# Response Respondent — Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385001_0155%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Response Respondent - **Published:** January 1, 1962 - **Citation:** 369 U.S. 111 ## Text ae wo oY oe tO : =e Office Supreme Court, U.S. SJ PREME COURT. J, ue F i y - D ne A TAR 's) 62/ NE —=+ JAMES 8. BROWNING. Clerk IN THE Suprene Court of the United States OcToOBER TERM. 1969" Vick Apwirnat Hywan G. Rickover, Petitioner v. Pupuic Arratrs Associates, Inc. Trading as Pustic Arrairs Press, Respondent On Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit RESPONSE FOR RESPONDENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSOCIATES, INC. STANLEY B. Frosu i300 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Washington 6, D.C. Harry N. RosENFIELD 1735 De Sales Street. NW. Washington 6, D. C. Attorneys for Respondent INDEN Memorandum on Conditional Cross-Petition tin Ne. 739) Reply to Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari iin No. O1974 i. Petition in No. 649 presents questions of law Il. Confliet among Courts of Appeals HI. Conflict with applicable decisions of this Court. Bubilier is inapplicable 1, Patent and copyright are basically different 2. Ditlerent statutory bases for Government officials 3. Dubilier moot 4. Cross-Petitioner comes without “clean hands” IV. Unsettled questions of Federal law V. Unsettled Constitutional questions Conclusion CUPATIONS CASES: A.F.L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 Associated Press v. United States. 326 U.S. 1] Benny v. Loew's Inc.. 239 F. 2d 532. aff'd per curiam by equally divided court. 356 U.S. 43 Bridges v. California, 314 U.s. 252 Callaghan v. Myers. 128 U.S. 617 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.. 104 F. 2d 661 Fisenschiml vy. Faweett Pub.. Inc. 246 F. 2d 598. cert. denied 355 U.S. 907 First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Minn. Historical Soc., 146 F. Supp. 652. aff'd sud nom. U.S. v. First Trust Co. of . Peal, 251 fF. 24 273 Page .10 i Index Continued Page LCA, vu b. & Oe Ce, S27 U.S. 3 Sawvery. Crowell, 16 F. Supp.. 471. aff'd 142 F.2d 497. cert. dented 3235 US. 735 110 Tok-vig ve Broce Pub. Co. Lol F.2d 664 1] Us. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 5-9 Los.v. Felin & Co. 334-008. 624 5 U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Co.. 362 U.S. 29 3 Wheaton v. Peters. 8 Peters 59] > \\ bSCOMS En Kleetrie Co.. v. Dinere Co.. 282 | SS. 813 5 CONSTITUTION. STATUTES AND Expect rive Action: Constitution, First Amendment. Second Clause 2.10. 12 \tomie Energy Act of 1946 7 Copyright Aet. 17 U.S.C. 8 EN NAS. Act of 1958, $305 6.7 Patents. 35 U.S.C. 260 6 Printing Law. FE OS.C. 58 y ae, Ae Research and Marketing Act of L916 7 Los. Senate. Committee on Interstate and For. Comm. 13 LoS. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business: 1959 Hearings ri 1960 Hearings 8 Executive Order No. LOO96 8 ALE.C.. Patent Poliey Statement 9 Dept. of Defense Regulations, 32 C.F.R. Part 9 7 Dept. of HLE.W. Regulations. 15 C.FLR. Part 6 7 Leeat WRITINGS: Annot.. Application and effect of “shop rght rule’, 61 A.L.R. 2d 356 7 Buckle. Property Rights in Creative Works, 32 J. Par. Orr. Soc. $14 6 Index Continued il Pave Cohen. Fair Use in the Law of Copyright. Ascar, Cory- RIGHT Law Sywupositw Ne. 0. 16 (1955) 1] Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights. 7 Coryrient PROBLEMS ANALYSED 69 0 Gunnels. Copyright Protection for Writers Emploved by the Federal Government. 960 Wasn. U.L.Q. 182 1 Here. The Patentee v. the Copyrightee, Ascav. Cory- hiGHT Law Sywpositvi. Sth Series. 191 6 latman, Fain Use or Copyricurep Works, Copyright Office Study No. 10. p. 15 41958) 1] Needham, Pape Recording, Photocopying & Fair Use. Ascap, Copyricut Law Syupositm No. 6. p. 75 (1959) 1] Recent Cases. Copyright. 9 Carn. ULL. Rev. 104 3 Recent Cases, Copyright. 33 Texp, L. Q. 305 6 Recent Decisions. Copyrights. 5 Virw. L. Rev. 38] I STEDMAN. Parents 6-7 6 Wicwore. Evinencr. 1:2 3 Wririncs ov Jawes Vaptsosx. ¥ 1:598 1] \IISCELLANEOL Ss: ~ Frankfurter. Jo. comment from Bench. 20 LoS.L Weer 3186 y 4 Halaby. N.E.. testimony before Senate 1 Rickover, testimony on patent policy 6.9 United States. Brief betore the Court 1] Washington Post. Feb. 22. 1961 1: IN THE Supreme Court of the United States Ocroper Teru. 1960 No. 739 Vick Apwiran Hywan G. Ricnover. Petitioner v. Pernice Arras Associutes, Ine.. Trading as Puspiic ArFairsS Press, Respondent Response of Respondent to Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari Publie Affairs Associates Inc.. Trading as Publie Affairs Press. respectfully submit this Re-ponse to the Conditional Cros-- Petition fora Writ of Certiorari in Ne. 739. The Conditional Cross-Petition in No. 739 also includes ma- terial (pages 7-14) which is tantamount of an Opposition to the Petition fora Writ of Certiorari filed by Public Affairs Associates in No. 649. Consequently, this Response will include (1) a Memorandum on the Conditional Cross-Petition in No. 739, and (2) a Reply to the Cross-Petitioner’s Opposition to the Peti- tion in No. 649. ~ MEMORANDUM ON CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION (IN NO. 739) Cross-Petitioner in’ Ne. 739 requests a conditional writ ot certiorari on the issue of dedication i.e. whether dissemina- tion of his speeches in otheial press release form prier te attempted copyright: registration pleced them ino the pull dlomain. The nature and manner of such release have important rela tionship to the seope of the Cross-Petitioner’s official dutie-. and to the Constitutional guarantee of Freedom of Pres- Iwn major psstes taised by the Petittron im Ne OVO, Tn this contest the growing tendenes of top-level Government ofheials te “gos ernment-by-press-release””) makes the Conditional Cross-Petition in No. 739 meritorious of this Court’. consideration, especially because of a third issue raised in) No. OF9: the need for thi- Court to deal with the unsettled but tnpertant questions of eo struction of the Copyright Net and the Printing Paw. in partie 4 ular, clarification of the meaning of “Government peblication.— Public Affairs Associates. Tne. therefore. raise mo obpeetio to the granting of the Conditional Cross-Petition in Ne. 730. the Petition m No. O19 be oranted, REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI CIN NO. 649) The CrossPetitioner’s opposition to the Petition in Neo G19 makes various arguments whieh. it is respectfully sulmyitterd present no valid reason for denial of the Petition in Ne. OF9. I. Petition in No. 649 presents questions of law. In alleging that the Petition in No. 649 present~ questions ot 1 Ch. Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s comment from the Bench that “the public relations counsel is part of our American way of life” 20 Los L. Week 3186 (Dec. 19, 1960) tact and not of law. Cross-Petitioner misconceives the entire port. Petitioner in Ne. O19 does not contest the tacts as found bin the eourts below: Petitioner eotitests only the erroneous rule of faw applied tw those court= to the undisputed facts. There is nota single disputed issue of tact inthis case. Both the Trial Court, 177 Bo Supp. at 002. and the Court of Appeals, 2B. 2d at 264. decided the case upon an “agreed statement of tacts and undisputed document: in the reeord. What is in dispute is whether Government press releases containing speeches vv oa high-level tederal otheer on matters related to and con. nected with lis otheral duties are “Government publications” ond theretore not subject to copyoght under the Copyright Vet and the Printing Law. or whether they are private publication- lewaily subjeet te yo reht. This determination is a legal one. Phe legal consequences of undisputed taet- raise questions ot laws ones which are traditionally sulijeet te appellate review and inne degree intrusive upon the fact-finding tanetions of the lower courts, This Court hax sand that ior oa question of law whether the lower court “applied the kD ae standard to essentially und:s- puted taet<" . that “the legal effeet ot evidence is a question of law *) and that its funetion is “to aseertain the meaning of the findings [ot tact] in order to determine their legal signifieanee 7” The Petition in Ne. 649 does not require this Court to review the taets since both parties accept the Lact. a= found below. Thi- Petitron presents the Court with a variety of important quesion- oft Law. for example: 1 Weestonr ON bvrener 2 bd eed Tob: see also Wiseomein Flectric Co. v. Dumore Co... 282 0.8. 813 + 18304. 1 nited States v. Parke. Davis Co J62 Eos. 20) bb 1960), Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lourmsille and No Ro Ce. 227 ts. 88, 92 (1913). > Lmited States vo John J. Felin & Co. 334 ULS. 624. 649 (1948). i (1) The legal scope of Votheial duty” and “otheial responsr- bility” of a Government otheial: (2) The /egal meaning of the statutory term “Governmen publication” as used in the Copyright Net and the Printing Law: (3) The legal effect of Cross-Petitioner’s status as a top-level ecovernment ofheral: and (4) The Constitutional issue of Freedom of Pres- under the birst Amendment. Il. Conflict among Courts of Appeals. All the other Courts of Appeals that have ruled on this precise copyright question have t ken a different and conflicting view ot the applicable rule of the Law from that adopted by the Court below.” In Saver in the Second Circuit) and the Lewis and Clark case in the Fighth Cireuit® both eourts ruled that whethe: a Government emplovee’s publication was within his others duties depended on the relationship between the subject matte: of the publication and the responsibilities of his Government position. These two Court. of Appeals ruled that such connec: tion between the publieation’s subject matter and the emplovee’- ofheral duties created a Government publication. The Court beelow. however, reyected any stich doctrine of ‘relationship or Meomnection.” and mstead adopted the conflicting leval doe- thine that a “Government publication” comes inte beige onky of it was the spree ifie object ot the emplovees duties to produc eit. In addition. Sawyer attached weight to the tact that Government facilities and time were used to produce the publieation. Whereas the Court below dismissed such criteria altogether. Ino short. © See Gunrnels. as quoted in Petition +n No. O89) at p 6. 7 46 F. Supp. 471 (DCS. DN.Y. 19421, affd 142 F.2d 497 62d Cir, LORD. cert. denied $23 Us. 735 «19440. S First Trust Co. of st! Pauly. Minn. Historical Society. 146 F. Supp. 652.668 (D.C. Minn. 1956). aff'd sub nom. Vos. y. First Trust Co. of St. Paul. 251 F.2d 686.691 (8th Cie, 1058). the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Cireuits apply directly conflicting legal doctrines from that adopted below. Hl. Conflict with applicable decisions of this Court. Cross-Petitioner does not deny that the dispositive legal question here is whether his activities were in the course of his offieial duties as a top-ievel Government ofheial. Nor does he deny that the applicable decisions of this Court cited in the Petition (pp. & 11) deal precisely with the question of determit- ing when the activities of an executive official of the Federal Government come within his “otheial duties.” To avoid the impact of these directly applicable decision-. Cross-Petitioner cites decisions of this Court dealing with report- ing af judicial opinions. The two decisions cited are Callaghan r. Veers, 128 U.S. 617 twhich was decided in 1888 and did not relate toa Federal otheer at all). and Wheaton rv. Peters. 3 tos. (Peters) SOL (rendered in 1834). The cases cited do not related to executive otheials of top-level rank. Both eases pre-dated the controlling statutes here involved. The prohibition against copyrighting of “Government publica- tions” originated in the Printing Law (44 U.S.C. 58) in 1895, 28 Stat. 608, §52: the prohibition in the Copyright Aet (17 LSe. 8) was enacted in 1909, 35 Stat LOTS. $7. Consequently the decisions in these two cases have no effect on the current legal situation controlled by the statutes cited. The Cross-Petitioner also cites a patent case. U.S. 2. Dubilier Condenser Corp.’ Although this case was heavily relied upon by the District Court and strongly urged upon the Court of Appeals in Cross-Petitioner’s briet below, the Court of Appeal- ignored the case altogether. Dubilier is inapplicable to the present case for at least four reasons: * 280 LOS. 178 (1933). Mr. Justice Stone dissented. with Mr. Justice Cardozo and Chief Justice Hughes concurring therein. \ 0 1. Patent and copyright are basically different. Dubilier involved a patent; (ae present case involves copy- right. The Constitution “recognizes that the standards for patents and copyrights are basically different" And. the statutory standard of valid patentalile inventions is considerably different from the definition of copyrightable subject matter.” Because “there is a wide distinction between a pateut and a copyright.” “the eases which relate to the one subject are not 1° altogether controlling as to the other.” 2. Different statutory bases for Government officials. In Dubilier this Court itself pointed out that its decision was based Upon unique statutory provision- applicable only te patents. that Government ofheials had been specifically auther- ized to take out patents for their Government work coder a statute going back to 1883, and that the statute gave to the United 13 States a free shop-right to use such patents.!? Tt has also been a well-recognized part of our law for the U.S. Government itself to hold patent rights on inventions devised by public servant and private parties engaged Ly government agencies. For example. the National Aeronautics and Space Aet of LO58 | | ‘0 Alfred Bell & Co. vy. Catalda Fine Arts. LOL F.2d 99, Loweo2 (L951) ithe various legal and practical differences are outlined at length. ' Buckle. Property Rights in Creative Works { Comparison of Copyright and Patent Laws, 32 J. Pat. Orr. Sec, FLA, A264385 19508: Finkelstein. Public Performance Rights... . 7 Corymieut Prowirsts Axarysep (1951) 69.70. See also Herr. The Patentee v. the Copy- rightee, Ascap, Copyricut Law Syuvostun, Fifth Series (1L95d+. 19] i... the differences... are many.” ) '2 Sreoman, Patents 6-7 (1939): Recent Cases, Copyright-Richt of Government Officer... 33 Teme. L. Q. 365.369 (1960) (Decisions in the patent cases would not necessarily be controlling in copyright cases”) 13 289 LS. 178, 189, 201, 192. The statute presently appears in 35 U.S.C, 26. requires certain patents to be in the Government's name.'* A similar provision prevails in the field of atomic energy.” By direction of Congress the Department of Agriculture in- cludes in its contracts a requirement that the results of its re- search and investigations be made available to the public either by dedication, assigament to the Government, or such other means as the Secretary shall determine.'® In still other agencies. the applicable statute authorizes Government agencies to take litle to such patents in the public interest.!7 In copyright, a completely different and contrary. statutory pattern prevails. The Copyright Aet, 17 U.S.C. 8. and the Printing Law, 44 U.S.C. 58. specifically prohibit both the Gov- ernment itself as well as Government emplovees from taking copyright in any Government publications.'* And, contrary to the situation with patents.’’ the Government has. no shop-right in copyrighted materials. 'f Section 305, 72 Stat. 435 (1958), 42 Us C. 2457. 'S Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended, 68 Stat. OFF (1954), 42 U.s.C. 2182 41958). '© Research and Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. 427i.) The De vart- inent’s Consistent practice has been te require an assignment of patent rights to the government, Statement of Assistant Secretary of Agricul- ture. “Patent Policies of Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government-L959” Hearings Bejore a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 86th Cong. Ist Sess... on “The Effect of Federal Monopoly Policies on Competition, Monopoly. Beo- nomie Growth, and Small Business.” Dee, 8 9. 10, 1959, p. 354 ‘hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings). 'T For Defense Department. see Senate Hearings, at p. 338 et seq: 12 CER. Part 9: for Department of Health. Education and Welfare. see Senate Hearings, at 361: 45 CPLR. Part 6. 'S The only exception is for the Postmaster General in’ connection with illustrations of stamps. 17 U.S.C. 8 (proviso in first paragraph) 'Y In patents, shop-rights most commonly arise not by express agree: ment but “by implication of the circumstances of the employment.” Annot.. Application and effect of ‘shop right rule’... 61 A.L.R. 2d 356, 368 (1958). 3. Dubilier moot. Executive Order No. 10096" has mooted Dubilier?' This Order establishes a uniform patent policy for government em- ployees’ inventions which gives to the U.S. Government (except vs waived) “the entire right title and interest” in all inventions made by any government employee “( 1) during working hours, or (2) with a contribution by the Government of facilities, equipment, materials, funds. or in- formation, or of time or services of other Government em- plovees on official duty, or (3) which bear a direct relation to or are made in consequence of the official duties of the inventor.” 1. Cross-Petitioner comes without “clean hands.” Cross-Petitioner’s reliance upon Dubilier is inconsistent with his public espousal of an exactly opposite position for other Government officials; he comes here without “clean hands.” As recently as April 8. 1960. he told a Senate Committee that “Where the Government bears all or nearly all the co-t. where the facilities belong to the Government. aad where the Govy- ernment bears all the risk. the people should own the patents. The American people are spending their money for the re- search and development; therefore, the patents should belong to them.?? ... The Government should own patents resulting from work it has financed.?> ... I believe that patents should 20 Jan. 23, 1950, 3 C.F.R. 292 (1949-1953 comp.) “' Cf: Recent Cases, Copyright... . 9 Catu LBs. bee, 105 (1900+. Cross-Petitioner’s Counsel substantially agreed with this view. Brief for Appellee Below. pp. 8-9. 22 LS. Senate. Select Committee on Small Business. Subcommittee on Monopoly, Patent Policies of Government Departments and Agencies 1960, Committee Print, 86th Comg, 2nd Sess.. April & 19600 p. 2 (hereinafter cited as Conference) 25 Id at 6, )) eenerally belong to the Government where Government moneys is used to develop them 7-4 In view of a justifieation urged by the Trial Court for it- decision (i.e. that private copyright is necessary “to encourage . 7 a 95 . intellectual development” of government. official-*?). Cross- Petitioner's farther comments to the Senate Committee are il- luminating: “Nor do PT agree with the. statement frequently made that inless there is such a patent provision. their emplovees will not work assiduously. TP have never seen anything of the sort. A man who has an idea in his mind. if he is worth hi- salt. will want to get it out. He will fight all obstacles to cet . +26 it out. And again: “oS .. ARC and NASA work. In these Selds the law places ownership of patents initially in the U. >. Government. Thi- vives the Government the opportunity to make them available to everyone. In omy opinion, this is a good system. beeause it makes new information available quickly. Otherwi-e. as7 there is the possibility of withholding information .. . 24 Id at 7. S177 F.Supp. at 604. “© Conference, at 4. ** Id. at 5. Cross-Petitioner is an AEC as well as Navy official. ABC. patent poliey is this: “It is the Commission’s view that where the (Commission sponsors and pays for research and development that the resultant inventions and discoveries should be the property of the Government for the benefit. not only of the particular contractor. but of the-general public... Evervone is entitled to the use of the scientific and technical data and the inventions and discoveries that have resulted from Commission contracts.” Statement of AEC’s Assisiant General Counsel for Patents, Senate Hearings. at pp. 234-35. 10 For the aforesaid reasons. it is respectfully submitted that Dulilier is not an “applicable” decision of this Court.” IV. Unsettled questions of Federal law. In claiming that the Petition in No. 649 involves no un-ettled law. Cross-Petitioner ignores the Copyright Office’s -tatement that the present law in this field i- unsettled and that its clarifiea- tion is necessary. (See Petition in No. O19. pp. 10-171. Cross Petitioner's only answer is that Congress ean change the Liw if it wants to do so; this is but an admission that the law is umn ~ettled., Cross-Petitioner contends that this Court is incompetent to deal with the question of unsettled law (p. 13). We reject such argument. Tf this Court applies te the facts of the instant case the legal doctrines it has elsewhere enunciated as to the scope of “official duty” of a Government officer (see Petition in Ne. 619. pp. 8-11). or the legal rules applied by the Court of \ppeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits in copyright eases. this Court's decision will be fully effective not only in dealing with this particular ease. but al-o in setting a clear poliey that can prevent conflicts with the law described in the Petition in No. O49 at pages 18-22. V. Unsettled Constitutional questions. Cross-Petitioner would abolish the Freetom of Press provision of the First Amendment. He argues that there is no Constitu- tional issue of Freedom of Press in this case because the only protection to. the press is through the doctrine of “fair use” 28 A contrary decision by this Court is all the more rea’ for go ont. ing the Petition in No. 649, in order that the Bench. the Bar. the Gov- ernment and the public at large mav know which of two allegedly applicable lines of decisions of this Court are te control, those defining “official duty” or those in the patent realm. (p. 14).°% Thus summarily stripped of Constitutional standing and guaranty, Freedom of Press would be relegated to the role of a non-statutory exception to Copyright Act. Gone would be the publie’s “right to know: ”? gone the safeguard of “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antag- onistic sources: *' gone the “right of freely examining public characters and measures. and of free communication thereon: gone the protection for “dissemination of controversial informa: tion which the public i3 entitled to receive’? —— gone, as Consti- tutional rights.’* all these and other attributes of a Free Press. 2) "Fair use” is an undependable reed for a free press to lean upon. The Copyright Office has said. “Fair use is not a predictable area of copyright law.” Latman. Park Use Or Copyricutep Works, Copyright Office Study No. 10. p. 13 trimeo. Aug. 1958)... Another commentator has said that. “There is no agreement on the nature ef the doctrine” and has pointed to the “confusion as to the nature and source of the doctrine” Needham. Tape Recording. Photocopying and Fair Use. Ascar, Copsricut Law Sy Meositm No. 6. p. 75 (1959). See Della ©. Samuel Goldwyn. Inc.. LO4 F. 2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (Fair use is “the most troublesome problem in the whole law of copyright”). Ci also: Cohen, Fair Use In The Law Of Copyright, Ascav, Copyricit Law SyMpositw No. 6, 43. 46 (1955). © H. Rep. No. 1758, 85th Cong.. 2d Sess, 17 (see Petition in No. 619, p. 25). 1} Associated Press vo United States, 326 Us. 1. 20 (1945). “6 Wartives OF Jaws Manso, 398 (1906 ed.) In the exercise of its Constitutional rights a Free Press is not limited in quoting from the text of official statements. “ However, the doctrine of “fair use” will not permit quotation of substantial portion of such important materials. Benny v. Loew's. Inc. 239 F. 2d. 532. 536-7 (9th Cir. 1956). aff'd per curiam by equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958): Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co. ISL F.2d 664.666 (7th Cir. 1950). UL S. Government's Brief before this Court. quoted in’ Petition (No. OF95 at pp. 24-25. 4 "Fair” use is only a privilege not a right. 3 VILL.L.Rev. 361, 385 (1958.) Furthermore it is net even a question of law: “. . . the issue of fair use is a question of fact.” Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications. Swe Dh F.2d 598.604 (7th Cir. 1957) cert. denied 355 U.S, 907 11957). 12 Nowhere is there the slightest scintilla of legal justifieation for such bizarre Constitutional interpretation. Cross-Petitioner’s ergnment eviscerates the First Amendment's guaranty of Free- dom of Press. On the other hand. this Court guards First Amendment right- “with a jealous eve.” Cross-Petitioner’s extraordinary pro- posal would fly directly in the face of this Court's pronounce- ment that “).. the First Amendment does not speak equivocalls It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language. read in the context of a liberty-loving so- ciety. will allow.” Petitioner in No. 649 respectfully submits that the Cros-- Petitioner's improper use of copyright to deny the American people and press the right of access to or even of quotation from his official statements publicly made as a top-level Government official presents a serious constitutional question involving Free- dom of Press under the First Amendment. Cross-Petitioner would deny Petitioner freedom of press heeause he is a so-called “free rider” (p. 14). By the same token the press at large is also a “free rider.” Cross-Petitioner’s claim in this regard indicates his fundamental legal position: Le. that any segment of the press can at his will or whim be denied not only the Constitutional right of Freedom of Pres- but even Cross-Petitioner’s substituted “right” of “fair use.” Petitioner submits its Petition in No. 649 on the