# Oral argument — In Re: Charles Kinney > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/argument%3A28781 ## Record - **Collection:** Oral argument - **Document type:** Oral argument - **Published:** March 7, 2017 ## Text Good afternoon, this is Dean Sir Henry Charles Kinney, Ninth Circuit Docket Number 15-80090. And this is a hearing requested by Mr. Kinney concerning whether the Ninth Circuit should impose reciprocal discipline based on the California Disbarment Order. So, Mr. Kinney, because we're going to make a record here today, I'd like to begin by having my Courtroom Deputy administer the Officer of Discipline and Disability and the penalty of perjury. So, Mr. Kinney, you understand that you're entitled to be represented by counsel if you so choose. And you are representing yourself. So, because this is a reciprocal discipline proceeding, the scope of my inquiry is limited. So, honestly, I have no, this court has no authority to undo what has occurred in the state of California. So, nothing that occurs here will affect that ruling. And our review is based on the question whether this court should accord deference to the California determination. And there are basically three considerations that go into play as to whether the court will accord that deference. So, there's a presumption that this court would impose reciprocal discipline. However, you have the right to this hearing. And you have the burden of showing, in order for the court not to impose discipline, one of three things. Either that the state procedure did not provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard in the due process for this act. Second, that the proof of facts were so infirm that this court should not accept the state decision. And that's, I think of that as a sufficiency of the evidence type of inquiry. And then a third sort of casual notion about whether some other grave reason exists that a court should not accord deference to. So, that's what my inquiry is here. I have studied your multiple submissions to the court. And I think I'm generally familiar with the approach, the analysis, and arguments that you've made. So, I think you can assume that I'm generally familiar with the arguments. And I don't think you need to address your arguments comprehensively. I think you can, as an appellate court, typically digest matters on paper rather than orally. So, I think you can rely on that. And I will consider all of what you said. However, you are, of course, entitled to this hearing. And I want to give you leeway to make the points that you think are important to make. So, I am interested in knowing how you propose to proceed today and what kind of presentation you would like. Why don't you step up to the microphone here. It will be a little easier for me to hear you. Good afternoon. Yes, I studied these matters. I think I was pretty clear in my responses. I mean, there's four of them. I had comments based on interpretation of some of the material I provided. Because Kramer Case talks about a review of the record. Some of the things I've included may not be so self-explanatory. So, I might actually alter some of those. And then it kind of comes down to how the law applies to the Steve Barr's decision. Now, when I read that, I realized that it was a small issue. I understand that. However, that said, there's still some ongoing issues. For example, the ongoing case right now, before the 9th Circuit, on the Sherman Act. And I think that applies and needs to be looked at because there are... If the State Bar doesn't satisfy the Sherman Act as to a clearly articulated state policy, and a clearly expressed state policy, that it's not a state action. So, those are nuances. But I can finally touch on those because they're subject to other things. But the most important reason I'm here is to make sure you understand my skills. Right. So, two points. One, I didn't cover this. But I want to make you aware of the fact that this proceeding is being recorded. So, your record will be available. And the second point I want to make is we do have access to the state court proceedings. Many of the documents we have here, others are available to us on request. So, and we will make independent review of the record that we are obliged to do under an incumbent case law. Okay. Some of the state court proceedings, I think, may not be fully available for you to see. The state bar transcripts I've provided, because I noted that I got the four volumes of the transcripts. However, I don't know if there's an actual docket that shows the entry of the oaths of any two complaining witnesses as a docket entry. You made the point that there were no oaths. Well, I understand, but I mean, I don't even know if a docket as such that would list that separate step is available. I do remember looking at the state bar website and coming across some abbreviated form of a docket. That does not necessarily mean that they will log in their procedure before they issue the NDC notice of disciplinary charges that, okay, we've had a complaint from so-and-so, and we have now checked that they've signed a verification report. So, again, I just don't know if that exists. I do know that state court dockets exist in Los Angeles. That's easy to get. I do know that. But the court of appeals, I do know that this exists. I don't have any reasoning as to why the California Supreme Court denied my petition for review, because it's just an item. There's only about four items. Received the petition, denied it. So, you know, that's a docket, but there's no, like, decision, petition for review is denied. So, to a great extent, I have to rely on the transfer of view and some of the lower court's entries. And then I have to kind of jump. I mean, I can sit here arguing that the state bar has never had a vote from Cooper or Smithburg to date. I've never seen it. Maybe they do. But for instance, so, I can't seem to get past filing a complaint to be entitled to discovery to say, okay, state bar, show me the oath. You have subject matter jurisdiction. Do you have an oath? I didn't see that on your papers. Yeah, and so I appreciate that you have that access, and I'll try and point to some of the things that concern those judges, because I have not provided you a complete docket in the LJ pre-sourcing before judging event, nor have I provided you a complete docket of the Kepton v. Los Angeles case, which we submitted in rank hitting. So, I don't understand. If you have a case that your wife's going to review, do you have a request? I think, in my notes, you have an hour or so. I said if that's the case. All right. First of all, I appreciate the opportunity to address the 9th Circuit. The last time I got to it was back in the Van Scoy case, and that's a 1989 case, but it was a different case. But it's important because it's one of the cases used by Judge Levin in the November 19, 2008, Infectious Disease Committee report. It's also important because even though somehow an out-of-state defendant could transfer to the U.S. District Court, I got penalized over $60,000, and then never got sentenced back to the State Court to address receiving U.S. charges, licensing of companies, to the detriment of my client. So, let's go through the cases and the stuff I supplied. In the one of the first submittals I supplied, some pictures are in the halls, but on the street out in front of my house, I also provided a letter from the Regional Water Quality Control Board that talked about how the city could not accept those discharges from the Three Arch Bay Community Service District. Those two documents alone indicate violations of the Water Act, to the extent that Henry Kitty, by Justice Board, describes that as a swiftness matter. There's pictures in there. There's the written phrase. In other instances, it's not. Also, in that first submittal, I provided the pictures of the sidewalks, where they should be if they weren't. In the 2006 notice to appeal, I guess the city employee, Cooper, who was one of the complainants, still exists to this day, but in different localities. There's a blockage of a couple of sidewalks. And that's that photograph that you have up there with the fence. Yes, it's one of the next sections of my battery. That's right. I can see it in front of my eye now. One of my documents down there goes all the way through a block. It's just like, you know, this is one of the first places that's just right up here. There is a five-foot runway in the surveyor's map. On that side. The other picture is on the front address of the property. It shows a nice-looking sidewalk five feet wide. I put that in. A little further, it shows grass. That's Cooper's house in the distance. And the city made me put in a curb that has a little lip to it. It's typically put around fire hydrants and telephone poles. In this case, it creates a tripping hazard. The fact that Cooper got an abatement murder, and the fact that I have a case of Kempton and Kitty versus City of Los Angeles from 2008, since the city is not doing its job, and so the writer's not going to be able to go over both on that street, one side or the other. So, that, too, then has merit, because the 2JUD versus Spicer case, and the 4U cases, you can't have obstructions on the public sidewalks. And you even got to go so far as putting in that slope. You see it with the yellow plastic bookies on it that the cities around here have been putting in so that you can get off of her and have something random to use. So, that's how the abatement order was issued. Sorry. I'm trying to wait until the console dies. Please. I can look it up in my file. I have it on my file, if you can't find it. But the one side shows a wood fence, and I'm sure you've tried to figure out that. That's the part where the abatement order, and that's my sidewalk. And I can find that in a color copy, and I have a copy in my car. I have plenty of these. But the one you just looked at was a very high speed, 5 foot wide sidewalk, which, in my opinion, would be a perfect curve. And just a little further is a green lawn. That's the exit here. Just a little further is that green lawn, which is the Cooper's house. I could not seem to get anyone at state court to address that issue. Even when Cooper was out there telling the contractor not to dig on that land, and a city employee came up and said, it's not your property, it's a city right of way. It's still, you cannot traverse that area with a wheelchair, therefore it violates the ADA. So, this is a combination of state and federal issue. Yes, I lost in the state, but I never had a trial on the merits, therefore the H.I.S. When I was still in Thailand, I produced this through the ADA. The other two color photographs show the sills on the street. This happens to be from a December 2010 storm. My house has the white balcony in front of it. This goes directly into the ocean. It's not seersomal because the downflow neighbors have raised their property up to create a short-term lake with a funnel in the bottom of it. So, there's the hill all the way back to 1992 showing this fine silt coming from above me, coming through our drain, looking for an amenity, all the way into the Pacific Ocean. A thousand steps, eight inches, one of the nicest beaches in the living. You have the black-and-white copy of the California Fish and Wildlife Control Board. You have a black-and-white copy of the agreement that's in the black-and-white. So, based on that evidence, I think, and I made this argument in front of the state bar, that both the L.A. case and the Laguna Beach case are valid. I'm trying to protect the public interest, which, incidentally, benefits me in my time. So, you can't say that this is without merit, as the state bar routinely champions. Another thing I provided was Senate Bill 731. That's the one that said that they are amending Code of Civil Procedure Section 391.7 to include the word justice, so that justice can create an order to show cause and find somebody to be a vexatious litigant at the appellate court level. In the process of challenging that, I came across approximately 80 examples in the many, many page California vexatious litigant list, in which, in the first instance, the Justice Department held that the person before them was a vexatious litigant. And the reason you can tell this is because I give you the case number. If the case number in the vexatious litigant list starts for a person's name with an A, B, C, D, E, D, official designations in the California Court of Appeal, depending on what district, if yours is SBA, Los Angeles is B, Laguna Beach is G, then you know that the appellate court judge decided they were a vexatious litigant without a superior warrant. And in my situation, I provided here, I think it's actually one of the California vexatious litigant page that actually has the two listings for me. And the first one, of course, is Judge Lindsor. It's from January, sorry, November 19, 2008. And it gives the case number B, C, 374938. And then the second one, of course, is Lawrence. Justice Lawrence is in a case, and it gives the lower part of the Court of Appeal under B-2255, which just by that example letter B means that it is an appellate court decision versus B-C means it's Los Angeles. And it gives you a December 8, 2009. The significance of that is that, number one, under statutory law, Justice Warren didn't have the power to do that. I was not a party in that case, so they give you the record for the underlying superior court gauges, you know, quantity. But I also provided a different page of Henry Kitty with which he describes me as an attorney. In fact, it starts out, an attorney with declarative vexatious litigant. So clearly, that's not yet in law by Senate Bill 731. And clearly, from the recent John case in 2016, the Supreme Court, California Supreme Court said it only applies to self-represented litigants. So he had absolutely no subject matter jurisdiction in a case in which I'm not a party because a cross-complaint or an appellant could make me a vexatious litigant under the theory that I was or attempted was a puppet. Also, that's X3. X2, of course, is my dismissal on November 7. That's the 10th of January. And of course, you have to remember, as soon as the judge, the superior court judge, Levin, decided to have a tentative ruling that I was a vexatious litigant, I immediately dismissed myself from the case. Because I read the state bar rules that I cannot be the attorney for a client in a case in which I may compromise that client's rights. I'm stuck with dismissing myself, period. And I did. And I did back on November 7. At that point, Judge Levin had no further authority over me with respect to vexatious litigant rules. He could sanction me, if he wished, as an attorney. But he can't make me liable for costs. And he can't make me liable for honor. But he made me liable for costs, and I could file a dismissal for years. But Clark and her attorneys, Marcus, never filed a memo of costs or came back to join me saying, oh, he's a co-owner. He's indispensable. We have to have him back. So I have a limit order, which does not mean to test an officer. The fifth under the vexatious litigant rules might have Bourne's order from 2011, which also doesn't mean those tests. And then you get into other issues immediately. Apparently, the courts are all involved in trying to address this issue. But they're shooting the messenger. They didn't make this up. I didn't have a messenger. But I had a case that I won for myself and my client in 2008 that said the city must force private property owners to remove their own obstructions on the public worth of money. So, but Bourne makes me a vexatious litigant. The question becomes, how is he entitled to impunity? Because that impunity issue is going to come back and revisit this and just take part of it. If you add to the total absence of jurisdiction, that's the ranking case. I cited it. It's a ninth circuit case. When I didn't say, you didn't have both the personal and subject matter jurisdiction or else you didn't have judicial immunity, that was followed up by Ashland versus Polk. And that one took out the personal jurisdiction issue and led to the subject matter. It's been cited by a couple of cases. After this case, I think. But now you're talking about it, actually. But you have a case to test this, right? Well, no. I've never been able to proceed with any action against the justice or the judge. But rules apply to a state agency or state officer. I understand that. But that's, to me, that you're, now you're kind of, I'll throw you a little bit off. Because I'm really more interested in things that were targeting you. If you had a basis against other people, then, to me, unless that was the basis for you. Well, I contend it is. I contend that the action against the justice, the state bar's decision to make the indiscretious litigant, was based on Judge Levine's 2008 order and Justice Lawrence and Ray Kinney. And it says so on the first pages of those orders. Both the hearing department recommendation, which said there was no evidence of the victim being And in the review department, which was document one in this case. And if you read document one, in this case, and look at it carefully, you see in Ray Kinney's mention, you see Judge Grimes 2007, where all this, all this stuff is mentioned. However, she mentioned that just before I prevailed in the Kempton v. City of Los Angeles published case. You see no mention of the. Yes, you see no mention of. For lack of an oath, you see no mention of the fact that the. Any close beyond this request for judicial notice that we've talked about, talked about in my briefs, trying to prove their convincing evidence. And you see no mention of the role that the state bar is pursuing as prosecutor and possibly Judge Justice Gordon is pursuing as a prosecutor. So you see none of that mentioned in the review department's gold page order, whatever it is, December 2014. I bring these up because within the last month, a few days, the Ninth Circuit decided with Navarro, Navarro, and APA, R.L.O. 845, that they're going to confide. And they cited the false POSSE versus open court Supreme Court case. And they said, well, we may not disregard the court's existing binding precedent. Well, the ADA law is an existing binding precedent, so is the Clean Water Act, so is stream protection as in the Toasty case. So is the right to all the steps of the state disciplinary proceeding will require an oath, which I maintain day after day before the Ninth Circuit matter jurisdiction. The denial of my right to cross-examination is a simple decision to deny all my subpoenas, including the one with the city of Los Angeles, which I can see maybe they consider I can't bring in a judge. But the city of Los Angeles person who is violating my civil rights might not be removing the objections on a sidewalk committee, but that wasn't what I was working on. But that's fine. So we get back to the state bar here. I think that the state bar is routinely argued as a sub-state sovereign entity entitled to a love amendment. It has never been tested. It is subject to the Sherman Act, Kohlfarb, FTC cases that say if you are active market participants pursuing the disarmament and punishment of a member, you've got to have a clearly articulated state policy and you have to have a clearly expressed state policy. What are the clearly expressed state policies? 2006, the German case, it states that through the California Supreme Court, all of the self-represented litigants are eligible to be executioned of course without attorneys. That's the Weissman case, the Reinhold case. There is no policy that the California attorney representing a client should be made executionary. No policy like that exists, except in the state bar's mind. There is no policy that an attorney should be made a party. None. That would unravel the California Code of Civil Procedure dismissal rules under Section 581. All the cases in San Juan should dismiss. That's the Ng case, that's the Cook v. Jacoboff's case. It all comes forward in order if you try to make a model of the law itself. Let's continue. Kramer was about a person who was found guilty for 38 violations, or 37, 38 times in New York and New Jersey. He actually had some court events, judicial court events. I didn't. I've never had a judicial court determination of any of this. I had a board issue in Ray Kennedy, who brought up that issue in 2008, and did it to now. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied my petitions. The U.S. District Court has solicited my opinion. Anytime I object to the bankruptcy problems or file any other type of case, it's dismissed it. And then the district has subsequently affirmed everything, even though I don't think it applies, and I've said so citing Henry Thomas. So regardless, Kramer says get a better review of these factors. If you need the transcripts, actually I can participate in trying to get them, but I didn't find some of the transcripts. Let's talk due process. If there's no oath, then the state court can't bring notice of disciplinary charges. It's very clearly stated in 6107, 6108, and 6109 that the business proficiency code has cited those in my briefs. If you don't have an oath, you can't get disciplinary charges. So if you need a clear state policy articulated to satisfy a court's order, and the FTC and the Sherman Act cases, there would be an expression of state policy in the legislature said, without having an oath verified by a disciplinary attorney. So now we have a clear state policy from the legislature and the DNP versus the California Supreme Court and the Juvenile Universal Superior Court case that came out last year. Let's continue. In the Kramer case, there were some false statements and affidavits. One of his clients, Shelby, had a discovery for us. A guy named Daniel Cutter had a separate problem. I'm going to call this complaint. I may disappoint. Well, Judge Levine and Justice Barnes were my top stand for that. In fact, the two complainers were the losers in cases that I've filed against Ben, a co-prosecutor. I'm very aware of that. Let's go to the unconstitutionally vague issue of due process. If I'm entitled to due process, then I'm also entitled to a constitutionally certain statute. If the vexatious legal rules are being used against Barney, they're vague if they apply to an attorney who's representing his clients, because that's not a clear legislative and judicial policy setting in California. There's also a conflict of interest with the State Department in pointing this out. If the paramount duty is to meet the public, what about the people that can't use the sidewalks in their lane and the people that are harmed by the pollution so they can't water act and look at that? And Costian is framing a straight problem being plotted by grading a road too close to the water out in a million dollars. Those are some of them. And in addition to carrying all the water and concealed grading permits, it's a way out, I'm thinking. I should note that the... I just saw, before I got here, in the Doskey case, asking the 9th Circuit to address that issue, they decided to not address that issue, to let Smith-Burke's Road exist in the hundreds of bluffs by its own agency. So we're back to the State Department. It has a paramount duty. It has to protect the public interest. That's B&B 6031.1. But it's not. And in fact, under, as I cited, Business and Profession Code 6031.1.B, it can undo what a justice does. So in this case, the Court of Justice, the Court of Human Rights, it can't even comment on it, even if that's what causes the public harm. We've already talked about it. There's a bill that's issued, I've cited cases, Fulton Island v. New Fargo, you can't prove they're clearly convincing. So I didn't. I think that takes us down to a little bit more of the issues of what we're doing here. Due process, I didn't have the proper procedures followed before the disciplinary charges were filed. The charges were approved by a request for judicial notice. The charges were approved after they had quashed all my subpoenas. And as you see from the transcript, they arrested their case within, what did I say, about how many pages in? I said a few pages. We arrest, judicial notice, we arrest. Well, that's not a judicial notice, but it's in any court, whether it be through a judicial court or a administrative proceeding court. My question is this. What author of proof would you make about the suspected testimony of the witnesses and the subpoenas that is required? Well, let's see. Just as a lawyer, a lawyer has a code of civil procedure 391.7 and how it didn't include court justice in 707.31, and I was not a party. And where do you come off saying that? It tickles my puppet. Well, the fact that it's on the basis, there is one. Remember on the premise, it was about the L.A. The fact that L.A. witnesses, he wanted to lose his board. The subpoena board? The justice, yes. And I was in a case with him, and I subpoenaed the attorney, the deputy city attorney from Los Angeles, who was the one who was charged with going to Cooper and saying, you lost the public court decision from 2008, says the private property owner has to remove this instruction. Please remove it, or we'll remove it and charge you. And so that's the L.A. That was the L.A. That was the L.A. That I subpoenaed to the judges and the deputy city attorney, I think it was Dave, I don't know if he's here, but I don't know if he's here, so I'm going to skip you all. You're all removed. All right. Thank you. Peter Meinstel, the person in charge of fending the city of Los Angeles, and then the person who lost the 165 Calab 4, 1344 case, which says the city does not have to incur costs. The city can simply ask the property industry to move across the sidewalk area of the Pullman right-of-way. It also said that we would stand a public nuisance along with a private nuisance, because remember, there's an issue zone with you, so it's a public nuisance versus a private. And the garage in this area, they did not cross this driveway, the vision is blocked by these fences. In the picture, it's the orange building, it's the garage, and we gave them another reason. So that was the decision in the 2008 case issued in August. Grimes issued his bully argument in early 2008, early 2007, calling the fourth division of the Los Angeles Court of Appeals would say this in the court's opinion. So I wanted the two conditions of their existence, the bully argument first, just as a board judge, I mean, I wanted Grimes, though, because from my point of view, as long as I eliminated the three things, the beach, the military queue, the Los Angeles sidewalk, the Laguna Beach neighbors, it costs to get up here in El Dorado County, and I proved my cases in merit, so he shouldn't be setting his cases. I was never allowed a chance, of course, it came out in Righetti, and everything else was my right, so the First Amendment, to even get into a courtroom to make these arguments, has not been allowed, as you can see from all the cases I've cited, and my responses, there's going to be 20 cases by now where their appeals are unwise, and not one has resulted in a hearing in front of a judge, until now, right here. So, I think I've explained the, the John Case matter, the subpoena requirements, the state bar limitations, the targets we've discussed, what's available, what isn't available, and I'm happy to, I read the spelling case, which pretty well refers to, and has three factors, it's the length of the sentence, Sally, you're right, I'm sorry, I couldn't hear Sally, and it talks about getting the transcripts, or the record, which I assume is accessible, the document, the transcripts, anything else that can be found, and I can provide some more, some more examples, about that state bar limitation. Then we're down to, how, if this court, grants reciprocal, disbarment, as the nature of this hearing, then I, I'm urging that they don't, because of the following reasons, one, I do not, I'm a disbarmer, I didn't mean to be, I didn't expect to be, but apparently, and, somehow, I've touched on her, and I may have touched on her, way back in the 1990 Van Scoy case, about Selenium, and in the San Francisco case, but ever since then, I've had a test time, in the federal courts, and I'm not, I've always had, all the facts to support it, we've discussed them, all the facts, as to the LA, sidebar case, we've discussed it, as to the Team Water Act case, we've led a discussion about, Toste, and the, street protection, during the review court hearing, as you know, Steve Barr, one of the three, state court judges, who were inactive, in terms of, officially, made a comment, the other two, saying, what about the Toste case, it's in the transcriminating variety, the page leaf, so, four lines, isn't this different, isn't the Toste case different, because Mr. Kennedy, is representing Toste's client, has no ownership interest, in what Toste's doing, and the other two, apparently, ignore him, and see that as a difference, the, I think it takes, I think we've talked enough about, sovereign immunity, we've got to have the state, country, policies, and export policies, Rankin, Miles versus Waco, talks about when an act is finished, I'd have to argue that, both in front of Levin and, Boren, it was not, to see the act that they did, because, I wasn't a party, it's not normal, for a judge, or a justice, to make an attorney, on these issues, so they get, when he's representing a client, um, neither resulted in a hearing, um, and, in Levin's case, the tentative ruling, for instance, going, more than seven years back, the, your sister's living in the mall, requires five losses, in seven years, and you can't go back, you know, seven, and I think it was 2008, for 1999, and she was, so, um, just to make sure, as we're seeing, um, going back to the factors, I think, we've talked long enough, about due process, if the state bars, are not going to fall on their own, then, this could, if this had no, federal, constitutional, due process, right, violations, I would agree, that this is not in circuit, as David and Tom, talked, and said, when the state process, is so deficient, that it, denies me my federal, constitutional rights, which would include my rights, that are surrounded, and my rights to, presenting witnesses, and having all of that, as far as, not escaped, I think, it's clear that there has been a, a different evasion of federal due process, and based on the facts, what you can see here, state due process, has been turned off. As to the insufficient proof of misconduct, we've walked through the three things, that Daryl wanted to talk about, which is the exact same thing, meaning the state bar. The three things, we wanted to talk about was, the three things mentioned by Justice Borden, in the beginning, we've talked about them, there's pictures, clips, almost all of those documents, were part of the record, except for the regional water, and the control board letter, which came later, in 2015, but, I got that letter, because, that proves, that, something's going on, when you're violating, the, the clean water act, creating justice, wrong. If, if the state policy, is to get rid of, attorneys that are whistle blowers, then this is fine, and really, I don't see that policy. I think, there was a case, that's called La Crosse, which I brought, because of that, idea, in court, it talks about how the, the government may not prohibit, the dissemination of ideas, that it disfavors, or compel the endorsement of ideas, that it approves, that's Knox versus Service Employees, Inter-Union, 132, Supreme Court, 2277, page 2288, 2012 case, so, until, the California Supreme Court, or the legislature, makes a policy, to disarm, the whistle blower, that happens to, happens to a judge, that's acting without jurisdiction, and makes the man, or until, the state bar, gets a state policy, that says, with people going to kick out of the club, you know, if there are, criteria for kicking out of the club, you don't get to be part of the state bar, that's the Southern case, I cited, until those occur, I, I think the design circuit is to say, well I'm sorry state bar, from the transcripts, and the, and the, documents, we haven't seen, a unified, the, any of the factors, in the Kramer case, not one, you know, you're relying on two void orders, you don't see those, you know, you don't have a clear state policy, about who has an attorney, it's in a case, in which, they don't want a state court, decision before, and we have to follow, under the, the Morrow, and the, and the Posse case, the Posse case, to kind of follow, what the Supreme Court tells us to do, and it's told us to do, certain actions, it's told us to do, you know, since Patrick, you know, don't necessarily get state, sovereign immunity, for rising, the Supreme Court says, you know, again, we're going to fail, when we enforce, state and administrative, decisions, which is what the, State Department did, this, the State Department, is administrative, in this state, in New Jersey, it's not, it's judicial, but there's, you know, I think the State Department, wants to, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, I'll use this argument, of the pay to play, which is, you know, the Supreme Court, has incredible power, and he appoints people, to the second, appellate district, court of appeals, for either people, who've worked on my cases, or they're now, within our agency, and, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, I have to, to, to, to, to defend my case, because I can't defend my case, because I can't defend my case, because I can't defend my case, because I cannot defend my case. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I applaud the centimeter. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. So here we are, this is a public entity, I think it's subject to the Hobbs Act, and the Hobbs Act talks about corruption for public officials, now this part of one of my Sherman Act complaints is still being pushed around in the 9th Circuit, but it's the sort of thing that if the State Bar survives the Sherman Act, the Hobbs Act, the life of the house, and can point to a policy and not attribute these people to decisions like his, and concedes that they would make this decision without reconsidering the sidewalk case in L.A. and the clean water case in the address those. One of the other things I remember reading in the Docket 1 is the face of the State Bar Review Department, it overturned the Constitutional Theory Department, I want to read page 8, I think it's important to particularly pay attention to that, page 8 of the Docket 1, which is in December 12th, 2014, a review department recommendation, which means it's their version of the opinion, on page 8 they say that Judge Pat McElroy found there is no evidence of a public situation, that they say we disagree, and that they seek the conclusion of disbarring as opposed to 3 years of suspension. The interesting thing about that is that there's no new evidence taken, when they're going down there, by that short little hearing I provided to the transcript of that hearing, 40 pages long or 80 pages long, that very short, rough investigation, so I'm not sure how they can disagree since Pat McElroy, the hearing officer at the hearing department level, made that finding, after looking at all the witnesses, and judging their credibility, Dostey was a witness, Tim was a witness, and I was a witness, so how can they disagree with what the hearing department says without taking some additional evidence, and at the same time there's cases that say that the hearing department findings were kind of the weight in the hearing department, that stood out to me as something that was disturbing that they felt that they could turn those actual findings around without explaining how. The second thing that was disturbing in this December 12th, 2014 review, you've seen this before, and I'm not going to get involved as a fixation flag, and so I have to file the case for guilt. Those were cases in which I was called, or you choose to call me, I ask for permission, I have to, because I'm a judge, within the 2008 order, but there's no rule that says that you miss the statutes of my client if I don't file the case within the two years or six months of the government term, whatever it is, and I don't get permission. It doesn't excuse me. I can't say, well, I violated that statute, but just void that requirement, because I was trying to get permission to be a clear party, and it allows me to wait, and it doesn't. Yet, the review department found this very interesting, to quote that, without understanding why I said it. I said it because my duty was first to my client, second to me. Now, if they brought me in, let's just assume they joined me, and seen these cases, I would then, as an attorney, because there's a potential conflict with my client, either get a raise in the, or get some other attorney to represent her, right? I mean, there's no more resource to do. In fact, I'd have the potential conflict if I don't call my own. Now, these concepts seem to be lost in the state bar, because they've got to explain why I said it, because at the end of the day, I had another man to meet the statute of limitations. Otherwise, perhaps, oh, a very, the reason I bring up Justice Borne is because it still continues. On October 12, 2016, Justice Borne issued an order in which I have an attorney to have me post $175,000 in security under Guns Over Seizures 391, in a case in which Clark's attorneys, Marcus, were trying to get discharged dead, and I had my attorney at the office, and he said, you can't do this under CCP 391 if you're represented, you don't have the rights to security, and even if you did, it'd have to be a reasonable amount to file an answering brief. It's not if you're going to send $5,000. And in this order, Justice Borne says that I'm represented. Actually, he says it in the homepage order. I asked for judicial notice of that, but I instructed in a case 15-55329, and that case was important, because I filed it before the state bar had their trial. That was in March of 2013. After that, I was going to go to trial. She was going to be represented by Sam Belichini, and I was going to represent myself. And it's on the civil rights action. St. Borne had no rights to issue an opinion, and neither had the Biden had no right to issue 2008. So, this is not what we in the United States Legislative Church is talking about at trial. And just recently, when I instructed something early in front of him, 15-55329, and then I issued a notice on an order by Borne that violates state law just as much as the rank it is. So, there is some more I can't do on this, because he keeps issuing orders which I think violate my federal constitutional rights. You know, I can't get me to do something as long as he's doing it. So, unless you've got any questions, I'll let you continue. Thank you. Thank you. In the Justice Department's CA, he issued an order to sub-clause where he was going to be deemed to be sexist. In the appeal by Kempton for the city of Los Angeles case that was first used in compliance with the 2008 decision, he issued an order to show cause against an attorney who was not a party to the appeal case in order to show cause why he shouldn't be considered an ex-custodian. In your response to the order to show cause, did you raise the issue that he lacked authority under the existing statute? Because he was a Justice Codeterminant. I believe I did. I also raised the issue that I was not a party. So, CCB 391, on his face, says, because of time and sheer self-representation, I did not yet have the benefit of the 2016 John Gaves Court. I didn't have that. He issued an in-ranking recurrence. And then I tried to appeal that in-ranking to the Supreme Court, the Congress of New York. They denied review of the evidence. And the interesting thing is, I just got through appealing the October 12, 2016, $175,000 security posting order. The California Supreme Court just got through Michigan. John, you need denied review. So the question then becomes, are these violations of my federal constitutional rights, and I'm you're going to deny all access to the courts of Olson v. Evergreen, then you're violating my First Amendment rights. So if, in the first instance, a court of appeal justice makes the decision, you try and go to review it, and no one will even review it, a summary trial or, in the case of the Ninth Circuit, summary affirmances, you're saying you don't get to come to court anymore. We don't care who you are. We care who you are. You're kidding. You don't get to come. We're not going to entertain you. In case you should file. And that makes me start thinking, okay, who are we all protecting? I remember, I have all my clamor on that 31 years of focusing somewhere. And I remember thinking of this in 2008 to 2011. Somewhere somebody's really mad or really wants to, you know, denizens. And I think I figured it out. There was an effort to make attorneys their safest locusts. They couldn't convince the California Legislature to pass it. And then, by and far in 2010, the California Legislature was not willing to budge anything against it. It's not surprising they couldn't convince them to change the law. So Boren decided to do it legislatively. And he immediately, after he did my case on December 8th, published the opinion. Two, three, four, five days later, he decided against it. And I don't think he'll do it. He's still looking for discrimination or finding other things. Later, Ringgold's case got published. His life certainly took it. And I don't know if you're aware of this. This is just going to get weirder and weirder. So, again, we're back to the issue of, are these issues of why is there a limit to process rights as an attorney? When you can follow the rules. When you know that the statutory law does not allow you to do this state part. When you know the case law doesn't allow you to do this state part. And here we are. But if I can't get a hearing on the Ninth Circuit, you know, I have to rely on, ultimately, federal regulatory agencies. Who can look at this and say, uh-huh, no, that is a violation of the Sheriff Act. Because, remember, I'm in a needless situation. I do a lot of battling work. I do a lot of work for clients. I'm in perfect E.J. Colorado because I have mineral oil and some interest sales there in New Mexico and Colorado. So, therefore, I have interstate commerce activities that are now foreclosed to me. So I meet the interstate commerce harm of all these acts, which no one seems to want to talk about. Oh, well. Maybe I'm going to be the poster child of those. But my first job is to try and convince the Ninth Circuit that maybe I should consider some of these things. Because none of these laws are new. They're all old cases, except for some of the recent Sherman Act stuff. If the state bar wants to prove it's not subject to the Sherman Act, people, there's another trial. You can sit there and tell us about the policies. You can sit there and tell us how they're clearly expressed and how you don't care about it. Let's have it be dramatic. All right. Thank you very much for your presentation. I will lead you, of course, into a reporting recognition, and you'll receive a copy of that. You'll have an opportunity to file objections if you so choose. And then, the reporting recognition, all of the objections that you may choose to submit about will be presented to the Attorney General, and then we'll decide what to do. Okay, thank you very much. So this matter is submitted before Congress for court recommendation. We're done. Thank you. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/argument%3A28781. Public record. Not legal advice.