# Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1955
- **Citation:** 349 U.S. 254

## Text

in Thi

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1954

. - i>
No. Po. 7. a
Waiatcua AGrmicuLtTurRaL Company, Limitrep, Petitioner
¥.
Cinaco Manisa, eT aL., Respondents

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CER-
TIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Rurvus G, Poote,
1625 IK Street, No W.
Washington 6, D.C.
LiviNGston JENKS,
Bank of Hawaii Bide.
Honolulu l, TLE.
Mitton CC, Denso
1625 K Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D.C.
Puitie Levy
1625 IK Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D.C.
Ernest C. Moore, Jr
302 Castle & Cooke Bldg.
Honolua, TH.
Attorneys tor Petitioner

—

INDEX

PAGE

OPINION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, DATED
DUE Ts Oe hee eee 1

JUDGMENT OF UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,
te FS GE Sap ERE Net smn ea ae oe

OPINION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, DATED
JUNK 24, 1954, UPON PETITION FOR) RE-
EE RS, OSIM Srey, ve 22

ORDER OF UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, DATED
JUNE 24, 1954, DENYING PETITION FOR
MEIN siete in cs co 23

OPINION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWALTLI,
ey OF gh Ge |, ob nemesis 24+

OPINION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-
PHKALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, DATED
FOP Y AP RP EE Ry. WP a cctrcdisnvnceentapintsnicapsseisiccwapnseswcen 9S

* The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the District
Court are printed at pages 190 et seq. and 308 et seq. in the rec-
ord used in the Court of Appeals, nine copies of which have been
filed with the Clerk of this Court pursuant to Rule 21(4).

“y
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~
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-
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In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1954

WalaLua AGricutruraL Company, Luairep, Petitioner
Vv.

Crraco Manesa, ET AL., Respondents

e

—_——

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CER.
TIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Opinion cf United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Dated May 5, 1954

No. 13,114—Opinion—May 5, 1954

Watatva AGricuLturaL Company, LrMiTep, Appellant,
vs.

Ciraco MANeEsA, ET AL., Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii

—

efore HEALY, BONE, and FEE, Circuit Judges

)
JAMES ALGER FEF, Circuit Judge:

This case must be reversed for error in approach. Waia-
lua initiated the procedure by petition for declaratory
judgment. The trial court, misled by the nature of the
cause and the attitudes of the parties, decided the wrong
issue.

The status of Waialua was tried out. It was contended
by Waialua that it was engaged in agriculture, and there-
fore all of its employees were exempt from application of
the statute. The trial court, in its first declaration, which
was reversed for lack of findings, and in its present dec-
laration and judgment, took the converse position. It has
held that Wailua, through corporate affiliations, interlock-
ing directorates and factor relationships, was a manufac-
turer of refined sugar on the mainland, and there engaged
in interstate and foreign commerce.’

By agreement of all parties and the Department of La-
bor, that Court finds that all employees of Waialua ex-
cept one group’ “are engaged in commerce or ih the pro-
duction of zoods for commerce.” Therefore, it was con-
cluded that every employee of Waialua on Oahu, Territory
of Hawaii, was subject to the drastic provisions of the Act
for each work week in which he did not spend every em-
ploved hour in an activity such as planting, irrigating,
cultivating, ratooning or cutting and loading ecane.* In
pursuit of the fallacy so induced, the Court refused to
describe each employee who harvested the crop by redue-

1 The trial court found that Waialua does not “directly engage in
any sugar refining operation.” 97 F.Supp. 198, 203.

2This group is composed of employees who perform the work
of repairing and maintaining dwelling houses in the mill village.
These employees the Court found, independently of agreement,
were employed in the production of goods for commerce. 97 F.
Supp. 198, 226-232.

3These activities are particularized by the trial court at 97
F.Supp. 198, 219, paragraph [3].

om)
wv

ing cane to raw sugar and molasses, an operation essen-
tial to its preservation, as an agricultural worker.‘

Thus the trial court did not give effect to the language
of the statute which excludes from its operation anyone
“employed in agriculture’® and defines “agriculture” to
include “farming in all its branches and among other
things * * * the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairy-
ing, the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting
of any agricultural and horticultural commodities * * *
and any practices * * * performed hy a farmer or ona
farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming
operations, including preparation for market, delivery to
storage or to market or to earriers for ‘ransportation to
market.” ®

After a remand upon a previous appeal,” on motion of
Waialua, the International Union was eliminated and its
Secretary, Jack Hall, stricken from the defendants. The
representative character of the original proceeding was

* The trial court, disregarding an express direction of this Court,
allowed the processing exemption, which is beside the point. The
activity was excluded by the terms of the Act. In its previous
opinion, 178 F.2d 603, this Court stated: “Not only was it the
desire to exempt processing as a part of the harvesting done by a
farmer or on a farm, but also processing done by a third party.
These provisions are not alternative or mutually exclusive, and
should be liberally construed for the reasons given by this Court
in McComb vs. Hunt Foods, Inc., 9 Cir., 167 F.2d 905, 908.” (page
609). The processing exemption, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(c), is directed
primarily toward that “processing done by a third party.” See
also Walling vs. Peacock Corporation, 58 F.Supp. 880, 883; Red-
lands Foothill Groves vs. Jacobs, 30 F.Supp. 995, 1006.

°29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(6). “* * the raising and harvesting of
sugar were specifically given consideration by Congress on ac-
count of the immense importance to the ecoromy of this country
as a whole.” Waiaiua Agricultural Company, Limited vs. Maneja,
9 Cir., 178 F.2d 603, 608, paragraph [6-8].

*29 U.S.C.A. § 203(f).

* Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited vs. Maneja, 9 Cir., 178
F.2d 603, cert. den., 339 U.S. 920.

bea

also abandoned. The individual workers, most of whom
Were retainers and dependents of Waialua although union
members, were permitted to file a so-called cross-complaint,
praying for relief in sums of money, and this time several
of these individual employees gave testimony as to the
kind of work each did. None of these devices, adopted to
meet criticism of this Court, changed the fundamental
character of the proceeding. The individual employee
cross-complainants still seem “pawns in this battle of the
demi-gods.” Waialua seems to act to preserve relations
with the Union and a federal bureau, as a policy. Prae-
tically all facts are agreed and, as above noted, constitu-
tional and jurisdictional conclusions as to coverage were
accepted. Thereby, emphasis was placed upon the wrong
problems.’ This conjugation by consent removes the cause
from the class of “eases and controversies” and is an
abuse of declaratory judgment procedure. The only bit-
terly partisan litigant is an executive bureau not named
in the record as a party. Notwithstanding a plain warning
of this Court upon the last appeal that such evidenee was
impertinent to the whole question as to whether the in-
dividual employee was an “agricultural worker,” the par-
ties introduced at this trial and the Court adopted as a
basis for decision two treatises. These were entitled, re-
spectively, “Labor in the Territory of Hawaii, 1959” ° and
“The Economy of Hawaii in 1947,” *° studies made under
the supervision of a department of the government,

—__- -__-_~

8 The suggestion of the trial court in one opinion that the ex-
clusion of agriculture would free farmers from the “oppressive
child labor” provisions of the Act need not be too much regarded.
Such a problem does not exist. And we have come a long way
from sound thinking in America if it be suggested that a farm
boy should not work on a farm. Of course, the bureaucrats could
take much Letter care of him.

® James H. Shoemaker, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, United
States Government Printing Office, 1940.

1° Bulletin No. 926, United States Department of Labor, United
States Government Printing Office, 1948.

~

7]

which, as noted above, took an active pert not only in the
trial court, but on both appeals.

Thus a false issue was created. Instead of concern with
the question of who was employed in agriculture, the at-
tention of the Court was deflected to a consideration of
membership of Waialua in a non-profit sugar refining and
marketing; cooperative ealled “California & Hawaiian
Sugar Refining Corporation, Ltd.”, of California, which
was engaged in the manufacturing business of refining
raw sugar, marketing the product, and transporting the
refined sugar to the consumers.” But all the activities of
the latter were carried on upon the mainland. No one of

_

"A similar contention was made by the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division. as a bitterly partisan litigant under the
guise of amicus curiae in Miller Hatcheries, Inc. vs. Boyer, 8 Cir.,
131 F.2d 283, 285, where Judge Johnsen, in an illuminating opin-
ion, held that employees of a commercial hatchery were excluded
because “employed in agriculture.” There the Administrator con-
tended “that the hatching of baby chicks by a commercial hatchery
is an industrialized and highly specialized activity which does not
itself have any direct connection with ‘farming operations’: that
the economic function of such an urban establishment is completely
disassociated from the agricultural activities,” that “thus trans-
posed from a farm to a commercial establishment it ceases to be
a technical farming activity’ and that “the attributes of farm
labor which justify its exclusion * * * ought not to be regarded’
as extending to a commercial operation.

This compares with the contentions of the Administrator here:
“To accomplish its purpose of producing raw sugar, appellait
plainly engages in many separate and distinct enterprises appro-
priate to that end, including manufacturing and transportation, as
well as farming. This integration of business operations neither
conceals the essential nonagricultural character of appellant's
manufacturing functions nor submerges the fact that appellant,
in operating a hybrid type of business, has assumed the functions
of a manufacturer and a railroad company, as well as those of a
farmer. * * * Just as the chain store cannot obtain the retail ex-
emption for its central office and warehouse merely because the
services of those units are restricted to exempt retail outlets, so
here. appellant cannot achieve exemption for its separate manufac-
turing function and its railroad activities simply because it utilizes
them only for the products of its farm.”

6

its employees is here involved. None of the workers of
Waialua was employed by the cooperative.

If the pertinent question of employment in farming had
been considered instead, then the lanzuage of the statute
defining such emplovees would have been civen effect.”

The decisions of this Court bear out the breadth of the
exclusion of agricultural workers. Dofflemyer vs. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 9 Cir., 206 F.2d 815 (Judge
Healy) shows that technical distinctions should not be
used to circumscribe the words “farmer” and “farm” as
used in the Act. The necessity for immediate processing
of a farm product is of great force in emphasizing the
scope of the agricultural exclusion, according to Judge
Bone, writing for the majority in MeComb vs. Hunt Foods,
9 Cir, 167 F.2d 905, where the interpretations of three
different district courts in widely separated agricultural
areas of the mainland are followed. There the Court
said:

“*The policy of protection to the growers of “per-
ishable and seasonal fresh fruits” is of as much force
as that of the protection of general industrial workers.
The objective of a uniform rule for hours and wages
in manufacturing should not be allowed to prevail
over the paramount necessity of garnering and pre-
serving fruits and grains when Congress equally ree-
ognized both in the Aet. The hypertechnical reasoning
concerning “exceptions” and “exemptions’’ has no
place here. A direct expression of non-applieability
constitutes neither.’

12 In an interesting case parallel to this in another food supply-
ing industry, the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit held, in
an able opinion by Judge Maris, that all employees necessary to
carrying on a fishery and fish processing activities were “exempt
by the plain language of Section 13(a)(5) of the Act.” McComb
vs. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 3 Cir., 174 F.2d 74, 78. It should
be marked with red on the margin of this case that the Adminis-
trator was there contending that all employees of a farmer, includ-
ing those engaged in first processing, were excluded by the lan-
guage, but that the exemption to fish processors was much nar-

rower.

“This is but another way of saving that if the busi-
hess operations claimed to be exempt are found to
fall within the exempt classifieation, the statute is, as
to them, a ‘remedial’ statute. We agree With the lower
court that no formalistic characterization should be
permitted in dealing with any of these clauses since
the plain intention of the statute should be earried
out.” (page 906).

The trial court was thus in error in requiring Waialua
to prove beyond peradventure the affirmative of the propo-
sition that each worker was employed in agriculture and
in activities by a farmer and on a farm. By an unwar-
rantedly strict construction, Waialua was required to es-
tablish exemptions beyond a reasonable doubt, as though
it were negativing a jurisdictional proviso in an indict-
ment.

Upon the former appeal, to which reference has been
made, the Court questioned the aptness of the declaratory
proceeding, but remanded because the findings were not
sufficient to support any judgment. The findings before
us are now meticulous and exact as to the hours and type
of work performed by each worker defendant during each
work week in question. However, the trial court failed to
find many vital facets which the record, as we view it,
bears out, and made many findings which are clearly erro-
neous. For these reasons alone, the cause must be re-
versed.

A vital finding contains the implication that sugar cane
ean be stored in Hawaii three or four days without spoil-
ing.’* In fact, a delay of three or four hours is apparently
deleterious, and for best results the cane, after cutting,
should move continuously from field to crushing mill.

1397 F.Supp. 198, 203.

1¢“Sugar cane is highly perishable * * * and starts to deteri-
orate immediately after harvesting. To avoid serious losses, it
must be processed into sugar, syrup or molasses within a few
hours after it has been burned or severed from the ground.”
Stipulation of Fact, Part I, § 4.

8

The Court coneludes that no worker at the erushing mill
is employed in agriculture but is exempt only insofar as
he assists in first processing. If necessity for immediate
treatment tor preservation liad been found, the Court
would have been impelled to find an employee at the rill
Woes engaged ino “harvesting” an agricultural product.
The Court found transportation of cane from fields to cars
was farming, but carrying of cane on cars drawn by a
locomotive from loading points to the mill was “railroad-
ing” and transportation in commerce. Again, the railroad
and its crew performed no other kinds of transportation,
and therefore what each did was “harvesting.’’ The com-
plete operation was vitally necessary to put the crop into
a form in which it would not spoil and, as “raw sugar,”
could be transported to the mainland for manufacturing.
Any activity of any employee which assisted in this opera-
tion, whether furnishing power to the mill or hauling cane
from field to mill, fell within the express word “harvest-
ing’ used in the enactment. Such a finding was not made,
Those which were made were erroneous.

Even if it could have been concluded that these activi-
ties were not “harvesting,” they were nevertheless carried
on by a “farmer.” Furthermore, such activities were
performed “on a farm.” On either of these independent
grounds, workers so employed were excluded by the en-
actment.

But the Court failed to find that Waialua was a farm-
er.” The record and stipulations show conclusively that

15 Employees of a “farmer” who work in or out of a store, trans-
porting, packing and selling plants in connection with a wholesale
and retail outlet located in a city four miles from the “farm” are
held to be employed in agriculture. Walling vs. Rocklin, 8 Cir., 132
F.2d 3. “The raw products were at most being prepared for mar-
ket in connection with the business of producing them.” (page 6).

1* The trial court held, contrary to the stipulations and evidence,
that Waialua “assumed a variety of functions, including those of
farmer, carrier, manufacturer, shipper, and operator of village
communities.” 97 F.Supp. 198, 218.

U

all activities of Waialua upon the island of Oahu were
concerned with growing, cultivating and harvesting sugar
‘ane. Tt should have been found that Waialua was a
farmer, and all workers performing functions for it. on
the plantation were employees of a farmer. It should
have been found that transportation of cane to the mill
and the crushing and drying of the raw sugar therefrom
Were activities performed by a farmer as ineidents to and
in conjunction with farming operations, including harvest-
ing, preparation for market and delivery to storage. Find-
ings of fact which have contrary implications are clearly
erroneous,

The trial court also found neither railroad nor erushing
mill were “on a farm.” ?? The admissions, maps and other
exhibits indicate all the activities of empleyees of Waialua
were carried on within the boundaries of a single parcel
of land described as a “plantation.”

The railroad and the miil’* were located upon a_ plot
of ground and appurtenances all of which were in exclu-
sive possession of Waialua. Practically all the area was
also in its “ownership,” ’ although seme acreage was
leased and one field was connected with the main body by
a right of way for moving its agricultural equipment,
supplies and sugar cane. By far the greater percentage
ef the ground in the area was devoted to raising and har-
vesting of sugar cane in a vear round process as an inte-

—

'? The trial court apparently confines the meaning of the word
“farm” to the fields upon which cane is actually grown, for it is
pointedly said in the opinion, “Obviously cane is not grown on
the right-of-way occupied by the fifty-six miles of permanent main
line railroad track.” 97 F.Supp. 198, 222. Cane probably does not
grow on roads where ox teams hauled cane.

‘* The trial court’s opinion states that the mill was on the plan-
tation. 97 F.Supp. 198, 204.

'’ Discussion of the peculiar land system of Hawaii is not neces-
sary.

lu

grated operation. This situation dictates that the locus
in quo be found to be a “farm.” *°

If then the particular activity of an employee was
neither “cultivation and tillage of the soil’? or “the pro-
duction, growing and harvesting” of this crop, he was
engaged in a practice performed “by a farmer or on a
farm” under the conditions set up in the statute.”

Misled by the apparent wholehearted agreement as to
the constitutional and jurisdictional conclusion regarding
preparation of goods for commerce, the trial court in-
ferred that a worker engaged in any operation or practice

20 National Labor Relations Board vs. John W. Campbell, Inc., 5
Cir., 159 F.2d 184, 187: “The argument that Respondent has 1,000
acres planted in tomatoes and grows packs and markets many car-
loads in a season and, because of ine very nature and size of its
operation, should be held to be engaged in an industrial enterprise
as distinguished from the pastoral pursuits of a farmer, will rot
do. The exemption was not restricted to the forty-acres-and-a-mule
farmer. It is rot measured by the magnitude of his planting nor
in the prolificacy of his harvest. In Larson v. Ives Dairy Co., 5
Cir., 154 F.2d 701, 702, we said: ‘Here, however, there is but a
single enterprise, and that a dairy farm. * * * ‘The size of the
farm, of course, does not matter—it is still a dairy farm.’ Here,
also, the growing, harvesting, packing and selling are all a part of
@ single enterprise.”

21 “Congress, as well as this Court, has recognized that the pack-
ing and preparing of agricultural products for the market is a
necessary incident to any agricultural operation, for no farmer,
dependent upon that which he produces to sustain his operations,
could long exist if he could not market that which he produces, and
so long as the operation of washing, packing, and preparing for
market by the employees of a farmer is on that only which he
has produced on his farm, it is a necessary incident to farming
and is agricultural labor. The wheat farmer must thresh his
wheat; the cane grower must cut his cane and make its juice into
syrup; the cotton grower must gin and bale his cotton; the citrus
grower must pick and pack his oranges; and the tomato grower
must do likewise. So long as these undertakings are in the prepa-
ration and packing by him for market of that which he has grown
on his farm, the labor necessary thereto is agricultural labor.” Na-
tional Labor Relations Board vs. John W. Campbell, Inc., 5 Cir.,
159 F.2d 184, 187 (emphasis added).

Which was considered noy farming by the strictes! classi-
fication was covered by the enactment. We eliphasize
that, if it had been found that reduction of cane to raw
sugar or molasses almost ntmnediateiy after cutting is an
Hinperative necessity, the palpable falsity of such sequela
would have been patent. The integrated operation re-
quired making of repairs on the erushing mill while shut
down for three months for that purpose, the repair and
overhaul of the various machines used in cultivating, cut-
ting and hauling, and the furnishing of power for the
mull, including the hauling and burning of bagasse 2? jn
the furnace thereof.

In order tu show how obviously it was on the wrong
path, it may be observed the trial court concluded em-
ployees assisting in repair and maintenance of houses and
the operation of services and facilities of villages on the
plantation, where some of these agricultural workers lived,
including the street sweeper and those who picked up
wood for cook fires, were engaged in the preparation of
goods for comunerce. In this conclusion, Which even the
Department of Labor does not attempt to defend in its
current argument, the trial court betrays emotional aver-
sion for the semi-feudal relationships whieh still exist in
a dependeney where the perquisite system abolished by
Waialua under pressure still exists.’ The fact that rises or are done by some outside agency. On the other
hand, certain judicial interpretations, if viewed as interpretations
of the general act binding on farmers on the mainland, are excres-
cences as foreign as gargoyles on a classic temple. McComb vs.
Puerto Rico Tobacco Marketing Co-op Assn., 80 F.Supp. 953, af-
firmed, 1 Cir., 181 F.2d 697; McComb vs. Del Valle, 80 F.Supp.
945; McComb vs. Casa Baldrich, Inc., 80 F.Supp. 869: McComb
vs. Super-A Fertilizer Works, 1 Cir., 165 F.2d 824.

27 Found at 77 F.Supp. 480 and 97 F.Supp. 198.

28 The Supreme Court expressly recognizes that largeness is not
the test. In Addison vs. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S.
607, 614-615, the Court adopted with approval and applied in the
solution of a like problem an expression uttered in a debate in the
Senate. “Senator Schwellenbach frankly stated that the largest
apple packing plant in the world would be exempt if the ‘work
done in that plant is as described in the amendment’.” The Court
summarized its position as follows: “Where Congress wanted to
make the exemption depend on size, as it did in two or three
instances not here relevant, it did so by appropriate language.
Congress referred to quantity when it desired to legislate on the

basis of quantity.”

15
Visions in all their rigor to the peculiar corporation which
Congress had not considered.

It we were drafting a specific law to deal with labor con-
ditions of Hawaii, emotional sympathy for some of the
attitudes of the trial court might be given effect. But we
are construing a general statute binding in all the states
as well as this territory.

Everyone who remembers the history of this legislation
knows that the mainland farmers were alert when these
bills were in Congress. The Congressional Record indi-
rates how changes in the language were required by them
and that the legislators debated and explained the effect
of each provision.*” The statute which was written seems
plainly to protect all possible phases of agricultural pur-
suits from regulation.“” But the drive of a motivated bu-
rean, Which appe:-ntly considers the interests of labor
utterly inimical to any protection of the farmer, has dis-
torted the language used by some of the courts.

Do some opinions mean that the plain expressions of
Congress in the statute excluding those employed in agri-
cultural pursuits are to be overridden by some higher
policy. The expressions of Congress were dictated not
only by the pressure of the farmers, but by the realization
that the federal constitution left local concerns such as
agnicult’ + whoily in the governance of the several states.

One of these perversions which might be allowable in a
statute applicable to a territory alone is the attempt to

29 See 81 Congressional Record 7648 et seq., 83 Congressional
Record 7393, 9162-9163, 9253 et seq., H.R. No. 1452, 75th Con-
gress, Ist Session, pp. 4-5, 11; H.R. No. 2182, 75th Congress, 3rd
Session, p. 2.

8° The agricultural! exclusion “is drawn in far reaching language
which shows the intent of Congress to make the term ‘agricul-
ture’ cover much more than what might be called ordinary farm-
ing activity and that is wnat now controls.” Damutz vs. William
Pinchbeck, Inc., 2 Cir., 158 F.2d 882, 883.

16

make the farmer prove aflirmatively that the particular
activity falls within the statutory exclusion. The use of
the word “exemption” in a heading of the enactment has
been seized upon by the bureau and followed by the lan-
guage of some of the courts.”

But agriculture is not conmmerce, interstate or foreign,
nor does agriculture affeet such commerce in a constitu-
tional sense. Most agricultural products eventually get
into interstate transportation, But growing and harvest-
ing of such produets is not preparation of goods for com-
merce, The statute sets this out in immutable terms by
expressly stating that preparation of goods for market
by a farmer or on a farm is excluded.

So we must go further and direct the proceeding be dis-
missed for abuse of discretion in entertaining a petition
for declaratory judgment here and attempting to settle

3! This Court, in the former opinion, 178 F.2d 603, 609, indicated
that the workers in agriculture were completely excluded from the
provisions of this Act. The language of the statute makes it
abundantly clear that, since agriculture is a local enterprise and
eanno*, without distortion be called commerce or preparation of
goods for commerce, the manifest intention was to exclude work-
ers on farms and those employed in agriculture from the sweep
of the Act. The use of the words “exempt” and “exemptions” in
the regulations and by the courts is justified by the text. But the
words of the statute, “shall not apply with respect to”, indicate a
policy of exclusion of such employee no matter what the business
of the master. With regard to agriculture, this policy of exclusion
was as powerful as the policy which dictated the general provi-
sions controlling employees in industrial pursuits. There is no
ground to invoke the theory of technical, narrow construction of
the Act to cover this basic food supplying industry. Walling vs.
California Conserving Co., 74 F.Supp. 182, affirmed, 9 Cir., 167
F.2d 905, cert. den., 335 U.S. 845.

** Federal regulation of agriculture invades the reserved rights
of the states. United States vs. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 But cf.,
Wickard vs. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111.

li

a question of jurisdietional and constitutional construction
therein.”

It is true the statute was not passed with the peculiar
economic situation of Hawaii in mind. Probably no spe-
cifie contemplation of an organization such as Waialua
Was in the foreground, But no one can deny that the posi-
tive clauses of the Act were to assure the farmer in the
several states of the continuance of his untrammeled way
of life. It was the intention that no bureau should dictate
the hours of his work “'—traditionally from sun to sun—
in the vitally essential task of feeding this nation and
foreign peoples to whom aid has been extended in the
form of foodstuffs. It has been a platitude of American
politics that the farmer is required to pay higher prices
for those things which he buys than he can obtain for the
products which he raises and sells. It was in the effort
to prevent the specialization of labor employed in agricul-
ture, where every man must he able to do all of the multi-
tudinous tasks, that these sections were adopted. It was
to the end that the farmer could use in the operations on
the farms unskilled and migrant labor, so that his eco-
nomic. burden might in one respect be lessened. These
provisions of the statute were included to prevent placing
innumerable restrictions and crushing burdens by bureau-
cratic supervision upon the American farms of the main-
land.

“This Court is without power to give advisory opinions. It
will not decide constitutional issues which are hypothetical, or in

advance of the necessity for deciding them, * * *.” Asburn Hos-
pital vs. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 213.

“* Speaking of the Fair Labor Standards Act and other acts, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit states: “* * * that exemp-
tion seems to have been a part of a general legislative pattern of
those times which clearly indicates that the purpose of Congress
was to relieve distressed farmers from burdens which it well knew
they were not equipped to carry.” National Labor Relations Board
vs. John W. Campbell, Inc., 5 Cir., 159 F.2d 184, 187.

Is

There has been an attempt to use the Farmers Reser-
voir case as a precedent here.’ The gist of the decision
there was that release of water from a headgate by the
field men of the reservoir company was not farming, (as
actual application of the water to a growing crop would
have been); it was not an act done by a farmer in con-
nection with farming and it was not done on a farm. The
decision on these specifie ¢rounds must be followed. Be-
sides, there is no reason to question its logical validity on
the basis above set out. It is true that the majority un-
fortunately accepted the acquiescence of the parties as
establishing the constitutional and jurisdictional factor
that the emplovees of a local irrigation company were en-
gaged in a “process or occupation necessary for the pro-
duction of goods for commerce.” Thereby the longstand-
ing principle of decision that a constitutional and juris-
dictional issue will not be debated or considered unless
actively raised by the parties was abandoned. Nor can
we accept as an explanation that rationalization leads to
quaint results.*

However that may be, in this case in a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding in a territory, all parties and the De-
partment of Labor acquiesce in the proposition that farm-
ing itself is production of goods for commerce. We re-
pudiate consent of the parties as a basis for decision.
Upon this fallacious theory, the trial court arrived at its
findings and conclusions here accused. We hold that a
farming operation such as growing the crop or harvest-
ing is not commerce. By no dialectics can it be shown
that irrigation, cultivation, plowing of the ground, prun-
ing of the trees or any of the processes before harvest,

—

35 Farmer’s Reservoir and Irrigation Co. vs. McComb, 337 U.S.
755.

36“Both in the employments which the Fair Labor Standards
Act covers and in the exemptions which it makes, Congress has
cast upon the courts the duty of making distinctions that often
are bound to be so nice as to appear arbitrary in relation to each
other.” Id. at 770 (concurring opinion).

1)

\Waether performed by a farmer or on a farm, are other
than purely local concerns relating to the production of a
crop. Cominon sense forbids it. Jurisdiction to regulate
farming on the ground that the products thereof may
eventually go into commerce cannot be conferred by con-
sent of the parties even in a particular case, sv definition,
any process essential to the growing, production or har-
vesting of crops is neither interstate or foreign commerce
nor preparation of goods therefor, nor yet again a process
or occupation necessary for the production of goods for
commerce. Farming in the several states cannot be regu.
lated as commerce even if it does constitute preparation
of farm products for market. To hold otherwise would
violate the express exclusionary language of the agriecul-
tural clauses of the statute and the public policy of cheap
production of foodstuffs above noted.

The public welfare requires that this statute be not
given a local interpretation to fit the needs of any terri-
tory, and that such special interpretations be not applied
to agriculture throughout the several states.” The Jan-
guage of the exclusion interprets a constitutional guaran-
tee, It is a charter for the mainland farmer. So far as
possible, in raising food for our widespread peoples, the
farmer should be exempt from higher cost of labor, He
should be able to plow, cultivate, irrigate, seed and har-
vest his crop without paving tribute. These processes,
essential to all, should not be made to cost more.* The

*’ This warning was expressed in our former opinion, 178 F.2d
603, 613: “The danger is that, by agreeing to this course of con-
duct, a precedent might be established for the settlement of prob-
lems on the mainland which does not have the peculiar problems
of Hawaii.”

**“Tt does not take a long memory to recall that in the midst
of the depression of 1935, and for a time before and since, the
farmer was the object of the deepest solicitude by Congress. It
furnished abundant evidence that it believed that no class of citi-
zens of the country was in greater need of Congressional aid than
the farmer.” National Labor Relations Board vs. John W. Camp-
bell, Inc., 5 Cir., 159 F.2d 184, 186.

LU

farmer in California should be able to run the heads of
wheat through a thresher or combined harvester and shell
out the grain, clean it, test it for protein content and
store it. He should be able to transport it on the farm
to the thresher or to storage or market, whether by his
own railroad or by trucks or by airplane. The stock raiser
in Idaho should be able to use ali forms of transportation
carrying calves or other stock to spring pasture or feeding
grounds. The stock rancher should be able to use his
vaqueros to repair barns, fences, corrals and even bunk-
houses, where his employees sleep, without becoming a
master carpenter. The raiser of peas should be anle to
make repairs and changes in his tractors, viners and mow-
ers by his own employees without becoming a master me-
chanic. He should be able to transport the fresh peas
many leagues from his land to the canner for essential
immediate processing by his trucks driven by farm hands
without becoming a trucker.

The sheepman can have a worker employed by him run
the system of gas or home-generated electricity which
lights up innumerable farm buildings and feed the chick-
ens he sells without becoming subject to the higher costs
under the industrial provisions of this law. The orchard-
ist of Washington should be able on his own land to pare
and core the apples, transport the meat thereof to market,
press out cider from the corings and peelings in a steam
driven rnill on his own land, and apply the residual pom-
ace as dressing to his land without becoming a manufac-
turer.” The operations described in processing raw sugar
from eane in Louisiana are in the same class.“

39 The si .vestion that this argument permits the farmer to carry
on extraneous manufacturing of such articles as automobiles on a
farm is vacuous.

4° As in the case of Miller Hatcheries, Inc. vs. Boyer, 8 Cir., 131
F 2d 283. 286, “We are dealing with a situation where there has
been ‘a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men
charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in mo-

ol

The authorities adverse to the maintenance of this de-
claratory proceeding are set out in the previous opinion.*!

The territorial institutions of Hawai: had provided the
protection for these workers almost identical with that
Which is the subject of this proceeding.” It is agreed by
the parties that this Act requires Waialua to pay and it
does pay as much or more than the minima of wages re-
quired per hour by the federal law. Perhaps, if local con-
ditions compel, the territorial legislature will require the
same work week in farming as is exacted by the Fair
Labor Standards Act, but without federal bureaucratie
control, which would necessarily he renounced if. state-
hood were attained.”

Each of these emplovees had an adequate remedy by
action at law if any thought he was aggrieved.*4 The
matter could have been tried on the facts relating to his
emplovment without the misleading background.

tion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they
are yet untried and new’.”

The Wage and Hour Division, on August 21, 1939, interpreting
the Act when it was new, said:

“Section 13(a)(6) renders the wage and hour provisions of the
Act inapplicable to employees employed in ‘agriculture’ * * *

“(b) The term ‘preparation for market’ must be treated differ-
ently with respect to various commodities. The following activities
among others, when performed by a farmer, seem to be included
within the term: * * *

“4. Sugar—-Manufacturing raw sugar, cane or maple syrup
and molasses.” Interpretative Bulletin No. 14. (Emphasis added.)

* 178 F.2d 603, 613-614, notes 16-28.

*? During each workweek involved herein, Waialua’s employees
received wages in excess of the Act’s requirements. They received
overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 48 hours a week. Thus
defendant employees are seeking a maximum of 8 hours overtime
pay for any of these workweeks.

** Perhaps for this reason Congress has never passed special
provisions of this law applicable only to Hawaii. as it did for the
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. See Note 26, supra.

**29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).

»)»

The cause is reversed for proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.*

(Endorsed:) Opinion. Filed May 5, 1954.
Paul PL O'Brien, Clerk.

Judgment of United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, dated May 5, 1954.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Distriet of Hawaii.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
the record from the United States Distriet Court for the
Distriet of Hawaii, and was duly submitted:

On Consideration Whereof, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the said
District Ceurt in this cause he, and hereby is reversed
for proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this
court, without costs to any party in this court.

(Endorsed) Judgnient.
Filed and entered May 5, 1954.
Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, dated June 24, 1954, upon Petition for Rehearing.

BEFORE: HEALY, BONE and FER, Cireuit Judges
JAMES ALGER FER, Cireuit Judge:

The opinion of the Court needs no clarification. The
cause Was reversed, the final orders set aside and the cause
remanded with directions to dismiss Waialua’s declara-

‘> Arguments advanced by appellees and amicus curiae which
are rendered immaterial because of the Court’s decision are: (a)
that the processing exemption, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(c), applies only
to the “place” in which processing is carried on and only during
such time as processing is actually taking place; (b) that any
employee who engages in a non-exempt activity for any portion
of a workweek is covered by the Act during such workweek.

23

tory petition. The Court construes what is called the
cross-complaint as a petition also for dee ‘laratory relief,

This is left undismissed by this Court. If the appellees
believe this to be a counterclaim at law, they may take
further proceedings as suggested in the latest opinion of
this Court. The parties and the Trial Court, however,
should be mindful of the fact that this Court has held
that the entire cause was tainted by apparent collusion
between the parties in the atte mpt to obtain an advisory
opinion upon constitutional questions. The considerations
of expense in futile proceedings are, of course, the concern
of the parties.

Rehearing denied.
(Endorsed:) Opinion on Petition for Rehearing. Filed
Jun. 24, 1954. Paul P. O’Brien, Clerk.

Order of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, dated June 24, 1954, denying
Petition for Rehearing.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCULT
Excerpt from Proceedings of Thursday, June 24, 1954
Before: HEALY, BONE and FEF, Cireuit Judges.
ORDER DIRECTING FILING OF OPINION ON
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

ORDERED that the typewritten opinion this day ren-
dered by this Court on petition for rehearing in above
cause be forthwith filed by the Clerk.

Pursuant thereto and on consideration of the petition
of appellant, filed June 2, 1954 and within time allowed
therefor by rule of court, for a rehearing of above cuuse,
TF IS ORDERED that said petition for rehearing be,
and hereby is, denied.

24
Opinion of United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii, dated May 3, 1951

In The United States Distriet Court for the
Territory of Hawaii

Civil No. 787

Waratua AcricutruraL Company, Ltp.,
Plaintiff and
Cross-Defendants,
Vs.

Ciraco Manesa, et al.,
Defendants and
Cross-Claimants.

Opinion and Decision of Court (May 3, 1951)
Containing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Merzcer, J.
Part I.
Statement and Findings
I

Nalure of Action. Controversy Involved,
and Jurisdiction,
This action arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1988 (the Act of June 25, 1938, 452. Stat. 1060, 29
USC Sections 201, ef seq.). Plaintiff sought a declara-

Oe
J

tory judgment, and the defendants filed a counter-claim
under Section l(b) of the Aet to recover unpaid over-
time compensation for work performed by them as em-
plovees of plaintiff, and to reeover liquidated damages,
costs and attorneys’ fees,

Following an earlier trial herein, a decision and judg-
ment of this court (reported at 77 F.Supp. 480), and an
appeal to the United States Court. of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, this action was remanded to this court for
further proceedings by a judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals rendered November 10, 1949 (reported at 178 F.2d
603).

Following the remand, all pleadings heretofore filed in
this action were amended by the parties, so as to drop
certain parties defendant from the litigation, to eliminate
the representative character of the case, and to limit the
action to the peried from November 20, 1946, to and in-
cluding September 14, 1947.

Under the amended pleadings, the following issues arise
With respect to that period of time:

A. Were the defendants or any of them exempt
from the provisions of the Act by virtue of
Sections 13(a)(6), 7(¢), or 13(a)(2), during all
or any workweeks falling within the aforemen-
tioned period?

B. Were certain of the defendants, while perform-
ing work of repairing and maintaining plain-
tiff’s dwelling houses, and while furnishing re-
lated facilities and services to plaintiff’s em-
ployees and others oceupying such dwelling
houses, engaged in commerce or in the produe-
tion of goods for commerce, within the meaning
of Section 3(1) of the Act?

(. What, if any, amounts are any of the defendants
entitled to recover from plaintiff pursuant to
Sections 7(a) and 16(b) of the Act?

|
4

These issues are raised by (a) the amended complaint
of plaintiff and defendants’ answer thereto; and (b) de-
fendants’ counter-claim, cross-claim and cross-complaint
under Section 16(b) of the Act, and plaintiff's reply and
answer thereto. In addition, defendants seek awards of
liquidated damages, and recovery of costs and attorneys
fees, pursuant to Section 16(b). By its reply and
answer, plaintiff seeks to defeat the request for liquidated
damages, as well as overtime wages due for the period
prior to May 14, 1947, by appealing to the good faith de-
fenses contained ir Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Portal-
to-Portal Act of 1947 (Act of May 14, 1947, Public Law
49, ¢. 52, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 61 Stat. 84, 29 USC See-
tions 251-263).

Ail issues have been presented and tried in a single
trial. The evidence consists of a lengthy stipulation to
certain facts, the testimony of plaintiff’s office manager,
the testimony of 22 of the defendant employees of plain-
tiff, and certain exhibits received in evidence, to which
reference will be made later.

This case does not involve waiting time, clean-up time,
travel time, or any of the types of activity whose con-
sideration occasioned in part the passage of the Portal-
to-Porta! Act of 1947. Defendants have atleged, it is not
disputed by plaintiff, and it is found by the court, that
the work performed by defendants for plaintiff, for which
recovery is sought in the counter-claim, was the principal
work performed by them, was compensable both under
an express contract and under custom and practice within
the establishments and places where the defendants per-
formed such work, and was performed during portions of
the days with respect to which the same was so made
compensable; that all such work was in fact paid for by
plaintiff, but the dispute between the parties is whether
the amounts so paid were sufficient to discharge plain-
tiff’s obligations under the Act for overtime compensa-

tion.

This court has jurisdiction of this action and of the
parties hereto pursuant to (ay Section U4 of the Judicial
Code as amended, 28 USC) Section IST. Ub) Seetion
Ji4id) of the Judicial Code, 28 USC Section 2201: and
(¢) Seetion Toth) of the bau Labor Standards Act of
1938.

7
Party ‘ and Period at LT tme luivoli ed.

Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws o:
the Territory of Hawaii en December 14, 1948. This
action Was instituted ou April 9, 1947, by a predecessor
corporation to the plaintiff?) bearing the same name. On
December 14, 1948, plaintiff acquired certain of the assets
and business, and assumed certain of the abilities, of
the predecessor corporation, including all rights, inter.
ests and liabilities in, or which might arise out of, this
action, By stipulation, piaintiff has been substituted as
the party plaintiff in this action fer the predecessor
corporation. All subsequent references to “plaintiff”
refer either to the predecessor corporation or to the new
corporation substituted herein, depending on whether the
Inatters to which they relate oecurred prior or subse-
quent to December 14, 1948.

Defendants are 42 individuals who were employed by
plaintiff during the period from November 20, 1946, to
September 14. 1947, inclusive. Each of then: appears in
this proceeding on his separate behalf only. and in’ no
Way as representative of any other persons or legal
entities. Uniess otherwise specified, each performed his
work on the plantation.

Summary of Plaintiff's Business.

Plaintiff operotes a sugar plantation located in_ the
District of Waialna, City and County of Honolulu,
Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii. In 1945, it was the
third largest producer of raw sugar in the Territory.

2S
At othe present time the plantation grows and produces
sugar cane on 9,065 acres of land owned or leased by it.
Substantially all of the land now devoted to sugar eane
production has been owned or leased by the plantation
und used by it for this purpose sinee 110.

As of approximately the commencement of the period
covered by this litigation, plaintiff had a total of 959 non-

supervisory emplovees,

inintiff’s business consists of (a) growing, cutlivating,
gad harvesting sugar cane on the lands owned or leased
hs its (hb) operating a system of railroad transportation
ever whieh harvested cane is hauled to plaiatiffs mill;
fe) processing such cane inte raw sugar and molasses at
the mili: Gd) shipping such raw sugar te a refinery
situated on the eontinemtal United States, where sueh raw
sugars refined and subsequently sold under the eireum-
stances dater diseussed herein: Ce) shipping molasses in
bulk to the continental United States; (f) operating a
series of shops for the purpose of maintaining, repair-
ing and overhauling plaintiffs batldines, machinery,
equipment, vehicles, and rolling stock; (2) maintaining
mill villawes and housing in which plaintiffs emplovees

ane their families dwell.

Plaintiff processes ne cane except that grown by itself
on its plantation. Neither dees it directly engage in any
suenr refining eperation. Towever, plaintiff and 30 other
COMPPIN TES engaged ino the production of raw sugar in
the Termtory, eonstitute the tetal membership of an
yesoeiation ealled Californin & Tlawaiian Sugar Refining
Corporation, Tatd. (@ & WW). a California eorporation.
(8 Toi. opalified as a cooperative marketing association
nnder the federal Capper Volstead Aet and under the
npplienble laws of the State of California. During the
hore inyvelyved in this litigation the meswhers of Co& Hl.
were under contract te deliver, and did

nolidinge pinne oft

~ :

29

deliver, to Co & H, all of the raw sugar produced by them
in the Territory, except for inconsequential amounts sold
for consumption as raw sugar in the Territory.

In this same period, C & H operated a sugar refinery
at Crockett, California. Under the mentioned contract,
( & H was entitled to process all raw sugar delivered to
it by its members, and to sell the refined sugar resulting
therefrom, 2s well as to sell in the ferm of raw sugar
any quantities delivered by the members of @ & H
Actually, © & H processed inte refined sugar more than
90° of the raw sugar delivered to it by its members, sell-
ing the balance as raw sugar,

The proceeds received by C & H from its sale both of
refined sugar and of raw suear, as well as any by-
products produced by it, were distributed in the following
manner. After first deducting the operating expenses of
("& H, the remainder was paid over to the members of
C & Hy, ineluding plaintiff. partly in the form of divi-
dends at 6% on the shares of eapital stock of C & H,
all of which were owned by the aforementioned 31 Hawaii
companies “substantially in the sane proportion as the
tonnage of raw sugar which they ship te C & HH” (Def.
Ex. 2) -and the balanee was paid over to the same eom
panies, in direct proportion to the amounts of raw sugar
delivered hy them to C & iH.

Plaintiff's Plantation Operations.

Sugar cane is highly perishable. To avoid serious
losses it is processed into sugar, svrup or molasses within
a relatively short time after heing harvested—usually, as
the reeord shows, the practice of processing is between
4 and 16 hours. Tt “eannot he stored more than 2 or 3

days without spoiling” (Def. Fx. 3B, p. 36).% It does

" For this reason and hecause of the great weight and bulkiness
of cane as compared with raw sugar. it must be processed within
a few miles of where it is grown

30

not move into interstate commerce in its natural state.
Except for small amounts which are used as seed cane,
it is grown fcr the purpose of producing sugar, syrup
and molasses. It is these products, which result from
the processing of cane, that become articles of interstate
commerce,

Substantially all of the cane-growing land of planta-
tien, its buildings and vard area, and other lands owned
or leawced by it, but unsuited for cane growing, ineluding
a wooded area from which firewood is eut for use for
fuel by plantation employees living in the plantation vil-
lages, forms a contiguous and compact area. Al! Jands
devoted to the growing of cane are managed and oper-
ated by plaintiff as an integrated farming unit and single
enterprise with identical cropping, cultivation and har-
vesting practices, and with the same labor and equip-
ment.

The growing and harvesting of cane, its processing in
the mill, and the shipping of raw sugar to the refiner,
take place continuously for a period of approximately
7-9 months. Annually, the harvesting and processing of
‘ane are Wholly suspended for the remaiaing 3-5 months,
for the purpose of completely reconditioning the mill
and equipment, and installing machinery and improve-
ments.

Plaintiff's buiidines, including the mill where eane is
processed inte raw sugar, and a number of buildings
whieh house repair shops for the maintenance of field,
transportation and mill equipment, warehouses for plainta-
tion supplies, and other buildings having funetional rela-
tion to the entice plantation operations, are centrally lo-
ented in the lowlands of the plantation in a eomnpact
aren,

Plaintiff. cane field operations are highly mechanized.
Speo TO there has heen x gradual reduetion in. the

nitber of man davs required te produce a ten oef raw

dl

sugar on plaintiff's plantation. This reduction was
brought about through mechanization and the application
of scientific methods. To a large extent hand labor and
the use of horse-drawn equipment and vehicles have been
eliminated, and motorized equipment substituted in their
stead,

The transportation system of plaintiff is also highly
mechanized, and this is likewise true Gf the processing
operations in the mill.

There is a high degree of coordination between field
operations, transportation, mill processing, shipping, and
all other aspects of plaintiffs activities.

“Operational problems on a sugar plantation are
comparable to those of a Detroit factory rather than
to those of a large lowa farm. The Primary ob-
jective of the management is to maintain ‘belt-line
production’ of sugar by so scheduling the various
field throughout the piantation for harvesting and
transport to the mill that full-scale raw-sugar pro-
duction will be continuous, 24 hours a day. To do
this it is necessary to maintain a fleet of large trucks,
mechanical harvesting equipment, a system of nar-
row-gage rathways (or other means of transporting
cane to the mill), a laboratory for scientific observa-
tien to determine the water and fertilizer needs with
an organized force of workers to implement. thes«
findings, and large pumping stations and = gravity
acetylene
veneraters, and beth stationary and portable welding
vrenerators,

3. Blacksmith Shop.

“his shop employs 2 blacksmiths and 2 helpers under
supervision of the ennelonding machine repair shop fore
tan. Ahent twe davs eneh week are spent by the Mack
smiths and helpers on mill work, conmsistine pryveipaliv

of constructing and reconditionme of cane carrier level-
Ing and preparation knives. Cane car repair work, such
as straightening of bars and channels, and repair of
tractors and caneloaders, and field implement work,
eceupy the yvreat percentage of the tman-lours in the
shop. The werk of this shop ix uniter throughout the
vear. Equipment in this shep includes 2 forges, an elee-
triecally operated hanmuner. and a variety of stall tools,

4. Tinsmith Shop.

This shop employs a tinsinith journeyman and 2 help-
ers. Mill repair work liere is negligible, although light
sheet steel work, including maintenance and reps of
roof gutters and down pipes, is performed by the shep
personnel. Repairs of auto, truck, traetor and caneloader
radiators are performed by the shop personnel.

The main work of this show is the making and reecon-
ditioning of tim irrigation SCOOPS. These scoops are used
in quantity in the field for the purpose of deflecting water
from conercte irrigation thoes to field irrigation lines,

». Caneloading Machi Be pau Shop.

Twelve cmplovees and a foreman work here. They per-
form all major repairs and overhaul of caneloaders,
grabs and miscellaneous field equipment. Men from this
shop are oeeassonally called pon to assist In emergency
mill repairs. They alse eo inte the field to repair cane-
landing machines during the course of harvesting opera-

TIONS,

An important funetion of this shop is the construction
ef auxiiars field equipmern’. sach as sub-soilers used in
plowing, cane [ne reshapers used to maintain irrigation
water fines on the field) and portable track line leveler
attachments used in leveline che lines for laving portable
tracks. Repairs on such auxihary field) equipment are

ae)

te

alse made in this shop, with Hssistanmee fron, personnel

of the traetor repair shop,

In the off-season, at least & of the Y canelouding tia
chines are completely dismantled and reconditioned, The
“th machine is peconditioned after harvesting has been
resumed. In the off-season, 10 te 12 operators of cane-
loading dachines are brought in to supplement the regu-
lar employees of this shop, and to assist. in overhaul,
Five cane grabs are overhauled and reconditioned during
the off-season, and all other cane vrabs are repaired.
During the harvesting season, 3 new cane vrabs are
usually built.

equipment in this shop includes 4 portable welding
renerators, and 2 portable welding generators mounted
on trucks for field) repairs. A hydraulic press, over-
head crane, motor-driven grinders and a variety of small
fools complete the shop equipment. Four welders in the
shop take care of welding repairs in the field, and re-
pairs to, and building of, new field equipment.

6. Tractor Repair Shop.

Seven employees normally work here, but in the off-
season this number is supplemented by 12 te 15 tractor
operators who are brought into the shop from the
fields, to assist in repairs. All tractors used in. the
harvesting field are overhauled in this shop during the
offseason. Tractors used for towing cane line” re-
shapers are also overhauled during the off-season, Other
tractors which cannot be overhauled during the off-
season are scheduled for overhaul at a later date. This
may mean that 6 or 7 out of a total of 48 traciors are
left for operating season overhaul. Tractor engines are
overhauled at recular periods,

Minplovees of this shop are sometimes dispatehed for
repair of tractors in the fields. They also assist in repair

44

of field implements in the caneloading machine repair
shop.

«2 Garage.

Personnel employed here numbers 24.) Primarily work
of the garage is to maintain and keep in repair plaintiff's
YS motor vehicles, consisting of 1S passenger vehicles, 45
pick-up trucks up to one ton, 27 heavy trucks from 1},
to 7 tons, 1 motoreyele, 2 fire trucks, and 2 panel trucks.
Sixty-four of these vehicies are assigned to operations in
the field, 12 to the repair and service shops, 1 to the
mill, 1 to the hospital, 2 to the plaintiff's retail store, 7
for administration, 2 are fire trucks, and 9 to the motor
pool.

Overhaul of cars and trucks is scheduled throughout
the vear, except that pick-up trucks used by the harvest-
ing men are overhauled during the off-season. ‘Truck
drivers are not used to assist in truck or auto repairs,
since there is generally a spare truck to drive when
others are being repaired. All such work is performed
by the garage mechanics.

Shop equipment consists of 4 overhead cranes, a hoist,
‘ralve grinding machine, brake drum lathe, boring ma-
chine, tire tools, and a variety of special tools.

Complete servicing equipment is also maintained, to-
gether with necessary personnel. Seven full-time em-
plovees and om part-time employee perform the lubri-
eating and was'ng of vehicles. One employee dispenses
gas and oil at the yard service station. Six persons are
emploved as helpers to garage mechanies when there is
no service work.

Field service covers the daily lubrication of all equip-
ment and the replenishing of fuel tanks. Tractors, cane-
loading machines, portable air compressor, diesel and

45

gasoline locomotives, and all field equipment are serviced
daily by a total of 6 men. Two completely equipped
service trueks manned by 2 men each service all field
equipment, except that in the harvesting fields. In. the
latter case, a two-wheel trailer, tractor-drawn, is kept in
each of the two harvesting fields. Oil, gasoline, diesel
oil, greases and water are carried on the trailer. to-
gether with pewer-operated grease guns. One man as-
signed to each trailer services the eranes and. tractors
in the harvesting fields. In this way service work ean
he done during lunch hour and slack periods without
serious interference with harvesting operations.

8. Electric Shop.

Fifteen employees work in this shop. Three of these
are mill electricians who divide their time between the
mill and the shop, working two weeks in the former, then
one week in the latter. The shop maintains electric
pumps and transmission lines and performs domestic wir-
ing repairs, including wiring of houses, and the building
of new electrical appliances. Employees of this shop per-
form necessary work on electrical machines located in
the other shops.

In addition to mill repair work done by the employees
assigned as electricians to the mill, electrie shop per-
sonnel may assist them in case of major electrical repairs
required, About half of the work in this shop is for
the mill. During the off-season, about 70% of the work
is for the mill.

9, Carpenter Shop.

Twenty-five carpenters and two supervisors comprise
this Shop’s personnel. They perform all carpenter work
on the plantation, whieh includes construction of mill
seaffoldings, construction and maintenance of railroad

+b

trestles and wooden gates for flumes, and construction
and maintenance of cane cars. In addition, they perform
necessary maimtenance work on the plantation buildings
and houses. ‘They also instail and maintain steel and
concrete pipe lines and siphons. Miscellaneous con-
struction, such as construction of tool lockers, scrapers
and strainers, is performed in this shop. Field work,
including work on the flumes, railroad trestles, siphons
and pipe lines, accounts for about 254c of the work of
the employees. Mill secaffoldings and mill building re-
pairs, construction of tool lockers, scrapers and strainers,
account for another 10%. Maintenance and repair of
plaintiffs buildings and housing account for another
45%c. The remaining 20° of the work consists of con-
struction and repair of cane cars. The work is uniform
throughout the year, with little change between grind-
ing season and off-season. During the off-season, addi-
tional nen averaging from 10 to 15 may be brought in
from the fields to assist in cane car overhauling and
general carpentry work.

10. Paint Shop.

Here are emploved 5 painters and a supervisor. They
perform all painting work on plaintiff's buildings, includ-
ing housing, and they also occasionally paint siphons and
railroad trestles. As a general rule, they do not paint
for the mill, this work being done by mill employees.
Most of the time of the paint shop crew is devoted to
painting of plantation buildings and housing throughout
‘he vear. During the off-season, an average of two
additional employees brought in from = the fields may
assist in the work of this shop.

HW. Plumbing Shop. .

Six pluinbers and one supervisor work here. Thev
perform all plumbing work on the plantation, ineluding
the construction and maintenance of sewer and water

40

systenis and plumbing for buildings and housing. Ap-
proximately 10° of the time is devoted to will plumbing
work, lo‘ to field work and the remainder to buildings
and housing. Assignments varv little throughout the
year. During the off-season, an average of two field
employees may be assigned to the plumbing shop as
helpers.

12. Roundhouse.

Reference to the roundhouse has already been made.
It regularly employs two inen in the shop, who perform
the servieing, cleaning and firme of plaintiff's locomo-
tives, Additional employees are occasionally assigned to
this shop to assist in minor locomotive repairs.

Laboratory.

In a separate building, plaintiff operates a laboratory.
Various chemical tests are made by the laboratory per-
sonnel in the course of all field and mill operations. This
work is performed under the supervision of a chief
chemist with the assistance of 13 chemists, testers and
samplers, By performing careful analysis of various
kinds relative to the cane and materials in the course of
growing, cultivating and harvesting of cane, and the
extraction of the sugar juices, all operations are con
trolled pursuant to scientifie methods.

Determinations of the cane fiber in each field, or
Variety of eane, are made during each shift. Figures
obtained are used in ealculating bagasse weights, field
distribution and extraction percentages,

Cane leaf analysis is made from samples of cane tops
brought in each day and analyzed for green weight mix-
ture, totai sugars, nitrogen, potash and phosphate.

Daily tests are made for a variety of other purposes.
Tests are made to determine the amount of field trash in

48
harvesting brought ts the mill. Continuous samples are
taken from the feed roller of uie first mill each hour,
and also at each change of harvesting, and records of
ratios of cane to available sugar are obtained. Extracted
Juices are sampled to determine the sugar obtained from
‘ane by the miiling process. Extracted juices are used to
ealenlate the weight of bagasse. Every three hours
samples from clarified juice are taken, to reveal the rela-
tive amount of solids being removed by the lime and heat
treatment of quices. Purity of svrup is cheeked., Samples
of bagasse are taken every two hours, and ash determi-
nations are also made twice daily, to determine the in-
fluence of different fields on the fireroom. Mix‘ures of
sugar and molasses are tested to determine the amount
of sugar lost in the filter cake,

Tests are also made of the mill boiler water, loeomo-
tive boiler water, steam pump boiler water, and pump
water. Pump water from eleetric pumps and well water
are sampled once each month. Wash water frew the
cleaning plant and condenser water are also analyzed each
shift.

Concrete Products Plant

In a separate building, plaintiff operates its own eon-
crete products plant. Six men ordinarily staff it, although
the number varies from 4 to 10. Work is usually per-
formed on a single shift basis, but occasionally two shifts
are maintained.

This plant is engaged primarily in producing eonerete
irrigation flumes and water supply pipe. It also makes
blocks, footings, sidewalk slabs and various other ineci-
dental concrete products required by the plantation.
Crushed rock used in the manufacturing process is pur-
chased locally, but from 80% to 90° of all cement used
is obtained from the continental United States. The work

40)

consists of setting up forms, mixing and pouring con-
creve, removing the previous day’s products and arrang-
ing thin ti storage. Cement used is stored in cars which
are set on the siding near the plant, or the cement. is
stored in the cement shed as part of the inventory of gen-
eral supplies warehousing. In the latter case, unloading
of cement tis done by the warehouse personnel. Various
activities requiring the flumes, pipe and other produets
receive them direct from the storage area where the prod-
ucts are stored,

The operations do not have any off-season. During the
off-season, however, additional personnel may be brought
in from the fields. In 1946, the plant produced approxi-
nately 46,000) concrete pieces, ineluding flume sections,
pipe and other products.

Storage of Supplies

Materials and supplies purchased for plantation opera-
tions are warehoused or stored in several separate build-
ings located in the plantation buildings and vard area.
Value of supplies on hand averages $500,000, The total
Value of goods proeured during a year, including stoex
and special order materials, averages over $1,000,000,

Most of the materials received were shipped to the
plantation from Tonolulu on the O. R. & LL. Purehases
nav be either local or by order and direct shipment from
continental United States. Freight received is placed in
the proper warehouses by the warehousing personnel. In
almost all cases railroad sidings permitted placement of
the OO RL & LL. cars next te the warehouse receivine the
materials. The warehonsing personnel is not responsible
for, nor does it engage in, delivering materials to the
various operations or shops.

The principal buildings in which the supplies and mate-
rials of the plantation are stored are the general sup-

50

plies warehouse and the heavy supplies warehouse. They
house electrical goods, building hardware, paints, window
screening, tractor and caneloading repair parts, copper
tubing, pipe stock, metal shapes stock, galvanized sheet-
ing, steel sheets and many other items.

The oil storage warehouse contains lubricants and a
limited amount of paint.

Gasoline, fuel oil, diesel oil and kerosene were dis-
charged directly from the O. R. & L. tank cars inio stor-
age tanks,

Most of the automotive parts and tractor, caneloading
and miscellaneous parts are stored in the garage.

Cement is stored in a separate warehouse. Lime is
stored in the mill in the lime room after being unloaded
by warehousemen.

Lumber is stored in the open lumber yard adjoining the
general supplies warehouse. Herbicides are also stored
there.

Fertilizers are usually trucked directly from = railroad
ears to the field as needed; but if temporary storage is re-
quired, they are placed in the sugar warehouse.

The warehousing operations are handled as one unit
under a warehouse superintendent with 13 > employees.
Five clerks perform the bookkeeping and handle aecounts.
The remainder of the warehouse personnel is employed
in the unload'ng and storing of stocks and materials, keep-
ing stock reeord ecards and taking inventory.

Main Administration Office.

The main administration office is located about 1500
feet from plaintiff's buildings and vard area. The man-
ager, assistant manager, and staff assistants have their
offices here, Employees include the cashier, bookkeeper,

ol

head timekeeper, 6 assistant timeke: pers, S clerks, 5 stenog-
raphers and typists—a total of 22 employees working
under the office manager and his assistant. Four time-
keepers keep the time of the field employees; 2 keep the
time of the shop, store, mill, hospital and village mainte-
nance employees, These offices are where payroll records
are maintained, and salaries and services paid.

Also housed in this building are the offices of the civil
engineer, one assistant surveyor, 2 Junior surveyors, and
facets
of the imstant case, support a different concluss pm. In
origin and history, Waialia village was and rer ains a
mull village, company owned and company-contromed, in
every sense of that tect, The same is true of the -maller
Villages on plaintiff's plantation where its employees
oceupy company-owned dwellings. All these villag -s, and
all of the butidings, houses, and other facilities « casting
therein, were created by plaintiff for the purpose f pro-
viding housing and community services for a stable supply
of labor. These villages are Jocated within the planta-
tion area, and Waialua, the largest of them, was estab-
lished in close proximity to the mill. Not only does plain-
tiff own the homes, but also the other services anc build-
ings necessary to community life the hospital, gym-
nasium, parks, playground, clubhouse. The oppo ‘tunity
to occupy or use any portion of these communities, their
fa ilities and the dwelling houses therein, has always
rested exclusively with plaintiff. Ingress and egress are
sub ject plaintiff’~ control,

While plain iff’s emplovees are not required under the
collective bargaining agreement to live in company-owned
houses, there is no evidence that they have any real choice
over the matter. The po-sibility of purchasing homes of
their own seems to be a remote and rare occurrence; the
unique system of semi-fendal land tenure plays a role.
Only to an ineonseqnential extent is it pessible for em-
plovees to rent, at suitable Iscations near to their places
of work, houses owned by anvone other than plaintiff. Tt

v1

cannot be assumed to be accidental that, of 959 non-
supervisory persons employed by the company, in- the
period to which this suit relates, only 16 lived in houses
other than those owned by plaintiff.

The work done by plaintiff's employees in maintaining
and keeping in proper condition the housing occupied by
its production workers, is neither trivial nor insignificant
to plaintiffs business of producing sugar. Tt represents
a material contribution to plaintiff's production of sugar.
Without the performance of such repair and maintenance
work, plaintiffs housing and village facilities would falk-
into disrepair. Its employees would be unable to con-
tinne to occupy them, and there would be marked inter-
ference and damage to the continuation of production of
goods for commerce. The close relaiionship between the
maintenance of the mill villages and the production of
cane and manufacture of sugar, is exemplified by the fact
that mill village maintenance employees, such as carpen-
‘ers, painters and plumbers, perform their work indis-
eriminately both or the buildings and facilities used by
plaintiff to conduct its production operations, and on the
dwelling houses. Oceupation by plaintiff's production
emplovees of its housing is to be considered in connection
with the fact tha: plaintiff hauls many of its emplovees
from their homes in the mill villages to and from their
job sites. In the operation of its business, plaintiff has
departmentalized its activities: the plumbing shop and
paint shop lave personnel comprising intaet groups who
perform necessary work both on plaintiff's production
haildings and its housing. In the ease of carpenters, all
are attached to the earpenter shop, without segregation
hetween village earpenters and industrial carpenters, ex-

cent as to timekeeping,

It ix in the light of these facts that decision must be
made of the question presented, That question is whether

92

the work of mill village repair and maintenance is “nec-
essary” to the production of goods for commerce. Judge
Healy has pointed out that the term “produced” is broadly
defined in the Act (Ciadver v. Bell and Luffland, Inc. 9,
Cir. 146 F.2d 29, 32. The Supreme Court has said that
the word “necessa-v”, as employed in the Fair Labor
Standards Act, should not be applied in a manner that
would give it an unwarranted rigidity; it is a word “to be
harmonized with its context” (Armour & Co. v. Waniock,
323 U.S. 126, 130-131. The issue there decided was
whether a firefighting service was sufficiently necessary
to the operation of a soap factory, to entitle such service
employees to coverage under ihe Act. The Supreme
Court said*
“* * * no hard and fast rule may be transposed from
one industry to another to say what is necessary in
‘the production of goods.’ What is practically neces-
sary to it will depend on its environment and position
* * * What is required is a practical judgment as to
whether the particular emplover actually operates the
work as part of an integrated effort for the produc-
{ion of goods.
* * * cd
“A court would not readily assume that a corpora-
tion’s management was spending stockholders’ money
on a mere hobby or an extravagance. The company
does not prove or assert that this fire protection is SO
unrelated to its business of production that it does not
for income-tax purposes deduct the wages of these
employees from gross income as ‘ordinary and neces-
sary expenses,’”
(No claim is advanced by plaintiff that its expenditures
for wages to its employees and for other purposes in the
maintenance and repair of dwellings and village facilities,
are not included in its income tax returns as part of its
expenses of operation, 26 USCA Int. Rey. Code Section
23(a)(1).)

93

“More is necessary to a successful enterprise than
that it be physically able to produce goods for com-
merce. It also aims to produce them at a price at
Which it can maintain its competitive place, and an
occupation is not to be excluded from the Act merely
because it contributes to economy or to continuity of
production rather than to volume of production.”
(Armour & Co. v. Wantock, Supra.)

Accordingly, the work performed by carpenters, paint-
ers, plumbers, and others was covered, pecause they con-
tributed to “the maintenance of a safe, habitable building”
(A. B. Kirschbaum vy. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 024), which
Was, in turn necessary to house, maintain, and keep in
desired proximity to plaintiff's operations, employees
Whose work involved them directly in the production of
goods for commerce.

Whether, since the amendment in 1949 of Section 3(j),
such employees are covered for future work, is not here
presented. The sole question for determination deals with
the period between November, 1946, and September, 1947,
Which antedates the recent amendments. Hence, decision
here is confined to the Act as it read at the time of the
activities over which the suit has been brought and no
intimation is intended as to the effect, if any, of the 1949
unendments of Section 3 (j), particularly since the factual
picture may have undergone change since 1949.

It resins to determine whether the exemptions of
Section 13(a)(6) or 7(¢) are applicabie. For the reasons
heretofore given in respect of employees in the repair
shops, neither exemption applies.

Commingled Work.

There are numerons instances shown of the performance
by a particular defendant, within a single workweek, of
some activities which are exemp: unde. either Section
fe) or W(a)(6), and other activities which are non-

94

exempt. As a general rule, the engagement by defendants
in non-exempt activities, in those workweeks where this is
found to be the fact, was substantial: and even in those
instances where such engagement was small in amount, it
was regular and recurring.

As construed by the Supreme Court, the statute makes
each workweek the standard to be considered in deter-
mining the applicability of overtime provisions (Overnight
Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 579).
It would be contrary to the Congressional intent to grant
the exemption for a workweek in which the employee per-
formed some activities which Congress intended to be non-
exempt. The Administrator has long held the view that,
where exempt and non-exempt activities are commingled
in a single workweek, the entire week is nonexempt (In-
terpretative Bulletin No, 14).

This view has been uniformly sustained in an imposing
array of decisions. Fleming v. Swift & Co., 41 F. Supp.
825 (N.D. Ti); afffd. 131 F.2d 249; Walling v. DeSoto
Creamery & Produce Co., 51 F. Supp. 988 (D.C. Minn.);
Shain v. Armour & Co., 50 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Ky.);
Walling v. Peacock Corporation, 58 F. Supp. 880 (E.D.
Wise.); Weeks v. Postal Tel., 1 WH Cas. 1177; McComb
v. Puerto Rico Tobacco Marketing Cooperative Ass’n., 80
F. Supp. 9538 (D.C. P.R.), aff’d., 1 Cir., 181 F.2d 697;
Anderson v. Manhattan Lighterage Corporation, 2 Cir.,
148 F.2d 971, certiorari denied, 326 U.S. 722; Jordan v.
Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co., 45 F. Supp. 769
(D.C., WD. Ark.) : Walling ve Bridgeman-Russell Co., 2
WH Cas. 785 (D.C. Minn.) ; Wabash Radio Corp, v. Wall-
ing, 6 Cir, 162 F.2d 391: MeComb v. del Valle, 15 Lab.
Cas. 74.679 (D.C. PLR.) : Sukes vo Lochmann, 156 Kans.
992. 499 PI G20: Gaskin v. Clell Coleman & Sons, 5
WH Repts. 581 (Ky. CC, Mercer Co., 1942); Loeh v, Ideal
Packing Co.. 7 WH Repts. 397 (Wise. CC, Mill Co, 1944).

3

os)

In the case at bar, there are a few scattered instances
where a defendant was assigned to perform exempt ac-
tivities for virtually the entire week, but also performed
a non-exempt activity for a small portion of time, some-
times as little as an hour or less. It is in aceord with
judicial authority to stand on the plain meaning of the
statute, and to hold the exemption inapplicable, no matter
how little time was devoted in the particular workweek to
non-exempt work. Departure from the statute would
create rather than obviate practical problems, including
the problem of where and at w'iat point io draw the line.
The instances where such a small amount of non-exempt
work was performed in a week which otherwise would he
exempt, are few and scattered. They do not present a
consistent or recurring pattern, and it is not claimed by
plaintiff tha. it cannot easily avoid such situations by
assigning the non-exempt activity to some other worker
who normally performs that type of work as a regular
part of his duties.

According!y, where in any given workweek a defendant
engaged in activities some of which were non-exempt, none
of the exemptions pleaded by plaintiff applies to such
workweeks despite the fact that nearly all activities per-
formed therein were exempt.

Retail Exemption.

Plaintiff urges that Section 13(a)(2) is applicable to
some of its employees. This section exempts any em-
plovee engaged in a retail or service establishinent the
greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate
commerce, Upon the record of this case, i: does not ap-
pear that any of the defendants fall within that provision;
henee it is found that Section 13¢a)(2) was inanolicable
to all of the defendants.

9G

Liquidated Damages.

In subsequent findings, determination is made that cer-
tain of the defendants are entitled to recover stated
ainounts as overtime compensation due and owing to them.
Defendants seek liquidated damages in amounts equal to
the unpaid overtime compensation found due to them.

The Act provides that any emplover found liable for
unpaid overtime wages, shall also be liable “in an addi-
tional equal amount as liquidated damages” (Section 16
(h)). In 1947, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act,
Which contains provisions under which liability for liqui-
dated damages, as well as unpaid overtime wages up to
May 14, 1947, may be affected. Under Section 9 of that
Act, no empioyer shall be subject to any liability, either
for overtime wages or liquidated damages, if he pleads
and proves that his failure to pay overtime was in good
faith, in conformity with and in reliance on any adminis-
trative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpreta-
tion of any agency of the United States, or any adminis-
trative practice or enforcement policy of any such agency
with respect to the class of employers to which he be-
longed; but this is expressly limited to claims based on
an emplover’s failure to pay overtime prior to the date
of enaciment of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which was May
14, 1947.

Under Section 10, a second special defense is provided,
Which is more narrowly drawn with respect to the number
or type of agencies of the United States on whose conduct
an employer places reliance. Under this section, no em-
plover subject to the Act shall be subject to liability for
overtime compensation or liquidated damages, based on
the emplover’s conduct on or after May 14, 1947, if he
pleads and proves that his conduet was in good faith, in
conformity with and in reliance on any written adminis-
trative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpreta-

7

tion, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy
of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of Labor.

A final special defense is created by Section 11, which
gives the court discretion to award no liquidated damages,
or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount
specified in Section 16(b) of the Act, if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that his act or omis-
sion giving rise to the action was in good faith, and tha:
he had reasonable grounds for believing that it did not
constitute a violation of the Act.

Plaintiff, by its pleadings, raised all three of these spe-
cial defenses. However, these defenses were abandoned at
the trial; no evidence was offered by plaintiff in support
of these defenses, and nothing was “proved” or “shown to
the satisfaction of the court” to support these pleas. In
the absence of evidence to bring into operation any of the
mentioned special defenses, there is no basis on which to
deny full liquidated damages to those defendants who are
entitled to recover, inasmuch as such is the requirement
of Section 16(b) of the Act.

Costs and Attorney's Fees.

The defendants pray for costs and attorney’s fees. The
Act provides that the court “shall, in addition to any
judgmen: awarded * * * allow a reasonable attorney’s fee
to be paid, * * * and costs of the action” (Section 16 (b)).

The amount of attorney’s fee awarded should bear
proper relationship to the facts of the case, and should be
reasonable in light of the quantum of service rendered,
the difficulties presented by the problem and issues in-
volved, and the ex:ent of recovery achieved.

The court will award an attorney's fee which takes into
account the foregoing factors as they relate to the facts of
this ease, the oceurrence of two trials and one appeal,

OS

X

and the total recovery for all defendants, which, including
liquidated damages, amounts to $6,729.02.

Costs of suit will also be ordered paid to the defendants
who prevail in this action.*

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, dated November 10, 1949

Before Stephens and Healy, Cirenit Judges, and Fee, Dis-
trict Judge.

JAMES ALGER FEF, District Judge:

This is a proceeding for a declaratory judgment,
brought by Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited, a
corporation, against Ciraco Maneja and forty-seven other
persons as defendants, individually and as representative
of all other employees of plaintiff who are similarly sit-
uated. Included also were Local 145-7 of the Interna
tional Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, and
Jack Hall, Regional Director, Territory of Hawaii, of the
International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union,
individually and “as representative of all emplovees of the
plaintiff who are named herein as defendants and of all
other employees of the plaintiff who are similarly. sit-
uated.”

The complaint sets up a general description of the oper-
ations of the plaintiff corporation and alleges that a col-
lective bargaining agreement was entered into between
plaintiff and defendant International Longshoremen’s and
Warehousemen’s Union, Local 145-7. The complaint like-
wise sets up a detailed statement of the duties of each

—-

* The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the District
Court are printed in the record used in the Court of Appeals, nine
copies of which have been filed with the Clerk of this Court pur-
suant to Rule 21(4). See R. 190 et seq., 308 et seq.

99

employee in somewhat vague terms. The praver of the
complaint is that the employee defendants named be de-
clared employed in agriculture and, if not, each be de-
clared to be engaged in the processing of sugar cane into
sugar, and that certain of the employee defendants, while
engaged in certain tasks in connection with the plantation
Villages, be declared not engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce. The answer contains
admissions and denials and prays a declaration that none
of the employees and defendants are engaged in agricul-
ture, and, while it is admitted that certain emplovees were
engaged from time to time during certain work weeks in
first processing, further prays the Court declare that none
of them were engaged in processing as an adjunct to agri-
eulture and that the Court declare all the emplovee de-
fendants were engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, and that all of the employees were
subject to the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and prays for an accounting.

There was then filed an elaborate stipulation which set
up that competent witnesses would testify as to volu-
minous facts relating to the general situation. Part I of
the stipulation, in paragraphs 1 to 37, inclusive, contains
the agreement that the witnesses would testify to the or-
ganization of Waialua as a corporation and a detailed and
meticulously precise statement of its operations and activi-
ties throughout the vast setup. Part IT of the stipulation,
under paragraphs 3S to 86, inclusive, contains the agree-
ment that the witnesses would testify to a general de-
scription (not related by particular hours, weeks, months
or vears or to any particular calendar period) of the work
performed by the forty-eight different emplovee defend-
ants of the Plantation. Part IIT of the stipulation is

100

devo‘ed to a limitation of the scope of the controversy
and dispute and reads as follows:

“It is Hereby Further Stipulated by and between the
parties hereto as follows:

“The controversy involved in the suit pursuant to
which this stipulation is made and filed raises the
question of whether the emplovees of the Plantation
named as parties defendant herein and all other em-
ployees of the Plantation who are similarly situated
are entitled to overtime compensation pursuant to the
provisiens of Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938.

“No controversy exists with respect to the appheation
of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 to the defendant employees
herein or any other employees of the Plantation simi-
larly situated as the lowest paid employee of the
Plantation is paid at an hourly rate in excess of that
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1988.
“The parties are agreed that any employee named
herein as defendant who is held not to be subject to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 or who is heid
to be exempt therefrom, and any other employee of
the Plantation similarly situated is subject to the
maximum hour provisions of the Hawaii Wage and
Hour Law and must be paid at a rate of not less
than one and one-half (114) times the regular rate at
which he is employed for all hours in excess of forty-
eight (48) hours per week.”

This stipulation was entered September 12, 1947.

So far as the record of the trial on September 18, 19,
2) and 23, 1947, was concerned, it appears the testimony
consisted altogether of one witness for the defendants,
who was the Regional Director for the Union, and one
witness for the plaintiff, who was the Assistant Manager
of the Plantation.

After the trial, the defendants filed an amended answer
and cross-complaint November 3, 1947, wherein it was set
up that the plaintiff had failed and refused since January

101

19, 1946, to compensate the defendants in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. This was made an issue by the
plaintiff in a reply to the eross-complaint, in which relij-
ance was placed in part upon Section 10 of the Portal to
Portail Act of 1947. However, pursuant toa joint motion
for separate trial upon the issue raised by this portion of
the defendants’ amended answer and cross-complaint and
plaintiff's answer and cross-complain‘, the Court, by order
dated March 22, 1948, granted the motion. This issue was
never tried and is not here presented. We disregard this
matter, for the Trial Court expressly directed entry of
judgment upon the case presented by the original com-
rlaint and original answer according to the provisions
of Rule 54(b), Rules of Civil Procedure. The cause must
stand or fall on these alone.

The Court thereupon took these “issues” under advise-
ment, and thereafter filed an opinion entitled in the ree-
ord, “Findings with Conclusions,” which appears in Waia-
lua Agricultural Company, Limited, vs. Ciraco Maneja,
et al, 77 EF. Supp. 480. No findings of fact were made
except as may appear therein. A judgment was then
entered. This “judgment” does not relate to any of the
individual defendants by name, but consists of a series of
generalizations.

From this judgment, both sides appeal. Plaintiff at-
tacks certain portions thereof. Defendants cross-appeal
from other portions. Both appeals must be sustained.
The “judgment” is a nullity. Ut gives no mandate or com-
mand as to the individual defendants named in the action.
This document consists of a series of economie maxims
which may or may not be applicable to the conditions and
hours of work and overtime, if any, performed by Ciraco
Maneja or Fumio Sunahara or Moses Fernandez or any
other named individual defendant. Tt is true these ex-
pressions mention plaintiff and cmplovecs of plaintiff, as

102

may be noted. But there is no declaration of the rights
of these defendants or any one of them either positively
or negatively. There is not the positiveness of command
or declaration required by a judgment.’ The reason a
judgment must be positive and founded upon fact is that it
is to siand as res judicata between the parties and
privies.2 Unless the facts found as a basis for the judg-
ment are definite and positive the ultimate characteristic
of finality would be dissipated.

The second fatal defect in this pronouncement is that
it lacks findings of fact. It is true, both parties refer to
the “judement” and opinion as though there were findings.
But this mutual disregard of error which they had by one
manner or another induced cannot avail to have this Court
consider a judgment not founded in facet... The Trial
Court, in the opinion on file, indicated acceptance of the
error superinduced by counsel! and inherent in the incep-
tion of the case and in all the proceedings.

It is obvious no rule of conduct in respect to future
activities and pay practices can be applied unless there
are known and found as facts what work week, what em-
ployees, what activities and how connected with interstate
commerce, agricultural or housing, through the particnlar
employee. Otherwise, the process is not judicial but ad-
ministrative or legislative. See Trans-Pacific Airlines,
Lid. vs. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 9 Cir, 174 F.2d 68. The

1 Watts vs. Waddle, 6 Pet. 389, 399; Drybrough vs. Ware, 6
Cir., 111 F.2d 548, 551.

2* * * an issue must have been decided before it can come
within the scope of res judicata.” Pierce vs. Kunkel, 5 Cir., 151
F.2d 897. 898: Brown vs. Fletcher, 6 Cir., 182 F. 963, 966-83 :
Huzhes vs. United States, 71 U.S. 232, 237; A. O. Smith Corpora-
tion vs. Petroleum Iron Works, 73 F.2d 531, 537, where it is said
a prior determination must be based on the merits.

3 Kelley vs. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415, 421.

103

absence of findings as to the particular employees named
as defendants leaves no pediment on which a judgment
ean stand.*. The Trial Court cites Tennessee Coal, Tron &
Railroad Co., et al. vs. Museoda Local No, 123, 321 U.S.
990, and Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation vs. Local 6167,
820 U.S. 161, as instances in which declaratory proceed-
ings were carried to conclusion in interpretation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. But in each of these cases,
detailed and specific findings were entered.’

The difficulties caused by lack of findings precise and
definite may be indicated. First, although the parties
stipulate that the gist of the controversy is whether the
individual defendants are entitled to overtime compensa-
tion, there is no evidence, finding of fact, conclusion of
law or declaration of the judgment that anv one of the
defendants named or any one similarly situated ever
worked overtime fer any period, definite or indednite, and
that any of them are asked or may be compelled to work
overtime in the future or that either the employer or the
emplovee contemplates such overtime work.

The result of lack of this essential finding is to render
the cause moot in this Court, for it leaves the critical issue
of the case here without allegation, proof, finding of fact
or positive judgment. In the absence of such structure,
the proceeding is coram non judice. There was not shown
in the findings and judgment a “case or controversy”

*Findings must be “s. fficiently comprehensive and pertinent to
the issues in the case so as to provide a basis for purposes of de-
cision.” Shapiro vs. Rubens, 7 Cir., 166 F.2d 659, 665; Schilling
vs. Schwitzer-Cummins Co., U.S.Ct. of App., D.C., 142 F.2d 82, 84.

5 See as *y Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation vs. Local 6167, 53 F.
Supp. 935, 937, 145 F.2d 10; as to Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rail-
road Co., et al, (directions for findings), 40 F.Supp. 4, 11, 135
F.2d 320, 322, 137 F.2d 176, 180, 321 U.S. 590, 603.

104

within the meaning of the Constitution.” If there were no
basis for such a finding in the petition or evidence, the
proceeding then must have been dismissed. For, failing
this, there was no jurisdiction.” However, we need not
determine whether the defect was fatal, since the cause
must be remanded on account of the lack of essential
findings. .

The ultimate problem before the Court is the fitting of
the provisions of a statute of national application to the
activities of a particular employee in ‘this giant agricul-
tural operation. There are several phases of the fact
picture on which the provisions of the Aet might be per-
tinent:

(1) Farming operations, such as harvesting, to which
Section 13(a)(6).° exeluding from the operation of both
wages and hors provisions of the Act “any employee
engaged” in agriculture, as therein defined by Section
3(f),° might be applicable.

(2) Prevention of the spoilage of cane and preparation
for delivery to market by processing to the point where
raw (not refined) sugar is obtained, which might fall as
work performed by a farmer on a farm in harvesting
and preparing for market under section 3(f}° or might be
excluded by Section 7(¢)" as part of the processing of raw

—————

6 Alabama State Federation of Labor vs. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,
460-2. See Atwater vs. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363; Unifed States
vs. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 475; Aetna Life Insurance Co.
vs. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240.

7 Colegrove vs. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552; Ashwander vs. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 325. Cf. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. vs. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300; Nashville,
Chattanooga & Louis Railway Co. vs. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 262.

*29 U.S.C.A. § 213.
929 U.S.C.A. § 203.
19 29 U.S.C.A. § 207.

105

sugar or might be ecnsidered in part as the production of
goods for comimerce,

(3) Construction, conservation, repair and recondition-
ing of plant, irrigation systems, tools, agricultural ma-
chines, processing plants, instruments of transportation,
Which might fall under Section 13¢a)(6), Section Tle) or
Section 3(J))."!

(4) Construction, Management, repair, reconditioning
and operation of villages, which may not be included under
the Act at all, and may, on the other hand, fall in part or
in Whole under Section 13(a)(6), Section Tice) or See-
tion 3(j).

inasinuch as it is apparent that the work of an employee
defendant might fall under any one of these various and
highly diverse classifications or might ina particular week
comprise a combination of duties under two or all of these
classes, the necessity for specific findings becomes more
and more clear. Such findings must be in terms of the
hours of each work week and the nature of the duty per-
formed in order to fix the kaleidoscopie changes which
vary the picture as often as the duties of a single eim-
plovee shift under the light of the statutory provisions.

In certain fields, where the Trial Court drew general
conclusions, we are unable to speak without such specific
and positive findings. But it is not the funetion of an
Appellate Cour’ to make findings on its own account.
Besides, other difficv'ties intervene. The stipulation is in
the form of testimony and would require the judgment of
the Trial Court to weigh the whole and select proper por-
tions for incorporation into findings. Tt is true the attor
nevs requested more specifie findings as ‘o employees,
The able and conscientious Trial Judge was unable to

+ Se

129 U.S.C.A. § 203.

106

make such findings owing to the posture of the case and
the state of the record oa matter which will be hereinafter
discussed, This is pointed out in the opinion of the lower
court on file herein.

It is a necessity, in view of the faet that a purported
declaration has been entered beiow, that it be specifically
indicated what findings would be requisite to support a
Judgment. Such analysis follows:

The statement that “practically every person employed
in the work of a sugar plantation in Hawai i> employed
In ‘commerce’ as it is defined and dealt with in the Fair
Labor Standards Aet.” is a conelusion of law and not an
applicable finding of tae .° The only method of making
binding findings upon this subject is to enumerate. the
exact duties of a particular emplovee for a specified
period of time and apply the pertinent statutory provi-
sions. The imperative need for detailed facts upon which
to found positive declarati-ns is found in the nature and
purpose of the act and the exclusions. The humanitarian
purpose of the statute to insure to the industrial workers
a fair wave fora reasonable work week was here crystall-
ized, as the learned District Judge pointed out.

But the raising and harvesting of sugar were specifi-
cally ziven consideration by Congress on account of the
immense importance te the economy of this country as a
whole. The tex: of the Act itself, the debates over the
ineaning of provisions, and especially the broad phrasing
of the exclusions, indicaces the intention that construction
should be eventy balanced and not technical. The text re-

“2Cf. Interstate Circuit Inc vs United States, 304 U.S. 55, 56.
“The statements in the decree tha. in making the restrictive agree-
ments the parties had engaged in an illegal conspiracy were but
ultimate conclusions and did not dispense with the necessity of
properly formulating the underlying findings of fact.”

LU;

fleets the leeling that, im troublesome times, the need for
sugar may momentarily become vital. As to sugar, the
all-vear processing exclusion, ‘in addition to the broad
agriculturai exclusion, indicates strongly congressional in-
tent. Not only was it the desire to exempt processing as
a part of the harvesting done by a farmer or on a farm,
but also processing done by a third party. These provi-
sions are not alternative or mutuaily exclusive, and shou!ld
be liberally construed for the reasons given by this Court
in McComb vs. Hunt Foods, Inc., 9 Cir., 167 F.2d 905, 908.
It must be remembered that the construction given to this
Act by the Court as to Hawan, although not conclusive,
will be generally applied to wheat farms and sugar plan-
tations In continental United States.

Agriculture and farming, as those terms are generally
understood, are not interstate or foreign commerce. As
has hitherto been pointed out by this Court in the case
just cited above, these provisior relating to farming are
exclusions, not technical exem © ons to be construed in
accordance with over-refined rules of pleading, but broad!
and liberally as is demanded by the nature of the subject
and the unquestionable intent of Congress. This factor
is directly applicable to the mdividual employee because
the Act specially provides that the statute shall not apply
to any employee who is engaged in agriculture.

As a result of the basie inconsistency which has been
pointed out before, vague phrases in the opinion of the
District Court are particularly inept when relating to the
activities of the employees concerned with the villages. It
is probable it might be concludec, if a detailed finding of
the work done by a particular employee in a particular
week were made, that he had no connection with commerce
or the production of goods for commerce, or it might be
found that he was engaged in agriculture or processing
of sugar cane, The wealth of detail which would have

108

heen testified to by competent Witnesses relating to the vil-
lages on the company property is such that it is extremely
difficult to discover on what basis the Court believed many
of these activities had any relation to interstate com-
merce.

Under the general conclusion that all employees of
Waialua are engaged in commerce, the Trial Court neces-
sarily holds that the carpenter who initially constructed
a house for an army officer on company property and the
heauty operator who werks in a hotel for transients and
the girl who takes tickets at the moving picture house are
so engaged. If this be true, it would be stretching the
bow very far. But we do not know that such employ-
ments exist, although “other employees similarly situated”
might be construed to include such type work. But, in
excepting to this conclusion contained im the opinion otf
the Trial Court, attorneys for appellant desire all em-
ployees blanketed under the agricultural exclusion, which,
of course, would be just as improper. It is doubtful that
many of these employees could be included in the agricul-
tural exclusion. There may, on the other hand, be certain
portions of such employment which would relate to retail
or independent establishments under the statute, but the
lack of findings hampers this Court to such an extent that
we cannot ‘eal with the situation. Seattered through the
stipulation as to almost every one of the employees before
the Court are statements to the effect that “he cuts fire-
wood for use as fuel by plantation employees living in
plantation villages.” He “is engaged exclusively in cut-
ting firewood for use as fuel by plantation employees liv-
ing in plantation villages, repairing houses and pruning
shade trees, ete.” And again, “he may spend a day or two
grading around * * * plantation housing areas prepara-
tory to the construction of a new building or a house.”
Here a bread brush has been used, and there is no shad.
ing. If i: were stated for what plantation employee the

~

109

firewood was cut, then there might be possibility of a
definite conclusion, but we would have to know whether
the firewood were a perquisite or whether it were paid in
part as wages and whether it were a gilt, dependent upon
the relationship of the employee to the company,

The determination of how many angels could stand on
the point of a needle would seem to have a firm founda-
tion in fact, as compared with a determination of what
relation the furnishing of firewood gratuitously to the
village streetcleaner or tree trimmer around independent
establishments of Waialua village has either to interstate
commerce or to agriculture. But again, we do net know
the facts. The finding in this regard might be based upon
the evidence set up in the stipulation that some compe-
tent witness would testify to these facts:

“Many non-plantation and independently owned and
operated stores, shops, restaurants, service es‘ablish-
ments and publie schools and churches made their
appearance op the plantation itself in and around the
Village of Waialua to serve the needs of plantation
employees and their families living in the area.”
“The village of Haleiwa is a sinall business and resi-
dential community which is made up of privately
owned residences and typical small retail and service
establishments. Haleiwa caters to plantation em-
ployees and to surrounding community residents, who
include persons working at other locations on the
island of Oahu and residents of numerous beach
houses and Army and Navy personnel using beach
recreational facilities.”

“Emplovees of the plantation as heretofore are con-
tinuing to render services and perform maintenance
work on plantation houses and village areas.”

The difficulties of proceeding without! a firm basis of,
fact are highlightea by a consideration of the transporta-
tion, The activities of emplovees engaged in transporta-
tion are various, according to crystalized testimony. Some
work of this type might be classified as wholly agricul-

110

‘ural, such as transportation to market, within the statu
tory exclusion. Some might be viewed as processing, if
that be not also agricultural, and a portion might be con-
sidered as unrelated to conmierce or production of goods
for commerce. It is probable that no feasible distinetion
ean be drawn under ‘he language «! the statute between
carriage by motor truck, railroad locomotives or other
modern devices, and by water buffalo with carts, as the
statutory cleavages are on other lines. For the same rea-
son, distinctions cannot be drawn on aeccoun: of size. If
a particular operation in transportation were done, ac-
cording to the faets, by a farmer in harvesting, it would
not fail under the statutory provisions even if the farmer
were an agricultural giant such as Waialua. If. the
particular hauling is not done by a farmer or “on a farm”
“as an incident to or in conjunction with” farming opera-
tions, such as harvesting, then the subsidiary questions
arise as to whether the haulage is connected with excluded
processing or with the production of goods for commerce
at all. The pushing of loaded sugar and molasses ears
from plant te siding of a carrier might be delivery to a
‘arrier for transportation to market or a part of a proc-
essing operation, according to the surrounding e¢ireum-
stances, such as, for instance, the time at which the raw
sugar is sold. The qualification of transportation of men
over roads outside the Plantation, the carriage of supplies
for the farm or for individual storekeepers or for con-
struction or for the electrie plant depends on facts in
minute detail, The placing of certain activities in trans-
portation or in the category of “preparation for market”
or “harvesting” on the one hand, or on the other in the
category of “processing” of sugar cane into raw sugar,
demands meticulous consideration,

The gathering of the cene and transporting it: on. the

farm and reducing it to a product whieh can be handled
without loss probably bears some analogies to other farm-

lil

ing. In the old days of thrashing operations in wheat
With stationary thrashers, the header cut the grain and it
was carried by elevators into header boxes and by the
header boxes carried to stacks. Thereafter the stationary
iurasher would move from one stack to the other and
thrash out the grain and place it in sacks. If the farmer
owned his own outfit and farmed his own land, it was
all a part of the harvesting operation up to the point
where the grain was in the bag. The facts, if found as
regards sugar cane, would settle the question as to
Whether the operations were outlined on stipulation as
part of “harvesting.

*

If it be that, to prevent deterioration, there must be
direct and immediate delivery from the harvest field to
the cane-cleaning plant for cleaning preparatory to crush-
ing, the hauling might be placed upon the same basis as
the other processes which are necessary to prepare agri-
eultural products to prevent deterioration. Again, the
thrashing operation with wheat, which is only a first step,
may furnish a guide. FEvervone realizes that, in order to
be used, the wheat must necessarily be elsewhere milled
into flour. Likewise, evervone realizes that, before the
sugar is usable, it must be refined at another factory.
The process of harvesting cane might end only with the
bagging of the raw sugar, as the harvesting of wheat ends
with the bagging of the grain. The disposal of the mo-
lasses, Which is an ineidental product, may be similar to
the disposal of the straw and chaff, which ‘s an incidental
produce: in the wheat harvesting process. The facts them-
selves, if found as to a particular employee, dictate the
application of the statute.

The stipulated evidence would seem to indicate that
sugar cane is highly perishable and starts to deteriorate
immedia‘ely after cutting. The same souree would indi-
eate that, to avoid serious losses, it must he processed

si2

into sugar, svrup or molasses within a few hours after it
has been severed from the ground, and that for this reason
and because of the great weight and bulkiness of cane as
compared with raw sugar, it must be processed within a
few miles of where it is grown. It was agreed also that
sugar cane never moves into interstate commerce in its
natural state. But these are not solidified into findings
so that it can be determined whether the hauling of the
cane is harvesting, an activity performed on a farm in pre-
paring an agricultural commodity for delivery to market
or to storage, or an essential processing operation with-
out which this farm product would have been lost. or
wasted.

The question as to the classificaticn of workers who
have to do with irrigation has recenti© heen dealt with by
the Supreme Court of the United States in The Farmers
Reservoir & Irrigation Co. vs. MeComb, Adm.. U.S.S.C..
June 27, 1949.) There it was held that an irrigation syvs-
tein common to a great many farms which hired its own
employees was under the provisions of the Pair Labor
Standards Act and was not covered under the agricultural
exception. But the Court there pointed out that in the
particular case there was not an operation by a farmer
or on a farm, but that if was a communal enterprise by
several farms. The explanation for this ease is the same
as that of Colaf vs. Gonzales, 1 Cir., 127 F.2d 934, Bowie
vs. Gonzales, 1 Cir. 117 F. 2d 11, 123 F.2d 387, and the
opinion of this Court in North Wittier Heights Citrus
Assn. vs. National Labor Relations Board, 9 Cir., 109
B.2d 76. While it is probable The Farmers Reservoir
opinion only highlights the exclusion of the worker who
deals exclusively with irrigation on the farm of this single
owner as one engaged in agriculture, the implications as
to those who construct t canals and those who may work
off the farm, if there he any, must be settled by reference

to the actual facets.

Lhe

[has impossible for this Court to rule in this state of
the record and without findings is to specitic employees,
specific work, specitie time and exact results on Himekeep-
ers, Warehousemen, material clerks, laborers who load
stenes on conveyances in the fields and machinists at the
mill, activities in construction and maintenance, employ-
nent, part or full time, in operation, maintenance and re-
pair of equipment, burning of bagasse, generatien and dis-
tribution of electricity, the cleaning and repairing of a
mill or machinery ard equipment, the hauling of supplies
and equipment by motor truck and maintenance and repair
thereof, the shoeing of horses and mules, maintenance and
repair of buildings and grounds, and clerical ehiplovees,
We believe many of these activities are shown bv the tes-
timo.y indicated in the stipulation to be excepted from the
statute. But we cannot make findings of fact.’

Since the cause must be remanded then for exact find-
ings, it will be pertinent ‘for the District Court to de-
termine whether there is a justiciable controversy, as
above noticed, and also whether in any event a declara-
tory proceeding should be entertained. For the difficulty
in crystalizing findings of fact did not arise from inept-
ness or recalcitrance of the learned Trial Judge, but from
the course of the proceedings and the attitude of the real
litigants.

The form of proceeding chosen by plaintiff was a de-
elaratery judgment. This was unfortunate since generali-
ties rather than concrete and exact definition of facets re-
sult from such a proceeding, Furthermore, since the pro-
ceeding is nebulous in form, the uneritical user may be-
lieve that any type relief can be obtained therein. But on
top of the declaratory proceeding was superimposed the

1S Kelley vs. Everglades Drainage District, supra; Ford Motor
Co. vs. National Labor Reiations Board, 305 U.S. 364, 373.

114

joinder of and prayer for relief against all similarly si -
uated. <A blanket declaration of exclusion of all employees
was sought. Then Waialua seemed to consider itself as
representative of all its feudally organized brethren.
Joined as defendants were the Union and its Regional!
Director, although no relief is sought against either.
These latter appeared to have slight, if any, interest in the
particular individual defendants, for they had in contem-
plation much broader issues. All the defendants, includ-
ing these individual employees, appeared by the same
counsel. But the moving actors were the Union and the
director on one side and the “representative” Plantation
on the other. The answer prayed likewise for a declara-
tion in broad terms.

The record shows that none of the individual employees
was called upon to testify in the case. No one of them
was called to establish his work record in any particular
week. Nor was any of them ever called to establish that
he worked overtime. So ‘ar as the record indicates, no
employee of the Plantation was ever in Court. Perhaps
these minor characters could not be trusted in this litiga-
tion of the demigods. In any event, the major players
seemed to have treated them as pawns.

The individual defendants and the duties of each are
described in the stipulation, but with such broad strokes
that individual characterization was obliterated and a com-
posite portrait of some characteristics of an assumed
worker achieved. The basis of findings of fact was here
destroved.

The record in the case consisted of the agreements of
the stipulation, in which, undoubiedly, the Plantation and
its operations ard activities are described in great detail
albeit it may be said with a very kind voice. There were
injected into the record pamphlets entitled “Labor in the
Territory of Hawaii” and “The Economy of Hawan,

llo

1947." The Regional Director of the Union testified he
could not personalivy swear as to the operations at the
installation of plaintiff, but that he had intimate knowl.
edge of the condition on other plantations on the island
and th. character of the work done there. Notwi h<tand
ing }. testified using the stipulation as a guide as to how
various general functions of enmplovees were performed
throughout the Plantation on the island. An example of
his anethod is contained in the following expression:

“| must confess, your Honor, that this legal argu-
iment leaves me a little cold. 1 am trying to indicate
in these job descriptions where they are incomplete
and where they are misleading. And in the ease of
No. 42, Augustine Lorenzo, the description indicates
that all of the water is used exclusively for irriga-
tion purposes. Eimployees similarly situated on many
of the plantations are handling water that is also used
for mill purposes.”
It is true the attorney for Waialua objected to this par-
ticular testimony, but he had already set the stage by the
course of the proceeding up to that time. The net result
Was an attempt to Jay foundations for an essay upon the
economy of Llawaii or on labor conditions in Oahu. While
the semi-feudal organization of industry and agriculture
upon the plantations of this semi-dependent archipelago
present a national problem, there should be no attempt to
settle them on the basis of an agreed record between a
single plantation and a labor organization.’ Especially
is this true where the rights of the individuals involved
are utterly disregarded, notwithstanding the express lan-

‘* The situation has

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA04386408_0124%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.
