# Appendix — Fontaine v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_1571%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 411 U.S. 213

## Text

In the Supreme Court of the Qnited States

Octoper Term, 1972
No. 71-6757

Davip X. FontTAINE, PETITIONER,
v.

Unrrep States

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

INDEX

Relevant Docket Entries, United States District Court....... 1
Relevant Docket Entries, United States Court of Appeals ... 2
Transcript of Arraignment proceedings, November 13, 1969. . 3
Transcript of Sentencing proceedings, February 13, 1970... 7
Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate and set aside judg-

ment of conviction, filed August 6,1971 ................ )
Brief of Law in Support of § 2255 Motion. .._—_—s-—s—........... 13
Exhibits to § 2255 Motion .__. 16
Motion to Dismiss motion to vacate sentence, filed October 6,

SS cn Eh # 22
Petitioner’s Traverse to Motion to Dismiss filed October 15,

SE oc xa-anl t 25
Opinion and Order Denying § 2255 Motion, December 7, 1971 30
Petitioner’s Assignments of Error on Appeal, filed January

RS TF GRAN peg tern eae ot 32
Court of Appeals Opinion and Order Affirming Judgment,

filed April 21, 1972 ....... : 34

Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, November 6, 1972 35

Date Filed
1971
Aug. 6

Aug. 6

Aug. 6
Oct. 6

Oct. 15
Dec. 7

Dec. 7

Dee. 21
Dee. 21
Dee. 21
Dec. 27

1972
Jan. 3

Reuevant Docket Entries
Unitep States District Court

Filings—Proceedings

Motion to vacate sentence with affidavit to
proceed in forma pauperis etc., filed.

Order granting petition to proceed in forma
pauperis, filed and entered.

Proof of mailing filed.

Govt’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s motion
to vacate sentence with proof of service, filed.

Petitioner’s traverse, filed.

Opinion and order denying motion to vacate
sentence, filed and entered.

Proof of mailing filed. _
Petitioner’s notice of appeal, filed.
Letter to attorneys re: appeal, filed.
Proof of mailing filed.

Order of CCA granting application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and denying peti-
tion for writ of mandamus, filed.

Petitioner’s pleading re: error and for designa-
tion on appeal, filed.

Date Filed
1972
Jan, 24

Jan. 31
Feb. 29

Feb. 29
Mar. 30

Mar. 30
Apr. 5

Apr. 13
Apr. 21

May 4

May 31
June 12

Rerevant Docket Entries
Unitrep States Court or APPEALS
FOR THE SrxtH Circuit

Filings—Proceedings

Certified record (1 vol. pleadings), filed; and
cause docketed.

Appearance of counsel for Appellant.

Four copies of Brief for Appellant, with proof
of service.

Four copies of Appendix.

Twenty-five copies of Brief and Appendix for
Appellee.

Proof of service of brief and appendix for
Appellee.

Case submitted on briefs without oral argument
(Weick, Edwards and Kent, JJ.).

Four copies of Reply Brief for Appellant
(Copies distributed to the Court).

Judgment of the District Court affirmed on
order without opinion (Weick, Edwards and
Kent, JJ.).

Motion of Appellant to stay the mandate and
send record to Supreme Court for certiorari
petition.

Order staying mandate thirty days (Weick, J.).

Letter from Office of the Solicitor General re-
questing that the entire certified record be
mailed to the Supreme Court (Supreme Court
No. 71-6757).

Unritep States District Court
FOR THE Hastern District or MtcHican
SouTHERN Division

5

Unitep States or AMERICA,

vs. > Cr. No. Arraignment
Davip FonTAINE

DEFENDANT.

Proceedings had in the above-entitled matter before Hon-
orable Fred W. Kaess, District Judge, at Detroit, Michigan,
on Thursday, November 13, 1969.

APPEARANCES:

JosEPH ZANGLIN, Esq.
(Assistant United States Attorney)

Appearing on behalf of the United States of
America

THe CLERK oF THE Court: The United States of America
vs David Fontaine.

Mr. Zanouin: Your Honor, this is an arraignment on an
information charging the defendant with armed bank
robbery. He’s been given a copy of the Information. He
acknowledges that he understands it and knows what the
maximum penalty is.

I have explained to him his right to an indictment by a
Grand Jury. He has waived that right and signed a waiver
of Rights Form.

He understands that he has a right to an attorney at
this time and he informs me that he wants to waive that
right and has signed a waiver of that right. Knowing all
of these rights he informs me that he intends to plead
guilty to the information.

Tue Court: You are Mr. David Fontaine?

Derenpant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tae Court: You have received a copy of the information
here, the charge here against you for armed bank robbery,
is that right?

3

STARR SSPREE STEN PTL LT

4

Derenpant Fontaine: Right.

Tue Court: The first thing of consequence is that you
have signed also a waiver of Grand Jury indictment which
means you are entitled to have this matter first submitted
to a Grand Jury and a determination made by that body
and an indictment returned first; do your understand that
and the rights you have thereunder? Anyway, that’s what
you will get if you wanted it to go to the Grand Jury.

Derenpant Fontaine: Yes.

Tue Court: You have signed a waiver of that right, am
I right?

DerenpDant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tre Court: In addition, you are entitled to be repre-
sented by an attorney and, if you are without funds with
which to employ an attorney, the Court will appoint one
for you. The Court has here before it a waiver of assign-
ment of an attorney. Is it your wish to proceed here with-
out an attorney?

Derenpant FontatneE: I guess so.

Tue Court: You have got to know so.

DeErenDANnT Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Are you aware of the maximum penalty in
this case? Not that you will get it because I don’t know
nor does anyone else what the penalty will be, but the
maximum penalty under your plea if you do plead, is 25
years and/or $10,000.00 fine; do you understand that?

Derenpant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: You understand the maximum penalty?

DEFENDANT FontaIneE: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Knowing all these things, is it your wish
then that—are you prepared to plead now?

Derenpant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: How do you plead, sir.

Derenpant Fontarne: Guilty.

Tue Court: With respect to your plea of guilty did any-
one made any promise to you of any kind with respect to
this matter in order for you to offer your plea of guilty
here?

Derenpant Fontarne: No, sir.

Tue Court: No one has threatened you?

DerenpDant Fontaine: No, sir.

Te Court: Do you understand the nature of the charge?
Do you know what you are charged with? : ae

es
f 5

Derenpant Fontatne: Yes I know what I am charged
with.

Tae Court: What are you charged with?

Derenpant Fontaine: Bank robbery.

Tue Court: Armed

Derenpant Fontaine: Armed bank rohbery.

THE Court: On October 8th?

Derenpant Fontaine: Right. I don’t know too much
about the law because I have never been in Court before.

Tue Court: I just want to know that you know what
you are doing

Derenvant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Is it your wish that the Court accept your
plea of guilty here to this offense of armed bank robbery?

Derenpant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Did you actually do that?

DrrEeNDANT Fontaine: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Did you actually attempt to rob a bank, or
did, I guess you did, of some $1,400.00?

Derenpvant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Are you knowingly and freely and volun-
tarily offering your plea of guilty here?

Derenpant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: I want to be sure that you know what you
are doing. You are pleading guilty to armed bank robbery
occuring on October 8th of the Liberty State Bank in
Hamtramck.

Derenpant Fontarne: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: And by the use of a gun, pistol, right?

Derenpant Fontarne: Right.

Mr. Zancuin: Your Honor, I would suggest that the
Court ask the defendant to put on the record some of his
own statements concerning the specifies concerning this
crime.

THe Court: What did you do on October 8th?

Drrenpant Fonrtarne: I held the bank up.

THe Court: What?

Derenpant Fontarne: I held up the teller.

Tue Court: You held up a teller?

Derenpant Fontaine: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Did you take from him some $1,400.00 plus?

Derenpant Fontarye: Yes, sir.

Tue Court: Any more?

Me. Zanoiis: Was anyone with you when you committed
this robbery?

Tue Covrt: He is charged with aiding and abetting
Gregory Edward Lee.

Mr. Zanoiiw: No, I think Edward Gregory Lee abetted
him.

Tue Cover: Aided and abetted by Edward Gregory Lee.
That’s the charge, do you understand that?

Derexvant Fortarye: Yes, sir.

Tue Covrt: Is it your wish that the Court accept your
pleat

Derexpant Fowtarxe: Well, your Honor I wish you
would accept my plea on the fact that I have never had a
past record. I got strung up on the drugs and I started to
make some money.

Tue Covet: The Court will accept your plea and refer
you to the Probation Department for a pre-sentence re-
port.

Mr. Zanouis: As to bond, we would re: »mmend a $20,-
000.00 cash or surety bond.

Tue Covrt: It may be so ordered.

Ustrrep States Disraicr Court
ror THE Easterns Distnicr or MicHican
Sovutnern Division

Unrrep States or AMEnica,

vs. Cr. No, 44433
Davip FonTANe DEFENDANT.

Proceedings had in the above-entitled matter before Hon-
orable Fred W. Kaess, District Judge, at Detroit, Michigan,
on Friday, February 13, 1970.

APPEARANCES:

HENRY MAHER, Esq,
(Assistant United States Attorney)

Appearing on behalf of the United States
of America

Detroit, Michigan
Friday, February 13, 1970

Cierx oy tHe Covert: Number 44433, United States of
America vs David Fontane.

Tue Cover: You are Mr. David Fontane, sir?

Derenpvant Fowtane: Yes, sir.

Tue Cover: At the time of your plea you waived the
appointment of counsel; is it your wish that you proceed
here through sentence without being represented by
counsel?

Derenvant Fontaine: Yes, sir.

Tue Covet: The maximum sentence in this matter is
twenty five years, as you well know. Is there anything you
wish to say prior to sentence being imposed upon you.

Derexpant Fontanxe: Yes, I would like to say I would
like to have the mercy of the Court.

Tue Cover: Pardon me.

Derewxpant Foxtaxe: 1 was under the influence of drugs
when this happened. I would like to have mercy from the
Court.

Tue Cover: This isn’t the time for your plea. How about
your habit now?

Derenpant Foxtaxe: Well, I have been in jail five
months.

Tue Cover: Have yout

Derexvant Foxtanxe: Yes, your Honor. I think I have
kicked it already.

Tue Cover: You did plead to the charge of armed bank
robbery.

Derenpant Fontane: Yes, sir.

Tue Covet: The Court takes all these things into con-
sideration.

It is the sentence of this Court that the defendant be
placed in the custody of the Attorney General for a period
of twenty years under the provisions of Title 18, Section
4208 (a) 2.

Are there any other counts on this?
Mz. Mauer: No, there aren’t, your Honor.

Ix THE Unitep States Disrzicr Court ror THE
Eastern Disteicr or Micnican
Soutnern Division

Davy X. Fowtatxz, movant,
vs. Cr. Case No. 44433
Unsirep States or America.

Ox Mortiow to Vacate axp Ser Asipe Jupcment or Con-
vVCTION AND Sentence 1s Crmminat Case No. 44433 Upon
tHe Grounps THAT aLL Proceepincs Heretorore ADsvuDI-
CATED 18 Sarp Caimiwar Cause ane Nuit axp Vom As InitI10
axD In Toto as 18 Attowep ann Avruonizep Unver Tir.e 28,
US.C., Secrion 2255.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

Movant herein, David Fontaine, in pro se, respectfully
moves the Court in the above styled manner and in support
thereof submits as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On the night of October 21, 1969, movant was awakened
from a sound sleep by a loud crash and the frightened
screams of his wife and children. Movant noticed a man
strugling with his wife and leaped to her rescue. Movant
was thereupon clubbed into an unconscious state of mind.
Movant was being dragged from his home when he regained
consciousness. Movant, while dressed only in his under-
wear, was tossed into a police vehicle and taken to jail.
Movant subsequently learned that the police had, without
benefit of a search warrant or probable cause, had broken
into his home, clubbed him into an unconscious state and
hauled him off to jail, in his underwear, for the purpose
of interrogating him. After reaching the police station,
movant was handeuffed to a chair and interrogated about
several crimes the police said movant had either committed
or was involved in. Due to his physical and mental condi-
tion at the time of his interrogation movant does not re-
member very clearly what was said or what was asked of
him. His most vivid memory is that one of the interroga-
tion officers was named John Crookshank and that this
officer struck movant several times with his fist and open

10

hands while movant was handcuffed to the chair. Said
officer called movant ‘‘a nigger bastard’’ and promised to
beat him to death if he didn’t co-operate with the police.
Movant, while befuddled, groggy, and in mortal fear of his
life informed the police that he would say anything they
wanted him to say. At the time of the interrogation movant
began to bleed rather freely from a gunshotwound he had
received a few days prior to his arrest and for which he
had been bedridden at the time of his arrest. The brutal
treatment administered to him by the arresting officers had
torn open the wound which had been healing. Movant
blacked out a couple of times during the interrogation
but was revived by the police in order that he might answer
their questions concerning several crimes they claimed
movant had either committed or knew about. Movant, in
mortal fear of the officers and suffering from severe pain
asked that he be allowed to see a doctor and get some
rest. Movant was told by the police that they might let
him see a doctor if he co-operated with them and answered
their questions but if he didn’t co-operate he wasn’t going
to get anything but a bashed in head. Movant asked if he
could call an attorney before being asked any more ques-
tions and was slapped in the face by detective Crookshank
who informed movant that he was tired of all the stalling
and if movant didn’t start talking that he (detective Crook-
shank) was going to ‘‘bash his fuckin’ head’’ with a billy
club. While in mortal fear that his life was in danger of
being forfeited, movant pleaded with the interrogating
officers not to kill him and stated that he’d tell them any-
thing he knew and would do whatever they asked of him.
Thereafter said interrogating officers told movant that he
had committed numerous crimes and, how he had committed
them. Movant, not wanting to antagonize said officers agreed
to anything they asked of him and signed several] papers
presented to him for his signature. Thereafter movant
lost consciousness and when he regained his wits he was
being admitted at the Detroit General Hospital. The ad-
mission sheets at said hospital reflects that movant was
suffering from Heroin addiction, serum hepatitis, gunshot
wound in right abdomen, hematoma of the right flank and
a convulsive disorder. While in the hospital movant was
interviewed and interrogated by state and federal police
relative to the crimes and the alleged confessions movant

11

had made on the night of his arrest. Movant, while ill and
mentally disturbed let the police intimidate and coerce him
into an agreement to enter a plea of guilty to armed bank
robbery. Movant was told that if he did not enter a plea of
guilty to the bank robbery charge in federal court that he
would be prosecuted in state court and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Due to his severe illnesses and mental prob-
lems movant allowed the police to convince him that he was a
bona fide bank robber and that unless he entered a plea of
guilty in federal Court that he would have to stay in the
Michigan State Prison for the remainder of his life. Movant
was told that he and another man had robbed a teller at
the Liberty State Bank in Hamtramack, Michigan of
$1,400. Movant, while mentally ill and not in control of his
faculties permitted the police to intimidate and coerce him
into an agreement to enter a plea of guilty to the robbery
of said bank ... A crime of which movant possesses no
knowledge of having ever committed, and a crime to which
he was coerced into saying he had committed.

Movant submits that he has a severe mental problem and
and that he suffers from epilepsy and a mental trauma of
major proportions due to his having been shot in the head
by the police when he was a teenager. Movant’s fear of
the police is such a strong psychological force it motivates
his every reaction and destroys his will to resist their
desires or commands. Movant holds a constant fear that
the police will kill him if he does not obey their every whim
or desire and it was this traumatic condition which moti-
vated movant’s mental apparatus when he allowed the
police to coerce and intimidate him into entering a plea of
guilty to a bank robbery. A crime movant did not commit.

Movant submits that following his arrest and arraign-
ment upon the bauk robbery charge that he was never before
a U.S. Commissioner nor had the advice of counsel at any
stage of the proceedings had.

Movant submits that he was beaten by the police for ask-
ing if he could talk to an attorney before being interrogated.

Movant submits that the police had conditioned his mind
for the proceedings in Court and that he did not understand
the consequences of his Constitutional waivers of counsel,
Grand Jury and plea of guilty.

Movant submits that he is uneducated (7th grade). That

12

the legal terms used by the Court were complete jargon to
movant and beyond his sphere of comprehension.

Movant submits that he was mentally ill at the time of his
arraignment and that his plea of guilty and waiver of
Constitutional safeguards was a product of his mental
illness.

MOTION NOW MADE

Movant prays that this Honorable Court take judicial
cognizance of the exhibits and brief of law annexed hereto
and made a part of this proceedings and if not convinced
that sufficient grounds exist for nullification of the Consti-
tutional waivers entered in this cause that a plenary
hearing be ordered whereby movant will be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence and testimony in his behalf;
that upon conclusion of such hearing that the Court make a
finding of fact and a conclusion of law therefrom; that the
judgment of conviction and sentence heretofore imposed
in this cause be declared null and void ab initio and in toto.
It is so prayed.

Respectfully submitted
Re err , 1971.

David X. Fontaine
Movant Pro se

Box P.M.B.
Atlanta, Ga. 30315

AFFIDAVIT

I, David X Fontaine, being duly affirmed and under oath,
depose and affirm that the allegations of fact set forth in
the foregoing motion are truee in all respects.

David X Fontaine
Affiant-Movant

Subscribed and affirmed to before me this 20 day of July,
1971.

Charles C. Moore
Notary Public

8S Ga Ge oh eee em ae a mc

BRIEF OF LAW
I

Movant submits that a plea of guilty is more than a con-
fession which admits that an accused did various acts; it is
itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment

and determine punishment. KERCHERAL V. UNITED
STATES, 274 U.S. 220.

II

The admissibility of a confession must be based on a
reliable determination of the voluntariness of issues which

satisfies the Constitutional rights of a defendant. JACK-
SON V. DENNO, 378 U.S. 368.

Ill

The question of an effective waiver of Federal Consti-
tutional right in a proceeding is governed by federal
standards. CARNLEY V. COCHRAN, 369 U.S. 506.

IV

Several federal Constitutional rights are involved in a
waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered:
first is the privilege granted against compulsory self-in-
crimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, U.S.
Constitution; second is right to trial by jury; third is right
to confront one’s accusers; fourth is the right to indictment
by a Grand Jury; and fifth is the right to competent coun-
sel; a waiver of these five important federal rights cannot
be presumed from a silent record. SMITH V. UNITED

STATES, 360 U.S. 1; BOYKIN V. ALABAMA, 395 US.
238.

ARGUMENT

Movant submits that the arraignment proceedings had in
this cause is of no force and effect when reviewed in their
proper light. Movant had long been brainwashed, coerced
and intimidated into entering his guilty plea before he was
arraigned. The in Court formalities conducted by the Court

13

14

and Government counsel did not go behind the scene on a
search for truth and in failing to do so may have provided
a record technically legal upon its face but when said record
is perused in the light of the truth such record becom<s a
mockery of justice.

The admissibility of a confession or a guilty plea induced
from a confession obtained under physical and mental
duress must be based on a ‘‘reliable determination of its
voluntary aspects’’. JACKSON V. DENNO, 378 U.S. 368,
387, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1786, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908.

In MCCARTHY V. UNITED STATES, 394 U.S. 459
the Supreme Court held that Rule 11, Fed. R.C.P. was de-
signed to assist trial judges in making the Constitutionally
required determination that a defendant’s guilty plea is
truly voluntary. See, eg. MACHIBRODA V. UNITED
STATES, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); VON MOLTKE JV.
GILLIES, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); WALEY V. JOHNSON,
316 U.S. 101; WALKER V. JOHNSON, 312 U.S. 275;
JOHNSON V. ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458; ef. SUNAL V.
LARGE, 332 U.S. 174.

In Von Moltke, supra, the Court held:

‘‘A waiver of the Constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel is of no less moment to an accused who must
decide whether to plead guilty than to an accused who
stands trial.”’. . . See WILLIAMS V. KAISER, 323

U.S. 471, 475.

In the case at bar Movant’s plea of guilty and conviction
based thereon is the product of fear, coercion and mental
illness.

In BISHOP V. UNITED STATES, 350 U.S. 961, the
Court held that the conviction of a legally incompetent de-
fendant violates due process.

In PATE V. ROBINSON, 383 U.S. 375, the Court again
held that the fundamental concepts of due process are
abused where the mentally ill are criminally prosecuted.

CONCLUSION

Movant submits that due process of law is sorely abused
where, as in the case at bar, the police, acting without bene-
fit of warrant or probable cause, smash in the doors of a
citizens home in the dead of night and brutally assaults

such citizen and his wife, then drags such citizen off to jail
in his underwear, cuffs him to a chair, beats him with clubs,
blackjacks, kicks him, and tells him that unless he ‘‘co-
operates’’ that his head will be bashed in, denies such citizen
access to legal counsel .. .

Such tactics used to obtain confessions and criminal ad-
missions are supposedly prohibited in a civilized nation
but the conviction dealt with herein was obtained in the
foregoing manner should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted

eee 8 Sete , 1971.
David X. Fontaine
Movant Pro se

Exhibits to Motion Under § 2255

City or Derroir
JEROME P. CAVANAGH, Mayor

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DETROIT GENERAL HOSPITAL
Detroit, Micuican 48226

DISCHARGE SUMMARY

NAME: David Fontaine
CASE NO.: 686365

SERVICE: Medicine, Ward 6-3
ADMITTED: 12/17/69
DISCHARGED: 1/6/70

FINAL DIAGNOSIS: Heroin addiction.

Serum hepatitis.

Old gunshot wound, right

abdomen.

Convulsive disorder.
SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS: Rule out hematoma, right

flank.

CHIEF COMPLAINT AND PRESENT ILLNESS: The
patient is a 26-year-old negro male who is a prisoner and
known heroin addict for the last two years. He came to the
hospital because the patient was complaining of dark urine,
yellowness in the eyes, anorexia, epigastric discomfort,
nausea and vomiting approximately one week prior to
admission. The patient has been in the jail for approxi-
mately 14 months and during this period he didn’t receive
any heroin. Two months prior to admission the patient had
a gunshot wound penetrating through the abdominal wall
in the right upper quadrant. He has been complaining of
right flank pain since then. Past history revealed a gunshot
wound in the head in 1962, Since then he continued to have
persistent headache and episodes of seizures. The patient
was placed on Dilantin and Phenobarbital since then. Three
to four days before admission the patient started having

16

dysuria, supra-pubic tenderness and fever with no chills,
and also started having right flank pain.

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: On admission showed a
well-developed, well-nourished negro male, not in distress.
Blood pressure 120/75, pulse 80 per minute. HEENT—
pupils equal, regular, react to light; fundi within normal
limits. Sclerae were icteric. Neck supple; no jugular vein
distention. Thyroid not enlarged. Mouth showed gunshot
wound hole in the superior palate. There was a scar in the
right forehead. Chest—lungs clear to percussion and aus-
cultation, Heart—normal sinus rhythm with no murmur.
Abdomen was soft. There was a penetrating gunshot wound
through the abdominal wall in the right upper quadrant.
There was a fullness and tenderness in the right costoverte-
bral angle. Also some tenderness in the supra-pubic area.
Bowel sounds present. Liver, spleen and kidneys were not
palpable. Extremities—there was no edema; all peripheral
pulses were intact. Neurological examination showed no
neurological deficit.

LABORATORY STUDIES: On admission, WBC 6,500,
hemoglobin 14 grams %. Reticulocyte count 3.5%. Urinaly-
sis—trace protein, sugar negative, WBC 8 to 16 per high
powered fielui. Alkaline phosphatase less than 4% B. units.
LDH 8,750, transaminase SGOT 786, urine culture showed
few alpha strep and few staph epidermitis. Colony count
less than 1,000. Subsequent urine culture showed no growth.
Prothrombin time patient 13.8, control 12.6. Bilirubin was
less than 1.2. Initial bilirubin total was 13.4. Bilirubin on
1/5/70, one day before discharge, was 1.4. Electrolytes—
sodium 130 mEKq/liter, potassium 4 mEq/liter, chloride 94,
CO2 24.7. Repeated determination of the enzyme alkaline
phosphatase, LDH and SGOT showed progressive lowering
in the serum level. Finally the enzymes returned to normal
on the day of discharge. Chest x-ray was normal. X-ray of
the abdomen was normal. I.V.P. was normal.

HOSPITAL COURSE: The patient during his hospital
course showed a smooth recovery and progressive improve-
ment in his general condition. Serial determination of the
bilirubin and the enzymes showing progressive lowering in
the levels. Finally bilirubin and enzymes SGOT, LDH and
alkaline phosphatase became normal before discharge. The

a rag IRE MIO AN TY

patient has been placed on a course of Ampicillin for
urinary tract infection. Finally, patient was discharged in
satisfactory condition to be followed in the Medical Clinic.
Discharge medications were Multi-vitamins, Dilantin and
Phenobarbital for convulsive disorder.

M. M. Au-Raw1, M.D.

W/0/#8
3/3/70

Crry or Derrorr

JEROME P. CAVANAGH, Mayor

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DETROIT GENERAL HOSPITAL
CENTRAL BRANCH
Derrorr, Micnican 48226

DISCHARGE SUMMARY

ADMITTED: 10/21/69
DISCHARGED: 10/26/69

NAME: FONTAINE, David

CASE NO. 686365

SERVICE: Surgical ITI

FINAL DIAGNOSIS: Hematoma, right lumbar

region abdominal wall.
SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS: Two-week-old gunshot

wound, abdominal wall.
OPERATIONS PERFORMED: None.

Patient was admitted with a history of pain, right lumbar
region with superficial swelling in abdominal wall of two
weeks duration. Two weeks ago he had a gunshot wound of
abdominal wall after which he developed this painful super-
ficial swelling in the right lumbar region which has not been
increasing in size, but the pain has been persistently there.
When he came to the Emergency while he had the gunshot
wound. At that time (there was) X-ray of the abdomen did
not reveal any gas in the abdomen except that there was a

small and superficial dense shadow in the right lumbar
regional abdominal wall.

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Patient does have a very
superficial swelling in the abdominal wall in the right
lumbar region which is tender, not fluctuant, and extends
around the area about 2 inches in diameter around the
wound of exit. There is no organomegaly or there is no
other tender spot in the abdomen. The rest of system ex-

amination of the patient is insignificant and is absolutely
normal.

Urinalysis of the patient: Patient does have 3 to 4 RBC’s
in urine and otherwise the urine is normal. The IVP is
normal and patient was put on antibiotics of Procaine Peni-
cillin, 600,000 b.i.d. and Streptomycin, 1 gm. per day for
about 5 days and a needle exploration of the area was done
under aseptic precautions to find out whether there was any
pus in that small superficial swelling. It was negative.

Patient is being discharged in good condition to be fol-
lowed later on in the Clinic.

M. Gursahani, M.D.

10/28/69
w.o./#12

UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

1200 West Leonard St.
Pensacola, Florida 32501
(904) 432-7632
January 22, 1971
James Ron Shelley
Public Defender
210 8. Palafox St.
Pensacola, Florida 32501
Re: Hubert Fountain, Jr.—Our file #41995
Dear Sir:

The records on the above mentioned person have been
microfilmed, therefore, we will have to give you the infor-
mation you need in the form of a letter.

He was in our hospital from 11/10/62 to 11/24/62 under
the care of Dr. Tippins. Drs. Wolf and Rodewald did the
actual surgery. The final Diagnosis was gun shot wound
of head, also, 1. Fracture of right cranial bone and maxilla.
2. Fracture of floor of right frontal sinus. 3. Foreign body
in right frontal sinus. 4. Depressed skull fracture right
frontal area. He was discharged as improved, with a
prognosis of good.

Operation: 1. Tracheotomy. 2. Removal of foreign bodies
from right frontal sinus. 3. Elevation of deparesed fracture
of right frontal sinus. The operative report shows that the
gunshot wound entered the head at floor of the mouth and
traveled through tongue, roof of mouth, nasal bones and
nose and was lodged in frontal sinus.

Past History: Never been hospitalized before.

Present History: This patient was brought to Emergency
Room after being shot by Police when trying to avoid arrest.

Hoping this is satisfactory, I am,

Yours truly,
Maus. J. Lerner

Medical Records
ee

Unrrep States Distaict Court
Easterns Disraict or Micnican
SovutrHuern Drvision

) CIVIL NO.

Daviw X. FonTane, PETITIONER, morrerro
pr + DISMISS

Usrrep States or AMERICA, RESPONDENT. ny ACATE r

SENTENCE

NOW COMES the United States of America by and
through its attorneys Ralph B. Guy, Jr., United States
Attorney, and Michael D. Gladstone, Assistant United
States Attorney, both for the Eastern District of Michigan,
and respectfully states as follows:

FACTS

Petitioner, David Fontane was charged in a one count
Indictment with having been aided and abetted by one
Gregory Edward Lee in the armed robbery of the Libert
State Bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2113(d).

Subsequently, on November 13, 1969, petitioner was ar-
raigned and at this proceeding pled guilty to the indictment.
Consequently, petitioner was sentenced to be placed in the
custody of the Attorney General for a period of Twenty
years under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §4208(a)2.

Petitioner’s motion to vacate is essentially based on the
claims that he was mentally incompetent to plea and that
his plea was involuntary.

1. Petitioner was not mentally incompetant when he
waived counsel and pleaded guilty.

Petitioner was specifically asked whether he desired court
appointed counsel and answered that he wished to proceed
without the assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges that
due to a gunshot wound seven years previously this waiver
is void as is his plea of guilty.

22

During the entire arraignment the petitioner failed to
mention or even infer any facts pertaining to his mental
condition, past medical history, or drug addiction. He did
respond to each question asked by the court and admitted
he knew what he was doing.

The Hayes case requires from a petitioner specific facts
regarding the alleged prior mental history or incidents of
aberration to-support the conclusory allegations. Hayes v.
United States, 399 F.2d 691 (5th Cir., 1968); See also
Dranow v. United States, 407 F.2d 47 (8th Cir., 1969);
Sanchez v. United States, 401 F.2d 771 (2nd Cir., 1968).

A similar fact situation occurred in Edwards v. United
States, 422 F.2d 788 (7th Cir., 1970). There the defendant,
Edwards, after waiving counsel added, ‘‘but I would like
to talk to somebody that has some maybe psychiatric train-
ing. ..’’ . The court was thereby alerted to this possible
defense, and upon further questioning and observation of
Edwards decided he was competant to plea.

In this case there is no warning given or incidents of
prior aberration nor evidence of medical treatment by a
psychiatrist. The medical report from University Hospita!
states no damage to petitioner’s brain and a good prognosis
after surgery.

It is respondent’s position that petitioner has not borne
his burden under the Hayes case.

II. Petitioner’s plea of guilty was not involuntary.

This claim by petitioner is completely unsupported by
the facts alleged. Petitioner covers three pages with un-
substantiated claims of coercion and maltreatment at the
hands of the Detroit Police.

But a month after the above confrontation, when he was
before the Federal judge not one word was uttered to the
presiding judge of any abuse but instead petitioner affirma-
tively states that there had been no promises made nor had
he been threatened.

The case of Spears v. United States, 250 F.Supp. 698
(S.D. W. Va. 1966) at page 701 presents the same issue as
in this case: who is telling the truth. The Court cited the
following rule: ‘‘The burden of proof resting upon him and
the rules of credibility applying’’.

a

24

It is the government’s position that again the burden
borne by petitioner has not been satisfied.

Finally, respondent asserts that the requirements of Rule
11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as adjudicated in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) were satis-
fied by the District Court. Petitioner admitted he under-
stood the nature of the crime and the consequence of his
plea on the record.

The petitioner would now two years later have this Court
vacate his sentence upon the following record: petitioner
voluntarily waived his rights; he asserted his guilt and
requested mercy; he briefly described the commission of
the crime; remained silent during the arraignment as to
any alleged coercion or incompetancy; and declined his
right of allocution.

If petitioner were to prevail upon this record then guilty
pleas would be a farce and a means whereby an incarcerated
felon could obtain a new trial after witnesses were wither
dead or unlocatable, memories have faded, and evidence lost
or destroyed.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully prayed that in view of the foregoing this
Court will deny and dismiss petitioner’s Motion to Vacate
Sentence.

Respectfully submitted,

Raupex B. Guy, Jr.
United States Attorney

Micuazt D. Giapstone
Assistant U. 8. Attorney

Dated: October 6, 1971

Untitrep States Districr Court
Eastern District or MICHIGAN
Sovutuern Drvision

Davin X. Fontaine, PETITIONER,

RE: Civil No.
eg C 36898
Unirep States or AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

TRAVERSE

Comes now, David X. Fontaine, the petitioner herein, and
respectfully submits this Traverse in reply to the respond-
ent’s affidavit in opposition (dated Oct. 6, ’71, received by
petitioner Oct. 10, ’71) to petitioner’s motion for Sec. 2255
relief in Cr. No. 44433, forwarded to this Honorable Court,
dated July 20, ’71.

For the purpose of the record, petitioner asks the Court
to take note that contrary to respondent’s assertion under
‘“‘Facts’’ that petitioner pleaded guilty to an indictment,
that such assertion is contradicted by the record, to-wit:
(pg. 2, Plea Transcript, Nov. 13, 1969) :

Tue Cover: You have received a copy of the ‘‘informa-
tion’’ here, the charge here against you for armed bank
robbery, is that right? (Emphasis mine).

DEFENDANT

Fontaine: Right.

Further examination of said page 2, will show petitioner
‘twaived Grand Jury Indictment.’’

Petitioner could not competently or intelligently waive
his right to counsel since petitioner was never advised by
the Court of his right to a jury trial and to be confronted by
the witnesses against him; under the circumstances, peti-
tioner felt that the only function that would be required of
counsel, would be to stand beside petitioner while petitioner
plead guilty.

That petitioner was never advised of his trial and con-
frontation rights whereby he could understand the meaning-
fullness of representation by counsel, is clearly shown by
the lack of advice to him in these matters, to-wit: (pgs. 2-3,
Plea Transcript, supra) :

Tue Court: The first thing of consequence is that you

Ceca aoa...

a. Se

have signed (sic) also a waiver of Grand Jury indictment
which means you are entitled to have this matter first sub-
mitted to a Grand Jury and a determination made by that
body and an indictment returned first; do you understand
that and the rights you have thereunder? Anyway, that’s
what you will get if you wanted it to go to the Grand Jury.

DerenDANT

Fontaine: Yes.

Tue Cover: You have signed a waiver of that right, am
I right?

DereNDANT

Fontaine: Yes, Sir.

The dialogue between the Court and petitioner clearly
shows the latter was not given any understanding by the
former as to just what such a waiver encompassed. The
failure of the Court to inform petitioner of his basic rights
(of trial by jury and confrontation of witnesses) when tak-
ing a guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11, Fed. Rules of Crim.
Proc., is patently in violation of the mandate under Mc-
Carthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, and ‘‘automatic
prejudice’’ ensues.

The Court continued its dialogue with petitioner in the
following manner (pg. 3, supra) :

Tue Covet: In addition, you are entitled to be repre-
sented by an attorney and, if you are without funds with
which to employ an attorney, the Court will appoint one
for you. The Court has here before it a waiver of assign-
ment of an attorney. Is it your wish to proceed here with-
out an attorney?

DEFENDANT

Fontaine: I guess so.

Tue Court: You have got to know so.

DEFENDANT

Fonrtarne: Yes, Sir.

The irony of the whole proceedings aforerecited, is that
petitioner was given a handful of ‘‘waivers’’ to sign BE-
FORE the Court made any attempt to advise him in any
manner. Thus, as far as petitioner was aware, such waivers
were binding on him and any further proceedings were
mere formality, especially where, as here in his instant
case, no effort was made to inform him that such waivers
were not binding if he desired counsel (or trial by jury for
that matter).

27

There is nothing in the record to indicate petitioner’s
waivers of basic constitutional rights to trial, counsel and
confrontation were competently or intelligently taken, and
it is axiomatic under American Jurisprudence that for
waiver of constitutional rights to be effective, it must
clearly he established that there was ‘‘an intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege.’’ See, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Brook-
hart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 1245 (1966). The waiver
must be intelligent and competent. See, Cross v. United
States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir., 1963).

The respondent claims that :

‘*In this case there is no warning given or incidents of
prior aberration * * *’’

Yet, when we examine page 6, of the Plea Transcript, we
find when petitioner tended to explain his circumstances,
he stated :

**T got strong up on drugs * * *”’

There should be no argument that a person addicted to
drugs is mentally and physically ill and is unable to func-
tion in the ‘‘norm.’’ Such statement of addiction on peti-
tioner’s part was sufficient warning to the Court that peti-
tioner’s mental capabilities might well have been impaired,
causing him to incompetently waive basic rights and plead
guilty to a charge of a 25 year maximum (which the Court
readily gave him 20 years of).

Respondent further claims the requirements of Rule 11,
supra, as adjudicated in McCarthy, supra, were satisfied;
Respondent stating: (quote)——

‘*Petitioner admitted he understood the nature of the

crime and the consequences of his plea on the records.’’
(unquote)

In view of respondent’s assertion, it is necessary to ex-
amine the record and see whether petitioner was even ad-
vised of the ‘‘nature’’ of the crime, much-less understand
it. Hence, we move to page 4, of the Plea Transcript and
examine the following dialogue between the Court and peti-
tioner dealing with the ‘‘nature of the charge’’ issue:
(quote)——

Tue Court: Do you understand the nature of the charge?
Do you know what you are charged with?

DEFENDANT

Fontaine: Yes, I know what I am charged with.

Tue Court: What are you charged with?

DEFENDANT

Fontaine: Bank robbery.

Tue Court: Armed.

DEFENDANT

Fontaine: Armed Bank robbery.

Tue Court: On October 8th.

DEFENDANT

Fontarne: Right. I don’t know too much about the lav
because I have never been in Court before.

Tue Court: I just what to know that you know what yo'
are doing.

(end of quote)

The gravamen of the offense charged in the informatio’
was that petitioner robbed the Liberty State Bank, 930
Joseph Campau, Hamtramack, Michigan, ‘‘the deposits o
which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insuranc
Corporation.’’

Since United States District Courts have no common la\
jurisdiction in criminal cases, See: Section 3231, Title 18
U.S.C.A.; Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, at 106, 107
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 32, 3 L.Kc
259, and United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 41%
4 L.Ed. 124, the ‘‘nature’’ of the charge in petitioner’s in
stant case was not ‘‘armed bank robbery,’’ for it is a
essential element of an offense under Section 2113, Title 1§
U.S.C.A., that the institution robbed be a ‘‘bank’’ as define:
in Section 2113 (f). King v. United States, 426 F.2d 27:
(1970), and the term ‘‘bank’’ as applied in Section 2113 (a
is defined in subsection (f) of Section 2113, to include (1
any member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (2) an:
bank operating under the laws of the United States, an
(3) any bank the deposits of which are insured by th
Federal Insurance Corporation. See: Schoepflin v. Unite
States, 391 F.2d 390, 396, note 5 (1968).

At no time, during the pleadings or sentencing proceed
ings against petitioner, did the Court define the bank it
question as being F.D.I.C. insured, nor at any time durin;
said proceedings was any ‘‘Organization Certificate’’ pro
duced, and the lack of such certificate shows a lack of juris
diction on the part of the Court to accept a guilty plea t

29

what may not have even been a federal offense, especially
where, as here, no judicial notice was taken by the Court as :
to the ‘‘National Character’’ of the bank im question. Com-
pare: King v. United States, supra.

The ‘‘Organization Certificate’’ goes to the factual basis
as well as the jurisdictional basis of whether the offense in
question was of a federal nature.

Petitioner respectfully submits, that the bank in ques-
tion in his instant case did not have a charter number at the
time of the alleged robbery, and did not have any as of
September 13, 1971, when upon petitioner’s request for
same made to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
a search for such Corporation’s records showed NO CH AR-
TER (ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATE) for the bank
in question—The Liberty State Bank.

Petitioner can produce documentary proof to such effect,
plus additional proof that F.D.I.C. does not insure against
robberies; such insurance being provided by ‘‘ private in-

surance companies.’’

Under the circumstances of this instant case, petitioner’s
guilty plea was nothing more than a farce, devoid of due
process and Rule 11 safeguards as adjudicated in Mc-
Carthy, supra, and petitioner is entitled to McCarthy
relief.

In view of the foregoing, petitioner respectfully prays
that the Honorable Court grant the Motion to Vacate.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip X. Fontaine 27801
Petitioner, pro se

Unttrep Srates District Court
Eastern District or MIcHIGAN
SoutHerN Drviston

Civil No. 36898

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE

At a session of said court held in the Federal Building
in the City of Detroit, Michigan, on the 7th day of Decem-
ber, 1971.

Present: The Honorable FRED W. KAKESS, United
States District Judge.

The court has before it a motion to vacate sentence filed
by David X. Fontaine, an inmate of the United States peni-
tentiary at Atlanta, Georgia. At his arraignment the peti-
tioner pleaded guilty to having been aided and abetted by
another in the armed robbery of a bank in violation of
Title 18, U.S.C., § 2113(d). As a result, he was sentenced
to a term of twenty years in the custory of the Attorney
General, pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, U.S.C.,
§ 4208 (a) 2.

In challenging the validity of his conviction the Petitioner
alleges that he was mentally incompetent to plead and that
his plea was thus involuntary. The respondent has answered
the petition by filing a motion to dismiss.

The petitioner specifically alleges that his plea was the
product of fear, mental illness, drug addiction, and coercive
police tactics. In addition he contends that he failed to
understand the consequences of waiving counsel and plead-
ing guilty. A review of the entire record, however, fails to
substantiate these claims. Each time the court offered peti-
tioner the assistance of counsel prior to acceptance of his
plea, such offer was declined. It is apparent from the record
that petitioner was interrogated on the question of the vol-
untariness of his plea, that he understood his right to a
Grand Jury indictment, that he understood the nature of
the charge against him, that no promises were made to him,
and that he understood the maximum penalty he could
receive. As such, the court clearly conformed to the re-

30

a ————————

quirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as dictated by McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969), in accepting petitioner’s plea as voluntary.
When the trial court has so questioned the accused about
pleading guilty, the petitioner cannot now be heard to col-
laterally attack the record and deny what was said in open
court. United States v. Davis, 319 F.2d 482 (C.A. 6, 1963) ;
United States v. Orlando, 327 F.2d 185 (C.A. 6, 1964), cert.
denied 379 U.S. 825. Decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court also reflect this rule. See Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970). Therefore, petitioner’s instant claims are
without merit and do not warrant relief.

In view of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the

motion to vacate sentence be and the same is hereby
DENIED.

Frep N. Karss
United States District Judge

Unrrep States District Court
Eastern District or MICHIGAN
SoutrHern Division

CIVIL No. 36898

TO: CLERK OF COURT:

Comes now David X. Fontaine, in per se, and assigns as
error pursuant to Notice of Appeal heretofore filed in this
Court from the order of Hon. Fred W. Kaess entered on
December 8, 1971, denying Motion to Vacate Conviction
pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

ERROR (ONE)

That the trial Court erred in its arbitrary and capricious
denial of fundamental issues of law set forth in defendant-
appellant’s motion de hors the record.

The contention of the Court that .. . ‘‘A review of the
entire record, however, fails to substantiate these claims

99

Trial Courts may not resort to now existent records to
deny material questions of law submitted de hors the
records.

In the case sub judice the Trial Court argues that a
mentally incompetent is capable of understanding the na-
ture of his charge and all of the intricate legal ramifications
surrounding the taking of waivers of Constitutional rights
to indictment, counsel, and what constitutes a valid plea of
guilty.

The official medical records submitted with defendant-
appellant’s motion to Vacate clearly and fordefully presents
a prima facie cause of action which required the Court to
grant a plenary hearing, accord petitioner an opportunity
to sustain the burden of proof required to substantiate the
material allegations set forth in his motion.

If the contentions of the Court are to be sustained there
is no remedy available whereby a mentally ill defendant
may collaterally attack an illegal conviction.

ERROR (TWO)

The Court erred in its failure to accord defendant-Appel-
lant an opportunity to be fully and properly heard upon
material infringements of constitutional rights which tran-

32

sc

spired outside the presence of the Court and the Court
reporter. This plain error and impermissable as a matter
of law.

RECORDS DESIGNATED ON APPEAL

- Transcript of Arraignment and Sentence.

- Motion to Vacate Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section
2255.

Governments Motion To Dismiss.

. Petitioner’s Traverse.

- Order of Court Denying Motion to Vacate.

. Notice of Appeal.

. Assignment of Errors.

. Designation of Records.

. All Court Minutes.

. Pre-Sentence Report.

- All Medical Records Made exhibits with Motion to
Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

ROO DOND OP ROM

— he

Done this 28th day of Dee., 1971.

/s/ Davi X. Fonvatne 27801-138
Appellant-Defendant
Box P.M.B.
Atlanta, Ga. 30315

Davw X. Fowrarws,
Petitioner-Appellant

Unsrrep States or Amenica,
Respondent-Appellee

No. 72-1060

Usrrep States Cover or Arrzars
vor tus Stuxra Cracurr

’

» ORDER

Before WEICK, EDWARDS and KENT, Circuit Judges.

Upon consideration of the appeal, it appearing to the
Court that in accepting appellant’s plea of guilty to the
information charging him with armed bank robbery the
District Court fully complied with Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P.,
and determined that his plea was wholly voluntary, that his
plea was not made as a result of any threats, and that he
was not under the influence of drugs at the time,

It is therefore ORDERED that the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court be and it is hereby affirmed.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT.

James A. Hicorns
Clerk

Supreme Cover or tux Unirep Srares
No. 71-6757

Daviw X. Fowrarne,
PETITIONER,

v.
Usrrep Srates

On petition for writ of Certiorari to the United States
eosccces Court of Appeals for the Sixth ........ Cireuit.

On consideration of the motion for leave to proceed herein
in forma pauperis and of the petition for writ of certiorari,
it is ordered by this Court that the motion to proceed in
forma pauperis be, and the same is hereby, granted; and
that the pe‘ition for writ of certiorari be, and the same is

hereby, granted.
Novemser 6, 1972

t U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972~489-457/227

35

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_1571%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
