# Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Laughlin v. Garnett > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA34806415_2040%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief for the Respondents in Opposition - **Published:** January 1, 1944 - **Citation:** 322 U.S. 738 ## Text ROE DOIN oa oacteccskse as eaiwtwokucnwececcsncneeoes 1 PUR ok nar cane ASK ane ehhh Cdcedes Canon bee ntaS Meeeie 1 RORINGNE SPONONUN shins ane h ast ccatnanssuccias nsec wncemme 2 EE IT LCE OT CECT ETT TEE ET ET 2 RI 6 kk Cadena tees naw nd lense nin ienssaweeseansne A RRM iL ca ie been do tee eed neanathENeteedsab ene nan ewe 8 CITATIONS Cases: Adame eT. Gel. ©. 107 Po GY ASO. 2 nce cnencccses 5 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Abbott, 130 F. (2d) 40___-- 4 Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367...........-.--.----- 5 Coleone ¥. Gated; VIG F Cay 8G ean cence s cence cewese ans 6 Coener ©; Armee, SE PO. BiG cas sc once as ince awcccnd 7 ae 4 v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135, certiorari denied, 305 5 Larecque ¥. Dorsey, 200 Pea: G60 .6... oon cence ccvcnnce 7 Sees $F: Fes, THe FG) Gio ncas ccc ecncsnccsasixn 6,7 National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. (2d) 145, rehearing de- WOE, OE Bs Gee) ies Covna cen kebivucGicwanseetcawen Piscine ¥. Daseh, OF F. CR) GI cennsccccwntesccesnxss Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. 8, 483._.......-.------------- United States v. Atherton, 102 U. S. 372__.__.-.--------- Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. (2d) 396, affirmed, 275 U.S. 503____-- Rules: Rule 12 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure_---_---- Rule 15a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-_------- (1) me OO Om OOD 584286—44 ROR RL ENGLER IIE ONES LR Se TINT Ne Mga Inthe Supreme Gourt of the Wited States OctoBER TERM, 1943 No. 820 JAMES J. LAUGHLIN, PETITIONER v. LESLIE C. GARNETT, JOHN W. FIHELLY, AND ALLEN BaKER ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION OPINION BELOW The per curiam opinion of the court of appeals (R. 49-50) is reported at 138 F. (2d) 931. The order of the district court denying petitioner’s motion for leave to file a proposed third amended complaint appears at pages 41-42 of the record. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals (R. 51) was entered on November 8, 1943. A petition for rehearing was denied on November 13, 1943 (R. (1) aie lee MD bermtinemrenencnepnmenrer acon 2 54). On February 11, 1944, the Chief Justice of the United States extended petitioner’s time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to March 13, 1944 (R. 53), and on March 11, 1944, he granted petitioner an additional extension of time until March 28, 1944 (R. 53). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on March 28, 1944. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying petitioner leave to file his proposed third amended complaint. STATEMENT Petitioner instituted an action for conspiracy and for malicious prosecution against respondents, a former United States attorney, an assistant United States attorney, and a police officer at- tached to the United States attorney’s office (R. 3-14). The answer to the complaint filed by re- spondents alleged as a ‘‘further defense’’ that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against respondents, in that the ~ complaint showed on its face that respondents’ acts were performed in the course of their official duties (R. 44-45). Without formal action by the district court, petitioner filed an amended com- plaint (R. 14-20), and, after respondents had poy So er Day meee waar Sees 3 moved under Rule 12 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the amended complaint (R. 45-46), again voluntarily amended his com- plaint without formal action by the court (R. 20- 23). Motions by respondents to dismiss the second amended complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim (R. 45-46) were sustained, and peti- tioner was given leave to move for permission to file a third amended complaint, provided that a copy of the proposed complaint accompanied the motion (R. 23). The motion was made (R. 23- 41) and denied (R. 41-42). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the order denying leave to file the proposed third amended complaint (R. 51). The second amended complaint alleged in sub- stance that respondents, acting maliciously, with- out probable cause, and palpably beyond the scope of their official duties, prevailed upon certain per- sous to make false charges against petitioner and prepare false documents; that on the basis of such false testimony respondents brought about peti- tioner’s indictment and trial on several criminal charges of which he was ultimately acquitted (R. 20-23). The proposed third amended complaint set forth the alleged reasons which inspired re- spondents’ malice towards petitioner. It further alleged that respondents induced certain persons to make false charges against petitioner and trans- mitted such charges to the Bar Association in an 5 BNRESTO WB entrees meninmncemmnmomenn: endeavor to harass him in the practice of law; that respondents endeavored to induce petitioner’s clients to dispense with his services; that on the promise of lower prison sentences they indueed certain of petitioner’s clients to make false charges against him and by means of false charges and forged documents succeeded in having him indicted and tried on criminal charges of which he was ultimately acquitted. The proposed com- plaint also set forth the means by which petitioner allegedly discovered the alleged conspiracy and annexed as part of the complaint affidavits by the persons who allegedly had been induced to make the false charges. (R. 24-33.) ARGUMENT The narrow question presented by this petition is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying petitioner leave to file his proposed third amended complaint. We think that it is clear that no abuse of discretion was shown. The gist of the complaint is that respondents maliciously instituted criminal charges against petitioner by the use of false testimony. Peti- tioner contends (Pet. 9) that the allegations that 2 Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “when justice so requires” the court may allow the filing of amended pleadings. The granting of such leave is a matter of discretion and is therefore not subject to review except for abuse. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Abbott, 130 F. (2d) 40, 44 (C. C. A. 4); ef. United States v. Atherton, 102 U. S. 372, 375. * r yn f Ce eae het panna wy ae ce i os Sip ety AEROS OLIN AY BESS ROO NaS So TRAE he Me AEE BTR BE VPI ART, OI Selo ER TENN. 5 respondents induced certain persons to make the false charges and prepare the false documents which formed the basis of the prosecution (para- graphs 18 and 19, R. 29-30) take this complaint out of the general rule that prosecuting officials are immune from civil liability for acts performed in their official capacity even though actuated by malice.” However, the immunity of a government official from civil liability extends to ‘‘action hav- ing more or less connection with the general mat- ters committed by law to his control or super- vision.”’ Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498; Cooper v. O’Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135, 139 (App. D. C.), certiorari denied, 305 U. S. 642. The db- taining of evidence to be presented to a grand jury is as much a function of a prosecuting attor- ney as the presentation of such evidence. Hence, under the cases cited, respondents cannot be sub- jected to civil liability for such acts. Petitioner also contends (Pet. 8) that para- graphs 13 and 14 of the proposed complaint, in alleging that respondents Baker and Garnett in- duced certain persons to make false charges * Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135 (App. D. C.), cer- tiorari denied, 305 U. S. 642; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 2), affirmed, 275 U. S. 503; Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367 (S. D. Fla.) ; cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. 8. 483; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F. (2d) 40 (App. D. C.), cer- tiorari denied, 314 U. S. 665; Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. (2d) 273 (App. D. C.), certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 718; Adams v. H. O. L. C., 107 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 8); Phelps v. Dawson, 97 F, (2d) 339 (C.C. A. 8). a . RTOS Pes TEER ATS ROR: ERR Ay 6 against petitioner and transmitted such charges to the Bar Association (R. 27-28), charged acts which are not within the scope of the immunity granted to prosecuting officials. It may be, as the court below suggested (R. 50), that allegations of the malicious institution of false charges in an endeavor to cause an attorney’s disbarment * would present a basis for a civil action against prosecut- ing officials.* In the instant case, however, there is no suggestion that the acts alleged in para- graphs 13 and 14 resulted in the temporary dis- barment of petitioner alleged in paragraph 27 (R. 32), or even in formal charges against peti- tioner. In themselves these paragraphs present a situation analogous to that where efforts to cause institution of criminal proceedings have proved unsuccessful and have therefore been held not to be actionable. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F. (2d) 423 (App. D. C.); Larocque v. Dorsey, 299 Fed. 556, 559 (C. C. A. 2); Cooper v. Armour, 42 Fed. 215 (C. C. N. D. N. Y.). And in any event, as the ’ Malicious attempts to effect revocation of a license have been held to support actions for malicious prosecutions. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F. (2d) 423 (App. D. C.); National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 4), rehearing denied, 59 F. (2d) 370. * The court below indicated (R. 50) that in its judgment the presentation of charges to a Bar Association, while privileged, is beyond the scope of a prosecutor’s normal duties and therefore not protected by the immunity doctrine ex- pressed in Cooper v. O’Connor, supra. Cf. Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F. (2d) 16 (App. D.C.). AER PR AY a OL Tertiary EERE . MC 7 court below held, the allegations of these para- graphs, together with those of paragraph 27, are clearly too vague and indefinite to stand alone as a cause of action when the main allegations of the complaint relating to official misconduct on the part of the respondents are stricken. Moreover, the question before the district court in the instant case was whether to allow the pro- posed third amended complaint as a whole to be filed. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 27 constitute a minor undeveloped portion of a long complaint based primarily on the charge of malicious prose- eution of criminal offenses. By its dismissal of the second amended complaint, the district court had already ruled that the criminal proceedings presented no ground for relief, and petitioner had taken no appeal from that order. Yet the bulk of his third amended complaint consisted of a repetition, with only unimportant amplifications of evidentiary details, of the very same allegations which he had made in the second amended com- plaint. Clearly, therefore, the inference is war- ranted that petitioner’s asserted cause of action rested primarily upon the allegations of false criminal charges just as had been the case with all the prior complaints he had filed, and the court was under no duty to allow him to file a complaint the main portion of which consisted of a replead- ing of facts which had already been properly held insufficient to constitute a cause of action. P ows —_ 7 - 7 ead RAE HR EPA LN a PLS ONT LL RIE Se THOS LOIS OSL, ET LA hp ES PR a lg - oes - = $ RM ROT LD or ERG SR RS aa a RATER ea kd Oe, Bae AG PLU Sk Sas NR RE NERA SN RIT CN lg BAGS ab PARI ATS lates 8 CONCLUSION The action of the district court in denying leave to file a third amended complaint involved no abuse of discretion, but on the other hand was plainly in accordance with applicable decisions of this Court, and the judgment of the court below affirming that action presents no question war- ranting further review. Accordingly, we respect- fully submit that the petition for a writ of certi- orari should be denied. CHARLES Fany, Solicitor General. Tom C. CLARK, Assistant Attorney General. CHesTeR T. Lane, Epwarp G. JENNINGS, Special Assistants to the Attorney General. BEATRICE ROSENBERG, Attorney. Aprin 1944. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1944 LER an Sara ES Rete eCT > . nee opt Oe! RI eRe ame eR Ae fer tt ee a NR Nt is pc Bs vente a pth dei BEN --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA34806415_2040%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.