# Motion to Dismiss or Affirm — Frohman Holland v. Hogan, District Attorney

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
- **Published:** January 1, 1968
- **Citation:** 392 U.S. 654

## Text

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‘ | PAGE
. Opinion Below .:....:......... or eS Eee UP
. : " >. F ’ ne -e * .

Gardner v. Broderick, 20 N. Y. 2d 227; 229 N. E. 2d
184, app. pending No. 635, Oct. T. 1967 : 6,7, 8,9, 12, 14

Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 498 ........... 5, 10,14.

George Campbell Painting Co. v. Reid, 20 N. Y.-2d
- 370, 229 N. E: 2d 602, app.. pending No. 673,
Oct. Bs BPE AS svis sewiice gnats ue Feeseee enee;

N\
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In re Gibraltar Amusements Ltd., 291 F. 2d 22 a earags
. Cir.), cert. den, 368 U..S. WEEE cs dade kcnsesiae’ +a. *: !
‘Joint Anti-Fascist' Refugee Coitimittee v. McGrath, . |
(341 U.S, 122 . jin as pre ae cidns ik aoe oN nee ee 11
oe Lagow v.. United States, 159 F, 2d 245 (2d. Cir.) a
Lerne opr Mepmereatle eo |
_ MeGowan v, Maryland, 366 US. 420 g......e- 10°
% McNeese’ v. Deaod of Education, 372 _U. "8. 668 .... “Ss |
_ Monroe v. Pape, 365 U, S..167 .........-. Aen |
Nélson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U. 8.1 ......13, a
. Noble » C.LR., 368 F. 2d:439. (9th Cir.) ....... co
. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 810 U. 8.118 ........5. 11
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 Neb ev aiAwaeus errr 10
Slochower v. Board of Higher Bducation, 350 U. Ss.
SME encase gee Bar cases siccens ons BA 8:
Spevack Vv. Klein, 385 U. S. 511 cece an wauant 1.5, 8, 14°
Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. ies 51 (D. ‘Kan.). Laie Ss
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U. S. ee Le
#2. ileston v. Ullman, 318 U.'S. 44 ......5...00eceeees 10 Be
} Uniformed Sanitation.Men et al. v. Commissioner bog capes
. Sanitation, —— F. 2d —— (2d Cir. Sept. 20 roe ;
ra Ohl 1967), Sl: Sh.. Op: p. me nee. | gts oe
+ United: Public Worker v. Mitchell, 330 8 Bas ea
| United States v. Raines,“362 VU. 8. aa. 62 vee eeeeeees - 10 Hg ~

A er i ; — PAGE

United States v. White, 344 U. Sp 694 .....% siete u

United States ex rel. Laino.v. Warden, 246 Supp. - o - iz
"72. (SD.N.Y.), aff'd 355 F. 24 208 (2d Cir.) ..12,18,14 22

TABLE OF CONTENTS’*~~ siti
ees eames a 8 pore ea

- Matter of Zara Contracting Co. Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 497
a Ct. Albany ©o.), aff’d 23 A. D. 2d 718 (3d

— ), Ww. to app. den. 16.N, Y. _ ae: ree .
: > Srarurss
28 U.S.C.: ° : :
| Nene Sere ensayo ene
§ 2284 eT T TT Serer eee hl ae
41 C.F.R. §1-1, 317 (1965) aT Tee Réel caeGs eheb A 13
New York Agriculture and Markets Law § 257 . “ a &
Ne ew York Executive Law § 71 . eae Coie Wess 4.
New York General ‘Municipal Law:
| ee See ey hn er 2 to
‘ § 108-d ei checa eh Pa durk dicueée ee ee agape 13
| New York Public ‘Authorities Law:
EE ieee Oras eed his owed aes soon vee a0 7
i a rey, ee Re ee 3
New York State Finance Law §139-b ...:.0....:.. 8
w York City Charter -§ 1123 eeiionk: i ekes
pan ork City Health Code, Art. 3, § 111 05 ; se oe 10

Rule 16, Revised Rules of Supreme war of aS 1,2

2 _ MISCELLANEODS |

N. - State taneiaiins Annual (1959), Memorandum :

_ of the Governor, P. “431 teeeyreeees ere ee
‘ en oo Be e i | a? ‘

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2.

IN THE

Perm art of i Rath es

OCT OBER TERM, 1967

No. 653

+75

-ROHMAN HOLLAND, IRVING HOLLAND, HARVEY
MILLER, ROBERT SAUNDERS, BERT GILBERT, on their
_ own behalf and on behalf of all! other persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants, |
RICHMOND KOTCHER, NORTON KOTCHER, |
- DAVID GIMPEL and JACK SACKS,
; , Tg hb Intervenor-Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
MICHAEL W. CAMMAROSANO and EDWARD BRENNAN
_ and all other gifficers and. employees of the Borden Company, .
RAG sae te oar

“RANK S. HOGAN, District Won y SAMUEL YASGUR,
Assistant District Attorn + Coan each and every Assistant District ,
—— of New York County, and- SAMUEL ADLER, — -

: ae _ Defendants-Appellees,
LOUIS J. LEF KOWITZ, as peer General
_ ,of the State of ‘New York, ~ :
-Intervenor-Defendant-Apjelle,

On APPEAL FROM THE Unirep States District Court
FOR THE SOUTHERN District oF New York

ys
a4

IOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM BY ATTORNEY
“GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Intervenor-appellee, Louis J.. Lefkowitz, Attorney Gen-
ral of the State of New York, moves pursuant to Rule 16
? the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United

“2. |
= ‘Wakis that the lad of the: Unit States District

Court for the Southern Distriét of Ne Em be efirmed
or, in the — that this appeal be

Opinion Below ce

‘The opinion of the Court below is not am aero It
_ is reproduced as ——_ * to sppellants. ety
statement.

Jurisdiction

| higgdienta: invoke the jurisdiction of this. Court under
' 28 U.S.C. § 1253. “8

Statute Involved

— York State General ae Lew, 6 103-b (Ap-

: pellants’ Aypees ahs

~ Questions Presented

>

1. Did the District Court improperly _abstain-trom’ de-—
'_ciding the constitutional question presented in view of the
_ patent necessity for State construetion of the statute and

appellants’ insistence that the sanction of the statute: was

not available because’ State authorities did not coniply with ee
_ statutel lis , aoe

2. Does the instant aie present a. justiciable contro-.

% versy within the ‘jurisdiction | of: this Court?

3 Does the questjon of the ‘eonstitutionality of the .
statute raise a substantial federal question réquiring’a full

hearing before this spats

oy

>

o-~——

Statement

3 Appellants appeal diréetly from an order of a three-
’ judge statutory court ‘of the United States District Court .

for the’ Southern District of New York abstaining ‘from . :

_ deciding whether or not New York General Municipal Law .

- . §108-b is consitutional. That statute provides in substance
» that, when a person called-before a Grand Jury to testify

*- concerning any transaction or contract had with the State
or any of its: political subdivisions. ‘‘refuses to sign a
waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion or to answer any relevant question -concerning such
transaction or contract’’, he and any corporation. of which
, he is a director or officer shall be ‘disqualified from there-
after selling to or submitting bids to or receiving awards

_ from or entering into any contracts with any municipal
corporation or fire district, or figeno any public department,

. agency or official thereof’: ... for a. period of five years

+ after such refusal or until a disqualifeation shall _be re--

moved . Ded enn

_ | __In thei agains the appellants allegdd that each is

an Officer of a-named milk dealer ‘‘which engages, or may
engage in any transaction or has or may obtain. a contract
or award or has submitted a bid for milk or dairy goods,

work or services with the State of New York, any munici-

pal corporation or fire district therein; any public authority

therein or any public oo ry. —— there- j
of’? (Complt. ¢ 2). ss

~ Each appellant alleged: ‘that he was called: Furthermore, appellants persist in their claim raised

id ,
4

before the District Court that the District Attorney im- -

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properly applied § 103-b when. he Poenin TD a iced, :

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incrimination was violated by thé-threat that corporations |
with which they were associated would be disqualified from ~
obtaining milk contracts if. they did not sign waivers of |

immunity.” It is clear that if appellants “vere to present an
‘aiguable claim that their privilege against self-incrimina-
_tion has been violated, it would be requisite for them to
establish either that improperly obtained testinfony was
used against them in, criminal proceedings or that they, as.
_ individuals, have suffered a civil sanction solely because of:
_ theit invocation of the privilege. In the instant case, can-.
cededly, not one of the’ appellants waived immunity, not-one
Of them testified, and not one of them was indicted as: a
Tesult. of. any such testimony being used against him. Con-
trast Garrity v. N ew Jersey, 385 U. S. 493.

Nor is there. ae arguable claim that they age: suffered> —

the imposition of a sanction ds a result of their claim of -

such privilege. First, none of the appellants, as individu- :
als, or as milk dealers, were’ licensed to sell milk as res

and New York Cit

uw

quired by New styditalth Code, and Matkefs Law, § 257 ca

Ith Code, Article 3, § 11405.- -It is

axiomatic that one who is‘not directly aggrieved by the

operation of the statute may not challenge its: validity in a
federal court. ‘McGowan v. Maryland, 366 .U. S. 420, 429-

_ 30; United Btates v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20-24; Tileston —

‘ vy, Ullman, 318 US. 44. Here the only possible conse-
quencgs of the refusal of. appellants to sign the requested
waivers of immunity are the civil sanctions to the corpora-
tions. Since there are no sanctions, against the. individual

on plaintiffs, it is untenable‘for stich appellants as individuals

_to daim thd standing to challenge the operation of the
statute. Poe v. Ullman, 367- U. 'S: 497, 503-505.

Appellants’ novel claim cto, meet this indispensable - re-
quirement is that ey are substantial stockholders of-the ;
corporate licensees’ and may suffer some consdyuences of
any possible disqualification of those corporate. licensees.
- However, the allegation ¢ of speculatively cries economic
\

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ces

detriment does not justify the action ae the ‘individual
stockholders. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113; .
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 422, 151. Even if each appellant owned all. of .the
stock of the corporation, -by electing to do business as a
corporation he éstablished a separate entity with its own
rights, duties and liabilities. The corporation is neither
_ responsible for its officers’ of stockholders’. individual li- .
abilities, nor is it the beneficiary of their individual rights.
Noble v. C.LR., 368 F. 2d 439, 445 (9th Cir. ); In re .
Gibraltar Amusements Litd., 291 F. 2d 22 aie cert.
den. 368 U. 8. 925; Lagow v. United States, 15 2c 245
(2d Cirs. Appellants? claim that they are virtually un-—
emplogable certainly is not a result of the statute. The.
stitute is directed: only at officers or directors of corpora-
— tions, it does not even apply to stockholders, let alone mere |
employees. And, of course, appellants are not, in fact, ©
unemployed. ’ : :

tn

Peculiarly, the licensed milk dealer ieimastionin were:
-. not made parties in this case. The complaint did not | ge.

that it was a violation ef due process of law to-di ify ~
such corporations fram obtaining city contracts because of -
any officers’ refusal to sign a waiver of immunity. More-
over, appellants still insist that they are not seeking "to
raise any claifn on behalf:-of the corporations. It is obvi-.:
ous, indeed, that the coxporations could not assert a claim
of violation of the privilege against self-incrimination
. since they do not have a privilege-of their own and since
- they cannot assert that privilege on behalf of anyone else.

United States v. White, 344.U. 8. 694. -

The individual. appellants” cannot claim a violation of |
their privilege against self-incrimination by virtue of the
‘ imposition of a sanction on another entity, . thdt is, the
<corporation. They cannot circumvent the fact that any
impact results on the corporation by claiming théWerivative
impact: of that sanction. Any claim of violation of the . -

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P ° A

privilege depends on there being an identity between the
person with the privilege and the person on whom any
penalty is imposed. Absent such ers no veeren
, — be asserted.

dates I a ees
___ The appeal fails to raise a substantial federal question.

Even if, arguéndo;- appellants could assert that their
privilege -against self-incrimination is violated by their
refysal to waive immunity, it is clear that any disqualifica-
tion results only from a-lack of candor on their part..
_ The position of appellants basically, i is that they may never

_ under..any circumstances, in any form, be called upon to
give an account of: themselves with respect to public con-
tracts.- The Second Circuit i in Uniformed Sanitation Men,
et al. v. Commissioner, of Sanitation, supra, has accurately
analyzed the situation :

**It was surely proper for a City official hinted with

' a duty to.do so to investigate charges of misfeasance in
the operation of the Sanitation Department and in
connection with such an investigation to question em-
ployees about their participation in activity which re-

+ flected the possibility of bribery and embezzlement.
Can there be any reasonable doubt that, an employee,
especially one who has been warned of the consequence

_ of his refusal to answer, can be ( and, indeed, should be)
discharged for such refusal!” :

* The District ae itself strongly stated the interest of

the’State (Jurisd. Statement pp. 59-60). The New-York
Court of Appeals in Gardner v. Broderick, supra and Camp-.
bell v.. Reid,’ supra has reached the same conclusion. Sée
also United States ex rel. Laino v. Warden, 246 F. — 72
(S.D.N.Y.), affd 355 F: 2d 208 (2d Cir.).

_ The State ‘has affirmatively dictated that it is of the at
highest. importance that there be no collusive bidding or

e

nie oy ee

bid rigging in any transactions involving public contracts.

This the State has done by stipulating that in every public
contract proper assurances be incorporated by the private .
contracting: party to that effect (See e.g. General Municipal
Law §103-d). .The New York statute is substantially
identical with federal requirements. Sed 41 C.F.R. § 1-1,
317 (1965) (Federal Procurment Regulations).

In approving Section. 103-b, Governor Rockefeller pointed
out that: ee

‘‘Unlike a private person who may contract with whom —
-he wishes, a public agency usually lets contracts by
public auction and is required to accept the lowest bid.
For that reason, it would seem appropriate to dis- ©

qualify the bids of persons who are unwilling to dis-

~ « close to a grand jury facts relating to some prior con-_
tract. with the public. Likewise, it would seem ap-
_ propriate that public contracts should provide that the |
__ benefit accruing under them be available only so long
as the beneficiary is willing, when required by a grand
jury to disclose any information he may have as to a.
public contract.’? Memorandum of the Governor, N. Y.
- Stave Lecisuative ANNUAL (1959), p. 431.

‘The provisions here challenged are in no respect arbi-
trary.- They do no-more than seek to ‘insure candor on

_\ the part of public contractors and the protection of the

public from persons ‘or corporations that feel they cannot
be candid in their public dealings. There ‘can be no ques- «
but that public bodies. are entitled to such candor
ey abet a statutory provision. United States ex rel.
‘Ta v. Warden, supra, at 93. This has repeat®dly been

7 held to he the case with public employees. Nelson v. County . Ed
of Los Angeles, 362 U. S. 1; Betilan v. Board, of - Public

Edweation, 357 U. S. 399; Lerner v.. Casey, 357 US. 468;
Sloc v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551.
The rationale which requires candor on the part of public

14.

~

employees applies equally at least to public contractors.
United States ex rel. Laino v. Warden, supra, at 94,

No decision of this Court has undermined the validity

‘of the state procedures for insuring non-collusive bidding -

and honest performance of duties and contracts. As the
_ Second Circuit pointed out, Garrity v. New Jersey is in-

apposite because no testimony was used in a criminal pro-- _

ceeding. See also Gardner v. Broderick, supra. This Court
has already held that testimony obtained from a witness
under threat of loss of emi] yment is inadmissible in. a
criminal proceeding. “There is no basis for finding. +that™
' the ye job (or coritract) loss must be an empty

one. The only way the state can protect itself: against
contractors who will not be frank about their. business

with the state or its — is not to do business with

them. .

Nor can appellants find any support in Spevack \ v..Klein,

385 U. S. 511. Their reliance upon it is overbroad, That

case involved neither a public employee nor public con- |

tractor but a licensed attorney whom the majority appear
to have found had a property right in the license. See

concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas (id. at 519-20). ~

Accordingly it did- not even suggest an overruling of such
casés as Nelson v. Los Angeles, supra; Beilan v. Board
* of Public Education, supra and Slochower v.. Board of
Higher Education, supra. The principle enumerated in or
of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75. It

decided only that the right to exercise the privilege against —

. self-inerimination could not be withheld from the licensed

attorney. _ It did not preclude the requirement. of candor °
licensed of attorneys with narrow regard to the right of ©

the State to any specific information. But the rights and
privileges of licensees of business or ‘professions dealing
with the public are a far cry from the exercise of ‘the
established function of. any governmental body, state or
federal, to protect. itself from the —— of collusive

a

—

iy ; . ©

_ bidding which have proved a cancer to. the body public -
where tolerated. Accordingly, there is no property right -<.
to a public contract in New York. Matter of Caristo Con-
struction Corp. v. Rubin, 15 A. D. 2d 561 (2d Dept.), aff’d
10.N. Y. 2d 538; Matter of Zara Contracting Co.p Inc., 45- |
Misc. 497 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.), aff’d 23 A. D. 2d 718. (3rd » ace ie

°Dept.), lv. to app. den. 16 N.Y. 2d 482. The necessity, So
. for candor required by the statute is, of course, far more

a compelling with respect to a public contractor who stands

-in-a special relation to the government. The provision
assailed by appellants is unquestionably an indispensible
safeguard for the public against any venal conspiracy ea ae
defraud the state. eh | a

“

CONCLUSION -

*F or the foregoing reasons the within section to dis- .

miss or affirm should be granted.
‘Dated: N ew York, New York, hla 8, 1967.
Respectfully submitted,

.. Louis J. LEFKowITz 3

Attorney General.of.the
‘State of New York. ,;
Intervenor-Appellee

pro sé. .

O-%

SamuEL A. HirsHow1t1z
- First Assistant Attorney General
BRENDA SoOLOFF _

Assistant Attorney General

' Of Counsel |

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_1140%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
