# Motion to Dismiss — Chupka v. Lorenz-Schneider Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion to Dismiss
- **Published:** January 1, 1963
- **Citation:** 372 U.S. 227

## Text

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Office-Supreme Coun, US.
FILED

9 195),

“JOHN F. Davis, CLERK

:

\ > Pupreme Court af the Yuited States

October Term, 1962

| Sioa
ees ei Ae ge a ;
} ; : ry No. 65
ANTHONY CHP, A. WILLIAM FREELY, LLIAM
MoNALLY gry CHARLES: S SCHLOSSER:
pllant

. LGORENZS¢ HNEIDER 44) INC. and’ TOHN STRAUSS,
as President of INTERNATIONAL BROPHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFPFEURS, WAREHOUSE-
NEN AND HELPERA OF AME ] CA, LOCAL soz,
~ £ . Appellees.

J. ° :
In the Matter of, the Arbitration

5
° heliceen

WHELTAM PRE ELSTON TTONY CHUPKA WIELIAM
pa’ / N Ali Ba. “mad 4 WW ART 5 s Sf HLUSSE ie

4 : . fpype i] mits

"i eee

INPERNATIONAL B ROTHERHOODOF TE AMSTERS,
: CBA EES. 2 Oe ee, AXD HELP.
“ERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL s02,¢ang LORENZ-

SCHNETDER CO. INC.,: * ty
‘8 : AS : ’ ; ‘i Appellees

‘
~~

> Ox Appeal From tik COotrr orf APPEALS OF THE
Stare of New York “

MOTION. TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTFRNATIVE
TO: AF — dt

! i

SAMUEL J. Cones, :
Attorneu tor. Appr Ihe Local 802,
DO East 42nd Street,
New York 17,.N, Y.

ad

a ee
Citations = .— wale.
ie Peete —_— . PAGE
. se at .
Cases: y ‘ : geet: ‘. .
“Brokaw -Brokaw, 99 Ind. “App. 385, 192 N: E. 728 : ‘2 17
~~ Bryan v, Kennetty113 U. 8. 179; 198 .2.........0. 6 16
( ‘entral Trust’ Co. \of New: York v. West India cd : :
Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387 pacnlne wees 50.0% 19
Commercial National Bank ,v. Canal- Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co. 239.U..8. 520... errr e ; 18
Conkey: v. Russell, 111. Fed, 417, Pepeeper Ae *. 35
Dembitzer v. eainats N. Y. 2d 851, 144 AK. =
EP a eieaecuscaneswel Mehhae ve ekC en Vén'slasess 13 -
pay?
Dgnato v. Auetionn pare e ede 283 App. Div. a
410; 127 N. Y. S. 2d 709, affirmed 306 1 N; ,, 966,
120°N: E. $d 297 ep Graney Sane + PRET Cae sa
- Harrisonville Vv. Dickey’ Clay. Co., 289 U. S.-334- . *
7 (1933) (Brandeis, We wichavupe can tos gue esate a 20
Hurd -v. Hodge, 334 UL. Sv 24 ( 1948) (concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, Me Givtekerssueee ates ~ * 20°
In re Lennon, 166 U. ‘8. 348 ..... ‘ Mee acce . 19
“White v. Sparkill Realty Co., 280 U. S. si as 20
STATUTES :,
Civil Practice Act -of the ‘State of New York,
, $1462 . 2... t eee ed * Siceeueclee woe ee ets 5, 12, 13, ‘4, 15
MISCELLANEOUS : OG tee - = ad aun
‘19 Am. Jur. Equity § 486 (1938) . eeBes Peewee eee 2
Bispham’s ee, of Eqpity (sth ed., 1908), ; SN avis
S$ 45 error aa gr Pe yee Gre a ee ee 'sisie dads “49
. é . a
30 C.J. S. Equity 11 SO oe 505 vans Peas 19
Pomeroy’ s Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed., 1941), - STATE OF NOW TORK ~~... a

* , s

_ - — ———() ee oe

MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE AL ERNATIVE
-TOAFFIRM ss

Appellee, pursuant to Rule 16 of “the itevines Rules of

~ the Supretie Court of ‘the. United: States, moves: fa) to.
» dismiss: the appeal herein on the ground that a substantial

federal question is “not: presented and that the judgment
“appealed from rests on an adequate non-féderal basis, or,
“in the alternative, (b) to affirm the final judgment of the
Court of Appeals of New “York State on the ground that
the question, presented jx so. ‘unsubstantial as‘not to need.

further argainient, xe daca a:
sib

—

Appe Mants,

om

on

Lyrenz-Schneider Co., Ine. (the ** Employer’’) and Local
S02, Intyrnational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers af America (the ‘*Un ion’’)
are parties to a.colleetive bargaining agr>>ment ex xecuted
on Oc; ‘Ober 5, 1959, for a term of four year? ending October

4, 1963 (650)*, This agreemeht governs the wages, hours: -

and working conditions of route salesmen employed by the
Employer (02). These employees are engaged in the
distribution to,retail storekeepers of products merchandised

by the Employ er, intluding potatachips and similar snack '

items (676).

a The subject matter of ‘the collective | eee Oe agree-

me
°o

ed

mept is the sales .romes Operated by these route salesmen.
Indeed, a route isa job under the agreement (597).

Commencing in May, 1969, the ‘Employer v@ongfully
eliminated four of the jobs éovered by the collective bargain-
ing agreememt by purporting to transfer four sales routes
to four individuals as independent entrepreneurs. These
four’ individuals had, until that time, been Union members

employed. by the Employer as,réhte salesmen under the

colleetive hargainingagreement etween the Employer and
the Union (678). These four individuals, ¢ ‘hupka, Freely,
MeNaltp and Schlosser by name, are the appellants herein
(** Individuagls’*).. )

The collective bargaining agreement contains an under-
taking b¢ the Employer that ‘the will not enter into any
‘agreement with any employee, verbally or in w rifting, which
may be inconsistent’ or in cofiilict with ‘this agreement
** *** (644). The ag ‘egment provides that a route may.
be eliminated only if it is Shown that the volume of sales
on the route has beeome uneconomic over aperiod of three

«
* Numbers in parentheses refer to folios’ of the printed record
on appeal, unless otherwise nacate.

/
?

months (4x). Neither the Employer nor ‘the individuals
claimed that the four routes ip question had become: uneco-

_nomie prior tothe ‘challenged transaction. (479, 596.

The Employer disposed of these four jobs by means of —
agreem@tits of conditional sale which it exceuted with eacti
of the Individuals (351, 395, 437, 485). No provision of
these ‘a agreements purports jo convey an ex¢lusive right

to sel to specified custonfers, ' or in a specified territory.

Actually transferred by these agreements of conditional

sale was the job of delivery of the Emfloy erts product to

a: fixe? number. of storekeepevs | in a given territory (351,
395, 437, 485). The four agreements of conditional sale
are Substantially identical. They provide that the Indi-
viduals may sell to storekeepers only fhe products fur-

" nished by the Employer (352, 396, 438, 485). Under these

agreements, the Indiyiduals are required to service each
of these customers at least twice’a week (354, 398, 441,
488). Display racks and stands are to ‘be sold. to the
Individuals by the Employer (358, 402, 445, 492). The -
Individuals must purchase all stock from the Employer,
and they may sell to each ‘customer only those items author-
ized for sale by the Emplover (355, 399; 441, 489). By
entering into these agreéments the Individuals have agreed
to avide by. an undisclosed set of rules and’ regulations
promulgated by’ the Employer to govern the defails of
the work performed. They must observe these rules find,
regulations which, according to express provision of the
contract, survive the closing (356, 400, 443, 490).

Each of the Individuals must, pursuant to these condi-
tional sales agreements, place their names on trucks andl

. On sales tickets where designated by the Employer (357,

402, 444, 491). Furthermore, -each- agreement. expressly

“ provides that in the event that the Employer récoups these
-routes, gurrent rates for repurchase will apply (3: a9, , 403,

ny are ni ; Ne it a eS San

4
&

Finally, no title to_1 these jobs or sales routes has yets'
vested in Chupka, Fre, ly, MeNally or Schlosser, and sitio
will not vest in them until May, 1967, or, in Freeky’s Cue:
September 1964 (361, 40, 449, 495) and. then only it the

specified installments have been paid.

‘Thus, the tasks which were formerly done by the four.
fnidividvals; as employees—are still, being performed by
‘+ them, The only majot change is that they now perform
the work not as employees gov erned by the collective har.
gaining agreement, but rather as- parties to’ individyal
conditional sales agreements with the Employer. The
merehandise is the same, the customers are ‘the same, and

the Individuals are the sume (O84)... Bhat teats ‘

Shortly after these transfers took pli we, the Unidn
> ativised the Employer of its objections, -on the grounds
that’ the transfer 6f jobs or sales routes ander. such cir
cumstances ¢was prohibited by the collective bargaining
‘agreement, Unable te resolve this matter amicably, the
_ parties followed the grievance procedures set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement ‘and ‘ultimately proceeded
* to arbitration (679). The Employer and the Union agrecd
upon (1) the selection of an arbitrator, and (2) the ixane
:.to be submitted to the arbifrator for decision ( WI). Pro-
tracted arbitration hearings followed on se®eral dates, w ith 2
hoth parties represented by counsel (679). The Individuals
wege not parties to. the arbitration proceedings.

The ret. er and the Union jointly framed the issue
for the arbitrator ( 503). The -issue submitted for arbitra-.
tion was: * : . °

' ‘*Were the Nemsgg @ s sales of routes, to W iia v

‘ =Freely, Anthony Chupka, . William MeNally ‘and
Charles Schlosser in violation of the contract be-,
- tween'the parties?) If so, what shall be the*remedy? "7
( wind 3 . : : s

The arbitrator issued his award on February 28, 1961
(680). In his award, he responded to 4he submission by
finding that the transfer of these jobs, or sales routes by the |
Employer tp the Individuals did, in fact, violate the collee-

tive bargaining agreement, As the remedy, he directed the
restofation of these routes to the ‘coverage of the collec-
tive bargaining -agreement from whieh they had “heen
. wrongfully removed. The arbityator’s Saward states:

ce
_“* Phe Conipany’s sales of routes toe William Free ly,
Anthony Chupka, William’ MeNally and Charles
Schlosser were in violation of the agreement between
the parties. (These rontes shall be returned to the.
coverage of the’ agreement to be served by’ route
salesmen, within’ the scope of Article 1(A) of the
parties’ agreement.’? (571275). |
‘The cpllective bargaining agreement provides that an arbi- -
trator’s award shall be final and binding upon the Employer
and the. Union 1636). :

Following the ‘ixsnance. of this award, the litigation
“which has led to the appeals now before this Court was
Qemimenced. c

Fer ease of refe renee, it is necessary to distinguish be-
“tween the two cases which are the subject of ‘this appeal.
| The casé captioned

hy the Matter of the Arbitration es
eae, Between - |

Lorenz-Schneider Co., Ine. and William Freely,
Anthony Chupka, W iMiam’ MeNally, and Charles . .
Schlosser, . en
. Petitioners,

and . .

_Internatibnal Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
. Warehousemen and Helpers of Amertea, Local 802, °
oe ‘, . Respondent,’

is a special proceeding Cent pursuant to Section 1462 6f
the Civil Practice, Act of the State of New York thy the

Employer and, the. Individuals, seeking an order vacating | 7

the arbitrator’s award. In this special proceeding, the . .

Union cross-mov ed.for an order and judgment confirming er
the arbitrator’s award. This special proceeding shall
henceforth be referred to as the ‘* Arbitration Proceeding’’. -

?

Following: a ‘decision by the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Depart-
ment, holding that the Individuals had no standing to apply ~
,tor the relief sought in the Arbitration. Proceeding,. the
"Individuals commenced a new and separate action in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York for an injunction _ .

and deClaratory judgment. «In the latter action, both the z eae,
_ __-imployer and the Union were party defendants.* By oo
action, the Individuals’ sought a judgment declaring t

the arbitration aw ard and the judgment confirming it were -
not binding upon them, and restraining the Employer and
the, Union f irons (1,) enfareing the award and judgment
agate: the Indiv iduals, and (2) interfering with the opera-
tion of thesé jobs. or sales routes by these Indiv iduals, ‘This
aétion is captioned’ » eae :

Se ~ . “Anthony € ‘hupka, William Free ely, William MeNally °
_ & and C harles Schlosser,
Plaintifts, ol

against © 4 1

«. Lorenz Seknshiies Co., Ine., and John Strauss, as

” President of International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chajfffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of —
America, L 802, °

ears - Defendants.”’

» ‘and will hereinafter be referred to. as the “Injunction = *

_ Action’’. Each of the foregoing matters Will be considered
in greater detail bélow.

*In the Injunction, Action, thes defendant Employer fully sup-
ported the position of the plaintiff Individuals, and indeed joined with
them in several applications for various relief against the defenlant

Unior. (23, 209-13).

’ ° gs, I ad . 4

a

The Arbitration Proceeding i

’ . : : , i | ° ih
By notice of motion.dated March '16, 191, the Employer
and the Individuals jointly commenced, the Arbittation

Proceeding. by moving the Supreme € ourt of the State of
New York, Queens County for an order: vacating the award

_ of .the arbitrator (675). That relief was denied, and the

Union’s cross-motion for an order confirming the award
and for judgment thereupon was granted (675); A judg-
ment confirming the arbitration award and incorporating
the arbitrater’s. mandate of specific performance - was
entered on Jane 5, 1961 (717).* The text of this judgment
is found in the printed record at folios 310-15.

The Kpployer ‘and the Individuals jointly appeale “l
from this decision:to the Appellate Division af.the Supreme

Court, Second Department. By order dated November 27.

1961, that Court unanimously affirnied (715-17). The Ap-
pellate Division also deteMined that the Individuals had
no standing to move tdé:vacate the arbitrator’s, award since

- they-were not parties to the collective bargaining avrosment — -

or-to the arbitration (717). In its « opinion, the Appellate

‘Division declared that it was not passing upon the points

urged solely on behalf of the Individuals (717).

_ From the adverse decision of the Appe late Division,
the Employer apptied to the Court of Appeals of the State,
of New York for leave to appeal to that Court. Leave to

appeal was. denied on May 17, 1962°(828). The Individuals -

| _ a9)
* The emypdAoyer’s welations of its agreement with the Pinion began

_ in the Spring of 1900678). To date, although every tribunal wh ich ,
has riled’ upon the matter. has found-in the Union's faver, enforcement.

of the judgmept confirming the arbitrator's award has been impossible

hecause of asuecession of intéNocutory stays secured by the Employer

in Individuals. Since the collective bargaiming agreement

e s on October 4, 1963, the Union will be wholly denied the
benefit of an ultimate decision in its favor tf the Individuals and the
F:mplover succeed in delaying enforcement of the judgment beyond

that date.

ss ; 8

- appealed directly*to the Court of Appeals thereafter, and

their appeal was dismissed ‘ipon the Union’s motion, on

the ground that no substantial constitutional question’ was

presented (808). Following the dismissal of their appeal |

by the Court of Appeals, the Individuals appealed direc tly
to this Court.

_ 2B ’ iG. 78 8

- The Injunction Action

’

By complaint and order to show cause’ dated December ~

11, 1961 (shortly after the, Appellate Division, had, on No-

vember 27, 1961, determined that the Individualy had no -

standing to move to vacate the award)’ the Individuals
commenced the Injunction Action against the Employer
and the Union, asking for a judgnient-(1) declaring that
the arbitration award and the judgment confirming were
void as to, them and (2) enjoining the Employer and, the

“~~

Union from enforeing the award. “‘againetthemand trom

interfering eit operation of the jobs or sales routes
(109-10), Following the denial’ by the Supreme. Conr. of

a motion by, the Individuals for a temporary injunction

(82-29), tht Court partially granted. the Union's IBOtion
for summary judgment by dismissing the complaint insofar
- as it sought injunctive relief, while at the same time grant

me ao F : re.
ss t .
7 ‘ ° is .
. ‘ ’ ‘ -
: -
*

ing judgment to the Individuals t the extent of declaring’
that they were not personally bound by the judgment issued
in the Arbitration: Proceeding. In the exercise of its dix-
cretion, the Court held that the equities did’ not warrant:
the granting of injunctive relief-in fayor of the Individuals
because the. effect of such relief would. be to nullify thie
judgment rendered i in favor of the Union, aril would permit
‘er to continue in the breach of its contract
/nion = 272). The Court beld, however, that

the form - an iatia for damages against the EmpJover.-
Jweave to bring suit for damages was granted (373-75).

*«

+

a

~ The Individuafs appealed to. thé Appellate Division of —

the State of New York, Second Department, from both theg

order denying a temporary injunction and the -order «i-

missing their complaint tor -permanent ‘injunetive relief.

On June 11, 1962, the Appellate Divagion * unaAnimonsl ©.

affirmed each of the orde Ts appe sated gor, without opinion -

(718-20). An appeal taken direetly by the Individual. 14

the Court of Appeals of the ‘State of New York from the»
foregoing determination by the Appellate Division wa- he
‘dismissed by that+Court on October 25, 1962, upon the ae
sented (S08), Following the dis Miggal of. that. appeal, the
I yedivicduels appealed directly to this ‘ourt..

a ARGUMENT.
ee seven Ce POINT I

“

The appeal i in the arbiaration’ case e presents no sub- ;
stantial federal question. ea a

A. No quleshantil federal question is raised by the absence -
' of the Individuals from the wh stank fore the
arbitrator. fa

No. federil dination ie’ abcd by the absence of thie +.
Individuals from the arbitration proceeding itself. The
arbitration was held pursuant to the provision in the con-
tract, between the Union amd the Employer under. which.

_ only eyntroversies between the parties to thle agreement
are: stbitrable (636). The Uniog and the -Employer sub--
mitted to arbitration a dispute between’ then concerning
the interpretation of their contract (578). The Individuals
were not parties to the agreement, and any dispute which Pa
they may have had with either party to the agreement was
imctependent of and not arbitrable under. thatgagreement.
Grievances -of the Individuals are justiciable . elsewhere
‘'. + . than’ in a contractual ‘arbitration proceeding between the.
Employer and*the Union. This Court has said that:

“© ® © arbitration’ is a matter of contract, and a-
party cannot be required to: submit fo’ arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to.submit.”’
(United Steelworkers ws “A therica ve W 7 “ntl
Nav igation C'o., 363 U. S. v4, 582

The arbitration wisions of the agreement certainly
do Piso amr with strangers arbitrable there-

-——~“under. Nor can it besaid that a stranger has a constitu-

‘tional right to be heard on the interpretation ‘of a contract
between thé ‘two contracting parties, before a tribunal

established by the contractitig parties for their own busi- -

ness purposes. In. the Warrior case; supra, this Court, |
quoting with approval from Shulman, Reason, Contract, -
and Law in’ Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L.. Rev. 999, 1016,
, stated :
3 oe
oa proper conception of the arbitrator’ s fune-
tion is basic. He is not a public tribunal imposed
upon ‘the parties by superior authority which the
parties are obliged to accept. He hay no general
charter to administer justice for a community: which
_ transcends theparties. He is father part of a systent
of self- government created by and- confin: vd to the
parties,”’ © (368.0. S. at OST. ) roe ’

‘THR -is not to say that the ‘stranger. is _ without a’ “remedy «

for the infringement of such rights as he may possess.
: There remains available to him in ‘an appropriate case
a Judicial rémedy for such infringement.

A stranger.’ s right to be heard on the issue of-the teinedy
to be awarded. by the ‘arMitrator is no greater than his
right to be heard with respect to the interpretation of .
the’ parties’ agreement. The, forniulation of a remedy | is
no less within the exclusive reflin of the arbitrator than
‘thesinterpretation of the contract itself: dn Unite d Steel-
workers of Amertea \. Po nterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 °
U.S. 593,597, Mr. Justice Douglas stated for the majority

-_of this C ourt:

° .
- ee .
.
s . . , ¢
ia. a*.
‘ .
> ° eg . .
‘

11

‘‘When an arbitrator is commissioned to inter-
pret and apply the collective bargaining agreement,
he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order
to reach a fair solution of a problem.. This is espe-’
cially true when, it comes to formulating remedies.
There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide

x variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have
thought of what specific remedy should he awarded
to meet a particular contingeney.’

The j issueg@ipintly subgpstted by the parties to the arbi:
trator’ required him to determine whether the collective bar-
gaining agreement was tokiet'y the Employer's removal:
of four route salesnien’s jobs from its coverage, and, if so,
what remedy should be awarded. The%arbitrator found that’
the Employer had indeed violated the ‘agreement. As a°

emedy,. the award directed the restoration of these four.

jobs to the cov erage of the agree ment. No remedy, it i¢ ,
submitted, could -be more appropriate under the cireum-
statices. No -federal’ question is raised by a’ stranger’s
assertion of the right. te be heard’ on the remedy to be
awarded in a contractual arbitration’ proceeding as hetw een
- thet two contracting parties.

The: Individuatfhaa no right, federal ‘or atherw! isk,
heard by the arbitrator. To the extent that they .
assumed the status of independent businessmen as of the

time the arbitration hearings were held, they were plainly

* hey ond the coverage of the agate of the.
agreement. To the. extent that Mev might have wished,
at that time, to continue to. be treited ' as members ef the
Union, they were bound by the conduct of ‘the arbitration
by the Union as their- , + Every court to which the Employgx has applied has. rejected

& this contention on, its merits. “Mist the Courts -hear the: |

4). ‘Same challenge again, and from" a stranger who supposes
himself damaged by the award, but who is neither a party

te the collective bargaining agreementsThe arbitration pro-

oes e ceeding, nor the dispute over contract interpretetion? Must

the State Courts, as a matter of substantial federal rights, -

7 ; hear attacks by stranger@fupon arbitration awards-which

resolve private: ‘business controversies? May strangers’

attack an award wich satisfies the parties to the arbi-

o °°. tration? Js any limit to -be placed upon the number «ff

_ strangers who may attack the award? .

wreitgeat chaos would be intréduced into collective bar-

vf on | gaining unléss arbitration is preserved as a speedy and

Py “effective method of finally resolving controversies between
We cae parties to, ‘a’ collective bargaining agreement. And the
exclusion of strangers f rom such controversies is grounded

- i a ee o-4-g——.- — he ee ee rey ——_
mutual, final and definite award upon aad supject- matter’ sub
mutted was not made.

rag : ~s. If there was no yalid eiisibadines or contract, and. the
a . * objection. has been raised under> the ‘conditions seg forth im
section fourteen’ hundred fifty-eight. aes sid

- &’ e%

Where an'award is vacated, thé court, in’ ity discretion, fnay

*. °°) direct a reheating either before the same arbitrators or béfére
new arbitrators to *be ‘chosen in the -manner provides d in the

. submission or contract for the se lection® of the origin: ul arbr-

trators may Hike a decision shall be deemed ‘applicable to thé new
arbitration and to: commerce from the date of the court’ s order,
Where: the court ‘vacates’ an award, costs, not exceeding,
| twenty- five dollars and disbursements may be awarded to’ the
prevailing party; and the payment the reat ntay be enforced im

** Jike manner as the payment of costs’upon % motion: in an action.”

Rg Beara S| .¥

‘ .
\

traturs and vany provision limiting ‘the time in which the arbi-.

a

an ' yy - . ¥ i

‘od

upon the Gesire to preserve the elitacy of this éalutaty .
procedure, and ‘upon the gecognition that strangers may,
in coart, exact a judicial‘remedy for any violation of fh cir

rights. - . ‘ ~é k

=
None y the claims whieh the: Individuals sought’ to ie
assert in the proceeding to vacate the aware we justiciable i
in such a processing. © No other claims have bee n advanced
by the Individuals in, support of the. substantial federal”

“Fight-whiel’ they assert on the Airst of ‘these two pppeals. 2° =

s
“th judgiwem was rendered

They have thus established ne ri ight. federal or otherwise?
“upflidenite tir. justify ax appeal to this ¢ ‘ourt,

sd .

POINT 11

The appeal in the ‘<iiaaii case presents no sub-
stantial federal] question.
A. No sub «tantial federal question is rateod by the pee
of the New York State Courts holding that the Indi-
viduals are not entitled to an injunctior, restraining the
egforcement ¢ of the judgment confirming the ‘arbitration
award. ; oir he
The action to seta the enforcement éf the judgment
confirming the arbitration award is, on its facy, a collateral .
attiick upon the validity of that judgment by persons ir -

priv ity of contract, with a party, to the proceedings i in 7.
La

The judeane nt eoulinming the arbitration award was
afirmed py the Ap nrwellate Diviston (715-17). The Ccurt of
Appeals, nye n two Sepamate occasions, has refused to re view
the «de ‘cision of the Appellate Division (825, 828). Under
thesy cirg Sianees, the judgment confirming the aavard
uscepti ible te collateral attack either by the parties 4

“fo the action in whie h it wAs rendered, or by other interested

persons who were not partie =.

Z Mryan v. Agune it. 11} v. Ss. 178, 198:
In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548; rp ;
SIhnson ©. Mua Thy racer, 340 UL SL 5ST:

Conktu ¥. Russell. 111 Feds ‘et 421,
a

See also e i 59
’

‘Donato v. Ame rican Locomotive Co., 28's App. Div.

A10, 127 N. Vos. 20 700, affirmed f06 N.Y. S06,
120 N. EB. "Bl 227 °

oles v. Aspinu all, 73 Coun, 493, 47 Atl. 73

Martocllo v. Martoc Mo, 197 Gaz 620, Bo oS. Lad

ES Jims: * Ps

Broke: ae <. Brokaw 9 hid App. 285,192 Ne ke. 72s

Suter vy. Suter, 77 'Ohie App, 44, 97 NEL 2b 616,

3

In Donatos: American Locomotive Ca, supra, the Court

observed that * ; ©

“Tf ove ry ro reon Who had interest in an arbitration :

* procer “ling towhieh he was nota “pitay had the right

to attack it by a plenary @uit in equitx. the i),
/

would be a ehaot e one.” "(127 XN: x. S. = at 715).

B. ‘No substantial federal question is raised by the ‘decisions

. of the New York State Courts holding that the Indi-
widuals’ rights canbe fully preserved by an action for
damages against the Employer.

‘ The Individuals argue that a subst antial federal ques
tion is raised dy that portion of the décision below which
’°

state Ss: : ; . e

ty “To grant the plaintiffs the drastic equitable

9 . relief they seck in this action would ¢ffectively de-
prive the union of its remedy and permit the continn-

ance of the breach of contract by the employer. That

does not mean, however, that the plaintiffs are

Ate ‘ remediless. Again, as observed by the justice who
passed upon the award: *The arbitrator’s award eid

wet affect any recourse the four independent -

tractors: [the present plaintiffs] may have against
the corporation se ke based on their contracts
with it.” won here

ia

Tiffs in this dctiongis th? basis for obtaining equitable
relief is that *if deprived of their routes, plaintiffs
may never again have the Opportunity of engaging

» The irreparable hagn relied upon by the plain-

lo

Bt ie
hi ' 48 j

in business for themselves and will sustain great .
finaneial loss in addition not compensable by damages
because of the difficulty of ascertaining and comput-
ing such damages’ (complaint, par. 14). Whether
plaintiffs may again have the opportunity of engag-
ing in business for themselves is highly speculative.
Damages compensable by the employer, however, can
readily be ascertained inasmuch as the monetary
value of the routes improperly transferred can be
computed. ; ;

‘*Plaintiffs having failed to plead any cause of
action of damages and sincé, for the ‘reasons noted,
they are not entitled to*equitable relief this court ©
cannot, in the present state of the pleadings, grant.
them money damages notwithstanding that all neces- ~
sary parties are before the court’* * * ’? (272-275)

__ Since the arbitrator’s judgment on the issue submitted _

is not judicially reviewable, it is established that the Union

. suffered injury as g result of the Employer's wrong-
* Mloing. Even if it is assumed arguendo that the Individuals
@ have also been wronged ly the Employer, and may be

damaged by the manner in which the Employer elects to
satisfy its duty to comply with tne award, the ‘court below
properly limited the Individuals to their damage remedy
against the Employer? Such a judicial limitation raises no,
substantial federal question.

Obviously, two parties successively wronged by a single
wrongdoer cannot each obtain spécitie performance. In the
presence of’stch conflicting claims for specific performance,
courts apply the equitable maxim that the claim prior ing

‘ time is superior in right. Pe Ee : vs

siana Vv. Mississippi 202 U. 8. 1; .
Commercial National Bank v. Canal-Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co., 239 U. 8. 520;
Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co.,
264 U. S. 182; eels 7
Niles v. Mathusa, 162,N. Y. 546, 57 N. E. 184;

4

19 :
a P
- ¢ ‘entral Trivss Co. of Néw York ¥. West India Imp.
tele. tea aes 314, 323, 62 N.E. 387, 390;

Bispham’ « Principles of Equity, 4 45 (8th ed. 1908).

_ Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, (8 ABW (Sth -

ed. 1941); x
19 Am. Jur. Equity, § 486 (1938);
30 C. J.S. Equity, f 111 (1950) ;
Applic ation wales is pringple to the ladiv iduals’ ‘claims
TIS 8 . Any separate agree-

ments made by them’ with the Employer concerning route _

salesmen’s jobs were necessarily subject and suborditate
to the collective bargaining agreement itself. -Transferees
such as the Individuals normally take propert? subject to
rights which. obtained while the subject matter was in the
hands of the transferor (Restatement, Judgments, “$115,

note 1(d) (1938)). The Individuals, all formerly employees .
working under the collective agreement and awaré of its.

terms, made their separate arrangements with the Em-
ployer concerning the subject njatter of the colleetiy e agree-
ment at their peril, The Individuals made their individual
agreemn its with at least constructive notice that such ar-
rangements transgressed the collective agreement.

The Individuals a. not deserving of specifie perform-

&

ance as-a matter of basic equitablé principles. A fixed ©

dollar price was agreed upon as the price for the property’
which, they claifn to have purchased from the Employer.

(360, 404, 448; 495). If such property had an-asecertainable
market value in dollars: at the time- the transactions

—oceurred, the value of such property together with any
subsequent accretions is necessarily Susceptible of comi- °

putation by the same means now. As the Court below
fonnd, x - 2
“

Damages ‘compensable by the employer, ‘Gies ver,
can readily be ascertained inasmuch as the monetary
value of the routes fAprope rly transferred can be

computed, ** 274).

‘ia ST

Cee ae ‘

ae

‘ 20 —

The grant or denial. of equitable remedies such as an
injunction or a decree of specific performance, far from
presenting a substantial federal question, has always been
_yecognized as.a matter withjn the sound discretion of the
trial court. , .

** equity is ‘rooted in‘conseéience, An injunction is,
ais. it abwyys has ‘been, ‘an extraorilinary reniedial
process which is granted, 1 it ais a matter of right
but m the exercise of a soundKjysticial discretion.” ’’
Hurd vy. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24-(1948) (concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, J) See also Harrisonrille
¥ Dickey Clay €4., 289 Ul. 334 ta eee
f.)

The discretion of a court of equity fraditionally is not
exercised to provide equitable relief There, as in thie
instant case, the legal remedy of daniages is adequate.
Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., supra; Pomeroy’s Equity
| Jurisprudence, $3338 45 ed., 1941); cf. White v. Sparkilt
Realty. Co., 280 U.S. 500 (1930).

Ls
The exercise of diseretion by a Court on the basis of

its “examination of the equities of the respective parties
does not raise a federal qut stion, The Court ‘of Appeals
ot the State of New York, following its examination of the
facts, dismissed both of these appeals upon the ground that
no substantial constitutional question is involved. This
- Court khould do the same.

—______———

oO :
P . . :
CONCLUSION |

(

For the reasons set. forth above, \this Court should
distniss the appeals herein on the ground that a. sub-
stantial federal question is not presented and that the,
judgment appealed from rests on an adequate non-
federal basis, or,.in the alternative, should affirm the
final judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York

_ State on the ground that the question presented is so
insubstantial as not to’need further argument.
; &,

Respectfully submitted,

. 5 ;
Samvuetn J. Comer,

Attorney for Appellee Local svz.

Of Counsel:
Samcen J. Cones, @
Herbert-A. Levy,
Bruce H. Simon. ,

?

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0294%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
