# Opposition Brief — Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0903%3A06

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1967
- **Citation:** 386 U.S. 544

## Text

ah the Sayre Gaurt of the ited States : :

OcToBER TERM, 1966

me pee No. 638 ,
Fiorma East Coast Rat.way COMPANY, APPELLANT ~
Vv. |

Unirep StaTEs OF AMERICA, ET AL.

' No. 639 |
Ciry OF Tampa, FLORIDA, APPELLANT
) ° v.

. . Unrrep Staves anp Lyrersraté CommERcE tS
COMMISSION, ET .AL.

‘©

No. 641
SouTHERN RatLway SYSTEM, APPELLANT
& oe yaar v.
UnitEepD StaTEs OF AMERICA

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRIOT COURT FOR’
. THE MIDDLE DISTRICT. OF FLORIDA

v

o.

‘nnidinateiene FOR THE UNITED STATES

. ° re } e
4% : STATEMEN 1 /

On July 22, 1960, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company and: Seaboard: Air Line Railroad Com-
237-563—66 . ):

e

2

: pany—two of the three major railroads in the south-
eastern United States ’—applied to the Interstate
: Commerce Comfnission, pursuant to Section 5(2)(b)

of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 5(2)(b),

‘for authorization to merge. After extended proceed- -
ings, the Commission, on December 2, 1963, approved

_ the application, finding it to be “consistent with the |

public “interest,” the eerie seaderd: 320 I.C.C.

— 122.

An action to set aside. the Commission’s order was
brought i in a-three-judge federal district court in Flor-
ida. Controversy focused | the adequacy of the

: -_ Commission’s findings with respect to the alleged

adverse competitive effects of the merger, the United -
States (among other parties) arguing that they were
inadequate. ‘The district court, upon ‘its initial review,
found it unnecessary- to consider the particularized
challenges to the Commission’s findings on competi-
tion; it held that, in any event, the order must be set -
aside because the Commission had failed ‘‘to decide
whether or nqt section 7 of the Clayton Act would be
violated by the proposed merger” and to make the
market analysis required in a Section 7 case. 242 ¥.
Supp. 14,20. |
"Phe Commission and the merger ‘applicants ap-
pealet-to this Court, which summarily reversed the
judgment | of the district court. Seaboard. ‘Air Line
‘R. Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154 (per curiam).
The-Court held that the. Commission was not required”
to make. Section 7 findings. although it was ae
1 The third i is ‘Southern Railway Company.

)

3

to “estimate the scope and appraise the dite of the
curtailment of competition” resulting from the
merger, as the Court had held in MeLean Trucking
Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87,.and Minneapolis
& St. Lowis R. Co. v. United States, 361°U.S. 173,
_ 186. The Court declinéd to consider the adequacy of
the findings the Commission had made on competi-
tion. Deeming that a matter for the district court
in the first instance, it remanded the case “for a full
_Teview of ‘the administrative order and findings pur-
suant to the standards enunciated by this Court.’’*

On. remand, the United States again urged the in-
adequacy of the Commission’s findings. The district
court, however, upheld the findings and order.’ These
_ appeals followed.* ’ | :

DISCUSSION

+ Ai merger duly approved by the interstate Com-
merce Commission cannot be challenged unde the ~
antitrust laws. 49 U.S.C. 5(11). But that is not to

. The course aingted by the Court had been urged by the
United States. We had stated that on. remand we would Te-
new our contention that the Commission’s findings were inade-
quate. Me@®orandum for the United. States; = os. 425 and 555,
O.T. 1965,gp. 4-5. :
' *The opinion of the district-court is not yet inl It is,
printed: as Appendix A to the Jurisdictional Statement of .
Florida East Coast Railway Company. ;

*We do not here respond to the appeal of the- Railway |
Labor Executives’ Association (No. 640, this Term), challeng-
ing the labor-protective conditions imposed by the Commission,
in view of the anticipated settlement of that phase of the case. _
: "See the application of appellees Seaboard Air Line ¢ filed .
November -3, 1966, for an extension of time wish Viet,
move to affirm in: No. 640. . ; MED OV)

©

4

tion—the policy which underlies those laws—in decid-
ing whether-a merger should be approved as consistent

with the public interest. The Commission’s guide in .
determining where the’ public interest lies is whether

a .

say that the Commission is free to ignore: competi- _

the proposal will promote “adequate, economical, and .

efficient service’ and ‘‘sound -economic conditions in

transportation” (National Transportation Policy, 49
. US.C. preceding §1), and competition is an. impor-

tant method whereby efficiency is spurred and sound

_ economic conditions fostered. Therefore, the competi-

tive impact of a merger is‘a factor that the Commis-

‘sion must. consider carefilly, and evaluate thoroughly

(He cLean, Minneapolis, supra).
Of course, having done so, the Commission may in

the particular case conclude that any adverse competi- __
tive effects the merger may have are outweighed by -

other factors and that, on balance, the merger is in the -

public interest, We do not quarrel with the balancing

process; the statute plainly requires it. But it is no
less plain that the Commission cannot perform its bal-

. ancing funetion in a rational and sound manner with- -

out making a reasonable effort to determine the scope -

‘and magnitude of the merger’s adverse competitive
effects. And while the Commission need. not follow

the identical analysis, or make the same findings, as

-would be required in an antitrust case (Seaboard Air
_ [ane R. Co., supra), it is surely the proper office of _
_ Judicial review to insist that the Commission’s opinion

clearly show that it: carefully considered the Dicietita

tive dimension.

&

5

"Bn Tested by this standard, the findings with wantin
to: competition which the Commission made in approv- -
ing the merger. of Atlantic and Seaboard were; we be-
lieve, deficient. We note here what -we regard as. the
most serious deMeiencies: .

First. The Commission seemingly’ assumed that the
enly adverse effects of the merger would be felt in
western and central Florida, where Atlantic and Sea- _
board are the only railroads. It failed even to advert
to the possibility: that the merger might i injure compe-
tition throughout. the Southeast, by reducing the num-
ber of major roads from three to two. Competition is —
generally more vigorous and effective where there are
many competitors; it is especially likely to be weak-
ened when, in a market already dominated by a small’
number of firms, one of the majors is eliminated as
an independent competitive factor.

‘We .recognize that the Commission was not com-
"pletely indifferent to the possible competitive impact —
of the merger throughout the Southeast. Its opinion

contains repeated findings that, outside of Florida,
rail competition would remain vigorous ‘and effective
after the merger (320 I.C.C. at 164, 166, 211), and it

. specifically found that, by virtue of certain conditions - _

designed to increase Southern Railway’s access to the -
eastern Florida market, the merger’ would “create
more balanced competition among the several rail car-
Tiers in the,southeastern seaboard area” (td. at 184) 7
and produce “an increase rather than detrease in‘.
intramodal rail competition’’ (td. at 188). But the
Commission’s opinion does not consider the. possibility

that; while Southern would doubtless continue to com-

pete vigorously against the merged roads, a reduction

in the number of taajor conipeting railroad systems in ‘.

the Southeast: might nonetheless have a sérious adverse

‘impact on rail competition generally i in the region. The -

district court did not mention, let. alone annie this
deficieney i in the Commission’s findings. .

Second. The Commission, conceding that the merger
would produce a rail ‘monopoly in portioris of Flor-

“ida, discounted-the economic impact of the monopoly
by reference to’ the vigor of competition from other _
maida of transportation—trucks and barges. But it
failed to determine the actual extent to which com- _

_ peting . modes ~provide anadequate alternative to ——

' Florida. shippers who now use rail service. Doubt- ~~

less the Commission was aware that, for the foresee-

‘able future, certain ‘kinds of’ shipments would con-.
.» tinue to move largely if not exclusively. by rail; it
' tated that competition among railroads was still a
_- value worth preserving (320 1.0.C. at,210). . Yet, the
» . Commission’s opinion, it seems’ to us, teo readily

assumes that the adverse effects of the Florida mo-

“nopoly would be largely offset by the strength of the

- eompetition from other modes (id. at 166, 211-212).

,

_ We believe that a more probing inquiry by the Com-

mission would have revéaled that the raflroads con-

"tinue to enjoy substantial monopoly power in the.

long-haul transportation of many important com-
modities pypdueéd in the affected area, and we point

* out that this was the view of the district court as
well (F.E.C. J.S., App. A, p. 20a). But, however |

e .
. . . -*
7 nd 5
‘
.

tHiat may be, surely the Commission.was not entitled’ —
to. presume the effieaey of’ inter-modal competition. .
It wes required to andlyze.with dome pgrticularity
the extent to which the affected Florida shippers
would, in fact, be shielded from, the injurious effects
of a rail monopoly by the availability of service by -
trucks or, barges.’ We find no. aah aneline in ab. |
opinion. |
Third In balancing the adverse pect an effects
‘of the merger in Florida against its overall benefits,
the Commission. made{ we think, insufficient effort to
measure the magnitude. of those effects. It did not. at-
tempt to determine how many, shippers would be
denied competitive rail service. Nor did it attempt —
. te assess the hardship. to them of such denial—e
_ deficiency. obviously related to the ‘Commission’ 8 ap-
‘parent assumption that shippers. dissatisfied with the
service of a rail monopolist have ready -recourse to.
competing non-rail carriers. The Commission con-
‘ sidered the number .of localities that would be de-
-prived of competitive’ rail service as a’result of the.
merger. (320 I.0.C. at 164-165), but not. the character
of the shipments originating fm those localities or the
dependence of the shippers: in those localities on rail
service. - It satisfied itself that only one eity of more ,
than 200,000 population (Tampa) would be deprived
‘of competitive rail service. (ibid.), but.it ignored the
possibility that smaller cities might be equally er more
- important sources of rail shipments (especially of min-
+ erals, forest and farm products, which typically do
.- not originate ‘in large cities) ; nor did it consider the
' probable impact of single-rail service on Tampa itself.

-

8 ,
= 8) In summary; judging the Commission’ by what it
"said, ‘as ‘we must,:we believe that it made insufficient
attempt te determine ‘the substantiality of the therg-.
er’s ‘ailverse ‘sompetitive effects: | More ‘considered
analysis; we think, was necessary before the Commis-
sion could meaningfully weigh | those’ effects against
the merger’s benefits, . We agree, of course, that had
the Commission made the proper analysis and found—
as we think the record shows—that the adverse. com-
petitive effects of the Atlantic-Seaboard merger would -
indeed “be great, it might still have approved the ©
merger. ‘But it would have. done so with its eyes open.
Instead; the Commission weighed against the benefits of
the merger a determination that ‘such ‘reduction in
competition as will result from the merger will have
fio’ appreciably injurious ‘effect upon shippers and
' eommiunities”’ (320 I.C.C. at 167)—a view, we believe,
_ not adequately supported in the Commission’s opinion.
One ‘eannot say what the Commission’s judgment
would have been ‘had it more fully confronted and
_aalyuce the crucial issues of competition in this case.

It may be questioned whether a-dispute as to the

elletancy’ of an agency’s analysis of one of the public-

interest factors that it must consider provides a suffi-
Gient basis: for invoking plenary review by this Court,

tt espécially ‘where, as in this case, the initial reviewing .

court, in'@ lengthy and considered opinion, sustained
the apetiey’sorder. But ere are special circum-
statioes Here.’ At-isstfe is'a major merger which will
temake’ the railtead map of the entire southeastern |
Gnited States. And it:is but one of a large wave of

Bi ge 4
railroad mérgers, constituting .a movement nation-
wide in scope and likely to have profound and perma-
nent effects upon the transportation indusfry of this -.

< country. All of these mergers must be submitted to

- the Commission for approval, and, once approved,
they are, of course, immune from antitrust challenge..-

— In the circumstances, insistence upon the adequacy of
| the Commission’s analysis of, competition is surely nt
o hypertechnical.

There is, in short, a clear seed for early delineation
of the standard of care to which the Commission shall
be held in evaluating the competitive dimension of. —
railroad .mergers, ‘and this consideration persuades
us that the case—despite its obvious difficulties—is oné
which would warrant’ plenary consideration by this
Court.
Respectfully submitted. *
Sense MARSHALL,
@\ Solicitor General.
~ . .. ‘Dowarp F. TURNER, -
Assistant Attorney General.
; f RicHarp A. Posner, ..
SOE ae Ea Assistant to the Solicitor General.
Bas | eee Epwin M. Zommerman,
, - | | ° Lions, KesTeEnBaUM,
, : ie ae THomas R.. ASHER,
bee a

<

ie Novemser 1966.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0903%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
