# Oral argument — Elston v. Oglesby > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/argument%3A21360 ## Record - **Collection:** Oral argument - **Document type:** Oral argument - **Published:** August 19, 2014 ## Text Case up this morning is Elston v. Oglesby. That's case number 413-0732 for the appellant, Matthew Cate, and you're the only one arguing as I understand it. Yes, sir. And we also have Barry Hines here. And for the appellee, Kent Fulmer, Mr. Cate, you may proceed. May it please the court, counsel. My name is Matthew Cate, and I'm an attorney at Barber-Segato. I often work in Cate here in Springfield. My co-counsel is Barry Hines, Barry Hines' law office, also in Springfield. We represent Kimberly Campbell in this matter. Kimberly is a woman now in the prime of her life that was the subject to an adoption many number of years ago, as this court is well aware. She was born back in 1968. Her mother had a short-term relationship with Richard Oglesby IV. We're using the term short-term relationship to confirm they didn't have a relationship after Kimberly's birth. And thus later, in 1972, Barber married Donald Elston. In 1973, they filed a petition to adopt Kimberly. And that's where the trouble started in this matter. The trouble started because the court in Syngman County never gained appropriate jurisdiction over Kimberly's natural father, Richard Oglesby IV. Normally in adoption matters, as this court is well aware, jurisdiction is rather easy to gain. You serve someone's summons, they either appear or don't appear, take some issue, everyone moves forward. It's more rare to use some other form of jurisdiction or to gain that over them. For example, by publication or something of that nature. In this particular case, we have a legislature affidavit and our motion to reopen that the court in Syngman County never gained appropriate jurisdiction through publication because Barbara knew where he was located. She knew he was in the military at the time. There are issues with that that were never looked at and we're now able to bring that up. Now, I understand the circuit court here stated, when we've moved to reopen, we can't even look at it. We can't even look at it because of the statute of limitations under the Adoption Act. It's a one-year statute of limitations for fraud or some type of mistake or some type of issue like that. I agree with that. I further agree that there's no tolling of the statute of limitations for a discovery period. I agree there also. What I don't agree with is that the court never analyzed or never even let us have a hearing on whether or not the court gained jurisdiction. If the court never gained jurisdiction over Richard Oglesby IV, it's a void order. It's a void order every day of the week. Although the circuit court makes a flippant comment that Kimmy is 38 years too late, actually, no, she's not. The problem is, if there's a void order, it can be attacked at any time in any court. So do you agree that the only way that you could proceed in this case is to argue that it was a void order as opposed to avoidable order? Your Honor, that brings up a good question, obviously, and that's why you're asking it. I believe it has to come as a void order. I do believe, at least in this particular circumstance, under the facts of this case. However, I believe avoidable order could also be attacked by Kimmy. Tell us how avoidable order could be attacked, given the case law and the constraints of 214.01. Right. Under 214.01, you have to show of the record, but I would point out, counsel has pointed to the NRAJD case for that principle, saying you can only look at the very specific facts on the record when you're talking about subject matter jurisdiction. But remember, here we're talking about personal jurisdiction over Richard Oglesby IV. And in the NRAJD case, what counsel doesn't provide this court is the line right before his quote, which states, a non-party, a non-party is only stuck with the pleadings at issue at that time. Kimberly was a party. She was the adoptive daughter. She was a party to the action. But she can attack the personal jurisdiction that the court had over Richard Oglesby IV, whether or not they had it. So we have to look at what are the facts and circumstances that Kimberly is now trying to bring up. Counsel, I have a question for you. Also in JD, when we look at the issue of whether or not the error is apparent from the record, because that case talks about the fact that if it's not, then you have to comply with the requirements of 1401, which would limit you to the one year. So how do you reconcile your position with that? How do we get over that? If Your Honor, to repeat the question, I apologize. I wasn't quite catching any once of it. I apologize. Okay. All right. I think this was quoted in opposing counsel's brief, the fact that if the error is not apparent from the record, then it requires proof by other evidence, and the party seeking to vacate has to comply with 1401, which of course with the adoption would limit you to the one year. That there is a difference when the error is apparent from the record versus when it is not. Okay. And I believe we can argue both of them. I believe we can argue that the error is apparent of the record in this case. How so? Well, in several different fashions. First, if we actually look at the record, although counsel has argued both ways in this on whether or not we can look at the record or not. On the one hand, saying we know we can even look at it. I'm not quite sure. Even this court can't even look at it, or at least I can't look at it, or something of that nature. I'm not sure. But I'd say looking at the actual record, the one that we have all seen and this court has seen. First, referring to publication. I'm sorry. Let me ask you this. Okay. We look at the record and we see that publication was done, and your position is that it wasn't done in the right place. They knew he was in the military. He wasn't even where they published the newspaper that they used. But wouldn't you have to offer other evidence that he was in the military? Other evidence that the mother knew where he was. Isn't that other evidence that's going to have to come in for you to establish what you need to establish? To a degree. I mean, I'd say first we can look at the record and we can see that the only thing that they did before they could do publication is they sent a letter to him addressed to his name in a city and town, and then used that as a basis to say, well, we didn't know where he was at. We couldn't find him. Now we're going to do publication. That's an issue, Judge, and that's absolutely of the record. The military status, I'd argue, is kind of a nuanced issue, but the military status, we can't tell of the record. That's their problem, not ours, because it had a say. Under the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act, even the one at that time, it needed to say one way or the other. It needed to say one way or the other whether or not he was in the military. That way the court could make a finding on that. As the court is seeking to vacate the judgment, you have to get into other evidence. Are you unwilling to concede that? I'm saying we could win either way. I'm saying we could win either way. I believe we could win pursuant to the record before this court. All we're asking for is on the motion to reopen, for the court to reopen, to then have that hearing. That's why I pointed to the Enright E.L. case. I would argue that case is directly on point for our specific issue. I understand counsel has tried to differentiate E.L. The way he tries to differentiate it is saying, well, there was a bigger fraud. More parties were working in concert against the father in that case. Well, the basic distinguishing fact of E.L. is that the challenge was made within one year. So the challenger could bring it pursuant to 214.01 and claim avoidable order and bring in this outside material. But here you're well outside the one year. Absolutely. But remembering the findings of the rule of law from E.L. was still the same. What they said though is they had a void order. They definitely did bring it in a year fashion. I totally agree with that. But what the court found was that it was a void order. And the fact remains we should have been able to have that hearing on the motion to reopen. What is there? What is not there? In other words, opening the door to at least allow the hearing. The court here said, Judge Schmidt said, can you look at me? Is it a year? Is it not a year? No tolling of the sets of limitations. Too bad you're out. All we're asking is for this court to send it back with directions to allow us to then have that hearing and to show all the things that we try to show by affidavit, unopposed affidavit, unopposed by anyone saying no one denies he was in the military. No one denies any of this type of stuff. To be able to have the hearing, we're not saying the court must then void the adoption. What we're only asking for is for this court to send it back with directions to Judge Schmidt to say what should happen, a limited hearing as to whether or not the jurisdiction was appropriate or not. That's it. It's a very limited case. It's a very limited relief that we are seeking. And following out further, and I apologize for getting a little bit hypothetical or esoteric, Kimberly could never, if going to counsel's ultimate end, Kimberly as the adopted daughter could likely never comply with what they're saying. If it's supposed to be brought within one year, no toll on the statute of limitations, I suppose everyone would concede until her period of minority, because during the year she was still a minor. She would have been eight years old at the time. So I don't think anyone would contend she has to bring it as an eight-year-old. The point is, if she doesn't learn as the adopted daughter until after her mother dies, until after another action is taking place where she finds out the true circumstances, Kimberly always thought that this was done by consent. She always assumed her father consented. Abandoned her, consented to adoption, he's out of there. It's not until after her mother passes away in 2011 and actions take place in Christian County in 2012, that her natural aunt informs her of her information, that she gets to know that, wait a minute, this all wasn't done appropriately. This isn't done the correct way. If we don't allow her the ability to at least have a hearing on the motion to reopen and find out the facts and circumstances, well then people like Kimberly are going to be out of luck. They're just going to be completely out of luck. And that's not the right answer on something that matters like this, because jurisdiction does matter. It matters in the sense that fathers could be basically out of luck if this type of argument holds up. Counsel, do I understand your argument if a judgment in an adoption in such a case, if jurisdiction is obtained through notice by publication, that is always forever subject to attack? It is when the facts and circumstances of gaining the ability to do that publication are based on a fraud or not full information of the court? Well, under your argument, you would always have a hearing to find out whether there was fraud. I would say in that case, yes, if there is a basis to doing so. For example, in this case, alleging that, wait a minute, they shouldn't be able to do publication. They really knew where my dad was, or he was in the military. During Vietnam, there's a very easy procedure to find out where the military person is at. They actually can write the Department of Defense at that time to locate where he's at. He could have been in Vietnam at the time. Again, this is all outside the record, and my concern is it seems that your argument would negate obtaining jurisdiction by publication. It would when your ability to publish was only based on a fraud on the court. For example, the fraud on the court here is saying, we don't know where he's at. We're not going to tell this court whether or not he was in the military or not. We're going to skip that step. Who cares? And too bad, so we're just going to publish. On those type of circumstances, then yes, whatever jurisdiction was gained by publication wasn't jurisdiction over him. And think about it this way. Different circumstances, let's say instead of Kimberly bringing it, it was Richard Oglesby IV. And he's a little bit too late. Let's say instead of 30-some years, he's a year and a day too late. And he has been overseas, and he's been in Vietnam. Are we going to say that in a circumstance when he was, for example, then writing to his mother and saying, I'm over here, and this is what's going on, and I'm being attacked every day and whatnot, and bombs are going off, that she can still then publish when he gets back, and it's a year and a day too late. And based on that publication, taking jurisdiction over him, and it's too bad, so sad for her, I can't imagine that would be correct. That cannot be the law. He has to be able to. In our case, I know it's Kimberly, but in my hypothetical, it's Richard Oglesby IV. At that year and a day too late, under the Adoption Act statute of limitations, that can't be the rule of law that this court would subscribe to. He has to still be able to say that, no court. She knew where it was at. And I'm going to prove that. Do you know anything about the legislative history behind that provision of the Adoption Act that limits it to one year and is very specific about its inclusion of 214.01 in the language? I understand that the courts have stated that the analysis has always been so that it provides finality. The finality, they do want things to be final. I agree with that. I understand that the courts don't want to have situations where children don't know who their parents are. But I'm wondering if there is any concern along the lines of what you've just raised, which facially is concerning, that either because of innocent mistake or fraud, a parent along the lines of the father that you were describing could come back in a year and a day and be without any form of relief. I don't know a specific legislative history, Your Honor. But I do know that I think the legislature would believe that this court would be the forum to correct it. In other words, allowing the person to then have a hearing. Again, the way we correct this is allowing judgment or directing him to have a hearing on it. To open it and look at it to see if that jurisdiction was not. to say that there is a hearing, the bar, the barrier for you is still Section 20B of the Adoption Act, right? I mean, it's a provision that it has to be done within a year. Having a hearing isn't really going to get you over the hump, is it? I believe it would, Judge, because I think, again, my argument is simply that the one-year statute of limitations is not applicable in these types of situations. Your Honor? Because it's a void order. It's a void order, yes. And it's the same, as this court has most recently, as the Bredesen decision, it found. Void orders are void every day of the week. And then following up on what Justice Holder-White was asking you about, a void order can be attacked, but only based on the record before the court. So whether or not there's a hearing, you handle it as to looking at what's in the record, right? What's the hearing going to do that you couldn't do preliminary to a hearing? Either the record contains the facts necessary to attack it as a void order, or it doesn't. Where does the hearing get you? Well, hopefully the hearing would get us to a point where the court could acknowledge that there was never a military status found, one way or the other. For example, the Adoption Act clearly stated that at that time and now, excuse me, the Soldiers and Sellers Relief Act and the Adoption Act would have required them to say one way or the other. In this case, it's silent. So the court could explore whether or not, was he in the military or not. Counsel stated that, heck, we didn't even know if he was in the military or not. Richard Oglesby V, the only sole natural remaining son of Richard Oglesby IV, calls that into question. Says, I don't know. No one even knows if he was in the military or not. That's disingenuous, because obviously I think Richard Oglesby V does know that, and we could have that analysis done. And if we were able to look at that issue, then the court could then look at, wait a minute, this wasn't done correctly. We actually have a hearing on that. Was he in the military or not? Was he able to be found? And thus, was the court correct? Was Judge William Conway correct in allowing the party to do publication? Because remember, the circuit court had to allow them to do publication, saying they made efforts to locate him. It's not just an attorney coming in and saying, well, Judge, you're fine, we published already. That's not the way it works. It works that the court has to say, you've made good efforts, you didn't gain the personal jurisdiction over, and now we're going to allow you to do publication. So let's look at it and see what it says, and see what happened, and see what they did. What they did here? We didn't say he was in the military. Too bad, so sad. We sent him a letter. Gosh, we sent him a letter first. Where did we send him a letter? To his name addressed to Atlanta, Georgia. I think any court could say that that's not enough to say, okay, we can publish now. Darn right. The post office didn't get it to him. In Atlanta, Georgia in the 1970s. That's ridiculous. Well, counsel, let me ask you this. Is the position you're advocating basically that even though in J.D. they talk about the fact that you have to be able to determine the judgment was void based on the evidence of record, is that a different situation than we have here, and basically that case doesn't apply? The analysis in that case doesn't apply? I mean, that was an aunt, not a parent. And you're hitting the nail on the head. The quote that I was trying to pitch earlier, which I didn't do a good job of finding it, the quote was the judgment is characterized as void, is where they start with the quote. The sentence right before it states, a non-party who collaterally attacks the adoption can only question one of subject matter jurisdictions, and they talk about looking at the record. This is different. She's not a non-party aunt who is trying to argue that there's some type of a fake agreement between DCFS and her. This is a party to the action. Kimberly. Of course she can. So she can attack not only subject matter, she can attack personal jurisdiction. She can bring up those things. So thus my argument would be, if the court limits me to this case, today's JD case, I think we can win by having a hearing. But I also believe that JD doesn't provide an analysis that this court should base its ruling upon. We go to the sentence right before. It talks about insolvency analysis of jurisdiction as a non-party. I don't think anyone would question the adoptive daughter. The adoptive daughter is actually a party. So I think that's where this court is left. And what we're left with is, I know what's troubling the court. It could trouble me too. You have an attorney asking to set aside an adoption order for the 1970s. My goodness. Why should we ever do that? And we haven't even talked about the basis, why you're asking to do that, and whether or not it's barred because she's seeking money. Absolutely. And just to touch briefly on that, that is not her basis for doing so. Her basis for doing so is that she had a natural father whose rights were violated, and she should be able to attack that. Now, we're not, if I may continue. You'll have time on rebuttal. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Fulmer. May it please the court, counsel. My name is Kent Fulmer. I represent Richard Oglesby V. This case requires the appellate to get over three hurdles in order to find that the statute of limitations does not apply. The first hurdle would be that there must be good cause to open the file. The second hurdle is that there must be some factual basis alleging fraud that is inside the record. And the third hurdle was inside the record. So to restate, there must be good cause, there must be fraud, and it must be inside the record. When you say record, you're talking about the record from the adoption proceeding? The 1973 record, Your Honor. Let's take Mr. Cates' hypothetical about the soldier in Vietnam, doesn't know anything about an adoption, comes back a year and two days after the adoption, and then learns about the adoption. He has suggested that under your theory there would be no remedy for this person. How do you respond to that? Well, I respectfully contend that that soldier might very well have a claim if, in fact, there was an allegation of fraud concerning his personal jurisdiction. Well, if there's no fraud within the adoption record, would he have a remedy? Does the discovery rule some way kick in that he discovered this adoption too late, and therefore he has another year? Your Honor, that inquiry would be dependent upon whether the fraud was in the record or not. If the record was apparent in the record, he would have a case. If it's not, he wouldn't. It would be very rare to have the record establish fraud on its face. Don't you agree? I agree. And there's a sound public policy consideration to support all of these laws concerning the Adoption Act. And this case boils down to really whether or not there's any reasonable basis to find that there is fraud inside or outside the record. And that inquiry goes directly to the affidavit of Kimberly Campbell. And her affidavit states that her mother knew how to contact the mother of Richard Oglesby. And that attached here to is a DD-214, which shows the mother's address, and that DD-214 is not attached to the affidavit. It was brought to counsel's attention. It's still not anywhere to be seen. And that if she would have tried harder, she maybe could have found the mother who could have then possibly brought to the court's attention the location of Richard Oglesby IV. Does this constitute fraud? Does this go to the issue of personal jurisdiction? Absolutely not. What about the fact that they didn't comply with the requirement to indicate whether or not the person is even in the service? That's correct. There's nothing in the record, and there's nothing even outside the record. And counsel can stand up here and say that Richard Oglesby V knew his dad was in the military. That's simply not a fact in the record. It's not a fact out of the record. And it is not relevant at this point. He has failed to establish good cause because the only basis for the motion is money. He can say that the basis for the motion to reopen is because it's a void order. Well, that's the allegation of fraud, but he's mixing the two up. There has to be an underlying basis, and there have been attempts to It's important for an adopted child to eventually get to know the biological father. The biological father has passed. Her mother has passed. These are potential witnesses that will never testify. Donald Elston, the adopted father, never entered his appearance. He didn't file an affidavit, and his privacy concerns are at issue too. So if there's no cause to open it, and there's absolutely no basis, there's no factual basis of a fraud inside or outside, this case should never have gotten this far. I believe Judge Schmidt entered an appropriate order, and the issues did get complicated when Judge Graves initially opened it without any factual findings, and then the entire record is in the appellate record. It allows us to perhaps see some things that we shouldn't have, but at the same time it's Well, counsel, let me ask you this. Opposing counsel says the bottom line in EL is that there was not jurisdiction, therefore there was a void order. Do you agree with that? Well, in EL, in that particular case, there were extensive allegations of fraud inside the record, and that case was properly ruled upon, and that natural father was able to proceed, but he was also within the one year. Counsel, if the court didn't have jurisdiction of the person, and it's a void order, that doesn't change, or I'm asking you, does that change based on how much fraud is in the record? Either there's jurisdiction or there's not jurisdiction. I agree with that, and your honor, in this case, there was jurisdiction by publication. In EL, the fraud was directed at the personal jurisdiction of the father. That mother wanted to hide it from him, and so for that reason, there was clearly a factual basis to set aside that judgment, because the fraud was not only in the record, but it was directly at the father to prevent him from learning about the proceedings so that his parental rights could be infringed upon. So EL was properly decided. JD was properly decided. This case got complicated because of the fact that Judge Graves opened it, but at the same time, that's helpful simply because we know now that even if this court would allow it to proceed on a motion to reopen, we know that there's no factual basis for fraud, we know that there's nothing inside the record going to the issue of fraud, and so therefore, because of Judge Graves' mistake, there's more reason to affirm the trial court's decision. But one additional point, I guess, on the issue of whether there's any possibility that the affidavit of Kimberly Campbell could be construed to constitute some basis in fraud, it's interesting that counsel argues that Richard Oglesby V had no relationship whatsoever with Kimberly's mother. So what would be the motivation behind Barbara Elston's fraud? So perhaps there was a scenario like, yeah, Barbara didn't want Mr. Oglesby V, the fourth, to learn about it, but it's clear from the allegations and in the affidavit that there was no relationship. In fact, it is pointed out that Richard Oglesby V may not even have known that she was pregnant. So there's absolutely no basis to conclude that there was any fraud whatsoever, nor is there any factual basis to find motivation to hide the whereabouts. But when you look at the affidavit, it's relying upon state of mind of at least two different people 40 years ago when the petitioner here was five years old at the time of her adoption. So it's a stretch, to say the least, and this court should affirm Judge Oglesby V is an important one to protect the privacy concerns, which is based and supported by the Illinois Supreme Court. And if this case would allow this one to open up, there would be a whole lot of others opened up as well. Since you've got some extra time, I just want to ask you to come up with an example of where fraud would be apparent in the record, and yet the court that allowed the adoption, approved the adoption, did not find the fraud. Can you give me an example of where fraud would be apparent in the record? Perhaps there could be an affidavit placed on file at some point during the whereabouts of the father, and then testimony could contradict that by another person, and then it could be in the documents in the court file, or perhaps someone would testify that would lead to a reasonable conclusion that there was deceit. It would have to be based upon concealing a relevant fact could be apparent in the record that may have slipped by a judge. But we're talking about, and I'm just asking you if this is correct, when we're talking about finding an order of void past one year under the trial court that considered the petition for adoption. And so if there was a later finding of fraud, it would necessarily have to be based on facts that the original trial court had considered and overlooked? Well, again, I believe that if there was an affidavit or a statement that perhaps an intentional omission, then one could allege that based upon this affidavit and this testimony, the court should entertain to allow the testimony of witness C to clarify whether or not there was a fraud. So it would be something along those lines, I believe. That's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. Cate, you have rebuttal, and you proceed however you want. But you were addressing Kimberly's possible financial motivation. I just wanted to remind you that. Absolutely. I appreciate that. The only one I want to hit on real quick is just where counsel ended off. An intentional omission. Exactly. Like an intentional omission of a person being in the military, where it's supposed to say one way or the other. I'd say that was a perfect example of how the court should then later conduct a hearing on that basis. And real quick, it will not open the floodgate. My goodness, this will not open the floodgate. I cannot imagine very many cases have a similar set of facts. It's not a floodgate. It would be a trickle or a drop that this court would be opening in that sense. Now, underlying basis. Absolutely. I cannot come in here, and I could not come into the trial court and say, guess what, Judge Schmidt, you need to reopen this adoption. Kimberly might inherit somewhere else. They're a natural father, so we need to open this. No, of course you can't do that. I mean, the case is always clear on that. I don't base it on that. I'd simply remind everyone, I am the one who stated it to begin with. I tried to set it out within the context of our petition so that no one would later accuse us of trying to do some type of end run to reopen just for the purpose of inheritance. Can you reopen? Can you reopen when the basis is that you have a problem with jurisdiction and the record, and you can reopen on that basis so Kimberly can actually have the natural father she was supposed to have? Absolutely. It simply means those cases are very specific. You can't simply try to. What do you mean so she can have the natural father she's supposed to have? I mean, he's deceased, right? Correct. I'm not sure what you mean by that. I think that it's simply appropriate for her to have, and she can have, that natural father she should have had to say that that was her natural father. And everyone has that right to do so, especially when in a situation, again, extrapolate it out. You have a situation where Donald Elston and her, Donald Elston was her potentially adoptive father. Maybe she and he did not get along. She has a natural father. She wants to have that be her legacy in a sense. I understand that in and of itself would not be a basis. I couldn't come in here and say, oh, she gets to have a legacy, or she gets to have that name and heritage that goes with the Oglesby name. No, absolutely not. But when you have a basis that the court never gained jurisdiction, is she one that can raise that, and is that a basis? But absolutely, every day of the week. Does it even matter for either the trial court or this court what the reason is behind the attempt to overturn the adoption decree when the basis for attempting to do that is a lack of jurisdiction? I don't really think so, Judge. I think that's possibly correct. I think the only thing you could do is you couldn't come into the court and say, the reason I want to vacate this adoption is because I could inherit. I think that's what those cases state, so I think that's correct. You can't come in and say, I want to inherit from natural father. That's why I want to reopen. You can't come in that way. But you can come in and say, wait a minute, it's a void order. Yes, you can come in and say that. And if it's a good basis, a bad basis, a high basis, a low basis, that's all. That's all fine. And Your Honor, simply, the privacy concerns, no privacy concerns, it's kind of disingenuous to bring that up since she knows everything. Donald Elston not entering his appearance actually supports this. Donald Elston would be called to testify, the actual natural adoptive father, at that hearing to reopen. He hasn't entered his appearance in this case. The person who should be arguing and saying, wait a minute, no, everything was done correct. We did this all appropriate. It would have been Donald Elston, not Richard Oglesby V. So I think that when counsel says that that doesn't support us, it actually does, that Donald Elston hasn't taken some action or at least done something to state what his position is. And Your Honor, very quickly at the end, there isn't a hypothetical that counsel could come up with where it wouldn't be apparent in the record. My goodness, that's arguing that court's just kind of, oh, heck with it, there's fraud in this file, let's go ahead and do the adoption anyway. That's not ever going to happen. If it does, then there's a whole lot of circuit courts doing adoptions the wrong way, and I don't think that's true. With that, I would simply ask again that the court send us back with directions to Judge Schmidt. I'm not asking you to overturn the adoption itself. If Your Honor has chosen to do that, that would be terrific. But we're asking for directions back to the circuit court to conduct that type of hearing and allow us to get in the race. Thank you, counselors, for your arguments. The case is submitted and the court stands in recess. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/argument%3A21360. Public record. Not legal advice.