# Jurisdictional Statement — Mitchell v. Donovan

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1970
- **Citation:** 398 U.S. 427

## Text

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JOHN F. DAVIS, CL

Supreme Court 4 the ited States

OcroBER TERM, 1969

0. $26

—

CHARLENE MITCHELL, et al.,

Appellants,
ny ame

JosePpH L. Donovan, Secretary of State of the State of ©

Minnesota and DovGi.as M. Heap, Attorney General of
the State of Minnesota,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES. DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Lynn S. Castner
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union
925 Upper Midwest Building .
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401
Attorney for Appellants

Me.vin L. Wuir
156 ‘Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10010
Of Counsel:

SS SS

—

Opinions Below Rica eee seaieceseisons SF g)phee ORF TRS RM

SR ALR SEAR: SEES a

NNN NINN acide ction ekinscesedeaviniSeceo—cescbubbiionasinnsen

Questions Presented me ssdeaccucnasdigecamuacctes

Statement of the Case cn

The Questions. Presented Are Substantial .............. Pare a

1.

te

cr

6.

A court cannot grant temporary relief and

then claim that the granting of the temporary

relief causes the original action to become mcot
and not an actual controversy when a federal
statute remains in effect which can be used to
inhibit appellants’ electoral activities ..............

The Communist Control Act, 50 U. S. C. $§841
and 842, is an unconstitutional bill of attainder

The Communist Control Act, 50 U: 8. C. §§841
and 842, is an unconstitutional ex post facto law

The Communist Control Act, 50 U. S. C. §$841

12
17

18

and 842, violates freedom of speech, press, as- -

sembly and petition -..02..2..20.2022.22.2-2:.:00------ pleas

“The Communist Control Act, 50 U.S. C. $y841

and 842, violates substantive due process ....

The Communist Control Act, 50 U.S. C, §$841
and 842, violates procedural due process ........

9
19

20

ii

7. The appellees’? action in refusing appellants’
nominating petition deprived appellants of due
process and equal protection.of the law ...........

8. The dismissal of the complaint by the court be-
low deprives-appellants of equal protection of
the law by requiring appellants to follow addi-
tional procedures not required of other politi-
CUE RIT Sistecar scscisimscxchtsncntgeiciomciocnasionds

9, The Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S. C.
§§841 and 842, is not within the legislative
power of Congress in that Article II, Section 1,
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution
limits federal control over the qualifications of
presidential electors asepcnianihansilncicdean ianeeucanlasaiine

a a ee re eS Fe
+

ApPpENvDIxX—Opinions and Judgment Below:

1. Opinion and judgment of three-judge court on
IE «hy SE pacescensnnecccernsneterenacandStaectrctncssi

2. Opinion and judgment of three-judge court on
July 14, 1969 -..W-..W.n-.-ereneeneenee rich ka cacadlber tie ee

CITATIONS

Cases:

PAGE,

21

21

Allen v. State Board of Elections; Fairley v. Patter-_

son, Bunton v.. Patterson; and Whitley v. Williams,

Tw le Th DR CED wiciericeistncecictcscsatatnininsiniicienisemicninianbevenion ,

Anderson v. Martin, 375-U. S. 399 (1964) _.00........ 21, 22

ill
PAGE |

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) .. 20
Associated «Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1944) 19

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) on. ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee |
Bohler v. Lane, 204 F. Supp. 168 (D. Fla. 1962) PERI Pi 14
Brockington v. Rhodes (No. eid 37 L. W. 3301, Feb-
I iis I occetiicestvtadinchaccaachcacincthapicckeacait Sirus 15
Butler v.. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380 (1957 D setcarbbrsnieahanioosiinine’ 19
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ......... iseeeats 20
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965) -.....222..------ 21
‘Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927) 20 3
Communist Party, U. S. A. v. Catherwood, 367 U. S..
389 (1961) ; ; NE: 9, 16,18
Communist Party, U. S. A. v. Babeenive Activities
Control Board, 367 U. S. 1 (1961) 0. 17,18
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18
2 Miike Be MS CD saci esccecenccnisaicls jaminataaicadRceuabicss 17,18 ©
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966) 002... 20
_ Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L. Ed.

906 (1867) iedadincadsebeaideslatetcsbiedenit 17.
Fitzgerald v. Green, 134.U. S. 377 (1890) ..... tS 23
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, |

ee ea Sia easels ecaedeeersindcccadteasenss 2-3

_ Friend v. United States, 388 F. 2d 579 (D. C. Cir. 1967) 14
- Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963) cApibdasetinaelaodies 14.
Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U. S. 358 (1969) 15

Hall v. Beals, 89 S. Ct. 1624, May 5, 1969 ooo. 15

wm.

lV at dace

’ PAGE

Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 x. D. Cal. 1964) .. 14

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 389 ( 1969) stdibe uenitiinkaohe ai, 22
Joint Anti-Fascist Hefngee Committee v. MeGrath, 341
FS Sp 2.) seul Wimmer iethcarh oe Sepa SARC? Sete 20
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1 (1929) tan dedecstabanss sicoae: ................ pease acai:
~ Article I, Section 10, RII 2 , Sa heceocdccunknceecbinkakboat tenes
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 0.0.0.2... ceeeeeeeeee eee
vaio lV, scauees 2, Clause 1

Statutes:
° |

Communist Control Act of 1954.

Section 841, 50 Bae es canes 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15,
ae 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
Section 842, 50 U.S. CG ace Seige ...2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, -

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 °
28 U.S. C.

NINN CUI = spilics sansscasctepsetinnaie>-kabbbeoniemnacloauncioes Ree Rpm nae ?
Section 188%. ii... sDakesecbekectits ipelibedaes 2
Section 1343 (3) and (4) —............ Rarer vee 2
Section 2043 2.2. OEE We RIOR Pe ey 8
Section 2282 20... le PRON CE A PIM a 2
Section 2284 0... se scccstga meat oan 2 :

Fe ey aT TnEN aE
Minnesota Statute 202.11 (2) ........ sc chidislantalicdeihentanetag

IN THE -

Supreme Court of the Anited Ptates

Ocroser Term, 1969
$ gRaerien

eee Va.

~~
‘ CuHartene Mircue.t, et al.,

Appellants,
eT = ,

Joseru 1. Doxovay, Seeretary of State of the State of
Minnesota and Dovcias M. Heap, Attorney General of .
_ the State of Minnesota,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

>
. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellants appeal from the final order of a three-judge
court of the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota dismissing their complaint as moot and sub-
mit this statement to show that the Supreme Court of the
United States has jurisdiction of this appeal and that a
substantial question is. presented.

Opinions Below
. The initial opinion dated Oct. 2, 1968, granting an order
requiring “the appellee, Joseph L: Donovan, to place the

names of appellant presidential .and vice-presidential
candidates on the Minnesota general election ballot is

‘9
—

reported in 290 F. Supp. 642 (D. Minn. 1968) and is set out
in the Appendix, infra, pp. 25-37. The later opinion July 14, °
1969, granting an order allowing the amendment to the
complaint, and dismissing the complaint, has not yet been
officially reported. It is set out in the Appendix, infra,
pp. 38-47.. |

Jurisdiction :

Appellants brought this action in the United States
District Court for.the District of Minnesota for a temporary
and a permanent injunction requiring the Secretary of
State of Minnesota to accept the appellants’ nominating
petitions and to place the names of appellants Mitchell and _
YZagarell on the November, 1968 general election ballot in
Minnesota and for a.declaratory judgment that the Com-
munist Control Act of 1954, 50 U. S. C. §$841 and 842, is
unconstitutional and void. ‘50 U. S. C. {$841 and 842 were
cited by the appellees as barring the appellant candidates
_ from the ballot..

The action was brought under 28 U. S. C. $1331, 28
U.S. C. $1343 (3) and.(4), 42 U. S. C. $$§1981, 1983, and
1988, and 28 U. S. C. §§2282 and 2284.

The three-judge court dismissed the appellants’ com-
plaint as moot on July 14, 1969, which order was entered
on that same date. The notice of appeal was filed on
August 13, 1969 in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota in the Third Division.

The final order of the three-judge court dismissing the
complaint is appealable to the Supreme Court of the United _
States under 28 U. S. C. $1253. The following decisions
sustain the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review
. the judgment on direct appeal in this case: Florida Lime

3

| and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 (1960),
Clark vy. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927). |

Statutes Involved

50 U. S. C. §841 provides:
§841. Findings and declarations of fact

The Congress finds and declares that the Communist
Party of the United States, although purportedly a
political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a con-
spiracy to overthrow the Government of the United
States. It constitutes an authoritarian dictatorship
within a republic, demanding for itself the rights and
privileges accorded to political parties, but denying to

‘ all others the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
Unlike political parties, which evolve their policies and
programs through public means, by the reconciliation —
of a wide variety of individual views, and submit those
policies and programs to the electorate at large for
approval or disapproval, the policies and programs of
the Communist Party are secretly. prescribed for it by
the fortign leaders of the world Communist move-
ment. Its members have no part in determining its
goals, and are not permitted to voice dissent to party
objectives. Unlike members of political parties, mem-
bers of the Communist Party are ‘recruited for in-
doctrination with respect to its objectives and methods
and are organized, instructed, and disciplined to carry
into action slavishly the assignments given them by

- their hierarchical chieftains. Unlike political parties,
the Communist Party acknowledges rio constitutional
or statutory, limitations upon its conduct or upon that

4

=

of its members. The Communist Party is relatively
small numerically, and gives scant indication of capac-
ity ever to attain its ends by lawful political means.
The peril inherent in its operation arises not from its
numbers, but from its failure to acknowledge any-
limitation as to’ the nature of its activities, and its
dedication to the proposition that the present constitu-
tional Government of the United States ultimately must
be brought to ruin’ by any available means, including
resort to force and violence. Holding that doctrine,
its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power ren-
ders its existence a clear present and continuing dan-
ger to the security of the United States, It is the means
whereby individuals are seduced into the service of
the world Communist movement, trained to do its
bidding, and directed and controlled in the conspirato-
rial performance of their revolutionary services. There-
fore, the Communist Party should be outlawed. Aug.
24, 1954, ec. 886, §2, 68 Stat. 775.

- 50 U.S. C. $842 provides:

§842. Proscription of Communist Party, its successors
and subsidiary organizations

The Communist Party of the United States, or any
successors of such party regardless of the assumed
name, whose object or purpose is to overthrow the
Government of the United States, or the government
of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof,
or the government of any political subdivision therein
by force and violence, are not entitled to any of the
rights, privileges and immunities attendant upon legal
bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of

iB

«Rael ie tat ee ha

5)

the United States or any political subdivision thereof;
and whatever rights, privileges, and immunities which
have heretofore been granted to-said party or to any
subsidiary organization by reason of the laws of the
United States or any political subdivision thereof, are
terminated: Provided, however, That nothing in this
section shall be construed as amending the Internal
Security Act of. 1950, as amended. Aug. 24, 1954, ¢. 886,
§3, 68 Stat. 776.

Questions Presented

Whether the three-judge court erred in dismissing
the complaint on the ground of mootness, in view of
the fact that there is uncontradicted evidence. that
the appellant Communist Party of Minnesota will
participate in future Minnesota elections, and that the
appellee Attorney General of the State of Minnesota
has firmly established state policy that 50 U. S. C.
§§841 and 842 (Communist Control Act of 1954) pro- -
hibits appellants from appearing on any Minnesota
election ballots, by a formal public opinion of the
Attorney General to this effect and by maintaining
this position before the three-judge court after the
three-judge court granted temporary relief.

Whether 50 U. S. C. $6841 and 842 is a bill of at-
tainder in violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 3
of the U. S. Constitution, and when applied by the
states, is a violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1
of the U. S. Constitution.

Whether 50 U. S. C..4$841 and 842 is an ex post facto
law in violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of

6

the U.S. Constitution, and when applied by the states
is a Violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the
U. S. Constitution.

Whether 50 U. S. (’. §§841 and 842 violates freedom
of speech, press, assembly and petition guaranteed
by the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.

Whether 50 U.S. C. §$841 and 842 violates due proe-
ess as protected by the Dne Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by not
being reasonably restricted to the evil which it pur-
ports to control.

3. Whether 50 U.S. C. $841 and $42 violates procedural

due process as protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution by.
depriving an organization of liberty and property
without affording those affected an adversary hear-’
ing, aglequate notice of the charges, the right to
couse, the right to present evidence, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to a
judicial determination and written findings of fact,
and the right to a written appeal.

Whether the action of the appellees in refusing to
accept the nominating petitions from the appellants
denied them due provess of law and equal protection
of the laws in that-the deprivation of the right of the
citizens of Minnesota to vote is a violation of due
process and equal protection of the laws. |

Whether the final order of the three-judge court dated

July 14, 1969 denies appellants equal protection of

the laws by requiring the appellants to follow addi-
tional procedures not required of other political candi-

7.

dates by making it necessary that the candidates
initiate a lawsuit each and every time they wish to
appear on the Minnesota General Election ballot.

9. Whether 50 U. S. C. 94841 and 842 is in fact within ~
the legislative power of Congress in that Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2 of the U. S. Constitution limits
the power of the federal government from interfering
with the qualifications of federal presidential electors.

Statement of the Case

In accordance with M.S. A. 202.69, the Communist Party
of Minnesota secured the signatures of over two thousand
eligible voters of the State of Minnesota on a petition
nominating the presidential and vice-presidential candi-
- dates of the Communist Party, U. S. A., appellants Char-
lene Mitchell and Michael Zagarell, which entitled the
names of those candidates together with their party desig- .
nation -to be placed on the Minnesota General Election
ballot for the 1968 election. The appellants, Elmer Bor-
man, Rose Ik. Bruns, Obadiah Cummins, James Erickson,
Nels Gudbrandson, Vernon Hartwig, Clara Jorgensen,
Trygve Larsen, Carl Lund, and-Betty M. Smith, were also
named on the nominating petition as candidates for the
office of presidential elector (Affidavits of : Betty M. Smith,
September 11, 1968; Michael Zagarell, September 10, 1968;
James Erickson, September 10, 1968; Elmer Borman, Sep-
tember 10, 1968; Trygve Larsen, September 10, 1968: Kar!
Sorg, September 10, 1968).

Within the time limit set by Sines Statute 202. 12),
the nominating petition, with 2,394 signatures, was pre-
sented to appellee, Secretary of State of Minnesota, Joseph

8

L. Donovan, for filing. Upon the advice in an official written
opinion of the appellee, Attorney General of Minnesota,
Douglas M. Head, dated September 9, 1968, the Secretary
of State refused to accept the nominating petition for filing
(Affidavit of Lynn S. Castner, September 11, 1968; written
refusal of appellee Secretary of State Donovan, September
9, 1968).

The written opinion of the State Attorney General stated
that the Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U. S. C. §§841
and 842, bars the Secretary of State from accepting and
filing the nominating petition submitted by the Communist «
Party of Minnesota and the Communist Party, U.S. A. ~
(Affidavit of Lynn 8. Castner, September 11,1968).

The appellants then brought an action in the court below
seeking a temporary and permanent injunction requiring
_ appellee Secretary of State Donovan to accept and file the
aforesaid nominating petition and to include the names of
appellant candidates Charlene Mitchell and Michael Zaga-
rell together with their party designation on the November
5, 1968 General Election ballot. A declaratory judgment
was also sought to declare the Communist Control Act of
1954, 50 U.S. C.$$841 and 842, unconstitutional and void in
that it violates the following provisions of the United States
Constitution: Article ‘1, Section 9, Clause 3; Article 1,
Section 10, Clause 1; Article Il, Section 1, Clause 2; Article
IV, Section 2, Clause 1; Article IV, Section 4; and the First.
Fifth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Com-
plaint). .

Chief District Judge Edward J. Devitt notified the
United States Attorney General of the constitutional
questions involved as required by 28 U. 8. C. §2043 on Sep-

-.

tember 24, 1968 (Notice to U. S: Attorney General, Septem-
ber 24, 1968).

United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota,
Patrick J. Foley, ‘appeared amicus ciriae and urged that
the Act is meant to disable the party as a party only and
not its members, and he suggested that the right of Mitchell
and Zagarell to appear on the ballot, and the right of the ©
nominees for presidential electors to be credited with the
votes cast for Mitchell and Zagarell, depended in no degree
on their status as nominees of the national or local Com-
munist Party. He argued that, as a matter of Minnesota
law, Mitchell and Zagarell are entitled to stand for office
because their names have been submitted in a timely
petition signed by the requisite number of qualified voters,
and concluded that no “right, privilege or immunity” of the
Communist Party as such is involved in this lawsuit. It
was therefore his view that the Communist Control Act of
1954 did not prohibit the Secretary of State from accepting .
. the nominating petitions and including the nominees upon
the ballot as candidates, of the Communist Party (Opinion
of the three-judge court, October 2, 1968, Appendix).

He also cited the “familiar rule that the decision of con-
stitutional questions should be avoided where fairly
possible,” Communist Party of the U. 8S. A. vy. Catherwood,
367 U.S. 389 (1961), and urged that the court should hesi-
tate long before adopting an interpretation that requires
resolution of “difficult constitutional questions.” 367 U. $
at 394. The brief of the United States admitted the serious-
ness of many of the appellants’ constitutional challenges to —
the law. Claims that the law is a bill of attainder, that it
unjustifiably abridges First Amendment: rights and the
rights to vote and to run for elective office, and that Con-

10

cress lacks power to establish qualifications for presiden-
tial electors are recognized as being substantial and raising
difficult constitutional ‘questions (Opinion of the three-
judge court, October 2, 1968, Appendix).

The three-judge court granted a temporary injunction
on October 2, 1968, reported as Mitchell v. Donovan, 290 F.
Supp. 642 (D. Minn. 1968), which ordered the appellee
Secretary of State Donovan to accept the appellants’
- nominating petition and to place the named candidates to-
gether with their party designation on the November 5,
1968S general election ballot. The appellee Donovan com-
plied, and the appellant candidates’ names did appear on
the ballot i in Minnesota as ordered.

The appellants appeared on the November 5, 1968 general
election ballot with other minority party candidates and
the following votes ‘were received by minority party.
candidates in the election:

Wallace and Griffin, American Party, Nominated by
Petition, 66,931 votes;
- Holstead and Boutelle, Socialist Workers’ Party,
Nominated by Petition, 808 votes; |
Blomen and Taylor, Industrial Government Party,
Nominated by Petition, 285 votes ;
Mitchell and Zagarell, Communist Party, U. S. A.,
Nominated by Petition, 415 votes;

Cleaver and Terry, Peace and Freedom Party,
Nominated by Petition, 935 votes;

McCarthy, Nominated by Petition, 585 votes.
1,606,307 Total Ballots
170 Scattered Votes

(Affidavit of Assistant Secretary of State Forrest Talbott -
in support of motion to dismiss, November 8, 1968.)

After the November 5, 1968 general election, the appel-’
lants moved to amend the complaint, adding paragraphs
stating that the Communist Party of Minnesota would
participate in future Minnesota election. The appellees
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of mootness
(Appellant motion to amend complaint, October 9, 1968;
affidavit of Betty M. Smith, November 2, 1968).

' The three-judge court granted the motion to amend the
complaint and the motion to dismiss on July 14, 1969 with-
out consider ing the merits of appellants’ claims, except in
the granting “of the temporary relief (Opinion of the three-
judge court, July 14, 1969, Appendix).

The three-judge court did not adopt the position of the’
U. S. Attorney, nor did it pass, on the merits of the ap-
. pellants claims in its’ granting of temporary relief (Opinion
of the three-judge court, October 2, 1968, Appendix).

12

The Questions. Presented Are Substantial

1. A court cannot grant temporary relief and then
claim that the granting of the temporary relief
causes the original action to become moot and
not an actual controversy when a federal statute
remains in effect which can be used to inhibit
appellants’ electoral activities.

;Though the election in 1968 in which the appellant
candidates were on the bailot is a past event, the Com-
munist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S. C. 60841 and 842,
retains the same force and effect as it had prior to that
election. Nq formal judicial decision on the merits of the
appellants’ constitutional claims has been made which will
govern future application of said statute to appellants’
political plans. Appellees are thus free.to repeat their past
conduct and continue to hold that the Communist Control
Act of 1954 prohibits allowing the candidates of the Com-
munist Party from appearing on the ballot.

Not’ only are appellees free to continue their past in-
terpretation but, in a hearing before Chief Judge Devitt on
November 25, 1068, after the election, concerning appel-
lants’ motion to amend .their complaint and appellees’
motion to dismiss, the then Solicitor General of Minnesota,
Richard Kyle, representing the appellee Attorney General
of Minnesota, stated that the appellee Attorney General
will continue to hold that 50 U.S. C. 4°S41 and 842 prohibits
Communist Party candidates from appearing on Minnesota
ballots : ,

“The Court: On another subject, | notice that
counsel's affidavit says on information and belief he
has learned that you, or the attorney general, are go-

13

ing to persist in your viewpoint so that if some other
Communist affiliated people file, you are going to take
the same position. .

Is there any basis for this information and belief?

Mr. Kyle: I think there probably is. At least there
is no new case law which has come down which would,
as far as | am concerned, dictate a different result,
ultimately” (Transcript of hearing, November 25, 1968,
pp. 7-8). .

Moreover, in an official published opinion of the appellee
Attorney General, the Attorney General ruled that 50:
U. S. C. §§841 and 842 bar Commiunist Party candidates
from the ballot and said, “However, any doubts relative
to this matter can only be finally resolved by the courts
pursuant to appropriate legal proceedings.”

This Court stated in Moore v. Ogilvie, 89 8. Ct. 1493,
1494 (1969), that the fact of the past occurrence of an elec-
tion did not require dismissal of a complaint based on
official practices in that election where there was a strong
indication of future repetition:

“Appellees urged in a motion to’dismiss that since the
November 5, 1968 election has been held, there is no

’ possibility of granting any relief to appellants and that
the appeal should be dismissed. But while the 1968
election is over, the burden which MacDougall v. Green,
supra, allowed to be placed on the nomination of

. nominees for statewide offices remains and controls
future elections, as long as [Illinois maintains her
present system as she has done since 1935, The problem

’ is therefore ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’
Southern Pacific Terminal Company v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 219 U. 8, 498, 515.”

7
14

Though the appellant candidates did appear on the Min-
nesota General Election ballot on November 5, 1968, as
they desired, only the order of the court below made that
event possible. But for that order, the appellees, Minnesota
Attorney General and Minnesota Secretary of State, would
have adamantly continued to refuse to accept appellants’ —
petition for nomination and to place appellant candidates’
names on the ballot. Their acquiescence to appellants’

requests was solely due to the court order below.

In Gray ¥. Sanders, 372° U.S. 368, 375 (1963), this Court
stated, in reference to a procedurally similar circumstance :

“Moreover, we think the case is not moot by reason of
the fact that the Democratic Committee voted to hold
the 1962 primary on a popular vote basis. But for the
injunction issued below, the 1962 Act remains in force; .
and if the complaint. were dismissed it would govern
future elections. In addition, the voluntary abandon-
ment of a practice does not relieve a court of adjudicat-
ing its legality, particularly where the practice is
deeply rooted and longstanding. For if the case was
dismissed as moot appellants would be ‘free to return
to... [their] old ways.’ United States v. W. T. Grant
Co., 345 U. 8. 629”.

See, ¢.g., Bohler v. Lane, 204 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D. Fla.
1962); Morris v. Williams, 149 F. 2d 703, 708 (8th Cir.
1945); Heilberg v. Fira, 236 ¥. Supp. 405, 407 (N. D. Cal.
1964); Friends v. United States, 388 F. 2d 579, 581 (D. C.
Cir. 1967); and Tyson v. Cages, 363 F. 2d 742, 743 (5th Cir.
1966).

The position maintained by the’ appellee Attorney
General is the result of an interpretation of an Act of Con-

15

gress which is still in effect and force. hus, the Com-

munist Control Act of 1954, 50 U, S. C. §§841 anc 842, pro-
- vides an independent basis for the appellees’ official position
and, thereby, establishes a “firmly embedded” policy.

The uncontradicted affidavit of Mrs. Betty M. Smith,
stating that the Communist Party will participate in future
Minnesota elections, indicates that a controversy still exists
which requires judicial resolution to prevent an identical
_ repetition of events at the next election (Affidavit of Betty
M. Smith, November 22, 1968).

This court has consistently granted review and decided
election cases after the November 5, 1968 general election.
. Brockington ~. Rhodes, cert. granted February 24, 1969,
37 L. W. 3301; Allen vy. State Board of Elections, Fairley
v. Patterson, Bunton v. Patterson and Whitley v. Williams,
393 U.S. 544 (1969): Moore v. Ogilric, 394 U. S. 814 (1969)
(May 6, 1969); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969) ; and
Hall v. Beals, probable jurisdiction noted May 5, 1969.

The three-judge court readily allowed the appellants’
motion to amend the complaint. The three-judge court dis-
tinguished election cases in the U. S. Supreme Court fol-
lowing the November 5, 1968 election as cases involving
firmly embedded state policies as expressed in the statutes
in the states involved (Opinion of the three-judge court,
July 14, 1969, Appendix).

_ This case involves a firmly embedded state policy to

bar Communist Party candidates from the’ ballot: The
appellee Attorney General published an opinion, which will
certainly be followed by all state election officials, advising
that 50 U. S. C. §6841 and 842 bars Communist Party
candidates from the ballot. While Attorney General opin-

16

ions are not binding, they will be followed by all state
officials unless the state official wishes to challenge the rul-
ing by court action. It is quixotic to think that any state
official could possibly have an interest in defending Com-
munist Party candidates’ rights to appear on the ballot,
and instituting lawsuits on their behalf. Therefore, unless
the Communist Party candidates are allowed judicial
resolution of the merits of their claims, the appellee Attor-
ney General ruling will, practically speaking, have the
force of a statute. Moreover, the appellee Attorney Gen-
eral, in his published opinion, called for judicial resolution
of the questions. ,

The three-judge court in granting temporary relief did
not adopt the U. S, Attorney’s position that 50 U. S. C.
§§841 and 842 does not bar Communist Party candidates
from the ballot, and there is authority in a case in another
state, the only opinion interpreting 50.U. 8S. C. 94841 and
842, in regard to Communist candidates, ruling that state
Communist Party candidates are barred from the ballot.
Salwen vy. Rees, 108 At. 2d 265 (1954).

Phe three-judge court, in its opinions of October 2, 1968
and July 14, 1969, acknowledged that there are serious con-
stitutional objections to 50 U. S. C. §§841 and 842; the
‘U.S. Attorney in his amicus curiae brief to the three-judge
court admitted that there are serious constitutional objec-
tions to 50 U.S. C. $$841 and 842; hnd Mr. Justice Harlan,
in the only case in this Court dealing with 50 U. S. C.
§$841 and 842,.Communist Party, U. S. A. v. Catherwood,
367.-U. S. 389 (1961), admitted that there were serious
constitutional objections to 50 U. S. C. $4841 and 842. The
merits of appellants’ claims should he determined.

“@ |
Ss

17

2. The Communist Control Act, 50 U. S. C. §§841
and 842, is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. ©

The Communist Control Act of 1954 sets out a Con-
gressional finding that the organization entitled the Com-
munist Party of the United States is guilty of membership
, and ‘participation in a foreign-controlled seditious con-
spiracy. 50.U.S. C. §841. Upon such finding, it terminates
all rights, privileges and immunities of that named organ- ©
ization. 50 U.S. C. §842.

A bill of attainder las been defined as a legi-lative
pronouncement that a particular named person or a group
of persons must be punished for committing certain acts.
Punishment has-been deemed to include deprivation of
rights and privileges available to other citizens. Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321, 323, 326, 18 L. Ed.
356 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366 (1867); United States v. Lorett, 328 U.S. 303,
314-316 (1946): and United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(1965). ,

This Court has held that an act which specifically names
the Communist Party and withholds some right or priv-
ilege from members of that named group available to
others is a bill of attainder. United States v. Brown, supra.
In commenting on Communist Party of the United States
v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961),
the Brown Court stated: “A majority of the Court rejected
the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reason-
ing that Section 3. does not specify the persons or groups
upon which the deprivations set forth in the Act are to
be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. ...”
367 U. 8S. at 451.

18

The majority in Communist Party, U. S. A. vy. SACB,
supra, clearly agreed that if the Act had applied to the
Communist Party by name, it would have been an illegal
bill of attainder. It is clear that under the prior decisions

of the Court the Communist Control Act should be declared
an unconstitutional bill of attainder.

In the only case to consider the constitutionality of the
Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U. S. C. 96841 and 842,
this Court in Communist Party, U. S. A. vy. Catherwood,
supra, held that the Act did not intend to prohibit the
Communist Party from being an employer, and thus the
constitutional questions were not decided.

3. The Communist Control Act, 50 U. S. C. §§841
and 842, is an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

An ex post facto law has been defined as a law which .
imposes punishment for activity which was not punishable
at the time it was committed. Cummings v. Missouri, supra.
In Cummings, an oath which required persons engaged in
many professions in Missouri after the Civil War to state, -
among other things, that the affiant had not engaged in
any past conduct hostile to the United States, was held
to be unconstifutional as an illegal ex post facto law. -

The Court held that a deprivation of rights, in that case
the right to pursue one’s profession, was punishment and
the statute was therefor an ex post facto law. |

50 U.S. C. §6841 and 842 deprives the Communist Party
of the- United States of all rights, privileges and im-
munities, thus constituting a punishment under the above
eases, solely on the basis of a legislative determination
based upon supposed past conduct of that named organ-
ization. Therefore, the Act is an ex post facto law pro-
hibited by the Constitution.

19

4. The Communist Control Act, 50 U. S. C. §§841
and 842, violates freedom of speech, press, assem-

bly and petition.

Minority political parties utilize the electoral forum to
espouse their political ideology and to propose solutions
for the problems that face society. By being able to par-
ticipate in formal election procedures, they can attain a
' larger and more attentive audience than they could through
use of other less effective vehicles for public debate.

This Court has often stated that the First Amendment
was designed to provide the widest and most complete
dissemination of pertinent information to the public so that
the electorate can promote a viable governmental system
through well informed choices of public officials and repre-
sentatives. Associated Press v. United States, 326.U.S. 1
(1944): Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 35 (1931).

Fundamental to participation in electoral politics is the
right to assemble together for a common purpose or dis-
cussion of public matters. “Effective advocacy ... is un-
deniably enhanced by group association”. National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama,
_ 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). i

Official action designed to restrain operation of these and
related rights has a “chilling effect” on speech, and on the
entire electoral process itself.

5. The Communist Control Act, 50 U. S. C. §§841
and 842, violates due process.

Governmental regulation must have a real and substan-
tial relation and be restricted to the evil with which it
claims to contend. Nebbia vy. New York, 291 U. S. 502,
525 (1934); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957).

20

The Act purportedly is designed to protect the national
security from activities which constitute a clear and pres-
ent danger to the United States. However, the Act is not .
restricted to prohibition or control of dangerous activities
but denies the Communist Party all its rights, including
the right to engage in lawful, peaceful conduct such as”
participation in electoral polities.

A statute must be “narrowly drawn to define and punish
specific conduct as constituting a clear and present dan-
ger’to a potential interest of the state.” Cantwell y. Con-
necticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U. S. 11 (1966). Legislative abridgment of funda-
mental personal rights must be narrow and consistent with
the least drastic means to achieve a valid ‘purpose. Shel-
ton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); N. A. A.C. P. v. Ala-
bama, 377 U. kos 288 (1964); Aptheker vy. Secretary of
State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964).

The Act is vague, overbroad, not reasonably related to
the evil which it purports to control, and thereby violates
due-process of law.

6. The Communist Control Act, 50 U. S. C. ssea1
and 842, violates procedural due process.

This Court has consistently held that a governmental
denial of liberty or property must be preceded by certain
fundamental procedures of fairness. The Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits Congress from depriving an organization
of liberty or property without according it a hearing on
the charges against it which are relied upon to support
the deprivation. some Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Minimally, a hearing must
be provided to determine the validity of alleged facts.

21

McFarland vy. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S.
79 (1916) ; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1 (1929); and Tot
. U. S., 319 U. S. 463 (1943). .

The Act does not provide any procedural safeguards
to those to be punished, not even a hearing. Instead, 50
U.S. C. §841 finds that the Communist Party of the U. S. -
is a criminal conspiracy designed to overthrow the U. S.
government, and 50 U. S. C. §842 deprives that organiza-
tion of liberty and property solely on the basis of legis- |
lative fiat.

7. The appellees’ action in refusing appellants’ nomi-
nating petition deprived appellants of due process
and equal protection of the, law.

An unfair discrimination operating to deprive someone
of the right to vote is a deprivation of due. process and
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. signed v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186;
— vi ene, 377 : U. S. 533 (1963) ; and Carrington

*, Rash, 380 U.S ” 99 (1965). ;

8. The dismissal of the complaint by the court below
deprives appellants of equal protection of the law
by requiring appellants to follow additional pro-
cedures not required of other political candidates.

This Court has held that a denial of equal protection
of the law résults from requiring certain political eandi-
dates or advocates of certain pieces of legislation to com-
ply with procedures not required of other candidates or
advocates, or to suffer certain burdens not required of -
those other candidates or advocates. Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U. S. 389 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387.U. S. 369
(1967); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).

22

Hunter v. Erickson, supra, struck down an amendment
to the Akron, Ohio city charter which required any ordi-
nance dealing with racial, religious or ancestral discrimi-
nation in housing to be approved by a referendum at. a
general or regular election before taking effect. This
amendment required additional procedures to be followed
in enacting this specific legislation, making it more difficult .
to enact this legislation as opposed to other legislation.
See also, Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399 (1964).

If the decision of the three-judge court dismissing the
complaint is allowed to stand, it will be necessary for
Communist Party candidates to initiate a fresh lawsuit
at the time of each and every election. With the inherent
time limitations in litigation, a strong possibility exists
that the merits of appellants’ contentions will not be
reached when further lawsuits are brought. Communist
Party candidates will have to file a lawsuit, be granted a
temporary injunction, and face dismissal of the suit after
the election. Though the Communist Party candidates
might still attain a position on the printed ballot, they
will. have to conform to this procedure of judicial inter-
ference which no other candidate need follow, which vio-
lates equal protection of the law.

9. The Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U. S. C.
§§841 and 842, is not within the legislative power
of Congress in that Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
of the United States Constitution limits federal con-
trol over the qualifications of presidential electors.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U. S. Constitution
provides:

“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct; a Number of Electors, |

—.

23

equal to the whole number of Senators and Represen-.

tatives to which the State may be entitled in Con-
gress... .” :

aa

This provision narrowly limits the power of the federal

_ government to interfere with the qualifications of presi-

dential electors. This Court has stated that the States

possess nearly exclusive control over the qualifications ‘of,
presidential electors. Fitzgerald v. Green, 1384 U. S. 377,

379, 380 (1890) and McPherson vy. Blacker, 146 U. S
35 (1902).

Of course the federal government does retain power to
control corrupt practices and to protect the right of all
citizens to vote in presidential elections without discrimi-
nation. However, these areas of control relate to protec-
tion of the electoral process itself, and of the constitutional
rights of the voters and office seekers. A prohibition of

members of the Communist Party from the ballot denies .

constitutional liberties of the electorate and the appellants.

4

CONCLUSION

¥

Jurisdiction should be noted.

”

Respectfully submitted,

Lyxx S. Castxen
Minnesota Civil Libertics Union
025 Upper Midwest Building
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401
Attorney for Appellants
> : ad .
Mevvis L. Weir
156 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10010
Of Counsel

APPENDIX

4 ‘

**

2

APPENDIX

Opinion and Judgment of Three-Judge Court
on October 2, 1968

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District or Mixxesora

Tuirp Division

No. 3-68-Civ-256

—_
Cuarctexe Mircuens, et al.,
; Plaintiffs,
vs.
Joseru L. Donovan, et al.,
Defendants.

——

Lyxx S. Castsxen, Minneapolis, Minnesota, attorney for
plaintiffs. |

Dovoras M. Heap, Attorney General of Minnesota, Ricitarp
Hi. Kyte, Solicitor General of Minnesota, Davin J.
Bynox, Special Assistant Attorney General of Minne-
xota, all of St. Paul, Minnesota, attorneys for defen-
dants. |

Parnwk J. Forty, United States Attorney for the District
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, as Amicus
Curiae.

Before:

Circuit Jupce Biackmun, Curer District Jupce Devitt,

and Disrricr Jupce NEVILLE.

Devirt, Chief District Judge.

This expression is occasioned by ‘the complaint of the
Communist Party candidates for President and Vice-Presi-
dent of the United States and others allied with them in
interest’ against Joseph L. Donovan who, as the Secretary
of State of Minnesota, is the public official charged with
the administration of the election machinery of the State.
and Douglas M. Head, Attorney General of Minnesota,
growing out of the refusal of Secretary of State Donovan
to accept for filing the nominating petition for the presi-
dential and vice-presidential candidates of the Communist
_ Party. oe ,

The plaintiffs request temporary and permanent relief
ordering Secretary of State Donovan to accept the ten-
dered nominating petition (which allegedly contains the
names of 2,394 qualified electors of the State of Minnesota),
and to place the names of the Communist Party candidates
on the 1968 general election ballot. Further relief is re-
quested in the form of a declaration of the inapplicability,
or in the alternative the constitutional invalidity, of the
Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U. S. C. A. 6§841 and
842. This law is the apparent authority for the Secretary
of State’s refusal to accept the plaintiffs’ petition.

* The other plaintiffs are: The Communist Party of the United
States, the Communist Party of Minnesota, ten nominated can-
didates for the office of presidential elector, two petitioners for
such nominations, and an eligible voter of the State of Minnesota.

4 |

At a hearing held September 17, 1968, briefs were filed
and arguments heard relating to the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the controversy and the
necessity and propriety of convening a statutory three-
judge court. While answers to the questions. of jurisdie-
tion and the necessity of a statutory three-judge court are
not completely clear, the court, acting through a single
judge, has made an initial determination that jurisdiction
does exist, 28 U.S. C. A. §§1331, 1343, and that a statutory
three-judge court should be convened to further consider
the issues involved. 28 U. S. C. A. $$2282, 2284. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,88 8. Ct. 1942 (1968).

Cireuit Judge Harry A. Blackmun of the Court of Ap-
. peals for the Kighth Cireuit, Chief District Judge Edward
J. Devitt, and District Judge Philip Neville, both of the
District of Minnesota, the judges designated under an-
thority of 28 U.S, C. A. $§2282 and 2284, heard oral argu-
ments on the issues on September 30, 1968, following no-
tice given on September 24, 1968 to counsel for all parties
and to the United States Attorney for the District of
Minnesota. In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S
C. A. 2403, the Attorney General of the United States was
notified by the court that the constitutionality of the Com-
‘ munist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S. C. A. $.S841 and 842,
was drawn in question, and was advised that he would he
permitted to intervene for the presentation of evidence, if
evidence were otherwise admissible in the case, and for
arguments on the question of the constitutionality of the
law. ; 7a

Extensive briefs have been filed on the questions of juris-
diction, the necessity that the matter be determined by a
statutory three-judge court, the granting of preliminary

28
relief, and the applicability of, and the constitutionality of,
the Communist Control Act of 1954.

It is not unlikely that a decision on the merits of this
matter would involve a determination of the constitutional-
ity of the Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S. CG. A.
§$S41 and 842. Since the passage of that Act there has been
scant judicial or legislative consideration of its meaning
and seope. In essence, the law contains a finding that the
Communist Party and its adjuncts are a menace to the
United States and should be outlawed ($841), and ex-
presses a determination that the rights, privileges, and
immunities normally attendant upon such bodies. are ter-.
minated ($842). |

The interdiction is broad and general in its terms, and
jabs at the very_core of our traditional constitutional free-
doms. It is thus not a matter to be considered lightly. Its
breadth and generality render its applicability to situations
like the present a question not admitting of hurried solu-
tion. The results of a determination of the relevant issues
on their merits may well have far-reaching national effect.
The constitutionality of the Act is not settled, nor have the
issues apparently involved in this case ever received au-
thoritative judicial consideration. The Supreme Court of
the United States has interpreted the Act on only one occa-
sion. Communist Party of the U. S. A. v. Catherwood, 367
U.S. 389, 81 S. Ct. 1465 (1961). In that case a decision on
the constitutional question involved was avoided. But the
court did imply a criticism of “the vague terminology” of
$842 of the Act. The court observed that:

“The statute contains no definition, and neither com-
mittee reports or authoritative spokesmen attempt to-

2

give any definition, of the clause ‘rights, privileges and
immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under
the jurisdiction of the United States or any political
subdivision thereof.” 367 U. S. at 392, 393.

~The question of validity of the Act, while not passed upon,
was noted to contain “novel constitutional questions.” 367
U.S. at 393. These observations might well be taken as a
skeptical, if not jaundiced, view of the constitutional va-
lidity of the Act.

An examination of the expressions of the United States
Supreme Court in other cases involving the control of
allegedly subversive organizations, and cases in other
areas involving similar constitutional doubts, may well be
looked to as a harbinger of the probable view of the court
if called upon in an appropriate case to pass upon the con-
stitutionality of the Communist Control Act of 1954.

Because attempted legislative control of subversive
groups and activities often involves —— of funda-
mental constitutional-freedoms, the Supreme Uourt has re-
quired that the standards of clarity and specificity be ap-
plied with particular stringency to such statutes. At least -
two provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, sections which on their face are narrower and more
specific than the statute here involved, have been stricken
down as vague and overbroad. United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 88 S. Ct. 419 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U. S. 500, 84S. Ct. 1659 (1964). See also, Note,
“Recent Developments in Communist Control Act Prose-
cutions,” 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 206 (1964).

In the case before us, issues involving rights of suffrage,
free speech, and free association are involved. Only the

30

most delicate control in such areas is to be tolerated.
Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. 8S. 54, 88 S. Ct. 184 (1967);
NAACP vy. Button, 371 U. 8S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328- (1963) ;
Cramp Vv. Ba. of Publ. Instr. of Orange Cty., Fla., 368
U.S. 275, 82.8. Ct. 275 (1961). Legislative exclusions of
the sort here being considered may be bills of attainder.
United States y. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85-8. Ct. 1707
(1965). Ae. .

The complaint, affidavits, briefs, and the oral arguments
presented have raised substantial doubts regarding the
Act’s applicability and constitutional validity. These.
doubts are of sufficient proportion to warn that hurried
arguments and precipitous decision of the issues would be
unwise. |

A Memorandum for the United States as Amicus
Curiae,” has been filed over the signature of Patrick J.
Foley, United States Attorney, advising that in his view
the Communist Control Act is ‘inapplicable to this case.
He urges that the Act is meant to disable the Communist
Party as a party only and not its members, and he sug-
gests that the right of plaintiffs Mitchell and Zagarell to
appear on the ballot, and the right of the nominees for
' presidential electors to be credited with the votes cast for
Mitchell and Zagarell, depend in no degree on their status °
as nominees of the national or local Communist Party. He
argues that, as a matter of Minnesota law, Mitchell and
Zagarell are entitled to stand for office because their names
have been submitted in a timely petition signed by the
requisite number of qualified Voters, and concludes that no
“right, privilege or immunity” of the Communist Party as
such is involved in this lawsuit. It is therefore his view
that the Communist Control Act of 1954 does not prohibit
the Seeretary of State from accepting the nominating peti-

tions and including the nominees upon the ballot as candi-
dates of the Communist Party.*

The Government also cites the “familiar rule- that the
decision of constitutional questions should be’avoided where
fairly possible,” Communist Party of the U. S. A. v.
Catherwood, supra, and urges that we should “hesitate.
long” before adopting an interpretation that requires reso:
lution of “difficult constitutional questions.” 367 U.S. at
394. a

The brief of the United States admits the scriousness of
inany of the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the law.
Claims that-the law is a bill of attainder, that it unjustifi-
ably abridges First Amendment rights and the rights to
vote and‘to run for elective office, and that Congress lacks
power to establish qualifications for presidential electors
are recognized as being substantial and raising difficult
constitutional questions. | | :

Because of the grave doubts which exist as to the con-
stitutionality of the Communist Control Act, and in light
of the amicus curiae position of the United States Attorney
as to the inapplieability of the Act to the situation: here,
and his strong suggestions regarding its constitutional in-
firmities, it would be unwise for us, on such short notier,
to attempt to resolve the issues on their merits. Addition-
ally, it should be noted that the Attorney General of the
United States, upon receipt and consideration of the statu-
tory notice sent to him pursuant to 28 U.S. C. A. ‘2403.
as to the pendency of the constitutional issues, may care
to intervene, offer evidence, and make argument as he has.
a right to do. He should be afforded sufficient opportunity

court, when presented with a similar probletn.
iat the Act reavhes only to the prevention of the
‘Communist Party.” from appearing on the ballot.
.16 N. J. 216, 108 A. 2d 265 (1954).

ee

7 At least o7
has observed
specific label,
Salwen v. Rees

32

and time to present his views. See also, 28 U.S. C. A. §$516
and 517. | ao

But, time is of the essence here. If a decision on the
merits were not reached by October 7, 1968, probably the
last date when the ballots must be delivered to the printer,
the nominated candidates would not have a place on the
printed ballot for the November 5, 1968 general election,
and the plaintiffs, assuming some merit in their conten- |
tions, would be deprived of their individual constitutional
rights. The plaintiffs have also sought to show that the
lack of an expeditious resolution of the issues involved will
substantially impede their proposed electioneering . cam-
paign in Minnesota.

On the other hand, the defendants have not urged, nor is
there apparent, any grave or irreparable harm which would
result from the grant of the requested temporary relief
directing the placement of the Communist Party ticket on
the ballot pending final disposition of the issues. It has
heen there several times before with unimpressive voter
response.* | ;

‘Thus, while the court finds and concludes that possible
serious injury will aecrie to the plaintiffs if the names of
Charlene Mitchell and Michael Zagarell as Communist
Party candidates for President and Vice-President do not
appear on the printed ballet, it has.found no discernible ‘

* According to the records in the office of the Minnesota Secre-
tary of State, the Communist Party vote for President in Minne-
sota for the years 1924-1940 is as follows: .

Weal ee Voting

1924 William Z. Foster—Workers Party 4,427 835,002
1928 William Z. Foster—Workers Communist. 4,853 999,823
1932 William Z. Foster—Communist 6,101 1,003,009
1936 Earl Prowder—Communist . 2,574 1, 120, 179

1940 Earl Browder—Communist ; 2,711 1 257 491

ballot.

33

probable injury which the defendants or the. citizens of
Minnesota will suffer if these names are placed on the

A well-informed, intelligent electorate such as exists

in the State of: Minnesota undobutedly will be able fairly to
discern and make appropriate decision upon the merits of
the principles advocated by the ¢ communist Party eandi-
dates and their sponsors. |

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED

That the defendant, Joseph L. Donovan, as Secretary of
State of Minnesota, absent any prohibitive Minnesota law,
accept for filing the nominating petition of the plaintiffs
and, if upon examination thereof he determines that the
petition complies in all respects with the requirements of
the pertinent Minnesota statutes, he is directed to cause
the names of the plaintiffs, Charlene Mitchell and Michacl
Zagarell, as Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates
of the Communist Party of the United States, to be placed
on the ballot for the November 5, 1968 general election.

This expression is intended to comply with Rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Clerk is directed to return the nominating petition
to pense counsel.

Dated:

October 2, 1968...

Harry A. BrackmuN
Harry A. Blackmun, Cirewt Judge

“pDWaRD J. Devitt
Edward J. Devitt, Chief District Judae

Puivie NEVILLE
Philip Neville, District Judae

a

Nevius, District SIudge °

T concur in the action taken by ied court since it pane
purely temporary relief. Personal disagreement on my part
with the philosophy and teachings of Communism obviously

_ dots not furnish an answey to the question presented in

this lawsuit. Assuming, ar 1 do, the validity and truth of
the findings mule by Congress and keeited in the Com-
munjst Control Act of 14, the court, nevertheless is urged.
by plaintiffs to dedlare’the Act unconstitutional Congress
declared the Communist Party to be “an instrumentality of
a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United
States.” whose policies and prograths “are secretly pre-

veribed for it by the foreign leaglers of the workl Communist

movement.” [tk existence was found to be “a clear present
and continuing danger to the scenrity of the United States”

amd the statute eer esg “Therefore, the C ommunist, Party
should be outlawed "' The juertion of the validity of the

c ¢ ‘ommmunist Control Act goes to the vers Inv ed» of our con.

stitutional framework. . \

1 would prefer to bottom jurisdiction on 42 0 OS. C. (1083
(Civil Rights Xet) and 28 U.S.C. (1343 rather than on 28
S.C. Ua. Although insevoting cases, proof of the
monetary value of the denial of the right to vote t one or
to many people perhaps can or-at least might ‘ be
presumed to he worth the jurisdictional $10,000 amount,
sections 1983 and 1343 require no financial amount to, Jae
involved, It seems dear to me that the Seeretary Of State
here acted “under color of (a) statute” of Minnesota. The
action of the Secretary of State determining that a statute —
permitting filing as 2 a canlidate hy petition: «did not

nialeiunditiiaausiiaiie

‘mrs eC, seat.
* Minn. Stat, $202.09.

3s

apply, for whatever reason, is acting under color of state
law. Faihire or refusal to apply a law is as much “action
under color of law” as is the reverse. Also | agree that a
three-judge court ix proper.

I take issue with the court's opinion insofar as it ex-
presses grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the Com-
munist Control Act. I do not mean to say that it is free
from all doubt. Further I believe that the United States
Supreme Court, if and when it considers this case, may
well conclude that if it permits the Communist Party to be
on the ballot little, if anything, will be left of the Com-
munist’. Control Act. Nevertheless | subseribe to the
temporary relief granted by this court because of the short-
‘hess of time, the inability fully to gtudy the problem and all
its facets, and the belief. that, halancing the equities, less
harin results from granting-the temporary relief than deny-
ing it.

Philosophically in a true democracy the majority should
rule and whatever it votes or determines should prevail. |
Yet inherent in thit concept are the seeds of self-destrue-
tion. Should the majority vote into power persons who
avowedly urge and effert the overthrow of the present form
of government, then no longer ix there a democracy or the
Republiean Form of government guaranteed to the states
by the United States Constitution.’ Under the “clear and
present danger” test prescribed by Holmes,’ Congress
* found, or at least expressed the fear, that such might

Philosophers and political scientists have pointed to the
“paradox of freedom” and have held to the view that the

' * US. Const, art. IV §4.
* Schenck ¥. United States, 249 1. 8, 47, ° (1919).

3

principle of freedom-cannot-require that one can make the
decision not to be free. It ix not freedoni to be allowed to
destroy freedom.’ It has been said that the best test of
truth is the power of thought to get itself aceepted in the
marketplace. Many contend, however, that a democratic ©
form of government should protect its freedom from those
who disbelieve in its theory and would abandon and deny
traditional civil liberties.

The court's opinion herein notes that the ates Court
has held restrictions on the activities of individual Com-
munists unconstitutional in situations where the statute
attempted to prohihit an avowed. Communist from working
in a defense plant * from holding an office in a labor union:
from obtaining a passport;’ and in another ease where
benefits were sought to be denied the Communist Party ax
an employer under state inemployment laws.” These cases
are, it seems to me, distinguishable, and relate to the move-
ment and citil rights of particular individuals and are quite
separate from and not precedent for the question of whether
by the ballot we should give our democracy the right by
democratic process to vote to destroy itself.

This most difficult question need not be and is not now
decided. I feel, however, that while doubts as to con-
stitutionality are not nearly as grave as the court's opinion

‘See Auerbach. The Communist Control Act of 1954, 24 v. cnt.
tL. kev. 173 (1956) containing a discussion at 168 et seq. on the
freedom to abdicate liberty. A number of writers holding generally

to this view are cited and quoted. See aleo Comment, The Com-
munist Control Act of 1954, 64 vate. +. 712, 738 (1955)

*U. 8. v. Robel, 389 U. 8. 258 (1967).
'T. 8. ¥. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
* Aptheker ¥. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
* Communut Party ve Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961).

37

would indicate,” small harm can come from permitting the
candidates to be on the ballot for this particular election:
whereas if they are excluded and the court should be in
error in such a decision some persons will have ‘been
deprived of their right to be candidates and others of their
right to vote for such candidates. Therefore, 1 concur.

Dennis 6. United States, 341 VS. 494, 509 (1951), wherein
the Court said: yr si, ~e Sig

“If Government is aware that’a group aiming at its over-
throw is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to co n-
mit them to a course whereby they will strike when leaders
feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is’
req 2 ag ‘ , , . , ;

Kut see Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
dimenting opinion of Justice Black at 137: a)

“I dé not believe that it ¢an be too often repeated that the
freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed
by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we
hate or sooner or later they will be denied -to the ideas we
cherish... .” |

38

Opinion and Judgment of Three-Judge Court
on July 14, 1969

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District or Mixxesora—Tuirv Divisios

No. 3-08-Civ-256

app
CHarcexe Mircuens, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
—vVvs.—
Joseru L. Doxovas, et al.,
Defendauts.

Lyx» S. Castser, Minneapolis, Minnesota, attorney for
plaintiffs.

Doveias M. Heap, Attorney General of Minnesota, Ricnarp
H. Kye, Solicitor General of Minnesota, and Daviw J.
Bynox, Special Assistant Attorney General of Minne- °
sota, all of St. Paul, Minnesota, attorneys for de-
fendants.

‘Before:

Cirrevit Juver Buackmus, Coser District Jupce Devirr,
and District Jupce Nevitre.

Devitt, Chief District Judge.

We concern ourselves here with the propriety of enter-
taining that portion of plaintiffs’ complaint seeking declara-

~ °

39

tory relief based on issues arising from the conduct of the
1968 Presidential Election in Minnesota as it pertained to
candidates running under the banner ot the Communist
Party. Defendants move tor dismissal, asserting mootness,

This action, for injunctive and declaratory relief, was
commenced in September, 1968 hy Charlene Mitchell, the
Presidential candidate of the Communist Part y. and others,’
against Secretary of State Donovan and Attorney General
Head, of the State of Minnesota, The plaintiffs sought an
order requiring Secretary Donovan to place the names and
party designation of the Yommunist Party candidates for
President and Vice-President of the United States’ on the
hallot for the general election of November » 1968,
Additionally, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the
Conimunist Contro! Act of 1954, 50 TLS. A. (°S41 and
S42, the ‘purperted ayithority for the defendants’ refusal
10 accept plaintifis’ nominating petition, ix inapplicable to
the présent situation, or in the alternative, is constitu.
tionally invalid. °
» In response to. the original complaint, probable juris-
dictionr-Was noted, 28 U. BC A. 51343, and a statutors
three-judge court Was convened, BU.8.C. A. $2282, 29R4.

‘to consider further the jsenes raised by the’ pleadings.

After oral arguments, ‘and study of briefs from the par-
ties and the United States Attorney as amicus curiae, the
court, in a memoranduny opinion and order dated October
2, 1968, granted temporary relief in the form ofan order
directing defendant Donovan, as Secretary of State of

' The other plaintiffs are: the Vice-presidential candidate of the
Comrounist Part#, the Communtet Party of the United States, the

Communist Party of Minnesota, teh nominated candidates for the
office of wresidential elector, two petitioners for such nominations,

and an eligible voter of the State of Minnesota. .

40)

Minnesota, to accept for filing the nominating petition of
plaintiffs, and upon a finding that the petition complied ~
in all respects with the .pertinent Minnesota statutes, to .
place the names of plaintiffs Mitchell and Zagarell, as
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the Com-
munist Party of the United States on the ballot for the
November 5, 1968 general-election. That Memorandum and
Order, containing a more detailed exposition of facts and
reasoning. is reported as Witchell v. Donovan, 290 F. Supp.
642 (D. Minn. 1968).

By affidavit with attached exhibits, it appears that-de-
fendant Donovan complied with the order of this court,
and that.the November 5, 1968 general election ballot con-
tained the names “Mitchell and Zagarell” with the
subdesignation “Communist Party USA/Nominated by
Petition.” * ;

On October 10, 1968, the plaintiffs moved to amend their
complaint by adding allegations that the Communist Party
plans to participate in Minnesota local, state, and national
elections which oecur after November 5, 1968, and that upon’
“information and belicf,” it appears that Attorney General
Head will continue to advise Minnesota election officials
that the Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U. S. C. A:
64841, 842 bars the Communist Party or any candidates
running under its express endorsement from participating
in any and all Minnesota elections.

One weck after the November 5, 1968 general election the
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground |
that “the issues involved in this litigation have hecome
moot and that there is no longer any justiciable issue to
be tried before this court.”

a,
;
;

?The plaintiff Mitchell and her running mate tallied 415 votes
* See eg., Moore v. Ogilvie, -.— V. 8S. ——. 89S. Ct. 1493, 37

41

In our view the issues raised by the original pleadings
are now moot since the plaintiffs’ nominating pctitions
were accepted and their names and their party designation
were placed on the ballot for the 1968-Presidential elections.

By their tendered amendment to the complaint, plain-
tiffs seek to have us rule for the future on the constitu-
tionality of the Communist Control Act of 1954, 50
U.S. C. A. §§841, 842, on the theory that Communist Party
candidates may seek some position on a Minnesota ballot
in some future election and that the person who is Attorney
. General of Minnesota at that time may take a position that
the provisions of the Communist Control Act of 1954 pre-
vent such filing.

We readily allow the motion .to amend the complaint,
yet view the issues thus shaped as inappropriate for ad-
judication and dismiss the complaint because, in our view,
such issues do not present a “controversy” as required by
the United States Constitution, Article II], and: the ex.
press language of the Declaratory J udgment Act, 28
U. S.-C. A. $2201.* oe

It is fundamental that the Declaratory Judgement Act
provided a judicial rémedy, but did not repeal the car-
dinal standard of federal jurisdiction that a federal court
may ‘not decide what is not a “case or controversy.” Mary-
land Casualty Co. y. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.. 312 U. S. 270.
61S. Ct. 510 (1941); Aetna Life Ins. Co. vy. Haworth, 200
U. S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461 (1937). In Maryland Casualty,
the Court said:

*“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except
with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
tion, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any
such declaration shall be reviewable as such.”

42

“The difference between an abstract question and a
‘controversy’ contemplated by the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act is necessarily one of degree; and it would
he difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a pre-
cise test for determining in every case whether there is
such a controversy. Basically, the question in each
case is whether the facts alfewed. under all the cir-
cumstances, show that there is a stbstantial contro-
versy, between parties having adverse legal interests,
-of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant. the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.” 312 U.S. at 273.

’ That constitutional hurdle demanding thie existence of an

actual case or controversy was in no sense abated by the
Declaratory Judgment Act. In fact, the course of a fed-
eral litigant seeking declaratory relief is in a sense the
more exacting, for,

“the Declaratory Judgment Act was an authorization,
not a command. It gave the federal courts competence
to make a deelaration of righfs; it did not impose a’
duty to do so.” Public Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rick-
aver, 369 U.S. TIL, 112, 82.8, Ct. 580 (1962).

Put in another way, the Declaratory Judgment Act,

“is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the
courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.”
Public Ser. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.
937, 241. 73 S. Ct. 236 (1952).

Here are guideposts which the United States Supreme
Court has set as to when declaratory relief should be
cranted.

43 =

“(Wy)hen all of the axioms have been exhausted and
all the words of definition have been spent, ‘the pro-
priety of declaratory relief in a particular ease will
depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness in-
formed by the teachings and experience concerning
the function and extent of federal judicial power.
While the courts should not be reluctant or niggzardly
in granting the relief in-the cases for which it is de-
signed, they must be alert to avoid imposition upon
their jurisdiction through obtaining futile or prema-
ture intervention, especially in the field of publie law.
A maximum of caution is necessary in the type of
litigation we have here. where a ruling is. sought
that would reach far beyond the particular case. Such
differences of opinion or conflicts of interest must be
‘ripe for determination’ as controversies over legal’
‘rights. The disagreement must not be nebulous or
contingent but must have taken on fixed or final shape
so that a court can see what legal issues it is deciding,
what effect its decision will have on the adversaries,
and some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding
them.” Public Ser. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co.,
supra, 344 U. S. at 243-4. ‘ ;

* Chief Justice Hughes expressed similar principles many years
hefore in Actna Life Ins, Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 997 (1937)
as follows:

“The Constitution limits the exercise of the Judicial power
to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ ‘The term “controversies,” if
distinguishable at all from “cases.” is <o in that it is less
comprehensive than‘the latter. and includes only suits of a
civil nature.” (citations omitted) .

. “A ‘controversy’ in this sense must he one that is appro-
_ priate for judicial determination. ... A justiciable controversy
is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypo-
thetical or ‘alstract character: from one that is academic or
moot... . The controversy must be definite and concrete,

44 ;

Applying these principles to this case, it appears to us

chat no issue is here ripe for decision; that a disagree-
ment, if it exists between the litigants, is nebulous and
eonjectural, not fixed and final in shape; and that no -use-
jul purpose would be served by a declaration of rights.
It is not at all certain that candidates will seek to run
on the Communist Party Ticket at the next or at sub-
sequent elections, albeit the affidavit of Mrs. Betty M.
Smith, the State Secretary of the Minnesota Communist
Party, alleges such future intention. From 1949 to 1968,
no person sought to run on the Communist ticket in Min-
nesota for any public office. Of course, it is certain that
future elections will be staged in Minnesota, but the. bare
certainty that future elections will be held is not enough.
Fair vy. Dekle, 367 F. 2d 377 (Sth Cir. 1966), cert. den. 386
U. S. 996. | |
But even assuming that some candidate were to run for
some office under the label of the Communist Party at-
some future election, it is not certain that at such future
election the then Attorney General of Minnesota will be
the same person who now holds that office or, if so, that
he will take the same legal position that was taken by the
Minnesota Attorney General in connection with the 1968
election. The present Minnesota Attorney General has not
said he will view the Communist Control Act of 1954 as
prohibiting persons from seeking ballot positions in future
elections. In view of the now expressed opinion of the

touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal!
interests. ... It must be a real.and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive -
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” 300°U. S.
at 239-241.

45

legal officers of the United States Government ‘that the
Communist Control Act of 1954 does not apply to the plain
tiffs, it is doubtful if the Attorney General of Minnesota
will presume to take a contrary position involving the in
terpretation ‘of this federal statute at.a future election.

The plaintiffs cite several decisions involving voting
rights cases, particularly some jist decided or now pend
ing in the United States Supreme Court’ as authority for
the proposition that this court should entertain and ad
judicate this case. In each of Fhe cited cases, however,
the plaintiffs were suffering under an adverse lower court
ruling, the appeals were all perfected prior to the No
vember 5, 1968 election, the issues were fixed and final:
in shape, and most important of all, these gases involve
firmly-imbedded state policies concerning election rights
as expressed in the statutes of the States involved.

There is no firmly-imbedded state policy in) Minnésota
as expressed by statute or otherwise af issue here, but
only the possibility of a future adverse legal opinion by
a then Attorney General of Minnesota on an uncertain
issue as yet unformed. The st: asinvolye dois a federa
not a state, one. As noted, the view of the chieMlegal Lofliees
of the United States, speaking through his United States
Attorney, is that the. constitutionalits of the Communes
Control Act of 1954 is not involved and, in his view, the ”
statute by its application does not prohibit: the plaimtitts
from the positions on the ballot whieh thes songelht

. bay e.g., Moore v. of ig i, loos SOS Ot THOR
U.S. L. W. 4389 (May 5, 1969); Hadno!t vo Amos, .8 ;
89 S. ict; 01 (1969) . ‘Wh nv. State Roard of Flector - st | HS
o44, 89S. Ct. 817 (1969) . Brockington vo Rhodes, probualte juris
diction bi 393 UL S. 1078, SOS. Ct 877 CO 196o

So, in summary, ,

1. The issue as originally framed is moot because the
election is over and plaintiffs were on the ballot as
requested.

2. As to the future, there is no certainty or finality as
to the issues sought to be adjudicated. because there is no
certainty as to whether any future candidates for office
in a Minnesota election may seek to run under the banner
of the Communist Party and if they do, that the issues
formed by their attempted filing may be the same as they
are in this lawsuit. Further, there is no certainty that the
issues sought to be adjudicated in the present lawsuit will
be sigtilarly viewed by the Attorney General of Minnesota
holding office at the time of a future election. The issues as
raised by the pleadings do not represent.any fixed or firm
state policy governing elections which should be examined.
In our view, therefore, the issues upon which decision is
requested here, are nebulous and contingent—not fixed and
final—as required by the Supreme Court.

3. At all events, no constitutional issue has been
definitely joined in the present lawsuit because the United
‘States Attorney General, charged with the duty of defend-
ing the constitutionality_of the statutes of the United
States, expressed the view that no constitutional issue was
present and agreed with the plaintiffs that a proper inter-
pretation of the law is that the plaintiffs were entitled to
be placed on the ballot at the 1968 election ‘as théy re-
quested. The United States Attorney General agrees with
the. plaintiffs’ view of the law: the Minnesota Attorney
General, by his motion for disniissal, does not care to con-
test the issue. In such a stance, who is there to oppose the

plaintiffs?

47

4. No useful purpose would be served by a declaration
of rights. .

In the words of Justice Brennan, in a most recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court, the con-
stitutional question, if one exists,

“ .. must be presented in the context of a specifie live
grievance.” Golden v. Zwickler, —— U.S. , 89S.
Ct. 956, 960 (1969). °

And, as the United States Supreme Court said in United
Public Workers of Amer, (CIO) vy. Mitchell, 330 U. 8S. 75,
67 S. Ct. 556 (1947) :

“The power of courts . ... to pass upon the constitution- °
ality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests
of litigants require the use of this judicial authority |
for their protection against actual interference. A
hypothetical threat is not enough.” 330 U.S. at 89-90.

All the plaintiffs assert here is a “hypothetical threat” of
a possible constitutional issue as yet unframed..
There is no “actual controversy” as is required by the

Constitution, by a long line of Supreme Court decisions,
and by the express wording of the Declaratory Judgment
ee So :

The complaint is therefore Dismissep.

- Dated: 7/14/69
Harry A. Biackmun, Circuit Judge

Epwarp J. Devirt, Chief District Judge

Puuip Neviie, District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_1447%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
