# Brief Amicus Curiae — Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S. p. A. v. Lisi

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief Amicus Curiae
- **Published:** January 1, 1968
- **Citation:** 390 U.S. 455

## Text

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SUPREME) COURT: UU. +

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ee JAN 2 1968

= s ements a oe JOHN: F. DAVW, BLERK
‘i Court nf the Ynited States 7
ees a Octoser TERM, saved
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Aurratta-DINEE ‘AEREE TTALIANE, S.p.A.,
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v.

Joun List, et al.,

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI LO THE UNITED STATES
. GOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

. ° e

- BRIEF OF ARNOLD HOLTZMAN AS AMICUS CURIAE
Stuart M. SPEISER
; Counsel for amicus curtae
° en : | Arnold Holtzman ©
; * 200 Park Avent
New York, N. -Y. 10017

Cuaries F’. Krause
' Aurrep W. Gans
Donatp W. Mapo.e
Spriser, SHUMATE, GEOGHAN & KRavse | .
. Of Counsel — ee .

~ January 18, 1968

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Nature of the Interest of Amious Arnold Holtzman

‘The Questions Involved .

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TABLE OF CONTENTS i

‘ ae ; & i -, PA&GE ;

| AncuMENT— Epi |
-. I, The Second Cireuit Considered AN of the Legal

_ Arguments- Now Being “Advanced on Behalf of
" Petitioner Alitalia, and Rejected. All of Them
for Sound Legal Reasons ‘

IL Claims i in Briefs of Other dwiiet That. the De-
x: . cision Below. Compromises the Good Faith of

. the United States i in Relations With Other Na-

tions, g and. May Lead to Erosion of the Warsaw |

‘ Convention, . Are’ Entirely Unfounded. The
Warsaw: Convention: Has Outlived Its Time
Only" Because of Misrepresentation ‘of Its True

Nature. There Is No Legal,.Moral or Economic —

Justification for Warsaw Today. The Argu-

~ments Made Herein Against the Decision Below - .
‘Tacitly Admit That Warsaw Cannot Survive
if Reasonable Notice of Its Limitations Is Re- '

quired actin

= s

a. Thére Is Absolutely No Economic Jastifice-

‘tion Today for Warsaw Limitations. Total
Passenger and Cargo Liability Insurance
Costs for U.S. Airlines Are Less Than One
Percent (1%) of Operating. Costs, With or
Without Warsaw “Limitations. The . Other
‘99% of Operating Costs: Are: Not Limited
. by Treaty, and Are Readily Paid, Often at
American Prices, by Foreign Airlines Eager

to Serve the Lush U.S. Air Travel Market..
The C.A.B. Has Found That the Impact of.

‘Complete Denunciation of ‘Warsaw Would
Be Minimal

‘12

PAGE

bh: The. Warsaw Convention Confers No: Bens- :

fits . Upon. Passengers—lIt Merely. Takes

‘Away Legal Rights They Would Otherwise

. Have.- Its Solé Purpose Was ‘te Limit Car-

rier, ‘Liability. All Ticketing and Docu-: |

. mentation. Procedures Developed Through -

Warsaw Are Also Available to Non-Warsaw
Signatories Through I.A.T.A. ...

. Warsaw: Does Not Reduce Litigation or

, Bring Uniformity of Law. By Injecting the.

Irritants of Arbitrary Limitations ‘and

16

. mt

Foreign Legal Concepts Into Nornial Litiga-

tion Channels, It Actually, Foments Pro- _
19

tracted Litigation and Destroys Uniformity

. Carriers and Insurers .Whg /Claim ‘That

-Warsaw’s Liability Limitations Are Neces- _

sary, Use American Courts to Litigate Huge
Hull Claims Which Dwarf Passenger Suits,

and Which Are N ot Limited by Any ‘Treaty.

: ‘Warsaw Is Admitted by Its Strongest Pro-
ponents to Be “Completely Repugnant” to

.American Law. The Only Reported Decision

Upholding Its Constitutionality Under the

21

%§

?

. Seventh Amendment Rests on the Untenable
_ Ground that the Right to Trial:by Jury Does
Not Include Assessment of Damages ............

. U.S. Adherence to Warsaw Has No Effect on .

: ‘Operating Rights to Foreign Countries. isu x

°

23.

PAGE

7 - denaataeilip Limitations . on ‘Wrongful ear
Death Recoveries i in a Few American States, Rie
Cited as.a Parallel to Warsaw, Are on the
Way Out; Aré Being Circumvented in Many :
. Aviation. Cases; Are Subject to State Legis-
‘lative Control; and in Any Event Cannot *
- - and Do-Not Apply to Personal Injury Cases’.
. Such as List ... 26

é cree ‘The Anic ‘United Kingdom, Italy and ry
* . Are Owners or Controllers of International Air
| - Carriers. Their Position on the Warsaw Coh- .
vention Should Be Considered i in. That Light

°

“a: | In General : ; innit ~ ie
a The Republic of Ttaly a ee
© @, The United Kingdom -i:tcccecncncnnrneen SAY.
da. Canada 7 : oe
e. gATA and IATA, the Air eeeny Trade.
Associations pine , _

@&

_IV. Every Expression ‘of United. States Policy on
‘ the Warsaw Convention ‘Has: Clearly ‘Stated
~~ “*That if the, Carriers ers Do.Not Give Passengers
- » Adequate Notice of Warsaw Limitations, the
- . Carrier Must Suffer Loss of the Liability ia
tation. Since the United, States Has Stead- coi
fastly Maintained ‘That Passenger Notice Is .
_. Essential -to Warsaw Limitation of Liability, |
It Cannot Be Claimed That the Decision Below ~~
Causes Surprise or* Any Breach-of interna-
fees sila tional ene : _

~,
“$5 ri

shi "Ww:
| | Sr et eis PAGE
| a. In ‘General ONES Pe iaaaied 56
ye by US. Policy. Statements at Rio , --- 56
ec. At the, Hague - eRe SAK OE ee
. d.-United” States Goverumental Policies and |

Statements of. Position, 1962-1963 ................ 61

| e. At Montreal Papel. Meeting of ICAO in.
1966... : 4
.. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (1965, Aa), 341
. Fd 851, cert den 382 US. 816 ..... ; 9
_ Muller v. iecencandinedcas i aeabamce 28 8Ct

] .

, | ' ) 7 -P : Pag eS
-. Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 09 Tenn Wises ae
Noel v. Linea aprepertal beaepres: 247 F 24 667... ag ae

- Oceanic. Steam Nav. Co..v. . Corcoran (1925, cag NY),
_F24'163, 57.ALB 163, at page 168; Slioheieis 86

: Pearson v. ‘N ortheast Airtined line. (1962, CA2 NY),
309 F2d 553, 92 ALR2d 1162, ‘certiorari denied in
~ (1958) 372 U.S. 912, 9 L ed 720, 83S Ct-726............. 18, 27
Pierre \v. ‘Eastern Airlines, et al. (1957), 152 F. Supp. at
486, U.S. District. Court for oe District of New

—— oe 24
. ~ Poff. v.. New ‘England T & T Co, 72 Nu. 164, 55 Atl. .
OF sn 8
Powell v. Eastern ‘Air tinea et al;, U. 8. D. G., ‘Bast- | 18

3

at

: kt 1
°° x ” 5 ye ; els :
N ae 3 : os Z Mi as PAGE
‘." 13 Oss, Cannrens, §§629. et SOQe. n-------- : ae 84»
ck aug Jur 2d, CARRIERS, §§942 et Onin wre . 84. :
ve 80 ous, ‘Suprine, §195a ...:.... toe cg ae
[1942] US Av 178 ania scckiaacasauume ta aac ae
[1947] US Ay 1. asaeneses ies ae
* Blackstone’s ‘icmeumnaas’ ineanveed 1996, Vol. T,
; Book EI, Chap. 23, Trial By Jury, p. 376 ia a
aes “Negligence Law in Europe”, 361 Insurance arsed i
ens ss Jo rnal 82 (Feb. 1953) .* - ef
-. JGIA document 23/1. 10A, Final Action, August 7,
1962, a D, page ees i 12
page 8 18
page 9 ...... 19

-Ynternational Conference on Private” Air Law, The*
Hague, September 1955 reported in ICAO Document
’ 7687-LC/140 “Hague Minutes” “..............29,33, 41, 44, 49,

-, 96, 98, 99

’ Least Committee of. ICAO (Ninth Session), Rio de
. Janeiro, August 25- September. 12, 1953, reported 1 in
° . — 7450-10 /136 “Rio Minutes” viiaias 30, 36, 38, 39,

i 40, 47, 48, 49, 51,
53, 57, 94, 95.

. Second. Interngtional Conference of Private Air Law, :
Warsaw’ Oct. 4-12, 1928 “Warsay Minutes” ......29, 30, 31,
> a -.,. & 88, 89, 92, 4.

. iG of i

58,59,60,61,

Ne
;

ee en

Cane _ . PAGE -
Special ICAO Meeting a Montreal, Peliruaiy 1-15,
1966, ICAO Document $384-L0/154- 1 “Montreal Min- |
utes” » ; me sosceeipaimian 2-80, 34, 50, 54, 66,

, Sg nt 88 69, 70, 71,108, 104

Speiser, Riscineey For Wrongful Death (1966), .......:26, 27

The United States and the Warsaw Convention, Low: ,
enfeld and Mendelsohn, 80 Harvard Law Rev .. ..100,101

Volume II. ‘Hague Conference, 1955 ICAO Document |

7687-LC/140 “Hague Documents” - nasiainn a
Warsaw Convention , 1 et passim 7
- World Airline Record, 6th. Edition, 1965 pub. by Road-::
cap & Associates; Chicago, __ honnn . 28, 30, 46.
_

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Ix THE

Supreme Caurt uf the Wuited States

Ocronsr. Term, 1967 ©

“Aurnanta-Liwee AEREE Trattane, S.p. "

ie Petitioner,
v.

Joun Last, ef al., a my
) . Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES ©
, COURT OF APPEALS FOR, THE SECOND CIRCUIT _

aS)

“BRIEF OF ARNOLD HOLTZMAN AS AMICUS CURIAE

‘Nature of the Interest of Amicus Arnold Holtzman

Amicus Arnold Holtzman’s motion for leave to file this
brief amicus curiae ‘was granted by this Court, on the
grounds that he now has pending an action for damages
in the Supreme Court of New York, County of Kings, en-
titled ““ArnoLp HoitzMay, Plaintiff —v— Barris Evro-
pean Arrways and De Havnaanp, Defendants,” being Index
No. 7840/1963 on the Docket of. said Court, in which: the
question involved is the same as “that presented for deci-
sion in the instant case, namely—are the limitation of lia-
bility provisions contained i in Article 22( 1) of the Warsaw
Convention (49 Stat. 3000- 3026), available to an air carrier
of a passenger receiving bodily injuries on a flight in |
international transportation in light of the provisions of
Article 3(2) of the Convention (49 Stat. 3015) precluding

&

ya

2
availability of various provisions ‘of the Convention limit-
ing liability where the purported ticket contains, on the

front thereof in exceedingly small print, the message,
“Each: passenger should carefully examine this ticket, par-

: .tieularly the Conditions on-page 4,” and the “notice” to

the passengers is located on page 4 of a ticket and baggage

cheeks: combined inthe form of a small booklet and.(to —

quofe the two courts below), is contained in footnotes
printed “in microscopic. type” and “camouflaged in Lillipu-

tian print in a thicket of ‘Conditions of Contract’”, and the _

“exculpatory statements ,.. are virtually invisible .. . are
ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and unempha-
sized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anythihg

_ else,” and “ ‘are so artfully camouflaged that their presence

is concealed’”? Amicus Holtzman states that the ticket
. “delivered” to him by. British European Airways, on the
international flight on which he sustained severe and per-—
manent bodily i injuries, is identiéal, as to its pertinent parts,
printing, typography and legibility, to the ticket delivered
to the respondents i in the instant case.

More specifically, amicus Holtaman was a passenger on
a de Hgvilland aircraft operated | by British European Air *

ways_ which. crashed and ‘burned at. Ankara, Turkey, on -

| Decaasber 21, 1961. Amicus Holtzman was .trapped in: the

flames, and aécording to paragraph 6(a) of the verified bill

of particulars which he filed in said action,
“As a “result of the accident plaintiff Arnold Holtz-

man suffered pulmonary burns. necessitating an emer- ..
' ? gency tracheotomy; plaintiff suffered burns covering

an area of 20% of the total body area including the

following: third degree burns. involving the entire. °

forehead and eyebrows, extending into the eyelids,
downward around the upper part of the left cheek and.

across the glabellar region of the nose. The lower

.
’

oes Sen hhc SESARND wie

SPN ORR F e $90 sm ESI oe ete dd Sey ue. Peete soe

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3

portions of the nose, upper lip, lower lip, cheek and
‘ naterior portions of the neck were deeply burned.
Scattered areas of third dégree: loss in the area of the
ears involving the helical rims of the ears causing a ~
loss of a portion of ‘the ‘area involyed. Second degree
| burns in the’ scalp. Deep and extensive third degree
Ds burns of -both hands. Said burns. resulted in many
operative procedures to repair and reconstruct the de-
stroyed areas of skin of. the face, forehead, ears and
hands. The permanent injuries are the results of the
healing scars. and the attempts at reconstruction which
have resulted in permanent disfigurement of the: plain-
tiff.”

‘An additional ground of the motion of amicus Holtzman
’ for leave to file this brief was that there are many other —
cases, now pending in various state and federal courts,
involving idéntical tickets “delivered” to passengers who
were killed or: suffered severe bodily injury in interna-
tional flight air crashes or accidents, in which the Warsaw ~
. . Convention is being-attempted to he used as a:defense,
__—-among them being the following captioned_cases in which: .

* the plaintiffs are represented by amicus Holtzman’s counsel.
Stuart M. Speiser: -Volney Righter, etc. v. American Air’. :
Lines, et al., Supreme Court, County of New York, Index —

No. 11487/64; Reiger v. Pan American, et al., Supreme
Court, County of New York, Index No. 13252/66; Byzinski.

v. Eastern Air Lines, et-al., Supreme Court, County of New

York, Index No. 6747/65; Rygaard v. Eastern Air Lines,

et al., Supreme Court, County of New York, Index No./
9722/65; Harrison vy. Eastern Air’ Lines, et al., Supreme
Court, County of New York, Index No. 9723/65 ; Graham:
v. Eastern Air Lines, et al.; Supreme Court, County of .

New York, Index No. 9718/65; Zuckerman v. Eastern Air
Lines, et al., Supreme Court, County of New York, Index ay:

~

olan . . " e |
. ,
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4

- No. 9721/65; Sivianais v. Eastern Air Lines, et ee Ringinesia
_. Court, County of New York, Index No. 9720/65; Boryk v.
- Aerolineas Argentina, et al., U. S. D. C., Southerg District,
- New York, 62 Civil 3855; Eck v. United Arab Airlines, -
Supreme Court, County of New York, Index No: 7778/63;
Eck v. United Arab Airlines, U. S. D. C., Southern District,
New York, 64 Civil 3855; Love v. Pakistan Air Lines, .
°U. S. D. C., Southern District, New York, 65 Civil 2369;
Masrenbions ¢. Eastern Aig Lines, et al., U. S.D.C., Eastern. -
- District, New York, 65 A. -640-and Powell v. Eastern Air
Lines; et-al., U. S..D, C., Eastern District, New York, 66 |
A. 101. 7 ae Sts oon

_ Amicus Holtzman further sahuceis motion for leave
_ _ to file this brief, that he-hias attempted ‘to present his views
_-. to. this: ¢ urt, by and through his present counsel, as to
the invalidity of the purported ‘‘withdrawal” of the Govern-
** ment of the United States of its earlier denunciation, of the
Warsaw Convention, in the case of Arnold Holtzman, Peti-. -
tioner, v. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Respondent, Case
No. 1294-on-the Docket of this Court for the October, 1965,
“Term; petition for writ of certiorari was denied May 16,
1966, reported in 384 U. s. 943, 16 L. ed. 2d 541, * Sup.
">. Ct. 1466.

| Amicus Holtzman “supports the position of the respon-
- dents herein, and respectfully urges this Honorable Court -
--° to affirm the decisions of the courts a:
°

The Question Involved

~

.* the liability of an air carrier. toa passenger limited to
$8,291.87 under the Warsaw Convention, when the only:
ticket reference to the possible applicability of the Warsaw |
‘Convention is the following: a message on the front ‘of a
ticket, in exceedingly small print, stating “Each passenger

.

a” 5 ° S
. e i Ni,

should carefully examine this ticket, particularly the Con-
‘ditions on page 4”; and, on said page 4; contained in foot-
-notes. printed in microscopic. type’ and camouflaged in
Lilliputian print in a thicket of “Conditions of Contract,”
the exculpatory statements are virtually invisible, are in-
effectively positioned, diminutively sized; unemphasized
- by bold face type, contrasting color or anything else, and
are so artfully camouflaged that their presence is concealed?

ARGUMENT
x : ‘
much longer. Lhere.then: began a series of conferences and
considerations of ‘the |Warsaw Convention problem, which
are described in more detail in Points II, IW and V below.
Throughout these conferences, the true purposes and nature

of Warsaw have been misrepresented consistently by its

proponents, and therefore it is no surprise to see this mis-

representation continued right into the amici briefs sup-

porting petitioner in this case. The purpose of this Point

' IT is to deal directly with these misrepresentations, and to

point out the true nature and purposes of Warsaw. —

Warsaw’s proponents have attempted to vecloag its life
by making vague claims that its limited liability i is an eco-
nomic necessity;. that it confers benefits upon passéngers;

q

that it brings about uniformity and lessens litigation ; and =

that it contains important provisions and_ has important

3

purposes other than the\limitation of carrier’s liability, -

such as a uniform ticketing regime which -would not be

— possible without the Convention. These claims are Cis- |

cussed below in the remaining: seettons of this Point II,

against the background of the same old vague claims and

innuendos, such as the statement on page 10 of the brief of -

amicus United Kingdom, that “a decision of this Court up-
holding the judgments below would imperil; the. limitation
provisions of the Montreal agreement”; and. the claimed

: “effect of the decision below in. compromising the good faith

and integrity of the United States-in its relations with other ° -

“nations” found at page 8 of the first brief submitted by

amicus AT . (attached to its motion of March 31, 1967 for

leave to file’ brief amicus curiae on, the petition for
certiorari). As will be apparent after reading the material

below, the true gravamen of the aforementioned claim of.

‘amicus United Kingdom is ‘that Warsaw is so unfair and

anachronistic that the mere requirement of reasonable

notice of its. provisions is enough to imperil its existence,

lageeere® ~ ef

12

a. There Is Absolutely No Economie Justification Today —
for Warsaw Limitations. Total Passenger and Cargo -
Liability Insurance Costs for U.S. Airlines Are Less
Than One Percent (1%) of Operating Costs, With

_ or Without Warsaw Limitations. The Other 99% of
Operating Costs Are Not Limited by Treaty, and Are
Readily Paid, Often at American Prices, by Foreign
Airlines Eager ‘to Serve the Lush U.S. Air: Travél

‘Market. The C.A.B. Has Found That the Impact of

: Complete Denunciation of Warsaw Would Be Minimal.

For several decades, proponents of Warsaw have claimed
that elimination of the liability limitation would cause finan-
cial havoc among international airlines. No figures of any

_ kind were ever presented in ‘support of this claim. To this

date, the foreign airlines, such as those operated by amict
U.K., Italy and Canada, have never submitted any sup-.
poitbess figures, even though such figures have been re-
quested by various organizations officially concerned with ~

the Warsaw problem.

Finally, as part of a seencinel review of Warsaw alenia

"by the U.S. Interagency Group on International Aviation —

(IGIA) in 1962, the Civil Aeronautics Board undertook a
staff study to. determine the economic impact of complete

_. denunciation of, Warsaw, and to study various other alter-

natives. The C.A.B: staff reached the conclusion that “The

_ increase in insurance cost to the carriers, in the event they
are subjected to unlimited lability as a result of U.S. with-

drawal from the Warsaw Convention, would be minimal”
(IGIA document 23/1.10A, Final Action, August 7, 1962, At-
tachment D, page 1). be

This conclusion is amply supported by reference to the
most recent figures*which counsel for amicus Holtzman has |

- been able to find in the public files of the C.A.B. Set forth

below are excerpts from C.A.B, Forms 41 required to be.

oo 13

_ filed with the C.A.B. by U.S. air carriers for the year end-
* ing December 31, 1966, of which amicus Holtzman respect-
‘fully requests this Court to take judicial notice. These
figures show total operating expenses, insurance costs and
passenger-cargo liability insurance cost as a percentage of
total. operating expenses, for the two largest’ all-doméstic
air°carriers (United. Airlines and American Airlines), and
various divisions of the largest. all-international air carrier
( Pan American World Airways). 2 Column A. shows total
operating expenses ; column B shows cost of purchased pub-

‘lie liability.and property damage and all other general in-

surance except insurance covering liability for i injuries, loss
and | damage to passengers and cargo, combined with. provi-
sion for self-insurance against general risks (generalized. as
‘non-passenger insurance”); column C shows cost of pur-
chased insurance and provisions for self-insurance cover-
ing liability for injuries, loss and damage to passengers
and cargo (generalized as “passenger-cargo insurance”) ;
and column D shows passe ager-cargo insurance as a per-
centage of total — expenses.

‘ D
‘ Passenger-
‘os =.
. insurance as
A {a Costof percentage
_ Total Cost of passenger- of total
. operating non-passenger cargo operating .
Carrier expenses imsurance insurance expenses

United Airlines $781,866,883 $5,607,896 $5,194, 537 .00664

-,. American Aitlines $621,000, 000 $0,907, 687 . $4,524,682 00728

Pan American, § » :
Pacific: Division . $229,510,686 - $2,110,580 $2,217,883 .00966

- Pan American, _._ i : |

Division $182,892,997 $1,701,804 $1,153,515 .00636

Pan American, - ; ee ane = ,
Atlantic Division $295,906,060 $2,519,486 $2,089,245 .00702

- @

%

14
Reveesi interesting conclusions may be drawn from these
figures: é

1. Pan American, protected by Warsaw limitations as to
most of its passenger claims, and operating entirely on‘in- -

oe ternational flights, had a higher passenger-cargo insurance

—-

/

cost (percentage-wise) than either of the two domestic air-
"lines, who are not protected by Warsaw as to most passen- .
ger claims. :

~-2.°"In four out of five instances othe cost of non-passenger _
insurance (not protected by any treaty) was a. than —

_ the cost of passenger-cargo insurance.

3. In any event, the total cost of passenger-cargo insur- :

ance, with or without Warsaw protection, .is well under one . —

aaa (1%) of total a costs.

What of the other 99% of opetating costs, which cover
such items as advertising, ticket sales, flight crew and ©
ground maintenance labor costs, fuel, legal fees, and equip-
ment depreciation! Clearly, none of these costs are limited
by any international'treaties. Yet, they are readily as-
sumed by dozéns of foreign airlines who compete energet-
¢ ically for a share of the U.S. international passenger mar-. |
ket, the largest and most lucrative in the world. Indeed, |
many of these costs are necessarily paid at American prices
in American dollars, since it is not possible to operate air

services in the U.S.A. without having extensive. personnel
* and equipment stationed here,’and without extensive ad-
' ‘vyertising and sales costs. In fact, it is well known that the-

Boeing.and Douglas jet aircraft, manufactured in the United
States, carry most of, the world’s international passengers, _
so that even equipment costs are mainly incurred at Ameri--

ean prices. But in the scramble to pay these 99% of operat-

ing costs at prices much highér than those prevailing at

. »

ana

a

~ home, the foreign carriers cling to the one area protected
by treaty, and seek to save. a-minute fraction of the less —
than: one percent involved in passenger insurance, by. con-
-. tinuing an | archaic subsidy conferred on them at the expense
of widows, orphans and cripples whose lives are shattered
by air disasters. :

ven in the claims area, foreign airlines- readily ‘accept :

- American standards in many operations. For example, they
must earry workmen’ s compensation insurance on thousands
“of their employes stationed in the U.S.A., and must carry

' liability insurance at standard rates on all their U.S.A.
ground operations, since none of these areas are protected © _

by treaty or subsidized by accident victims. Thus, the air-
lines operated by’ amici United Kingdom, Italy and Canada
must. “pay full damages if they injure or kill Americans

~ who-may be strangers to them, through negligent operation
of ground vehicles or negligent maintenance of ticket office

| premises ; but as t6 Americans who patronize these airlines
* as passengers, they seek treaty protection and limitation of
~ liability to a fraction of the actual damage ! |

This is the true economic punabdass of the Warsaw Con- -
vention. The. sole purpose of this. treaty was to limit lia- .
bility and to confer a subsidy on the carriers at the 2 expense _ va

of those passengers least able to afford it—the ones who

- do not make it safely to their destinations. Probably the

most complete answer fo the groundless economic claims
of Warsaw’s proponents is the U.S. domestic airline system,
which has developed into the largest, safest and most prof-
itable in the world, without benefit of any specially enacted
liability canitapene. ;

ae
.

©

16

b. The Warsaw Tee, Confers No ‘Benefits nen
-Passengers—It Merely Takes Away Legal Rights They
Would Otherwise Have. Its Sole Purpose Was to Limit
Carrier Liability. All Ticketing and Documentation -:

‘Procedures Developed Through Warsaw Are Also’ -
-Available to Non-Warsaw Signatories Through 1.A.T.A.

- When it became apparent after World War II that in-

~ “ternational air.transport no longer neéded special protec-
. tion, the airlines and others interested in preserving the -

special economic advantages of limited liability attempted
to portray the Warsaw Convention as a great boon to the

____ traveling public: Various claims were made as to broad-

ened legal rights. obtained by passengers, despite the ad-

mitted original purposes of the Convention to benefit the

aitlines at the expense of the passengers. These claims are
refuted by a: cursory inspection of the nepotion American
cases. : bet

_Apologiste for the Warsaw: Convention froquetttly claim

that it protects American passengers from even harsher

limitations of foreign laws, but the Courts have held that
the Convention is a ceiling and not a floor. It doés not cre- —
ate an independent cause of action but merely limits what-
ever greater rights the passenger may have under other

applicable laws (N oel'\ v. Linea’ Aeropostal Venezolana, _

F. 2d 667).

le the same category, supporters of. Warsaw mihe the
general claim that the Convention protects’ American citi-
zens who sue foreign airlines in foreign courts. Aside from

the above refutation of the “floor” argument, it is impor-

tant to note that there have been no reported cases .of .

American: passengers suing foreign airlines in foreign.

courts. Practically all of the world’s international* carriers .

- do business in the United States and thus are amenable to, -
suit here. | -

17

It is also sometimes claimed that the Conventior gives
the passenger a broader choice of. venue.for bringing suit,
‘whereas the opposite is true. Since the Convention does
not create a new cause of action, it is necessary to make
personal service of process upon the carrier in accordance
with local law. Article 28 further limits venue to four
places: the carrier’s domicile, its principal place of busi-—
nes, the place where the contract -was made, or the desti-
nation. There are no such venue limitations in the local
laws of our states, so that it is-quite possible to have a
Warsaw Convention case dismissed for improper venue or

lack of jurisdiction, when the same case could have been

.maintained against the carrier without the Warsaw Con-
_ vention (see Berner v. United Airlines, et al., 149 N. Y. 8.
2d 335; Winsor v. United Air Lines, 153 F. Bape. 244).

So far as the burden of proof i is concerned, ‘the Conven-
tion does no more than codify the rule of res ipsa loquitur,
which exists in our state laws independant of the Conven-
tion. _ [For a collection of the _— cases, see 6 ALR 2d
| 528]. ee

Inithe civil law countries, there is actually a stronger
presumption of negligence. than res ipsa Joquitur, without
the Warsaw Convention, A typical provision is: “Every .
act whatever of an individual which causes injury to an- .
other obliges the one, because of whom it has occurred,
- to make up for it”. [see Cohen, “N egligence Law in ~

Europe”, 361 Insurafice Law Journal 82 (Feb. 1953) |, e

In suits brought in the: United States for injuries or
deaths occurring in, foreign countries, when the Warsaw:
Convention is not involved, there is ample protection for

'*. the passenger in American law. -American courts would —

not even have. to consider the full faith and credit clause,
which ‘was involved in such cases as Kilberg v Northeast ©
Airlines, Inc. (1961) 9 NY2d 34, 211 NYS2d 133, 172 NE2d .

‘Y - 18 | Pa. ° . *,

526 ; and Pearson v. Northeast ‘Airlines, Ine. (1962, CA2

“NY ), 309 F2d 553, 92 ALR2d 1162, certiorari. denied in
'. (1953) 372 U.S. 912, 9 L ed 720, 83 S Ct 726, Harsh for-

eign limitations could be disregarded under established —

American precedents; see 11 Am Jur, Conflict of Laws, §6;
Loughran v Loughran (1934) 292 US 216, 78 L ed 1219,
54S Ct 684, rehearing denied in 292 US 615, 78 L ed 1474,
54 S Ct'861; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta
é Pine Land Co. (1934) 292 US 143, 78 L ed 1178; 54 8 Ct
634, 92 ALR 928, rehearing denied in 292 US 607, 78 Led
‘1468, 54 S Ct 772; Coster v Coster (1943) 289 NY 438, 46
NE2d,509, 146 ALR 702; M@sci v Young (1932) 109 NJL
453, 162 A 623, 83 ALR 869, affirmed in Y oung. y Masci

.. (1933) 289 US 253, 77°L ed 1158, 53 S Ct 599, 88 ALR.170;
Dougherty v American McK, nna Process Co. (1912) 255 -

Ill 369, 99 NE 619, LRA 19f F 955, Ann Cas 1913 D 568;
Usher v. West Jersey R. Co. 126, Pa 206; Nat. Bank v
Shaw, 1g9 Tenn 237. . =

* The C.A.B.. Staff Study made for the IGIA hidden.
~ tion of Warsaw in 1962 concluded that the “existing regime
of tort liability to which the carriers are now subject and
for which they already have insurance” is adequate protec-

. tion for the American. domestig passenger (IGIA document

—23/1.10A, Final Action, cai 7; 1962, Attachment D,
Pp. 8).

Warsaw ans have often atnnaned. bie convey the

falee impression that the liability limitation is only one

_ -small part of the Warsaw scheme, and that it also includes —
a complicated and valyable system of ticketing gud docu- —

‘mentation, without which the processing of international
flights would be seriously hampered. Examination of the
Convention reveals nothing of substance other than ‘the

- liability limitation dnd. s&pporting procedures. In°prac- °.

* tice, there are many major nations which have never ad-

19

| herd to Warsaw (e:g., Chile, Disses: but litte have al- —
ways used ‘the common. international ticketing and —
documentation system. The plain truth is that-this system

is a product of the International Air Transport Association
rather thar Warsaw. Appendix B of the ATA-IATA amici -

_ brief shows that the airlines of Chile, Turkey and other non- ~
. Warsaw nations. are members of IATA.

c. Wana Does Not Reduce Litigation or Bring Uni-

_ formity of Law. By Injecting the Irritants of Arbi-
trary. Limitations and Foreign. ‘Legal Concepts Into .
Normal Litigation Channels, It Actually Foments Pro- bs
__ tracted Litigation and Destroys Uritformity.

Another claimed benefit. of Warsaw is that it brings
about “uniformity” in the administration of justice. Ad-
mittedly, ‘Warsaw’s objective is to be uniformly unjust to
all its victims by limiting all recoveries to 4 fraction of
the actual damage suffered. . However, even within this .
narrow sphere Warsaw has not -brought uniformity. Be-

_ cause of the many legal technicalities arising even under
* the old Warsaw.,Corivention itself (without considering
further. complications caused by -Hague and Montreal),
the C.A.B. found in 1962 that only .53% of the claims
against US. -flag (overseas) airlines came under the War-..
saw Convention during the period 1950-1960, leaving some —
47% of such claims to be governed by other laws (IGIA
document 23/1.10A, Final Action, August. 7, 1962, Attach- -
‘ment A, p. 9). Furthermore, the most ludicrous instances
of non-uniformity arise under Warsaw, for many . times
passengers seated right next’ to each other, even on flights
within the United States, are governed by different laws
“because of Warsaw. The applicability of Warsaw depends:
upon the stops listed in the ticket of each passenger, rather -
than upon the place of accident ar his immediate destiitas =
tion on the crash flight. In many accidents occurring on °

%

~ “3 . e

ee

our domestic airlines, there are, some passenger claims
limited. by Warsaw and some which are. not limited at all.‘
Therefore, even the crude attempt at uniformity through®

| denial of compensation has been ineffective.

If one were seeking to disrupt the natural forces. of tort

litigation, prevent reasonable settlements and thus foment -

protracted litigation,. one would have to search hard for —

a better way to do-this than. to attempt . to-limit liability -
in aviation accidents. In -this field, we have the combina-
_ tion. of the highest earning power of victims, and the most

“serious and deadly i injuries which are an inevitable result
‘of the speed and destructive power of modern aircraft.

\

’ France Paris crash of 1962, in which the claims for the

: . Therefore, to limit liability i in this field is te create such

disparity between real damage and compensation as to give
the plaintiff practically nothing to lose and everythitig: to ~

gain by* litigating rather than settling. Because of ‘this

factor and because of the difficulties of interpretation which
are to be multiplied by Hague-Montreal, our courts -are.

now. jammed with dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Warsaw

cases which would otherwise have°been disposed of years |
ago. An example is the litigation arising out of the Air —

deaths of 62 passengers are being litigated in the US.
District Court, Northern District of Georgia. The opinion
in Block et al. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France (Noy...
8, .1967) —— F 24d ——, 1967 CCH Neg Cases, p.. 2307,
which took the Fifth Circuit panel more than two years to_
write, deals with only one obscurté provision of Warsaw, -
but it is a striking illustration of the obstructive nature.
of Warsaw when injected into the American’ legal system.

With the addition of the Hague protocol (as to some -
Warsaw signatories but not to others)\and the Montreal
agreement (as to some airlines -but not otliers), it is diffi-
cult if not impossible even for aviation law specialists to

“”

21

predict what law would apply to. many international pas-
sengers today. Yet, in the face of this. hopeless complica-
tion, the amici supporting petitioner, and the other inter-
national air carriers - seek to avoid giving passengers ade-
quate notice of ‘Waysaw even today.

~ Warsaw brings further coniplicntion ‘to litigation ‘by
erenting the atmosphere for joining of non-carrier defen-
dants, such as aircraft. manufacturers, repair agencies and ~>~-
airport operators, nune' of which -can claim the liability —
limitation. The more defendants, the more diffieult ordi-_
nary settlement and litigation procedures become, particu- - ore
larly when the non-carrier defendants do not consider ; “
themselves primarily or even substantially liable, and feel |
v that they have been joined only because the plaintiff can .
recover so little from sad airline.

.

d. Carriers and Dneuindie- Who. Claim That Warsaw's
: Liability Limitations Are Necessary, Use American
Courts to Litigate Huge Hull Claims Which Dwarf
Passenger Suits, and Ww hich Are Not Limited by “Any

' Treaty. ; 7

Another argument made by Wereew proponents is that

_ airline passenger liability claims represent a catastrophic

: risk, which must: be limited. in amount, and which are not —
appropriate for ordinary damage litigation in U. 8. courts.”
This argument is largely self-refuting in that we have
always. had the. example of domestic passenger claim
litigation, which has never. been limited, is fully covered
by liability insurance, .and has successfully been accom-
‘modated ‘by our American legal system without financial
saieetl to the airline industry.

- Moreover, this contention has lost all semblance of rea- |
son with the postwar advent of larger aircraft. In the _——
: _ pinned: accident today, the damage claims for loss of the

Fao! .

aircraft hull usually run to more than five or six million

dollars, and thus’ dwarf the amounts paid out on pas--

senger claims. ba

There is’a ‘preat” disk: of ey F this ieee be-

“. tween ‘airlines. and aircraft. manufacturers, in which the”

insurance company, which paid the hull claims on a crashed «
airliner 4s actually suing the products liability i insurer of

‘the manufacturer. There are other suits’ pitting airline
“against airline, seeking to recover ‘millions of dollars’ in
-hull claims caused by collisions. In some of these cases, |
: the passengérs on these crashed airliners are limited to .
mabe $8, 300 in claims_by the Warsaw Convention, and yet the

airline is free to sue for millidns of dollars in property |

damage arising from the same accident! Thus, the airlipes~ a

and ‘insurers who support Warsaw’s limitatioris against

_ passengers,-are not concerned over chtastrophic claims

and the imperfections of the American legal system, when

it comes to litigation! of their own claims against each other.

An example of this type of litigation is the case .of

' Braniff Airways, Ine. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., V.S._Dis- . °
trict Court, Southern, District of New York, several prelim--
‘inary phases of which dre unofficially’ reported at 7 Avi.

18,114 ahd 8 Avi. 18,255 (CCH Aviation cases). ‘There, ‘

| Braniff Airways seeks to recover $3, 750, 000 dantages for.
loss of a DC-7C airplane which crashed in Florida on.

March 25, 1958, claiming. that the defendant supplied |

, deféctive engines which caused the crash. A ‘number of

passenger cases arising out of. the same accident were

governed by the- Warsaw convention, but this has: not

deterred: Braniff’s hull insurer (a Lloyds’ of London group)
from suing the manifacturer (insured by’ another Lloyd’s

. group), for over three million dollarg. .Soon, we shall ‘see :
“such claims in the area of ten to twenty million dollars
per hull, when the “jumbo jets” and supersonic aireraft. are

‘\
1 ’

”
nn “|
al
7
;

‘
e ;
. ; °
> ‘ .
NE eS ee ee a ae
.* e . .
.

23

activated: It should be noted that the insurandé cost figures
. set forth in section “a” of this Point II ‘show that even
in this early stage of the jet era, passenger-cargo liability

insurance costs the airlines. less than their hull.and other

f types of i insurance. — ' oe -

Sai ie 4
@-«-

e. Warsaw Ig Admitted by Its pee Prapeuiin to.
’ * . Be “Completely’ Repugnant” to: American Law.: The
Only Reported Decision Upholding Its Constitution-
ality Under the Seventh Amendment Rests on the
@Untenable. Ground that the Right to Trial by Jury

_ Does Not Include. Assessment of Damages. :

A strong: insight into the real opinion of Warsaw held

Co its ‘strongest proponents can be obtained from the
minutes of the International Union of Aviation Insurers,
which are j&blished in the Appendix of the J.-S. Senate

- Hearings on the Insurance Industry, Sen. Res. 231, 85th -

following - quotation from page 497, referring to a -state-
ment of the American insurer’s position on Warsaw by.
George G. Orr, director of claims for U. S. Aviation
‘Underwriters, one of the two largest American aviation
insurance groups: 3 a. ms

.

“As to the revision- of he Warsaw ‘Convention, he

wanted to make the American position clear. Ameri-

..gan insurers had had plenty of experience of dealing .

with the Convention and were fully alive to its defects,

but generally speaking, it had enabled settlements to

-‘be made at lower figures than the average for non- —

- . Conyention cases and its validity had been upheld and

_ affifmed by the American Courts in a Series | of cases.,

a There were. three dangers: about revision. The first
was that although revision would no doubt cure some

| the defects, it might introduce new ones. In the
~ second “place; there was: quite a serious danger. that

¥ yon /

_

~ Cong., Aug. 6-15, 1958,’ ‘at pp. 487-675. An example is the. -

a revised Convention ‘might not be ratified by the :
American Senate, since the’ Convention ‘contained sev-
eral principles which were completely repugnant ‘to
American law and the. original Convention owed its
easy passage through the Senate to the exceptionally
_ wide powers exercised by President Roosevelt at that _
‘time. Finally, even-if the’ revised Convention were ;
7 passed, it would necessitate ‘fighting a serie of actions
‘in the Courts to establish its validity and the existing
decisions would be rendered ——- ” . (Emphasis
a me : |
; A.
In the 38 years since the: drafting. of the Warsaw _ Con-
vention, and the 33 years since the United States ad-

‘’ hérence, there has been only. one written court: opinion
on. the constitutionality of the Convention under the |
‘Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to trial

by jury in civil. cdses involying more than $20..

The Convention was attacked under the Seventh Amend-
ment in Pierre v. Eastern. Airlines et al. (1957), 152 F..
Supp. 486, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey. Counsel ‘for amicus Holtzman was ‘one of
the counsel for the plaintiff, atd knows that the question
was very. carefully briefed by Ne see In addition,
the United States of America intervetfed in order to defend .
the constitutionality of the. Convention, and government -

attorneys were granted delays of. several months to pre-_

pare their briefs. Appearances were entered by the local

United States Attorney, by an Attorney from the Justice . °

Department in Washington, and by two legal advisers to

‘the State Department from Washington.

| After this thorough briefing ‘and argument, the Coast

-was able to declare the Warsaw’ Convention constitutional .
7 only 7 wceae (Montreal Minutes, page 46;° mi iddle. of page); aa

ut! "wished to: confirnt his spirit of ca-operation and - eta
faith i in the Warsay Convention.” ieee Ea nee ete
The fi Kingdom ie TAS can

~The internatiénal: air carriers ak the United, Kingdon ie
ag Ruropean, Airways Corp: Seca and Brit:

e o . . .
“F 5 sal

Ts . 4 TaN esi ‘ * of on | ae ae es . (

35
_ish Overseas Airways Corp. (“BOAC”). Who owns BEA.‘
‘and BOAC? World Airline declares, at page 241 et .seq.,.
that.BEA is a public enterprise gwned by the, Government:

- the same work announces, at pages 248, 251, United Aaing-
- dom’a.ownership of BOAC.

. The representatives of the United Sinahoin’ (hereinafter ss

. “UK’”), moreover, at the various international confer-
ences and meetings concerning air ‘law, have-not been bash-
ful in showing their concern for the welfare of the inter-
national ‘air carriers. \.

-The chief of the UK delegation, at ‘Pande in 1929,

_ was Sir-Alfred Dennis. The various ‘national rep resenta-
tives were discussing principles of exoneration or limita-
tion of liability of international air carriers, and the law

_as to. maritime and railroad carriers and ‘their freedom °
from, or limited, liability. In discussing a maritime con-

_yention of 1924, and a proposed UK amendment to the +

_ CITEJA pre- -1929. draft which amendment would limit

‘| air carrier responsibility, Sir Alfred sald; |

.- “Cette convention | reproduisait originairement les
'. conditions qui ‘sé trouvent dans le droit maritime et
is; e’est pour cette raison que mon Gouvernement a ac-
A _ cepte ‘provisoirement et dans’ ses es générales le
@ projet de convention de-1925 sur la responsabilité du.
‘. \transpotteur. -Depuis, au cours des discussions, sont
_. intervenus des changements qui ont modifié le carac-
tere général « “de ce projet de. convention en ce qui.
touche la ‘responsabilité due transporteur. Mon Gou- >
-vernement m’a recommandé de soutenir aussi énergi- 9%.

; quement¢ qu’il me serait possible mon -amendement, |
pareé qu’il trouve que, dans ensemble; la’ responsa-
bilité qui este imposée au transporteur est beaucoup °
trop lourde.’ 3 ‘)

°

yo

ee

; _ 36

*

a translation of the foregoing is:

“This convention reproduced originally the condi-
tions which are formed-in maritime law, and it is for |
this reason that my Government accepted, temporarily
and in its principal lines, ‘the draft of convention of
1925 on the responsibility of the carrier. My. Govern-
.ment has urged me to support as. energetically as
would be possible, my amendment because it finds
; that, as a whole, the résponsibility put upon the carrier
is much too heavy. ” fae

UK's concern for the carrier has been steadfast and con-
sistent. After UK had ‘adopted. the Warsaw Convention
the internal law of UK i in 1952:(See the First Schedule.
of English Carriage by ‘Air (Non-International ° Carriage) .
- Order, 1952 [S.I. 1952, No. 158]), UK’s delegation at Rio
* in 1953 kept up its steady pressure against those provi-
sions of Warsaw which attempted to afford some modicum
of notice and protection to the international air passenger
‘or air shipper. Here is UK’s proposal to abolish all-provi-
sions relating\to documents of carriage, plus its casual
‘denigration of any right: at all-of. a ‘paksenger. to know ©
. that chrriage i is subject to Warsaw, as stated by its cenaag
_ sentative (Rio Minutes, pages 50,51): > dom Delegation now wished to invite the Conference
to. reconsider seriously ‘ the question whether it was
desirable to maintain anything in the Protocol which ;
related, to documents of. carriage at all.

; The provisions of the Warsaw Convention relating

. to documents of carriage were, in modern conditions,

_ unsatisfactory. First of all, Article 3, relating to the
‘passenger ticket had been described by high authority
as futile and absurd, because it required delivery: of

—_

+

a

@/

a ticket” without seeing what oad ticket’ was going to
contain. . .».

Thess: were, therefore, tio’ questions in respect of

_which ‘some step had to be taken. Firstly, were the”

present provisions contained in the Rio Protocol satis-

_ factory, or could they be made satisfactory? Secondly,

would the consequences of the total omission of these

provisions be unfortunate or not? . . . The second re- _

spect in which the present provisions were unsatisfac-
tory related to the sanctions to be imposed on non-
compliance.~The Rio Protocol imposed the sanction
of unlimited liability. Consequently, a slip made by a
booking clerk, or a perfectly unintentional error as to
law, was visited. by the same consequences as - wilful

misconduct. If the provision under discussion were -

read together with Article 25 as at present drafted,
the result would be that the pilot. or navigator, on
whose skill the passenger relied for his safety, could
be as negligent as he pleased, and yet liability would
be limited. But, if a booking clerk made a mistake,
liability -was unlimited. That was difficult to defend

’ from the legal point of view. On the other hand, if

this solution were rejected, what alternative could be
provided? A. number of solutions were suggested in,
the documentation and the Conference might’ find it
_ ‘difficult to agree on what was the best of them. The
provisions on documents of carirage were not satis-
factory as they stood and thé United Kingdom Dele-
. gation felt very grave doubts whether the Conference
would be able to agree by a sufficient: snagarity on
satisfactory provisions to replace them. .

The segond question was ‘in regard to the con-

sequences of total omission. Would those consequences -

be unfortunate? In practice, the forms of tickets were
worked out’ by commercial organizations connected

(

+t Rear Tree came
'

‘
> oR Ser er
‘

| BBB posenantniguna caammanansa 0 REE RTS ee ee

° é me 43 ¢@

with air transport. In this regard, he was thinking
‘not only of IATA but also of other carriers. It might
‘be said that if there were nothing in the. Convention,
that would place too great power in the hands of

_ those bodies and the passenger and the consignor of
goods would consequently be helpless. He did not
think. that this would be so, “for the reason that ac-
count had to be taken of the’ fact that many courts
in many countries took a very strict view of any:
attempt to impose limitations of liability or to exclude
liability and only gave effect to such limitations or
exclusions if they were brought to the notice of the

‘passenger: ‘The carrier issuing a ticket had to take
this into account Convention or no Convention and
this provided a very effective safeguard. The United
Kingdom Delegation was not speaking entirely, from
theory in that respect since the courts of the. United —
Kingdom were among the ones thtat.togk a very strict ° -
“view as to the necessity of warning the passenger.

* The case of Westminster Bank vs. Imperial Airways

1 United Kingdom King’s Bees Division: [1936] 2 AN E.R. 890; —
155 L.T. 86; 52 T.L.R. 607; 80 Sol. Jo. 794; -42 Com. Cas..1; 55 :
. Lloyd, L.R. 242; (1936), US. Av. R. 39.

Limited showed what a strict view the United ‘King-
dom courts would take. Nevertheless, in-spite of that,

_ the United Kingdom applied the Warsaw Convention’

_ to domestic carriage within the United Kingdom ‘and a
@within the territories over which it was competent to—

@legislate without applying the provisions of the Con-
vention concerning documents of. carriage. During

the three years in which that legislation had been in

: force, no difficulty whatever had arisen. -He com--
mended that experience to the Conference as an indi- »
cation of what would happen if the provisions on docu-

44

bd

ments of carriage were removed from the Convention

altogether. .

There were two main arguments which had ‘been
used against the United Kingdom proposal. -'The first
argument was that, if these provisions were deleted,
- the result would be a lack of uniformity in an im-
portant matter. But, he wondered whether the: bare
skeletal requirements of the Protocol; ‘or even those. of

the Warsaw Convention itself achieved uniformity “are

regard to documents of carriage. All uniformity, in

fact, came about,-not because of the provisions in the .

Convention, but because of the sharing of experiences
among commercial men. What brought uniformity was
practice and not legislation of this kind. . . . He-re-
thinded the Conference that,“at the Rio meeting, all
commercial opinion which expressed itself was in

favour of the deletion of these clauses. He referred

* to such bodies as the International Chamber of, Com-

merce, the International Union of Aviation Insurers.
and the International Air Transport Association. Re-_

~ gard should be paid. to the views of those bodies and

the Conference could do no-greater service to the ~
‘ advancement of civil aviation on -an effective:-basis. _
than by deleting the provisions under discussion from

the Convention.” 0

‘The correct and logical answer to the arguments of

_UK, as stated above and as stated over. and over at the
various international meetings, was given by M. Garnault,
Delegate of France at the Hague meeting (Hague Minutes,
pages 50, 51, when he réjoined : erie

“St should be remembered that air eanspert existed not

Oty for the benefit of the carriers, but also for the ©
usefs, that i is, the nationals of the States represented.

. Ks

. ’
Rn
§ .

at the Conference. Since the principal object of the

~ Convencion was to subject the carrier to 4 more favor-

evle regime of liability than that usually established’
by common law, it was equitable to consider the situa-
tion of the passenger and to draw his attention to the-

-

precisély the - are eae Z

- of

d. Canide : x ‘J ~ . : 7.
‘Canada also files a plea: on behalf. of petitioner for: a

. strict, literal.construction of the Warsaw Convention. But |

Canada; also, i is the owner of: an international air carrier.,

The airline Air Canada - (earlier Trans’ Canada Airlines), a
as -World Airline notes at page 272, has its stock euatiel
. “vested in the goverhment-owned Canadian National Rail-

- ways.” Canada i is thus an owner financially interested in

' and in Montreal in 1966; as is “indicated hereinafter by
| references ‘to the Minutes- of those three conferences.

- UK proposal for the elimination of Articles 3 to 11 of ©

recoveries for passengers injured or killed, on. international.
. air flights.

In 1929, - “Canada was a Dominion, and was not repre-' -

sented,yper se, at the deliberations at Warsaw. Representa-

f tives of the Canadian Government did participate actively

in-the deliberations in Rio in 1953, at ‘The Hague in 1955,

| Mr. Nadeau of Canada, at Rio, originally supported the

\

the Warne Convention, stating (Rio Minutes, £ page 55)

. “the Canadian. Delegation wis in entire agreement with
the proposal of the United Kingdom. Articles 3 to 11 of. -
the Warsaw Convention should. be completely eliminated.” -
Later; expressions. of Ganada at Rio and. at the Hague, ss
_ showing concern for the passenger ard ‘his notification of
* Warsaw limits, are somewhat. difficult to reconcile with
Canada’s present position as purported amicus demanding 4
a harsh and literal construction of Article 3 (2) of the —
-original Warsaw _Convention. Most of these statements.

“emanate from Brigadier | M..@. Booth-who was the leading
| spokesman for Canada in Rio ‘and at ‘The Hague.

For instance, at the Rio. meeting: she we page =
118): - : 5s

“He nuked if dines ‘was some spécial reason why the
air carriers should enjey a preferehtial treatment on
this question’ of a limit of: liability.It might be that

in certain States, liability was limited in other maies. 2 rea

of transport, but, in the areas with which he was fa-

miliar, liability was not limited in most other mode’ .

of transport. The liability of railways, buses and taxis
“was certainly not limited. Therefore, if the Committee
decided to limit the liability. of the air carrier, it
should: not be limited beyond a reasonable level. |

_ >The tiability of the operator of the aircraft had been
limited in the Rome Convention to prevent the results
of an accident from being catastrophic for the operator —
in question. It, might be suggested that this was the
_ basis on which the limitation of liability of air carriers
under the Warsaw Convention should be established!
. However, this was not being proposed.. _The liability
~ of the ‘operator in respect of each person killed: or
' injured was limited to 500,000 Poincaré francs under .

‘the Rome Convention. While it was true that, in that :

ane

oY “half of what it was worth under. the Rome Convention.

181) said:

‘ pe » by tife® ‘Convention. This -was-an important fact. |) Ping
» on : ® ’ . .
’ . .
“f : ° =

If it were left up to ‘an fnternational ‘eteaty to

establish the contents .of the documents: of carriage,
it would: cause grave constitutional difficulties in the

United States, which could «not. adhere to a convention

y. . .': in the documents -of carriage, the carrier _

Was Sbliged to notify the passenger -or the shipper
_, that this liability might be limited. ‘The Delegation ‘of.
_. the. United States was of the-opinion that the passen-.

- ger ticket should contaty the express provision that

. the carriage was subject to the terms and conditions.

of the Warsaw Convention which might limit the*car-
rier’s er shinee 5

"* +. ot, a ‘ ie

9

6

58

As to American, preference for a “private” ( recovery
from the- carrier) sanction, he said (Hague Minutes, page

7 81) ee ahs

ee: *

“The system of sanctions set out in the present Con-
_ vention was the most appropriate one, because it was _
based onthe passenger ticket itself. The whole Con-
vention was based on the. passenger ticket; corse-
quently, if the-ticket did not contain the provisions
that. weré required by law to be set out in it, then’
_ the contract did not, in fact, meet: the requirements
_ of the Convention. Under these circumstances, it was
only just and equitable that the carrier should suffer
the consequences. One. might think otherwise if the
danger to the carrier were really very great. But if
the United States proposal for a form of advice to
passengers were adopted by the Conference, the dan-
ger would not be very great. The form could be in-
cluded in every ticket, and. consequently, all that the
agents of the carrier need do would be to fill out the
ticket properly. This was not much to ask of the
carriér in return for the reduced liability which the |
- Convention accorded him.”

: He renewed the plea aon Minutes, page 128):

“Mr. Calkins (United States) preferred to..have -
sanctions imposed by private law rather than haviny
them imposed by the various States under public law.
The reasons for this preference were, first of all; that
* with a private law sanction there would be the possi-
bility of applying a uniform sanction for non-compli-
ance with the requirements of the Convention, and.

secondly, the policing of these sanctions would be —
‘made more easy... . In the case of private law, ‘sanc-
tions, no heavy policing was: required because, in‘the _

4

- ie os

59

iS

event that ‘no ticket was issued, ‘the claimant had his

.Temedy against the carrier. ... He did not feel that
the sanction should apply: to the ‘particulars concern- ~
ing a place of departure and ‘place of destination .
and the agreed stopping places. The passenger should

. certainly assume the obligations of seeing to it that
the ticket issued. to him set forth these places. How-
ever, flie sanction should apply to the sammaon con-

act this notice.”

Agaiti and again, at The Hague; the United States ham-
mered at the need for notice for the’ international’ passen-
ger, in a -eomprehensible form, in print that would stand
out, as a fundamental of American Policy. Mr. Calkins.
stated (Hague Minutes, page 60) : ‘

: -, “Every State had the reloaliliti, not only for
maintaining its air transport services, but for pro-
tecting its citizens and giving to those citizens a trans-.
portation service that was just and equitable. .

‘His Delegation felt, in regard to the notice reevire:
ment, that this requirement of the. passenger ticket,
the baggage check and ‘the air waybill was. the one

. requirement —_ really formed _ crux of the whole -
difficulty. .

His Daegation proposed that Article TI (a) of the .
Protocol—Article 3(1) of the Convention—should pro-

" vide that every ticket sold by an international airline,
‘or om any other airline, for that matter, should include
the. . . provision:

‘ ‘Advice to International Travellers’ (in letters not
less —_ Ye centimeter —. wt 4

Also (Hague Minutes, page 61): ~ - |

“Tt had been remarked that this notion was qeally
‘uhnecessary and that all citizens were presumed to

es
‘

‘Know the law. : That might well be true in ordinary: .
commercial | affairs. However, it. did not solve the
problem in this case, since, in air transportation, do-
mestic passengers travelled side by side with interna-_

"tional passengers. “In the ordinary course of commer-_

cial affairs and in day-to-day living, a person expected
to be treated in the same way as other persons who
were in the same group in a public transportation
vehicle. Here, the matter was different. Persons on
international carriage were subject to the Warsaw Con-
-vention; those confined to domestic transportation had

the benefit, ‘in some countries, of unlimited. liability, .
which was much more preferable for the ‘passenger *

‘than the limited liability of the Convention. As a re-
sult of this, States would insist on putting some kind
of a notice requirement and on imposing it on inter-
_ national carriers coming into their territory. The re-
sult was that there would be a variation of law, a

_ variation of requirements and there would be as many
requirements as there, were States. There might be _
as many decisions ‘ss there were courts, because the

~~ ‘matter would be left up to the court.” .

Then (Hague Minutes, page 74) : 4

“In addition to having a notice more or less in the
same form as his Delegation had already proposed,
he now proposed that the rotice should be: printed in |

-a different coloured ink on the ticket so as-to make it

Stand out.” |

_& “He disagreed with =“ opinion 23 Mr. ae to. the
effect that the notice provision was worthless. To a
certain extent, the value of the provision depended on

‘the ‘amount of internal , parriage. that .went-\on.in'a _

,country. There was a. very great. amount of internal
—— in ‘the United ' ‘States ‘and’ the international

-6

FERAL RTA GANS RPT ANE TNS TOR
° Pe °

a

a”
. .

61

carriage was,’ perhaps, -the exception rather. than’ the
rtle. Consequently, the notice provision was extremely
necessary for the United States,.and also for other
countries where internal transportation was highly de-
veloped. The provision jeopardized nobody ‘and ‘had —
the advantage that all transportation from a Con-
tracting State to a non-Contracting State and back was.
covered: by the Convention. Since almost ‘all interna-
. tional air transportation was likely to be round-trip
_ transportation, the notification, as recommended by .-
> the: United States, did put the passenger definitely on
. notice that’ his: — to - a snaeonil would be
limited” it

| Finally, Mr. Calis sikesied : the passenger, jn accord-

ance with American policy as to relationships between a

carrier and a passenger, to the “man in the. street,” saying

(Hague Minutes, page 116) :. ee ire

Geammemrnnn nS

“he believed—that it was was desirable that the text.be 5
couched in: a form which thé man in the street or :
ordinary traveller could understand,. withont. the use
of legal terms that might be difficult to understand ;
the form of the text should also put the man in the

| street or passenger on notice that if he were taking

_°@ journey of a. certain type; his rights against the
carrier would be limited.” *

de United iis Governmental | Policies and Statemients

* of Position, 1962-1 963

- Frequently, 3 in 1962 and 1963, the United States ‘Govern- :
ment and various Departments and Agencies affirmed the
strong American policy as to the necessity for notice of

‘limitations of liability and as to adequacy: and understand-
ability of any —— notice. Set

; | 62 Pt res, ; {
. In 1962,.the United States Interaggney. Group on Inter- ae
- national Aviation (“IGIA”) issued a réport dated August 7, ae
- 1962, relating to the Warsaw Convention and the Hague. «+.
Protocol, after the mest extensive study of the subject
ever made by the U. S.-Government. One of the recom-
mendations of IGIA was that air carriers be.required to’ e ;
" give “clear and positive notice of the limitations of liability - 4
- article (Article 22) of the Warsaw Convention. ” Attached | .
to said report were recommendations of various United “ie
States governmental departments and agencies, including a
- the Civil Aeronantics Board,‘the Federal Aviation Agency,
- the Department of Justice, fhe Department of Commerce, oe
the. Departgtent of Labor, etc.. The recommendations of :
. thege departments and agencies are easily _ accessible and |
~ are contained in appendices to’said IGIA- Report of August | .
7, 1962, which is listed as ‘TGIA 23/1. 10A.” It is perfectly »
clear that as early as Atgust, 1962; all the governmental |
‘> agencies and departments involved reached.the conclusion .
* that the language then contained in international air ¢ar- wa
rier tickets. did not give adequate notice of the limitations ioe ant
of liability in the Warsaw Convention. > é |

The point was stressed by Senator Homer E. Rialaoe are r
in comments on the Warsaw Convention which, on Novem- . |
ber 10, 1961, he addressed to IGIA (see Attachfhent No. 61 aa @
to IGIA 23/1.3) in the following language: Ae ees, |

“Thig is the most unconscionable provision in all ae ‘
history ever to affect adversely all American citizens. . |
_. There is absolutely no need for a provision of this na- }
__ ture, and the felony is compounded i in that less than —
one-half of one percent of the passengers in interna- ' {

tional traffic are even aware of it. = :

63

Further, the IGIA Report stated that a& passenger:
_. °° “should be positively ‘advised, when he buys his ticket

. © or when he checks inyof the exact amount of. the car-*
rier’s limitation of liability. ”

To give the gist of IGIA 93/1. 10A, at page four of a ©
| -Ietter from N. E. Halaby,. Chairman of the International.
a _+—Group on International Aviation, to The Honorable Dean
Rusk, the Secretary of State, dated August .3, 1962, head

following language was used: et ;

- “It is also recommended that in supplementary Jegis-
lation United States air carriers be required tO give.
clear and positive notice of the limitation of liability .

_ article (Article 22) of the Warsaw Convelition and the’
extent of coverage under the automatic insurance plan.
Thus each passenger intending to embark on carriage

= covered by the Warsaw Convention should be posi-

way tively advised, when he. buys his ticket or when he:
checks in, of the exact amount of the carrier’s limita-
tion of liability under both the Protocol (or the Con-
vention) and the insurance plan. Such a passenger

_ would then have the opportunity of buying at his own. .

expense re insurance ar. to his needs.”

While there was ‘considerable division among the IGIA
member agencies on other phases of the IGIA Report,
-- there was sence’ on the need. for “clear and positive
- “notice”.

? Shortly after. the. « eibotion of said IGIA oaeaek: counsel

for amicus Arnold Holtzman wrote a létter on September _- ~

. 27, 1962 to Alan Boyd, then Chairman of the Civil. Aero- s
‘nautics Board, calling attention to this unanimous IGIA
recommendation that clear and positive notice be required,

ce

‘and. suiinias the C.A.B..to take action Giana: This

letter-is reproduced : as Appendix A of this —
Following. this letter, the C.A.B.. took action, bylissuing ”

_ a notice of proposed rule making, Economic Regulations -

' Docket .14411, dated April 1; 1963, dealing with Part: p>:

_of the Civil Air Regulations, concerning the ‘construction, ed
publication, filing and posting of tariffs of air carriers / .

and of foreign air carriers. ‘The C.A.B. in this notice of
proposed Tule making, was giving notice of its propose dad

- action as to the limitation of: liability for death .or injary

_ of passengers under the Wareey. Convention. The first

ee

Reamer URAM,

ne eet

paragraph states:

“Notice is hereby given ‘that the Civil Aetdnauti¢s
‘Board has under consideration a proposed amendment
to Part 221 of the. Economic Regulations that would
"provide for: improved notice of limitation’ of liability. —
: .for death or injury of passengers. under the Warsaw
Convention, eae: Be

°

Thereafter, ‘in ee Apxitenatory Statement” “of some

seven. pages attached to the foregoing sin it was stated,

on page two:

“The Warsaw Convention eile that the eiiieen
be given a ticket containing a statement that the
__, transportation is subject to the rules relating to liabil-
ity. established by the Convention. ‘The carriers’ com-
ply with this requirement by @ notice in small print —
on the face of the ticket reading’ as follows: ‘If: the
passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination |
or stop in a country other than-the country of depart-

ure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and -

the Convention governs and in most cases:limhits the
liability of carriers for death or personal injury and
> in _— of loss of or damage to — It appears

. 7

A:
47"

.
. . y4 - .
° ia wn , - ”
| AEB GOR A ELLs AEDES 000 st Oh Fe ed
> '

.
.
Wi 0 80 Zathey Pete ta i we tela 8 Hah teas,

.
.
.
rong
'

\

a, |

65

\ _ to the Board that this notice may be siainaette. in
two major respects: First, the ticket is by nq means —
the most effective instrument, for advising a passenger’
of.a limitation of liabiligy. There can be no-assurance -
’. that a passenger will read his ticket at all or if he
does, that he will read it ugger such circumstances as
will enable him to. realize the significance of the notice
- provision and take such. protective action as his cir-
cumstances require. The type in which the notice is

currently printed on the ticket is too small to alert the
_ passenger to the importance of the matter. Second, —
the -fact of greatest significance to the passenger,
. Namely, the amount of limitation on liability for death

or injury does not appear in the notice.”

é ee Then; on page =" the meplenainty Statement declares
as ‘follows :. ~

are On January 22, 1963, the member carriers of the Air.
: . Traffic Conferénce of. America (ATC) submitted to
the Board for approval: under §412(b) of the Federal -

| Aviation Act of 1958, a resolution effective March 22,. -
@ ~ .. 1963, | providing for an approved form of notice of the->
Pe limit of-liability of the Warsaw Convention, by means °
of a prescribed statement on a separate sheet of paper.
to be placed.in the ticket envelope or attached to the .
ticket. (Agreement No. C. A.B, 16950). -

whwetinn, on April 1, 1963, the Civil Aeronautics Board,

adopted Order No. H-19447, referring to Agreement C.A.B,
« ° No. 10559, R-2; Docket No. 14411; and, on the second page
of the order, it made the following remark and order:

-“In the Explanatory, Statement of the proposed ' rale
the Board set forth’ reasons why it considers present '
means of giving notice of Convention liability limita- -

| @
» *

a

tions | |inadequate.. ‘Insofar as applicable to the. untied a

% provisions now appearing in the ticket, the Board
“stated (1) the type in which the ticket tiotice, is: eur-

rently, printed on. the)ticket, is too small to alert pas- ig

sengers to the importance of the matter, and (2) that

' the monetary limit of liability for death, or —

‘does not appear in the notice.”

~ Thus, becatise of the unsitisfactory nature of the then,

existing: notice, the Civil” Aeronautics. Board in 1963
adopted this regulation (§221.175, Economic Regulations)

which required air carriers and: foreign. air carriers to, r give”
more complete and adequate notice of Warsaw Convention |

_ limitations t passengers to and from the United States.

e. At ldcsereal Special Resting of ICAO in 1966 ©

Following the United States denunciation of the —_—
Convention in November, 1965, a Special Meeting of ICAO .
to consider limits for passengers. under. Warsaw. andeHague © :
was commenced at. Montreal’ on Februaiy 1, 1966. The.
- Jarge American -delegation ‘was headed: iby Andreas F. . .
Lowenfeld, and-included Allan F. Mendelsohn, both then
of the United States Department of State: Mr. -Lowenfekd |

made it abundantly clear’ that :the principal conegrn of
the United “States was the a and. welfare of Amer-
Seeking to impose its standard of living on all the other _
| countries in the world. Nothing could be further from —
- the truth. The United States did not interpret limits

. to. mean the average compensdtion . payable, because
‘average’ would mean that 50% of the persons in-

- yolved had suffered damages. Only when a,limit was

as inadequate ‘as that of the Warsaw. Convention. _
there a tendency for it to be at an average level. .

_— 6 ‘ te
\ 5 ’.

69

Resuming: the argument (Montreal Minutes, pages 30,

31), he declared: ’ . ;
“Every victim. ef an icihitond had the right to equi-- ~
table compensation. No ,matter what methods were _

“used im‘ the different eountries or even by -the various
courts and administrative authoritiesQyifhin the same
country, the aim was always the. same:to determine
the compensation for the financial loss suffered ‘by the .
victim or, in the case of death, by the’ dependents. So |
far as ‘possible, the financial indemnification was not
intended to punish those-responsible for the accident, —-_.
but rather to restore to the dependents the financial .

i circumstances which had existed * before the acci- |
" ** dent. . |
a aan on- Warsaw claims—The aforementioned Table ts

. shows that during the same period the average com- ©

pensation per passenger* had amounted to’ approxi-
mately U.S. $38,500. From 1958 to 1964, the average
compensation had been around U. S. $52,500, ‘a figure -
which should be borne in mind. The United States was be
_ Not concerned with average compensation, but with 7
the consequences of a limit. In other words, they were
' interested in the percentage of persons who, regard-
~ less of the limit, did not receive what was due to them
as a result of the operation of the limit. If that coin- « °
_ cided with-the average, 50% of passengers would con-'
. sequently be placed at a disadvantage. .: . ?
‘The effect of the raising of the insurance premium
“upon the overall operating ‘expenditures of the air- |
lines had. been estimated , for the ‘year 1964 as follows: —

64 cents per 1,000 passenger revenue thiles; 80 tents fe
per 1,000 of the latter. at a U.S. $50,000 limit; 90
cents on the same calculation. with a limit of U.S.

$75,000; and 86 cents at a limit of U.S. $100,000. The
difference of the cost of insurance between U.S.

© + a

* ws . re
; ‘ Y. ;

70

_ $75,000 and U.S. $100,000 amounted to only 6 cents
-per. 1,000 passenger revenue miles.

In conclusion, he stated that a) the Warsaw Cones

-tion was ‘inequitable and constituted a burden which

' the United States could no longer impose upon its na-.

_ tidnals and b) that. the expenditure involved in the

proposed new limit was altogether ‘reasonable and

would impose no heavy burden either upon the world’s

- airlines or their passengers.”

_ Agafn (Montreal Miniites, page 43):

hilea, as to the protection of the passenger (Montreal oy Be

“the Delegate of the United States indicated that he
realized that his country was only one among many,

but having a great many ‘airlines and a-great many «—

citizens travelling ‘all over the world, his country

must to some extent take its own interests into ac-
count. .

Bpaaking to’the references made to the generosity

_of the United States, he said that if airlines needed
| support, or ‘countries teoodeDeapport; there-were ways

to secure it. The United States did not believe that it
cou continue to ask in effect the widows and orphans

he of its citizens to assume this burden.”

| Minutes, page 60) :

“In his opinion, however, there was a difference be-
tween a race horse and-a passenger. As he had al-
ready pointed out, the protection’of the passenger was

at the very core of the United States considerations.”

‘In closing his remarks, and stressing the “famous small

’ print purporting to give notice” of the Warsaw Conven- —

tion and.its limits, Mr. Lowenfeld stated (Montreal Mi- ©
nutes, pager 140-142) :

“Tt is with considerable sedan that I have asked
for the floor af this time. The United States delegation
thought that it had‘come to Montreal well prepared
with facts and with arguments in support of our posi-
tion. We thought we had made a persuasive presenta- i

‘tion for the proposition that the Warsaw Convention

’ needed to be updated, and updated substantially. We
believed, and still believe, that the United States pro-
-posal, or something close to it, would have been in the

.’ public interest. It would have secured er for many
persons, and at very little cost.

.We thought that this Conference would recognize _
that commercial aviation is no longer an infant indus-
.try entitled to. special shelter, but that it should: be
treated like other persons or businesses dealing with
the public. In other words, we thought this Confer-
ence would recognize the principle that persons ‘or

. firms engaged in international commercial aviation—
whether airline, manufacturer, or ground ‘control—
should, on the whole; -be held responsible ” injuries.
done to others. . fa

We hoped (Then follows the provision contained in the so-called

- agreement of _May 16, 1966, whereby certain of the inter-
- national air carriers agreed to raise the limit of liability
to $75, 000.00. per passenger.) ;

: Subsequently, on September ‘19, 1966, ‘the Civil Aero-
. nautics Board gave notice of proposed rule‘ making’ as to

Part 221, Economic: Regulations Docket No. 17725, with.

_ .respect, to posting of notice of limitatioh of liability for - -

- death or injury ‘of passengers under the Warsaw Con-,
vention. Attached to this notice of September 19, 1966, .

- ig another. Explanatory Statement starting with page #3. cae

On page #4 of this nme as the eo language * Je

| pears:

“By this agreement, the parties thereto ‘bound them-
‘selves to, include in their tariffs effective May 16, 1966,
a special contract in accordance with the Warsaw

Convention or the Hague Protocol providjng fora —.

limit of liability foreach passenger for death, wound-
ing or other bodily «OM of $75,000.00 inclusive of
legal fees. The partie further agree .to provide\ in

their tariffs that the. carrier would not, with respect te
to any claim arising out of the death, wounding, or :
other bodily injury of a passenger, avail itself of cer- -

tain defenses. The carriers. further stipulated: that
they would, at the time of’ delivery of the, tickets,

furnish to each passenger governed by the Conven- |

~ tion or the Protocol and by the special contract de-

, scribed above, ‘a notice in 10 point type advising such
international passengers of the limitations of liability
’ established by the Convention or the Protocol, or the

. higher liability agreed to,in these special contracts

_ pursuant to the Convention or Protocol as described .

above,” ©

2

_In the final draft IGIA letter: of September 30, 1966, : 3
~ signed by Mr. David on behalf of the United States Gov-

ernment and sent to Mr. Twigt of ICAO, the sppiiiee)
appears on pages 5, 6: |

ae

ie “As to Question 4): The inclusion of a easy

. concerning advice to international passengers on lims-
—_ aii — wes 3 - :

‘The United States considers that the notice provi-
sions of Article 3' of the Convention, and of the Con-
- vention as amended by the Hague Protocal, are inade-

quate, and that: they. should. be amended so as to.
_ Provide ‘more effective notice to passengers. Hx- ’
_. perience in the United States demonstrates that many .

| passengers, on international flights are unaware 6f. the
applicability of the Warsaw Convention to their trip.
The notice required by the’ Convention is. usually

“ae printed in small type on the ticket, and, along with |
many other standard terms and conditions. of the |
ticket, comprises material which the average passenger .

‘does not take the time to: read. Moreover, even if the

- passenger does read the notice, it fails to state that ax”
limit of either $8,300 or ‘$16,600 may be currently -

‘applicable to him. Although more complete notice is
now being given by carriers who are parties to the
Interim Agreement, that agreement is an interim and
voluntary arrangement only, and is not applicable. to
all carriers and all Warsaw transportation:

Because of the unsatisfactory nature of the existing.-

“notice, the Civil Aeronautics Board in. 1963 adopted _—

a regulation (Sec. _ 221.175, Economic Regulations) -
which requires air carriers and foreign air carriers

to give more complete and adequate notice of Warsaw.

limitations to passengers to or from the United States.

While many ajternative forms of notice could be con- —

sidered in lieu of ‘the one adopted by the Board, we
- believe that some notice of this general character

should be .included. The form of notice incorporated
in the Interim Agreement ¢ can also serve as a ae

e
. ” .
— Ra ty gts, a

i December. 23, 1966, a draft ofa ‘position paper”

s

&

a. > . re]

forfoints of view in order to prepare the position that oe »
_ the United - States would maintain. at. an ICAO’ meeting — ey
of a Panel of Experts. on Warsaw limits tobe held in .- =, ,
Montreal on January 19, 1967. The draft was transmitted :
by Mr. John H. nn Consultant to the CAB. At -

“page 9, it stated:. a} i > a Uae “a °. re
“Since ‘the Taterim Agreement is an ‘inter-carrier,
rather than inter-governmental, agreement, strictly. a> =
_ speaking an ICAO meeting i is not-an appropriate forum: ©. * |
in which: to consider possible changes i in the Agree- ae ‘..

ment in order to remove or minimize any deficiencies es
‘which have been discoyered in. it. Nevertheless, no . oS
“objection on this ground should be raised to any such” » ee
suggestions, since the Panel meeting may well be the re

best forum to obtain’ an objective. discussion of such |
problems.” moete seagate —
| “There may also be ocenplaint that the notice. re--
- quirements. under the real nee are unsatisfactory, a | ;
- and. indeed are chaotic... 2 = ms 3 |
|

o

ein >The airlines spuennily are fearful that failure a give the.
re ' notice required by the Interim Agreement may -be deeméd to be

failure. to give the notice required by Article 3 of the Convention, a
8 and thereby subject the carrier % — liability.” Bal ince
After the Panel of Egperts net, an ICAO “letter” known |
as ICAO- S-18/8-67/28; dated March >, 1967, was sent, | Le

_ covering the work of the: Panel on.Warsaw and Hague — .
"limits of liability at their “First Session.” Mr. Wanner -:
had attended as a Member representing the. United States.
_. Attached as a: restricted ‘document: was: PE-Warsaw -Re- -
- port-1, — At page 4,- f 12, this . Wareaw Report
noted: .

.
os

“y; riews were: strongly expressed in the Panel to the
effect that the carrier should hanes be deprived of the

4: # on | . uae 6 ’ ae AY
« . . Te te E . . . ;

: .
°

Pies oe : é % j eat °
Ei ee ee Ca ee Sates uae

vn

. benefit. of limits of. liability. merely by reason sof some

irregularity in the issuance of a ticket ‘or of a notice

to -passengers, The requirements of Article 3 of the |
. Warsaw :Convention in regard to ticketing or notice

are not unimportant, but they could be enforced by
other measures, e.g., by a fine ‘or a refund of the

‘passenger fare in whole or in part: While this was |
-- the general view of the Panel, one member considered
‘that such deprivation provisions were required i in order
- to ensure compliance by the carrier ‘With the notice
: ‘teqeiremante: of . .

.

Tn ANNEX B, at page 9, the tagging points were
- examined! |

“1) The jiestiiaih effects of the U. s. Court deci-

sions in the case of Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines c
and Lisi v. Alitalia in conjunction with the waiver

provisions of the Interim’ Agreement could result in

. absolute and unlimited:liability for air carriers.. The ..-

carrier which may have lost: the limitation of liability

- for: non-compliance with, the notice requirement of
;, the Warsaw Convention may also face the consequences |
. of its contractual waiver of the defences under Ar-.
ticle 20(1) of. the ‘Warsaw Convention. Serious ‘con- ©
_sideration should theréfore be given to a temporary
amendment. of the Interim Agreement as a matter of,
urgency so as to relieve the carriers of the waiver —

provisions in the Interim Agreement until the effects
of the Lisi, case on’ notice requirements under the
Warsaw Convention can be clarified and satisfactorily _

_ resolved.” J -~
fp te cations ‘asian claimants ‘could -

recover up to $75,000 and use this sum for the presécu-
tion of further proceedings against the air carrier |

®

Xe ,
. - 4 ‘ Y ° ¢ ‘
> - QO ° P
pees feickins 2 fo rina ill ‘ pcdiaicg old ae + ss
we 4 . id ‘ =r

ee

‘ol > - ‘:
or third parties, unless the: new limif is expressly nit’

an alternative remedy ‘leaving it to the election of ~~.

claimants whether to proceed undér the- Interim Agree-

».* . ° ment or under t @ normat rules of the Warsaw Con- .
vention. This tisk is aceentuated by the combined |
effects of the Lisi and M erteps cases mentioned above.” .

- And, same document,, (page 10):

7 ) The ‘legal effect of a failure to give notice ii
the Interim. _ Agreement is not clears If the notice

to a provision tha the failure to give the notice ‘re-
“quired by the Interim Agreement does not affect the
Laide’ 8 ‘Higbility under: the Convention.” sill

ea os The what document is a draft, Sousiatinad in a letter
; sent April-12, 1967, from the same Nelson B. David, United -

| . States Representative, to Mr. Twigt of ICAO, in ‘response

: Mr, David submits the comments of ‘the Government of the

United States. On. page two thereof, Mr. David made the

A following significant observations: ae F

“Solution IT. This proposal, ‘although - siliadead:
‘similar to the present Interim Agreement between the .

io airlines (Agreement CAB 18900), would not be ac-

ea requirement. i is retained, consideration should be given’

/ to the Twigt letter. of March: 2, 1967. This “draft” from ..

ceptable to -the United States in its present ferm in ©

view of the numerous qualifications which have been

. proposed, such .as elimination or restriction ‘of the ©
notics. provisions and of Article 25, and the addition :

of exceptions to the rule ¢ of absolute liability. Only'if.

~the-limits were. raised substantially above those now :

stated in the proposal would ‘the United States be x |

willing tezponsider inclusion of any. of such’ qualifice-
- tions.” ce a: aes “a ¢

; a

+ Pree

“=

81

‘In the ¥ view of my Government, the notice provisions

of the Convention and. Protocol are of major im-
portance, and require strengthening rather than weak-

‘ ening as suggested by the majority of the Panel. The

_.« reasons for this view are set forth in my letter of

‘September 30, 1966, and reed not be repeated here.
| Unless substantial parity is achieved between the levels
of liability applicable to both foreign and U.S. domestic

ia ‘.air transportation the need for notice to passengers

embarking on international journeys will continue. ).
An‘this connection, wé do not agree with the Panel’s
recommendation to weakeh the notice provigions. It

_. may be that a majority of the Panel believes, that no
‘ notice provision can be made effective as a result of
_ recent court Aecisions i in the United States with respect
to notice requirements. In our: opinion, however, these

instances in which it was held that the carriers failed ~

to give adequate notice in fact serve to emphasize
~ the need for greater effort on the part of the carriers
rather than ‘a need to weaken or eliminate the notice °
requirements of the Convention. Certainly we do not’
“agree that these decisions have: rendered * provisions
on notice unnecessary or meaningless. Ps?

There ensued’ another tetten from Secretary General

'Twigt of ICAO, dated August 2, 1967, transmitting the

. “Second Report” of the Panel of Experts after the Panel
_ had held its second session from 4 to 18 July 1967, : This

: attended the Second Mo

letter is S' 18/10- 67/145. Attached thereto was another
restricted document; another Report of the Panel, known
as PE-Warsaw Report-2, 18/7/67: Mr. Wanner had again
eal Session of 1967 as the United
States Member the Panel. ‘A number of statements ©
showing the eadfast position 6f. the United States on
notice ‘are contained. in this Report of the second session.

it4

First, in order to appreciate the United States position,
one must know the proposed revisions suggested by the
Panel. The Panel’s revision as to. notice ‘is contained in
7 on page 3 of the Report: -

es The following features will be common to both
Solutions I and II as revised at this session:

(1) Notice:
| Article 3 of the ‘Wee Cenniibiton as amended -
- gat The Hague should be'so revised as to eliminate:
- any possibility that the carrier would lose his .
' limitation of liability because of noti-delivery of -
ticket or notice“or any other defect in the docu-
' ments of carriage. Reasons for. this view ‘are
- stated in Annex 1 hereto. ws cel ee

| Part of tie United States sabiliadlon is. contained on -
_ page 5:

Exclusive of Costs ‘Inclusive. of Costs
‘ “olution I. US $75,000 ~ US $100,000

xe 37,000 =~ —_—_-50,000
- Solution IL 58,000 § —--—«-75,000
| 33,000 43,000

8.1 ." specifying the limits applicable to Solution im
.the Panel boré in mind that any amount exceeding |
$100, 000 would be scones to be acceptable to a marge -
number of States.

. 8.2 The Member from the United States of Riiiie

pointed put that the comments from his ‘country indi-
‘cated that the benefits to passengers under interna- -

tional and U:S. domestic rules and limits of liabilityg -
we should be approximately. equivalent before elimination

¥

»¥

= “ae 83.

of the natice requirements of the Convention could be
considered. In view of the Panel’s recommendations
concerhing notice (see paragraph 7(1) above and An-
nex 1) he felt that.the limits of liability recommended

_ by the Panel might be too low for a by the

United States.”

In ANNEX 1, at page 9, the Panel noted :

“1, Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention ’provides .

that if the carrier-accepts a passenger without a ticket”

~ having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail

‘himself of the provisions ‘of the Convention which
_ exclude or limits his liability. In one country the

courts have interpreted this as meaning that the car-
riar is not entitled to avail himself of the limits if the
ticket delivered does not give adequate and timely
notice of the fact that the Convention applies to the
carriage.” :

Again, the 1967 American refutation tonain 9, 10):

~ that notice is needed-in countries were the Warsaw/ .

“5. Contrary. to the views stated above, the Member _
from the United States of America was of the opinion

- Hague system is not’applicable to domestic air trans-.

portation and where the liability of carriers is gen-
erally unlimited. In the United States of’ America,

- for example, a very substantial number of people travel

frequently on domestic journeys, but quite infrequently 7

‘on international journeys. Unless supstantial parity

is achieved between the levelg and rules of liability :
applicable to. both foreign and U.S. domestic or air

" transportation, the need for legible, intelligible and

timely notice will continue, so that such passengers

will be aware of the exceptional liability limitations —

'g

. for international journeys and can | take appropriate .
measures to offset their impact.

5.1 The Member from the United States of America

considered that past experience demonstrated the need »

to- continue the sanction of the loss of limitation. of

liability in order to ensure compliance by the a,
with | the notice requirements.”

: ‘he this Court steal knows, the Solicitor Genéral of
the United: States, in his memorandum filed herein, has
sapparten the a of.th at gl courts below.

_Therefore, we respectfully conclude that ‘the consistent,
unswerving and undeviating position of the United States,

and all of its ‘departments and agencies has been that the

notice cdntained in the Lisi ticket is completely inadequate :

: to bring to the attention of United Statés’ passengers on

international flights, the limits of liability and related
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, and that'the absence
of adequate notice results in a loss of the carrier’s limita- -

= _ tion of liability. Sa ean pee

g- American Public Policy on Carrier Liability Limitations _
Under the law (admiralty. and maritime) of the“United
Sfates, ‘and under the law of the individual states of the —
United States, it is against public policy for a common
carrier of passengers to limit, or to attempt to limit, the
amount of. the carrier’s liability for personal injury or
death of passengers incurred through negligerice or other
tortious conduct, See: 14 Am Jur 2d; CARRIERS, §4§ 942
et seq.; 13 CJS, CARRIERS, §4 629 et seq.; 80 CJS, SHIP-
PING, § 195 a; 7 New York Jur, CARRIERS, §4 399 et seq.

With respect to air carriers, the annotation in 13 ALR

2d 340, 341, indicates that any. attempted limitation of its

ie Oe ra ; ,
—— . . ups ish cS RANGA Mai te 5
a

85
‘liability toa passenger by an air carrier, by inserting a.
provision to that effect i in the pander ticket,
“is contrary to public policy and void, “Allison v. Stan-
.. dard Air Lines, Inc. (F DC Cal) [1930] US Av 292,
' affd (CA9th) 65 F2d 668, [1933] US-Av 92; Law v.
Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. (F DC Pa)
[1931] US Av 205; Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc.
v. Glose (CA3d NJ ) 66 F2d 710, [1933] US Av 26,
.228, cert den 290 US 696, 78 L ed 599, 54 S Ct 132; |
Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc. 266-NY
244, 194 NE 692, 38 NCCA 186, [1935] US Av 97, affg
242 App Div 625, 271 NYS 1107. |
‘The American common-law policy of barring a com-
mon carrier of passengers from limiting or extin-
guishing its liability for negligence by contract with .
the passenger was followed in Curtiss-Wright Flying
. Service, Ine. v. Glose (CA3d°NJ) 66 F2d 710, [1933]
_ US Av 26, 228, cert den 290 US 696, 78-L ed 599, 54
S Ct 132,cwhich excluded the air carrier’s ‘attenipted -
- limitation of damages to a stated sum, by provisions
‘ printed on the passenger ticket covering a seat in an
airplane which crashed through the alleged negligence
of its pilot, causing the death of. its lone passenger.
Calling attention to the practice of excluding such
limitations in connection wtih land and water trans-
portation, the court stated: “All alike perform the
. Same service, viz., transportation. They are competi- |
tors for the same class. of business. Every passenger
carried by airplane means a passenger less: for the
railroad or the steamship. Transportation, as its deri-
vation denotes, is a ¢arrying across, and, whether the _
‘carrying be by rail, by water or by air, the purposé in
- view and the thing-done’ are identical in result. Since,
then, the three stand as, in substance, the saine, i a

7

o

see

~ mains to inquire:whether the defendant was a common
carrier, for, if it is, its attempted limitation of an in-
jured passenger to recover full compensation for loss
due to its negligence i is invalid.” ‘Fhe court then went
on to point out that an air carrier’s holding itself out
to the public as performing the things done by a com-
mon carrier and its solicitation’ of the patronage of
the traveling public, its advertising of schedules or
routes, times of leaving, rates of faré, and its estab-
lishment of general rults and regulations, all clearly
indicated that it held itself out as a common carrier of
passengers and came in direct competition with rail
and steamship lines.”

We again point out, the contrast between American and .
British law.and public policy in regard. to this important
issue. As was noted in Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Corcoran
(1925, CA2 NY), F2d 163, 57 ALR 163, at page 168:

“In England, however, a different rule prevails, and
it is there settled that a public carrier may exempt it-
self from liability for its own or its agents’ negli-
gence. Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R.'2 H. L. Se. App.
Cas, 470; Parker: v. South Eastern R, Co. L. R. 2
' OC. P. Div. 416—C. A.; Richardson, 'S. & Co. v. Rown-
tree [1894]. A. C. 217--H. L.; ; Price v. Union earl
age Co. [1904] 1 K. B. 419, 6 B. R. C. 119—C.
Pyman S. 8. Co. v. Hull & B. R..Co. [1914] 2 K. -
788 ; Baxter’s Leather Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet
_ Co. [1908] 2 K. B. 626—C. A.; The Marriott v.
Yeoward Bros. [1909] 2 K. B. 987; Cooke v. T. Wil- ..
son, Sons & Co. (1915), 85 L. J. K. B. N. S. 888; Hood *.
. y. Anchor Line [1918] A. C. 837, 849, 9 B, R. C. 1097 -.
: “B. ) Charles Wade & Co. v. _London.& N.W.R.Co. =~ -
[1921] i K. B; 582 ; Jones v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. :
(1924) 40 ‘Fimes L. R. 847, 849.” }

_ oe

A

fe.

a ™ " . 5 .
willy MARINO i ii iets Nbc aes n ote cdnn

? .
/
°

. oo .
%
as Ney 87

This British notion of freedom of the passenger to con-
tract away his right of recovery has been carried over, at
least ina Canadian case affirmed by the Privy Council, to
relationships between an air. carrier and its passengers,

In conformity. with English law the Canadian Supreme
Court in Ludditt v. Ginger ‘Coote Airways, Ltd. [1942]
Can SC 406, [1942] 4 DLR 353, [1942] US Av 178, held
that a licensed air carrier of passengers may contract out

of liability for personal injury to its passengers. The suit.

“was based on personal injuries and loss of baggage eaused
by defendant’s negligence while the plaintiff was a passen-
ger in a plane making a regularly scheduled flight from
Vancouver to Zeballos. While the court expressly stated:
that in Canada “under.the existing law and statutes, a car-
rier of passengers can contract out of the liahility which
attaches to him, by the use of apt words in the contract
or ticket which he issues, provided the-gonditions for miak-
ing them binding have. been duly. complied with,” it should
be noted that the Supremé Court did not, as appeared in
the Court of Appeal decision of the same case, decide -
whether the air carrier in-the present case was a common |
carrier or not, but was content to base its judgment on the: .
ground that, under the Canadian Transport | Act of 1938,
the Board of Transport Commissioners may allow the is-
_suance of tickets limiting. liability, if it appears that the
proper procedure i is followed. 5 :

On appeal to the Piivy Council, the English court of ap-
peals, in upholding the Canadian court, emphasized that
although at common law a common carrier of. goods was’
virtually an insurer ofcthe goods and liable at all. events
except for “acts of God, and of the enemies of the King,”
the carrier of passengers was only required to. carry with |
‘due care, and that the common-law freedom to contract
. was not taken away from carriers of passengers by such

¢

-" statutes as the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, which ©

referred to railroad common carriers of goods, or the |

Dominion Transport Ac® which involved a code of provi-

» sions relating to traffic, and to tolls and tariffs, to which .

‘ all licensees. under the act must adhere. [1947] AC 233,
[1947] 1 All Eng 328, [1947] US Av 1. !

aS ge a Ee : ; ; ? : 3

.
. ”
. « . oe oe . —
LR ER Sat 8 OTE Mahl Mite at Rea HEN Ractp eed

Y.

In Addition to ae United States, Other Participating
Governments at Warsaw, Rio and The Hague Evinced
Concern for the Passenger. They Noted the Inequality _
of Bargaining Positions of Airlines and Passengers;
_ Noted the “Adhesion” Nature of the Contract of Car-
riage; and Supported the Principle That Airlines Would
Lose Their Liability Limitation if They Did Not Give ;
Notice to the ee | ez seh

a. At Wartime

‘In 1929 at ‘Warsaw, - least some -of the participating
governments voiced concern for the welfare of ointerna- .
tional air line passengers and profound interest in ‘fhieir!=

. protection. The inequality of the bargaining positions;
the nature of the contract of carriage as a contract of adhe-. “
sion; and the need for notice in: order to avoid loss of ©
liability limitation, were articulated frequently. .

» At the very. outset, at Warsaw, the Rapporteur, M. deVos
of. Belgium (Warsaw Minutes, page. 13 et passim), noted
‘ the importance of the sanction in protecting the passenger 7
or the: shipper: In referring: to the work of the Comité
_ International Technique - d@’Experts Jd uridiques ~ Aériens
“(“CITEJA”), he declared (Warsaw Minutes, page 15), as
‘to the passenger ticket and other documents: ;

RT BRATS Se MS A eR a

“La chose essentielle, 4 cet égard. est la sanction,
sanction — ‘pour les trois documents. et. qui con-

Ii esi issitiisserpa lain Ais ss suit
sae ;

i 97), noted :

siste 4 retirer au- transporteur qui transporterait des
voyageurs ou des marchandises sans documents er

© .avee des documents non conformes & la convention, ' “
ae — des avantages prévue par la convention.

This may be translated as follows:

. “The essential thing, with regard to this, is the sanc- ~
tion, sanction provided for the three documents and
which consists in withdrawing from the earrier who :
would transport passengers or goods without docu- _—
ments, or with documents not in conformity with the -
convention, the benefit-of the advantages provided by

; the: convention.”. ; ra

M. Sabanine of be i US.S.R. (Warsaw 2 Minutes, page

“Au point de vue économique, au point de vue des ©

; relations existantes entre le transporteur et le trans- :
__ porté il n’y a pas d’autre moyen de transport, ou

Pinégalité entre ces deux Parties au contrat soit plus’
grande. Déja ‘le fait méme dt transport aérien, le fait

- que V’avion vole, mais ne rampe pas sur terre avec,
une lenteur déconcertante, agrandit la distance entre °°
Jes rapports juridiques du transporteur et du’ trans-

' porté. Tl faut remarquer ensuite que nous connaissons
tous la structure des grandes compagnhies d’aéronavi-
gation qui, ou bien dans certains pays sont des com:

" -pagnies d’Etat ou bien nonobstant leur caractéré privé
au point,de vue formel, sont trés prochement liées
avec les’ milieux. gouvernementaux et donc sont trés
influentes et économiquement fortes. Dans ces condi-
tions nous sommes obligés _@appuyer trés fortément *

* Popinion qu’uné décision de la présente Conférence, .
comme quoi les cadres’ de Pexonération eventuelle du

_ quence. Or, qui de fous désirerait un pareil, ies

transporteur deviennenit trop larges, sarelt s\équitable

et pourrait influencer négativement le développement
des transport aériens au point du vue de Jleur fré-

-“Si au commencement de ce siécle on parlait
du: droit aérien avec trop de détails en comparaison
avec Détat de la technique de l’aviation, maintenant ce
serait une fauté' de sous-estimer les possibilité de

- sécurité et de commodité, dont djspose et dont ‘dis-

posera de plus en plus le transport aérien et de quitter

“pour cette cause la voie habituelle et normale de la

responsabilité du transporteur, surtout si om estime

la grande prépondérance économique “et politique qui
est du cété de celui-ci. ” :

Translation of the foregoing “Yellows:

. “From the economic point of view, from the point

’-of- view. of the existing relations between the carrier ©

_. and the traveller, there is no other means of trans-

portation where the inequality between the two parties
to the contract are greater. Already the very fact of —
air transportation, the fact that the plane flies, but

does not creep on earth with disconcerting slowness,

widens the distance between the juridical relations of

‘the carrier and the travelle®. One must note further

that we all know the structure of the large air naviga-
tion companies which in certain countries are either -

‘state companies, or in spite of their. private charset

from a formal point’ of. view, are very closely’, bound

to the governmental circles, and are therefore very

| influential and economically strong. In these condi-

tions we are obliged to support very strongly the opin-
ion that a decision of the present conference whereby

‘the framers of eventtial exoneration of the carrier be- -
come too wide, would be inequitable and could nega-”

—~ pe BF

tively influence the development of air. tianaportation:
and from the. viewpoint of their frequency. Now, who
among us, would wish such a result?” ;

' “Tf. at the seg beailiie of this evens! one still spoke .

of air law with too much detail in comparison with the -

state of the technique of aviation, now it would. be a”
- mistake to underestimate the possibilities of security

and comfort at the disposal, now and forever- more,

of air transportation and to leave, for this reason, . |

the usual. and normal path of the liability of the car- rie :

rier, especially if one-values the: great economic and

— preponderance which is on his side.” aot ‘“
€ ’ =
Such juridical thoughts as ‘to the protection of the: trav- |
elling public were strenuously voiced from non-communist
sources as well. Thus, the spokpaman for Switzerland
* (Warsaw Minutes, -page 103) stated: |

M. PITTARD—(Suisse)—“N ous devons donner au
public des régles qu’il connaisse. Si vous dites: c’est
“une question entre les compagnies de navigation aéri-
enne ét le public, au point de vue administratif, c’est
tré simple, mais tous les juristes vous diront: nous
devons éclairer le public, 1 ne faut pas qu’il soit obligé
@aller trouver les compagnies de navigation aérienne |
‘ pour leur demander: comment faites-vous!? Le. public
“ne va pas aller trouver la compagnie de navigation
' aérienne pour luit dire: donnez-mois vos conditions «=
générales, que je voie si je suis protégé ae

- Translation ensues. | aN | 2

ae must give the public rules that it knoWs ; se
you say: it is a question between the companiés of
_ air "navigation ~and the public, mom an administrative

‘

\
4

Pi *. 32). For ‘convenience; “we. repeat the translation: —

re eae ‘which must be guaranteed. . Hg 7
; Ou “Consequently, ag pasa Sinuibies of the Italian

a . ee ‘gence toward the ‘ship’ owners. This -me

+.
—

* to Bo to. the. companies of air navigation to ask them:

\

Ss Giannini on behalf of Italy. (Warsaw Minutes, page

——

&: “Th these ‘conditions, when. we find ourselves, facing
j “ orgamiized interests like: those. of the ship owners) and —

: gers, we feel that the latter should not: be ‘forgotten,
“otherwise | we do not have the harmony of interests —

r

ee ; Delegat ation I. hist say” that We. are not. prepared to
= /aecept dny measure of favor or of particular indul-

dns’ ‘that for
via what touches the, interest of air navigation, that. is of .

“no.” ~ athe ,

» (Warsaw 1 ‘Minutes, ‘page 66), pointedly remarked : -“Dans

- eetvarticle comme. pour'les autres, la Déégation jtalierine-

estime que tout ce qui constitue pour ie transporteur aérien —

| ee * un) privilége exagéré jlo doit pas. étre accepté.”- “Fn this

“article asin the others, thie Italian delegation’ considers that .
“everything that constitutes an singgerston-petvilens for
ier mast not ibe accepted,”

a ey - se na °

. ~ P. ~ fire P 4 , ¢ .
“ -" » .

2
~
oe J er
. Y ” oe
.* °
. +

ok peintot view, it is very. y staph, Sak 6 all jurleteé will tell.
: you: we must enlighten the public, it should not haye. ‘

?

of. non-organized interésts, like. those of’ the passen-

-

’ : ie wd “national interest, — bes eer Te iigiss or kane, ei

Zs (or go -hqw do’ you do if? The- public ‘is. not going ‘to ga.to.. "|
thie. company of. air navigation to say: give mq your.
“general conditions, - that T, gan see. if. I am protebted. ¢

we have. \already: usta, above, ‘the: observations of era,

A “tt - Also, in_discussing sialiive atid, Signe “Giannini Baby

' M) Pierre ‘Fla india for France (Warsaw Minatos, page oe
a, > re Ps i ee

oA

“og

~ &T] est clair que nous devons, dans une convention
qui tend & étre universelle, établir des régles qui,soient
une garantie, qui constitiaent une garantie pour Vusager

_ et ce serait, 4 mon gens, commettre ane_grave erreur

que de considérer qu’une législation’ ‘comme celle que

. nous voulons créer doit étre adaptée seulemerit aux

conditions. actuelles du moment: il faut tenir compte.
de Pévolution probable d’un moyen de fransport tout |

nouveau, es garanties de sécurité : de ‘plus’ grandes

__ qu'il offrira et ne pas créer & son encoutre une différ-

oN ence trop grande qui inciterait Pusager, soit le passa-

—_—

ger, soit le commercant qui confie des marchandises
au ‘transporteur, a ne plus emprunter la voie aérienne,

\ pares, qu il serait moins garanti: que sur les autres

.voies. “Or, parallélement A une législation rsetrictive
“ de la'responsabilitécomme celle dont jé viens de parler
a Vinstanty, que s’est-il -passé dans les pays?”

- The translation,

~

“Tt is clear titet. ‘we must, in a convention which tends

to be universal, establish rules which should We a
"guaranty, which ¢onstitute a guaranty for the user,
and it would be, ‘in my opinion; to commit ‘a grave
- error were we to consider that. a legislation like the
one we want to create be adapted. only. to actual con-
7 ditions of the moment; one must take into. account

. . the ‘probable evolution of an entirely new means of

; transportation, of the guaranties of security, larger

“ and larger, that it shall offer, and not create against |
‘it too large a differente, which would induce the client,
7 either the apssenger, or ‘the businessman who éntrusts

his merchandise to the carrier, not to use the airways,

because he ‘would be less covered than by, other means

oe si an A VOSS Se

—— canamsthen tai OF ee ee ee rinses Aba

4.

a

"94

. bh. At Rio ©

Expressions of concern for the passenger, stressing the

inequality of -his position, abounded at the Rio Meeting i in
1953. -The Delegate of France; M. Garnault, Bio —
_ pages 174, 175) stated:

~

| “Article 3(1). of the Working Group’s text provided |
- that the passenger ticket must include a statement to

_ the effect. that the carriage was subject to the rules re-

lating to liability established by the Convention. This .

was an essential provision. The contract of carriage
‘was, particularly in regard to the passenger, a a “con-
‘trat d’adhésion” the terms of which could not be dis-

' -eussed. The passengers ‘were not familiar with the

~ detailed provisions governing their travel by air. The

least that could be told.to them was that they were

travelling under a system of limited liability, and not

* under a system of complete liability, as would be the
- ease under the majority of legislations governing other

modes of transport. If they did not receive this notice,

they would risk being deceived in regard to the con-.

_ ditions ‘under which thby were taking the risk of a

trip by air, ‘and this was a serious matter. The French ,
\ Delegation felt, that there. should be - ‘a particular in»
the. ticket concerning, at least, the provisions of the —
Convention which limited the ifability of the carrier...

Tt also felt that a sanctio ould be applied to the

‘earrier in the case of the omission of this particular, .

‘and this sanction should be that the carrier could not
claim limited liability, because it left thg. other party
‘to the contract in ignorance as to eas existence of lim-

_ liability.” ”

Later, specifically referring fo the, “sometimes small

_ print” used by the international air ‘carriers in their ie

nee tickets, he added:

—_ -

. “Mr. Garnault (France), - _— to Mr. Cooper

(IATA), pointed out that if the Freneh. Delegation,

_ Sacrificed logic, it did'so in order to take into: account
.the practical facts of the problem): -The passenger who

took an aircraft received a ticket which included num-.

erous particulars, which a person would not be tempted

to read unless he were suing on them, but what could |

_ be observed was that, in spite of the sometimes small
print, these causes were perfectly studied by those who
eworked for the carriers, so much so that everything
_ having beef prepared and written, one could not pos-

sibly be deceived and it was hardly -likely that the

servants or agents would commit blunders. -

“The practical difficulty which the proposals of Can-- *:
ada and France wished to overcome was to draw the .

rights. It would even be necessary that, in the future,

attention of the passenger oes he was sub-; —
ject to special rules of liability whic he his

it be brought out in a.better way on the passenger

’ ticket that- the ticket was. a contrat @’adhésion, ‘for,
otherwise, the passenge ight not take out supple-

~ - mentary insurance if he di not-know that he was

_ travelling. under rules/ providing for limited: liability.

The French Delegation, . therefore, asked that the lia-

bility of the carrier be unlimited, as was the. cage for

‘ticket that the carriage was subject to the Ne Te@- x

lating to liability established by the Convention.” -

At a still, earlier session‘of the Rio meeting, The French ‘:: me}
Delegate, rieting that the contract of carriage was a con-

tract of adhesion, had stated (Rio Minutes, page 54):

“The formalities with which the contract of carriage ~,,

should ui ha rae had the aim of enabling the

>

re

96
parties to this contract to prove its contents, On tin
other hand,.it could not be admitted that, in a contrat

. dadhésion, the carrier ‘could be free to define the form
of this contract.” o.) .
c. At the Hague | |

- Concern for the passenger’s welfare and for giving him

information as to his rights predominated at The Hague in ~

1955. In addition to the ideas articulated by Mr. Calkins
on: behalf of the United States, discussed above, dele-

_ gate after delegate stressed the need for complete enlight-
‘.enment. of the air travelling public. Mr. O’Connor of the

Ireland Delegation argued often and strongly, among
others. : arate,

Thus (Hague Minutes, pages 69,:70), Mr. O’Connor said:

“it seemed inevitable that the interest of the public
“must at least slightly predominate,- if only for the
reason that. the public was “nognally less better in-
formed in ‘matters-of this kind than the airlines. There-

fore, he had voted against the éntire deletion of Arti-

-eles 3 to 11, which would leave the position wide open,
In the event of deletion, no matter what good inten-
tions the airlines might have, it seemed inevitable that
the public might suffer.” :

“What was the position of the passenge:, who knew
nothing whatever about the conditions of liability?
Normally he might wish to cover himself in some man-

‘ner additional to the coverage provided by the Con-
vention. Consequently, it-was essential that the passen-

' ger should be given some information as to the situa-

tion. It seemed absurd to his Delegation to suggest

‘that such information could be conveyed by saying on

’ the ticket that the Warsaw Convention, if it covered

97

.

the journey, applied to the journey. Yet, this was an

interpretation of the suggesfions which had been made
in the Conference concerning the notice: It should not

be beyond the capacity of, say, ICAO and to some ex- ©

‘tent of IATA to aid in the dissemination of the infor-
mation. His Delegation was attracted by the United

States proposal, which seemed to. attempt’ to tell the -

passenger most of what he wanted to know.”

“It had been stated that it was ridiculous to apply

to a simple omission the sanctions which were already

applied in the Convention in the case of wilful mis-.
conduct. But, when an omission left the passenger -
pe id in ignorance of his position, the situation

if not quite as bad as in the case of wilful miscon-
? a erious for’ the passenger. Consequently, the
- sanctions should apply in the case of such an omission.

It had been said that the sanction was harsh because

_ the tetm ‘wilful misconduct’ must necessarily apply

to something of a very high order for unlimited lia- -
bility to apply. But, this was not so, because the
Courts. of the country concerned would decide what the .
actual liability would be and the ability so determined —

must be _— to be reasonable. ”

Then, at page 122, he contieiaell:

“in the case of the notice, in order to ‘establish a fair >

balance between the public interest, as represented
. by the passengers, and the private interest, as repre-
; sented by the carriers, one had to weigh the balance
- a little in favour of the. passenger’ who was in an in-
. ferior position in relation to the knowledge of the

_ law governing the carriage. The proposals.before the -

- meeting merely paid lip-service to the principle that
the eid nome have knowledge of the Conven-

¢

OS)

te c
98°
ean
* .

tion. These Sere tee tried to make the passenger
~ aware of the existeree of the Convention, but made no _

effort to tell him what, the Warsaw Convention covered,

or in what circumstances it would operate. Only the
United States ss attempted to goa isu in that
direction.”

Mrs. Zalka of Hungary (Hague Witaiiton page 58) noted —
es “the interest of the passengers, which was an interest-

which the Convention should defend, since. this was an

‘interest of the citizens of the States who were represented
at the Conference.” | .

M. Garnault noted, on 1 behalf of Dentin — Min-
utes, page 88) :

“The Convention coiled espevially to the extent
that it implied on the part of the passenger, the ac-

ceptance of a regime of limited liability of the carrier. —

When this element was not included in the .contract
- of carriage or was not sufficiently brought out in the

contract, the’ consent of the parties was to that extent —
not manifest on the question of limitation of liability.-

In that event there would be a return, at least in cer:

~ tain countries, to a common law solution whereby the -
carrier was entirely liable’ to give compensation for

td caused during the carriage. ws

‘He then saat on (Hague Minutes, page 126) :

wm.
° “The non-inclusion of a provision for sanctions

would®be even more curious in view of the fact that -

the Observer from the IUAI had pointed-that if the

sanctions were not included, the Courts might perhaps, .
apply them. The sanction should apply in cases where ©

there was a flagrant neglect on the part of the carrier
to give a notice to the passenger.” |

— o>

m "The delegate from Soak, Sefior G6mez Jara (Hague
7 Minutes, page 90) spoke straight tg the point: ' %

“it was, entirely natural and logical that the Cameeiiticin
should include a sanction of unlimited liability when
a the passenger. was not given notice that the carriage

in question was subject to a regime of limited liability. :
It was entirely natural that the Convention should
‘include a procedure to ensure ‘that the ticket would
. eontain the fundamental condition to the effect that
the carriage was subject to a limitation of liability.
The basis of the Warsaw Convention was to’ give the

carrier the benefit of the. limitation of liability.” |

ea . +O”
“Other speakers, including Messrs. Calkitis and Gar. —

nault, had said that the Warsaw Convention had a’ ©
. contractual basis and that in this contractual basis
had to be included the fundamental condition or pur-
pose of the Convention which was the limitation of
liability. If the Convention reduced the rights of the
passengers by a limitation of liability, it was abso-
lutely necessary .that, at. the time the contract was
entered into, the passenger ‘now that there might be
this limitation of liability.” _

. reiterated (Hagne Minutes; page 129) :

-“The fundamental elemént of the Convention was * 2
‘that it restriéted the rights of the passenger by limit-.
" ing the liability of the Carrier. Therefore, it was only

just and logical to draw the attention of the passenger

to the possible limitation of the carrier’s diability.”.

100

.
,)
of e

The Position of Air Carriérs Has Completely iad

‘Since the Fledgling Days of 1929,.and the Warsaw
Convention Must Be Considered in Light of Modern
Prevailing — oe

— 7 Ne

—>

ot

a. -The Radical Changes Since 1929

The position of air carriers in the 1925-1929 period is ~

described in “The United States and the Warsaw Conven-

tion”, by Lowenfeld. and Mendelsohn, in 80 Harvard Law’
Review. The authors recite the following facts .(80 il

vard L Rev at page 498):

“The Warsaw Convention’. was the result. of two

a

. 146)
_ (a) The place ‘and date of i issue ;
(b) The place of departure and of destination ; ie,
(c) The agreed stopping places, ‘provided that the carrier
‘may reserve t

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_1084%3A25. Public record. Not legal advice.
