
made findings on a case-by-case basis in Des Vignes and
numerous other individual cases that petitioner had pur-
sued frivolous appeals or otherwise engaged in unprofes-
sional conduct, and it had imposed monetary sanctions on
petitioner in those individual cases (Pet. App. A17-A18,

1]

AS54-A55, A105-A113). This Court denied certiorari when
petitioner sought review of the order finding the appeal
frivolous and imposing sanctions in Des Vignes (see note
7, supra), and petitioner did not contest the finding of un-
professional conduct in any of the other individual cases in
which monetary sanctions were imposed (Pet. App. A17).
Those decisions therefore should properly be regarded as
binding on petitioner here. The only question in these pro-
ceedings is whether the cumulative effect of this course of
concededly unprofessional conduct—in the face of re-
peated warnings and despite the imposition of monetary
sanctions in some cases— warranted the further sanction
of suspension from practice before the court of appeals
for a period of one year. If we take as a given—as we must
for present purposes—that petitioner pursued frivolous
appeals or engaged in other improper conduct on the
numerous occasions for which sanctions were imposed
under Rule 38, then the one-year suspension under Rule
46(b) was patently warranted.

Moreover, petitioner was not suspended from practice
before the Federal Circuit solely on the basis of the court’s
prior findings in the individual cases. Judge Bennett and
the en banc court unanimously concluded, on the basis of
their independent review of petitioner’s prior filings and
conduct, that petitioner in fact had prosecuted numerous
frivolous appeals and otherwise engaged in unprofessional
~conduct (Pet. App. A65-A70, A182-A184). This confir-
mation of the prior findings in Des Vignes and other cases
removes any possible doubt regarding the existence of a
factual basis for the suspension.

b. This is not a case, as petitioner claims (Pet. 26, 30),
of a court’s closing its doors to litigants because of the in-
convenience of a heavy caseload. Rather, the court below
reasonably determined to manage an _ extraordinarily
heavy docket of closely related cases by adopting a “lead

12

case” approach that would finally resolve—at least at its
level—the controlling legal issues. In order for that pro-
cedure to be of any benefit to the court and the parties, it
was necessary for the parties to treat the resolution of
issues raised in the lead cases as thereafter controlling the
resolution, by a panel of the court of appeals, of any iden-
tical issues presented in the other cases that were held in
abeyance—especially after this Court denied certiorari in
the lead cases. It therefore was entirely reasonable for the
court of appeals to inform counsel that the parties could
not simply ignore the disposition of the lead cases. In any
event, petitioner is in no position to question the fairness
of this special “lead case” procedure, because he raised no
objection when it was first instituted or at any time before
the lead cases were decided, and he was the sole counsel in
one of the lead cases (Pet. App. A9, A162).

Moreover, the procedure followed by the court below
did not prevent counsel from (1) attempting to distinguish
their cases from the lead cases on legal or factual grounds,
(2) seeking en banc reconsideration of the legal issues that
had been decided, or (3) simply acknowledging the court
of appeals’ precedents and preserving the issues for possi-
ble review by this Court. But petitioner followed none of
those legitimate courses. Instead, he simply reargued the
issues previously decided —disregarding the court’s rules
and notices, failing to distinguish the lead case authorities,
ignoring the authorities cited in the government’s briefs,
and making factual arguments without citation to the
record (Pet. App. A170). There accordingly is no merit to
petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 7-9, 26) that the numerous
briefs he filed were addressed to questions left open by the
decisions in the lead cases.? This conclusion is confirmed

® Because none of petitioner’s briefs cited to the record below, peti-
tioner cannot argue that he properly raised any factual issues, such as

13

by the court’s exhaustive analysis of petitioner’s brief in
Des Vignes, which was substantially identical to almost all
of the other briefs and which demonstrated that petitioner
neither attempted to distinguish the lead cases nor
acknowledged those adverse precedents and argued for
their reversal or modification; he merely repeated the same
arguments that a five-judge panel of the court had only
recently rejected (Pet. App. A189-A190). Nor, contrary to
petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 26), did he prosecute the ap-
peals in a manner that simply preserved the issues for con-
sideration by this Court. He took the position that he was
entitled to prevail in the court of appeals, thus requiring
government counsel and the court below to examine each
and every case and brief that he filed so that any
meritorious issue left open by the lead cases would not be
overlooked.!°

the propriety of consolidation by the MSPB (see Pet. 7). See Moylan
v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 524 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) (petitioner waived any right he may
have had to object to consolidation). Moreover, contrary to peti-
tioner’s suggestion (Pet. 8), the appropriateness of the penalty of
removal for the offense of participating in the illegal strike was settled
by Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 477
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984), one of the lead cases.
Petitioner’s reliance (Pet. 8) on Brown v. Department of Transporta-
tion, FAA, 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984), for the proposition that
there was still doubt on this point after Schapansky is completely
misplaced, because the offense in that case was not participation in a
strike. Finally, while it is true that the decision in Schapansky left
open the possibility that individual controllers who were absent during
the strike could prove facts showing that their absence was not at-
tributable to participation in the strike (see Pet. 8-9), petitioner’s
briefs did not legitimately raise this issue because they did not cite to
supporting evidence in the record.

'0 As Judge Bennett pointed out (Pet. App. A81I), only four cer-
tiorari petitions were filed in the 154 cases in which petitioner pros-

14

c. Petitioner erroneously relies (Pet. 15-17, 28 n.8,
31-32) on the views of several experts on legal ethics who
testified at the hearing before Judge Bennett on the ques-
tion of when an appeal should be regarded as “frivolous.”
Although the court below properly concluded that the
responsibility to judge the conduct of members of its bar
resides with the court, rather than petitioner’s witnesses, it
nevertheless observed that the conclusions drawn by peti-
tioner’s witnesses were stated in general terms and did not
address the specific grounds upon which the court had
already found the appeals to be frivolous (Pet. App.
A50-A51, A186-A187).

The experts premised their testimony largely on the view
that petitioner was obligated to pursue the appeals because
his clients insisted that he do so. That proposition,
however, is clearly incorrect. The American Bar Associa-
tion’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983), which
codify broadly accepted professional standards, prohibit
the maintenance of frivolous litigation.'' Although those
Rules do permit a lawyer to make “a good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”
(see note 11, supra), when pursuing that course, it is im-

ecuted appeals on behalf of 736 controllers, and all of those petitions
were denied. %

'' Rule 3.1 provides:

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or con-
trovert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is
not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an exten-
sion, modification or reversal of existing law. * * *

As Judge Bennett’s recommended opinion explains, the relevant pro-
visions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were
adopted in 1983, are fully consistent with the corresponding provi-
sions of the superseded Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Pet. App. A32-A38).

|

15

perative, as Judge Bennett observed, “that the attorney
cite and attempt to distinguish the contrary precedent and
provide arguable reasons supporting an _ extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law” (Pet. App. A80).
Yet petitioner “consistently did neither” (ibid.). Because
petitioner’s experts focused on the propriety of such
legitimate efforts to confront and distinguish countervail-
ing authority, their testimony did not address the conduct
in which petitioner actually engaged. In addition,
although the Model Rules require a lawyer to represent his
client with diligence, that duty does not extend to the use
of unlawful or unethical measures.'? See Jn re Bithoney,
486 F.2d 319, 322 (ist Cir. 1973). As the court below prop-
erly concluded, a lawyer may not escape responsibility for
his own unethical conduct by asserting that his clients in-
sisted that he engage in it (Pet. App. A187).

d. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 11) that his firm took “ap-
propriate, lawyerly steps” to deal with the problem of fil-
ing dozens of briefs within the 60-day period prescribed by
the court of appeals after the lead cases were decided.
However, that contention ignores the fact that petitioner
apparently was able to prosecute the numerous appeals
only by flagrantly disregarding the court’s rules and

'2 Rule 1.3 provides: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client.” However, the comment to
this rule states that a lawyer “may take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor” (em-
phasis added). Similarly, although Rule 1.2 states that “[a] lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation,” it provides only that the lawyer “shall consu/t with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued” (emphasis
added). Thus, as between the lawyer and the client, the lawyer must
decide what means are lawful and ethical. The client’s authority is
limited “by law and the lawyer’s professional obligations,” and “a
lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply
because a client may wish that the lawyer do so.” Rule 1.2, comment.

EC

16

notices and by filing “canned” briefs that did not mean-
ingfully address the governing precedents or even
acknowledge the individual records upon which the ap-
peals were based. It was not sufficient for counsel to cope
as best he could; it was his responsibility not to take on
cases that he could not competently handle.'?

e. Finally, the decision below does not, as petitioner
maintains (Pet. 25), require members of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s bar to serve as its “gatekeepers.” The decision below
simply enforces the “almost universally recognized” duty
of officers of the court to avoid conduct that is “prej-
udicial to the administration of justice.” Jn re Synder, 472
U.S. 634, 645 (1985). It cannot be doubted that filing more
than 140 frivolous appeals in the face of repeated warnings
was prejudicial to the administration of justice, because it
detracted from the court’s ability to devote its limited
resources to deserving litigants and required unwarranted
additional efforts of government counsel in responding to
petitioner’s submissions. For these reasons, petitioner’s
conduct was “unbecoming a member of the bar of the
court” and properly subjected him to the one-year suspen-
sion.

2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 33-40), however, that the
suspension was defective because he was entitled to, but
did not receive, certain “procedural safeguards” — prin-
cipally a “neutral and unbiased tribunal” (Pet. 33, 36), by
which he means a tribunal other than the court of appeals.
However, there is no support for petitioner’s contention
that it is improper for the court before which an attorney
engages in misconduct to make determinations under and
enforce Fed. R. App. P. 46. To the contrary, the Rule ex-

'’ The comment to Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct states: “A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that
each matter can be handled adequately.”

17

pressly provides for the court itself to take the disciplinary
action. See note 8, supra. Vesting that responsibility in the
court is consistent with the fact that it is the court itself
that admits attorneys to practice in the first place, and
with this Court’s recognition of the inherent power of the
federal courts, in the absence of a governing Act of Con-
gress, to regulate the conduct of attorneys and to suspend
or disbar an attorney from practice before them. See /n re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985); Ex parte Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-379 (1866); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824). Moreover, as Judge Bennett
pointed out (Pet. App. A44-A45), the standard procedure
in the courts of appeals is for the court itself to make the
final determination whether an attorney should be sus-
pended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplined. See /n re
Snyder, 472 U.S. at 638-642; In re Bithoney, supra; In re
Tatum, 587 F.2d 682 (Sth Cir. 1979); In re Chandler, 450
F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner seeks to bolster his argument that all judges
on the en banc court of appeals should have been dis-
qualified by arguing (Pet. 33-36) that disciplinary pro-
ceedings are like criminal contempt proceedings, in which
disqualification is sometimes required. The two situations
are, however, very different. A criminal contempt, to
which various procedural safeguards attach, “is a crime in
the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public
wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both.” Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968); accord,
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S.
787 (1987). This Court therefore has held that in some cir-
cumstances, where the conduct involves a personal attack
on the judge that is likely to leave a personal sting, the
contempt proceedings should be presided over by a dif-
ferent judge. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488,

18

501-503 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). A pro-
ceeding concerning the possible suspension of a lawyer for
“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court” is
quite different from a criminal prosecution. Such a pro- —
ceeding focuses on the individuai’s adherence to the widely
accepted standards of his profession, including the
avoidance of conduct that is inimical to the administration
of justice (Jn re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 645), and a proceeding
concerning the possible suspension or disbarment of an at-
torney is an aspect of the court’s broad regulatory power
over the attorneys who practice before it. It therefore is
untenable to suggest that all judges of the particular court
must be disqualified from participating in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding. Moreover, even in cases of
criminal contempt, there is no absolute rule barring the
judge who presided in the underlying proceeding from also
presiding in the contempt proceeding, if the conduct does
not personally embroil the judge. Here, petitioner’s un-
professional conduct was not personally directed to any of
the judges of the court of appeals, and therefore would
not require the disqualification of those judges even if the
principles of the contempt cases were fully applicable in
this setting.

b. There is no basis for petitioner’s underlying premise
that the court below was partial or biased in some manner.
There is, for example, no evidence that the court of ap-
peals had prejudged the question whether petitioner
should be suspended from practice before that court. All
evidence is to the contrary. The court appointed a re-
spected senior judge, who had not previously been involved
in the air traffic controller appeals, to take evidence and
issue a recommended decision,'* and petitioner par-

'4 There is no indication that Judge Bennett considered himself
bound by the court’s previous conclusions regarding the frivolous

19

ticipated in a full evidentiary hearing at which none of his
evidence was excluded (Pet. App. A22). Petitioner also ex-
ercised his right to take exceptions to Judge Bennett’s
recommended decision, and the court addressed and
responded fully to each of his arguments — both initially
and on reconsideration. In the absence of any concrete
evidence of bias, petitioner’s argument that disqualifica-
tion was required in this case, if carried to its logical con-
clusion, would lead to the disqualification of all judges in
all matters relating to sanctions for misconduct in the
course of litigation, because of a supposition of bias.'°
That simply is not the law.

c. Relying on an analogy to an increase in a penalty on
appeal, petitioner maintains (Pet. 38-39) that the en banc
court impermissibly imposed a “more severe” penalty by
rejecting Judge Bennett’s recommendation that the
suspension be deferred pending petitioner’s demonstration
of good behavior. This contention is without merit. The
order to show cause made it clear that the court would

nature of petitioner’s appeals; to the contrary, Judge Bennett stated
that he made an “independent review” of the briefs petitioner filed in
order to determine whether they were frivolous (Pet. App. A67). In
any event, as explained above (see pages 10-11, supra), Judge Bennett
would not have been wrong to have regarded himself as bound by the
court’s prior determinations. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion (Pet.
38), those findings were made in adversary proceedings. In each of the
briefs it filed in those individual cases, the government argued that the
appeal was frivolous and requested that sanctions be imposed.
Although petitioner did not respond to those contentions, he clearly
had an opportunity to do so.

'S See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 38 (damages for delays caused by
frivolous appeals); Fed. R. App. P. 30(b) (sanctions against counsel
for unreasonably increasing the cost of litigation); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
(sanctions for violation of requirements that pleadings be well
grounded in fact and law, etc.); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (sanctions for
failing to obey pretrial orders, etc.).

20

determine the appropriate sanction and that Judge Ben-
nett’s role was that of a master assigned to take evidence
and recommend a course of action. Petitioner was clearly
on notice, as of the date of the show cause order, that he
risked being suspended from practice before the court for
a period of two years.'®

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

DONALD B. AYER
Acting Solicitor General*

JOHN R. BOLTON
Assistant Attorney General

DAVID M. COHEN
SANDRA P. SPOONER
Altorneys

DECEMBER 1988

'6 In any event, as a result of petitioner’s request for reconsidera-
tion, the en banc court considered all of his arguments in favor of the
sanction proposed by Judge Bennett, and rejected them (Pet. App.
A206).

* The Solicitor General is disqualified in this case. Although
counsel for the government did not participate in the proceedings in
the court of appeals leading to petitioner’s one-year suspension, we
deem it appropriate to file a response to the certiorari petition in the
name of the United States, on behalf of the court of appeals, in light
of the fact that an agency of the federal government was the opposing
party in the individual cases in which petitioner was found to have
engaged in unprofessional conduct and the government sought sanc-
tions in those individual cases. The court of appeals requested this Of-
fice to file a response to the certiorari petition, but it has not reviewed
the content of this brief.

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

In re

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS LITIGATION

Before FRIEDMAN, RICH, and DAvis, Circuit Judges.

[Filed Feb. 24, 1983]

ORDER

There are pending before the court more than 225 peti-
tions for review by former air traffic controllers challeng-
ing decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the
Board) sustaining the discharge of the controllers by the
Federal Aviation Administration (the Administration) for
participation in an illegal strike in August 1981. In most of
the cases the petitioners filed suit in this court following
decisions of various regional offices of the Board and did
not ask the Board itself to review the cases. In two of the
cases, however, the petitioners sought review by the Board
of regional office decision and then filed petitions to
review the final Board decisions in this court.!

The various cases raise a number of issues, including
challenges to both the Administration’s discharge of the
controllers and the Board’s affirmance of that action.

In addition to the cases before the court, the Board ad-
vises that it has pending more than 1,500 cases challenging

' Schapansky vy. Department of Transportation, Appeal No.
83-663; Johnson v. Department of Transportation, Appeal No.
83-664.

(la)

2a

decision[s] of its regional offices. The Board will review
five of those cases on an expedited basis as “lead cases,”’?
and it is expected that we will review Board decisions in
those five cases. The decisions of this court in those five
cases and the two cases already before us that the Board
itself has reviewed are expected to determine most, or
perhaps all, of the legal issues in the air traffic controllers
litigation.

On February 15, 1983, we suspended proceedings in
three of the cases before us in which the petitioners direct-
ly challenged the decisions of the Board regional offices
but did not seek review by the Board. We did so because,
in view of the large number of cases, it is appropriate that
this court first determine the common controlling legal
issues as soon as possible and thus avoid repetitious and
unnecessary decision of the same issues in many cases.

We conclude that we should follow the same practice in
the remaining cases until the seven lead cases finally have
been determined.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. All appeals from the Board, except for the seven
cases listed in footnotes | and 2, in the Air Traffic
Controllers litigation now pending before this court
are stayed pending final disposition of those seven
cases.

2 Richard T. Adams, et al. v. Federal Aviation Administration,
MSPB No. NY075281F0347; Kipp C. Anderson v. Federal Aviation
Administration, MSPB No. SL075281F0347; Gary S. Baracco v.
Federal Aviation Administration, MSPB No. DC075281F0895;
Robert L. Campbell v. Federal Aviation Administration, MSPB No.
DE075281F0697; and Joseph R. Noa (Richard E. Golle, et al.) v.
Federal Aviation Administration, MSPB No. NY075281F0697.

3 Thomas R. Ferrando v. United States, No. 83-687; John M.
srickson v. United States, No. 83-688; and Michael J. Zullo v. United
States, No. 83-689. de

3a

The Board is to withhold transmission of the cer-
tified lists normally submitted to the court in lieu of
the record.

Pending disposition of the seven cases, the Clerk of
this court is directed to retain in a suspense file all
pending petitions for review filed by Air Traffic
Controllers, with accompanying fees, and to with-
hold docketing of any petition as an appeal.

4a

APPENDIX B

NOTICE TO COUNSEL AND PETITIONERS IN AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLER LITIGATION

Enclosed are opinions in the Air Traffic Controller
“Lead Cases”.

The suspension entered by the Court on February 24,
1983 in all other Air Traffic Controller cases will remain in
effect until final disposition of all the “Lead Cases.”

You will be notified upon final disposition of all “Lead
Cases.” Within 30 days from the date of that notification
you must notify this court in writing if you want to pros-
ecute your appeal. If you do not so notify the court, your
appeal will be dismissed. Retained filing fees will be
returned.

The court has directed attention to the prosecution of
frivolous appeals. Wright v. United States, 728 F.2d 1459
(1984); Beachboard v. United States, 727 F.2d 1092
(1984); Connell v. Sears, 722 F.2d 1542 (1983); and
Asberry v. United States, 692 F.2d 1378 (1982).

May 18, 1984

/§/ GEORGE E. HUTCHINSON
George E. Hutchinson, Clerk

Sa
APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
717 MADISON PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20439

GEORGE E. HUTCHINSON TELEPHONE 633-6550
CLERK AREA CODE 202

NOTICE TO COUNSEL AND PETITIONERS IN AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER LITIGATION

The Supreme Court has completed final disposition of
all “Lead Cases” and mandates have been issued in those
cases to the Merit Systems Protection Board.

In accord with this court’s notice of May 18, 1984, you
are hereby notified that:

(1.) The suspension entered on February 24, 1983 will
remain in effect to and including January 10, 1985. Before
that date you must withdraw your present petition for
review or file a renewed petition. If you do neither, your
petition will be dismissed.

(2.) Any renewed petition must include a statement of
the issues relied on and not decided in any of the “Lead
Cases”.!

(3.) Checks received with the initial petition are being
returned with this notice. If you file a new petition, you
must enclose a new check for the $65.00 filing fee.

(4.) The Court again directs attention to the im-
propriety of frivolous appeals. Asberry v. United States,
692 F.2nd 1378 (1982); Connell v. Sears, 722 F.2nd 1542
(1983); Beachboard v. United States, 727 F.2d 1092
(1984); and Wright v. United States, 728 F.2d 1459 (1984).

' The “Lead Cases” can be found in 735 F.2d, pages 477 through
549.

6a

(5.) If you file a new petition, on or before January
10, 1985, your appeal will be docketed on receipt of that
petition. You must file your brief within 60 days
thereafter.

(6.) If you file a new petition, a certified list will not be
required. If need arises, the list of documents of record
may be ordered by the court, on motion or sua sponte.

(7). The Court will not act on motions of respondent
to dismiss or for summary affirmance in relation to a new
petition until petitioner’s brief/appendix has been filed.

FOR THE COURT

December 10, 1984
/s/ GEORGE E. HUTCHINSON

Clerk

7a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Misc. No. 145
In re

JACK B. SOLERWITZ

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, FRIEDMAN, RICH, DAVIS,
SMITH, NIES, NEWMAN, BISSELL and ARCHER, Circuit
Judges.

[Filed Jan. 21, 1987]

ORDER

On May 18, 1984, this court sent a “Notice to Counsel
and Petitioners in Air Traffic Controller Litigation”. That
notice enclosed copies of opinions in the precedents of this
court referred to as the Lead Cases and directed attention
to the impropriety of maintaining frivolous appeals, citing
published opinions of this court on that subject.

On December 10, 1984, this court again sent a “Notice
to Counsel and Petitioners in Air Traffic Controller
Litigation”. That notice informed recipients that the
Supreme Court had completed final disposition and man-
dates had issued in all Lead Cases, and that all pending
petitions would be dismissed unless withdrawn or replaced
with a new petition, stating “faJny renewed petition must

8a

include a statement of the issues relied on and not decided
in any of the ‘Lead Cases.’ ” That notice also gave the cita-
tions for the Lead Cases, and emphasized the impropriety
of frivolous appeals, citing published opinions of this
court on that subject.

The above-described Notices were sent to Jack B. Soler-
witz, Esquire. In addition, on July 12, 1985, July 31, 1985,
and August 30, 1985, this court wrote Mr. Solerwitz re-
questing that he review the propriety of maintaining his
appeals in light of the need to avoid frivolity and the ac-
companying abuse of the judicial process.

Mr. Solerwitz was thus repeatedly and expressly warned
by this court against filing and maintaining frivolous ap-
peals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal
issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those
presented and decided in the precedents represented by the
Lead Cases. Ignoring those warnings, Mr. Solerwitz, who
was sole counsel in one Lead Case, maintained 11
frivolous appeals pending on May 18, 1984 and filed and
maintained another 131 separate frivolous appeals in air
traffic controller cases. In his briefs in those appeals, 107
of which were virtually identical, Mr. Solerwitz disre-
garded Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and this
court’s rules, failed to file appendices, provided no cita-
tions to the record, ignored authorities cited by the
government, advanced numerous arguments On issues not
on appeal, and repeatedly raised contentions not raised
before the Merit Systems Protection Board. Mr. Solerwitz’
briefs were devoid of any showing on which the decision
appealed from could even possibly be reversed, devoid of
any basis on which the precedents of this court could be
distinguished in law or fact, and devoid of any effort to
make such distinctions, in total disregard of this court’s
written instructions of December 10, 1984.

9a

Despite repeated warnings and imposition of sanctions
totalling $74,500, Mr. Solerwitz continued his improper
pattern of conduct before this court. In three air traffic
controller “rehiring” cases, Mr. Solerwitz filed appeals and
had sanctions imposed because those appeals were
frivolous.

Mr. Solerwitz filed and maintained an appeal in a non-
air traffic controller case for which a sanction was im-
posed.

Mr. Solerwitz’ conduct in filing and maintaining
frivolous appeals having no colorable basis in fact or law
has wasted the time and limited resources of this court, has
denied availability of the court’s resources to deserving
litigants, and has constituted flagrant and totally inex-
cusable abuse of the judicial process. Mr. Solerwitz’ con-
duct has been “unbecoming a member of the bar of the
court”, Fed. R. App. P. 46(b). See e.g., In re Snyder, 105
S.Ct. 2874 (1985); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319 (Ist Cir.
1973).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

(1) That Jack B. Solerwitz, Esquire, by written answer
filed within thirty days from the date of this order, show
cause why he should not be suspended for two years from
representing clients before this court.

(2) That said answer shall state whether Mr. Solerwitz
desires oral argument or evidentiary hearing.

(3) That any oral argument or evidentiary hearing
shall be strictly limited to the above-described conduct of
Mr. Solerwitz.

(4) That Mr. Solerwitz complete and return within
said thirty days, the attached “Declaration of Admission

10a

to Practice” form. Waiver of answer does not remove the
necessity of completing and returning the attached form.

FOR THE COURT

Jan. 21, 1987 /s/ FRANCIS X. GINDHART
Date Francis X. Gindhart
Clerk

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1966 — 24169900013

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385002_0170%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
