# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_1407%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1970 - **Citation:** 397 U.S. 315 ## Text VAV 19 1969 4a f paws CLER | Sapreme Court of the United States. Oc TOBER TERM, 1969. No. 5 at “ARNOLD TOURS; INC, er au, > Petitioner 8, : 1p v. ; | WILLIAM B. CAMP er au, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ae eee FOR THE FIRST CRUSE Timotny J. Murpuy, Ricuarp W. Murpuy, - One State Street, | Boston, Massachusetts 02109. ADDISON C, GETCHELL & SON, INC., LAW PRINTERS, BOSTON. Table of Contents. Opinions below | | ta Jurisdiction | Question presented Statute involved — Statement of the case Reasons for gr anting the writ Conclusion - Appendix ‘‘A’’ Appendix ‘‘B”’ Appendix TT Oe | ns cae | Appendix wie lata | ies Table of Authorities Cited. CASES. - Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 © * & bd dO’ > a oe a oo - © & 8 American President Lines v. Federal Maritime :; ‘Board, 112 F. Supp. 346 Association of Data Processing Service or ganiza- tions, Ine. v. ‘Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675, aff'd, 2/6/69 F.2d | / Baker, Watts & Co. v, Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 Citizens Association of peangerewn v. Simonson, F. 2d Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 Frost v. Corporation Conimission of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515 FA Frothingham v. Mellon,-262-U.S. 447 4n. 4n.,8 omUm™ li . TABLE OF CONTENTS . Investment Company iustitute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 i 4n. Rural Electrification Administration v.: Northern State Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 Sn. Saxon v. Georgia Association of Independent Insur- _ ane® Agents, 399 F. 2d-1010 ; 4n., dn., Tn. Texas & Pacitie Railway Co. v. Pottortf, 291 U.S. 245 Wingate Corporation, The, v. Industrial Xational Bank, =F. Supp. ., rev'd, 3/27/69 F. 2d 4n. Sratutes, Erc. Administrative Procedure Act, See. 10(a), 5 U.S.C. See. 702 8.9 12 U.S.C. See. 24(7) 3,7 28 U.S.C. See. 1254(1) 2 Rules of the Comptroller of the Currency, Rule 67 3 / ‘’ MISCELLANEOUS. Comptroller's Manual for National Banks, . Para- graph No. 7475 s ‘ Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, sec. 22.02 Time Magazine, Business Section, p. 101, Nov. Ss, Supreme Court of the United Sttutes. October TERM, 1969. : No. iceeat “ARNOLD TOURS, INC., er au, Petitioners, v. WILLIAM B. CAMP er au. — - Respondents. \ | PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTLORARE TT) THE. UNITED STATES COUR T QF ARES ALS. RU IR THE _ FIRST CIRCUIT. sia a . Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of \yppexaik for the First Circuit, entered in the above entitled) ces an March 27,1969. anon a? Opinions Below. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First: \lireni: is reprinted in Appendix Q appended hereto. ‘Nhe Hninian of the District Court is reported in 286 F. Sapp. 771) 1f48s) and is reprinted in the Record herein commenging its *«*R’’ hereinafter refers to the Appendix to Brief a Pbaainitiits. Appellants, filed in the First Cireuit Court of Appeal. a ° 7 2 Jurisdiction. . The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed on Marelr 27, 1969, and judgment was entered on Mareh 27, 189. (App. A). “The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked yader 28 U.S.C. See. 1254(1). ‘- Question. Presented. _ Whether the petitioners have legal standing to challenge (a) the decision of the Comptroller of the United States Currency in allowing national banks to enter:the travel | agency business and (b) the actual entry of the South Shore National Bank into the travel business. Statute Involved.’ . The releyant (provisions of the National Bank Aet, as amended (12 U.S.C. See. 24(7)), are printed as Appendix ‘B to this petition. } The Comptroller's ruling contained in- Comptreller’s Manual for National Banks, Paragraph No. 7475, is prRnted as Appendix C to this petition. e J Statement of the Case. The petitioners are forty-two pdeesbiient, travel agents of Massachusetts engaged in the travel ageney business. Many of the activities and obligations of the travel agenfs are controlled by conferences of air and steamshi p carriers which are in certain instances supervised by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Maritime Commission (R. 2 and Exhibit A). The petitioners brought this: suit individually and also as a class on behalf of all other Massachusetts firms in 1 the travel business (R. : 2-3). The respondent William B: Camp is the ¢ ‘osaptioller of the Currency, who is charged by law with administrative and regulatory authority with respect te national banks. Mr. Camp’s predecessor, Comptrollér James J. Saxon, a former lobbyist and attorney for the national banks, in 1963: arbitrarily ruled, without notice and without a hear- ing, that national banks may enter into the travel busittess on a full-seale basis for profit (R. 14). This decision repre- sented a change in policy on the part of the Comptroller (R. 4). - Rule 67, issued by the Comptr oller in ‘1949 ‘ . stated: ‘*It is | the position of this office that a national batik does not have ~ the legal right to act as agent .°. . of transportation com- ‘panies in the operation of a regular travel ageney . . 2”? | ‘In November, 1966,” respondent South Shore National Bank availed itself of -the Comptroller’s‘ruling and entered into the travel agency business. . Said ‘Bank, with approxi- mately twenty-seven branches, is the first and only bank in Massachusetts to engage in the travel agency business (R. 5): It has entered into the travel business on a large-seale basis and has launched: a massive advertising program, complete with seven roadway billboards, full-page news- paper ads and a radio saturation program (R. 5 and Ex- hibit B). | Ne i There are approximately ninety other national banks in ‘Massachusetts with approximately three hundred forty tive branches (R. 6). , The petitioners contend that the C omptroller Gacniied his authority in allowing the national banks to enter into the travel business and that the South Shore National Bank is illegally competing with them for travel customers: The 4 | ~ petitioners have lost substantial. busitiess and profits and — stand to lose even greater business and profits in the future as a result of the South Shore National Bank’s ‘sag entry” -into the travel business (R. 3, 5, 6, 7, 24, 27). As a result thereof, on May 8, 1967, the petitioners brought suit for a declaratory nen and mandatory injunction: (R. 2-8). On July 11,1968, motions for summary judgment brought by the respondents were allowed by the District Court and a similar motion brought by the petitioners was denied .(R. 44, 48-49). The court held that. the re had no. . ‘standing oe Ss From such order of the Distriet Coat thie sulsiioniave _ appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the. ; ' Pirst Cireuit (R. 49). That court affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a written opinion (Appendix D herein). ; ; Reasons for Granting the Writ. | f The issue as to whether small: itidependent businesses. have standing to challenge competition presented by the national banks pursuant to authority given by the Comp- ' troller: has sprung up all over the country. Ineonsistent opinions have been rendered by the various courts based upon varied and diverse reasoning.’ The Court of Appeals in: the instant ‘case, by its own ad-— mission, has tendered a decision in conflict with the’ de- = ‘1Compare Saron vy. Georgia Association of Independent Insir- ance Agents, 399 F. 2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); Baker, Watts & Co. _ ¥. Saron, 261 F. Supp. -247 ¢D. D.C. 1966), and Investment Com- pany Institute vi Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 (D. D.C. 1967), with ‘Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 ‘aff’ d,8th Cir. 2/6/69, F.2d ‘and The Win- ~ Vv, Industrial National Bank, F.Supp. (RI. gate Corporation D.C. 1968), rev'd, Ist Cir. 3/27/69 F. 2d ‘ 5 cision of at least one other Court of Appeals on the same matter.2 In fact’, this Court of Appeals has rendered con- flicting decisions within a singular opinion inasmuch as ‘it, held that data’ processing service corporations do have standing to challenge competition by national banks but that travel agents: do not have standing to challenge such competition. The obvious anomaly is that the business of data processing is more closely related to the business of . banking than is the busmess of travel service. ‘With the recent phenomenon of one-bank. holding ‘eom-. panies and with the growing invasion of conglomerate’ in-. dustries, it is apparent.that illegal competition by national banks should be stopped. The Chairman of. the Federal Reserve Board, William McChes1 Martin, said in oppo-: sition to the Comptroller that the y by the banks into unrelated business ‘‘. . . can affect the whole capitalistic system in the United States. The line between banking and commerce should not be erased.’’* The travel agents. _ attempted to prevent the. line from being erased but have ‘been denied even the opportunity. to raise the issue. This. recent trend by national banks to invade ‘business: areas - totally unrelated to the business of banking poses an im- portant question of federal law, namely, what are the limits of power that Congress has given national banks. — ; The. Court of -Appeals said in effect that the national banks have the right to choose what they want to do, both literally and figuratively, and such conduct is ‘‘none of . plaintiffs’ business’? (App. D, p. 14). Further the First Circuit implied that the South Shore National Bank is in- volved in illegal ‘‘ultra vires’’ activity but ‘‘even assuming ‘that [they]... are prohibited by ‘section 24 ( 7) from en- 2 Saxon v. Georgia. Association of Inde} pendent Insurance Aye nts, 399 F. 2d 1010 (5th Ciy. 1968). 3 Time Magazine, Business Section, p. 101, Nov. 8, 1968. 6 tering into the [travel] business . . . this is not sufficient to provide a statutory aid to standing’? (App. -D, p. 17). ‘Such a decision seems to elevate form over substance and constitutes a convenient avoidance by the Federal Court to stop conduct which is obv iously ‘illegal and prohibited by _Congress. The fine technical distinctions enunciated by the Court of Appeals in explaining why data processing com- panies do have Standing and why travel agents do not have. standing provide scholarly fodder for legal’ research analysts but they provide double-talk and side-stepping to the petitioners and other small businessmen. In getting bogged down in the refinements of the standing i issue, the . Court has allowed itself to get. further and further away ~ from the: realities of this age and opens itself to persuasive attack by those who say ‘that the law has no relevance and that the little man is prevented by the government from get- | ‘ting his day i in court. One excellent example of overlegal- ism and confusion in this case is w here the First Circuit said . that the petitioners have standing to be told they have: no standing, but they do not have standing to challenge illegal _ - ecompetition.* The mere ‘fact that there is no explicit law allowing a Comptroller’s decision to be judicially reviewed or. pro- tecting the travel agents from competition should not’ pre- vent this Court from granting standing to the petitioners, In finding. standing, this Honorable Court would not be usurping the powers of the Congress because it is clear *that the banks’ participation in the travel business is illegal. ‘Congress has made it clear that national banks are only to ; exercise that power specifically given to them by Congress. *The Court said as follows: ‘‘The © ‘omptroller argues at length - that this [operating full travel serv ice] is traditional and legitimate - bank activity. We do not, however, consider this matter except to say that... the question of standing is pee before us.’ Bonin D, p. 14.) . ¥: As Brandeis, J, said: ‘‘The measure of their [national. banks] powers is the statutory grant; and powers not con- | ferred by Congress are denied.’? Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S, 245, 253 (1934). ,, Section 24(7) of the National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. See: lists numerous powers explicitly granted ‘to banks a as the First Cir- cuit held: ‘It has long. been settled .°. . that the enumera- . tion of such powers is an effective seit strong prohibition of all activities not enumerated and ihe incidental to bank- | ing’’ (App. D, p. 16). Thus, it is clear that national banks ihe prohibited by Section 24(7) fyom enteri ing into the travel business. The petitioners are recipients by impli- cation of Congressional protection and accordingly have the requisite statutory aid to standing. Frost v. Corpora- _ tion Commission of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515 (1929). To affirm the First-Cirenit’s decision would be to sibaiit the national banks to compete illegally in any businesses they wanted to where there were no express laws protecting the damaged businesses. For example, national banks could go into the night club, laundry, liquor or construction busi- ness, ete., without fear of reprisal. - The doctrine of standing has been eroded almost com- -pletely by its exceptions. Because it is a doctrine of ju- dicial invention and convenience, it has been interpreted and applied in many different ways. This Honorable Court recently attempted to reshape the doctrine in the case of Flast v.. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). However, even: Flast has been interpreted and applied differently. - It is the petitioners’ contention that this Honorable Court’s new philosophy on the doctrine of ‘*standing’’ should be applied to the case at bar. Accordingly, since > Compare Judge Thornberry’s concurring opinion in Sazon v. Georgia. Association of Indcpcndent Insurance Agents, 399 F. 2d. 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), and Citiz ae “Association of Georgetown v. Simonson, F. 2d (D.C. Cir.. 958). 8 this case poses sufficient adversity and clarity, the Court of Appeals should have found ‘‘standing.’’. | Moreover, petitioners contend that Section 10(a) of the -Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. See. 702, pro- vides standing for any persons claiming to be ‘‘adversely affected in fact.’’ This contention has been supported by some federal courts *® and by Professor Davis in his Ad- ministrative Law Treatise.’ The interpretation and appli- cation of Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act is also ina state of confusion among federal courts and should be resolved: by the Supreme Court.® In the case at bar the Court is not burdened with de- ciding a frivolous issue, a political issue, an abstract issue or an issue where the plaintiffs’ interest is ‘“comparatively minute and indeterminable,’’ which are the typical cases wherein the legal roadblock of ‘‘standing’’ is invoked. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Aetna Life Insurance Co, v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). Moreover, “the fear expressed in Frothingham that allowing one tax- payer to sue would inundate the federal courts with count- _less similar suits has been mitigated by the ready availabil- ity of the devices of class actions and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .. .’’ Flast v. Cohen, . 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). The instant case involves a real, ‘serious and adverse case and controversy which should not be sidetracked from the judicial artifice of ‘‘standing.”’ In summary, it is submitted that there are many reasons why this case should be reviewed. First, there are con- 6 American President Lines v, Federal Maritime Board, 112 F. Supp. 346 (D. D.C: 1953) ; Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saron, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D. D.C. 1966). enn : _* Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, sec. 22.02. _* Compare. Baker, Watts & Co. vy. Saron, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D. D.C. 1966), with Rural. Electrification Administration vy. Northern States Power Co., 373 F. 2d 686; 692-693 (8th Cir. 1967): 9 flicting federal decisions on the main issue e of standing as it relates to national banks and there are coflicting federal decisions on the subsidiary-issue of standing relating to the interpretation and application of the Flast case and the | Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 10(a). Second, this case involves an important. federal question of national . magnitude and of grave concern to our economic leaders. - The time is ripe for a yational decision involving the na- ‘tional banks. hal ae 7 ees | / . / +» Conclusion. It is respectfully submitted that, for the reasons above stated, this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. ~ Respectfully submitted, | TIMOTHY J. MURPHY, RICHARD W. MURPHY. 10 Appendix “A.” Unitep States Court or APPEALS ‘For tHe First Circuit No. 7192. 3 i, Arnotp Tovurs, INc., ET AL., | PLAINTIFFS, “APPELLANTS, aoe Wituram B. Camp b&T, AL., DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES. JUDGMENT. Entered March 27, 1969. 2G This cause came on to be heard on appeal froin the United States District Court for the District of Massa- chusetts, and Was argued by counsel. Upon consider: ation whereof, It is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. : By the Court: /s/ Rocer A. “STINCHFIELD. Clerk Appendix “B.” , ~* Srarute INvo.ven. Title 12, United States Code, § 24, paragraph Seventh, in pertinent part, states: a * ; e . ° 4 . . ‘*Upon duly making and filing articles of association and an organization certificate a national banking asso- o 1 ciation shall become, as from the date of the execution of its organization certificate, a body corporate, and as such, and in the name designated in the organization certificate, it shall have — Seventh. To exercise by its:board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to. law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and nego- tiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buy- ing and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the. provisions of this chapter.” ! anny - oak Appendix “C.” . CoMPTROLLER’s ManvuaL For National Banxs No. 7475. National banks acting as travel agents. Incident to those powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C; 24, national banks may provide travel services for their customers and receive compensation therefor. Such serv- ices may include the sale of trip insurance and the rental of automobiles ,as agent for a local rental service. In eonnection therewith, national banks thay advertise, de- velop, and extend such travel-services for. the purpose of : attracting customers to the bank. 12 Appendix ‘D. Uxtrep States Court or APPEALS ° \ For tHe First Crrecvit No. 7192. . Arxotp Tovrs Ton St Al, \ PLAINTIFFS, APPELLANTS, v. ao Wirtiam B. Camp Et AL., DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES. ay _ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS and oi No. 7186. : nny -Tue WINGATE CoRPORATION, PLALNTIFF, APPELLANT, v..- ( 9. [xpustrian Nationat Bank ET AL, DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF, RHODE ISLAND Before ALpbaicn, Chief Judge, Woovsery,* Senior Circuit Judge, and CorFix, Circuit Judge. ~, No. 7192. ‘“ Richard J. Murphy, with whom Timothy J. Murphy was on brief, for appellants. Alan 8. Rose nthal, Attorney, Department of Justice, with 1 whom *Sitting by designation. 13 « 2 ARNOLD TOURS — WINGATE CORPORATION CASS. +] Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, aad) FP. Mark- ‘ham, United State Attorney, and Leonard Sehatiman. \Ateoornev. Department of Justice, were on brief, for Williaa |}: ‘Camp. Comptroller of the Currency, appellee. Elliott V. Grabill, with whom Arihur H. Blound: bill, Ley & Butterworth were on brief, for South Bank, appellee. ord land Gra- Mute National No. 7186. Edward J. Regan, with whom Eustace! T. Plathus aan rakam. Reid, Ewing & Stapleton were on briet, for appeljarnt: -Matthew W. Goring, with whom Edward M. Waésuen, ieohrr: W- Meserée, John B. Newhall, Gordon L. Docrfer, Ihinekliue. Allen. Salisbury & Parsons and Nutter, McClennen & Mish) xcere on brief, for Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island, agypselie Alan 8. Rosenthal, Attorney, Department of Justice, weith whom Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Hewure) DP. Gal- logly, United States Attorney, and Stephen R. Felson, vitharney, Department of Justice, were on bwief, for Williaa |} Canip, Comptroller of the Currency, appellee. ; Robert J. McOsker, City Solicitor, and Vineendé J) ) Pecei nit Assistant City Selicitor, on brief for City of Previdernce, agpeliee. Matthew Hale on brief for The American Bankers. syacusaation. amicus curiae. | March 27 1969. Apricu, Chief Judge. These are two actions-liyv parties engaged in certain business pursuits to restrain eamayeti-, tion from national banks which, supported by ratings. «a? the Comptroller of the. Currency, have entered thet elds. Plaintiffs seek, basically, to attack. thes , rulings, lin beth cases the district courts held that they were withwut:~ Despite numerous exceptions,|this principle has withst ood -1°°97475. National banks acting as travel agents. Incident to those powers vested in them under 12 US. 24. national banks may provide travel services for their emstomers and receive compensation therefor. Such services may imlade the sale of trip insurance and tlle rental of automobiles as agert for a local rental service. In connection, therewith. national benks may advertise, develop, and extend such travel servives for the _ purpose of attracting customers to the bank. See *TITé& : | 15 + ARNOLD TOURS — WINGATE CORPORATION CASES a erosion not only because 6f the traditional rationale be- hind standing doctrines generally, see Flast v. Cohen, 1968, . 392 U.S. 83,.91-101, but because of the policy encouraging free and open competition—a policy that favors competi- tion in the market place, not in the courts. The excep- tions, where standing is recognized, are. as well estab- lished as the principle itself. The first is fer complaints of ‘illegal’? competition, by which is usually meant competi-_ tion that is unlawful as to plaintiff apart from considera- - tions.of corporate power or authority. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, supra at 479; Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v. REA, W.D.La., 1964, 236 F.Supp. 271, 277, rev'd, 5 Cir, 354 F.2d 859, cert. denied 385 U.S. 815; but ef. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, D.C.Cir., 1935, 225 F.2d 924, -cert, denied 350 U.S. 884. Plaintiffs do not suggest that | the Comptroller has sanctionéd, or that the bank has under- taken, any unfair, conspiratorial, or criminal methods of | competition, or that there has been any violation of the anti! - trust laws. The second exception is where it is claimed that some ‘legal right’? has been injured, by which is “meant, in its, nonconclusory sense, that plaintit® has an independent property right, or a right to be free from the particular kind of competition he is challenging.. Such a right is attached to or arises out of an exclusive fran- chise, on the one hand, or a restricted license or the like, on the other. Frost v. Corporation Commission. 1929, 278 U.S. 515; cf. Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Or- leans, D.C.Cir., 1963, 323 F.2d 290, 299-300, rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 411. Plaintiffs fit in no such’eategory. - The final general exception is where the plaintitl, ean show the existence ofa ‘‘statutory aid to standing’ for a class of persons which includes himself. This statutory aid may take the form of a ‘judicial review"? provision of the particular administrator in question for ‘parties ag- 16 a : OPINION OF THE COURT ~ 5) Mie grieved,’’*‘adversely affected,’ or the like. In such a case, - FCC y. Saiders Bros. Radio Station, 1940, 309 US. 470, would presumably provide standing for legitimate competi- tors. See generally, Jaffe, Judicial Control of Adminis- trative Actions, 513-31." There is, however, no such provision as to the Comptroller of the Currency. An alternative statutory aid may be found if there is an indication of Congressional intent, explicit or im- plicit, in the relevant substantive acts to grant protec- tion to the competitive interests of a class of businesses ~ whith iticludes the plaintiff. This in Hardin vy. Kentucky ‘ Utilities Co., 1968, 390 U.S: 1, the Supren 1e Court found “that a competing .private utility company had standing jto challenge the expansion of TVA into new. areas in al- leged violation-of the area limitations of section 15d(a) of ” the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4 (a). The Court‘said, ‘*{O]ne of the primary purposes of the area limitations in. § 15d of the Act ‘was to protect — privajfe utilities from TV A competition. ... Since re- spowdent is thus in the class which § 15d is designed to pro- tect; it has standing . .”? 390 U.S, at 6-7. The only possible statutory aid to the standing of travel agents in nafional banking legislation exists in 12 U.S.C. §24(7). This section states that national banks may ‘‘exer- cise... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary and then lists nu-. ° bed to carry on the business of banking,’ merous powers explicitly granted. It has long been settled in suits over private contracts that the enumeration of - ,such powers is an effective and strong prohibition of all ‘activities not. enumerated and not incidental, to: banking. See First National Bank vel fational Exchange Bank; 1875, 92 U.S..122;.128; Natioual Bank v. Matthews, 1878, 98 U.S. - . 621, 625; Logan County National Bank vy. Townsend, 1891, ieee ce Tae 6 ARNOLD TOURS — WINGATE CORPORATION CASES 139 U.S. 67, 73. But even assuming that national banks are prohibited by section 24(7) from entering into the _busimess of procuring travel arrangements, this is not sufficient to provide a statutory aid to standing. The pro- hibition. must be demonstrably: intended to protect the. ee interests of other members ‘of the prohibited | : business. Sée the concurring opinion of Judge Thornberry in Saxon v. Georgia Ass’n, of Independent Ins, Agents,.. 1968,-5 Cir., 399 F.2d 1010, 1019 ;. Association of Data Proc- essing Serv, Organizations. v. Camp, D.Minn., 1968, 279 F.Supp. 675, aff’d, 8 Cir. 2/6/69, . ° F.2d - - .."We,’ too, (see 8th Cir. opinion in Camp, n.10), cannot accept ; the simplistic suggestion by the majority in Georgia Ass’n, © 399 F.2d at 1016, that as soon. as it- appears. that the competitive activities were unlawfully carried out the plaintiffs have standing. _ ; The plaintiffs have not pointed to, nor have we in our research discoveréd, any ‘evidence that Congress’ in de- limiting the scope of banking activity in-the ultra vires