# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1944
- **Citation:** 323 U.S. 779

## Text

¥FILUD
off 18 1944
CHARLES ELMORE OROPLEY
/ OLERK

No 8 609

Supreme Court of the United States.

Oocroser Term, 1944,

RAYTHEON PRODUCTION CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST
CIRCUIT

AND

BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

EDWARD C. THAYER,
Attorney for Petitioner.

ADDISON ©. GETOHELL & SON, LAW PRINTERS, BOSTON.

eer a a ERS 5 AE ROLE TE DOTY EN 2 at PRR LCR tay Re

Subject Index.

Page
PETITION 1
Opinions below 2
Jurisdiction 2
Question presented 2
Statutes involved 2
Statement 2
Specification of errors 6
Reasons for granting the writ 6
BrigF 9
1. The decision below is in conflict with decisions
in other Cireuit Courts of Appeals 9
2. The decision below is in conflict with principles
announced by this Court 10
Appendix 13
Table of Authorities Cited.
CasEs.
Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 11
Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Commissioner, 79
Fed. (2d) 697 9
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 11
Edward N. Clark, 40 B.T.A. 333 10n.
Kisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 10
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Catlettsburg, Ky., v.
Commissioner, 59 Fed. (2d) 912 9
Highland Farms Corporation, 42 B.T.A. 1309 10n.
Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 10 .
United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U.S. :
88 11 pe
Le
4
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:

Supreme Court of the United States.

Octoser Term, 1944.

RAYTHEON PRODUCTION CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST
CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States:

The petitioner, Raytheon Production Corporation, prays
that a writ of certiorari may issue to review the decree of
the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered
July 28, 1944, in the case between the above-named par-
ties, docketed therein as No. 3956. Said decree affirmed a
decision of the Tax Court of the United States that an
amount received in settlement of a damage suit under the
federal anti-trust laws (charging damage to business good
will through illegal licensing agreements) is taxable in-
come in full in the absence of any showing of cost or other
basis of the good will injured.

2
Opinions Below.

The findings and opinion of the Tax Court are reported
in 1 T.C. 952, and printed in the Record, pp. 16-31. The
opinion of the Cireuit Court of Appeals is not yet officially
reported (but see 1944 C.C.H. § 9424). It is printed in the
Record, pp. 139-148.

Jurisdiction.

This Court has jurisdiction to review said decree under
U.S. Code, Title 28, See. 347.

This application is made within three months after the
entry of such decree, as required by Section 350.

Question Presented.

Is an amount received in settlement of a suit under the
federal anti-trust laws (charging tortious injury in dam-
aging the valuable good will of a radio business but not
involving accounting for any income or compensation for
taking or conversion of any asset) income in the absence
of shewing of cost or other basis of the good will?

Statutes Involved.

The statute involved is the Revenue Act of 1936, Sees.
22, 111, 112, and 113. The relevant parts of these sections
are set out in the appendix (infra, p. 13).

Statement.

The petitioner, Raytheon Production Corporation, came
into existence as a result of a series of tax-free reorgan-

ERA EAS IES ACNE DER TTR IAT AEN RES LOLA AOS EES PE MS A

izations having no effect upon this case (R. 140). Like
the court below, we will refer to any one of the original or
successive companies as ‘‘Raytheon.’’ The original Ray-
theon Company was a pioneer manufacturer of a rectify-
ing tube which made possible the operation of radio re-
ceiving sets on alternating house current. In 1926 and
1927 it was doing a large and profitable business produc-
ing over half the rectifying tubes being used (R. 41). This
business continued in 1928 on a diminishing scale. Earn- :
ings were: 1926, $450,000; 1927, $150,000; 1928, under :
$10,000 (R.-46, 45). It was producing these tubes under
patents of its own, free of any license fees. Radio Cor-
poration of America (R.C.A.) had many patents covering
most of the practical circuits used in radio sets (R. 42),
and it developed a competitive tube which produced the
same kind of rectification as Raytheon’s.

Karly in 1927 R.C.A. offered licenses to set manufactur-
ers under its patents and cross-licensing agreements with
General Electrie Company, Westinghouse, and American
Telephone & Telegraph Company. In the licensing agree-
ment it incorporated ‘‘Clause 9,’’ which provided that the
licensee was required to buy its tubes from R.C.A. (R. 50).
Clause 9 was held to be illegal in Lord et al. v. Radio Cor-
poration of America, 24 Fed. (2d) 565 (D.C. Del.); af-
firmed, 28 Fed. (2d) 257 (C.C.A. 3); certiorari denied, 278
US. 648.

In 1928 practically all manufacturers were operating
under R.C.A. licenses; and, as a consequence of the re-
striction in Clause 9, Raytheon was left with only replace-
ment sales, which soon disappeared (R. 43). When Ray-
theon found it impossible to market its tubes in the early
part of 1929, it obtained a license from R.C.A. to manu-
facture tubes on a royalty basis under the latter’s patents.
The license agreement contained a release of all claims
of Raytheon against R.C.A. by reason of illegal acts of

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the latter under Clause 9. But a side agreement provided
that, if R.C.A. were to pay compensation to any other
company on account of ‘‘Clause 9’’ damages, the right of
Raytheon to assert its claim would be reinstated (R. 51).
In 1931 R.C.A. admitted making cash settlements of other
claims (R. 56). On December 14, 1931, suit was brought
on the Raytheon claim against R.C.A. in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts for triple
damages under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, ad damnum
$15,000,000. The declaration alleged that the plaintiff had
by 1926 created and then possessed a large and valuable
good will in interstate commerce in rectifying tubes for
radios and had a large and profitable established business
therein; that the defendant conspired to destroy the busi-
ness of the plaintiff and others by a monopoly of such
business and did suppress and destroy the existing com-
panies; that by the early part of 1928 the tube business of
the plaintiff and its property and good will had been to-
tally destroyed at a time when it had a present value in
excess of $3,000,000 (R. 141). The suit was brought by
the petitioner’s predecessor, a Massachusetts corporation,
but wholly for the benefit of the petitioner. The case came
before this Court on a preliminary issue, 296 U.S. 459,
and thereafter was referred to an auditor, who found that
Clause 9 was not the cause of damage to the plaintiff but
that the decline in the plaintiff’s business was due to ad-
vancement in radio art and competition. He also found,
however, that, if the plaintiff were entitled to recovery, the
damages would be $1,000,000 (R. 142). A jury trial had
been claimed, and it was open to the jury to come to dif-
ferent conclusions (R. 80, 83° In the spring of 1938, just
prior to the time for the commencement of the trial before
a jury, officers of the Raytheon affiliated companies began
negotiations for the settlement of the litigation with
R.C.A. In the meantime, a suit brought by R.C.A. against

DADs At Tee AEM Deh ERIE TERE LAS RM OR LE

the petitioner for the non-payment of royalties resulted in
a final judgment of $410,000 in favor of R.C.A. The par-
ties finally agreed on the payment by R.C.A. of $410,000
in settlement of the anti-trust action, R.C.A. stating, how-
ever, that it wanted some of Raytheon’s patent rights
“thrown in’’ to R.C.A. (R. 60). Patent license rights
were included in the settlement, but R.C.A. declined to
allocate the amount paid. The agreement of settlement
contained a general release of all claims between the par-
ties (xs. 19, 20, 24, R. 97-105).

The officers of the Raytheon companies testified that
$60,000 of the $410,000 was the maximum worth of the
patents (R. 68, 78). In the proceedings in the Tax Court
the Commissioner admitted that the value of the patent
rights did not exceed $60,000 (Answer, paragraph V B,
R. 13).

The petitioner returned $60,000 of the $410,000 as in-
come from the patent rights and treated the remaining
$350,000 as a realization from a chose in action and not
as taxable income. The Commissioner determined that
the $850,000 constituted income on the following ground
only: ‘tIt is the opinion of this office that the amount of
$350,000 constitutes income under See. 22(a) of the Reve-
nue Act of 1936. There exists no clear evidence of what
the amount was paid for so that an accurate apportionment
can be made as to a specific consideration for patent rights
transferred to Radio Corporation of America and a con-
sideration for damages. The amount of $350,000 has there-
fore been included in your taxable income’’ (R. 9).

The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner on the
grounds (1) that in view of the general language in the in-
struments of release ‘‘We are unable to allocate any por-
tion of the settlement to non-taxable capital recovery in
the face of the presumption that the Commissioner’s de-
termination to the opposite effect is correct’? (R. 27), and

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(2): ‘‘If we assume that capital recovery is involved and
contained in the compromise moneys, only that portion
above basis may be left untaxed’’ (sic) (R. 29).

The Cireuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Board of Tax
Appeals, not on the ground that there was any lack of
evidence that the $350,000 was received in settlement of
the suit and constituted a return of capital involving no
question of lost profits (R. 145), but on the ground: ‘*Al-
though the injured party may not be deriving a profit as
a result of the damage suit itself, the conversion thereby
of his property into cash is a realization of any gaRtntttr
over the cost or other basis of the good will prior to the
illegal interference’? (R. 146). The court illustrated:
“Thus A buys Blackacre for $5,000. It appreciates in
value to $50,000. B tortiously destroys it by fire. A sues
and recovers $50,000 tort damages from B. Although no
gain was derived by A from the suit, his prior gain due to
the appreciation in value of Blackacre is realized when it is
turned into cash by the money damages’’ (R. rer) 776

Specification of Errors.

The court erred in deciding thai in this case any taxable
income was derived or, in the ease stated for illustration,

would be derived under the Revenue Act of 1936.

Reasons for Granting the Writ.

The decision below is so unprecedented ' and involves so
important and basic a question of tax law, namely, whether
an injured taxpayer is to be taxed upon compensation

1 The Cireuit Court of Appeals cites no decided ease for its pro-
nouncement. The texts cited and the cases discussed therein
do not support the proposition.

7

in mitigation of damages inflicted upon it by a wrong-
doer, that we submit it ought to be scrutinized and passed
upon by this Court.

It has been decided in other Circuit Courts of Appeals
that damages for injury to an intangible capital asset do
not constitute income. The decision below is in conflict
with these decisions.”

The decision is also in conflict with principles announced
by this Court.*

The results that will flow from this decision in the ordi-
nary case are such that the intention to produce them
ean hardly be imputed to Congress. Thus, suppose that
at the same time A bought Blackaecre, as stated in the
court’s illustration, X bought Whiteacre, which similarly
appreciated in value to $50,000, and then voluntarily sold
Whiteacre at that price. Or suppose governmental au-
thorities, acting under the law of the land, took Whiteacre
by eminent domain and paid X $50,000. In both such cases,
where X parted with title to the land either voluntarily
because he wanted to do so or where it was taken from him
by laws enacted for the good of the community, there has
occurred a sale or disposition of X’s property that is taxed
as capital gain. But in the case stated by the court, A, who
has done no act and exercised no volition, has not been
affected by any action that is not illegal—has not, in fact,
been involved in any sale or disposition of anything—has

*Farmers & Merchants Bank of Catlettsburg, Ky.. v. Commis-
stoner, 59 Fed. (2d) 913 (C.C.A. 6).

Central R, Co. of New Jersey v. Commissioner, 79 Fed. (2d) 697
(C.C.A. 3). These cases are discussed in the aecompanying
brief (pp. 9 and 10).

® Fisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189.

Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170.

United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88.
These cases are discussed in the accompanying brief (pp. 10
and 11).

sgn Five . w ete ve A es a 8 RGR OR RIE SET SI OD RE RS OE ie UES

Pays

merely been compensated for an injury—is subject to tax
upon 100% of $45,000. Is it conceivable that Congress,
which provided in Section 117 for partial relief to the
taxpayer in the case of the sale or disposition of
capital assets and in Section 112 for complete relief in the
‘ase of involuntary conversions of capital assets would
not have made provision for the taxpayer who recovered
damages for injury inflicted upon him by a wrong-doer, if
it had thought that such recovery would be treated as any-
thing but diminution of a loss and might be taxed as

2 Has not Congress assumed, rather, that the Cir-

income.
cuit Court of Appeals decisions above referred to. satis-
factorily stated the law? #

Furthermore, it must be remembered that the taxpayer
is not enriched by the damages. He is merely compen-
sated for the injury he has wrongfully suffered. It is
purely speculative whether the good will built up before
the wrong would or would not eventually be sold or dis-
posed of so as to produce revenue to the government.

We submit that the decision below is in conflict with the
decisions of other Cireuit Courts of Appeals, that there is
reason to believe that it is in conflict with principles laid
down by this Court, and that it involves an important and
basic question of federal taxation. We urge that the writ
issue to resolve such conflicts and to bring about an early
authoritative decision by this Court of the important ques-
tion involved.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD C. THAYER,
Attorney for the Petitioner.

* Since the decision in the Farmers & Merchants Bank of Catletts-
burg, Ky., case, June 27, 1932, eleven revenue acts have been
passed by Congress.

PETA RANE ETE SLATS EET MSM CMTE IN Ge mT SMG WEEK RINE TPES

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA34806415_2352%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
