# Oral argument — Etheridge v. Jamison > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/argument%3A100392 ## Record - **Collection:** Oral argument - **Document type:** Oral argument - **Published:** September 16, 2025 ## Text Alright, it looks like the public court will second the decision to now present the Honorable Justice Breedon-Sanderson case to the trial. Thank you. Hello, good morning everyone. Please be seated. So we will be hearing the case of Jasmine Upridge v. Timothy Jamison. Counsel, would you please approach the bench. Good morning. Would you please tell us your names, spell them, and say who you are representing. My last name is F-O-U-P-R-I-D-E-N. Thank you. Good morning. My name is Matthew Arnault, A-R-N-O-U-X, and I represent the F-O-B. Good morning, counsel. Go ahead and have a seat, Mr. Arnault. So each side is given 15 minutes to present your arguments. Ms. Futris, you can begin. Do you have any rebuttal time that you want reserved? I usually don't use all my time, but I suppose I'll keep five minutes. Okay. Thank you, Justice Santine. Good morning. Good morning, counsel for the appellee. When Timothy filed his petition for review of child support in October 2015, Cook County had neither subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction over the appellant. The question then is whether she consented to the court's exercise of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, and what constitutes that consent. With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the statute here, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, in Section 205A.2, provides that even if everyone has left the state, the circuit court retains jurisdiction to modify its previously entered order if the parties, quote, consent in the record or in a record for an open court. So what does that mean? Yeah, what does it mean? Aren't there a number of our Illinois Supreme Court cases that state that judges get subject matter jurisdiction from the Constitution? And the Constitution gives judges jurisdiction over any general subject matter that they can hear. So in this case, it's a domestic relations case. But you're suggesting that the judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Well, the statute clearly provides that when both parties and the subject child have left the state, there's one small exception for if one of the parties is out of the state and the other party is in another country, because that's not relevant here. If both parties have left the state and the child is not here, the court only retains jurisdiction to modify if the parties consent. And what the committee comments show us is this is really meant for the parties' convenience. But the issue, you're saying, prevails over the Illinois Constitution. Well, you know, I'm not aware that this statute's ever been challenged. I guess I haven't thought about that. No, right. Well, so are we saying that? Yes. There are cases that suggest that courts get subject matter jurisdiction if it's the type of case that they are generally permitted to hear, which is a domestic relations matter. But this was a parentage case that had been off-call for years at this point. You know, I think it's – How many years? Three. Oh, okay. So it's actually – this brings up an interesting point, which is that in 2012 was the party's first modification. So at that time, Timothy filed a position to modify. Everyone was out of the state. He didn't properly serve it on Jasmine again, but he did mail it to her. And she did consent to both the court subject matter jurisdiction to modify and its personal jurisdiction over her by appearing in the matter, filing her own petition for rule, et cetera. And eventually that issue was resolved by entry of an agreed order, and the case went off-call again. So there was a time when the court didn't have jurisdiction, but because the parties consented when there was a request for modification. Right. He consented by filing it. She consented by appearing and litigating the matter. And I'm sure that's what he hoped she would do this time as well. Neither of them were here. He said that then there was no appearing for litigating anything that December 15, 2015 meant. That's correct. Okay. And tell me why we shouldn't just get rid of this case, because you haven't given us anything for the record of those proceedings. There's no reported proceedings. There's no bystander's report. And there's no agreed statement of facts as to what actually occurred when that order was entered. When the December 2015 order was entered? Yes. You're challenging that, aren't you, along with the 2017 order? Or you're not? No, the 2015 order was just entered following a status appearance. That's the order that said this attorney, Clark, showed up for Jasmine, showed up, attended court, and said he was there on behalf of Jasmine. Is that what the order reads, showed up, attended, or does it say appear safe? Either way, I think we need to know. I think we need to know. I know, but I think we need to know if you're challenging, I thought you were challenging the 2015 order and the 2017 orders. Well, there is, I mean, there is no order. In 2015, the court modified the court without subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Well, what did that order say that day? Do you have it in front of you? It was just Catholic, wasn't it? Yes. Didn't he say he had jurisdiction? Didn't he say the attorney appeared? Didn't he enter substantive orders? Actually, could he temporarily modify the court? And then what else did he do? I think we're talking about two different orders. On October 23rd, 2015, or no, I'm sorry, that's not correct. It was in March. It was on March 16th of, I'm sorry, December 9th, 2015, Judge Kaplan entered an order providing that Clark appeared on behalf of Jasmine and sought a continuity. What else does it say? Oh, you don't have the order? The court, I'm sorry? What else does the order say? The court gave Clark leave to file his appearance, gave her an additional 28 days to respond to her petition, required the discovery issue within 45 days, and set hearing on Simpson's petition to modify for March 16th, 2016. So it was in 2016 when he entered substantive orders for them? I thought Judge Kaplan entered substantive orders. I mean, Judge Kaplan is in. Was he temporarily modified? Yes. In 2015, he had, on that same day, December 9th, 2015, he reduced Timothy's support obligation from $3,500 a month to $1,000 a month, payable by the FDU, and temporarily suspended his obligation to make $1,000 monthly payments into the 503G trust for college. And he also said that he had jurisdiction over the parties. Was that in that order? No, that's not in the order. Okay. Are you looking at the order? No, I'm looking at my summary of it. Oh, okay. If the order said he had jurisdiction, I would have included that in my statement of facts, because that would absolutely be relevant, Justice McBride. Okay. Well, maybe I'm wrong. I think there's something in the order as well. I think it has jurisdiction of the parties. But you don't have the order from me, so that's all right. You don't have it. I don't. So are you challenging that order? I probably do in this pile of papers. No, I'm not asking if you have it. I'm asking are you challenging it? No, I'm not challenging that order entered after status. My position is, our position is that the court at no time from 2015 to 2017, when the final modification order was entered, and the matter again went off the call, had subject matter jurisdiction over the modification or personal jurisdiction over Jasmine. Okay. So I just want to make, I'm just trying to get this clear. Are you telling us today that you're not challenging the 2015 order where the judge entered substantive orders and the attorney appeared in front of Judge Kaplan, specifically the December 9th, 2015. That is an order in the procedural progression to the final 2017 order. Sure. I mean, it's one way to know what you're arguing on a field. So I guess we're going back now to my original question. Why should we not, under Fauch v. Bryant, simply dismiss this issue because you have not given a report of proceedings. As the appellant, you have not provided any agreed statement. And you have not provided a bystander's report of what actually happened that day under Supreme Court rules. That was a status appearance that was a decade ago. So there is no record of it available. See what the court summarized at length and reported in its order. I think that provides the court with a sufficient record of what occurred on that date at that status appearance. But you are beyond a status appearance because at least one of those orders had a substantive ruling reflecting the reduction of Timothy's child support obligation. Right? It wasn't down to $1,000. Yeah. It was a status, Justice Van Hine. And things like this do happen at statuses in Cook County. But that was a status appearance. And maybe perhaps Judge Kaplan said, you know, oh, look, we have a lawyer for her. I'm going to take some action. I don't know. I can't. So then I guess it goes back to my question that I have to ask you one more time. Now you said that you are appealing every order that was in progress since 2017. And on the 2015 order, the judge actually entered substantive ruling. He actually temporarily modified the support. And he also said that the $1,000 payment to the trust fund didn't have to be made. So my question is, are you saying that for purposes of vouching, you don't have to provide what the Supreme Court Rule 328 requires because it was a status hearing or something else? There is no other record of that court appearance, save what the court reported in its own order. Right. But that's not what the rule requires. If you don't provide us with anything, then what do we have to look at? I think you have a sufficient record for what occurred that day in the order itself. Okay. In addition, remember we're in the motion for summary judgment context. So while allegations are to be construed in favor of Jasmine, I mean, you know. The motion for summary judgment, so there's no dispute as to the fact. Is that correct? Well, the court found there's no genuine issue of material. So therefore, what basis would the transcript do if we know, you know, if we disqualify a case when we don't have a record, that's only if the record impedes our decision. Here we know what the summary judgment was. The summary judgment was by standing up in front of the court, Jasmine's consent. So that's what the issue is. So let's go forward. And it's on the pleadings alone. I mean, the summary judgment at 1401 is done on the pleadings, taking all the well-said allegations in favor of the client. So do you have any other questions in that vein, Justice McBride? Well, I'm not sure what your summary judgment request is. Do you think there's a question of the fact as to whether the court – I think the issue here is whether the court gets jurisdiction at any time. In 2015, 2017. So, and if the order reflects that the court set it in jurisdiction, what do we do with that? Jasmine has never had, in 2015 to 2017, an appearance on file. She never filed a responsive pleading. She never filed, like she did in 2012, a motion of her own, a petition for contempt because she wasn't paying support. She never submitted herself, this non-resident respondent, to the jurisdiction of the court during that period of time, that personal jurisdiction. As far as subject matter, you know, the statute tells us what you have to do to submit yourself to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over modification. Subject matter jurisdiction is the ability, inherent ability of the court to hear this particular kind of case. And 205 actually is talking about domestic relation cases, so subject matter jurisdiction is an united issue. When we talk about the case estate, when we talk about jurisdiction, when we talk about jurisdiction, we have an out-of-state party, all the parties are out-of-state. I'm talking about consent for the court to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident citizens. We're not talking about subject matter. We're talking about general jurisdiction. You can name it and call it subject matter, but I'm talking about general jurisdiction, the right of Illinois courts to hear the cases of people who live in Georgia, in Texas, they don't have any connection with Illinois. I'm talking about general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in the case of Jabell v. Brookway decided this case. They're talking about the jurisdiction of Illinois to exercise, the right of Illinois to exercise jurisdiction. We're not talking about subject matter because, of course, the court can hear domestic relation cases. I'm talking about general jurisdiction, the right of Illinois to exercise power over non-residents. The statute says that the court can only modify its previously entered judgment if the parties consent, that once the parties are gone, the court loses jurisdiction, but if the parties consent under the statute, then it can hear it. That's my point. We're not really talking about subject matter. We're talking about general jurisdiction. Okay. Let's talk about consent. You weren't able to find any cases from anywhere else. Did you suggest that the consent should be in writing in your brief? I said it's up to California to decide it. Every state has adopted the UISFA, but nobody has defined this phrase except for California that said it should be It was only 10 cases citing 205 in general. It varies from state to state, right? Notwithstanding that uniform appears in the caption of that law. There are various iterations of it. California and Illinois are the same, but it certainly does vary in different states. The court, as Second District, kind of teetered toward it in this Collins case, but declined to consider the issue because it sounds that the Alcoburg father in that case didn't provide authority to it, although I don't know what he would have provided because there isn't any second district statute. Wouldn't we be missing this during the statute, though, if we took your position that it should be in writing? Again, I said counsel when the legislature said it. A record in court or open court. Open court, sure. Or consent. It didn't say anything about writing. Wasn't there a previous version of the Illinois statute that did have it? Or am I mistaken? No, you're not mistaken. The same statute provides with respect to another issue that written consent is required. That's not an or another court issue, and I can't recall what it is. One party remains in Illinois, but both parties file a written consent in another state for that state to hear the modification proceedings. Something like that. It's earlier in the statute. So your written consent is referenced elsewhere. I actually didn't argue in my briefing that the consent should be in writing. I simply reported to the court the only decision on the issue out of California. I don't know what consent should be. I mean, that's for you to decide if you consider the issue. Well, don't we have to consider the issue because that's the issue that you're relying on? Yes. I mean, we have to determine what consent means. Yes. And what is your interpretation of what consent means? I'll tell you what it isn't. It isn't an attorney who you never hired walking into court for a statute and saying, hey, I'm here for her, and then disappearing never to be seen or heard from again. I think it's that. And what would you suggest talks about that? I mean, she had various different statements, never by affidavit, that he did appear for her, her mother got him to go to court. There were multiple statements over time, none of which were ever supported by an affidavit. So I don't know. Didn't he eventually come around to saying that he appeared in court on my behalf? She admitted, if you actually parse her response to the motion for summary judgment, she admitted that he, it's clear to me when I read it, that she's admitting that he stepped up and said, I'm here for Jasmine. She then went on to explain, I never hired him, I never retained him, he never filed an appearance for me, my mother sent him to court. Okay, so let's get to the summary judgment. What? I know you weren't the attorney. Okay. But I want you to tell us what the attorney meant when, I don't know if it was, I don't know who the person was, but they conveyed to the court, we are not contesting jurisdiction. Jurisdiction can only be waived prospectively, not retroactively. Okay, that statement, that's not really my question, but that's what you're saying, that on that case, in that particular hearing, at the summary judgment, the lawyer was saying, we're not contesting jurisdiction today? Is that what you're saying? No, I don't know what she was thinking. There's no transcripts of that hearing either, is there? There is not. Okay. That was evidence. That is not a non-educational argument. We're reviewing it to know. So what you're saying is that you think that that attorney was telling the judge, judge, we're not contesting jurisdiction today and going forward. But those weren't the words. No, I would not engage in conjecture about what she meant. I have no idea what she meant. All I know is that we don't have a report of the proceedings. What are we supposed to do? Presume that the judge knew what he was doing? I don't know why you would need a report. Well, because you don't know what all you've said is you have no idea what that attorney meant when you said, judge, we're not contesting jurisdiction. What we're really contesting is due process, and we didn't have the right to a fair hearing. That's how I read your remarks. It doesn't take a part of the record. You know, we have to get these things in context. Do you know what context that statement was made? The judge reported that statement in his order. He said that Jasmine – let me get the exact language. The court said in its August 12, 2024 order, the only issue this court is determining, which is another problem I think, is whether Attorney Clark's appearance in court, admitted by Jasmine in her response to Timothy's summary judgment motion to be at her direction, which I lay out in my brief is not actually true or correct if you parse her response, constituted a waiver of the argument that the court did not have jurisdiction to end all orders 15 through 17. While Jasmine waived this issue in her response to the motion for summary judgment, wherein she admitted that Clark appeared on her behalf, and further waived that issue in the argument against summary judgment when she affirmatively stated that she agrees the court has jurisdiction. This statement by her then very new counsel at this hearing does not retroactively imbue the court with personal jurisdiction over her nine years, nine to seven years earlier. I mean, that's clear that personal jurisdiction can only be waived going forward, and the court found that she waived it based on that statement. Well, as the Supreme Court said on a number of cases, personal jurisdiction can be established by one, either service or process, or by a party voluntarily submitting it to the court's jurisdiction. That's exactly right. And what the court found here was that Attorney Clark stepping out of the status and saying he was there for her was her submitting herself to the court's jurisdiction. Did the court notice that you're using this as a status hearing? I mean, you keep calling it a status. Well, if you look at the order before that, that's for rulings on specific motions, and the court actually entered orders. I mean, I don't think we can call this a status hearing when the judge modified the order that day, and he also said that you don't have to put $1,000 a month into the trust. I don't know why you keep calling it a status hearing, and I don't think the judge ever called it a status hearing at the summary judgment hearing. I mean, you'll certainly correct me if I'm wrong, but if you look at the order before that one, I think it was continued for status to that date, but I think it was continued because which date did the lawyer appear on? That's a good question. I mean, you know, it's a long time ago. December 9, 2015. And that's the only date Christopher Clark appeared, right? That's right. And that's the date he was saying is a status hearing, right? That's correct. Okay, and we're not sure yet, but we think the order says that the court said it had jurisdiction of the parties. I don't have the order in front of me right now. Either way, the order before that one was November 25, 2015, and I believe it continued the case for status to the 9th, but like I said, I don't have the order in front of me, so I won't make that statement with any certainty. I think your position is that submitting to the jurisdiction, is it trumped by RAGE 103? What is the number, you know, where if you contest jurisdiction, you don't have to do it immediately. It can be contested anytime if the court, if you've never done anything to really subject yourself. You waive jurisdiction by filing a general appearance, you know, and addressing the substance of the case without first objecting to jurisdiction or by filing your own substantive motion in the case that doesn't contest jurisdiction. And that's what happened in 2012. He mailed her this filing that he did, and she filed a petition for rule against him for non-payment of support. So obviously she submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court despite the fact that she didn't have to. But that's not what happened. That's probably what he thought would happen in 2015, but it isn't. She didn't appear. She didn't file her own motion. Well, so that's one of the questions of fact. You know, when an attorney steps up before a judge and says that he is here on behalf of so-and-so, what is the judge supposed to do with that? Those circumstances are not really known exactly what Clark sent to him. We know he didn't file an appearance, right, but we don't know what he said that day because we don't have anything other than the order that's in this record. Without the filing of an appearance, I don't think he could have said anything that could have subjected her to the personal jurisdiction of the court. And what is the site that says that a lawyer has to file an appearance in stature in order to represent a client? One only waives jurisdiction by the filing of an appearance and the addressing of substantive issues or by filing their own petition in court. So that didn't happen here. Give me the case. You keep saying this, but give me the case. The statute says, okay, well, McNally v. Morrison, personal jurisdiction over a non-resident respondent required proper service, didn't happen, long-arm jurisdiction, didn't exist here, and due process or minimum contact weren't present here. Is that in your brief? I'm sorry? That's in your brief. It is, yeah. Municipal Trust and Savings Bank v. Morality. Under Illinois law, one waives a jurisdictional objection only by filing responsive pleading or motion, and that's in Statute 301, or by filing an appearance and making substantive arguments without first objecting to jurisdiction. None of that happened here. Again, the question is, did she submit herself to the jurisdiction of the court in terms of her personal jurisdiction, and did she consent to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court? I take your point, Justice House, that I'm maybe characterizing it differently, but those are the two questions here. Are you aware of any case that has been modified that pertains to waiver of personal jurisdiction where in order of the court, where a person is in the jurisdiction without filing an appearance and making a responsive plea? I'm not. I mean, to me, that is a well-established statute and case law with respect to personal jurisdiction. None of that took place here. And what does your client actually seek in terms of money or whatever? Because there was like years where she was receiving money quite a different amount than what was actually previously ordered. And so for like seven years, I think the records show that she was getting, I don't know, $200 or $300 a month from the child. There was no money put into the trust. What is she actually asking for? She filed a petition to vacate the 2017 order, the final modification order, and all of the orders and procedural progression to it because they're void. That's what the record tells us she wants. I can't answer, I can't tell you from the record what went on in those, what happened from 2017 to 2020 or 2024. I mean, I can't say at the same time. So I guess I'm thinking now. So when was the summary judgment here? Because it was at that time that, of what, 20? 24. Yeah, so at least she was looking, she wanted to go back because the child reached majority in 2023. That is when the support payments were ending. She filed shortly before the child reached the Asian majority. You know, I think, from my time doing trial work in these cases, sometimes when people aren't getting paid what they're supposed to be getting paid, and there's an arrearage, and there's mispayment, sometimes clients lose the threat about what their order, or what they're entitled to, and sometimes they just give up on it. Then a life event happens, like this child heading to college, and you think, I know it's the money here, but I really should try to do something about it. And then she looked at the case on the docket, what she said in her response to the summary judgment, and maybe also the 1401, and realized the disorder had been entered in 17, after she talked to Timothy, and he said, I don't know, I didn't have to pay that money into the 503G for many years. So that's how she ended up back here. Timothy did raise the defenses of the spot hole and of latches, but the court didn't address those issues. Is that correct? That's right. I mean, when... You've never been in a trunk jurisdiction, can you? You can't have... No. You can't be relieved from the jurisdiction by arguing a spot hole or latches, can you? No. She did it one time. Oh, yes. Well, you remind me. I don't know about that. She's a liar. She's a liar. She's a liar. She's a liar. She's a liar. She's a liar. But what about revestment? I'm sorry? What about doctrine of revestment? We're looking at things that were raised below, but we didn't see any of them here. I can't address that. I'll be honest with you. I don't even know what the doctrine of revestment is. Well, it means that the parties have pretty much given the court the jurisdiction that it had originally. I'm just wondering, I have not seen any single case that has applied for revestment to this particular U.S. statute. I mean, I don't know what she would have done to indicate a desire to revest the court. And again, the statute's really clear about how the ability to modify returns to the circuit court, and those things didn't happen here. So, backing up a little bit, is it your position that both the December 9, 2015 order and the July 25, 2017 order are void, rather than void of vault? Void. For lack of jurisdiction, that's right. I mean, the 2015 order was a temporary order. Even if she knew about it at the time, she couldn't have... She would have to file under Section A1 within 30 days, or under 1401 within two years. So, she was out of the box to contest a void of vault order. So... But her position is that the orders were void. I mean, the 2017 order and everything that led to it, all the temporary orders that led to it. Notwithstanding that she asserted that she wasn't contesting jurisdiction when she argued before the judge that heard the case on August 12, 2024. I mean, her pleading filed by her more long-term counsel certainly said otherwise. And again, I mean, whatever this counsel said does not retroactively imbue the court with jurisdiction a decade earlier. But we can't really interpret that now, I don't think, because the lawyer said we're not contesting jurisdiction, Judge. I don't think it matters. We're arguing due process. She wasn't... She didn't have notice in hearing. That's what was argued before Judge Hughes, right? Well, we have Judge Hughes' description of her statement where... Do you want me to read exactly what he said? It's the last page of the record. It's kind of long. He said that she affirmatively stated that she agreed that the court had jurisdiction. Jurisdiction win. Yeah. Well, paragraph 22, during the summary judgment argument, Jasmine's counsel conceded that they are not contesting jurisdiction, but rather asserting due process arguments about notice Jasmine may or may not have received. Paragraph 27 of the order. Jasmine argued during the hearing of Timothy's motion for summary judgment that the issue was a due process issue, not jurisdictional. I mean, due process is, sort of ironically, right, one of the arms of personal jurisdiction. You have, you know, personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Proper service didn't happen. Minimum contacts weren't present and then, I'm sorry, due process, minimum contacts. You know, that is part of personal jurisdiction. So was it the argument, well, I didn't hire him, maybe my mom did, but he did appear for me, he represented me, he was there on that court, but he didn't appear as an amount to... He didn't appear for her, though. He attended court for her on one occasion. He didn't appear for her. She never retained him, that this is her... Well, if he had come to court and said, I'm not appearing, I'm just sort of here as a bystander, the judge wouldn't have said it for him filing his appearance. And there's no record of any objection at that point. He didn't even need to file his appearance, that's right. And there's no record of him objecting to any one of those three orders that were entered back in December of 2015, right? That's right. So judges now should just, if a lawyer steps up and says, I'm here on behalf of someone, so what the judge, that's nothing? He should have, especially considering we're dealing with a non-resident respondent, he should have continued it until the appearance was filed. And how many years is he expected to continue it? Is it permissible to just ignore court orders and then later on, years and years down the line, complain about not consulting if you're represented by counsel and all the options. But she wasn't represented by counsel and that, I mean, that's what you're saying. That's her well-placed and her response to the motion for summary of the judge records. But you're basically testifying as to what that lawyer did. And then you're saying that the judge, according to you, we don't have a record. There's an order entered and the judge entered orders with an attorney in front of him. And then later, they're saying, judge, this isn't about jurisdiction. It's about due process because she wasn't heard. So, I mean, these are things that we have to wrestle with. So, it's a record that seems to be pretty absent. Except, you know, that a judge entered substantive orders with a lawyer standing in front of him. And we have, you know, I mean, you keep saying, he wasn't represented her. Well, you know, that's just your interpretation. But there's nothing that really says he wasn't because the judge entered orders, multiple orders that day with the lawyer. And didn't the judge say that this complaint that she had was with Clark? Didn't judge you say that? But the court had jurisdiction. Her complaint is with the lawyer that he wasn't really represented her and that her damages or whatever she's seeking is really something that should be directed at this attorney. The attorney was not in the middle of the law in that case. And is that correct in that the objections to person's jurisdiction are not raised unless a filing is made. Is that correct? That's right. And since lawyers are bound to know the law, didn't the judge care to the same standard? Yes. And this judge's mistake was made, I read the record, this judge's mistake was made when he made his decision based on a case which was superseded by statute. That's right. I mean, we can't do that. That's right. But what about Judge Kaplan? Are we going to say from this record he erred too? That he had absolutely no idea what he was doing when he entered those orders One of the orders that's been issued, the 2015. There's no indication in the record that I saw that Timothy ever told the court that the lady resided out of state in Georgia. He may not have been aware of that. They would never disclose the initial filing, didn't plead, neither party resided in Illinois. I mean, from the very beginning you can tell that the circuit court didn't understand that she was out of state. Oh, it got mailed to her. She doesn't show up. She's subject to default. Oh, you're saying the judge didn't understand she was out of state? No, absolutely not. That was not Why was the lawyer told to, on a number of occasions, mail the notice? Because when people don't show up for it, I mean, by then they may have knew. They certainly didn't know at the beginning. And when people don't show up, trial lawyers are directed to mail the order to the other side, especially if they're not represented by counsel. Send this to them. See if they'll come. Do you see any significance to the fact that Timothy has paid Jasmine and she accepted all these child support payments required by these orders in 2015 as well as July 25th, 2017? We don't know what he paid. We know he was ordered to pay. We don't know what he actually paid. She could have, if one thing, the judge, certainly had jurisdiction to enforce the court order. So if he wasn't making payments he was supposed to make, Jasmine could have come into court without any problem living wherever she was living for these overdue payments. That's right. It went from $3,500 to $1,000 at $265. But because sometimes his committees don't always do that. Like I said, sometimes over a long period of time they lose the spread about what they're owed. I think I'm about three times over my time. If anyone has anything else I'm happy to address it. Can conduct ever be considered as consent to jurisdiction or implied consent to personal jurisdiction of the court? That is not contemplated in the law as it stands here. As of now. I mean, I can't imagine the court found that by operation of, I mean, explicitly found in its order that because Attorney Clark stepped up on one occasion Jasmine was subject to the jurisdiction of the court. You have all the statutes and case law providing what exactly you have to do to waive a jurisdictional objection. That is not one of them. This would represent a pretty significant expansion of the law surrounding personal jurisdiction, in my opinion. But in this case he didn't just step up and ask for a continuance straight. He was present when other things occurred, that's correct. So how do we know that? Because the order reports it. The order reports what? The order reports that he was present and he was there when the charges and the orders were entered. Of course. But he wasn't represented. That's correct. He never filed an appearance on her behalf and her well-led allegation said he didn't. Okay, so everything is hanging on this. He was there, he was present, the judge entered substantive orders, the judge said he had jurisdiction over the parties, but you're saying he wasn't, there was no jurisdiction. There's no statement in the order that the court found he had jurisdiction over the parties. There's no what? I don't think the order said that he found that he had jurisdiction over the parties. The order did say he had over the parties in the preamble. I said I didn't have that one in front of me though. I think that's correct. Okay, so I want to go in two of those directions. I think it's very important to look at this case from the beginning. At the very beginning of this case in 2009, nobody lived in the state of Illinois. There was never a time when somebody actually was in Illinois and then left the state of Illinois. And if you look at section 205 A1 and 2 in the state of has subject matter jurisdiction if somebody lives here or they consent. And the initial filing in 2009 and nobody lived here was the consent for subject matter jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. When Mr. Jameson came back in 2011, there was again consent because nobody objected. So the question is what does the consent mean? If you look at 2011 and 2012, there is no point in consent because that started in 2009. The reason I bring up this point is the question that the state with respect to voidable and void orders. If there is no subject matter jurisdiction, it is a void order. It does not have any time mark to attack the order because it is a void The only way to avoid it is not subject matter jurisdiction. Initially there was subject matter jurisdiction. continued that through 2011 and 2012 and continued through 2015 through 2017. It any reflection of an open court or written consent. If we look at the consent in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, the consent was not written. It was not in the consent The consent was not in the consent form. It was not in the consent form. It was not in the consent form. If you read the statute, it is not there. I would respectfully suggest that if you read in language in the it is not there. I would like to point out that the request was for a continuous response to the pending motion to modify. At the same time, entered substantive rulings with that standing there. The court found in his order that this not in the consent form. The found that this was not in the consent form. The court found that this was not in the consent form. The court found applies orders without prejudice to retroactively or not. Respondents shall pay 1,000 per month child support 28 days to answer the pleading or petition to revise or review child support and petitioners to determine the amount. I can't read what four says. this within 45 days. Respondents shall 1,000 per month 28 days to answer the pleading or petition to support Respondents shall 1,000 answer the pleading or petition to review child petitioners to review child support and petitioners to petitioners to insist the case equals consent in open court. MS. the child court would make a signing that nearly a perception to waive or consent. So that's what we're doing. We're not talking about what else he may have because I was not arguing that consented judges the said that by standing up and asking for a continuance that's waiving. We don't need a transcript for that, do we? I would have to disagree because I think we have to decide about the 2015. I think we have to decide what happened that day when the court entered these orders and we have this record that we entered these I think that's a question before us, too. So I'm just saying that there's also this question of whether this alone, this order by Judge Capra, does that follow this statute? Was this the case pointed out that this other statute says if you just come in, you don't file a cleaning, you're not asking for relief, that under 301 you can contest jurisdiction later. So I mean, there's a culpable problem. So even if Judge Capra cited an outdated case and his conclusion was just merely coming into court and asking for continuance equates to consent, that's not what happened here, right? I mean, there are because there are three orders on It's not just an it's an it. So does that action is that not right from the December 2015 hearing? I believe it is. And I think Judge Ewing in finding 12 noted that indirectly when he did not object to the 205, It's not. I agree. When we go back to the purpose of 205, it's a uniform interstate family support act. That's the whole purpose of this sort of statute. It's because we don't want courts in different states to be entering all sorts of different orders that could potentially be in with each other. In the 90s it was tied to funding from the federal government. states needed to get the parties in and out if they wanted to say file another state. In this case, there were no filings in any other state except Illinois. Do you see any significance to that? I do. It was one of my initial arguments that this court was the one court that was deciding the child support. I think it would be an entirely different case if for some reason they started a case here with nobody living here. That would be a different case. If we look at the statute, purpose of the statute is to unify the procedures that one state issued an order that was fulfilled by their actions in 2009 forward. So, this is consistent with the legislative attack the way the legislative attack was conducted in 2009. So, attack that was conducted in 2009. So, the parties consented well, really, going back to the very first case, the initial child support order operated as a consent as a result, just doesn't make sense under the statute. First of all, Timothy was temporarily residing with his parents and that's why she served him here the first time although she never resided here. The child support order was He filed the first modification in 2012 and she was the first first in I don't think this concept of an ongoing years-long consent is consistent with the statute. The only other thing I'll say quickly is that the subsection 201 which talks about an individual submitting to the jurisdiction of the state by its very language is only in a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order doesn't seem to contemplate that at all. So I don't don't with the state determine whether or not there was consent under the meaning of this statute. I would say on these facts you should find that she never submitted herself to the personal jurisdiction of the court. If you are inclined to that, then I would say that would require a remand because we have no idea what the circumstances surrounding all of that are. Do we have any knowledge of the circumstances of her mother getting this lawyer to appear and then the lawyer appeared and then she said he was there on her behalf and then he wasn't there on her behalf? Respectfully again, she never said that he represented her. The word wasn't represented. You can have that, but not the rest. My question is this. Even if she did ask me to go to court, was there going to personal jurisdiction? She wouldn't have submitted herself to the personal jurisdiction of the court because she would still not have waived her right to object to the jurisdiction of the court. Unless he filed an appearance and a response of pleading that day, for example. But she didn't. Thank you. It's going to be an interesting one. All right. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/argument%3A100392. Public record. Not legal advice.