# Motion to Affirm — Illinois Central R. Co. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion to Affirm
- **Published:** January 1, 1967
- **Citation:** 385 U.S. 457

## Text

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
Pte er FILED
NOV 2-9 1966
os ele JQHN F. DAVIS, CLERK
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroszr TzRm, 1966

Nos. 687, 688, 689

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, ST.
‘ LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY anp .
MONON RAILROAD, :
Appellants,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION, e¢ al.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MOTION TO AFFIRM

LEON LEIGHTON,
6 East 45th Street,
New York, N. Y. 10017,
Attorney Pro Se.

BLANK
PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE CoMMISSION’S CONCLUSIONS .........eccceeeee

Tue District Court’s CONCLUSION ........ ae

ARGUMENT:

Pornt I. There is warrant in the law and the facts
for the Commission’s conclusion that the public
interest considerations overwhelmingly favor ap-
proval of MoPac control of Eastern, notwithstand-
ing the Section 5(4) violation ..................

A. The Commission’s Balancing Test ........
B. The Commission’s Power and Responsibility

C. The Commission’s Application of the Bal-
ancing Test, Affirmed by the District Court,
Does Not Present a Substantial Question

Point 2. There is warrant in the law and the facts
for the Commission’s refusal to reopen to receive
evidence of Eastern’s current financial condition

Point 3. Monon’s complaint is premature ........

I a eet a ee

TaBLE oF CasEs

Alamo Express, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp.
694 (W.D. Tex), affd. 382 U.S 19 ..............
American Airlines v. Cwil Aeronautics Board, 178
oe UF ME hv éacd bbecdvedebekbaeneursbncs
Atchinson, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284
BM EE bs evn dha os cacedccdnsawaceseucsoes ae

lor)

Atlantic Transp. Co.-Control and beatin 56 M.C.C.
Oe ssdbtans sk RRS AED ER ee ee 8

Benton v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 37 (M.D. Ga.) la
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 147 F. 2d 152 (D.C.
OD bende tace canes csenreducecdasatnseneaevers 12f
Broth. of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United
States, 221 F. Supp: 19 (E.D. Mich.), affd. 375

We esses is oe seen res 13, 2a
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 158

Ds ee Ce SE he odd dete naeieddnk sees 4,1a
Central of Georgia R. Co. Control, 307 I.C.C. 39 .... 6,8
City of Nashville, Tennessee v. United States, 155 F.

Supp. 98 (M.D. Tenn.), affd. 355 U.S. 63 ........ la
Columbia System v. U.S., 316 U.S. 407 ............. 17f
Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Martin, 303

x ee ee oi who ee nceceakares es 16
County of Marin v. United States,.356 U.S. 412 ...... 6f
East Fexas Line v. Frozen Food Exp., 351 U.S.49... 17f
Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 .............. 15, 18
Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 448 ....... 18
El Dorado Oil Works v. U.S., 328 U.S. 12 .......... 17f
Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Company v. United

States (not yet reported, S.D.N.Y.) .........6... 2a

Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. United States (not yet
reported, M.D. Fla.), after remand in 382 U.S. .
1954, revg. 242 F. Supp. 14 (M.D. Fla.) .......... 2a

Fried v. United States, 212.F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y.) la

Friedman v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 815
(oot 6 ae BR 2 ee Per Teer Tre la

Frozen Food Exp. v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 .... 17f

Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. U.S., 371 U.S. 115.....6, 7, 8, 18

Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 294 F. 2d 217 (D.C. .
Cir.) Gant, Ga, Te Ws Oe occ ccevssicnsvaveses 12f
Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St.

| P.é P.R.Co., 318 U.S. 523 | beteveckeceberebeenuns 13

Com’g, 270 F. 2d 404 (10 Cir.) ........ccceeeeees

* PAGE
Insurance Group v. D. d R. G. W. R. Co., 329 U.S. 607 =—-:18
I. C. C. v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 508 ............ 10f, 13, 18
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67. 4,7f
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361

0 EN ere Orr eee 4,18
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 449

(E.D. Ky.), affd. 293 U.S. 524 ........... Ss lat -la
National Van Lines, ae v. United cakes, 326 F. 2d

362 (7 Cir.) CRS 8 Soy Coa Re ah eo 17f
Nelson, L. & Sons Pare Co. Duaied and Merger,

awa Kees 8
N. Y. Central Securities Co. v. U.S., 287 U.S.12.... la
New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. United gig 95 F.

Supp. 811 (N.D. Ohio) . : .

_ Norfolk & Western Railway Co. poe" ‘Net ew yY ary Chi-

cago & St. Louts Ratlway Co.—Merger, 324 I.C.C.

5 BREE oly cheer 1 ees eae Le re 14f
Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Comm’n, 322 U.S. 507 = 17f
Pennsylvania R. Co.—Merger—New York Central

Pee Pe ee 16f
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202 17
Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 275 ...........4.. 17f
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. C.A.B., 345 F. 2d 445

BPA Cs by GOEG: GU, SO Ws CO cc kccccccveceess 15
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. U.S., 307 U.S.125 ......... 17f
Schwabacher v, United States, 104 F. Supp. 875

(D.D.C.), after remand in 334.U.S. 182, revg. 72 F.

oe RR ee ee la
Seaboard Air Line R. Co.—Merger—Atlantic Coast |

Inne, 320 I1.C.C. 122, affd. Florida East Coast Ry.

Co. v. Umited States if) eee 14f
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v U. S., 382 U.S. 154 ..... 7f
Stott v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y.) la
Sunray Mid Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power :

15

iv

PAGE
Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co., 328 U.S.134... 14f
U.S. v. Detroit Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236 ....... 7
United States v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co.,

No. 20, decided Nov. 14, 1966 .................. 10f
U.S. v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515 ........ 3, 10, 12, 18
SraTuTEs
WUE COM oo ooo vcncovdcdcevseav esas 16, 18
es SOD 6 hob heise pena deresenxenss - 14f
MISCELLANEOUS
i ee ec Peer 14f

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

‘Ocrosgr Term, 1966
Nos. 687, 688, 689

>
Vv

Inuinois CENTRAL Ramroap Company, St. Louis SoutH-
WESTERN RAILWAY Company and Monon Rarzoap,

Appellants, :

Vv.

Unrrep States or America and InTerstaTe COMMERCE
Commission, et al., .
Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT .
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ra’
Vv

MOTION TO AFFIRM:

Pursuant to Rule 16, paragraph 1(c), of the Rules of
this Court, the undersigned appellee ? joins in the motions

1 The parties will be identified as in the District Court opinion:
Eastern for Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company ; IC for
appellant Illinois Central Railroad Company; Cotton Belt for appel-
lant St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company; Monon for appellant
Monon Railroad ; MoPac for appellee Missouri Pacific Railroad Com-
pany; L&N (called. “Dixie Line” by the Commission) for appellee
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. )

Initialled references are to the respective jurisdictional statements
and motions to affirm. References captioned “J.S.” are to Appendices
1 and 2 to appellants’ jurisdictional statements. References captioned |
“Tr.” and “Ex.” are to the Commission’s transcript and exhibits.
References captioned “Doc.” are to the documents in the District
Court record,- which has been filed in this Court.

2 The undersigned is a stockholder of Eastern, who participated
throughout the Commission proceeding (J.S. 35a), and intervened
in the District Court in support of the Commission’s order (J.S. 1a).

of the other appellees that the judgment of the District
Court be affirmed. This motion adopts the statements of
appellees Commission and MoPac; and will not repeat
arguments fully’ treated by them.

The Commission’s Conclusions

The Commission concluded:

1. ‘‘Eastern’s preservation as a prosperous com-
petitive rail carrier under the control of Missouri
Pacific . . . is clearly in the public interest—certainly
far more so than would be its eventual subjugation
and disintegration under the control of Illinois Cen-
tral... or its continued operation as a self-restricted,
financially weak system as at present’’ (J.S. 91a) ;

2. ‘‘Approval of the Illinois Central plan would
deny to shippers and receivers in the Southeast and
‘in the Southwest a vastly improved direct-line service
to and from-the Chicago gateway for which. this
record contains abundant evidence of ne d” (JS.
45a) ;

3. ‘‘Of paramount importance in these delibera-
tions is the impact our decision will have upon the
public interest.* * * To deny Eastern the relief and
assistance offered through the several proposals now
before us, would leave it foundering and of diminish-
ing value to either the public generally or to its own
security holders. Twice since the turn of the century
Eastern has had to be rescued from bankruptcy by
a reorganization—in 1922 and again in 1941; and
now, in these proceedings we have the opportunity to
approve remedial proposals capable of preventing a

\

3

recurrence, at least in the foreseeable future’’ (J.S.
90a-91a) ;*

4. ‘‘Even though we find a statutory violation
through the unlawful acquisition of control, we are
not free to simmarily deny Missouri Pacific’s appli-
cation. For, in carrying out the duty imposed upon
us by law, we must necessarily make an appraisal
of the whole case, and thereupon determine that dis-
position which would best serve the public interest.
A violation of section 5(4) does not automatically
defeat a transaction.* If overriding public interest
considerations are plainly evident, they are not to be
rejected merely for the sake of returning the wrong-
doer to the status quo ante; but should be recognized
as justifying approval of the transaction. In our -
opinion, the public interest considerations in these
proceedings overwhelmingly favor approval of
Missouri Pacific’s control of Eastern subject to con-
ditions for inclusion of Dixie Line, notwithstanding
the section 5(4) violation’’ (J.S. 89a-90a).

The District Court’s Cicitiiites

The District Court adhered to this Court’s mandate that
‘‘the function of the reviewing court . . . is limited to ascer-
taining whether there is warrant in the law and the facts
for what the Commission has done’’ (U.S. v. Pierce Auto
Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 536 [1946]) (J.S. 15a).

’ The Examiner reported that, under MoPac’s estimates, as to
which “there is sufficient validity . . . to be accorded full consideration
in the determination herein” (J.S. 180a), from and after about the
fifth year of operation under common control, Eastern’s net railway
operating income (before Federal income taxes) would be increased
by $6.1 millions (J.S. 127a). This is 2.7 times Eastern’s average
tor the five-year period 1961-5. See Moody’s Transportation Manual
(1966), p. 159.

* Unless otherwise indicated, all italics are supplied.

+

This mandate is especially — to railroad control
and merger cases.

In Stieesuaslie & St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361
U. S. 173 (1959), this Court approved the Commission’s —
order awarding joint control.of Toledo, Peoria & Western
Railroad to Pennsylvania and Santa Fe, in preference to
the competing bid of Minneapolis & St. Louis." The Court
(at pp. 187-8) repeated with approval the following lan-
guage from McLean Trucking Co. v. U. S., 321 U. S. 67,
87-8 (1944) :

‘‘Resolution of the conflicting considerations ‘is -
a complex task which requires extensive facilities,
expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the
transportation industry. Congress left that task’ to
the Commission’ .. . ‘The wisdom and experience of
that commission,’ not of the courts, must determine
whether the proposed [acquisition] is ‘consistent
with public interest.’ ”’

This reliance on the Commission’s ‘‘expert judgment
and considerable knowledge of the transportation indus-
try,’’ which led to affirmance of Commission approval of
control or merger in the two foregoing cases, induced
similar affirmances in every other case of judicial review
‘of such Commission orders approving railroad control
or merger applications. 4 The Court is respectfully re-
ferred to the opinions in Minneapolis ¢ St. Louis, supra;
and in the Spokane International case (Canadian Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 248 [D. Minn.
1958]), in both of’ which the Commission likewise favored
an ‘‘end-to-end’’ over a ‘‘side-by-side’’ relationship (see,
J.S. 2a), because the latter would result in disemployment
of many persons, in destruction of competition, and in
abandonment of lines. |

4 See cases in Appendix. ,

oe

5

ARGUMENT

1. There is warrant in the law and the facts‘for the
Commission’s conclusion that the public interest considera-
tions overwhelmingly favor approval of MoPac control of
Eastern, notwithstanding the Section 5(4) violation.

2. There is warrant in the law and the facts for
Commission’s refusal to reopen to receive evidence o
Eastern’s current financial condition.

3. Monon’s complaint is premature.

+ POINT 1

There is warrant in the law and the facts for the |

Commission’s conclusion that the public interest con-

‘siderations overwhelmingly favor approval of MoPac

control of Eastern, notwithstanding the Section 5(4)
violation.

A. The Commission’s Balancing Test

Having made the uncontroverted and uncontrovertible

finding that the public interest would best be served by
authorizing MoPac’s control of Eastern (see J.S. 4a),
‘“‘{t]he Commission applies a balancing test’’ (District,
Court opinion, J.S. 6a). ‘While §5(2) directs Commission’
approval of a proposed control transaction if it will be
‘consistent with the public interest,’ 45(4) declares it un-
lawful to enter into such a transaction without §5(2)
approval. Denial of a §5(2) application because of a
$5(4) violation may deprive the public of important trans-
portation benefits; approval of a §5(4) fait accompli re-
wards the lawbreaker. ‘The Commission is not a stranger
to this dilemma”? (ibid., 5a).

Appellants urge as two ‘‘substantial’’ questions requir-
ing answers by this Court:

.

1

-(a) Whether the Commission must consider the merits
of a railroad control application even though the applicant
has already violated Section 5(4), ‘‘or whether in such
circumstances it has the power to deny the application .

‘solely on the ground of the antecedent violation’’ (IC 4;
- “CB 5); | |

(b)’ Whether the Commission’s conclusion, that the See-
tion 5(4) violation was outweighed by public interest con-
siderations under Section 5(2),5 ‘‘was correct as a matter
of law and rested upon adequate findings, supported by

substantial evidence’’ (IC 4; CB 4-5).

. B, The Commission’s Power and Responsibility
The Commission doesnot need a judicial pronouncement

on the subject of its power. The Commission knows that it

has power to deny.an application for control because of a
violation of § 5(4), and exercised it.in the Central of Georgia
case by denying Frisco’s application because its violation
outweighed the public benefits of the proposal in that case
(J.S. 5a-6a;\see also 307 I.C.C., at pp. 39-41). This Court
has already confirmed ‘‘the principle recently stated by the

e Commission i in Central of Georgia R. Co. Control, 307 I.C.C.

39, 43, that a 4 5(4) violation may alone bar approval of a
merger unless, ‘upon consideration of all the facts, it clearly

_ appears that the’ public interest will be served best by such

approval’ (Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. U.S., 371 US.

145, 128 [1962]).

What the Commission méant in saying ‘‘we are not free
to summarily deny Missouri Pacific’s application’’ because

-._ Of thé statutory violation (IC 4, 11, 14-16, 18; CB 5, 9, 16-17;

but cf. complete context of Commission’s Report, p. 3,

supra) is that it was not free to abdicate its ‘‘heavy re-

5 “The congressional purpose in the sweeping revision of §5 of

the Interstate Commerce Act in 1940, enacting § 5(2) (a) in its
present form, was.to facilitate merger and consolidation in the national
transportation ‘system” (County of Marin v. United S tates, 356 US.
412, 416. [1958}).

patie, Higs) paiaeali, paella iateciadali es? LER PONE LPB TIO LL IOI Ly OIE SEIDEL LE AID Sa By VEE Pen ae ees *

, .

sponsibility to tailor the remedy to the particular facts of
each case so as to best effectuate the remedial objectivés”’

of Section 5(4) (Gilbertville, supra, at p. 1380); nor its —

statutory function ‘‘to bring to bear upon the problem an
expert judgment-and to determine’ from its analysis of the
total situation on which side of the controversy the public
interest lies’’ (U. S. v. Detroit Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236,
241 [1945]). ‘The Commission is charged with the same

duty of applying a balancing test here as it has when a —

proposed merger may impinge on antitrust principles,—

something at least as offensive to public policy as a viola-

tion of § 5(4).®

C. The Commission’s Anslication of the Balancing Test,
Affirmed by the District Court, Does Not Present
a Substantial Question

- In yn Express, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp.
694 (W.D. Tex. 1965), affd. 382 U.S. 19 (1965), the District
Court said (p. 696):

. [T]he Commission concluded that the con-
trol and management of InLanp in a common interest
with Cenrrau had been effectuated and was in viola-
tion of Section 5(4) of the Act and had continued
until September 5, 1961, when terminated by the
grant of temporary control authority. The viola-
tion, however, was found not to be such as to pre-
clude Centra as being unfit to control Inuanp, nor
so aggravated as to prevent approval in the control
case, tf it could otherwise be found to be consistent
with the public interest’’ (italics in original).

vy
, s of the curtailment of competition which will result from

“the proposed consolidation and consider them along with the advan- °

tages of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to
determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the
over-all transportation policy” (M cLean Trucking Co. v. U. S., supra,
321 U.S. 67, 87 [1944]). See also Seaboard Air Line R. Co. Vv.
U. S., 382 U.S. 154, 156-7 (1965).

ort, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise .

my

ee

8

The control in that case was found to have been actually
effectuated and to have persisted since December 1, 1957
(nearly four years) (90 M.C.C., at pp. 787-8). Contrast
this with the case at bar, where actual control had never
been effectuated and when the violation lasted for only
eight months (J.S. 3a).

With the issue clearly focused by appellants’ jurisdic-
tional statement which made many of the arguments urged
by appellants herein,’ this Court granted the motion to
affirm.

The Commission similarly granted control applications
in seven other motor carrier cases despite § 5(4) violations
by the respective applicants. Atlantic Transp. Co.-Control
and Merger, 56 M.C.C. 329, 340 (1950); see cases cited in
J.S. 6a; and in L. Nelson & Sons Transp. Co.-Control and
Merger, 80 M.C.C. 257, 265 (1959). Central of Georgia and
the instant case are the only railroad control applications
- wherein the issue. was squarely adjudicated by the Com-
mission.® In Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. U.S., supra, after
discussing the Commission’s rule in Central of Georgia,
this Court said (371 U.S. 105, at p. 129): ‘‘In fact, the
Commission’s rule is not automatic and will give way to a
clear showing of public interest in approval.’’ ®

7“ * * * The approval of the instant transaction was to ‘bless’

the ‘reckless and flagrant disregard for the Commission’s authority,’

and does not comport with the general rule announced By\the Com-
mission” (pp. 22-3). v4 ea:

8“The Commission was correct in saying that ‘unlike the
flagrant disregard for. the law which characterized the situation in
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. Control, 307 1.C.C. 39 (1958), there are
in the present record a number of factors mitigating the unlawful
conduct’ ” (District Court opinion, J.S. 14a-15a).

® The fact that the Civil Aeronautics Board adopts a Draconian

automatic rule (IC 16-17, 22-3) is totally immaterial. The Inter-'

state Commerce Commission is entrusted with the responsibility of
regulating rail and motor carrier transport, in which it has the
expertise ; it is not required to apply‘in its field the principles which
the Civil Aeronautics Board finds appropriate in the exercise of its
expertise in air transport.

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9

The District Court here was clearly right in affirming

the Commission’s application of the balancing test (J.S.
16a). IC and Cotton. Belt in effect ask the Commission
to punish Eastern and the public for MoPac’s violation,—
which was effectively corrected within eight months, and
which did no harm to Eastern or to the public interest dur-
ing its short duration. Eastern is to be punished, either (a)
by being kept independent, which ‘‘would leave it founder-
ing and of diminishing value to either the public gen-
erally or to its own security holders’’ (J.S. 91a); or (b)
by placing it under IC domination, where ‘‘Eastern would
be so restricted in its conduct of its own operations that, in
the event such domination were to be terminated, volun-
tarily or otherwise, the reestablishment of Eastern as an

independently operated carrier would be entirely im-

practicable, if not impossible’’ (J.S..44a). The public is to
be punished by denying ‘‘to shippers and receivers in the
Southeast and in the Southwest a vastly improved direct-
line service to and from the Chicagd gateway for which this
record contains abundant evidence of need’’ (J.S. 45a).

POINT 2 |
There is warrant in the law and the facts for the

Commission’s refusal to reopen to receive evidence
of Eastern’s current financial condition.

Appellants argue that a ‘‘substantial’’ question is pre-
sented by the Commission’s refusal to reopen the record
to receive evidence concerning ‘‘the. significant improve-
ment in the financial and operational health of [Eastern]
whose debility as depicted in the stale record on which the
Commission’s decision was based underlay the Commis-
sion’s conclusion that absorption of [Eastern] by another
railroad [MoPac] would be in the public interest’? (IC 5,

32-3; CB 5, 19-20). Chief Judge Campbell’s dissent ac- _

cepted this argument (J.S. 32a).
The Commission’s refusal to reopen was based upon
the finding in its order of June 29, 1966 that ‘‘the alleged

i}

[

A

10

recent short-term improvement in the financial condition
of [Eastern] is insufficient to warrant reconsideration of
the Commission’s conclusion, based on the long-term history
of the carrier, that its affiliation with a stronger railroad
wie be consistent with the public interest”’.

. [I]t has been held consistently.that rehearings
before. administrative bodies are addressed to their own
discretion. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Jersey
City, supra [322 U.S. 503 (1944)]. Only a showing of the
clearest abuse of discretion could sustain an exception to
that rule’’ (U. S. v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 539
[1946] ).7°

The evidence tendered by appellants (IC 32-3; CB 19-20)
is contained in Cotton Belt’s petition to reopen (Doc. No.
46), which cites certain facts in Eastern’s 1965 Annual
Report to the Commission (pp. 5-7). But this very report
emphasizes the validity of the Commission’s reiteration
of its conclusion ‘‘that [Eastern’s] affiliation with a
stronger railroad will be. consistent with the public inter-
est.’’

10 “Administrative consideration of evidence—particularly where
the evidence is taken by an examiner, his report submitted to the
parties, and a hearing held on their exceptions to it—always
creates a gap between the time the record is closed and the
time the administrative decision is promulgated. This is espe-
cially true if the issues are difficult, the- evidence intricate, and
the consideration of the case deliberate and careful. If upon the
coming down of the order litigants might demand. rehearings as a
_matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new
trend has been observed, or some new -fact discovered, there would
be little hope that the administrative process could eyer be consum-
mated in an order that would not be subject to reopening” (Jersey
City, supra, 322-U.S., at p. 514).

' “Appellees also insist that a new hearing be held so that evidence
of ‘present conditions’ could be presented to the Commission rather
than ‘speculation.’ It is true that this case has been pending for 10
years but this, rather than being a reason for holding additional hear-
ings, operates to the contrary” (United States v. Norfolk and Western —
Railway Co., No. 20,.decided Nov. 14,:1966, slip opinion, pp. 17-18).

oe ” <
Le a i al. RR RIE nie emer iam ata te alan en Ra, hs one as la . TT

ae:

That report contains the following Balance Sheet as of
the close of 1965 (Doc. No. 48, p. 7):

Current Assets
Cash oe $ 4,018,058

Accounts receivable 4,709,283
Materials and supplies 2,618,189
Other current assets | 96,789

Total current assets $11,442,319

Current Liabilities

Accounts payable + 5,937,038

' Payroll and vacation pay 1,605,123
Taxes | 1,353,654
Other ‘ 373,698

Total current liabilities $ 9,269,513
Long-term debt due within one year 3,380,024

Total Current Liabilities, including
long-term debt due within one year $12,649,537

Obviously materials and supplies, while treated as cur-
rent assets under the Commission’s accounting procedures,
cannot be used to meet a payroll or other operating ex-
penses. Eliminating this leaves $8.8 millions of current
assets to meet current liabilities and long-term debt due
within one year aggregating $12.6 millions.

Cotton Belt’s petition emphasizes Eastern’s issue of

new common stock in 1965, and the rise in the price of its.

common stock since 1961 (Doc. No. 46, pp. 7-8). But the
vagaries of the market place are no substitute for the
expertise of the Commission.

In Statement BE, the verified testimony of Eastern’s
President filed with the Commission and made a part of its
record, he detailed the inherent weaknesses which brought

Eastern to its present precarious financial condition, and

which have not been and cannot be cured by one ora few
_ years of improved earnings:

‘‘a. Location in an area abundantly served by
transportation agencies (p. 12);

b. Higher terminal costs " — vallrends
(p. 17);

c. Greater impact of wage increases and labor
working rules on small railroads because of intense
competition (p. 19); —

d. Higher cost of sales in relation to revenue
(p. 17);

e. Lack of an adequate and flexible car supply
(p. 18) ;

f. Tendency of shippers to locate new plants on
large railroads serving existing plants (p. 18);

g. Tendency of shippers to favor large rail-
roads which can reciprocate by substantial pur-_
chases (p. 18).’’

Atchison, T. @ 8. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S.
- 248 (1932), the case relied on by appellants (IC 33-4; CB
20-1), has no application to the facts at bar. ‘‘That case,
as has been indicated more than once, was ‘promptly
restricted ... to its special facts, United States v. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co., 288 U.S. 490, and it stands virtually alone’ ”’
(Pierce Auto Lines, supra, 327 U.S., at pp. 534-5).1!

11 Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 294 F. 2d 217, 228 (D.C. Cir.
* 1961), cert. den. 366 U.S. 965 (1961), and Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
CAB, 147 F. 2d 152, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (IC 34), have nothing
to do with an alleged improvement in financial condition. In those
cases, the Civil Aeronautics Board, having denied licenses because
of lack of qualification of applicants’ owners, was held to have abused
its discretion in refusing to reopen to admit evidence of change of

ed

13

Applicable here is the pronouncement in I.C.C. v. Jersey
City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944), where the Court said, per Jack-
son, J. (p. 517): ‘‘We Have rejected the plea of railroad
stockholders that events subsequent to approval of a re-
organization plan of a very similar character to those al-
leged here, require its return for consideration. Group of
Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St. P. &d P. R. Co., 318
U.S. 523, 542-44; Ecker v..Western Pacific R. Co., 318 US.
448, 506-9.’’ Yet the estimates of future earnings based
on the records in those cases have been used by the Com-
mission, with the approval of this Court, as the basis for
liquidating large portions of debt, as well as stock interests,
despite the claim that the failure to consider substantial in-
creases in earnings since the record was closed violates due
process. See Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in Insurance
Group v. D. &@ R. G. W. R. Co., 329 U.S. 607, 621, et seq.
(1947); Cf. Western Pacific, supra, 318 U.S., at pp. 475-7;
Milwaukee case, supra, 318 U.S., at pp. 536-9.

Those cases would apply a fortiort here, where the .
effect of the: Commission’s finding is to permit Eastern
to ‘‘have access to revitalizing resources outside of itself
[essential], if it is to survive as a positive and contributing
element of the national transportation system’’ (J.S. 91a).
The Commission did not have to find that Eastern was
already on the courthousg steps. Broth. of Maintenance of
Way Employees v. United States; 221 F. Supp., 19, 22, 39
(E.D. Mich. 1963), affd. 375 U.S. 216 (1963).

POINT 3:
Monon’s complaint is premature.

The Commission concluded that ‘‘[w]e would be derelict
in our responsibility to:serve the public interest, if, in the
face of this record, we failed to provide Dixie Line 4a
opportunity to acquire the Evansville line . . .; the opera-
tion of [which] by Dixie Line would be consistent: with the

14

public interest’’ (J.S.57a). Accordingly, the Commission’s
order requires MoPac, upon assurning control, immediately

_thereupon to ‘‘take all reasonable, necessary and appropri-

ate steps to cause Eastern to negotiate in good faith for the
sale to Dixie Line’’ of the Evansville Line (J.S. 67a).!? ©
~MoPac has accepted that condition. Whether or not
the parties agree on the terms of acquisition, § 5(2)
requires that the Commission must approve the trans-
action, and the order specifically provides that L&N would
have to make such an application (J.S. 68a).*
Monon’s attack on the L&N condition does not present
a substantial question (see Mon 3-4).
First, judicial review at this time would be premature.
There is no assurance at this time that L&N will ever make
such application.1¢ There is a wide divergence between the

12 The Commission had to make the foregoing finding of public
interest in order to incorporate the condition for compulsory negotia-
tion, and’ the reservation of jurisdiction to enforce it (J.S. 25a-26a).
See Seaboard Air Line R. Co.—Merger—Atlantic Coast Line, 320
1.C.C. 122, 186-8, 268-9 (1963), affd. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v.
United States (M.D. Fla. June 6, 1966); Norfolk & Western Rail-
way Co. and New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co.—Merger,
324 I.C.C. 1, 28, 148 (1964) ; Note, 63. Mich. L. Rev. 543 (1965).

18 The order also directs that necessary steps be taken to grant

_ L&N trackage or joint use rights, pending final determination of

its acquisition. Monon alleges possible injury from such a tempo-
rary grant (Mon 9).

The complete answer is L&N’s unequivocal statement that it
will not apply for interim trackage or joint use rights (L&N 10 fn.).
If it did, Commission approval would still be required. § 5(2) (a) (ii) ;
Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co., 328 U.S. 134, 146-8 (1946).

- 14 The allegation that “control of the C&EI by MoPac would be
authorized if, and only if, the L&N operates through trains over the
C&EI’s Evansville-to-Chicago line” (Mon 6, 13) is not supported
by the cited portions of the report (J.S. 67a-68a, 92a). “The con-
ditions requested by Dixie Line would be mandatory only in the -
sense that good faith negotiations. would be required. However,
. . . they would not make it mandatory that the negotiations be suc-
cessful and the acquisition be accomplished” (J.S. 56a). See also

. District Court opinion (J.S. 26a).

15

parties regarding the value of the Evansville line (cf. Exs.
H-179 and H-147 with Tr. 3325 and 3870). And L&N’s
president stated unequivocally that he was ‘‘not will-
ing to let any outside agency such as the Commission or
arbitrators fix a reasonable price’’ (Tr. 2975-6),—a posi-
tion. reiterated by its counsel at oral argument before the
Commission (Tr. 5901-2). See also L&N 14.

In short, the condition directing compulsory negotiations
for sale of the Evansville line to L&N is an ‘‘iffy’’ condi-
tion, which had to be imposed in the instant order to retain ©

the Commission’s jurisdiction, but which may never hurt

Monon,—either, because the Commission may not approve
a price agreed on by MoPac and L&N, or because the latter
may not agree to the price fixed by the Commission, or be-
cause the Commission may find that the injury to Monon
outweighs the public benefits of the sale, or because the
Commission may impose conditions which Monon finds to
be adequate protection.

‘‘The concurrence of these contingent events, necessary
for injury to be realized, is too speculative to warrant antic-
ipatory judicial determination’’ (Eccles v. Peoples Bank,
333 U.S. 426, 432 [1948] [Federal Reserve Board]).: ‘‘In-
asmuch as petitioners have lost nothing and have had im-
posed upon them no obligation by the board’s direction to
the [Railway Express] '*® and no final order has been
entered, we think that no right of petitioners to complain
has matured’’ (American Airlines .v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 178 F. 2d 903, 910-11 [7 Cir. 1949]; cf. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. C.A.B., 345 F. 2d 445 [D.C. Cir. 1965],
cert. den. 382° U.S. 879+[1965]). See; to the same effect,
Sunray Mid Continent Oil Ca. v. Federal Power Com’n, 270
F’. 2d 404, 407 (10 Cir. 1959).

Secondly, if on L&N’s subsequent § 5(2) application the
Commission does direct sale to it of the Evansville line,

15 The Board had directed Railway Express to negotiate revised
air express agreements with petitioner air lines and to submit such
revised agreements to the Board within: six months (p. 910).

16

the Commission would not confine itself to ‘‘approv[ing]
the details of said acquisition’’ (Mon 3, 7-8). In order
to make the finding that the sale to L&N will be consistent
with the public interest, the Commission would have :to
evaluate its competitive effect on Monon (see Mon 10-12).*®
‘‘Monon will have ample judicial protection if and when
the final L&N § 5(2) application for purchase of the Evans-
ville line is approved by the Commission. Monon can
‘raise its objections at that time’’ (District Court opinion,
J.S. 26a-27a). ,

«© @ © © [Final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review
on the review of the final agency action’’ (5 U.S.C. § 704).

In Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Martin, 303
F. 2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the Bank had been admitted to
the Federal Reserve System in 1952, subject to the express
condition that ‘‘the net capital and surplus funds of such
bank shall be adequate in relation to the character and
condition of its assets and to its deposit liabilities’’ (p. 215).
In accordance with this condition, the Board, on July 18,
1960, ordered the Bank to increase its capital and surplus
by not less than $1,500,000 within six months. .

The Bank filed suit for a declaratory judgment that the
order was void. The District Court dismissed the com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction. In affirming, the Court said
(pp. 217-8) : :

‘‘Thus fay there has been no definite legal con-
sequence attributable to the order of July 18, 1960.

16In its report. in Pennsylvania R. Co—Merger—New York
Central R. Co., 327 1.C.C. 475 (1966), the Commission said (p. 540) :

“* * * L&N is accorded the right merely to hegotiate for the
acquisition of C&EI’s Evansville-Chicago line. The acquisition itself
would require our prior approval in a separate section 5(2) proceed-
ing, and any adverse effect thereof upon other carriers would
material to that proceeding.”

ne me ee en

17

There is no fine, penalty or other sanction which
flows from the Bank’s refusal to abide by that order.
Forfeiture of membership in the System does not
ensue. * * ° ;
o s ; *

‘«* * * [N]othing eventuates of a legal character
upon failure to comply unless the Board proceeds
under [12 U.S.C. § 327].

“ce * * Action taken as a result of those proceed-
ings no doubt would be ‘final agency action’ which,
if adverse to the Bank, could be judicially reviewed.”’

The L&N condition herein is ‘*preliminary, procedural,
or intermediate agency action’’. It bears no similarity to
administrative orders which were held reviewable because
(a) they had ‘‘an immediate and practical effect’? on com-
plainant by determining status ‘7 or construing tariffs ; 18
or (b) being made in the exercise of the delegated legislative
function of rule making, the regulations promulgated ‘‘af-
fect or determine rights generally, even though not directed
to any particular person or corporation”? * or (c) they were
advisory orders rendered atthe request of a court in regard
to technical rate matters entrusted to the agency’s primary
jurisdiction.?°

17 See, e.g., Frozen Food Exp. v.. United States, 351 U.S. 40,
43-5 (1956) (Cf. East Texas Line v. Frozen Food Exp., 351 U.S.
49 [1956]); Rochester Tel. Corp. v: U. S., 307 US. 125, 143-4
(1939) ; Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 511-12
(1947).

18 See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 276, 284-5 (1937) ;
National Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 326 F. 2d 362, 367-73
(7 Cir. 1964).

19 See, e.g., Columbia System v. U. S., 316 U.S. 407, 417-25
. (1942).

20 See, e.g., Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202,
205 (1960); El Dorado Oil Works v. U. S., 328 U.S. 12, 18-19 .
(1946). |

>

18 ..

* ‘Conclusion |

. The District, Court has correctly applied the principles

enunciated by this Court in Minneapolis ¢ St. Louis R. Co.
v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959) ; Gilbertville Trucking
Co. v. U. &., 371 U.S, 115 (1962); Alamo Express, Inc.
_v. United States, 382 U.S. 19 (1965); U. 8. v. Pierce Auto
Lines, 327 U.S. 515 (1946) ; 1.C.C. v. Jersey City, 322 US.
503 (1944); and Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426
(1948) ; and has correctly construed 5 U.S.C. § 704. .

_ It is manifest that the questions on which the decision |
of the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need
further argument. The motions to affirm should therefore
be granted. | |

Respectfully submitted, |

- Leon LezicHTon,
6 East 45th Street,
New York, N. Y. 10017,
Attorney Pro Se.

November 29, 1966.

Appendix

| Judicial Affirmance of Commission Orders Approving
Railroad Control or Merger Application
_N. Y. Central Securities Co. v. U. S., 287 U.S. 12, 24-5,
28 (1932). (New York Central control of Sa Four and
Michigan Central) ; ‘ |

Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 449,
452 (E.D. Ky. 1933), affd. 293 U.S. 524 (1934) —
Pacific control of Cotton Belt) ;

New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. United States, 95 F.
Supp. 811, 815-6 ¢N.D. Ohio. 1951) (Pennsylvania control
of Detroit, Toledo & , seueaed, ;

Schwadacher v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 875, 628
(D.D.C. 1952), after remand in 334 U.S. 182 (1948), revg. |
72 F. Supp. 560, 561 (E.D. Va. 1947) —— & Ohio-.
Pere Marquette merger); a

Benton v. United States, 114 F. =o 37, 44-5, 47 (M.D.
Ga. 1953) (Central of Georgia control of Southwestern) ;

City of Nashville, Tennessee v. United States, 155 F.
Supp. 98, 16% (M.D. Tenn. 1957), affd. 355 U.S. 63 (1957);
Stott v. United.States, 166 F. Supp. 851, 857 (S.D. N.Y.
1958) (Louisville and Nashville—Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. Louis merger); : ay

Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 158 F.
Supp. 248, 252 (D. Minn. 1958) (Union Pacific control of
Spokane International);

Friedman v. United States, 168-F. Supp. 815, 818 (S.D. |
_ N.Y. 1958), affd. 359 U.S.. 205 (1959) (Illinois Central

_Mmerger with Alabama and Vicksburg, and Vicksburg, -
~ Shreveport and Pacific) ;

Fried v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 886, 889 . D. N.Y.
1963) (Erie-Lackawanna merger) ; :

2a

Broth. of Maintenance of: Way Employees v. United
States, 221 F. Supp. 19, 24 (E.D. Mich. 1963); affd. 375
U.S. 216 (1963) (Chesapeake . Ohio control of- Baltimore
& Ohio) ;. 3:

. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. United States (not yet

| reported, M.D. Fla. June 8, 1966), atver remand in 382

U.S. 154 (1965), revg. 242 F. Supp. 14 (M.D. Fla. 1964)
(Seaboard Air Line-Atlantic Coast Line | EY), now on
appeal to this Court;

Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Company v. United States
(not yet reported, 8.D..N.Y. Oct. 4, 1966) (Pennsylvania-

’ New York Central merger), now on appeal to this Court.

TA eae lt ai salle

AO a Pe OR Nn anc he es

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0867%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
