# UNITED STATES TAX COURT

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Atax-court%3Af93dc556357860db

## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

120 T.C. No. 3

-

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. & SUBSIDIARIES, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket. No . 18170 -98 .

,

Filed January . 15, 2 0 03 .

. MP is the parent of an affiliated groi2p, (P) thát
filed consolidated income tax returns for the taxable '
years, at issue..
.
1986 Transactions : 2 In 1986, P decided ,to sell the

principal investments business of MLL, a second tier
subsidiary. Because P wanted to retain certain assets
of MLL, consisting of its lease advisory bus'iness and
certain other assets (the 1986 retained ås'sets) within
the consolidated group while minim1z1ng .or eliminating
gain on the sale of MLL outside the consolidated group,
P adopted and implemented a plan consisting of the.
following, steps: (1). MLL distributed the 1986 retained
assets to its subsidiary, Merlease; (2) MLL then sold
Merlease cross-chain to a sister corporation (MLAM)

in~

a transaction that qûalif ied as a, sec . 304, I . R . C. ,
deemed redemption; (3) MLL then distributed a' dividend
of the gross sale proceeds to its parent, MLCR, a
wholly owned subsidiary of MP; .(4) .P then~ completed the
sale of MLL to a third party. Under the consolidated

SERVED JAN 1 5 2001

- 2 return regulations then in effect, the cross-chain sale
aÊd the related dividend generated an increase in
MLCR's basis in MLL's stock, enabling P to sell MLL
outside the consolidated group at a loss.
On the date of the 1986 cross-chain sale, P had
identified the prospective purchaser of MLL, had
negotiated a tentative purchase price for MLL, and
clearly intended to sell MLL outside the consolidated
group, thereby terminating MLL's constructive ownership
under sec. 318, I.R.C., of Merlease, the issuing
corporation.

On its consolidated tax return for TYE Dec. 26,
1986, P claimed a loss from the sale of MLL after
treating the gross sale proceeds as a dividend and
increasing its basis in MLL's stock by that amount.
1987 Transactions: P decided to sell the leased
properties business of MLCR, its wholly owned
subsidiary. Because P wanted to retain MLCR's
nonleasing assets (the 1987 retained assets) while
minimizing or eliminating gain on the sale of MLCR
outside the consolidated group, P adopted and
implemented a plan consisting of the following steps:
(1) MLCR identified the subsidiaries holding the 1987
retained assets

(MLBFS, MLPC, MLVC, MLEI, MLRDM, MLI,

MLLE); (2) MLCR then sold the seven subsidiaries to
three sister corporations (MLRI, MLPFS, MLAM) within
the consolidated group in transactions that qualified
as sec. 304, I.R.C., deemed redemptions; (3) MLCR then
distributed dividends of the gross sales proceeds to
its parent, MLCMH, a wholly owned subsidiary of MP; (4)
P then completed the sale of MLCR to a third party.
Under the consolidated return regulations then in
effect, the cross-chain sales and related dividends
generated increases in MLCMH's basis in MLCR's stock,
enabling P to sell MLCR outside the consolidated group
at a loss.

On the dates of the first seven of the 1987 crosschain sales, P had identified the purchaser of MLCR,
had prepared a draft acquisition agreement, and clearly
intended to sell MLCR outside the consolidated group,
thereby terminating MLCR's constructive ownership under
sec. 318, I.R.C., of the subsidiaries sold cross-chain
(the issuing corporations).

- 3 After the.first seven of the 198,7-cross-chain
sales had closed and shortly before the sale of MLCR
was scheduled to close, _the. purchaser of MLCR notified
P that it could not own VL, one of MLCR's .subsidiaries
because of Federal law restrictions. Approximately 2
weeks before the sale of MLCR closed, MLCR sold the
stock of VL to MLAM, a sister corporation, in a
transaction that qualifiëd as a deëmed sec. 304,
I.R.C., redemption.
.
On its consolidated income tax return for TYE
Dec. 26, 1987, P claimed-a loss of $466'!9853176 from
,
the sale of MLCR after treating the gross sales
proceeds from thet 1987 cross-chain sales as a dividend
and increasing its basis in MLCR's stock by that
amouilt .
Respondent determined that the nine cross-chain
sales of Merlease, MLBFS, MLPC, MLVC, MLEI, MLRDM, MLI,

MLLE, and VL (the subsidiaries)- and the sales of MLL
and MLCR outside the consolidated group were parts of a
firm, fixed, and clearly integrated plan ,to completely
terminate MLL's and MLCR's actual and constructive
ownership of the subsidiaries . Petitioner contends
that each cross-chain sale resulted in the receipt of a
dividend by the selling corporation under.secs.·302(d)
and 301, I.R.C., equal to the gross sale proceeds and
that it was entitled, under the consolidated -return
regulations, to increase its basis in MLL's and MLCR's
stock as a~ result of the cross-chain sales.:
Held: The cross-chain"·sales qualifi.ed as
redemptions in complete termination of MLL's and MLCR's
interest in the subsidiaries sold cross-chain· under
sec. 302(b) (3), I.R.C., and must be taxed as
distributions in-exchange for st-ock under sec. 302.(a),
I.R.C., rather than as dividends under sec. 301, I.R.C.

- 4 -

David J. Curtin, Sheri Dillon, Peter J. Genz, William F.
Nelson, Kimberly S. Piar and Cornelia J. Schnyder, for
petitioner.

Carmen M. Baerga, Jill A. Frisch, Lyle B. Press, and Jody S.
Rubinstein, for respondent.

MARVEL, Judge:

Respondent determined the following

deficiencies in the Federal income tax of Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc.

(Merrill Parent) and subsidiaries (collectively, the

consolidated group or petitioner):
TYE

Deficiency

Dec. 26, 1986
Dec. 25, 1987
Dec. 30, 1988

$7,704,908
12,141,242
12,928,981

The ultimate issue in this case involves the proper
computation of petitioner's basis in.the stock of two
consolidated group members (the target corporations) that it sold

in 1986 and 1987.

In order to resolve that.issue, we must decide

the tax effect of nine cross-chain sales1 of stock of certain
subsidiaries (the issuing corporations) owned by the target
corporations.

These sales were structured by petitioner to

transfer certain assets from the target corporations to other
members of the consolidated group (the acquiring corporations)

1For purposes of this opinion, a cross-chain sale means a
sale by one brother-sister corporation to another brother-sister
corporation in the same ownership chain.

before the target corporations were i sold'outside the consolidated
group.

The parties agree that1the .cross-chain sales qualified as

section 3042 redemptions that must be tested for dividend

equivalency under åectiòñ 302 (b) > ' The*parties .disagree; however,
regarding the result of that' testirig.
RespondeÑt contends that 'eåch croès-chain sale by as target
corporation and the later sale of that target corporation outside

the consolidated group were parts of .a firm, fixed, and clearly
integrated plan to c mpletely terminate Áhe target corporation's '
actual and constructive ownership of .the issuing. corporations.
Respondent argues, therefore, that the cross-chain sales

qualified as redemptions in complete terminatiön of the target
corporations' ^interest ,in the issuing corporations under section
302 (b) (3) , and must be taxed as a distribution in. exchanÛe for
stock under section 302 (a) .

Petitioner coritends that each cross-

chain ,sale resulted. in the receipt of a dividend by the . selling
corporation under sections 302;(d) and 301 equal tò the gross sale
proceeds and that it ewas entitled, under the . consolidated return -

regulations, to increase its basis in the target corporations'
stock by the amount of the dividend.3

Petitiorier's claim to

2All section references^aré to'the Iriternal Revenue Code in
effect for the years in issue, and·all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 'Monetary'amounts arei
rounded to the nearest dollar.

3Under" the consolidated return investment adjustment (cont inued . . . )

increased bases in the stock of the target corporations when the
target corporations are sold to unrelated third-party purchasers
in 1986 and 1987 depends for its success upon dividend treatment
for the gross proceeds of the nine cross-chain sales.

See secs.

1.1502-32(a) and 1.1502-33, Income Tax Regs.

Following concessions,' therefore, we must decide:

3(...continued)
regulations, see secs. 1.1502-32(a) and 1.1502-33, Income Tax
Regs. as in effect for the years at issue, a consolidated group
member's basis in a subsidiary was increased or decreased, dollar
for dollar, by changes in the earnings and profits of the
subsidiary. The Commissioner subsequently amended the
consolidated return investment adjustment regulations generally
for determinations and tax years beginning on or after Jan. 1,
1995.

T.D. 8560, 1994-2 C.B. 200.

4In its petition, petitioner asserted (1) that respondent
failed to use the Becker "separate return limitation year" net
operating loss of $85,164,319 in computing petitioner's group
taxable income for the 1987 taxable year; (2) respondent failed
to take into account the recalculated amount of environmental tax
deductions for the 1987 and 1988 taxable years; (3) respondent
failed to allow a separate fuel tax credit and instead included
such credit in petitioner's general business credits for the 1986
taxable year; (4) respondent failed to include petitioner's
available general business tax credits in determining
petitioner's alternative minimum tax for the 1988 taxable year;
and (5) respondent failed to take into account $98,505 of Federal
income tax withheld by Newmont Mining on dividends paid to a
consolidated Canadian subsidiary of petitioner during the 1987
taxable year. In its petition, petitioner also stated that
respondent agreed with petitioner's position regarding
adjustments (1)-(4).
In the answer to the petition, respondent
conceded adjustments (1), (2), and (4). Respondent also conceded
that the disagreements regarding adjustments (1)-(4) would be
resolved in computing any final deficiencies in this case. With
respect to adjustment (5), respondent denied the adjustment in
the answer but did not raise the issue on brief or at trial.
Adjustment (5) is, therefore, deemed conceded.
See Rule
151(e) (4) and (5); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.

661, 683

(continued...)

.

... 7

(1)

-

Whether a deemed,section 304 redemption in:the form of

a 1986 cross-chain stock sale ibetween brother-sister corporations
in a consolidated: gröup must- be integrated with the .later, sale of
the cross-chain seller outside the consolidated groupqand treated
as a'redemption in complete termination funders.section 302 (a) and

(b) (3) as' respondent contends /L ·or whether thet deemed section 304.
redemption qualified as a distribution óf property ,taxable as a
dividend -under section 301' asopetitioner contendst -and .
(2)

whether' deemed sect·ion 304 redemptions , in .the .·f orm of

eight 1987 cross-chain stock.sales between-brother-sister
corporations in a consol·idated group must be, integrated with the
later salë of thè cross-chain. sellér outside the.consolidated group and treated as a5redemption in complete ,termination under
section 302 (a) and - (b) (3) as respondent contends,: .or . whether the
deemed section 304 redernptions; were distributions of rproperty-

.

taxable as dividends under section 301 as petit.ioner contends.
FINDINGSi OF. FACT ·.

Some of the facts have been estipulated.: We incorporate the
stipulhted Pfacts into oür findings by th:is reference.
Merrill Parent is a corporation organized runder. Delaware law

and'is- the parent-corporation of an affiliated group, of
corporations that filed consolidated Federal income tax returns .

4 ( . . . continued)
(1989); Money v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 46, 48

(1987).

- 8 during the years at issue.

Merrill Parent, through its

subsidiaries and affiliates, provides investment, financing,
insurance, leasing, and related services to clients.
I.

1986 Sale of ML Leasing

Before it was sold outside the consolidated group, Merrill
Lynch Leasing, Inc.

(ML Leasing or MLL), was a wholly owned

subsidiary of Merrill Lynch Capital Resources, Inc.

(ML Capital

Resources or MLCR), which in turn was wholly owned by Merrill
Parent.

ML Leasing was engaged in the business of arranging

leasing transactions between third parties (lease advisory

business).

ML Leasing also was engaged in the business of

leasing its own real and tangible personal property to third
parties in the capacity of lessor (principal investments
business).

Immediately before the years at issue, the principal

investments business leases were generating substantial positive
cashflow but had "turned around" for income tax purposes, meaning
that if ML Leasing continued to hold the leases the principal
investments business would generate taxable income in excess of

pretax cashflow.

ML Leasing also owned, directly or through

single-purpose subsidiary corporations, general and limited
partnership interests in limited partnerships that held property
subject to operating and leveraged leases.
A.

Preliminary Discussions

As early as August 22, 1985, Douglas E. Kroeger, a member of

thes corporate tax. department. at Merrill*Parent, sent an

interoffice 'memorandum to ·David K. - Downes,c corporate · controller
at Merrill Parent , . recommending thè sale of _ ML Leasing' s st ock,
after "stripping out" certain assets Merrill Parent .did not wish
to sell, 'as part of a tax strategy; that cou-ld result in an-

.

increase in after-tax earnings of more than $60 million.5 reciation when
calculating earnings and profits.
See Woods"Inv. Co'. v.
Commissioner, 85 T,. C. 2'74 (1985.) .. This tax strategy is not at
issue in this case.

Although it is unclear 'from the Yecordl it uppears that
Merrill Parent. rptained Merrill Lynch Capital Markets (ML Capital
Markets) to sell the stock of ML Leasing in 1986 arid ML Capital
Resources in 1987.

- 10 -

At some point thereafter, Merrill Parent decided it wanted
to sell only the principal investments business of ML Leasing as
part of its tax strategy.

Merrill Parent did not want ML

Leasing's lease advisory business and certain other assets that
were not part of the principal investments business (collectively
referred to as the 1986 retained assets) to leave the
consolidated group.

Merrill Parent decided to transfer the 1986

retained assets to other corporations within the consolidated
group in preparation for the sale of ML Leasing, leaving only the
principal investments business remaining in ML Leasing, including
the operating and leveraged lease assets.
On March 26, 1986, participants at an internal meeting of
petitioner discussed the possible sale of ML Leasing's stock.
At the meeting, the participants discussed the estimated tax
basis of ML Leasing as of the end of 1985, the approximate value
of ML Leasing, whether the sale would be prohibited because= of
various restrictions in the lease documents, the intangible
effects of the sale of ML Leasing, the possibility of tax reform
being passed prior to late August 1986, the estimated after-tax

economic benefit of the sale of ML Leasing, and the estimated
after-tax book gain that would result from the sale of ML
Leasing.

At the meeting, Jeffrey Martin, a member of

petitioner's Mergers & Acquisitions Group, was asked "to feel out
the market on a no-name basis inquiring if there are any

- 11T-

interested^parties for such attransaction."- 'Upon conclusion o.f
the meetihg, it was decided that petitioner "would.await Mr.
Martin's findings before any ádditional workttakes.place"
regarding1the sale of ML Leasing..

,

In approximately April 1986,

petitioner decided to pursue a sale of ML Leasing and appointed
Theodóre D

Sands; managing.director of the Investment Banking

Division'at Merrill Parent,2to serve.as,the chief negotiator with
re-spect to thë~ sále.7

Mr. Sands suggested that petitioner "clean

up"' ML Leasing: by removingí any.assets the mcompany did not want to
sell (i.e., the 1986 retåinéd assets).' Mr.~Sands, however, did
not suggest the manner ini:whichsthe 1986 retained assetss should
be transferred"from Mu-Leasing, and he did not suggest
implementing the 1986 bross chain·sale at 1ssue an this case.
B.

Pe't"ition~er Seeks a Purchaser

.

Mr. Sarids was 'asked to dévelopr a profile of -a likely
pros ective *purchaser for ML.Leasing and a list of prospectives
purchasers.

Mr. Sands establ'ished three criteria for,a-potential

purchaser of ML'Leasing:

(1) A purchaser should .be ~financiallyc

70n July .28, 1986, petitioner officially appointed a fiveperson project team to conduct the divéstiture of ML Leasing,
which i'ncluded Mr. Sands as chief negotiator.
8The.1986 retained assets consisted of assets leased under

operating, finance, and leveraged leases, 'subject to thé'
liabilities associated with such.assets, and 'the shares of 34
corporate subsidiaries that owned leased equipment and leased
real property. .The·decision as do which assets would be sold and
which would be retained was Made by the head of'investment
banking at Merrill Parent.

- 12 -

sophisticated to handle the lease portfolio;

(2) a purchaser

should be able to finance the transaction; and (3) a purchaser
should have a net operating loss (NOL) carryforward and,
therefore, should be indifferent to the fact that the lease
portfolio was about to turn for tax purposes.
In or around April 1986, Mr. Sands contacted Inspiration

Resources Corp.

(Inspiration).

Inspiration was a diversified

natural resources company whose stock was publicly traded on the
New York and Toronto stock exchanges.
by Minerals & Resources Corp., Ltd.

Inspiration was controlled

(MINORCO), a Bermuda

corporation headquartered in London, England.

Mr. Sands had

worked with Inspiration on other matters before 1986 and was
aware that Inspiration had a' significant NOL.
Petitioner provided to Inspiration a document entitled
"MERRILL LYNCH LEASING INC. Proposed Sale of Equity Investment
Assets" dated April 1986 (ML Leasing offering memorandum).

The

ML Leasing offering memorandum described the assets that would be
owned by ML Leasing at the time of the sale and the pretax

cashflows expected to be derived from the portfolio of leases.
The ML Leasing offering memorandum described the proposed
transaction as follows:

Prior to the sale of Leasing's stock, any of Leasing's
assets which are not to be sold will be dividended to
MLCR. Assets rema1n1ng ln Leasing will be the equity
investments in real estate and equipment net leased to
major corporations, tax benefits purchased under the
1981 Tax Act, unused ITC carryover, and any state net

--13 operatins losses '("NOL's") not. used inuthè:various
ML&Co. 1986 unitary returns. The remaining liabilities
in Leasing would consist solely of deferred- taxes.
-MLCR ki·ll then sell the stock of Leasing. .* * *
The 1986 retained assets

er~e ñot included in-the description of

ML Leasing's portfolio.

On Juáe 19, 1986, Mr. Sands prepared a memorandum entitled
"Status of ML Leasing Sales'Effort"'.

The memorandum -reported on

a telephone call Mr. Sanda receited from Mr. Smith, the Vice
President-Finance for Inspiration.

As summarized in..the

memorandum, Mi . Smith~ "expressed strong interest". in. purchasing
ML Leasing and repo'rted that he hadtprepèred a detailed.analysis
for consideration by In'spiration's ~execut^ive.committee.:

Although

Mr. Smith had expressed reservations ábout the status of
Inspiràtion's NOLs'ând ábout>the lack^ of certainty regarding the
lease résidual value's, Mr.

540anås
reportèd that Mr. Smith's

dohbérn regardiný Inspiratioù's NOLs was not a serious problem

and that Mr: Smith's concern regarding'the residual values would
be addressed in a meeting on Junè 23 ùhen"Mr., Smith and- his staff
would meet with a representative of ML Leasing to review the

residuals on a lease-by-lease basis.

Mr. Sands reported.that, if

Mr. Smith were satisfied after the June 23 meeting, Inspiration

"will make a go , no go decision on. buying Leasing. at the $80
million asking price based on.the assumption. that the residual
values can,be.confirmed.by an oµtside appraiser."

- 14 -

On July 3, 1986, a written "Presentation to Inspiration
Resources Corporation" prepared by ML Capital Markets was
submitted to Inspiration.

The presentation again described the

assets proposed to be owned by ML Leasing at the time of sale of

the ML Leasing stock to Inspiration and the pretax net cashflows
expected to be derived from the portfolio of leases.
retained assets were not included in those assets.

The 1986
The

presentation proposed a purchase price of $98 million and a
closing date at the end of 1986.
C.

The Tax Plan and the Section 304 Cross-Chain Sale

Sometime between 1985 when the possible sale of ML Leasing
was first discussed and July 21, 1986, when ML Leasing
contributed the 1986 retained assets to Merlease Leasing Corp.
(Merlease), petitioner finalized a plan' to strip ML Leasing of
the 1986 retained assets and to sell ML Leasing outside the

consolidated group using planning techniques designed to increase
petitioner's tax basis in ML Leasing and thereby eliminate gain
on the sale of ML Leasing.

The plan consisted of the following

steps:

9It appears from the ML Leasing offering memorandum that
petitioner originally intended to have MLL distribute the 1986
retained assets to MLCR as a dividend. We infer from this fact
that petitioner finalized its plan to engage in sec. 304 crosschain sales after the ML Leasing offering memorandum had been
prepared.

- 15 1.' ML Leasing.-would contribute the 1986 retained asset.s to
Merlease, a direct wholly owned ·subsidi'ary of ML Leasing, in
anticipation of ML Leasing's sale'outside the consolidated group.
2.

ML Leasing would -then sell Merlease cross,chain to a

sister corpóration within the consolidated group.
-3.

ML:Leasing would declare a dividend to ML Capital

Resources öf designated:assets and the gross.sales proceeds from
the cross-chain sale of Merlease to the acquiring corporation.
4.

After each of the steps outlined above had occurred,

petitioner wóuld then sell MLiLeasing to a third-party purchaser.
In acóórdance with the plan,and -pursuant·to a resolution
dated July 21, 1986,- ML Leasiñg contributed the 1986- retained
assets'to the capital of'Merlease.
In·accordance with the plan and pursuant to resolutions
adopted on July 22, *1986, the respective boards of directors of
ML Leasing and Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.

(ML Asset

Management.ör MLAM), ardirect wholly owned subsidiary of Merrill
Parent, approved the sale of -the stock of^Merlease to ML Asset
Management for a purchase price equal to the .fair 'market.value of

such.stóck as of July 22, 19861.

Two days later,. ML Leasing and

ML Asset Management entered into a stock purchase agreement dated

"Some of the same assets identified in the July 21, 1986,
consent to corporate action as having been contributed to
Merlease's capital~were included.as part of a.dividend declared
and paid to ML Cåpital Resources, ML Leasing's sole shareholder
as of July 18,

1986.

- 16 -

.

July 24, 1986, pursuant to which ML Asset Management agreed to
purchase all of ML Leasing's Merlease stock for a purchase price
of $73,320,471.

The sale closed on July 24, 1986.

Immediately

before ML Asset Management purchased the stock of Merlease, ML
Asset Management's accumulated earnings and profits exceeded the
price it paid for the Merlease stock.

The parties agree that the

sale of Merlease to ML Asset Management was a section 304
transaction.
D.

Presentation to Merrill Parent's Board of Directors

On July 28, 1986, only 4 days after the cross-chain sale of
Merlease, a formal presentation was made to Merrill Parent's
board of directors regarding the sale of ML Leasing."

The

presentation included the distribution of a written summary and

slides illustrating the details of the plan.for the sale of ML
Leasing, including key calculations.

The written summary began

as follows:

We have identified a significant economic benefit,
based on an opportunity in the tax law, in selling
Merrill Lynch's proprietary lease business. This
economic benefit can be achieved by structuring a
transaction to sell the stock of our primary leasing
subsidiary, Merrill Lynch Leasing. We believe that
such a sale could realistically result in an after-tax
financial statement gain of approximately $104 million.

The presentation laid out the various steps of the plan to

"Petitioner was unable to locate the minutes of the meeting
of the board of directors on July 28, 1986, the date the
presentation was made.

- 17. dispose of -Me'rri'll Lynch's propriet'ary lease business, culminating.
in the

541ale
of ML Leasing's stock.: .

The stated purpose of the presentation was 'to ,secure 3the
board's 'approval "to enter into a letter of intent with the
purcha 541er*'and
to secure the board's authorization for:. the Executive Committee to approve the final details sof
the proposed transaction in accordance with the letter
of intent, subject to closing adjustments and unforseen
contingencies arising from negotiating a final
agreement in early October, up to a máximum reduction
of $20 million.
The written summary informed the board of directors that
"due to the exhaustion of tax benefits, many of * * * [ML
Leasing's] leases begin to produce taxable income in 1987, with
the remainder 'turning around

in 1988.

Accordingly, it is an

opportune time to sell our Principal Investments line of business
to an appropriate purchaser."

The summary also informed the

board of directors that because it was not Merrill Parent's
intent to withdrew from all aspects of the leasing business,
Merrill Parent was removing the 1986 retained assets from ML
Leasing before ML Leasing's stock was sold in two-steps:

-(1) The

1986 retained assets had been. sold to ML Asset Mánagement for

approximat ly $57 million.; and (2) ML Lea ing w 11 decläre' a $115

The presentation represented to the board of directors
that "Once both partie's have signed the letter of intent, the
sales price will be firmly established subject -only. to changes in
the residual value by~ the appraisers . Moreover, even the impact
òf residual value appraisals will be limited to $14 million."

- 18 million dividend to ML Capital Resources consisting of cash
received from ML Asset Management, plus other cash, receivables,
and certain liabilities.

After removal of the 1986 retained

assets, the summary represented that Merrill Parent would then be
in a position to sell the principal investments business portion
of ML Leasing.
The summary unequivocally identified Inspiration as the

purchaser of ML Leasing's stock, described Inspiration, and
stated that "In return for the stock of ML Leasing, we will
receive $126 million in cash (subject to adjustments for residual
value appraisals) from the purchaser, Inspiration Resources
Corporation."

The summary also explained how the sale price was

determined," quantified the after-tax income and the tax benefit
that would result from the sale, explained the tax risks of the
transaction, and recommended the creation of a $37 million tax

"The sale price was determined by calculating the present
value of the cashflow stream generated by ML Leasing's assets
($42 million), discounting the pretax cashflow to reflect the
value of the cashflow to Inspiration ($143 million), calculating
the value of Inspiration's NOLs ($101 million), and adding to the
present value of the cashflow stream a premium of $53 million
(representing a split of the benefits arising from Inspiration's.
NOLs). The resulting base sale price ($95 million) was then
increased by the amount of cash to be left in ML Leasing
(estimated to be $31 million) to arrive at a total sale price of
$126 million (subject to adjustment for residual value
appraisals).

- 19 reserve for the transaction."

In calculating the recommended

reserve, the summary stated the following:
The first item of tax reserve concerns the sale to
Merrill Lynch Asset Management of the leasing
subsidiaries we wish to retain. The IRS could maintain
that the form of this transaction should be disregarded
and in substance, a distribution with a reduction in
tax basis should be deemed to have occurred. The $16
million reserve amount is the $57 million I noted
previously multiplied by the 28% capital gains tax
rate.
Following the presentation, Merrill Parent's board of directors
approved the plan, including the sale of Merrill Leasing to
Inspiration.
E.

Nonbinding Letter of Intent

On July 29, 1986, 1 day after the presentation to its board
of directors, Merrill Parent entered into a nonbinding letter of
intent with Inspiration for the sale of the stock of ML Leasing
to Inspiration.

The letter of interit provided a "period of

exclusivity" during which Merr'iZ1 ParerÀt would negotiate

exclusively with Inspiration to reach an agreement for the sale
of ML Leasing.

Upon executinò the letter of intent, the parties

agreed that "if' subh sale a'greement is not executed on or prior
to August 31, 1986, neither of us intends to proceed with the

transactions-contemplated herein."

The letter of·intent provided

"The $37 million tax 'reserve consisted of a $16 million
reserve for the possible disallowance of the deemed dividend
resulting from the cross-chain sale and a $21 niillion reserve for
lost tax benefits if certain income projections were not
realized.

- 20 that "If the conditions to reaching an agreement are satisfied,
the aggregate purchase price will be $95,000,000", subject to
adjustment for cash left in ML Leasing, for the value of
residuals as determined by independent appraisers, and for other
specified adjustments.

The letter of intent also stated:

It is understood that this letter of intent merely
constitutes a statement of our mutual intentions with
respect to the proposed acquisition and does not
contain all matters upon which agreement must be
reached in order for the proposed acquisition to be
consummated. A binding commitment with respect to the
proposed acquisition will result only from execution of
definitive agreements, subject to the conditions
expressed therein.
Following execution of the nonbinding letter of intent, both
Inspiration and Merrill Parent hired outside appraisers to value

the lease portfolio."
On July 29, 1986, Merrill Parent issued a news release to
its employees announcing that it had entered into a letter of
intent for the sale of a portion of its leasing operations to
Inspiration.

Merrill Parent announced that the sale, if

consummated, would result in a realization of after-tax gain of
at least $70 million and was scheduled to close at the end of

During July and Aug. 1986, petitioner also executed
various transfers within the consolidated group to remove assets
from ML Leasing before its sale to Inspiration. By resolutions
dated July 31 and Aug. 1, 1986, ML Leasing's board of directors
authorized payment of a dividend to ML Capital Resources
consisting of all the capital stock of five subsidiaries of ML
Leasing, intercompany receivables, cash, and other assets. These
distributions are not at issue in this case.

,

- 21

1986,, "subject to negotiation of definitive documentation and
normal' conditions to closing."

.

.

On August 5', 1986,."Inspiration''s boardrof directors ratified
and retroactively approved the nonbinding letter of, intent

between Insþiration- and Merri-ll Parent'.

'I'he board of directors

authorized the executive committee'of the board of directors to
"take any'and all necessary or:desirable actions in connection
with the proposed·acquisition of" ML Leasing.
F.

.

..

FurtherJNégotiations Between. Petitioner and- Inspiration .

On August· 19, t 1986, (Inspirations wrote a letter to .Mr. Sands

explaininéf that "Several problems'have arisen over:the- past few
weeks" regarding tlíe. purchase' of ML Leasing.

In the letter,

Inspiration, advised that it »was: unable. "to. f inance this
transacti-on on a secured basisj within the timeframe and terms of
our agreement: "

Inspiration stated. that it had started to review

alternative means of financing, including. both unsecured
financing and the sale of specific leases from the ML Leasing
portfolio as .a means of financing the transaction and suggested
that the increased cost oft the .unsecured financing "may justify a
downward adjustment'-in the purchase: price."

In -the= letter, -

Inspiration requested that the terms ofi.the draft stock purchase
agreement be altered to accommodate alternative-means-of
financíng; i.e.

by eliminati g a provision in the dra'ft stock

agreement that prohibited Inspiration from sellirig signifiàant

- 22 -

assets from ML Leasing for a period of 5 years.

In addition,

Inspiration suggested that "Merrill Lynch may have to arrange
with the lessee and the secured noteholders to waive certain
restrictions on transfer of ownership" in order to accommodate
its request.

Inspiration also pointed out that the existing

draft purchase agreement did not contain a representation from
petitioner that the cashflows as presented to Inspiration were
correct.

Inspiration advised that in order for a lender or a

purchaser to make financing decisions based on "these cash flows,
a legal due diligence review will be insufficient and it will be
essential for Merrill Lynch to represent that the cash flows [of
the leases] are accurate."

Inspiration concluded its letter by

expressing its continued interest in completing the transaction.
In order to give the parties to the letter of intent

additional time to finalize their deal, the parties on August 29,
1986, agreed to extend the term of the nonbinding letter of
intent to September 19, 1986, and negotiations and discussions
continued with Inspiration after August 29, 1986."

Shortly after August 29, 1986, petitioner's appraiser and
Inspiration's appraiser completed their analysis of residual
values.

Both appraisers valued the residual values of the leases

"A Sept. 8, 1986, interoffice memorandum from Mr. Sands
stated that although Inspiration still had not secured financing
to purchase ML Leasing, Inspiration was optimistic that it would
do so. Mr. Sands also indicated that Inspiration's financing
efforts were going very well.

- 23 -

in ML Leasing's portfolio higÑer th'an petitioner and Inspiration
had expected.

As a rÁsult , the chie f f inanc ial of f icer f oh

Merrill'Parent i'nstructed Mr. Sands tÒ'negotiaÊe an lncrease in
the purchase price from $126.6 million tò Ô131.4 million.

In

accordance with thbse instructions, Mr. Sands attempted^to
negotiate an adjustment to the purchase þrice.

Älûhou'gh his

efforts appaèently were not* init-ially sell réceived," thè^
partie^s ultimately agréed tò increase the purchase-pricè by $3
million.
In approximately Áugust or Àarly Sèptethber 1986

petitioner

proviÈled Inspiration wiÊh"a draft stock purchase agreemént dated
September 11,

1986."

On SeÙt mber 1 254Ï,
1986, t!he executivë

committee of Inspiration's.board·of directors met to--discuss the
acquisition òf MÈ Leasing4

AfteÈ discus ion, Ehe- eNecutïve

committee approved the Septembër 11~, 1986, stock"purchase
agreement 'substanti'ally in the form presented.

The executive

commithee also authorized Ins ïration's management td 'finalizé
the necessary bank financing.

Mr. Sands was asked by Inspiration's representatives to
leave the meeting, and, for at least -at day. after the meeting
Inspiration refused to return phone calls from either Mr. Sands
or petitioner's attorneys.
"The Aug. 19, 1986, létter from Inspiration t$o Mr. Sands
indicaties there was .a. previous version of the Sept . 11, 1986,
draft stock purchase agreement. , The record is unclear, however,
as to when the .first 'stock purchase agreement was^ drafted and
circulated.

- 24 G.

ML Leasing Stock Purchase Agreement

Effective September 19, 1986, Merrill Parent, ML Capital
Resources, ML Leasing, and Inspiration executed an agreement for
the purchase and sale of the stock of ML Leasing (ML Leasing

stock purchase agreement).

The ML Leasing stock purchase

agreement was amended as of October 31, 1986, to reflect further
negotiations on certain matters.

The purchase price was

$129,445,843, payable in cash at closing, subject to certain
postclosing adjustments.

Pursuant to the ML Leasing stock

purchase agreement, the purchase price subsequently was adjusted
based on residual value appraisals for certain leases.

The sale

of ML Leasing closed on October 31, 1986.
II.

1987 Sale of ML Capital Resources
At the beginning of petitioner's TYE 1987, ML Capital

Resources was a wholly owned subsidiary of Merrill Parent.19

ML

Capital Resources was engaged in the business of arranging
I

equipment leasing transactions between third parties and also
owned various types of equipment and other tangible personal
property, which it leased to third parties.

ML Capital

Resources' business focused on small business leases.

It was

also a partner in certain limited partnerships that held

"By resolution dated Apr. 8, 1987, _the board of directors
of Merrill Parent approved the formation of a newly organized
corporation, Merrill Lynch Consumer Markets Holdings, Inc.
(Consumer Markets or MLCMH), and the contribution of all the
capital stock of ML Capital Resources to Consumer Markets.

- 25 -

computers leased to IBM . and had -been- active .in other types of
financing for medium; 541ized
businesses. · ML Capital ·Resources also
owned the stock of . a number of esubsidiary corporations that ,were
engaged in the business of· arranging .equity and debt financing,
for middle- and small-sized companies. .,
Merrill - Parent decided to sell .that portion of ML Capital
Resources' búsiness consisting of t the-ownershipt of, leased
property .

.

In the aggregate, the . leases , were generat- ing

.

substantial positive cashflow but had "turned,around" for income
tax purÓosestso that if MLiCapital Resources continued to hold

..

them, the' leases would~generate taxable income .in excess of
pretax cashflow.

Because Merrill Parent did not .want ML; Capital

Resources' nonleasing'Êssetis:to leave the; consolidated: grqup, it
decided tihat ML Cap'ilal Resources would'sell to other affi-liated ,
corf>orations the stock of T certain subsidiary corporations that
were ehgagéd in lending and financing activities>or that owned
other as'áets'fand büsinesses that were not related to its.·core .
consumer leasing operations (collectively referred to as- the 1987
retained assets) .20

A. * Petitioner Seeks a Purchasert

e

'r

Mèi-rill Parent decided to conduct the sale of ML Capital
Resources' utiilizing a bidding: process .

By February 17, 1987, a

20Senior .management decided which assets to' sell and which
assets to retain within the consolidated group.

- 26 -

draft preliminary offering memorandum regarding the sale of the

stock of ML Capital Resources (preliminary offering memorandum)
had been prepared, as well as a list of prospective buyers and a
projection of an estimated sale price for ML Capital Resources of
between $70 and $80 million, on which was calculated a potential
after-tax gain of between $43.5 and $88 million.

At some point

between February 17, 1987, and March 1987, the preliminary
offering memorandum was finalized.
If a potential purchaser was interested after reviewing the
preliminary offering memorandum, Merrill Parent required that the
potential purchaser sign a confidentiality letter, at which point
the potential purchaser could request a confidential 3-volume
detailed offering memorandum dated March 1987 regarding the
specific leases in ML Capital Resources' portfolio (3-volume
offering memorandum). Under the bidding procedure established by
Merrill Parent and set forth in the 3-volume offering memorandum,
interested purchasers were required to submit "preliminary

indications of interest", including a proposed cash purchase
price, by March 27, 1987. Immediately thereafter, ML Capital
Markets and ML Capital Resources would select a limited number of
potential purchasers that would be given the opportunity to
perform detailed due diligence.

At that.time, prospective

purchasers would be given proposed forms for a stock purchase
agreement.

Prospective purchasers were required to submit bids

4

- 27 -

as to price·and terms by April 10f 1987.5

The..3fvolume'offering

memorandum -indicated that ML Capital Resources -"does not intend
to engage .in substantial negotiations with: respect to. the terms
of the Stock Purchase Agreement". and proposed an April 30, :198.7, 042
closing date.
042

On March 13, 1987, :the· chairman of the board of ML Capital

Resources authobized a five-person team to pursue the divestiture
of ML Capital Resources, .'four of whoin had been .involved in the
sale of ML Leasing.
ne^gotiator.

Mr. Sands again was appointed as; chief

.

.

In and around March 1987, Merrill Parent contacted various

potential' purchasers regarding the sale of. ML Capital Resources.
The ultimate purchaser, GATX Leasing_ Corp.
itself" and ·BCE 'Development,, .Inc.

(GATX) , -on behalf of.

(BCE) , a majority-owned

subsidiary of Bel.1 Canada'Ente prises (collectivelý referred. to

e

as GATX'/BCE unl'ess otherwise indicated) , :apparently.rreceived the
preliminary offering memorandum sometime during March 1987

· e

because ML Capital Markets sent GATX/BCE a confidentiality
agreement dated March 23, 1987.

B.

Section 304 Cross-Chain Sales
1.

Five Subsidiaries

Effective March 28 and March 30, 1987, respectively, the
boards of directors of ML Capital Resoûrces and Merrill Lynch

Realty, Inc. '(ML Realty o

MLRl), a wholly owned subsidiary of

- 28 Merrill Parent, approved the sale of all the stock of five
subsidiaries wholly owned by ML Capital Resources to ML Realty:
Merrill Lynch Business Financial Services, Inc.

(Financial

Services or MLBFS);" Merrill Lynch Private Capital, Inc.
(Private Capital or MLPC);" Merrill Lynch Venture Capital, Inc.
(Venture Capital or MLVC); Merrill Lynch Energy Investments, Inc.
(Energy Investments or MLEI); and Merrill Lynch R&D Management,
Inc.

(MLRDM)

(collectively referred to as the five subsidiaries).

ML Capital Resources and ML Realty entered into a stock
purchase agreement dated March 30, 1987, for the sale of stock of
the five subsidiaries to ML Realty.

The purchase price of the

stock of the five subsidiaries was $53,972,607 (which was
allocated to each subsidiary based on their respective book
values).

The sale closed on March 30, 1987.

Immediately before

its purchase of the five subsidiaries, ML Realty had accumulated
earnings and profits that exceeded the purchase price.

The sales

of the five subsidiaries were five of the eight cross-chain sales

Before the sale of Financial Services, effective Mar. 30,
1987, ML Capital Resources contributed certain loan receivables
and other assets and liabilities with a net book value of $10
million to Financial Services. These assets and liabilities were
part of the 1987 retained assets and thus were not intended to be
included in the assets of ML Capital Resources at the time of the
sale of its stock.

"Private Capital had a substantial negative book net worth
as of Mar. 29, 1987. Before the sale of Private Capital,
effective Mar. 30, 1987, ML Capital Resources contributed $32
million in cash to the capital of Private Capital and thereby
created a positive book net worth in Private Capital.

- 29 -

at issue for the taxable year ended December«25,- .1987: t The
parties agree that these sales were section 304- transactions.
2.

ML Interfunding

Merrill Lynch r Iríterfunding,' Inc . . (ML Interfunding or. MLI) -,
was a wholly owned subsidiary of ML Capital Resources .

i By .

resolutions dated March 27, 28, and 30, .1987., the boards of

directors of- ML Capital. Resources and ML ' Asset Management
approved the' sale4 of all the stock. of ML Interfunding to ML Asset
Management ."

ML, Capital Resources and ML Asset .Management

entered into a· stiock purchase agreément dated March 30, 1987,
which profided for an initial purchase price of-. $160 million to

-

be paid at closing with the purchase price to bei adjusted as soon
as practicable. by subsequent âgreement of ML Asset Management and

ML Capitali Resources'so as to equal the fair market value of the
shares as of March 30, 1987.
1987.M

The ÷sale closed on March 30,

Immediately >before its!*purchase of. ML Interfunding, ML

By resolution dated Mar. 27, 1987, the board of directors
of ML Interfunding declared and paid a dividend having a total
value of $100 million to 'ML Capital Resources of certain ·
preferred stock that it owned in .Gelco Corporation (Gelco) plus
the shares of certainrunaffiliated corporations (portfolio
stock) , which it had acquired as a dividend from - its wholly owned
subsidiary, ML Portfolio Management, by resolution dated Mar. 26,
1987. By fesolution dated Mar. 28,' 1987, ML·Capital Resources
contributed the portfolio stock and the Gelco .shares to Merrill
Lynch Property Holdings, Inc., a direct wholly owned subsidiary .
of ML Capital Resources.
In a valuation report dated Apr.. 18, 1988,. Deloitte
Haskins-Sells determined that the fair-market value of the stock
(continued. . . )

- 30 -

Asset Management had accumulated earnings and profits that
exceeded the purchase price.

This is the sixth cross-chain sale

at issue for the taxable year ended December 25, 1987.

The

parties agree that this cross-chain sale was a section 304
transaction.
3.

Leasing Equipment

By resolutions dated April 3, 1987, the respective boards of
ML Capital Resources and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.

(MLPFS), a first-tier wholly owned subsidiary of Merrill

Parent, approved the sale of all the stock of ML Leasing
Equipment Corp.

(Leasing Equipment or MLLE), a wholly owned

subsidiary of ML Capital Resources, to MLPFS."

ML Capital

Resources and MLPFS entered into a stock purchase agreement dated
April 3, 1987.

The purchase price for Leasing Equipment's stock

was $119,819,690.

The sale closed on April 3, 1987.

Immediately

before its purchase of Leasing Equipment, MLPFS had accumulated

"(...continued)
of ML Interfunding as of Mar. 30, 1987, was $181,080,000.

Based

on such appraisal, ML Asset Management and Consumer Markets, as
assignee of ML Capital Resources' rights under the ML
Interfunding stock purchase agreement, agreed that ML Asset
Management would pay Consumer Markets $26,413,365 as the final
payment of the purchase price for the ML Interfunding stock,
which was the difference between $181,080,000 and the net
consideration paid at closing of $154,666,635.
"On Apr. 2, 1987, ML Capital Resources contributed the
stock of MLL Corporate Partners, Inc., a subsidiary of ML Capital
Resources engaged in nonleasing activities, to Leasing Equipment.

31s -

earnings and pròf itis that exceeded . the purchase price .

This is

the seventh cross-chain sale at issue for the taxable year ended
Deöember 25, 1987.

The parties agree that this cross'chain sale

was a se'ction 304 transaction-.
C.

The a Sale' óf ML- Capital Resources .

Pursuant to the bidding p ocedure govern1ng the- sale of ML
Capital Resources; petitioner received five or six bids,
includ'ing one from GATX/BCE.

The bid from GATX/BCE, dated April

21, 1987, contained the principal terms upon iwhich GATX/BCE was
prepared to Òurchase all the òütstanding shares of ML Capital
Resources (Apri'l 21, 1987, bid proposal) .

GATX/BCE proposed a

base purchase price of $63 million, .plus 70 percent of certain
residual payments in excess ofn$27 million.

GATX/BCE's April 21,

1987, bid proposal specifically provided, among .other _things, the
following coñditions precedent:

(1) GATX/BCE would enter into a

purchase agreement ohly upon the×receipt of all requisite
corporate approvals, including approvals .by the -boards of GATX
and BCE, and (2) satisfactory completion of further: due
diligence .

The further 'due diligence included, but -.was not

limited t'à*, review of the. basid and related documentation, review
of audited firiancials of -the IBM partnerships,and iML .Capital

Although 042the
bidding proced re required each pròspective
purchaser to submit by Mar. .27, 1987, preliminary indications of
interest outlining a proposed purchase price, the record contains
no information regarding what, if anything, GATX/BCE submitted.

.

- 32 -

Resources, and review of a report prepared by IBM Credit
Corporation for the partners of the IBM partnerships.

On April 23, 1987, a formal presentation regarding the sale
of ML Capital Resources was made to Merrill Parent's board of
directors at its regular meeting.
Courtney F. Jones.

The presentation was made by

The substance of the presentation was

summarized in a written summary and slides illustrating the

details of the plan for the sale of ML Capital Resources.

The

written summary began as follows:
We have identified a significant economic benefit,
based on an opportunity in the tax law, in selling
Merrill Lynch's proprietary middle market lease
business. This economic benefit can be achieved by
structuring a transaction to sell the stock of one of
our leasing subsidiaries, Merrill Lynch Capital
Resources. We believe that such a sale could
realistically result in an after-tax financial
statement gain of approximately $73 million.

In conjunction with Merrill Lynch Capital Markets we
have identified a purchaser. The purpose of this
presentation is to secure your approval for the
Executive Committee to approve the final details of the
transaction and sign the definitive agreement.
The written summary laid out the various steps of the plan to
dispose of Merrill Lynch's proprietary middle-market lease
business culminating in the sale of ML Capital Resources' stock.
The written summary informed the board of.directors that-due to the exhaustion of tax benefits, many of * * *
[ML Capital Resources'] leases have begun to produce
taxable income in 1987. The projected cash flow from
the leases will in most years not be sufficient to
service the debt and the tax liability generated by the

- 33 -

.leases., Accordingly,÷ it is an opportune time to sell
this business to an appropriate purchaser.
The written summary also informed the board of directors that
because Merrill Parent did not intend to withdraw from the
"Lending Activities" aspect of the business, Merrill Parent "will
first remove the assets and operations related to the businesses
we wish to retain" and will "transfer all of the subsidiaries of
ML Capital Resources elsewhere within our Corporate structure" in
three steps before ML Capital Resources' stock was sold:

(1) ML

Capital Resources had already sold ML Interfunding's stock to ML
Asset Management7for its net bòok value of approximately $160
million;

(2) ML Capital Resources had already. sold, the stock of

certain of its subsidiaries to ML Realty Inc. for approximately
$50 million; and (3) ML Capital Resources will declare a $459
million* dividend to its parent company,. Merrill -Lynch Consumer
Markets Holdings, Inc.

(Consumer Markets), consist ing of cash

received from ML Asset Management and ML Realty, -existing cash
balances, the stock of the remaining .subsidiaries, receivables,
and liabilities. . The board was informed that after these
transfers we~re completed, ML Capital Resources "will have equity

of approximately· $40 million" and "we will be in a position to
sell" ML Capital Resources' stock.
The presentation identified "a joint venture between BCE
Development, Inc., a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of Bell- Canada

and GATX I)easing Corporation," a wholly owned subsidiarý of GATX

-·34

-

Corporation" as the likely purchaser and estimated a sales price
of $70 million, consisting of $62 million in cash plus the
assumption of $8 million in liabilities.

The presentation also

explained how the sale price was determined, quantified the
after-tax income and the tax benefit that would result from.the

sale, explained the tax risks of the transaction, and recommended
the creation of a $35 million tax reserve for the transaction."
In calculating the recommended reserve, the presentation stated

the following:
As you can imagine, it is the tax aspects that make
this sale especially attractive. The Tax Department,
in conceiving this transaction, has creatively applied
two different tax concepts to maximize the calculation
of Merrill Lynch's tax basis in ML Capital Resources.

*

*

*

*

*

The second tax concept deals with the creation of
approximately $210 million in tax basis.
This basis is
created by selling the stock of certain ML Capital
Resources subsidiaries to MLAM and ML Realty Inc. for

$210 million, rather than distributing this value to ML
Consumer Markets Holdings Inc. Under the tax rules the
sale is recharacterized as two separate transactions; a
dividend by MLAM and MLRI to MLCR of $210 million and a
contribution to the capital of MLAM and MLRI by MLCR of
approximately the same amount. The dividend received
by MLCR increases Merrill Lynch's tax basis in MLCR by
$210 million. MLCR's contribution to the capital of
MLAM and MLRI has no effect on tax basis.

"The $35 million tax reserve consisted of a $14 million
reserve for the possible disallowance of the deemed dividend
resulting from the cross-chain sale and a $21 million reserve for
lost tax benefits if certain income projections were not
realized.

- 35 The final step is for MLCR to declare a dividend of
cash, certain subsidiaries, and receivables to ML
Consumer Markéts Holdings Inc. This _intercompany
dividend triggers a taxable gain that also increases
our tax basis in MLCR
-What remains is our.. tax basis
at the time of sale, $340 million.

.-

As our basis in the stock is greater than the sales
price', the sale results in..a $278 million long term
capital loss. This capital loss will offset other long
term capital gains, resulting· in a.-tax benefit of $94
million.
The intercompany dividend to ML Consunier Markets
Holdings"-triggers a_ tax liability of $8 million, which
reduces the maximum potential tax benefit to .$86
million
2
-a.
The 'summary represented .that Merrill Parent's .corporate law
department and outside counsel had already prepared a proposed
definitive sales agreement and that the purchaser.had submitted
its desired contract changes, which were being negotiated.
Although the summary requested the ·board of, directors to
authórize the executive committee to .approve the final details of
the transaction and to sign the definitive.agreement for a :;.
minimum sales price of $70 million, the board authorized the
proper officers to finalize .the -sale of all the capital stock of
ML Capital Resources for not less than $60 million,. subject to
adjustments based on the valuation.of. certain assets.

- D.

GATX/BCE Modifies Its Initial Bid

In a letter addressed to Mr. Sands dated April 27, 1987,
GATX modified its April 21, 1987, bid proposal (April 2'7, ..1987,

- 36 -

bid proposal)."

GATX reconfigured its April 21, 1987, bid

proposal from $63 million, plus 70 percent of the discounted
value of the residual.payments in excess of $27 million, to $66
million, plus 40 percent of the discounted value of residual

payments in excess of $29.5 million.

The April 27, 1987, bid

proposal stated that, except for the replacement of the original
paragraphs in the April 21, 1987, bid proposal concerning the
purchase price, "all other terms and conditions remain
unchanged."

As of April 27, 1987, GATX/BCE had not evaluated the

lease portfolio of ML Capital Resources, and the proposed
purchase price was based on the representations made in the
offering memorandum.
E.

Nonbinding Letter of Intent

On May 22, 1987, Merrill Parent entered into a nonbinding
letter of intent with GATX/BCE for the sale of the stock of ML

Capital Resources (nonbinding letter of intent).

The nonbinding

letter of intent confirmed that Merrill Parent had provided
GATX/BCE with a draft sale agreement containing a description of
the assets in which ML Capital Resources had an equity interest

as of the proposed closing date.

The nonbinding letter of intent

set forth pricing terms identical to those set forth in GATX's
April 27, 1987, bid proposal; i.e, $66 million'plus 40 percent of

"The record is unclear as to whether a second round of bids
was conducted or whether petitioner merely asked GATX/BCE to
modify its original bid.

4

- 37 -

th'e -discountied value of . residual payments i in :excess : of
$29, 500 , 000 .

,

.

The- nonbinding letter of intent specif ica'lly stated

that the parties were bound by the; terms of their March 23, 1987,
confidentiality agreement...

The nonbinding letter of intent also

stated:
The consummation of the- acquisition contemplated
herein is subject to·(i) negotiation and execution of
definkitive agreements acceptable in form and. substance
to * * * [GATX/BCE] and * * * [petitioner] , (ii) no
change having occurred in the federal income tax laws
or the regulations of the U. S. Treasury promulgated
thereunder that would materially adversely alter the
economic effect of the transactions contemplated
herein,. (i'ii) approval of the·transactions contemplated
herein by'* * * [petitioner's] Executive Committee and
by the. appropriate corporate· authorities for- * * -*
[GATX/BCE] , (iv) consummation of satisfactory secured
financing by * * * -[GATX/BCE] and (v) other customary
and appropriate closing conditions.
F.

GATX Finance Committee Approval

On or about May 29, 1987, the GATX Finance Committee met to
consider thé proposed acquisition of ML Capital Resources.

A

written proposal presented at that meeting stated that GATX was
"awarded the transaction" based on its initial and modified bid
proposals and was "invited to perform a due diligence
investigation."

The written proposal also stated that, upon

completion of the due diligence process, GATX/B.CE reserved the
right to adjust the purchase price based on its due diligence
findings in the event that any information in the 3-volume
offering memorandum was incorrect.

The written proposal also

recommended that the base purchase price be reduced to $63.3.

- 38 -

million as a result of an increase in the reserve for losses and
a net reduction in expected future residual values.
On June 1, 1987, the GATX Finance Committee approved the

proposal to acquire the capital stock of ML Capital Resources for
a purchase price of $63.3 million, subject to certain specified
conditions.

The GATX Finance Committee recommended that the

proposed transaction be forwarded to the GATX board of directors.

G.

Continued Negotiations

After executing the nonbinding letter of intent, petitioner

and GATX/BCE continued their negotiations.

In conjunction with

GATX/BCE's due diligence review of the lease portfolio,
petitioner and GATX/BCE agreed that it was impractical to examine
each lease separately because the lease portfolio consisted of
such a large number of relatively small leases.

Therefore, they

agreed to use a "statistical sampling technique", whereby the
parties would jointly pick a certain number of leases at random
to examine in significant detail and compare them to the
representations made by Merrill Parent in the 3-volume offering

memorandum.

The results of the "statistical sample" were not

satisfactory to GATX/BCE; i.e., a larger than expected portion of
the leases did not coincide with Merrill Parent's representations
in the 3-volume offering memorandum.
From May 22 through June 25, 1987, negotiations continued in
order to accommodate the adjustments revealed by the due

- 39 -

diligence review.

Among other concessions; petitioner

represented to GATX that to the best of petitioner's knowledge,
as of the date of the closing, the schedules'in . the contract were
the actual status of the individual leases and) to the extent
they were not, there would be a postclosing adjustment to
accurately reflect the discrepancies.

.

'

.

During the negotiations, GATX requested £hat ML Vessel 042
Leasing Corporation (Vessel Leasing), a wholly owned subsidiary
of ML Capital Resources, not be included in the ML Capital
Resources portfol'ió because GATX/BCE could not own the Petitioner asserts that
the deemed seátion' 304 redemptions, standing alone, did not .
completely terminate thé÷target corporations'z actual and
construòtive ownership interes!t ·in the > issuing corporations s .
because, under i the i attribution rules of. section

18; the target .

corporatiòns continued tö hold an ownership. interest in. those .
corporations following the redemptions.

Respondent: contends,

however, thät the' section 304 redemptions a at issue in this case
i.e., the-nibe cross-chain salesymust be integrated with the
lateri sales of the target. corþorations in 'order. to decide under

section-302 (b) (3) whether the target corporations' constructive
ownership of the transfer'red stock under section 318 ,was
completely terminated.

The parties rely onudifferent legal

standar'ds .in support -of the^ir respéctive positions.

- 46 -

Petitioner relies on a test articulated by this Court in

Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, supra at 291.

Petitioner claims

that this Court has consistently used the Niedermeyer test to
decide whether a redemption should be integrated with other
allegedly related transactions in order to ascertain the tax

consequences of the redemption.

In Niedermeyer, we held that, if

a redemption, standing alone, fails to qualify under section
302 (b) (3), the redemption will nevertheless be subject to sale or
exchange treatment "Where there is a plan which is comprised of
several steps, one involving the redemption of stock that results
in a complete termination of the taxpayer's interest in a
corporation".

Id. at 291.

However, we required that "the

redemption must occur as part of a plan which is firm and fixed
and in which the steps are clearly integrated."

Id.

Petitioner

describes the Niedermeyer.test as a "variation of the step
transaction doctrine" and asserts that "While the test permits
amalgamation of steps that are not subject to an 'absolutely'
binding contract, it leaves little room for contingency".
Petitioner relies on this Court's opinions in Monson v.

Commissioner, 79 T.C. 827, 837 (1982), Roebling v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 30 (1981), and Bleily & Collishaw, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra at 756, to support his position.

According to petitioner,

each of the three above-cited cases had the following facts in
common:

(1) Each case involved a partial redemption that was

a

- 47 held tó be part oft a firm and 3fixed plan;

(2) in-each case, the

complete termination of the shareholder's interest vrequired .a
party not controlled by the taxpayer to acquire :thetremaining
shares*; and (3) at 3the~time of the redemptión, the third-party
purchaser had-already negotiated-for'and made a firm commitment
to acquire the remaining xshares .

Petitioner :extracts from the

cases the conclusions that, where an alleged plan to_completely
terminate a shareholder's ownership requires tthe participation of
a third party, the third party must häve committed to the plan at
least in súbstance on ör before the redemption date in order for
Niedermeyer's "firm and fixed plan" requirement to be satisfied
and that a taxpayer's unilateral plan can never be a firm and
fixed .plan.

'Petitioner s analysis and arguments, therefore,

focus primarily on whether the!re was an agreement in substance
with the third-party·purchasers of the target«corporations' stock
on the dates of the deemed section 304:redemptions; i.e-., the
nine cross-chain sãles.
Respondent rejects petitioner's attempt:to focus the Court's
eye primarily on the third-party purcha.sers who acquired. the.
targeh cÄrpofatioås

.

stock and ärgue[Â fÒr the applicatiòn of an

intent-based test drawn from the decision of the U.S. Court'of
Appeals for the Sixth Circùit in Zenz v. .Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914
(6th Cir.. 1954) and pertinent opinions of thi's Court, including
but n t limit!ed to, Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, supra.

Citing

- 48 Zenz, respondent argues that a partial redemption, which is one
of a series of transactions intended to terminate completely a
shareholder's ownership interest in a corporation, must be
integrated with the related transactions for purposes of section
302(b) (3) and treated as a sale or exchange.

Under respondent's

articulation of the relevant legal standard:
As a result of the decision in Zenz, other
transactions must be taken into account in testing
whether a redemption is a distribution under § 301 or a
sale or exchange under § 302(a) where the redemption is
part of a firm and fixed plan to terminate a
shareholder's interest in a corporation. Niedermeyer
v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280

(1974), aff'd 535 F.2d 500

(9th Cir. 1976) (articulating a Zenz-like standard).
As subsequent applications of the Zenz doctrine make
clear, the sequence of planned transactions is
irrelevant where the overall result is the complete
termination of a shareholder's interest. United States
v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531

(8th Cir. 1961)

(holding that

Zenz applies when the redemption precedes the stock
sale pursuant to a plan); see also B. Bittker and J.
Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 19.06[3] at 9-42

(6th ed. 1994) ("[I]f the

form of the distribution is cast as a redemption, its
treatment as a sale under Zenz is highly likely unless
the preliminary redemption transaction can be separated
from the later sale.")
[Fn. ref. omitted.]
In its reply brief," petitioner dismisses respondent's reliance

"In their reply briefs, both parties argue alternatively
that the applicable standard is derived from the step transaction
doctrine and that one of three tests for deciding whether the
step transaction doctrine should be applied, but not all three
tests, must be used in this case to analyze the sec. 304
redemptions and the later sales. Petitïoner contends that only
the binding commitment test should be used, and respondent
contends that only the end result test should be used.
For a
detailed description of the three tests, see Andantech L.L.C. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-97. We decline to apply any of the
(continued...)

on Zenz, claiming that "its relevance to -this case is at best
tangential."

.

Petitioner notes that Zenz involved both a tax year

prior to the enactment of section 302 and .a different factual
situation.

In Zenz, -the -sole shareholder of .a corporation sold

some of .her stock first, and a short time, later, 3the. issuing , , . ,
corporation redeemed the remainder of her- stock.

Petitioner

distinguishes 2ènz from the instant case because n"The order- of ,
sale and subsequent redemption was chosen to -reduce taxes--that

is, to avoid dividend treatment from the;redemption leg", the
redemption completely terminated the _taxpayer's interest in the 042
corporatión, and the Commissioner was attempting to,reorder the
transactions in order to obtain dividend, treatment for the

redemption proceeds.

.

Petitioner urges .this Cou'rt _to.limit the

application of the Zenz intent-based test to cases where the form
of the transactions and the intent of the taxpayer coincide as it
did' in Zenz and tc7 decline to äpply the test in· cases such as
this where the issue to be decided is "whether a r'edemption that
does not. terminate the shareholder's 'ìnterest and a later- sale
that does terminate that interest are sufficiently related to
justif y trea.ting a non-terminatinc redempt^ion as part of the
later sale transactioh.

( c. : continued)
.
three tests because the applicable legal standard is that
identified elsewhere in this opinion.

-

- 50 III.

Analysis of the Nine Cross-Chain Sales
A.

In General

Each party claims that the applicable legal standard is
clear and that the legal standard, when applied to the facts,

supports a decision in that party's favor.

The parties rely on

many of the same cases to support their respective positions.
The parties' arguments, however, are so diametrically opposite
regarding their interpretation of the cases that we must turn to

an examination of the principal-cases on which both parties
rely."

A careful examination of the pertinent facts and

holdings of these cases is necessary to respond adequately to the
parties' detailed and often tortured parsing of these cases in
support of their respective arguments.

"Petitioner also relies on several anticipatory dividend
cases to bolster its arguments regarding the cross-chain sales.
See TSN Liquidating Corp., Inc. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328
(5th Cir. 1980); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
1086 (1987); Gilmore v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1321 (1956); CoffeV
v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1410 (1950); Rosenbloom Fin. Corp. v.

Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 763 (1931).
In each of the anticipatory
dividend cases decided by this Court, we held that a
corporation's distribution of a dividend to a shareholder before
the shareholder sold his stock was taxable as a dividend and not
as part of the later stock sale. The dividend transactions did
not involve the exchange of stock for consideration. We agree
with respondent that the anticipatory dividend cases are
distinguishable from this case, and we do not consider them
further.
See Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of
Corporations and Shareholders, par. 8.07[2][a], at 8-66 (7th ed.
2002) ("In order to obtain the hoped-for dividend result, it is
important that the selling shareholder not surrender any of its
target stock to the corporation because use of the redemption
format will likely trigger sale treatment.")

51 -

1. 'Zenz v. Quinlivan

.» .

.

.

In Zenz v. Quinlivan,'.213 F.=2d 9143.(6th Cir. -1954), the sole
shareholder of a corporation decided tos sell the corporation to a
compet:itor.

=Because the. competitor did not want to assume.the

tax liabilities associated with the corporation's accumulated
earnings fandLprofits, the»competitor purchased only part of_ the
shareholder's stock.

Three weeks later, after a corporate

reorganization and corporate'action, the corporation.redeemed -the
balance of the shareholder's stock.

On her tax.return, the

redeemed shareholder reported the transaction as,a..rèdemption of
all of her stock under section,115(c1) of theaInternal Revenue
Code of 1939 and claimed.that thè transaction must..be treated as
a sále or exchange of :stock.'

The Commissioner determined.that

the redemptïon was essentially= equivalent to.the distribution of
a taxable dividend and recharacterized the redemption'proceeds as
diví dend incbme .

-

The CoÙrt·of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
decisión of the lower 'court, which had upheld.the Commissioner's
determinatïon.'

The Court of* Appeals acknowledged the "general.

princißle" that "a t'axpáyer hast the legal right -to decrease the
amount of what otherwise^would be his -taxes or'altogether.avoid
them

by mean.s which the law permits."

at 916.

Zenz v. Quinlivan,»supra

The dourt of Appeals refused to decide -the issue

presented based on'the taxpayer's motivation to.avoid taxes.

- 52 -

Instead, it examined the nature of the transaction in order to

decide if it was, in substance, a dividend distribution or a
sale.

The Court of Appeals held that the redemption was not

essentially equivalent to the distribution of a dividend because
the taxpayer intended "to bring about a complete liquidation of

her holdings and to become separated from all interest in the
corporation", and the redemption completely terminated her
interest in the corporation.

2.

Id. at 917.

Niedermeyer v. Commissioner

Twenty years after Zenz v. Quinlivan, supra, was decided,
this Court decided the tax effect of a sale in ·the context of
section 304.

In Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974),

the relevant issues were whether the taxpayers' sale of all of
their common stock in American Timber & Trading Co., Inc.
to Lents Industries, Inc.

(AT&T)

(Lents) was a redemption involving a

related corporation under section 304 (a) (1) of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1954 and, if so, whether the redemption should be
treated as a distribution in exchange for the redeemed stock
under section 302(a) or as a distribution to which section 301

applies.

The taxpayers in Niedermeyer sold all of their common

stock but not their preferred stock in AT&T to Lents on September
8, 1966.

On the date of the sale, the majority of Lents' stock

was owned by the taxpayers' sons.

On December 28, 1966, the

taxpayers contributed their AT&T preferred stock to the

- 53 Niedermeyer Foundatioh, a tax-.exempt organization.

The« taxpayers

alleged that the distribution- by Lents toe them was in exchange
for their AT&T stock.

The Commissioner alleged that the sal-e was

a section 304 transaction between related corporations and that
the distribution was a taxable dividend under sections 301 and
302.

This Court.first considered whether the sale was a deemed
redemption.uhder section 304'(a) (1).

.After applying. the

constructive ownership, rules of section 318(a) as required-by
section 304 (c), this Court concluded that'the taxpayers were in
control of both AT&T and Lents immediately prior to the sale and
that the transaction in which Lents- acquired,.the·taxpayers' AT&T
dommon stóck must be- treated as airedemption under section
304 (a) (1).

- This Cóurt then addressed the taxpayers:' contention that,
even if the sale were.treated; as a.deemed redemption under section 304 (a) (-1), the taxpayers nevertheless were entitled to
treat the distribution'from Lents as full:payment in exchange for
their AT&T stock under section 302(a) by meeting one of the
conditions of section 302 (b)..

.After rejectingsthe >taxpayers'

argument under sectioh 302(b) (1), the Courtrturned to their.
argusents under. section 302 (b)..(3).

Among other things, the

taxpayers argued that:the~distributionewas in complete

terminatioh of their ownership interest .in AT&T, contending that

- 54 the distribution and their subsequent gift of their AT&T
preferred stock were parts of a single plan to completely
terminate their actual and constructive ownership of AT&T before
the end of 1966.

In Niedermeyer, this Court acknowledged that, where there is
a plan consisting of a redemption and one or more other steps
that results in a complete termination of the taxpayer's interest
in a corporation, section 302(b) (3) may apply.

Niedermeyer v.

Commissioner, supra at 291 (citing in support Leleux v.
Commissioner,

54 T.C. 408

(1970), Estate of Mathis v.

Commissioner, 47 T.C. 248 (1966)).

The Court emphasized,

however, that the redemption "must occur as part of a plan which
is firm and fixed and in which the steps are clearly integrated."
Id.

After searching the record for evidence in support of the
taxpayers' alleged plan, the Court concluded that the evidence
presented was "too insubstantial to prove the existence of such a
plan."

Id.

Among the facts on which the Court relied were the

following:
(1) The alleged plan was not in writing, and there was no
indication that the taxpayers communicated their donative
intention to the charity or to anyone.

(2) The taxpayers' son who testified at trial about the
Lents stock acquisition did not mention any desire on the

- 55 -

taxpayers' part to completely terminate their ownership interest
in ·AT&T .

-

(3)-The taxpayers could easily haveichanged their minds
regärding their áVowed intention to donate their preferred stock.
(4) The3taxpayers failed to show that their alleged ,decision
to donäte the preferred stock was in any way fixed or binding. This Court'·emphasized that a plan·sufficient to.pass muster.under
section 302 (b) (3)'did'not need to be "in writing, absolutely

bindiNg, br 'communicated to" others"·but; that "the above-mentioned
factors, 'all of which are lacking here, .tend to show a plan.which
is fixed and firm."

Id. at 291-292.

042

Although the^ Court in Niedermeyer- did not expressly state

that the plan td which it was.referring was a plan of.the-.

-

,

taxpayers, suöh a conclusion is wärranted.· The Court rejected
the taxpayers' self-serving testimony regarding their intention
to donate and searched instead for.objective.evidence that the
deemed:section 304 rëdemption and the later gift were.integrated
parts of a firm and fixed .plan on, the part of the, taxpayers to
completëly"terminate their ownership interest; i.e. , a plan
consisting of clearly integrated steps to which the taxpayers.
were firmly committed.
3.

.

Beniamin v. Commissioner

.

e
S

.
.

In Beniamin v. Commissioner; 66 T.C. 1084 (1976), affd. 592F.2d 1259 (5th Cif. 1979),'the'issue presented was.whether the ·

8

- 56 redemption of the taxpayer's class A preferred voting stock by a
family-held corporation was essentially equivalent to a dividend
under section 302 (b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

In

deciding the tax effect of the redemption, this Court addressed

the taxpayer's argument that the redemption was pursuant to a
plan of redemption that, when fully implemented, would completely
terminate the taxpayer's ownership interest.

The evidence at

trial failed to disclose any common understanding among the

shareholders or the redeeming corporation as to the timing of, or
procedure for, the alleged redemption plan, nor was there any
evidence of a concrete plan involving the shareholders or the
corporation.

After examining the record, this Court concluded

there was no credible evidence of any firm plan to redeem, noting
that "vague anticipation" was not enough to constitute a plan.
Id. at 1114.

4.

Paparo v. Commissioner

In Paparo v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 692 (1979), the taxpayers
were shareholders of Nashville Textile Corp.

Jasper Textile Corp.

(Nashville) and

(Jasper), two women's apparel manufacturers,

and House of Ronnie, Inc.

(Ronnie), the corporation that designed

and marketed the clothing made by Nashville and Jasper.

In order

to improve their sales development effort, the taxpayers

approached I. Amsterdam, a succe sful sales organization.
shareholders of I. Amsterdam als

The

owned Denise Lingerie Co., a

women'è apparel manufacturer.

'The taxpayers concluded that -if

Ronnie could acquire Denise in exchange for Ronnie's stock,
Ronnie would?acquire notionly Denise's'manufacturing.facilities
but aläò theráales relationship with*I.-Amsterdam.

-In the early

part :of 1969, negotiations began., Denise's shareholders were
interested in the taxpayer.'s ÷acquisition proposal,but·would not
coñsider accepting-stock in a privately 'held corporation.,

.

In conjunction with the proposed-acquisition of Deni.se,.the
taxpayers began to explore' taking Ronnie.public..

The underwriter

they had selected recommended ithat paahville andt Jaspersbe
combined with Ronnie before the public offering.

In, January

1970; the 'taxpayers' and another shareholder-of Nashville ·and
Jasper agreed to sell all of their.stock to :Ronnie for $800,000..
The taxpayers contèmplated that the purchase price would be;paid
from the proceeds of one or more public.offerings of Ronnie's
stock.

,.

.

On March 30, 1970, the first public offering of Ronnie's
stock was made.

A portion of the sales proceeds was used to make

the downpayment to·the Nashville and Jasper shareholders.
On October 30, ~1970, sRonnie'entered into-an. agreement with
Deniså's shareholders to acquire all of Denise's outstanding..
stock in exchange for.Ronnie's stock.

.

On April 20, 1972, a second public offering of Ronnie's
stock was ,made.

A portion. of the proceeds were used to pay the

- 58 -

balance of the purchase price owed to the Nashville and Jasper
shareholders.

The sole issue for decision was whether the amounts received.
by the taxpayers in 1970 and 1971 from Ronnie in exchange for

their stock in Nashville and Jasper were taxable as capital gains
under section 302", or as dividends under section 301.

The

parties agreed that section 304 applied to the stock acquisitions
in question and that, therefore, the transfer of Nashville and

Jasper stock to Ronnie must be characterized as a redemption
through the use of related corporations.

The parties disagreed

only with respect to the application of section 302.

The

taxpayers contended that the redemptions qualified as sales under
section 302(a) because they met the requirements of either

section 302 (b) (1) or (2).

The taxpayers argued that the 1970

redemption was but one step in an overall plan to redeem their
interest in Nashville and Jasper that ended in 1972 with the

second public offering, and it was not the essential equivalent
of a dividend.

This Court rejected the taxpayers' argument, concluding that
the record did not contain any compelling evidence of an overall
financial plan covering both the first and the second public
offerings.

No formal written plan for the funding of the

Relevant code provisions were from the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.

- 59 -

redemption through*subsequent public offerings: of Ronnie's =stock
existed, and no corporate minutes were of fered into evidence to
substantiate5such a plan.

In"àdditioh, funding the redemption

through·subsequent publiä offerings of Ronnie's stock wa 541
beyond
the control öf the- taxpayers .·

Although this Court acknowledged

the taxpayers' apparent intent that. subsequent public offerings
be made, the taxpayers had inade no promise to the underwriter,

nor was theke any evidence of an agreement*to make another public
offering.
ST

Bleily & Collishaw

In'Bleily & Collishaw

Inc. v.. Commissioner .

Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 751

(1979); the taxpayer owned 30 peröent of a corporation.

The

majority shärehòlder wanted sole control over the corporation,
and the taxpayer' was'willing to sell. all of its shares to the
majority shareholder.

However, because 'the majority shareholder

did not have sùfficient- funds to-purchase all of the taxpayer's
shares at' that: t'ime, the majority shareholder .purchased only a
portion of^ the taxpayer's 'stocki i Thereafter, over a period of~
appr'öximatèly 23' weeks, the corporation redeemed the balance· of
the taxpayek' s stock in increments tied to the availability of
money to fund the redemptions.

Although the ·taxpayer was under

no contractùal or other legal obligation to' sell the rest of. its
shares or have them redeemed if and when money became available -

to fund additional acquisitions, this Court found that the

.

- 60 -

taxpayer intended to sell its shares whenever the money needed to
fund the acquisitions became available.
In Bleily & Collishaw, Inc., the issue before the Court was

whether the redemptions met the requirements of section 302(b) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.. We described the
applicable legal standard as follows:
Where several redemptions have been executed pursuant
to a plan to terminate a shareholder's interest, the
.individual redemptions constitute, in substance, the
component parts of a single sale or exchange of the
entire stock interest. We have refused, however, to
treat a series of redemptions as a single plan unless
the redemptions are pursuant to a firm and fixed plan
to eliminate the stockholder from the corporation.
Generally, a gentleman's agreement lacking written
embodiment, communication, and contractual obligations
will not suffice to show a fixed and firm plan. On the
other hand, a plan need not be in writing, absolutely
binding, or communicated to others to be fixed and firm
although these factors all tend to indicate that such
is the case. [Id. at 756; citations omitted.]
Noting that whether a firm and fixed plan existed in a given case
is necessarily a fact issue, we held that the requirements of
section 302(b) (3) were met because the redemptions were part of a
firm and fixed plan to eliminate the stockholder from the

corporation.

The record established that the corporation planned

to eliminate the taxpayer as a shareholder and that the taxpayer
had agreed to the sale of all its shares and to the purchase
price, even though there was no binding.obligation on either

party to consummate additional stock sales.

- 61 6.

Roebling v. Commissioner

In Roeblfing v

Commissioner, 77 T.C. 30 .(1981)., a taxpayer

ownéd approximately 90 percent of the class B.preferred stock and
approx:imately 45 percent of the ·common stock of Trenton Trust Co.
(Trenton Trust)~.

In 1958, Trentòn Trust adopted a plan of

recapitalization to simplify and strengthen- its capital structur.e
which, among*óther things, called'for,the redemption.of a
specified amount- of the class B- preferredustock each year and
required-Trenton Trust- to establish. a sinking fund for:that

purpose.

DuFing each of the·years 1965-69, part-of:the

taxpayer's-class B preferred stock was redeemed, and in 1965 and
1966, "the 'taxpayër sold some shares.

Among the issues presented

to~thìs Court was whether the redemption.of the taxpayer's class

B preferred shares was not essentially equivalent to a dividend
within the meaning of section 302(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code bf 1-954 .

. .

Each year, Trenton Trust set.aside funds and decided how
much of those funds.it would use to retire the class B preferred
shares.

Each retirement of shares required -action of Trenton

Trust's board of directors and*the consent and.appro.val.-of the
FDIC and the Department'of Banking and..Insurance of the State-of
New Jersey.s^ Each year,- Trentoni Trust's; board of directors
adopted a resolution to'applf for the necessary regulatory
appróvals, and Trenton Trust then filed its applications.

For

.

.

- 62 -

most of the relevant years, the applications were granted at
least in part, but on one occasion the application was denied.
Although the taxpayer in Roebling relied only upon section
302 (b) (1) to support her contention that each of the redemptions
qualified as a sale or exchange under section 302(a), she argued
that the redemptions were integrated steps in a firm and fixed
plan to redeem all of the preferred stock and that the
redemptions in the aggregate resulted in a meaningful reduction

of the taxpayer's interest in Trenton Trust.

Applying the same

analysis used in cases involving section 302 (b) (3), this Court
held that the redemptions were integrated steps in a firm and
fixed plan even though there was no binding commitment on the·

part of Trenton Trust to acquire the taxpayer's shares or on the
taxpayer's part to tender her shares.

The Court acknowledged

that each redemption was subject to the financial condition of
the bank and required regulatory approval, but emphasized that
"this was about as firm and fixed a plan as a bank could have
under the circumstances."

7.

Roebling v. Commissioner, supra at 55.

Monson v. Commissioner

In Monson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 827

(1982), a closely

held corporation owned by the taxpayer and his children redeemed
all of the children's stock and a portion of the taxpayer's stock
on July 30, 1976.

Immediately following the redemption, the

taxpayer was the corporation's sole shareholder.

On August 2,

- 63 -

1976, the taxpayer sold" all of his shares to a third party for
cash ahd a promi-ssory note. e Minutes of a board of directors
meeting held on-July 30; 1976, described the; redemption and -the
subsequent sale of taxpayer's remainincJ stock to a third party as
steps in the, sale

The taxpayer reported the redemption proceeds

as income from.the sale or-exchange of stock under -section
302 (a) .

-

,

.

Citing Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914

(6th Cir. 1954), this

Court examined the record to determine whether the .intent of the .
taxpayer was to bring about a; complete .liquidations of his
ownership iriterest in his corporation.
súpra at 835-836.

. .

Monson: v. Commissioner,

Because the record c-learly established that

the· redemption of .the-taxpayer's stock wass partthe proposal to
acquire ML 'CÁpital Resources' stock (June 1,. 1987) , and GATX/BCE
had completed 'its due di 042l'igence
reviewe During final

·'1..

negotiations, GATX had requested that ML 'Capi'tal:.Resources

.
s

dispose of its Vessél Leasing* stock priort to closing because
GATX/BCE ^ could not own Ves'sel :Leasing duento Federal law
restrictions.

Immediately thereafter the respective boards: of ML

Capital Resources and ML Asset Management approved the sale of
Vessel Leasing's stock to ML Asset Management, and the final 1987
crossLchain sale closed.

n

It is appareht 'that* the cross-chain sale of Vessel Leasing's
stock to ML Asset IVlanagement was tarranged in anticipation of the
immïrient Esale of ML Capital Resourcesl to GATX/BCEtand was part of
a seamless nét öf tra'nsactions culminating in the complete
term*ihation of ML ,Capitàl Resources' owners!hip interest in the
issu[ing.·corporations\(whose stock was sold cross-chain .in
tYansact'ions that qualified as sectión 304 rede'mptions:.

>We find

- 80 -

therefore, that a firm and fixed plan to dispose of ML Capital
Resources outside the consolidated group existed on the date of
the Vessel Leasing cross-chain sale and that the Vessel Leasing
cross-chain sale, like the other 1987. cross-chain sales, was an
integrated step in that plan.
Because the eight 1987 cross-chain sales (the deemed section
304 redemptions), when integrated with the sale of ML.Capital

Resources' stock, resulted in the complete termination of ML
Capital Resources' actual and constructive ownership interest in
the issuing corporations, see section 304 (b), we hold that the
redemptions qualified under section 302 (b) (3) and that,
therefore, the redemptions shall be treated as a payment in
exchange for the stock under section 302(a) and not as a dividend
under section 301.
IV.

Conclusion

.

The record establishes that on the dates of the cross-chain
sales, petitioner had agreed upon, and had begun to implement, a

firm and fixed plan to completely terminate the target
corporations' ownership interests in the issuing corporations
(the subsidiaries whose stock was sold cross-chain).

The plan

was carefully structured to achieve very favorable tax basis
adjustments resulting from the interplay of section 304 and the
consolidated return regulations, and the steps of the plan were
described in detail in written summaries prepared for meetings of

- 81 Merrill Parent's board of directors.

As described in those

written summaries, the cross-chain sales of the issuing
corporations' stock and the sales of the target corporations were
part of the same seamless web of corporate activity intended by
petitioner to culminate in the sale of the target corporations
outside the .consolidated group.

Under the test prescribed by

this Court in Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974),
and other cases discussed herein, respondent properly integrated
the cross-chain sales with the related sales of the target
corporations to ascertairí the tax consequences of the
transactions, and we sustain respondent's determination.
We have considered the other arguments of the parties, and,
to the extent not discussed herein, we conclude that the
arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Ru'le 155.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Atax-court%3Af93dc556357860db. Public record. Not legal advice.
