# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Howard National Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA34086415_1563%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1943 - **Citation:** 319 U.S. 757 ## Text : Office - Supreme Osurt, U. APR 30 1943 PETITION AND BRIEF CHARLES ELMORE CBOPLEY : Supreme Court of the United States : OCTOBER TERM, 1942 No. 9¢8 HOWARD NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, PETITIONER Us. EMILY TENNEY MORGAN, MARIAN BAYLEY BUCHANAN, RICHARD MORGAN, Et AL. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF VERMONT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PETITION l SUMMARY STATEMENT 2 ASSERTED BASIS OF JURESDICTION cicccsecccssscossesssonn 7 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 10 REASONS RELIED ON : 11 PRAYER 13 BRIEF TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF 14-15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 16-19 TEXT OF BRIEF 1-30 APPENDIX 31 i _—_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1942 No. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HARRIS R. WATKINS, Deceased, HOWARD NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF VERMONT TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSO- CIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Howard National Bank and Trust Company of Burlington, Vermont, a corporation created and existing under the laws of the United States and having its principal office at Burlington in the State of Vermont, brings this.its petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Ver- niont entered in the above entitled cause, affirming the judgment of the Probate Court of the State of Vermont for the District of Chittenden and remanding the cause to said Probate Court. The opinion, review of which is sought has not been printed in the official reports of the Supreme Court of Vermont but is printed in 30 Atlantic (2d) 305. 1 ER "i SIRE PENI RISE OST CM MOEN ISIS SRI TR RA 2 SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MATTER INVOLVED This cause arose upon the petition of the beneficiaries of a testa- mentary trust provided by the will of Harris R. Watkins, late of | Burlington, in said Probate District of Chittenden in the State of Vermont, for the appointment of an administrator d. b. n. c. ta The will was duly probated March 18, 1930, and letters testa- mentary were issued to City Trust Company (Op. par. 6-7, Rec. 51-52), then a banking corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Vermont, with its principal office in Burling- ton, Vermont, which was named executor in said will and had qualified April 17, 1930. (F. 10, Rec. 26.) City Trust Company occupied the same banking rooms and had the same officers as Howard National Bank (F. 12, Rec. 26; Op. par. 9, Rec. 52), and on the 12th day of March, 1931, while acting as executor as afore- said, was consolidated with said Howard National Bank by virtue of the Act of Congress of November 7, 1918, as amended Febru- ary 25, 1927,c. 191, sec. 1. (F. 15, Rec. 27, Op. par. 9, Rec. 52- 53.) The consolidated corporation took the name Howard Na- tional Bank and Trust Company. The consolidation was ap- proved and certified by the Comptroller of the Currency, March 12, 1931. (J/b.) No annual corporation license tax for City Trust Company was paid to the state of Vermont for the succeed- ing year. And on April 1, of that year (1932) a revocation of the state charter of City Trust Company for non-payment of the annual license tax was recorded by the Secretary of State. (F. 4 Rec. 24-25, Op. par. 9, Rec. 52-53.) The petition by which this proceeding was instituted, alleged the provision of the will, that the petitioners were the persons in interest, that the will was allowed and City Trust Company qualified as executor, that the'debts, the funeral expenses and special legacies had been satisfied, that the consolidation and charter revocation above stated had \occurred, that the consolidated national bank had never been appointed exect tor or administrator and had taken over the assets of the estate without right, “that there is not now, there never has been since on or about March 12, 1931 (the date of consolidation) any legal —— executor or administrator... ."’ Wherefore petitioners pray for the appointment of an administrator (Rec. 4-7). A copy of the will was annexed. (Rec. 8-9.) Howard National Bank and Trust Company made answer as- serting among other things the following : “(a) On the 12th day of March, 1931, City Trust Com- pany a Vermont corporation theretofore named, qualified and acting as executor of the will of Harris R. Watkins was consolidated with Howard National Bank, a corporate instrumentality of the United States, into a corporation of the United States under the name and style of Howard National Bank and Trust Company of Burlington having the same officers and directors as City Trust Company and by virtue of the laws of the United States, then and since in harmony with the laws of the State of Vermont in this regard, the powers, property, rights, obligations and duties of fiduciary relationship of City Trust Company, including the executorship of said will of Harris R. Watkins, de- volved upon said consolidated corporation, and from said day hitherto have been exercised by it agreeably to the laws of the United States of which said consolidated corporation became and continued a corporate instrumentality and agreeably to the laws of Vermont. “(b) Since March 12, 1931, City Trust Company has con- tinued its existence as a constituent part of Howard Na- tional Bank and Trust Company continued in life by and subject to the laws of the United States of America and said City Trust Company as a constituent part of said Howard National Bank and Trust Company has continued to be and is an instrumentality of the United States; and the state of Vermont since said March 12, 1931, hitherto has been without power to regulate, control or terminate the corporate existence of said City Trust Company as a constituent part of said consolidated corporation or to im- pair its utility.” And that from the date of consolidation the consolidated bank “has been the true and qualified executor acting under bond as pro- vided by law.’ (Rec. 13-14.) PRE ata poe ee 4 After finding the facts the Probate Court entered a judgment order that : “City Trust Company upon the forfeiture of its charter, ceased to exist as a corporate entity of the State of Ver- mont, for the purposes of this case. “It is further, adjudged that a vacancy was created in the office of the Executor of the Estate of Harris R. Watkins as of that time.” (Rec. 2.) This judgment, thus fixing the termination of the executorship upon the date of the supposed forfeiture of the charter of City Trust Company rather than at the time of consolidation, as asserted by the petitioners, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Vermont. That court recognized the claim of the consolidated national bank made in its answer as above stated and, pursuant to claims made in the brief for the consolidated bank, held: (1) “.... in the absence of any statutory interdict we are un- able to discern a public policy of this State, that would operate to prevent a consolidation of State and National banks under the Acts of Congress. Specific statutory authorization was not necessary. Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 24 L. ed. 168, 169; Petition of Worcester County Nat. Bank, supra, 162 N. E. at page 220. We hold that the consolidation of the City Trust Company and the Howard National Bank was not in contravention of our law, or of our public policy.” (Op. par. 12, Rec. 54.) (2) That there was no Vermont statute which declared the charter void upon consolidation (Op. par. 14, Rec. 55) and it fol- lowed precedents which it cited to the effect that : “|. the corporate identity of the trust company is not destroyed and its charter is not dissolved by the consoli- dation.” (Op. par. 14, Rec. 55.) (3) That the appointment of an executor is not in Vermont the result of judicial proceedings but: __ “In our law an executor is a person, or corporation em- powered to discharge the duties of a fiduciary, appointed as such by the testator in his will. The Probate Court has no power of choice, for the office is held by virtue of the testa- tor’s selection.” (Op. par. 16, Rec. 50.) But the Vermont court contrary to the claim of the consoli- dated bank held that the petitionee did not become the legal execu- tor as the result of the consolidation, asserting : “Our law does not recognize any right to succession to the office of an executor by a person or corporation not desig- nated by the testator in his will.” (Op. par. 17, Rec. 57.) (4) The court then ruled that the state might after the consoli- dation regulate, tax and destroy the state corporation and thereby extinguish its authority as executor and create a vacancy to be filled by the probate court. The court said: “As we have seen, the petitionee asserts that since the date of the consolidation the State of Vermont has been without power to regulate, control or terminate its corporate exist- ence. We do not adopt this view. The ‘franchise’ of the state bank, the transfer of which is provided for in the Act of Congress (12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 34a), cannot mean its right to be a corporation. The right to transfer franchise powers of a corporation organized under the laws of one sovereignty to a corporation organized under the laws of a different sovereignty is extraordinary. It can not be im- plied in the absence of explicit statutory enactment to that end.” (Op. par. 19, Rec. 57.) In support of this proposition the court cited Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases and failed to accept or apply the rule of immunity of national banks from state control, as enunciated by this court in Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 at 283, cited and quoted in the brief for the consolidated bank and the rule recognized by the Vermont court in State v. Clement National Bank, 84 Vt. 167 (cited and quoted in the brief for the consoli- dated bank ), that there can be no state taxation of a national bank 6 without the consent of Congress, citing Mercantile, etc., Bank y. City of New York, 121 U.S. 138, Owensboro National Bank y, Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 and other cases. The Vermont Supreme Court impliedly held that, after the con- solidation, City Trust Company was taxable under Section 1035 of the General Laws of Vermont which is as follows: “Every foreign corporation doing business in this state, and every association or joint stock company doing busi- ness in this state issuing shares of stock or dividing its cor- porate rights or property into shares, and every domestic corporation, shall, except as hereinafter provided, pay an annual license tax to the state.” The court after holding that the corporate franchise was not transferred by consolidation, continued : “It follows that the State of Vermont had the power to terminate the corporate existence of the City Trust Com- pany, in accordance with G. L. 1046 (now P. L. 1000), providing that: ‘Every corporation shall, by virtue of this section, except as otherwise provided, cease to exist as such corporation on the first day of April in any year during which such corporation has not, on or before such day, filed its annual license tax returns for the fiscal year be- ginning with the first day of the preceding Febuary, and has not, on or before the first day of April in such year, paid to the state the annual license tax for such fiscal year. ...’ Although the certificate of revocation was dated June 1, 1932, the City Trust Company, not having paid its annual license tax, ceased to exist as a corporation upon April 1, of that year. Its authority as executor was there- upon extinguished and it devolved upon the Probate Court to grant administration to a suitable person, as required by G. L. 3240, now P. L. 2784, which is, undobtedly, the exercise of a judicial function.” (Op. par. 20, Rec. 58.) The court further said: “The court might, after the dissolution of the City Trust Company’s charter, have appointed the petitionee adminis- trator with the will annexed, for a national bank may serve in this capacity.” (Op. par. 24, Rec. 60.) ee The court further recognized that prior to consolidation the constituent banks, City Trust Company and Howard National Bank, occupied the same banking rooms and had the same officers (Op. par. 9, Ree. 52); and that at the time of consolidation the consolidated bank took possession and control of the assets of the estate and thereafter “the directors of the City Trust Company never took action as a board and the affairs previously conducted by the company were directed and controlled by the directors and officers of the petitionee.” (Op. par. 10, Rec. 53.) Thus the Supreme Court of Vermont held that although the iederal statute with respect to consolidation of state and national banks could operate in Vermont because not in contravention of Vermont law, it could not operate upon the franchise to be a cor- poration because the state had not given affirmative consent ; and it could not operate upon the testator’s designation of an executor because the consolidated corporation was not the same corporation named by the testator. That the state corporation continued in life and continued to hold the executorship, although it was under the management and all its assets, including the estate assets, were in the custody of the consolidated bank. But that the state cor- poration, after consolidation, remained subject to the control and taxation of the state and that for failure to pay a corporation license tax assessed by the state of Vermont, the state could destroy that corporate entity and vacate the executorship. ASSERTED BASIS OF JURISDICTION TO REVIEW Petitioner contends that the Supreme Court of the United States should review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont because the Supreme Court of the State of Ver- mont has decided federal questions of substance, (a) Which heretofore had not been expressly determined by this Court ; and ELLE LOLI OSE TES DE LY LEE BEA GE NM ¢ DALY SELL EOE IGE ECT, SION rot ROBE EL, BTM TTT 8 (b) Has decided such substantial federal questions in a way probably not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Court with respect to the controlling elements of the questions here pre- sented. The questions are federal because the ruling of the State Court frustrates the full accomplishment of the expressed purposes of the national legislation as to consolidation of state banks into national banks, when not in contravention of state law. In particular the questions involve the decision of a state cour: which : (1) Makes the full operation of the federal statute as to the consolidation of state and national bank depend upon the expressed consent of the state rather than upon the absence of contravening law. (2) Sanctions taxation burdening a national bank (through a constituent state bank) in a manner not within the permission of Congress. (3) Without the consent of Congress, imposes upon the con- stituent state bank, after consolidation, control by the state to the extent of destruction of that constituent to the detriment of the co.solidated national bank. The questions are substantial because (1) they are the neces: sary foundation of a decision which deprives petitioner of the right to act as executor and makes it an intermeddler in a large estate ; and (2) because the answers given by the Vermont court to those questions, assert as the necessary basis of the decision, a rule so important and far reaching that it would subject many national banks throughout the United States to the payment of unlawful and burdensome tax levies by the states, or alternatively te impait- ment of their operations. The sum of the answers to these federal questions raises an issue of federal law which has never been presented to this court for a composite ruling. But the component rules which make up mi , s SERA s PP Se SURES Ks cop opentets NE EME Nhs _ ——_! 9 the decision of the state court are in conflict with the decisions of this court, 772. : (1) The ruling that affirmative consent of the state is neces- sary to a complete consolidation of a state bank into a national hank, though there be no contravening state law, is in conflict with the decision of this Court in Ex parte Worcester County National Bank, 279 U.S. 347 and with other cases cited in the accompany- ing brief. (2) The ruling that a state may burden a consolidated national bank by a license tax upon the constituent state bank is in conflict with Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 19S. Ct. 537, 43 L. ed. 850. Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Bedford, 310 U. S. 41 at 52, 60 S. Ct. 800 at 805, 84 L. ed. 1067. Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 16 S. Ct. 502, 40 L. ed . 700, as well as other cases cited in the accompanying brief. (3) The rule that after consolidation into a national bank under federal law not in contravention of state law, the state re- tains a degree of control of a constituent state bank such that it may destroy the state corporate entity and thereby terminate an executorship held by the state bank after consolidation to the benefit and under the management of the consolidated bank, is in conflict with Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, supra, and other cases cited in the brief, and (4) The ruling that a consolidated national bank may not hold in its own name an executorship held by a constituent bank at the time of consolidation, although the state bank’s entity is not destroyed by consolidation, because the consolidated bank is not the bank name as executor in the will, which (rather than judicial appointment) creates the executorship,—this ruling is in conflict with the implied ruling of this Court in Ex parte Worcester County National Bank, supra, although the question has not been expressly decided by this court. EE SOE BES EIG R TPE BTID FEISS LANE DI RNA OBEN ER DENI LAO SE STAN LO SAE REDE OAM OEN IS eT Mg Sie PRD EAE ENGL TALC AN D8 RENE RB 89 cH bie Sigh 98. 10 QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner asserts that upon the record the decision of the State Supreme Court raises questions which this petition presents for re- view as follows: 1. If a state has no law or public policy in contravention of consolidation of state banks into national banks under the federal statutes (Act of November 7, 1918, c. 209, sec. 3, as amended by Act of February 5, 1927, c. 191, sec. 1), 2. And if a bank of its creation, while holding under its law the office of executor by virtue of testamentary appointment rather than judicial order, has been lawfully consolidated into a national bank without loss of corporate existence or of its office as executor, In those circumstances, may the state, after consolidation, deny the right of the consolidated bank to be executor for the reason that it was not named in the will and impose a corporate license tax upon the constituent state corporation and, if the tax is not paid, destroy the constituent state corporation and terminate its executorship because the laws of the state did not give affirma- tive consent to the merger of the state corporate identity into the national corporation? This question is divisible, thus: In the circumstances above stated (a) May the state deny the effectiveness of the federal statute to transfer out of state control and vest in the consolidated bank the franchise of the state bank to be a corporation, unless the state gives affirmative consent to such a transfer? (b) May the state refuse to recognize the consolidated bank as the legal executor in the right of the continuing state entity? (c) May the state continue to regulate and control the consti- tuent state bank ? (d) May the state after the consolidation continue to impose license taxes with respect to the constituent state bank in a form not within the permission of Congress as to taxation of national banks? si ESE EOE EMG NY TERE ES TARE SAME TaN NRT OTS te wi 11 (e) May the state destroy the constituent state entity because those taxes are not paid, and thereby terminate the executorship to the injury of the consolidated national bank ? Petitioner asserts that these questions require answers in the negative ; and when so answered require the reversal of the decision of the state courts. REASONS RELIED ON The reasons upon which petitioner relies are set forth in an ac- companying brief. The decision of the Vermont Supreme Court asserts that that State may regulate, control, tax and destroy the corporate existence of a constituent state bank after completion of its consolidation with a national banking association under the Act of Congress, although that control, taxation and destruction operates to the detriment of the national bank. But this decision of the State Supreme Court is in conflict with established law of this court that state law may not operate in conflict with the laws of the United States as to national banks. It impairs the efficiency of national banks to exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred and imposed by the laws of the United States, (Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664; First National Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258 U. S. 362, and other cases cited in the accompanying brief.) The rule is applicable whether the taxation or interference is direct or indirect, (Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton 738; Federal Land Bank v. Crossland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 S. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed. 703; Pittman v. H. O. L. C., 308 U.S. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15, 84 L. ed. 11; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451,72 L. ed. 857.) The Supreme Court of the State of Vermont asserted that that tion of the constituent state bank after consolidation because, al- 7 Se eh ee eee ee ee ee SURI ASIII OEE tte State might exercise the regulation, control, taxation and destruc- si ——— 12 though there was no law or public policy of Vermont in contra- vention of consolidation, the State of Vermont had not given affirmative statutory consent to the transfer of the corporate fran- chise of the constituent state bank. But such affirmative consent is not required by the statute to an effective consolidation, by which the consolidated national bank shall acquire all the franchises, in- terests and fiduciary offices of the constituent state bank, unless there are contravening state laws; and the operation of the statute according to its terms is within the federal power (/:x parte Worcester County National Bank, 279 U. S. 347; Cannon v. Dixon (C. C. A. 4, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 913; and see Metropolitan National Bank v. Claggett, 141 U. S. 520; Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293, 12 S. Ct. 450, 36 L. ed. 162; Guardian Depositors’ Crop. v. Currie (1940), 292 Mich. 549, 297 N. W. 2; Central United National Bank v. Abbott (1939), 125 Ohio St. 37, 18 N. E. (2d) 981 and other cases cited in the brief.) The denial by the state court of effective operation of the statute, so as to preserve the complete identity of the constituent state bank within the corporate structure of the consolidated na- tional bank, resulted in the denial to the consolidated natoinal bank of the right of executorship given it by the federal statute (Adams v. Atlantic National Bank (1934), 115 Fla. 399, 155 S. 648), although the state treated the executorship of the state bank as continuing. The rules of law thus asserted by the Vermont state court may be applied to the injury of a great number of consolidated national banks throughout the United States because they are based upon general theories of federal power and federal statutes and are not limited to the peculiar statutory provisions of a particular state 13 WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari may issue out of, and under the seal of, this Honorable Court directed to the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont commanding that Court to certify and to send to this Court for its review and de- termination a transcript of the record and proceedings in the afore- said cause and that the judgment of said Supreme Court of said State of Vermont affirming the judgment of the Probate Court for the District of Chittenden in the State of Vermont be reversed by this Honorable Court ; and that if need be to effectuate a proper presentation of the record in the aforesaid cause a writ of certiorari be issued out of and under the seal of this Honorable Court directed to said Probate Court for the District of Chittenden in the State of Vermont, commanding that Court to certify and send to this Court for its review and determination all or so much as may be appropriate of the record in the above entitled cause ; and that your petitioner have such other and further relief in the premises as to this Honorable Court may seem meet and just. ? JoserpH T. STEARNS, Guy M. Pace, G. J. MurpHy, 172 College Street, Both 172 College Street, Burlington, Vt. Burlington, Vt. Joun J. DESCHENEs, Of Counsel. 158 Bank Street, Burlington, Vt. Attorneys for Petitioner. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI Page of Brief I. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the consolidation involved was not in contravention of the law or public policy of Vermont, did not require specific statutory authority from the state, was validly effected, did not destroy the corporate identity of the state bank or terminate its executorship, al- though all the assets of the estate were in the possession of, and were managed by, the consolidated bank l II. Vermont Supreme Court held that the corporate franchise of constituent state bank was not vested in consolidated national bank for want of affirmative consent by the state and that the state corporation remained subject to state regulations control, taxation and destruction after consolidation...» 3 III. United States has power, in the absence of contravening state statutes, to effect complete consolidation without affirma- tive consent of the state IV. That power was exercised by COmgress....ceccccmencnnmnuenennnns Il V. No state may burden and impair the efficiency of a na- tional bank by control or taxation except as permitted by na- nD ae Ses SEAS 5 tee EO l A. A state may not share in the COMtTrO]....csseenennenennnn l B. A state may not tax a national bank directly or in- directly except within the permission granted by the Teatal Sea accesses cect 18 tae tse 14 _— 15 VI. The taxation and destruction of the constituent state bank, after consolidation was an unauthorized burden on the consolidated national bank A. The tax by the state was in effect upon the consolidated national bank, because 1. The situation precluded payment except by the national bank 2. The corporate franchise taxed was either merged in or owned by the consolidated national bank........ B. The destruction of the charter of the constituent state bank (resulting from the tax) impaired the perform- ance of the functions of the consolidated national bank C. The tax by Vermont was not within the permission of the United States because (1) the state otherwise taxes national banks And the tax was in an arbitrary AMOUNE ......ccssssseeenn D. The tax occasioned an unauthorized burden upon the exercise of national privileges VIl. The Vermont Courts wrongfully denied the executor- ship to the consolidated bank The only reason for denial was that the consolidated bank was not named in the will But the effect of national law continuing the existence of the state entity within the consolidated bank, made it the corpora- tion named in the will, as a matter Of national 1AW o.com VIII. Widespread injury to national banks would result from establishment of the rule of decision announced by the Vermont Court 20 26 27 28 VEL TANG UE TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES Page Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U.S. 765, 51S. Ct. 252, 75 L. ed. 690 Brief 26 Adams v. Atlantic National Bank, 115 Fla. 399, 155 S. 648 Brief 9, 29 Pet. 12 Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 209, 56S. Ct. 417 Brief 12 Bank of California v. Richardson, 248 U. S. 476, 39 S. Ct. 165, 63 L. ed. 372 Brief 19, 22, 26 In re Barreiro’s Estate, 125 Cal. App. 153, 13 P. (2d) 1017 Brief 12 Bransford, Ex parte, 310 U.S. 354: GOS. Ct. DAT entncnn Brief 16 Cannon v. Dixon (C.C. A. 4, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 913 Brief 13, 14, 28 Pet. 12 Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. G73. 24: L.. e€h. 16S cic Brief 8, 10 Pet. 4 Central United National Bank v. Abbott, 135 Ohio St. 37, 18 N. E. (2d) 981 Brief 8, 9, 12, 15, 28 Pet. 12 Clement National Bank v. State of Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 34 S. Ct. 31, 58 L. ed. 147 Brief 25 Coffey v. The National Bank of the State of Missouri, 46 Mo. 140, 2 Am. Rep. 488 Brief 12 Cook County National Bank v. United States, 107 U. S. 445, 2S. Ct. 561, 27 L. ed. 537 ......... Brief 17 | 17 Page Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41 at 52, 60 S. Ct. 800 Brief 19 re. 9 Commonwealth v. First National Bank and Trust Company, 303 Pa. 241, 154 A. 379 Brief 5,6,8 Commonwealth v. Merchants National Bank, 323 Pa. 145, 185 A. 823 Brief 5,7,8 Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 16S. Ct. 502, 40 L. ed. 700 Brief 6, 16, 18, Appendix Pet. 5,9, 11 Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190, 194, 60 S. Ct. 480........ Brief 17 Easton v. lowa, 188 U. S. 220, 23 S. Ct. 288, 47 L. ed. 452 Brief 18 Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102, 62 S. Ct. 1 Brief 19 Federal Land Bank v. Crossland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 S. Ct. 385 Brief 19, 26 Pet. 11 First National Bank v. Chapman (1929), 160 Tenn. 72, 22 S. W. (2d) 245 Brief 9 First National Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258 U. S. 363, 42 S. Ct. 323, 66 L. ed. 661 Brief 18 Pet. 11 First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 341, 46 S. Ct. 135, 70 L. ed. 295 Brief 19 Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Currie, 292 Mich. 549, 291 N. W. 2 Brief 12, 28 Pet. 12 Hawley v. Hurd, 72 Vt. 122, 47 Atl. 401, 52 L. R. A. 195, 82 Am. St. Rep. 922 Brief Appendix “ Page 18 Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Cleary, 2% U.S. 315, 56 S. Ct. 235, 80 L. ed. 251, 100 A. L. R. 1403 Brief 8,9, 10 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 265, 49 S. Ct. 108, 73 L. ed. 318 ox Brief 17 International Text Book Company v. Lynch, 81 Vt. 101, 69 481, 54 L. ed. 678 ... Brief 25 International Text Bokk Companyg v. Lynch, 81 Vt. 101, 69 Atl. 541, reversed 218 U. S. 664, 54 L. ed. 1201, 31S. Ct. 225 Brief 25 . Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U. S. 245, 249, 57 S. Ct. 449 ........ Brief 14 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 48S. Ct. 423, 72 L. ed. 770 Brief 26 Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank, No. 449, Decided March 1, 1943, 63 S. Ct. 587 Brief 19 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347, 17S. Ct. 85, 41 L. ed. 461 Brief 16 Pet. 11 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 4 L. ed. 579..Brief 18, 19 Mercantile National Bank v. City of New York, 121 U.S. 138, 30 L. ed. 895, 7 S. Ct. 826 Brief Appendix Pet. 6 Metropolitan National Bank v. Claggett, 141 U. S. 520, 12S. Ct. 60, 35 L. ed. 841 ; Brief 7, 12, 28 Pet. 12 Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293, 12 S. Ct. 450, 36 L. ed. 162 Brief 7, 12,28 Pet. 12 Osborn v. Bank of U. S.,9 Wheaton 738, 6 L. ed. 204....... Brief 18 Pet. 11 19 Page Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 43 Bs i: OU, FF i SR Be ts eteetitbestreneniss Brief 18, Appendix Pet. 6,9, 11 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 48S. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857 Pet. 11 Pittman v. H. O. L. C., 308 U.S. 21, 60 S. Ct. 15........ Brief 19, 26 Pet. 11 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 S. Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577 Brief 16 State v. Bradford Savings Bank & Trust Co., 71 Vt. 234, 44 A. 349 Brief Appendix State v. Clement National Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 A. 944, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 22 (affirmed 231 U.S. 120, 34S. Ct. 31, 58 L. ed. 147) Brief Appendix Pa. 5 Stahman v. Vidal, 305 U. S. 61, 59'S. Ct. 41, 83 L. ed. 41 Brief 19 Thomas v. National Bank, 187 Wash. 521, 60 P. (2d) 264 Brief 29 Ex parte Worcester County National Bank, 279 U. S. 347, 49 S. Ct. 368, 73 L. ed. 733, 61 A. L. R. 987 Brief 4, 5, 6, 9, 23, 26, 28, 29, Appendix Pet. 9, 12 Petition of Worcester County National Bank, 263 Mass. 444, Ge PE: 247, BIE FOU, 3. GAF ciennes Brief 5,7, 8, 21 Pet. 4, 5,9 NOMA PEAROMY, EATS NURS SFL ENS ISP PLAGE NS PPA PRYD ne ESN EBT SS TIC AASBR GR, Re TENNENT EON CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES i age Amendment VI, cl. 2 Brief 16 STATUTES UNITED STATES Bank consolidation statute: (Act Nov. 17, 1918, c. 309 § 3; Feb. 25, 1927, c. 191 $ 1; 44 Stat. 1225 la U.S.C. A. 34a) quoted Op. Dat FT FR OG sient Brief 4, 11, 13, 15, 16, 28 Act of June 16, 1933, c. 89 § 24, 48 Stat. 100........... Brief 13 Permission for State Taxation of National Banks: R. S. Sec. 5219 as amended March 4, 1923, c. 267, 1499, and March 25, 1936, c. 88, 44 Stat. 223, subd. (a) U. S.C. A., Sec. 548, subd. (a) quoted Ap- pendix I] Brief 32 Brief 12, 18-19, 24 VERMONT Corpration License Tax, G. L. 1035 (now P. L. 989), quoted Petition & Brief 15, 24 Forfeiture of Charter for Nonpayment of License Tax, G. L. 1046 (now P. L. 1000), quoted (Op. par. 20, Rec. 58) Brief 4 ; Brief 15-24 Taxation of Income from National Bank Stock, subd. Il of Sec. 3, of Part I, read with Sec. 8 of Part II of No. 17 of the Acts of 1931. Quoted Appendix III.....Brief 33 Brief 24 20 | | } --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA34086415_1563%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.