# Appendix — City of New York v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1970
- **Citation:** 397 U.S. 248

## Text

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_ APPENDIX A—OPINIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Oral Opinion, October 28, 1969

———Fhie Court | Curtis, J »): Ver vy well. I take it, ther, the

hearing has come to a completion. .

Mirst of all, | want to‘thank all those who have appeared
as friends of the court. TRave appreciated your comments
and they have been very helpful.

I have, of course, had the benefit of all ‘of the arguments
of. counsel for some time, and | have re: id them. My law
clerk and | have done research which seems to have been.
nee wessttated here, so | must admit that T came into the
hear ing with a pretty fair idea of what the outcome of this
case would probably be unless there were some suggestions.
made here today ,or some argument which I -had_ not
thoroughly considered.

Of course, as T stated this morning, T éan only say again
that it is very—well, first of all, before T commence that.
| should state that it is my intention to write an opinion
and file a written opinion here which will cover the legal
aspects of the ease and which will be published and which —
all attorneys will. understand so that they can understand |
my position.

| realize, though, that a lot of people have come a long
way and there are a lot of people in the audience who have
been asked to come here and appear. I feel that it might
he wise for me to,‘since | know what Tam going to do, .
speak informally and in & non-legalistie fashion so that you
may better understand the problem that confr onts this court
and the conclusion to which the court has come.

| have already expressed my personal feelings about air
pollution, the importance of the problem, .and the urgency
of its solution. T have ‘already mentioned that it is a prob-
lem of Government and that it is the function of the Ad- |
ministration ae ting through various departments and agen-:
cies to initiate and to pursue a program of research and

(i

. dev elopment of its own and to acquir

jt emt

all possible knowl-
edge in order that it, may make its prdyer recommenda-
tions to Congress and Congress mnmay pass Mie needed legis-—
lation # order that it‘may be informed to Jhe point where

et up effective administrative Megs for the regu-
lation and control of these factors.contributing to the prob-
lem.

Congress has a duty, too, that of making laws which are
helpful and necessary. The courts have a function and that

is to stand ready to assist at all times in the implementation |

of these administrative decisions.

It is our constitutional .coneept of Government that Gov-
ernment moves forward smoothly when our three branches

* of Ciav ernment—the executive, the legislative and the judi-

cial—each Tune tions in.its own sphere of aunthority.. It is in-
appropriate for any one branch of Government to exercise

the prerogative of another, “It is elementary -political

science which I_ know we all know. ae ‘

The Departinent of Justice, whom this court must as-
sume is the representative of the people, has Mrought this
action by way of an administrative decision made by the

- Department of Justice to fashion an aetion of this kind.
‘

They brought this action into this court alleging that the
automobile manufacturers had engaged in a conspiracy to
eliminate competition and asking as its sole remedy that
the court enjoin the defendants from engaging in conduet
consisting of a long series of acts enumerated in the com-
plaint and thonght by dlie Government to be a violation of

the Antitrust Act.

Now, | am not going into the technical aspects of the

Government’s theory here. We only know fr om some of

the intimations what its theory is. But it. Seomed quite
clear to those who are knowledgeable in this field that the
Government is proceeding on a somewhat novel theory, and —
it is one in which there has heen no precise court decision,
So, after having filed this avtion and after many months of

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working where parties have worked together with technical
advisers, they have negotiated and reached a settlement of
_ this Jawsnit upon terms and: conditiouis which have been
set forth im the proposed consent decree and which they -
now ask this court to approve. :

Tn approaching this problem the court must move ecau-
tiotsly lest ‘it override an. administrative decision based
upon matters of policy with w lich this court cannot prop-
erly inter fere,

“Consent decrees which result from infor oe eaitlatons
between the Antitrust: Division and defendants in fhiese
cases are numerous, and they are most always without
exception ratified by the court with little or no change.

Under well-established law, this decree must be approved |
unless this court finds some legal defect in it suc’ as its un-
enforceability according to its terms, or its failure to pro-
vide relief which is consistent with the complaint.. It is

. the court’s duty to protect. the rights of persons who are

not parties to the action and, of course, the deeree should
not be approv ed if it is contrary to the public interest.

After a careful review of. the proposed decree and a-
reading of the voluminous ‘opposition to it,: and in light of
the’ research which we have: dove and the hearing here
today, it seems clear to me that the deeree must be ap-
proved for the following reasons. -

In the first place, the dine ree is legally enforce: bie. on its. .
face. .I have heard no contention 16 the contrary.

Secondly, it is consistent with the prayer in the eom- °°
_plaint, in spite of what has been said-here, It is, as has been
said, substantially consistent. The. alley: ifions with re-
spect to prior antitrust violafions is a necessary allegation
and a necessary finding if this case were to go to judgment,
but if it is.not to go to judgment it does not heeome a
necessary finding.

- 4a

The prayer for such relief as may seem proper is a gen-
eral catchall clause, as all attorneys know, and it means
little if anything. |

With those exee ‘ptions, the decree prov ides substantially,
as near as Lam able to tell, wads of the benefits which the
complaint seeks, |

Thirdly, the decree does ’ not prejudice the rights of
treble damage claimants. It has been, of course, contended
that the Government has the duty to bring this case. to
judgment so that trebké damage-claimants may have the
benefit of its judgment, as prima facie proof of liability. fr ~
treble damage suits. T he law does provide that treble dam-
age. claimants: may use sucha judgment .as prima facie
evidence of liability, but it also provides that cases of. this
kind may be settled without an-admission of liability.

| Congress did th: it for’a very definite reason and that is
. for the reason, such as exists here, to permit a ready and
definite conclusion to these eases’ without the long expense
of a trial.

. And as has been mentioned here, this is nothing unusual,
this is done all the time. The Government scéttles between
70 and: 75 percent of its antitrust eases in this fashion.
If it didn’t.it would not have the personnel to run the
office.

T ‘here is no authority to’ the effect that the Government
has the duty to try any case merely for the purpose of
aiding treble damage claimants in their: individual suits.
| have had none cited to me. As far as T know there is
no such authority, and I see no basis to compel the Gov-
ernment here to.do that.

The treble damage claimants are free fo bring any kind
of an action they wish. he State of California and the
other States may bring Any kind of an action which they
can maintain withont Peing affected in the least by the -
decree in this action. : . a

da

Lastly, it appears to me that this anaes 3 is'in the publi¢
interest for it gives the Government all the relief it could
have gained if it had fried the case and won. It avoids a
tremendous expenditure of taxpayers’ money and the ex- °
haustion of Antitrust Division manpower, And it brings
immediate results.

If this ease were to go to trial, although there has been
some contention about it.to the contrary, I think there is
little doubt but what it would take between four and five
years of discovery, preparation and trial of this case. The
small amount of evidence which is now in the hands of the
Department of Justice and was obtained through the Grand
Jury investigation, | think, would be a small thimbleful
of evidence. in comparison with that whicli would be re-
quired if this were to go to judgment.

Furthermore, this decree brings ‘an assured result. The
thing that amazes me is that all of the opponents seem to
assume With such assurance that if this case were tried the
iovernment would win. Now there are many knowledge-
able people who disagree with this.

It would seem to me it would be tragic if this court would
refuse to sign the decree and compel the Government to
go to trial only to lose the ease, which would mean that
the benefits of this deeree, which are great, would be lost
to the entire country forever, and it would help the treble
damage claimants not a whit.

The proposed deeree, for the reasons which T have
enumerated, will be approved. .

I have not mentioned all of the arguments that have been
made here, There have been a lot of them made. It does
not seem to me that the others need answering in view of
my Views as expressed here. +

Now, | think it is plain that from what T have said that
I shall deny all petitions of those wishing to intervene in
this action as parties.. I think it has not been seriously -

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urged and, if so, not convincingly so, that these petitioners
are Ontitled to intervene as ‘a matter of right. Almost all
of those wishing to intervene are treble damage claimants—
that is the basis of their contention that they intervene
because of their treble damage claims—and the cases are
very clear that the interest of treble damage. claimants is
not cognizable as an interest such as will entitle the elaim-
ant to intervene in an injunction action of this kind.

Rule 24(b). suggests that permissible intervention shall
be allowed only where it will not delay or prejudiee the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Now,
there can be no yaa = what permitting the intervenors
here to beeome /parties in-this suit conld do nothing but
prejudice and delay’ on cause interminable confusion in’
_ handling the action which is now pending before this court.

~The other intervenors,-there are cout who have other
claims. upon which they would base their right to inter-
vene—they are yaried, and T think’ each one ean be an-
swered from a substantive standpoint. But, in any event,
noué of them have been made timely, and they will be
denied for the reason thaf they have not been timely made.
To admit them at this time even though they have some
legitimate canse for -intervention would cause undue delay
in the adjudication of this ease.

Now, a lot has been said about the Grand Jury tran-
scripts and the evidence there. T think there is a lot
misunderstanding, too. The mere fact that they have not
been released, it is assumed by everybody to indicate that
there is some mystertous amount of evidence in the hands
-of the Grand Jury that if ever released would be of great

value fo ‘somebody, and \the court is a part of a great con-
spiracy. trying to keep this from being released. —

Tt has been traditional in federal courts that Grand Jury
proceedings be kept seeref for at least two very apparent
reasons. One is that the Grand Jury is permitted to delve
into matters which but for public necessity would be an

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invasion of privacy protected by the Constitution. Evi-
dence so obtained must be kept seeret in order to protect
the innocent and must not be released unless a need there-
for be shown of such a high order as would justify a court
in overriding constitutional considerations.

A second reason for the secreey is that witnesses appear-
ing before the Grand Jury afford better cooperation and
are more willing to testify with the knowledge that. pro-
ceedings are secret,

Now, we have to clothe all Grand Jury: proceedings with
that aura if we are going to maintain ‘a: proper Grand
Jury concept. The Supreme’ Court has been adamant that
District Courts be véry careful and be very reluctant to
release Grand Jury transcripts of any kind in any ease
“unless there is a need shown.

The order which hes been prepared—and T have not had
an opportunity to examine it carefully—but it is my inten-
tion to sign an order which—if this does not so provide, we
will See that one does will impound all of the testimony:
and all exhibits which have been presented to the Grand
Jury so that they may not be destroyed or lost or dissi-
pated. If-these were to be released generally they would
have to be released by the persous from whom they were
obtained, and the only way they could be recovered would”
he by a subpoena. They would suffer the possibility of
loss or destruction or mutilation. In order that this evi-
dence be maintained and be available to treble damage |
claimants or anyone else who is interested in further Jiti-
gation, all of this material will be impounded with the
Department of Justice and will be available to any such
Claimant upon a proper showing.

Right now any request for the release of Grand, Jury |
records will be premature. There has been no showing and
there have been no arrangements made for their release,

ie

Sa

But the details of the release and the conditions under
which they ean be released, 1 am are, will be liberal enough
to satisfy anybody who makes any reasonable demand.

That, | think, disposes of all mations to consolidate and
the Grand Jury niatter.

I did want to make one more comment. I have’ lost my
notes, but T will make it anyway. In this case it has seemed
to me—well, | just wanted to express again my apprecia-
tion in having all the members of the Bar here from vari-
ous parts of the country who have appeared as friends of
the court.

What | wanted to say at this point is—and I don’t want
to be misunderstood—it has been pretty clear to me ever
since the issues were crystallized what the result would be.
There have. been some efforts made here by political inter-
ests, I feel, to make this court a useful court for their own
purposes. This-court as a result has been deluged with
letters from good people, sincere people, throughout the
United States who, T think, have been deluded to some ex-
tent as to the issues presented here. It is obviously an
intent on the part of some politicians, T think, to divert the
fire which—or, the heat which their own constituents have
placed upon them and to attempt to exercise some pressure
on this court. Now, pressure isn’t new to a judge; we get
used to it.and simply ignore it. But this kind of pressure
‘is-not proper, and is inappropriate in a court of this kind
where it’is used in an attempt to influence the court to do
‘something other than what the law requires’ them to do.

I resent the implication that this court is susceptible to
that kind of influence. The decision T have come to is a
decision which is based upon the law as T understand it to
he, and T feel pretty eertain that the decision which the
eourt has reached is consistent with ‘the law.

Thanks. all of von, bai coming.

There being nothing further the ecouyt stands adjourned.

9a

4
Memorandum Opinion, November 7, 1969:
, on « [Caption Omitted]

This is an action brought. by the United States of
America charging that the defendants, Automobile Manu-
facturers Association, Inc.,; General Motors Corporation ;
se Motor Company; Chrysler Corporation; and Amer-

‘an Motors ¢ rporation have conspired with other motor
dace manuf turers, in violation of $1 of the Sherman
Act (15 U.S.C. $1), to climinate -competition in the re-
search, development, manufacture and installation of mo-
tor vehicle air pollution control equipment, and in the pur-
chase from others of patents and patent rights, covering
such equipment. By way of relief, the plaintiff, is seeking
an order enjoining these defendants from continuing the
alleged unlawful’ conduct.

After eight months of negotiation, the parties have
agreed to settle this case upon terms and conditions em-
bodied in the proposed consent decree now before this
court for approval. ; | 3

On September 11, 1969, the proposed decree was .-made
publie and all interested parties, including the State of
California,.County of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles, |
aml the Air Pollution Control District of the County of
Los ‘Angeles, were invited to express their views as to
whether or not the consent deeree should be approved.
The United States reserved the right to withdraw from
the stipulated judgment, however, at any time within
thirty days after its submission in the event any -objec-
tions brought to its attention might seem meritorious.

On ‘October 28, 1969, after the ,thigty day period had
expired, this court held an open hearing: at which. time
all persons wishing to appear as amici curiae were per-
mitted to voice their objections. Appearances have been.
made on behalf of many states, counties, cities, air pol-
lution control districts, congressional groups, associations
and interested individuals.

10a

Petitions to intervene, as parties plaintiff, were -filed by.
the County of Los Angeles; County of Santa Barbara;
the Bay Area: Air Pollution Control District; Air Pol-
lution Control District of the County of Los Angeles;
the State of New York; the State of Connecticut; the
State. of Maryland; the State of New Jersey; ‘City of
New York; American Civil Liberties Union; two aldermen
from the City of Chicago; M. B. Grossman and S. J.
Tamkin, plaintiffs in a class action now pending in this
court; and William J. A. Sturtz. With the exception of
petitioner Sturtz, all) prospective piesa ‘sought in-
tervention in order to assert treble damage claims.

Tt has not been urged scriously, or if so, not convine-
ingly, that these petitioners may intervene’ here as a
matter of right, for it is well settled that treble damage
claimants do not have am ‘interest’? cognizable under
Rule 24(a) FUR.Civ.P. in Government anti-trust actions
‘seeking injunctive relief. United States -v. Blue Chip
Stamp Company, 272 F. Supp. 480 (C.D. Cal. 1967), -aff'd
sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Company vy. United
_ States, 389 US. 580 (1968): Commonwealth Edison Com-
pany Vv. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 207 F.
Supp. 252 (ND. TL 1962) aff'd 315 F.2d -564 (7th Cir.
1963); United States vy, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc,
unreported opinion (N.D. HL, E.D., Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd:
‘sub pom.. City of New York vy. United States, 390 U.S

715 (1968) 3° United States v. Western Electric Co. 1968
CCIE Trade Cases 72,415 (D, N.J., 1968), aff’d sub

' Petitioner Sturtz sought intervention to compel the defendants
to buy his smog device, alleging their previous failure to do ‘so
constituted an anti-trust violgtion.

* Here the Supreme Court affirmed a denial of intervention in
a consent decree proceeding where the - states and municipalities
were seeking virtually the same relief as is being sought here, in-
eluding an ‘‘asphalt clause’’, access to grand jury records and a
summary of evidence. -

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nom. Clark Walker and Sons, Ingxy. United States, 392
U.S. 659 (1968); United States VY Mirnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Company, wireported opinion. (NX.D. TIL.
1. Sept. 2, 1969); United States v. Alaminum Company
of America, AV ERD. Shaft ds per curiam sub nom. j
Lupton Mfg. Co, v. United States, BSS US. 457 (1967)3

It also seems clear that the intervenors are not entitled
to permissive intervention, Rule 24(b) E.R.Civ.PL re-
quires the court, in considering Whether to allow permis-
sive intervention, to consider whether the intervention.
will ‘Sunduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties.’** * :

The main goal of the intervenors here is to block the
proposed decree in the hopes of compelling the parties
to litigate this case to judgment. A favorable judgment
could then be used as a basis for theg own treble damage
actions. Ino the alternative, they are seeking the in-
clusion of an admission of liability, commonly ealle® an

® But see Cascade Natural Gas vy. hl Paso Natural Gas, 886 U.S,
129 (1967). Tn this case, upon which intervenors heayily rely,
the Supreme Court upheld intervention asa matter of right. But
“this Was a case df divestiture in-which the decree had a direct effect
upon. the intervenors. In any event, in the light of subsequent
cases it now appears that that ruling is sui generis and must be
limited to the facts of that case, United States vo Western Electric
Co., supra; Hobson vo Manson, 4A ERD. Ts (DE DLC. 1968) 87
Harvard. Law Review 306 at 106 1967): United States vo Alum:
num Company of America, supras Lupton Mfg. Co. vo United
States, supra: United States vo llarper & Row Publishers? Tne.,
supra; City of New York’yv, United States, supra,

Rule LA. Kederal Rules of Civil Procedure, :
~(b) Permissive Intervention, Upon timely application anyone

may be permitted to intervene in an action: (Py... er (2) whet

an applicant's chiim or defense and the main action have a question
. . . . ! . . .

of law or fact in common oo.) In exercising tts discretion the

court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

‘asphalt clause’’,° which would produce the same result.
However, the defendants have made it clear that) they.
would not consent to such a clause and if it were to be
insisted upon, no settlement of the ease would be possible.

To allow permissive intervention in this case would
certainly. delay and prejudice the adjudication of the
original parties. Courts, generally, have consistently
denied’ intervention under Rule 24 ELRCiv.P. in’ Gov:
ernment anti-trust cases where the purpose is to defeat
the entry of a consent decree. Uvited States ve Blue Chip
Stamp Company, supra. =

All petitions for intervention should, therefore, be de
nied.

° ‘ s

Prior to the institution of this action, the Government
impaneled a grand jury to investigate charges that these
‘defendants were. engaging in anti-trust activities. Alter
etehteen months, . the ‘rand jury was dismissed, without
an indictment having been returned. However, during its
- investigation, a tremendous amount of evidentiary. ma
terial was gathered together and reviewed and the tes.
timony of many witnesses was obtained. It has ‘been
contended by many appearing here as amici curiae that
the proposed decree should contain some provision re-
leasing this material, as well as the transeript of the
grand: jury proceedings, from the cloak of seereey tra

* An ‘asphalt clause’? gets its name from r vroup of antitrust.
cases.against defendants cngaved in the asphalt’ business, wherein
a consent decree containing an admission at lability. was approved
United States vo Allied Chem. Corp. ret Ngaude Cas, 9 69,923, wy
77.641 (D. Mass. 1960): United States vo Bituminous Conercte
Ass'n, Tne. 1960 Trade Cas. © OU S7s at TT AST CD. Mass.) ; United
States vo Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co, 1960 Trade Cas. © G9 835,
‘at W7.272 (D. Mass.d, So faras the court is aware, such a clause
had never been used before and has never been Used since. hur
thermore, its value is doubtful, for insistence upon it would, for
all practical purposes, eliminate the possibility of settling “anti
trust cases. — %

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ditionally surrounding such proceedings, in order that
it might become available to treble damage claimants.
At the hearing, a proposed order was presented to the
court, to which all parties have’ agreed and \which this
court has signed, requiring that all evidence obtained by
the grand «jury, as well as its own’ transcript, be im-
pounded in the hands of the Justice Department, where
it may be obtained by treble damage claimants, or others,

by subpoena‘or other appropriate means, where ggod cause

therefor ean be shown. This appears. to satisfy those
making this contention.

Let us now turn to a consideration of the proposed
consent decree.

Seetion 5(a) of the Clayton Act, after providing that a .

“final judgment or decree in an ‘anti-trust action brdught by
the Government may be used with prima facie effect in
treble damage actions, expressly excepts from these. pro-
‘visions consent deerees entered in’ such actions, _In so
doing, it implicitly recognizes consent decrees as ja means
of terminating civil anti-trust actions brought by the Gov-
ernment, and their use has become a most effective tech-
nique in anti-trust enforeement. It is reported that be-
tween TO and 75 per cent of all such Government cases
are settled-in this manner, which allows the Government
to obtain a large measure of injunctive relief. without
tremendous consumption of the limited manpotwer and
finaneial resources available to the Anti-trust Division.

~The decision to settle an-anti-trust case in this fashion,

hike the decision to commence it in the first place, is’ an
administrative decision and is a part of the implementa-
tion of the general policy of the Exeeutive Branch of
government, As such, it is not subject to review by this
court, | |

This court does have the power to disapprove the pro-

posed settlethent, but its use requires the exercise of

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diseretion, based upon legal, as distinguished from ad-
ministrative, considerations. For instance, the court
should withhold its approval if the decree be unenfor

able gv if it should provide for, relief not consistent with
the prayer of the complaint. The court may properly
coufder whether or vot the rights of persons not partie-
to the ation ure je opaurddizs «land whether the consent

_ decree, on the whole, is aagatinint. the publie interest.

The proposed decree ; appears to te enforceable, and ne
contention to the contrary has been made, Furthermore,
the relief which the decree provides is consistent with
the prayer of the complaint.

It hia ‘the notrged that the decroe adversely i Tects Ahi
right
. Defendants,

Complaint |
The United States of America, plaintiff, by its attorneys,
acting under the direction of the \tjorney General of the
United States, brings this civil aétion against the defend
ants named herein, and complains and alleges: as follows:

J

Jerisprerion axp VENUE

This complaint is. filed and these proceedings are
instituted under Section “a the Net of ( ‘ongress of July 2,
ISOO, as ame ded gi le G OF . £4). commponty known: as the
Sherman Net, in order to prevent and restrain continuing
violation by the defendants, as hereinafter alleged, of

Section Toof. the Sherman Net.

4 hae I of the corpor: ite defendants named . herein
trans: wets business'and is found within the Cemtral District
of California.:

18a
i.
Derr NDANTS

Automobile Manufacturers Association; Ine., a corpo.
pation orgauized and existing under the laws of the State
of Now York with its principal place of business in Detroit,
Michigan, is made a defendant herein, Automobile Manu-
factiirers Association, [we is a) trade association whose
membership consists mainly of firms engaged in’ the
business of manufacturing and selling motor vehicles and
component parts and accessories thereto in various: states
of the United States,

The Corporations named iss low are made defendants
het Mach of said corporations is organized and exists
under the laws of the State indieated and has its principal
place of busitiess in the. city indicated. Within the period
of ‘tinte covered by this on int said defendants have:
primarily eheaged in the business of manufacturing and
xe ‘Ming motor vehicles in various stat. of the United
States, and also manufacture ane sell coinponent parts and

ACCESSOrIES ‘thereto, : 4
cae

. State ot ’ Principal Place
Dietendant Corporation ; Dine ar porution ol Business
Caeneral Motors Delaware Detroit, Michtean

Corporgtion

deord Motor Compan % Delaware 1), reborn. Micha
Vhrysler Corporation Delaware Hisvhlaned Part. Michioa
American Motors © Marsviand: - Detroit, Michtean

( ‘orporat heety

o Whenever in this complaint references is mitde to any
cnet, deed oor transaction of a corporate defendant, such
allegation shall be deemed tocmvean that Sid corporation
Sengaged in said act, deed or transaction by or through its
officers, directars, aeents or employer. While they Were

netively wnenowed imp oD haer Peesedeseere tis! cbereetion or centred.

of corporate Dusiness affairs...

194 ; 7 . - . .
im, i
Co-CoNnsPIRATORS

6. Mach of the corporations listed below in this. para-
graph is not named a defendant herein but is named, as
a co-conspirator and has participated as a co-conspirator
with the defendants in the offer nse hereinafter charged and
has beasties acts and made sthtements in further ance
thereof,

Stateof- Principal Place

* Corporation : ; Tacorporat on of Busine NS
Checker Motor Corporation Ni W Jersey Kalamazoo, Mic higs un

(successor to Checker Cab ‘

Manufactdring Corporation }

. e .

“Diamond T Motor Car Compons : Iinois ° Cleveland, Ohio
-Tnterndtional Herrsester Conmipreny ©. Delaware Chicago, THlineis

(nm comsohids tion oft Tete mu: itonnl

Ilarvester © CME, Now bot rss

Corporation, and International

Harvester Corporation, nu Del: were

Corporation) : ere e

Studebaker Corp ation Cstecessor Mic lan South Bena, Drlisince
‘fo Studcbiker Packard Corpdration :

oe ; ; ; .

White Moter Corporyution ecesseor Ohne - z Cleveland, Ohio

te Thee Wyte Motor (Comper °

Kestscr de yp fr rpreyitioy . Neva Fr Oakland, California

(steer ssor fo Wilivs Motors, fr » * Fs ¢

1 Pernnssiyanin Co rporation r
» Mack Trucks, Tne : : ° New York New York

(suceessor to Mack Manufacturing

‘ pet ifion

7. Various other persons, firms and corporations not
rinde defendants therein dav partichpated Hf CO CONS PATA
tors with the defendants “in the offense charged in this: _
complaint and have performed nets and made statements
im furfherunce thereof, ;

IV
DeriniTion -

SAS need herem, the term ‘tmotor veliicle air porlliution
control cquipment means equipment, or any part thereof,
designed for ristallation Ono a Motor vehicle or any -vstem ‘

or engine modification on a motor vehicle whieh is designed

to cause a reduction of pollutants emitted from the:
vehicle, including, but not limited to, any device for the
control of emissions of pollutants from the exhaust system,
the er anke: ise, the ‘arburetor, or the fuel tank.

TRADE AND COMMERCE

9. Automobiles for the most part are manufactured in
the State of Michigan and are shipped therefrom to each
of the fifty states of the United States. Some automobiles
are assembled an various states of the United States from
parts manufactured in the State-of Michigan and other,

‘states. In 1966, 78,515,000 passenger cars and 15,864,000 .

trucks and buses, exclisive of olf the-road vehicles, were
registered in the United States. In that vear, 8,604,712
passenger sears Valfied at more than $17!5 billién and
1791587 commercial vehicles: valued at more than 3:9
bition | Were produced: in this country. Of the trucks
produced, 96,560 were bnilt-ewith> diesel motors.

10. The largest numbtr of passenger cars registered
and new: ars Sold in any state of the United States in 14
was in the State od ( ‘alifornia where 7,621,792 curs were *
registered and Sazaas new ¢ ars’sold. ‘The largest number @
of passenger Cares revistered: 4n any county: of any state °e-
in the United State in 1966) was in Los Aneeles County,
Where 2OR2Z98O0 cars were registered, Similarty, jn 1aG6
California accounted for the largest number ef truck regis
Arations and new truck sales with 1.542.984 tracks rgeis
tered and 150.027 new trucks yold, and os Anecles County
accounted for the. largest Qumber of trugks rewistered,
numbering 4302 TS. : ome

11. Since at least 1952 it has-been established that motor
vehicles contribute te air pollution by they emission of
hvdrocarbons, carbon monoxide, @xides of nitrewen and
other contaminants, Io! example, Th Los Aneeles County, «
as of Jannary 1967, rasoline powfred motor vehicles
. a = : +

‘

‘ . ° g

om ; ;

periodically, and to require **most-favored-pur-

chasey’* treatment of (all) parties to the. eross-.

licensing agreement if any one were licensed by a
person not a party to that agréement; |

(¢) agreed to install motor vehicle air pollution control

equipment only upon yo uniform date determined by

agreement, and subsequently agreed omat least three
separate occasions to attempt to delay the installa

tion of motor vehicle air pollution control equip.

ment: °°. ro

(1) in W967 the defendants agreed among them

“selves to delay installation of “*positive cragkease

ventilation?’ on vehicles for sale outside of Cali
fornia until the model year 1963, despite the facet
that this antipollution deviee could have been
Installed nationally for the model vear T9620 and
that oat) least some automobile mianufaetivers
expressed. willingness to dotso, in the absenee ofa
contrary tndustevewide: agreement: pa =

(2) in date P9G2 and extending into 1965, the
defendants aereed among themselves to elias
Instalhation of oun Iproverens to the positive
eran Chse Ventilation deview, HL Pp roweriene Which
the Caligornia Motor Velnele Pollution -Contiol

Board had indicated if would make mandatory:

(3) in earh D904 the defeadants agreed amony
themselves to attempt to deley the introduction, of

-@

Joa
new exhaust pollution control measures on motor
vehicles sold in’ California until the model wear
N67; despite the facet that all were expable of .in-
stalling the improvement for the model year 1966,
“the defendants avreed to tell ( ‘alifornia recuhitory
Ollicials that installation of exhaust antipollution -
measures would be tex hnologieally Hmpossible before
W967, and only under regulatory pressure made
possible by competing devices manufacturers not in
the automotive *indus! ry did’ the defendants agree

Fs

toa California reguhitory requirement that exhaust

devices be installed for the model Yoar L966: and
(d) agreed to restrict publicity relating to resedareh and.
development efforts coneeruing the motor vehicle

“air pollution problem,
Wan
. as Mirrets

fo lo. Phe aforesaid combination and conspiracy has had,

among others, the following effects:

d
(aS hindering and delaving the researeli, development,

and manufacture both by the defendants and co
conspiretors and by others not parties to the were’
ments alleged hereii: and the installation of motor
Vehicle air pollution control equipment :

(b) restricting and suppressing competition aamiong the
ls Pendants rel Co con pirators in) the researeh,
development, mannfactire and tistallation of moter
Veliele air pollution central equipment’ ened

(¢) restricting and suppressing competition in the pur
chase of patents amd patent right covering motor

Vebiele an ‘pollution conmtrad Cpu bey erpe nee
; - Praveen
Wiiererone, the plaimtit po

| Thar thar ¢ our't ach pucdire snd deeroe that the defend

ants hive eng tered noi Combination nie COMSPMPAeV, In un

a

reasonable restraint of the aforesaid interstude trade and
commeres, In viokition of Scetion Lot the Sherman Net.

2. That Gach of the defendants tuned in this complaint,

. ; ~ 3 oe .
its suecessors, Wstenees and transferees and the respecte
| é '

offigers, directors, agents and emplovees thereat, aud all

Prersotys veting or clatmine toonet on behall thereat:
, >

(a)

(b)

be enjoined Prom) Conbiningy Mittin OP Penne
Ine, directly or indirectly, the combination ar eon
spiracey hereibotore atleged, or Prom cnet in
wy other” practiee, plu, program, er device lian
ine a similar etheet; Srey RoNN

be enjarned Prom centering ante uN eereemenbs,
arrangements, Understandings, plein er provrain
With any other person, partnerships or Orporalign,
directly ar indirectly: |

(1) te delay installation of aan pollution cong rel
eyMpiiedt art athemmase restragn anictiv tela!

tleeisfaus Sas to agstalhation abate

.
“ >

(2) te restriet Srmdlivedial partelicity of: réseuineh

he alee etepmertt: rehutiime tes aa padthation
ty oy : ee fa rrebeorrrie bien tet pores
Jour vl Coeerrihye iit parbliitien eontral ts 1)
robo toh wel peered s Peepide ! in fever!

An prenti ? a3} 4 party ha whee: tne

. ‘ -

o

oN sistant \ttorney fieneral

Losvcdedace | aashiad

Pha
; *

(ec) be required to issue to any applicant interested in
developing motor vehicle air pollution technology.
thvestricted, royalty-free licenses and production
Kriow how tinder-all United States patents owned, |
cont rolloder applied for to which the cross-lHeensing
agreement-adated duly 1, 1955, as amended, has been
applicable, and to make available to any Such ap

phicant all other know-how related to-air pollution

control technology which has been exchanged with
camy other d@Fendant. * e :

OPhat the plaintiifl have: such other, further and dif.
Ferent relief as the nature of the ease may require ane
the Court hia deem just an proper in the Premises,
rneludine eaneellation of the cross licensing’ agreement
dated uly 2. TOA, ae aiiended, and an injunction en
Whine that all totute joint arrangements relating to air
pollution contre Pech nology Ihe appropriately limited its

fo subject matter of joint effort and numbers of partic

Paints se-as too miaintain competition in the development |
of oar pollution technology.

4. Vhat the jolarntatl recover the costs of this suit.

Ramsey Clark |. Ravinond W. Philipps

“A\ttorney General a . .
e (diarkes LL. Marindecio

ie ee WA) sini’ F
| In ite Mo Zbraiertnsein Attorneys, Department of

J ustice:

.

\tten Hen yi Department of |

ly tice Fe
Win. Matthew Burne, di 2 !
| 1 teal States \tternes .
.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_1406%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
