# Motion to Dismiss or Affirm — Vokes v. City of Chicago > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0472%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Motion to Dismiss or Affirm - **Published:** January 1, 1964 - **Citation:** 377 U.S. 124 ## Text Office-Supreme Court, U.S. FILED MAR 9 1964 JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK IN THE Supreme Court of the United States Ocrorer Term, 1962. No. 855 ROBERT G. VOKES, er a. Appellants, vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, a Mesicrpat Convonation, Appellee. ———E—EEEE ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM. Joun (C. MELANIPHY, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, 911 City Hall, Chieago 2, Illinois, Attorney for Appellee. Sypney R. Dresiy, Ropert J. CoLiins, Assistant Corporation Counsel. Of Counsel. INDEX. PAGE Motion to Dismiss or Affirm ...................... 1 EIS EI, ig A ell an eo Le | 2-8 SUI res caries oh ed gig poe can a g'ee bic on ak 8 AUTHORITIES CITED, » Federal cases : City of New Brunswick v. Zimmerman, 79 F. 2d OR ee Re Se ea ee 6 Evanston Cab Co. vy. City of Chicago, 325. F. 2d ee: SOI SUED oo eo aw ec Shen cc ven. 7 State cases: City of Chicago v. Vokes, 28 Ul. 2d 475, 193 N. EB. ON ooo oo ens hens sac chincsciwcsees. 3,5 City of Elgin v. Winchester, 300 IL. 214, 183 N. E. - (| Teter eee ere eee FY | Ex Parte Trish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 Pac. 1056, 61 ee Mes Me POR GMD once ce civnccsercccese 6 Hinebaagh v. James. 119 W. Va. 162, 192 8. E. 177 we tS een 6 Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air, W2 Md. 536. 192 Atl. 417 (1937) . fr re eee i) Larson v. City of Rock id 371 Til. 441, 21 N. E. | a SE Ree an Aer 4,5 Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace vy. Johnson, 123 Atl. 65 (Md. 1923) .............. 6 People v. Bowen, 11 Mise. 2d 462, 175 N.Y. 8, 2d 125 (Court of Special Sessions of City of New York, Appellate Part, Ist Dept.. 1958). 0... 5 People ex rel. Hater ©. Fiynn, 13 Ll. 2d 368, 150 N. E. 2d 183 (1957) ...;. ¥ oF pee “ ii Whipple vy. City of South Milwaukee, 218Wis. 395, - Be Pe et errr Torre 5, 6 Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 296 TL 38s, 307, 71 N. HB. 38 G5S (1967) .............0.. 7 Yellow Cab Co, v. City of Chicago, 23 I. 2d 453, 456, 178 N. E. 2d 330 (1961) .................. 7,8 Statutes: Illinois Revised Statutes, chap. 24, pars. 11-42-6, RPO, RAD HOOD oc ce sccesevnercuces 2 Municipal Code of Chicago, chapters 28, 28.1, 195A, 195A-1 (1939, as amended) .......... > s % Miscellaneous : Se CE cb oh ona eee nceee eens uraGn os 6 Fe EE hank caakauny os clean hewn ore 6 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States Ocroser Term, 1963. No. 855. ROBERT G. VOKES, er at.. Appellants, vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, «a MusictraL Corporation, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM. Appellee, pursuant to Rule 16(1)(b)(c) of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, moves that the appeal be dismissed on the ground that it does not present a substantial federal question and further be- cause the judgment rests on an adequate non-federal basis ; alternatively, appellee moves that the final judgment of -the Supreme Court of Illinois be affirmed on the ground that the question is so unsubstantial as not to warrant rr? further argument. to ARGUMENT. In Illinois municipalities may license and regulate taxi- cabs (Til. Rev. Siat. 1963, chap. 24, par. 11-42-6) and may regulate the use of streets (Tll. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 24, par. 11-80-2) and traffic thereon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 24, par. 11-80-20). Each city and village has adopted its own local ordi- nance licensing and regulating the operation of taxicabs within their own municipalities. Appellants are employees of the Evanston and Skokie Cab Companies engaged in the business of transporting passengers for profit over the public streets. The Chicago ordinance prohibits appellants from operating their taxicabs over Chicago streets without a license (Municipal Code of Chicago, Section 28-2). How- ever, appellants may enter Chicago with a passenger and discharge such passenger in Chicago, after which appel- lants may not solicit or aeeept passengers within Chicago ‘Municipal Code of Chicago, Section 28-3). Appellants contend that their constitutional rights have been violated hecause they were arrested in Chicago where they were engaged in operating their taxicabs for profit conveying fassengers from a point within Chicago to a destination within Chicago. They were operating solely within Chicago and had not entered the City for the pur- pose of discharging passengers accepted for transporta- tion outside the City. Appellants are not chailenging those provisions of the Chicago ordinance whith led to their arrest, i.¢., that they were operating unlicensed taxicabs over the streets of Chicago for profit. Rather, they are attacking an entirely separate provision of the ordinance, riz.: the portion of 3 the ordinance relating to corporate applicants for a Chi- cago license which provides, in part (Municipal Code of Chicago, Section 28-5.1) : ‘*All corporate applicants * * * shall be organized or qualified to do business under the laws of Illinois and have their principal places of business in the city of Chicago * * *.’’ Appellants argue that this requirement is discriminatory against, Illinois corporatiofs which do not have a Chicago address and that, therefore, appellants should not have been found guilty of violating ordinance provisions which prohibit them from operating unlicensed vehicles over Chicago streets. Appellants contend that to require cor- porate applicants to have their principal places of business in the municipality which licenses them is a violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal pro- tection of the laws. The court below answered appellants’ contentions and reviewed the authorities, both pre and con, and concluded that the ordinance provisions in question were a reasonable exercise of the police power. (City of Chicago v. Vokes, 28 Til. 2d 475, 198 N. KE. 2d 40.) It would be repetitious for us to employ the same arguments here and in the interest of brevity we adopt the opinion of the court below as our argument. - With one exception (and the exception sustains our posi- tion, not appellants’), none of the authorities relied upon by appellants are relevant to the issme before the Court. The courts have uniformly rejected as unconstitutional any arbitrary discrimination against non-residents. On_ the other hand, the courts have sustained legislation required under the police power for the protection of local citizens. The latter is the situation in the case at bar. In City of Elain v. Winchester, 300 Il. 214, 133 N. E. 205 4 (1921), an ordinance was held to be unconstitutional as unreasonable and arbitrary. In that case, Elgin adopted an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of advertise- ments in the city without first obtaining a license so to do. A bond of $3800 was required of each applicant and a fee of $2 per day for each person employed was charged. However, residents of Elgin were not required to obtain a license if the mayor issued them a permit. A traveling salesman from New York distributed pamphlets advertis- ‘ing Jell-O products and solicited orders for such products. The Illinois court held this to be an arbitrary diserimina- tion without any redeeming features. Indeed, none were advanced. ‘Larson vy. City of Rockford, 371 IN. 441, 21 N. E. 2d 396 (1939), involved an ordinance licensing automatic vending machines for the sale of candy, peanuts, soft drinks, pop- corn and gun. The ordinance provided forthe. issuance of licenses upon evidence (p. 4438): es “«* * * that the applicant,.if an individual, or the per- son in charge of the business, if it is a firm or corpo-— ration, is a responsible person of good character and reputation having a residence or business address in the city of Rockford.”’ Suit was brought by an individual and also by a corpora- tion. In sustaining the ordinance the Illinois court distin- guished the arbitrary discriminatory aspects condemned in the City of Elain ease and said (pp. 445, 446) : ‘*The ordinance. was adopted by the city council * * * for the protection of the public * * *. Where the council reasonably exercises its legislative power over subjects properly within its legitimate fieid, the re- eyirement will be upheld. * * * {T]he city council might reasonably have believed that public safety and health would be promoted by requiring operators * * * to maintain a place where inspectors * * * might com- municate with them * * * and where customers might register complaints and receive adjustments. * * * Under such circumstances, we believe the council was warranted in requiring every operator to establish a * * * business address in the city for the protection of customers and to facilitate enforcement of the ordinance.’’ Thus, the test is whether the legislation under attack is a reasonable exercise of legislative judgment for the protection of the public or whether it is an arbitrary ex- pression of legislative power enacted solely to diserimi- nate in favor of residents. The court below reviewed in patient detail the many cogent reasons why the ‘* place of business*’ requirement was reasonable (28 TIl. 2d 475, pp. 478-482) and concluded that there was no merit to appellants’ constitutional objections— Authorities other than Illinois décifions are equally in- applicable to the facts in the case at bar. People v. Bowen, 175 N. Y. S. 2d 125, 11 Mise. 2d 462 (Court of Special Sessions of City of New York, Appellate Part, Ist Dept., 1958) held invalid an ordinance making two years resi- dence in the city a prerequisite to application for a license as a sightseeing guide as applied to persons conducting an interstate tour. The court held thet the two-year require- ment served fo purpose and was therefore unreasonable. Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 192 Ati. 417 (Md. 1937), involved an ordinance which made it unlawful for any person not a resident to solicit orders frort residents of the town without having a license so to do. Jewel Tea sought an injunction réstraining the enforcement so that its salesmen could solicit orders for articles to be shipped in from Washington, D. C. No regulatory features were contained in the ordinance and it was held to be arbitrary and invalid. Whipple v. City of South Miwaukec, 261 N. W. 235 (Wis. 1935), is another instance (like City of Elain v. Winchester, 6 300 Til. 214, discussed above) of the cases upon which de- fendants rely. In W hipple (as in City of Elgin) the ordi- nance complained of provided for a license fee, but its terms were inapplicable to residents. Although defendants quote extensively from Whipple, it is thus proved to be distin- guishable from the case at bar. City of New Brunswick v. Zimmerman, 79 F. 2d 428 (3rd (ir, 1935), is similar to People v. Bowen, 175 N. Y.S, 2d 125, discussed above, where the ordinance requited a year’s residence before a barber's license could be applied for. It is completely foreign to the issues in the case at bar. Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace v, Johnson, 123 Atl. 65 (Md. 1922), is described by defendants as ‘the closest case on the facts’’ and defendants quote at length from the case. Again, however, defendants rely upon an ordinance substantially different from the regulatory ordinance in the case at bar. In the Havre de Grace ease the ordinance prohibited entirely the operation of taxieabs on certain streets of the municipality, but the ordinance was inapplicable to ‘‘operators ov drivers of automobiles who are actual and bona fide residents of the city * * * and who have resided therein for a continuous period of six months."’ The annotations agpon which appellants rely are similarly vulnerable. 61 A. L. R. 30, is an annotation following Ex Parte Trish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 Pac. 1056, 61 A. L. R. 232 (1926), another instance (like City of Elgin v. Winchester) where a license fee was imposed upon non-residents, but not upon residents: 112 A. L. RL 65 is an annotation follow- ing Hinebaugh v. James, 119 W. Va. 162, 192 8S. -. 177, 112 A. L. R. 59 (CW. Va. Court of Appeals, 1927), a case in which the court sustained the denial of a license to operate as a distributor of non-intoxicating beer to anyone who had not been a four-year resident. Neither set of facts is ap- plicable to the case at bar. Appellants are well aware of the provisions of the Chi- cago ordinance. They are not seeking, as they would have this Court believe, the right to be licensed. Such would be anathema to them. They are already licensed in their own municipalities, just as Chieago taxicab opera- tors are licensed by Chicago. Appellants may come into Chicago to discharge passengers aecepted outside of Chi- cago, just as Chicago taxieah operators may enter their municipalities to discharge passengers. What appellants are seeking is the right to operate unlicensed taxieabs within the territorial limits of the City of Chicago, in competition with licensed taxicabs. Appel- lants want to pick up fares in Chicago and take them to destinations in Chicago. Provisions of the Chieago ordi- nanees regulating taxicabs have been substantially the same for many, many years. Presumably, similar ordi- nances exist and are enforeed in the municipalities where appellants are licensed to operate. Appellant~" conduct was undoubtedly inspired by their corporate emplovers who have filed a separate suit under Federal antitrust Jaws, which suit) has been dismissed. Branston Cah Co. vs. City of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963). In the Kvaustouw Cab Co. suit, identical eon stitutional arguments were rejected, the eourt there ap proving the decision of the [linois court in the case at bar. Independent of the taxical licensing ordinance, the City of Chicago has for many years limited the number of tuxieabs that may operate on its streets. The eourts have sustained the right of the City to limit or restrict the num her of cabs which are to be operated on the streets and has enjoined the issuance of additional licenses until hearing- are conducted to determine the ueed for more taxicabs (Vellow Cah Cov. City of Chicago, 396 TIL 388, 397). The present ordinance ( Municipal Code of Chicago, chap. 195A) was enacted subsequent to extensive public hearings (Ye/- & low Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 23 Ul. 2d 453, 456) and limits taxicab licenses in the city 10 4600. If appellants are permitted to operate in the City of Chicago, then the contract rights of those who now hold licenses are violated and their business threatened. The validity of the limiting ordinance has been sustained by the court and, conse- quently, appeliants cannot operate m defiance of the ordi nance thereby increasing the number of taxicabs on the streets of Chicago and destroving the business of those legally licensed under the ordinance. In addition to upholdine the ordimance jimmiting the number of taxicabs which may operate in Chicago, the court has also held that Chicago residents may not com- pel the issuance of licenses to them (People ex rel. Hates v. Flynn, 15 Ul. 2d 368). Thas, resideats and non-resi- dents are in the same position—uneither can obtain licenses because the number of taxicabs which may operate in the city has been restricted to a certain number. To permit more would frustrate the limiting ordinance and expose the city to litigation for not adhering to its own ordinance. CONCLUSION We respectfully submit that the appellants present no substantial question for the decision of this Court. and that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ilinois should be affirmed, or, alternatively, that the appeal should be dismissed, Respeettully submitted, Jous (. Meranipay, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicag Attorney for Appellee. Sypnev R. Drea. Ronert J. Couns. Assisigr? Corporation Coumart! Of Counsel, --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0472%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.