# Jurisdictional Statement — Inland Empire Builders, Inc. v. Washington

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1964
- **Citation:** 378 U.S. 580

## Text

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

In the
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTosex TERM, 1963-4 .

No... 8.2.0).

Hess & Naropick Coxsrruction Co., Inc. and GENERAL
Construction Co., joint venturers, doing business as
Hess & Naropick Construction Co., Inc., &
ASSOCIATES, Appellant,

vs.
Tue State oF WASHINGTON and Wiuam 8S. Scuv-
MACHER, CLARK Squire and A. E. HANKINS the
Tax Commission of the State of Washi n,
Appellees. -

Hess & Naropick Construction Co., Inc.,
a Washington corporation, Appellant,
vs.

THe State oF WaSHINGTON and WiriuiuaM-S. Scuv-
MACHER, CLARK SQuIRE and A. E. NEKINS, as the
Tax Commission of the State of Washington,

Appellees. __
On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
- , WASHINGTON

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Casey & Prvuzan
By Cari Prvuzan
T. M. Royce :

Attorneys for Appellants
30th Floor, Smith Tower,
Seattle, Washington 98104

Tre ARGUS PRESS, QR SCarrie. wWasninaran

la the
Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1963-4

No

Hepp & NARODICK CONSTRUCTION Co., INC. and GENERAL
CONSTRUCTION Co., Joint venturers, doing business as
Hess & NARODICK ConstructTION Co., INc., &
ASSOCIATES, Appellant,
vs.

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON and Wuiuiam S. Scuv-
MACHER, CLARK SgurreE and A. E. HANKINS, as the
Tax Commission of the State of Washington,
Appellees.

No...

Hens & NARODICK CONSTRUCTION Co., INC.,
a Washington corporation, Appellant,
Vs.

TRE STATE OF WASHINGTON and WintiiamM S. Scuvu-
»MACHER, CLARK SQuIRE and A. E. HANKINS, as the
Tax Commission of the State of Washington,
Appellees.

Own APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Casey & PRUZAN
By CARL PRUZAN
T. M. Roycr
Attorneys for Appellants
30th Floor, Smith Tower,
Seattle, Washington 98104

THE ARGUS PRESS, ake SEATTLE. WASHINGTON

INDEX

111

Pag
AL Opinion Below 2
Ib. Siatement of Grounds 2
(. Question Presented by This Appeal 3
Dotty Statement of the Case 5
I, (2) Federal Question Raised Below 20
ki. The Federal Question Is Substantial 21
Conclusion 25

Appendix A—Opinion of the Washington Supreme

Court “App. A, pp. 3 to 24
Appendix B—Statutes Involved App. B, pp. 1 to 13

TABLE OF CASES
Clallam County, Wasi? a Ud a 263 US. 341

General Motors Corp. vv. Washington, Supreme
Court Docket No. 1071

Green v. Eglin Atr Force Base Housing, Inc., 104
So.(2d) 463 pes iS

Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 205 US. 434.
83 L.Ed. 272, 59 S.Ct. 325

Janes v. United Artists Corp., 305 U.S. 410. 83
L.Ed. 256, 59 S.Ct. 272

Kern Limerick, Ine. ve Scurlock, 340 US. 110, 98
L.Md. 546. 74 S.Ct. 403

Kuapp-Stiles, luc. vg Michigan Dept. of Revenue,

870 Mich. 629. 122 NAVA) 642 9}, 2:
Liringston ve US. 179 BSupp. 9 364 ULS. 281. 4

L.ed.(2d) 1719, 80 S.Cf, 1611

ELS. 0. Boyd, Supreme — Docket No. 1157

STATUTES
ROW s82.04.040
ROW &2.04.050
ROW s2.04.060

“*
~~

“«
~~

“-*
al

»)

*- 2
~~ ~~

“*
~~

So bee

w STATUTES

Page
RCW 82.04.190 a 3
RCW 82.08.010 3
RCW 82.08.0220 3
RCW 82.08.0380 3
RCW 82.08.050 3
RCW 82.32.150 2
RCW 82.52.180 2
28 U.S.C. 1257(2) 3
42 U.LS.CLA. 1594 18
42 U.LS.CLA. 1594a, et seq. 3

In the

Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1965-4

No

Hepp & Naropick (‘oNSTRUCTION Co., INC. and GENERAL
CONSTRUCTION ©Oo., joint venturers, doing business as
Hepp & Naropick Construction Co., INc., &
Associates, Appellant,

Vs.

THE Strate oF WASHINGTON and Wiuriam S. Scuv-
MACHER, CLARK Sgurre and A. E. HANKINS. as the
Tax Commission of the State of Washington,

A ppe llees.

No.

Hess & Naropick ConstrucTrion Co., INc.,
a Washington corporation, Appellant,
V8.

THE SratTe oF WASHINGTON and Winiram S. Scuv-
MACHER, CLARK SQUIRE and A. E. HANKINS, as the
Tax Comnussion of the State of Washington,
Appellees.

Ox APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

A single Jurisdictional Statement is being tiled cov-
ering both cases appearing on the title page. pursuant
to Rule 1503). for the reason that the two cases are

appealed from the same court, and invelve identieal

1

2

questions. The first listed case invelves the construction
of military. housing at Fort Lewis, Washington. The
second listed case involves the coustruction of military
housing at Fairchild Air Foree Base at Spokane,
Washington. All facts referred to herein will be taken
from the record in the first listed case, as will all page
references to the record,

A, OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington is reported in — Wn.(2d) —, 384 P.(2d)
337. A copy of the opinion is attached hereto as Ap-
pendix A, “*

B STATEMENT OF GROUNDS

(1) Appellant instituted action to recover retail
sales taxes paid under protest, and to enjoin the State
of Washington from collecting further retail sales
taxes assessed against appellants in connection with
the construction of military housing on a military res-

ervation under a contract with the United States, en- .

tered into pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Con-
gress popularly known as the Capehart Act. The action
was brought under Revised Code of Washington 82.32-
180 and 82.32.1590.

(2) The judgment of the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington was entered on August 1, 1963.
The order denying appcllants” petition for rehearing
was entered September 26, 1963. Notice of appeal was
tiled in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
on December 20, 1963.

(3) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtfof the

A

—

© x
3 , .

United States to review this judgment by appeal is eon-
ferred by Tithe 28, U.S.C. See, 1257(2).

(4) The following decisions sustain the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to review the judgment in this
cause on appeal :

Kern Limerich, luc. ve. Scurlock, 340 U.S, 110,
OS L.Ed. 546, 74 S.C t. 403; ~

KS. Boyd, Supreme Court Docket No. 1157;

Giencral: Motors Corp. vo Washington, Su-
preme Court Docket No. 1071;

Livingston ve ULS., 179 F.Supp. 9, 364 U.S.
PS1.4 L.ed.( 2d} 1719, 80 S.Ct. 1611;

James re U si Artists ew .. ao U.S. 410,
83 L.Ed. 256, 59 S.Ct. 272;

Gavinn, White & Prinee ve. Henneford, 205
U.S. 434, 83 L.Ed. 272, 50 BOL 325.

(5) The State statutes involved are Revised Code
of Washington Sections 82.04.040, 82.04.050, 82.04.0600,
82.04.190, S2.0S.010, 82.08.0204, 82.08.0380, 82.08.050,

The above are set forth in Appeudix B.

C. QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL

The following question is presented by this appeal:

Publie quarters owned and operated by the United
States are constructed tor the United States on a mili-
tary reservation. pursuant to the provisions of the
Capehart Act (42 ULS.CLA. See. 1594a et seg.). Is the
Washington State retail sales tax statute, as construed
and applied by the Supreme Court of the State, re-
pugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United
States, in that it miposes a state sales tax on the United

4

States or its instrumentality based upon the cost of
such construction to the United States, in violation of
the immunity of the United States and its instrumen-
talities from state taxation ?

In the State of Washington, the retail sales tax is
imposed by statute on the buyer or consumer, and not
on the seller. The statute requires the seller merely to
collect the sales tax on behalf of the State, and pay it
over to the State (Revised Code of Washington 82.08-

050). It was stipulated in the pre-trial order that when =

the appellant contractor submitted its bid to the United
States, it did not include sales tax as an item of cost, or
collect sales tax. The State's assessment against the ap-
pellagit contractor is based squarely upon the claim
that the gontractor should have collected sales tax as
agent of the State, but failed to do so,

As will be demonstrated, the buyer or consumer of
the military housing owned and operated by the Army

can only be the United States or its instrumentality.
Aik? os

The Washington State Supreme Court held that sales
tax should have been collected by appellant.

Thus, the Washington State retail sales tax statute,
as coustrued and applied by the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington, is repugnant to the Constitution
and laws of the United States, in that is does impose
the state sales tax on the United States or its instru-
mentality, in violation of its constitutional immunity
from State taxation.

ets Always

5
D. (1) STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As Capehart” military housing project for the U.S.

Army is Initiatedeand completed as follows:

The Secretary of the Army determines that the
Army requires military housing facilities on a mili-
tary reservation. Plans and specifications are prepared
by the Army Engineers. The United States calls for
bids. The Contractor submits its bid to the United
States accompamedby the required $25,000.00 bid de-
posit. The bid of the successful contractor is accepted
by the United States, in the form of a document entitled
“Letter of Acceptability,” given to the contractor by
the Secretary of the Army ( Ex 3. R. 15-14).

Construction takes place uider the supervision of
the Army (Ex. 8, Pages He Si, 8, I4). As each separate
military housing unit is completed, the\contractor is
required to place it under the control of the Depart-
ment (of the Army)” and the. United States is re-
quired at all times to “maintain aud operate at its own
cost and expense such individual housing unit as pub-
lie quarters” (ex. 8, p. HC-7).

The contract with the contractor contains all clauses
which Federal lav requires in every contract with the
United States for the construction of Federal Public
Works, such as: Buy American Aet, Officials of Con-
gress Not to Denetit, Covenant Against Contingent
Fees, Prohibition of Convict Labor Act, Nondiserimi-
nation in Kmplovinent Act, Davis-Bacon Aet (requir-
ing payment of prevailing wages as determined by the
Secretary of Labor), Eight-Hour Day on Public

» \6

Works Act. Anti-Kickbacks from Public Works Em-
ployees Act, Renegotiation Act, and others (Ex. 8).

In the “Invitations for Bids*’ (Ex. 1, p. 16), the
United States deseribes the project as follows:

“The Housing Contract provides for the con-
struction of Government quarters, and therefere,
no inspection fees or approvals by municipal oF
other governmental authorities will be required.”’

THEONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CAPE-
HART MILITARY PROJECT AND ANY OTHER
PROJECT BEING BUILT FOR THE FEDERAL
GOV ERNM ENT, IS IN THE METHOD. BY
WHICH THE UNITED STATES CHOOSES TO
PAY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION (Ex. 1).

The method by which the United States pays for the
construction is this:

The United States requires that a Delaware corpo-
ration be fotmed. It requires that this corporation
execute and deliver a promissory note to a lending
agency for the amount of the contract price of the
construction. The promissory note is payable in in-
stallments (Ex. 9). Jt is provided that the United
States, and not the corporation, will pay the install-
ments as they become due (Ex. 16). With the proceeds
of this note, the contractor is paid the contract price
for the construction of the military housing for the
United States (Ex. 1, 5, 4,9).

This is the method of financing used by the United
States for the construction of military housing under
the Capehart Act generally, and is the method of ti-
nancing used by the United States for the construction

7

of the military housing on Fort Lewis in the instant

Case,

Since the funds are by this method acquired through
private l@hding institutions, the United States avoids
charging the cost of construction against the national
budget in the vear of commitment. It also obtains for
the United States the privilege of paying the install-
ment note from annual appropriations.

}

The United States also requires the execution of a
mortgage in connection with borrowing the money to
pay for construction. The reason is this: Many institu-
tious Which lend or invest their funds can only do so
on the security of mortgages. These include pension or
retirement trusts, insurance companies, and the like.
The restrictions limiting their investments to mort-
gages are contained in their charters, or their state
law.

Some institutions are permitted to loan only on
F.HL.A. insured mortgages.

Therefore, in order to enable such institutions to in-
vest their funds in the construction of military hows-
ing, the method which the United States has created
for the payment by it of the promissory note, also in-
cludes a ‘mortgage.’ Because of the nature of the
security, the mortgage is one in nage ouly—an illusory
mortgage.

In order to create the illusion of a *tmortgage,’’ the
following sequence of events is required by the United
States.

Th an opinion dated October 22, 1959, rendered by

‘pe

8

the Attorney General of the United States to the See-
retary of Defense, it is stated ; |
“The actual operation of the Capehart Act is
extremely conmplex. Indeed, it has been character-
ized as a jig-saw puzzle on the floor of the Senate.”’
The sequence of events is required by the United
States in the contract created by the contractor's offer
(his ** Bid,’ Ex. 2), and the acceptance of the United
States (its ** Letter of Acceptability ”’ Ex. 3).
eh exact texf of each document hereinbefore and
hereinafter referred to, is prescribed and required by
the United States (R. 18).7 :
The requirements of the United States are these ;
(1) That the contractor cause to be incorporated a
Delaware corporation (Ex. 1, p. 4).
(2) That the corporation be capitalized for $1,000.00
—-100 shares at $10.00 each (Ex. 1, p. 4).
(3) That the contractor subsétibe for all of the stock
(Ex. 1, p. 4).
(4) That the egutractor elect officers and directors
(Ex. 1).
(5) That the stock certificate be endorsed in blank
by the contractor (Ex. 1). ‘
(6) That the officers and directors of the corporation
‘sign resignations (Ex. 11.

\

(7) That the endorsed stock certificate and the res-
ignations be placed in irrevocable eserow (Ex. 11).

(8) That the terms of the escrow be that these docu-
ments shall be delivered to the Secretary of the Army

J

} en
9

of the United States, immediately upon completion of
construction (Ex. 11).

(9) That at the same time the resignations and stock
are placed in eserow for the United States, the Seere-
tary of the Army exeeute a document entitled ** Lease”
ho the Delaware corporation (Ex. 6). Ps

(10) That this *lease’* be of the land owned by the
United States, on which the military heusing is to be
erected (Ex. 6). \

(11) That the corporation turn over to the Army,
as the stated consideration for the “lease,” the $1.
GOU.00 paid to the corperation for the purchase of its
capital stoek (Ex. 1).

(12) That a document extitle&® Department of the
Army Housing Conutraet™ be tk by the following:
The United States, the contractor, and the Delaware
corporation (Ex.8).

(13) That these documents provide that the lessor,
rather than the lessec, has the exclusive right of posses-
sion of the leased grotud during the entire term of the

lease! (Ex. 8 p. HC-7).

(14) That the Delaware corporation exeeute and
deliver a promissory note,.pavable in installments, to
some lending institution (Ex, 9).

(15) That the installment note be in a sum equal to
the amount of the contractor’s successful Bid, previ-
ously accepted by the United States (Ex. 1).

(10) That the United States erecute a document in
which it is agreed that the United States, ratherthan”

ot

od

10

the Delaware corporation, will pay the promissory note
(Ex. 16).

(17) That the Delaware corporation execute and de-
liver a document entitled ** Mortgage.’ te **secure’’ the
promissory tiote Which the United States has agreed to
pay (Ex. 10).

(18) That the mortgaged property be not the land,
or the buildings to be erected, but only the Delaware
corporation's non-existent leasehold interest (Ex. 10).

(19) That the F.LHLA. agree in advance to insure the
note and “mortgage’’ immediately upon completion
of construction (Ex. 5).

(20) That the contractor construct the military
housing im accordance with its accepted Bid to the
United States (Ex. 1). .

(21) That the lending agency use the proceeds of
the loan represented by the promissory note to pay the
contractor for the construction of the military housing
(Ex. 3).

(22) That progress payments and final payment to
the contractor be made only with the approval of the
United States (Ex. 8, p. HC-3).

(25) That the docunients provide that during the
entire term of the illusory ‘tlease,”* the lessee Delaware
corporation is prohibited from occupancy of the leased
premises, and that during the term of the ‘lease’ the
lessor United States shall maintain and operate at its
omwn cost and copoeunse such individual housing units as
Public Quarters” CIEX. 8, p. HO-7).

* * *

11

The following nomenclature is used in the doeu-
ments:

The contractor is called Eligible Builder.”

The figurehead) Delaware corporation is called
** Mortgagor- Builder.”

The document tn which the United States agrees that
it will pay the installment note executed by the figure-
head corporation is entitled*Guaranty’” (Ex. 16).

The so-called “Guaranty” is not a guaranty, but is a
direct statement that the United States, rather than
the figurehead corporation, will pay the loan, This docu-
ment states:

“This guaranty, executed this 12 day of May,
ds, by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(hereinafter called the * Department’) represented
by the Secretary of the Army (hereinafter called
the *Secretary’),

WITNESSETH:

**** The Department will, subject to, the con-
ditions stated in the foregoing guarantek, make
each periodic payment becoming due to the mort-
gagee on said note in accordance with the terms
thereof WITHOUT ANY REQUIREMENT
THAT THE MORTGAGEK SUALL HAVE
MADE A PRIOR DEMAND TO THE MOR®-
GAGOR-BULLDER (the figurehead corporation )
FOR SUCIL PAYMENT.” are

NOTE: The Attorney Generai of the United States
on October 22, 1959, rendered an opinion to the Seere-
tary of Defense. in part as follows:

“See also * * * 105 Congressional Record A
4156 pointing out * * * that a guaranteed mortgage

12

¥
constitutes a truly direct obligation’ of the United
States." * * *

“TL conclude that Congress has the power to
authorize the Secretary to guarantee Armed Serv-
ices Housing mortgages * * * My conelusion that
the Secretary's loan guaranty under See, 403 (Ce)
of the act constitute a valid obligation of the
United States is fully supported by pertinent
congressional statements."

On page 2 of Exhibit 1, **Invitation for Bids,”’ the
United States describes this so-called **Guaranty”” in
the following words:

‘Payment of the mortgage indebtedness of the
mortgagor-builder is undertaken by the Depart-
ment (of the Army ).”

* * *

As stated, the illusory ‘*mortgage”’ and the promis-
sory note signed by the figurehead corporation, but
payable directly by the United States, is also insured
by the F.H.A. The reason for this is not that the direct
obligation of the United States to pay the note is not a
sufficiently sound security. The actual reason is stated
by the Attorney General of the United States in the
above described Opfhion rendered to the Secretary of
Defense, as follows:

“Two preliminary questions present themselves.
First. why Congress provided tor double protec-
tion: Le. Insurance by the (F.H JA.) Commissioner,
and guaranty by the Secretary (of Defense)...
The duplication of insurance by the Commissioner
and guaranty by the Secretary is based on the con-
sideration that, while, basically, Armed Services
Liousing constitutes a responsibility of the Depart-
ment of Defense, mortgages insured by the Federal

?

13 4

Housing Administration can be financed relatively
easily because virtually all states have legislation
making them legal investments for banks and
similar institutions. The enactment of state legisla-
tion making mortgages insured or guaranteed by
the Seeretary legal investments throughout the
nation, aud thus generally acceptable to institu-
tional investors, probably would have taken tive
vears, to Judge from past experience. In these cir-
cumstances it appeared desirable that Armed
Services Housing mortgages should carry the
customary insurance by the Fedezal Housing Com-
missioner as Well as a guaranty by the Secretary
of Defense.”’

* * 7

The cutive military housing project is not paid for
through this round-about Capéhart method. The doeu-
nents provide that certain “improvements and utili-
ties’? shown on the plans and specifications are to ve
furnished by the United States, and not by the eon-
tractor. The United States enters into separate eon-
tracts with others to furnish these improvements and
utilities, and pays for them directly.

Payments under such separate contracts will
he made by the Department (of the Army) from
sources other than mortgage proceeds. ”*

Part of the project is thus paid for directly by the
United States, in the usual way, and part of the project
is paid from the proceeds of the note and **mortgage”’
signed by the tigurehead corporation.

* * *

Kven though all the buildings are to be built by one
contractor, pursuant to one Bid made to aud accepted

14

by the United States, there may be more than one
Delaware corporation involved in the financing. This
is because the amount Involved may be too great for
any one private institution to loan. In such eases, the
United States allocates detinite portions of the single
contract price among two or more Delaware corpora-
tious. Except for the ** Hiousing Contract’? (Ex. 8), a
full set of documents as above described are made and
executed relating to each corporation.

Thus, in the instant case, the plaintiff contractor’s bid
accepted by the United States was approximately
36,000,000.00. The Uniced States directed that three
Delaware corporations be created, and that each one—
execute a promissory note for approximately $2,000,-
000.00, The United States then executed three separate
documetits in which it agreed that it, rather than these
corporations, Would pay the three notes. The sum of the
three notes equalled the amount of the plaintiff’s Bid
which the United States had accepted (Ex. 1, p.3).

The ** Housing Contract’? (Ex. 8) shows clearly that
the United States required the creation of the **mort-
gagor-builder’

corporation, that the corporation is an
instrumentality of the United States, a figurehead of
the United States — in fact, to all intents and purposes
it is the United States. The ** Housing Contract’? shows
that the United States and the Contractor are the oniy
parties in interest in either the ‘*lease’* or that contract.
The contract is exactly the same as if the United States
and the contractor were the only two parties named to
the agreement.

The named parties to the **housing Contract”’ are:

15

(1) “THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
acting by and through the Department of the Army
(hereinafter called ‘The Department’’) and repre-
sented by the Contracting Offieer,”’

(2) “HEBB & NARODICK CONSTRUCTION
CO. INC. & ASSOCLATES (hereinafter called the
‘eligible builder’ or the *Contractor’),”’

(3) “ALC HOUSING INC. Now 1, ALC HOUS-
INC INC. No. 2, and ALC HOUSING INC. No. 3.
Delaware corporation (each and all of which are herein-
after referred to as the *mortgagor-builder’)."’

Following is a brief summary of some of the pro-
Visions of the ** Housing Contract’’ and —T not
previously mentioned : :

(1) The Housing Contract is entitled

“DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HOUs-
INC CONTRACT.” (Ex. 8, p. 1) ~

(2) The tirst ** Whereas” clause shows that it is the
Army, not the tigurehead corporation, Which is con-
tracting for housing: ~

* Whereas. Tithe LV of the Housing Amendments
of 1955, as amended * * * authorizes THE DE-
PARTMENT TO CONTRACT, ON THE BASIS
OF COMPETITIVE BIDS. FOR THE CON-
STRUCTION OF HOUSING * * * (Ex. 8, p. 1)

(3) The ‘Lessee’ is prohibited from ever oecupy-
ing the Jeased preperty — either before or after con-
struction (Ex. 8. p. HC-7; Ex. 6, p. 2).

f
(4) The “Lessee” is required to consent to giving
the Army Lessor exclusive possession of the leased

prenuses for the full term of the so-called lease. ** with-

16

out charge or cost to the Department.’ The ** Lessee ”’
gets no compensation in return for giving the Army
lessor the exclusive right of possession (Ex. 8, p. HC-7).

(5) The *Lessee** cannot engage in any other en-
deavor, on the leased premises, or elsewhere, because
(a) its Articles of Incorporation prohibit it from: en-
gaging in any other endeavor, and (b) the ** Lease’
provides that the premises are ‘tte be used solely for
the purposes of constructing thereon an Armed Services
Housing Project” (ex. 6, p. 1).

(6) The **Lessee™* has no voice in what is doue with
U.S. had already aec-

~

the leased premises, because the,
cepted the contractor's bid to construct a projeet on the
entire leased premises in accordance with plans and
specitications drawn by the U.S. (Ex, 2. Bid, and Ex. 3,
Letter of Acceptability ).

(7) The *t Lessee” is prohibited from asking the bank
to pay out any money to the contractor from: the ¥6,-
000,000.00 note which it signed. The U.S. has the sole
voice in that respect (Ex. 8, p. HC-3).

(8) The tigurehead corporation is prohibited from
entering into atiy agreement with the contractor CEx.
8, p. HC-5).

(9) The ‘Lessee’? is ‘trequired”’ to sign’ whatever
form of Building Loan Agreemer. is acceptable to
the U.S. (Ex. 8. p. HIC-8).

(10) Even personal property which the contractor
is required to furnish — which never becomes part of
the real estate — belongs to the U.S., rather than the
Lessee,” and the **Lessee"* is prohibited from using
the same during the term of the lease (Ex. 8, p. HC-9).

17

(11) The U.S. has the right to extend the time for
completion of the project as long as it desires (Ex. &,
p. H€-16),.

(12) Any articles of property belonging to the con*

tractor which he fails to remove from the leased
premises when the job is ¢ompleted, are deemed aban-

doned to the U.S. Lessor. rather than to the ** Lestee
(Ex. 8, p. HO-20).

(15) [t is specitieally provided that whenever words
“satisfaction.” “required,”’ *tordered,”’ *‘acceptable,”’
“approved,” ete. are used, those words refer to the
“satisfaction,” “approval,” ete. of the ULS., not of the
figurehead (Ex. 8, p. HO-31).

(14) ‘Phe ‘Determination of Completion’’ is made
solely by the United States (Tex. 8, p. HC-7).

(15) Tho United States, not the figurehead, has the
right to ternunate the coutract and assess liquidated or
actual damages against the contractor (EX. 8, p. He.
34) | /

e ; / é

,
4

(16) The figurehead corporation is specifically re-
heved of every single obligation nominally placed upon
it by the Housing Contract, by a specitie provision in
the Housing Contract itself that all obligations of the
figurehead shall be performied either by the United
States or by the contractor (Ex. Ss. p. 8, He-9).

The cliguhle builder shall bear all expenses * * *

and qauarantes the discharge of all duties of the
ercept * * * the obliga-
tious of the mortyaqor-builders which the De part

oe FP

> ball

mortgaqor-builders *

ment shall have quarantecc

THUS, IN THE **HOUSING CONTRACT”

18

ITSELF. THE CONTRACTOR AND THE UNITED
STATES AGREE THAT THERE IS NOT A
SINGLE OBLIGATION PY RPORTEDLY
PLACED UPON THE FIGUREHEAD CORPORA-
TION, WHLCH IS NOT EITHER THE OBLIGA-
TLON OF THE CONTRACTOR, OR THE OBLIGA-
TION OF THE UNTTED STATES — PROVING

BEYOND DISPUTE THAT THERE ARE-ONLY—.-

TWO REAL PARTIES ‘TO THIS “CONTRACT?
THE CONTRACTOR, AND THE UNITED
STATES.

(17) The contract provides that the project is not
subject to local real or personal property taxes. The
United States agrees to hold the njortgagee harmless,
from payment of such taxes, and contends that such
taxes are not applicable (Ex. 8. p. HC-8). 0

(18) Par. 3 of the ** Lease’ requires ‘*that the les-
see shall place each housing unit in the Project under
the control of the Department as soon as it is available

for occupancy as determined by the Commissioner

Nore: This is meaningless language, beeause :

a. The Capebart Act, 42 USCA 1594, requires that
this identical clause be inserted in the contract between
the United States and the Contractor: _

The Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter
inte ventracts with any eligible bidder to provide
for the construction of urdeotly needed housing
on lands owned * * * by the U.S. for the purpose of
providing suitable living accommodations for
military personnel * * * Any such contract shall
provide that each housing unit in the project shall
be placed under the cOntrol of the Secretary of

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Defense as soon as the unit is available for oc-
cupancy * * * .”’
b. The ** Housing Contract’* provides that the Con-
tractor shall place each unit as completed *‘under the
control of the Department’ (Ex. 8, p. 7).

c. The figurehead never has any right of possession
to turn over to fhe United States.

d. Art. XX of the Housing Contract provides that
every obligation purportedly placed upon the figure-
head shall be performed instead by the contractor.

(19) Par. 5 of the lease provides: \

‘That the buildings and other improvements re-
quired to be furnished the project in accordance
with the Drawings and Specifications SHALL BE
AND BECOME REAL ESTATE AND PART
OF THE LEASED PREMISES AND PROP-
ERTY OF THE UNITED STATES.”

Nore: As each unit is completed, the contractor is
required to place it under the sole control of the Army
(Ex. 8, p. 7). The Lessee is prohibited from occupancy
at any time during the lease (Ex. 8, p. 7). This clause
goes further and says that the buildings as built be-
come the property of the United States.

(20) The Federal Tort Claims Act applies to the
project (Ex. 6, p.9). ;

21) The contractor is required to ereet on the
*‘leased’* premises a large sign which tells the world
that the project is that of the Army, and that the ap-
pellant is the contractor for the United States, A draw-
ing of the required sign is contained in the Housing
Contract (Ex. 8, p. HC-39) facing this page.

20
D. (2) FEDERAL QUESTION RAISED BELOW

By their Complaint (R. 5-4). their contentions in the
Pre-trial order (R. 14). and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law proposed by them (R. 64-67), ap-
pellants raised in the Superior Court the federal ques-
tions sought to be Mviewed here, namely that levying
a State sales tay on the construction of the military
housing is prohibited by the supremaey clause of the
Constitution of the United States.

On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, appel-
lants likewise raised the federal questions sought to be
reviewed here in the assignment of error in their Open-
ing Brief (R. 74) and in the arguments presented there-
in, and in their Reply Brief (R. 78).

The Supreme Court of Washington passed upon
these Federal questions by holding that the Capehart
corporation which the U.S. required be created was
uot its instrumentality, that the U.S. was not the buyer
of the military housing, that assessing State sales tax
against thé Capehart corporation was not a tax by a
State upou the U.S. or its instrumentality, and that the
Washington State sales tax statutes required that the
sales tax be assessed against the Capehart corporation
(Appendix A). Quotations from the opinion are set
forth in the following section.

E. THE FEDERAL QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL
The Federal question is substantial for the following

reasons:
*

1. The State court held pr efteect that the United
States or its instramnentality is subject to State sales

/

21

4
-

tax. Four members of the Washington State Supreme
Court dissented on this basis, in the 5 to 4 decision below.

2. The State court decision is contrary to and sub-
stantially destroys the intent of Congress in substi-
tuting Capehart Act military housing (built by and for
and financed by the U.S.) for the Wherry Act housing
(under which landon a military reservation was truly
leased to a private) corporation which privately and at
its OW expense constructed the housing for its own use
as rental property ).

3. There is now a diversity of opinion by highest
State courts on the identical question —/the instant
decision by the Washington State Supreme Court being
directly contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court
of Florida, Green v. Eglin Air Foree Base Housing,
fuc., 104 So.(2d) 465, and directly contrary to the
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Knapp-
Stiles, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Revenue, 370 Mich.
629, 122 N.W.(2d) 642. Florida and Michigan both
hold that State sales tax cannot apply to Capehart
housing contracts In that it would be a tax by a State
upon the United States or its instrumentality (the
Aigurehead corporation it required solely for its own

— financial ends).

In the Green case, the Florida Supreme Court held:
“That Centex is a contractor employed by the
United States is quite obvious. The United States
advertised for bids for the work to be done. It
accepted Centex’s bid. It signed the contract with
Centex and it is in process of supervising the con-
struction. It arranged the method by which Centex
will be paid and it is obligated to eventually pay

22

the cost of construction by paying off the mort-
gages. It would seem to be-equalty obvious that
the materials purchased go into and become a pa¥t
of the publie works owned by the United States.
* #

“It is very doubtful if these corporations should
be regarded as anything other than agencies or
instrumentalities of the Federal Government. In
Clallam County, Wash. v. United States, 263 U.S.
341, the Supreme Court held that a corporation
created for the purpose of operating a sawmill and
‘ailroad in the promotion of the war effort during
the tirst World War and which was wholly owned
by the United States was an agency of the United
States and that its property was, therefore, im-
mune from State taxation. In describing the cor-
poration there involved they used language pe-
culiarly applicable to each AFB corporation:

‘**The incorporation and formal erection of a
new personality was only for the convenience of
the United States, to carry out its ends.’

“The creation of the AFB corporations was
only for the convenience of the United States to
enable it to finance military construction in a
manner determined by the Congress to be most
conducive to the rational interest.”’ (Emphasis
ours )

Similarly, in the Anapp-Stiles case, the Supreme
Court of Michigan held With reference to identical
Capehart housing:
| ‘*We agree with the holding of the trial court

that plaintiff’s housing censtruction contract is
with the United Stytes acttyg through its instru-
mentality, the Deyartment Cof\ the Army ).”’

To like effect, the four dissentin? judges of the Su-

\

+

ge

preme Court of the State of Washington in the instant
case held:

**Contemporaneous with the signing of the hous-
ing contract, the stock of the corpoye ction in the
instant case was irrevocably placed in escrow,
together with the resignations of the officers and
directors, to be delivered to the United States at
the conclusion of the construction of the housing.
There was no possible contingency for the return
of the stock to the stockholders or the documents
of resignation to the officers and directors. The
corporation owned nothing of any value in the
housing being constructed. It served solely as a
meaus to the end of obtaining military housing for
the United States. There was no possibility for it
to engage in any purpose other than to serve the
end of obtaining military housing for the United
States on this exclusive project. Because it had no
purposes independent of those of the United
States, the corporation was nothing more than an
instrumentality thereof. * * * it was nothing more
than an instrumentality of the United States
Government; that it had no commercial purpose
other than the Gmvenience of the United States,
serving as a means to the end of obtaining this
military housing; and that the sovereign immunity
of the Federal Government applies.”’

The majority OpRHen in the instant case, on the
other hand, without pointing to one single fact to
support its statement, holds:

“The mortgagor-builder corporate entity
created for the purpose \of constructing and
financing Capehart housing ‘serves a separate and
distinct function from that of the United States.”’

=

son

Appendix A, Page 12

Appellants contend that title to the units, when built
in accordance with the contracts, vested in the Unite®
States; that the United States controlled and dictated
the terms of the construc¥jon contracts, and that it
guaranteed the mortgage obligation and ultimately
gained ownership of all of the corporation’s capital
stock ; hence, the corporation is a government agency.

¥ -
In support of this contention, appellants rely on

Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 68 L.Ed.
328, 448.Ct. 121 (1923) ; Green v. Eglin AFB Housing,
Inc., 104 So.(2d) 463 (Fla. 1958) ; and Knapp-Stiles,
Inc.,v. Michigan Department 6f Revenue, CCH 2 Mich.
Tax Cases £¢ 200-202 (1962 }.

The Clallam County case held that a corporation, or-
ganized pursuant to a World War I emergency act
which authorized the Director of Aircraft Production
to establish one or more we NaC AE to produce
war ruaterials, was an agency of the United States and,
as such, its activities were exempt from state taxation.
The case is not apropos. The Director of Aircraft Pro-
duction was, by law, an agent of the government. In the
instant case, the successful bidders were not author-
ized agents of the government. Furthermore, the facts
in the cited case did not disclose any evidence of an
intent to distinguish the corporate activities from those
of the United States. In this regard, the court stated
(p. dto): °°... This is not like the case of a corpora-
tion having its own purposes as well as those of the
United States...”

In the Green case, the court stated (p. 467) :

“+... The question here is the extent of an ecemp-

Appendix A, Page 13

tion granted by state statute. Had the legislature in-
tended to limit the exemption to that required by the
Federal Constitution there would have been no occasion
whatever to go further than to say ‘* There shall also be
exempted all sales made to the United States.’’ But the
legislature intended to grant a greater exemption and
made that intent clear...’ ”’

In Arapp-Stiles, Inc., v. Michigan Department of
Revenue, sapra, the court stated:

‘At the outset, it may be noter. that the question is
not whether the State has the power to impose such tax
upon contractors who are performing contracts with
the United States.

e+
*“_*

**Michigan has the power to impose such a tax. Has
it done so? Or has it, by the language of the statute, ex-
empted the sales here involved from the tax?...”

In the Green and Kuapp-Stiles cases, the result was
determined by interpreting a state exemption statute
much broader than our own, for which reason the cases
are distinguishable.

[5] The mortgagor-builder corporate entity created
for the purpose of constructing and financing Capehart
housing serves a separate and distinct function from
that of the United States. That such a corporation is
not an agency of the United States is sustained by the
following decisions:

In Ji re S.S. Silberblatt, Inc.. v. Tac Commission of
the State of New York, supra, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the mortgagor-builder corporation

Appendix A, Page 14

was subject to that state’s mortgage recording tax,
stating (p. 641):

‘*The appellant's contention that this petitioner and
the five corporate mortgagors are instrumentalities of
the Federal Government or its agencies and, as such,
are exempt from State and local taxation, is without
substance. ... At the time of the execution, delivery and
recording of these mortgages, each of the mortgagors
Was a private corporation, all of the capital stock of
which was privately owned. They were created for a
commercial purpose for private profit, as distinguished
from a governmental purpose. In the absence of statute
to the contrary, it may not be assumed that a govern-
mentié? function was involved. They possess all of the
requisit S$ and responsibilities of corporate existence
and, #s such, are an entity separate and apart from the
United States (United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491)
and this is so, notwtthstanding the fact that all of the
capital stock of each’ corporation will ultimately bee
owned by the Federal Government (Sloan Shipyards
vu. United States Flect Corps, 258 U.S, 549, 42 S.Ct.
386, 66 L.Ed. 762) ...°’ (Italics eurs )

In United States v. Ft. George G. Meade Defense
Housing Corp. No. 1, D.C., 186 F.Supp. 639 (1960), it
was held that the leasehold interest acquired by the
mortgagor-builder corporation from the United States
Was subject to the Maryland mechanics’ lien law be-
cause

the so-called Capehart Act contemplates leav-
ing the entirg arrangement for the financing and con-
struction of Capehart housing projects in the hands of

Appendix A, Page 15

private enterprise until the point at which the govern-
snent has secured the capital stock of the Housing Cor-
poration..."

The reasoning in the following cases, although not
arising from Capehart transactions, supports the view
that the mortgagor-builder corporations are not agen-
cles of the government.

In BE. 7. Du Pout de Nemours & Co. v. State, 44 Wn.
(2d) 339, 267 P.(2d) 667 (1954). it was contended that
the Du Pont Company was an agent or instrumentality
of the United States in its operation of the Hanférd
Engineer Works. We held (pp. 349, 350) :

2. the fact that the government reserved and exer-
cised the right to restrict or control the action of the
cont aetor as to its general activities does not establish
the existence of an ageney relationship. 4

“Tt is also without signiticanee that all of the real
and personal property utilized in performing the con-
tract was owned by the government, | Citing cases. | The
sume is true with regard to the fact that the govern-
ment exerted unusual supervisory controls over every
phase of the contractor's activity. [Citing case. ]"

lu (united States v. Brown, D.C. 41) F.Supp. 83>
(1941). the contention was rejected that certain Re-
gional Agricultural Credit Corporations, created pur-
suant to federal chaectment. were imumune from state
taxation beeause the United States owned all of the
capital stock of the corporations. The court said (p.
R4()) :

"Whether or not these Regional Corporations shall
enjoy sovereign immunity from taxation is wholly a

Appendix A, Page 16

question of Congressional intent. They are purely com-
mereial corporations exercising no sovereign function.
In the absence of statutory provision, there is no rea-
son why they should be exempted from taxation, espe-
cially in view of Congressional policy concerning this
type of corporation, evidenced by many statutory pro-
Visions expressiy subjecting the real property of
similar corporations to taxation.

“The mere fact that the United States owns all the
capital stock of these corporations is not alone suffi-
cient to endow them with sovereign immunity, nor do
they acquire such immunity merely because they are the
medium through which the Government carries out
certain proprietary activities. Note, 33 L.Ed. 799 et seq.

“When a corporation Is created for commercial as
distinguished from Governmental purposes, it is ordi-
narily implied in the absetice of statutory provisions |
to the contrary, that such corporation shall have all the
requisites and responsibilities of corporate: existence,
even though the United States owns all the stock” Such
a corporation is an entity separate from the United
States. United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 41 S.Ct.
105, GQ Lied. 368."°

We conclude that the mortgagor-builder corporation,
having served an independent and distinet purpose in
the taxable event, is not a federal agency.

Further, Congress has not expressed a legislative in-
teut to lmmunize a Capehart corporation from state
taxation. The invitations to bid expressly provided :

‘Nothing in this Invitation for Bids shall be deemed

Appendir 1, Page 17

to relieve the eligible builder of any liability for the
payment of sales or use taxes properly levied.”’ |

For the reasons stated, the sales tax was ‘*properly
levied”? upon these transactions. Appellants, under the
statute, were obligated to colleet the tax from the mert-
gagor-builder corporations. Having failed to colleet it,
appellants are liable for the tax, ROW 82.08.050, supra.

The judgments are affirmed.

FIncey, Rosennini, HamMinron, and HALE, Won

eur.

Hunter, J. (dissenting )—The majority say that the
sales tax must fall upon the person legally obligated to
pay for construation of the military housing. With this
l agree.

The majority then state that, by the express terms of
the contract with the mortgagor-builder, the Delaware
corporation, and not the United States was legally ob-
ligated to pay the appellant contractors; hence, the eor-
poration Was the buyer under the statute, The fact that
the ultimate economic burden of the tax may fall upon
the Uiited States does not constitute it as the person
legally obligated to pay the tax. Neither do I disagree
With this rationale.

Lt is mv disagreement with the majority in the dis-
position of the issue relating to Whether the mortgager-
builder corporation is am iustitimentality of the Urited
States that bring ne toa result contrary to that of the
Inajority in this case. ;

Under the established rule for the construction of
contracts, a contract must: be picked up bw its tour

4

Appendix A, Page 18

corners and considered in its entirety. In so doing, it is
inescapable to conclude other than that the prime pur-
pose ef the housing contract was the construction of
military housing for the exclusive use of the United
States. It was necessarily the obligation of the govern-
ment to pay for this housing and, although it. did not
wish to be directly obligated, the United States, in
causing the Delaware corporation to be organized, did
so to provide a means to carry out its obligation te com-
pensate the contractors for the construction of this
housing.

© In Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 68
L.Ed. 328, 44. 8.Ct. 121 (1923), it was held that a corpo-
ration created for the purpose of operating a sawmill
and railroad for the promotion of the war effort and
wholly owned by the United States was an instrumen-
tality of the United States. The court there said:

**In short the Spruce Production Corporation was
organized by the United States an an instrumentality
for carrying on the war, all its property was conveyed
to it by or bought with money coming from the United
States and was used py ut solely as means to that end,
and when the war was over it stopped its work except
so far as it found it necessary to go’on in order to wind
up its affairs.... . oS

- ; - —\\

“ee — \

The State claims the right fo tax on the sound
that taxation of the-mgency may ‘he taxation of the
means employed by_the/government and invalid upon
admitted grounds, but that taxation of the property of
the agent is not taxation of the means. We agree that it

Appendix A, Page 19

34 not always. or generally, taxation of the means,’ as
said by Chief Justiee Chase in Thomson v. Pacifie Rail-
road, 9 Wall 579, 591, But it may be, and in our opinion
clearly is when as here not only the agent was created
but all the agent's property was acquired and used, for
the sole purpose of producing a weapon for the war.
This is not like the case of a corporation having its own
purposes as well as those of the United States and in-
terested in profit on its own account. The incorpora-
tion and formal crection of a new personality was only
for the convenience ofthe United States to earr ry out its
ends....°” (Italies mine. )

Contemporaneous With the signing of the housing
contract, the stock of the corporation in the instant
case Was irrevocably placed in escrow, together with
the resignation of officers and directors, to be deliv-
ered to the United States at the conclusion of the con-
struction of the housing. There was 10 possible con-
tingency for the return of the stock to the stockholders
orthe documents of resignation to the officers and diree-
tors. The corporation owned nothing of any value in
the housing being constructed. It served solely as a
means to the end of obtaining military housing forthe
United States. There was no possibility for it to en-
gage in any purpose other than to serve “the end of
obtaining military housing for the United States on
this exclusive project. Because it had no purposes in-
dependent of those of the United States, the corpora-
tion Was nothing more than an instrumentality thereof.

The appellants cite Green ve Eglin AFB Housing,
Tue. 104 So.(2d) 463 (Fla. 1958), which is persuasive

Appendix A, Page 20

of their contention. There, under the authority of the
Capehart Act, the government entered into a contract
virtually identical with that of the instant case for the
construction of military housing at the Eglin Air Force’
Base in Florida. The Florida court in effect found that
the Delaware corporations wét government instru-
mentalities, stating:

+
HILL, DonwortHh, and WEAVER, JJ., coneur with
HUNTER, J.

Appeudir B, Page 1

APPENDIX B

STATUTES INVOLVED

Revised Code of Washington

RCW 82.08.010 Definitions. For the purposes of
this chapter:

(1) **Selling price’* means the consideration, whether
money, credits, rights, or other property, expressed in
the terms of money paid or delivered by a buyer to a
seller, all without any deduction on account of the cost
of tangible property sold, the cost of materials used,
labor costs, interest, discount, delivery costs, taxes, or
any other expenses whatsoever paid or accrued and
Without any deduction on account of losses; but shall
not include the amount of cash discount actually taken
by a buyer;

(2) **Seller™’ means every person making sales at re-
tail or retail sales to a buyer or consumer, whether as
agent, broker, or principal;

(3) ** Buyer” and *tconsumer”™ include, without lim-
iting the scope hereof, every individual, receiyer, as-
signee, trustee in bankruptey, trust.festate, firm, eo-
partnership, joint venture, club, company, Joint stock
company, business trust, corporation, association, so-
ciety, or any group of individuals acting as a unit.
whether mutual, cooperative, fraternal, nonprofit. or
otherwise, municipel corporation, quasi municipal cor-
poration, and also the state. its departments and insti-
tutions and all political subdivisions thereof, irre
spective of the nature of the activities engaged in or

Appendix B, Page 2

-
functions performed, and also the United States or any
instrumentality thereof ;

(4) The meaning attributed in chapter 82.04 to the

terms ‘*tax vear,’’ ‘ttaxable yvear,’’ **person,’’ **com-
pany,’” “‘sale,”’ ‘salle at retail,”’ *tretail sale,”’ ‘sale at
wholesale,”’ **wholesale sale,”’ **business,’’ *‘engaging
in business,’’ *tcash discount,”’ ‘*sucecessor,’’ **con-
sumer,” “in this state’’ and ‘within this state’’ shall
apply equally to the provisions of this chapter. ...

RCW 82.08.020 Retail sales tax imposed. There is
levied and there shall be colleeted a tax on each retail
sale in this state equal to three and one-third per cent
of the selling price: Provided, That from April 1, 1959
the tax imposed by this seetion shall be equal to four
per cent of the selling price. The tax imposed under
this chapter shall apply to suecessive retail sales of the
same property and to the retail sale of intoxicating
liquor by the Washington state liquor stores. ...

RCW: 82.08.030 Exemptions. The tax hereby levied
shall not apply to the following sales:

(1) Casual and isolated sales of property or service,
unless made by a person who is engaged in a business
activity taxable under chapters 82.04., 82.16 or 82.28:
Provided, That the exemption provided by this para-
graph shall not be construed as providing any exemp-
tio nfrom the tax imposed by chapter 82.12;

(2) Sales made by persons in the course of business
activities with respect to which tax liability is speecifi-
cally imposed under chapter 82.16, when the gross pro-
ceeds from such sales must be included in the measure
of the tax imposed under said chapter ;

“Appendix B, Page 3 *

(3) The distribution afd newsstand sales of news-
papers ; ,

(4) Sales which the state is prohibited from taxing
under the Constitution of this state or the Constitution
or laws of the United States;

(5) Sales of motor véhicle fuel used in aireraft by
the manufacturer thereof for research, development,
and testing purposes and sales of motor vehicle fuel
taxable under chapter 82.36: Provided, That the use
of any such fuel upon which a refund of the motor ve-
hicle fuel tax has been obtained shall be subject to the
tax imposed by chapter 82.12 ;

(6) Sales (including transfers of title through de-
cree of appropriation) heretofer or hereafter made of
’ the entire operating property of a publicly or privately
owned public utility, or of a complete operating inte-
gral section the . to the state or a political subdivi-
sion thereof for use in conducting any business defined
in subdivisions (1), (2). (8), (4). (5), (6), (7), (8),
(9), (10) or (11) of RCW &82.16.010;

(7) Auction sales made by cr through auctioneers of
tangible personal property (including household goods )
which have been used in conducting a farm activity,
when the seller thereof is ua farmer and the sale is hed]
or conducted upon a farm and uot otherwise ;

(8) Sales to corporations which have been imeorpo-
rated under any act of the congress of the United
States and whose principal purposes are to furnish vol-
unteer aid to members of armed forces of the United
States and also to carry on a system of national and
international relief and to apply the same in mytigat-

Appendix B, Page 4

ing the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire,
floods, and other national calamities and to devise and
carry ou measures for preventing the same ;

(9) Sales of purebred livestock for breeding pur-
poses where the animals are registered in a nationally
recognized breed association; sales of cattle and milk
cows used on the farm;

(10) Sales of tangible personal property (other than
the type referred to in subdivision (11) hereof) for
use by the purchaser in conitetion with the business
of operating as a private or common carrier by air,
‘ail, or Water in interstate or foreign commerce: Pro-
vided, That any actual use of sueh property in this
state shall, at the time of such actual use, be subject to
the tax imposed by chapter 82.12;

(11) Sales of airplanes, locomotives, railroad cars,
or watercraft for use in conducting interstate or for-
eign commerce by transporting therein or therewith
property and persons for hire or for use in conducting
commercialdeep sea fishing operations outside the
territorial waters ef the state; also sales of tangible
personal property which becomes a component part of
such airplanes, locomotives, railroad cars, or water-
craft, and of motor vehicles or trailers used by the
holder of a carrier permit issued by the Interstate
Commerce Comission authorizing transportation by
motor vehicle aeross the bound. ries of this state, in the
course of constructing/ repairing, cleaning, altering,
cr improving the same; also sales of or charges made
for labor and serviees réudered in respect to such con-
structing, repairing, cleaning, altering, or improving;

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Moots. SGh ts) AMIE ee tt vos mn + eee , -
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- Appendix B, Page 5 \

(12) Sales of motor vehicles and trailers to ie used
for the purpose of transporting therein persons or
property for hire in interstate or foreign commerce:
Provided, That the purchaser must be the holder of a
carrier permit issued-by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and that the vehicles will first move upon the >
highways of this state from the point of delivery in
this state to a point outside of this state under the au-
thority of a one-transit pernit isshed by the diree-
tor of licenses pursuant to th® provisions of RCW
46.16.100 ;

(12) Sales ef motor vehicles and trailers to non-
residents of this state for use outside of this state, even
though delivery be made within this state, but only
when (a) the vehicles or trailers will be taken from
the point of delivery in this state directly to a point
outside this state under che authority of a one-transit
permit issued by the director of licenses pursuant to the
provisions of ROW 46.16.100, or (b) said motor vehi-
eles and trailers will be registered and licensed imme-
diately under the laws of the state of the purchaser's
residence, will not be used in this state more than three
months, and will net be required to be registered and
lie@nsed under the laws of this state. *

(14) Sales to nonresidents of this state for use out-
side of this state of tangible personal property which
becomes a component part of any machinery or other
article of personal property belonging to such nonresi
dent, in the course of installing, repairing, cleaning.
altering, or improving the same and also sales of or
charges made for labor and services rendered in re-
spect to any tustalling, repairing, cleaning, altering, or

‘

Appendix B, Page 6

improving, of personal property of or for a nonresi-
dent, but this Subsection (14) shall apply only when
the seller agrees to, and does, deliver the property to
the purchaser at a point outside this state, or delivers
the property to a common or bona fide private earrier
consigned to the purchaser at a point outside this state ;

(15) Sales to nonresidents of this state for use out-
side of this state of watercraft requiring coast guard
registration or registration by the state of principal
use according to the Federal Boating Act of 1958, even
though delivery be made within this state, but only
when (a) the watercraft will not be used within this
state for more than forty-five days and (b) an appro-
priate exemption certificate supported by 4dentitication
ascertaining residence as provided by the tax commis-
sion and signed by the purchaser or his agent estab-
lishing the fact that the purchaser is a non-resident
and that the watercraft is for use outside Of this state,
one copy to be tiled with the tax commission with the
regular report and a duplicate to be retained by the
dealer.

(16) Sales of baby chicks and turkey poults for use
in the production for sale of poultty 6r ‘poultry
produets.

(17) Sales to nonresidents of this state for use out-
. side of this state of machinery and implements for use
in conducting a farming activity, When such machinery
and implements will be transported immediately out-
side the state. As proof of exemption, an affidavit or
certification in such form as the tax commission shall
require shall be made for each such sale, to be retained

as a business record of the seller.

Bin ,

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Appendir B, Page 7

(18) Sales for use in noneontiguous states, terri-
tories and possessions of the United States, but only
when, as a necessary incident to the contract of sale,
the seller delivers the subject matter of the sale to the
purchaser or his desiguated agent at the usual receiv-
ing terminal of the carrier selected to transport the
goods, under such circumstances that it is reasonably
certain that the goods will be transported directly to a
destination in such noncontiguous states, territories
and possessions. . . .

* * *

RCW 82.08.050 Buyer to pay, seller to collect tax—
Penalties. The tax hereby imposed shall be paid by the
buyer to the seller, and each seller shall colleet from
the buyer the full Amount of the tay payable in respect
to each taxable sale in accordance with the schedule
of collections adopted by the tax commission pursuant
to the provisions of RCW 82.08.060. The tax required
by this chapter, to be collected by the seller, shall be
deemed to be held in trust bv the seller until paid to
the commission, and any seller who appropriates or
converts the tax collected to his own use or to any use
other than the payment of the tax to the extent that
the money required to be collected is not available for
payment on the due date as preseribed in this chapter

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ‘

In case any seller fails to collect the tax herein un-
posed or having collected the tax, fails to pay it to the
coLimission in the manner prescribed by this chapter,
whether such failure is the result of his own acts or
the result of acts or conditions beyond his control, he

Appendix B, Page §

shall, nevertheless, be personally liable to the state for
the amount of the tax.

The amount of tax, until paid by the buyer to the ,
seller, or to, the commission, shall constitute a debt
from the buyer to the seller and any seller who fails or
refuses to collect the tax as required with intent to vio-
late the provisions of this chapter or to gain some ad-
vantage or benefit, either direct or indirect, and any
buyer who refuses to pay any tax due under this chap-
ter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Where a Buyer has failed to pay to the seller the tax .
imposed by this chapter and the seller has not paid the
amount of the tax to the commission, the commission
may, in its discretion, proceed directly against the

‘buyer for collection of the tax, im which ease a penalty
of ten percent may be added to the amount of the tax
for failure of the buyer to pay the same to the seller, re-
gardless of when the tax may be collected by the com-
mission; and all of the previsions of chapter 82.32, in-
cluding those relative to interest and penalties, shall
apply in addition; and, for the sole purpose of apply-
ing the ‘Various provisions of chapter 82.52, the fif-
teenth day of the month fellowing the bimonthly tax
period in which te purchase was made shall be ¢on-
sidered as the due date of the tax. ... —t

RCW 82.08.060 Collection of tax — Methods and
schedules. The tax commission shall have power to
adopt rules and regulations prescribing methods and
schedules for the collection of the tax required to be
collected by the seller from the buver under this chap-
ter. The methods and sehedules prescribed shall be

_— Po tt > Seb OR ee PS os IR
wee NOES SE FH ey aE - ot

~*~

Appendix B, Page 9

adopted so as to eliminate the collection of fractions
of one cent and so as to provide that the aggregate col-
leetions of all taxes by the seller Shall. insofar as prac-
ticable, equal the amount of tax imposed by this chap-
ter. Such schedules may provide that no tax need by
collected from the buyer upon sales below a stated sum

and may be amended from time to time to accomplish -
&
the purposes set forth herein. ...

* * * af
a

RCW 82.08.140 Administration. The provisions of
RCW 82.04.470 and all of the pyovisions of chapter
$2.32 shall have full force and application with respect .
to taxes imposed under the provisions of this chap-

ar

**SALE DEFINED , -

, RCW $2.04.040 “Sale”? means any transfer of the
ownership of, title to, or possession of property for a
valuable consid: ation and ineludes any activity clas-
sitied as a “sale at retail’ or ‘retail sale’? under RCW
82.04.050. It includes renting or leasing, conditional .
sale contracts, leases with option to purchase, and any
contract under which possessiog of the property Is °
given to the purchaser but title is retained by the
vendor as security for the ‘payment of the purchase
price. It also includes the furnishing of food, drink, or
meals for compensation whether consumed upen the
premises or not.

Casual or isolated sale’? meats a sale made by a per-
son who is not engaged in the bus: ness of selling the type
of property involved.

Appendia I, Pag 10

“SaLe aT Rerai., "RETA SaLe”” DEFINED

RCW 82.01.050 “Sale at retail’ or stretail sale”
tneaRs every sale of tangible personal property (in-
eluding articles produced, fabricated. or imprinted )
other than a sale to one who (a) purchases-for the pur-
goose of resale as tangible personal property in the
regular course of business, or (8) installs, repairs,
cleans. alters, imprints, improves, constructs, or deco-
rates real or personal property of or for cousumers, if
sugh tangible persoual property becomes an ingredient
fr component of such real or personal property, er (Ce)
purchases for the purpose of consuming the property
purchased in producing for sale a new article of tati-
gible personal property or substance, of which such
property becomes au mgredient or componeut or as a
chemical used in processing, when the primary pur-
pose of such chenucal is to create a chemical reaction
directly through contact with an ingredient of a new
article being produced for sale. The tertn also means
every sale of tangible personal properts to persous en-
gaged in auy business Which is taxabie under RCW
S2.04.280, subsection (2), and S2.04.290,

The term ‘sale at retail’? or ‘tretail sale*’ shall an-
clude the sale or charge made for tangibie personal
property consumed and or for labor and services ren-
dered in respect to the fellowing: (a) The installing,
repairing, cleaning, altering, Imprinting, or improving
of tangible personal property of or for coustumers, ex-
eluding, however, services rendered in respect to live
animals, birds and insects: (b) the cousgructing, re-
pairing, decorating, or improving of new or existing
buildings or other structures under, upon, or above

2, bs

Appendia BP, Page 11

real property of or for consumers, including the in-
stalling or attaching of any article of tangible personal
property thefein or thereto, whether or not such per-
sonal property becomes a part of the realty by virtue
of installation, and shall also acelude the sale of serv-
ices or charges made for the clearing of land aud the
moving of earth, excepting the mere leveling of laud
used in commercial farming or agricuiture; (¢) the
sale of or charge made for labor and services rendered
in respect to the cleaning, fumigating, razing or mov-
ing of existing buildings or structures, but shall not
include the change made for Janitollal serviees; (d)
the sale of or charge made for labor and services ren-
dered i respect to automebile towing, armored car
service and sinular automotive transportation services,
but not in respect to those required to report and pay
taxes under chapter 82.16; (e) the sale of and charge
made for the furnishing of lodging and all other serv-
ices by a hotel, rooming house, tourist court, motel,
trailer camp, and the granting of any similar license to
use real property, as distinguished from the renting or
leasing of real property, and it shall be presumed that
the occupancy of real property for a coutinucus period
of one month or niore coustitutes a rental or lease of
real property and vot a mere license to use or enjoy the
sale. :

The term shall net inelude the sle of or charge made
for labor and services neudered in respect to the build-
ing. repairing. or Muproving of any publiely owned
street, place, road. highway, bridge. or trestle which
is nsed for to be used primarily for foot or vehicular
traffie. nor shall it include sales of feed, seed, fertilizer,

A pipe nde i Parag 12

and spray materiils to persons for the purposes of
producing for sale any agricultural product whatso-
ever, including milk, eggs, wool, fur. meat. honey. or
other substances obtained from animals, birds, or

insects.

“Sate at WHoLesaLe,’* ** WHOLESALE SALE’ DEFINED

RCW 82.04.0060 “Sale at wholesale or wholesale”
sale omeans any sale of tangible personal property
whieh is nota sale at retail and means any charge made
for labor and services rendered for persous who are
not consumers, 1 respect to real or personal property,
if such charge is expressly detined as a retail sale by
ROW s2.04.050 when rendered to or for consumers:
Provided, That the the term “real or personal prop-
erty as used in this section shall not juelide any natu-
ral products named in ROW 82.04.100.

GROSS: PROCEEDS OF SALES’? DEFINED

RCW 82.04.070 “Cross proceeds of sales”” menus
the value procepding or accruing from the sale of tan-
gible personal properts aia) or for services rendered,
Without any dedtiction on account of the cost of Prope
erty solu, the cost Of niaterials used. labor costs, inter-
est, discount paid, delivery costs, taves. or auy other
expense Whatscever paid or accrued ana without any
deduction on account of losses.

:
“CONSUMER” DEFINED

RCW 82.04.1990 **Cousumer”” means the following:

(1) Any person who ‘purchases, acquires, owns,
holds. or uses any article of tangible personal property
other than for the purpose (a) of resale as tangible

App nelia PB, Pag ] i

personal property in the regular course of business or
(bh) of incorporating such property as an ingredient
or coliponent of real or personal property when in-
stalling, repairing, cleaning, altering. imprinting, im-
proving, constructing, or decorating such real or per-
sonal property of or for consumers or Ce) of eonsum-
ing such property in producing for sale a new article of
tangible personal property or a new substanee. of
Which such property becomes an jngredient or compo-
nent or as a chemical used in processing, When the
primary purpose of such chemical is to create a chemi-
cal reaction directly through contact with an ingredient
of anew article being produced for sale;

(2) Any person engaged in any business activity
taxable under RCW 82.04.290 ;

(Oo) Any person engaged in the business of contract-
ing tor the building, repairing or improving of any
publicly owned street, place. road, highway. bridge or
trestle Which is used or to be used primarily for foot or
Vehicular traffic as detined in RCW = s2.04.280, in re-
spect, however, ouly to tangible personal property
used or consumed in such business;

(4) Any
right of posse’

versol Whe Is ah owner, lessee or has the

Slon to or au Casement in real or per-
sohal property which is being constructed, repaired,
nproved, cleahed, imprinted, or otherwise altered by
a person engag@l in business. exeluding ouly the United
States, the state, and its political subdivisions in respect
to labor and services rendered to their real property
Which is used or held for public road purposes.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0525%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
