# UNITED STATES TAX COURT

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## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

T.C. Memo. 1997-259

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JOHN SANN AND MARIANNE SANN, ET AL.,1 Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket Nos. 21518-88, 21519-88,
4789-89, 21209-90,
22399-90, 22466-90.

Filed June 10, 1997.

Stuart A. Smith and David H. Schnabel, for petitioners.
Louise R. Forbes, Paul Colleran, Gary S. Gross, Mary P.
Hamilton, and William T. Hayes, for respondent.

1

Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated for
opinion: John Sann and Marianne Sann, docket Nos. 21518-88 and
22466-90; Laurence M. Addington, docket Nos. 21519-88 and 2239990; and David M. Cohn, docket Nos. 4789-89 and 21209-90.

- 2 CONTENTS
Page
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION....................... 2
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE............................ 3
FINDINGS OF FACT.............................................. 7
A. The Plastics Recycling Transactions...................... 7
B. The Partnerships.........................................10
C. Richard Roberts..........................................12
D. Guy B. Maxfield..........................................13
E. Petitioners and Their Introduction to the Partnership
Transactions.............................................18
1. John and Marianne Sann...............................18
2. Laurence M. Addington................................22
3. David M. Cohn........................................25
OPINION.......................................................30
A. Statute of Limitations...................................33
B. Section 6653(a)--Negligence..............................39
1.
The Private Offering Memoranda......................41
2.
The So-Called Oil Crisis............................47
3.
Petitioners' Purported Reliance on an Adviser.......50
a.
The Circumstances Under Which a
Taxpayer May Avoid Liability Under
Section 6653(a)(1) and (2) Because
of Reasonable Reliance on Competent
and Fully Informed Professional
Advice.........................................51
b.
Maxfield.......................................53
4.
Miscellaneous.......................................60
5.
Conclusion as to Negligence.........................70
C. Section 6659--Valuation Overstatement....................71
1.
The Grounds for Petitioners' Underpayments..........73
2.
Concession of the Deficiency........................77
3.
Section 6659(e).....................................81
D. Petitioners' Motions For Leave To File Motion For
Decision Ordering Relief From the Negligence Penalty
and the Penalty Rate of Interest and To File Supporting
Memorandum of Law........................................85
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DAWSON, Judge:

These cases were assigned to Special Trial

Judge Norman H. Wolfe pursuant to the provisions of section
7443A(b)(4) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.

They were tried and

- 3 briefed separately but consolidated for purposes of opinion.2
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect
for the tax years in issue, unless otherwise indicated.

All Rule

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The Court agrees with and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial
Judge, which is set forth below.
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
WOLFE, Special Trial Judge:
Plastics Recycling group of cases.

These cases are part of the
For a detailed discussion of

the transactions involved in the Plastics Recycling cases, see
Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177, affd. without
published opinion 996 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993).

The facts of

the underlying transactions and the Sentinel recyclers in these
cases are substantially identical to those considered in the
Provizer case.
In three notices of deficiency, issued on June 16, 1988, in
docket No. 21518-88 (Sann), on June 6, 1988, in docket No. 2151988 (Addington), and on December 22, 1988, in docket No. 4789-89
(Cohn), respondent determined the following deficiencies in and
additions to petitioners' 1981 Federal income taxes:

2

There were three separate trials for these cases. The cases
of John Sann and Marianne Sann, docket Nos. 21518-88 and 2246690, were consolidated for the purposes of receiving certain
testimony. The same procedure was followed for the cases of
Laurence M. Addington, docket Nos. 21519-88 and 22399-90, and the
cases of David M. Cohn, docket Nos. 4789-89 and 21209-90.

- 4 Petitioners
Sann
Addington
Cohn

Deficiency
$192,666
63,137
10,250

Sec. 6653(a)(1)
$9,633.30
3,156.85
512.50

Additions to Tax
Sec. 6653(a)(2)

Sec. 6659
$54,582.60
18,840
2,892.30

1
1
1

1
50 percent of the interest payable with respect to the portion of the
underpayment attributable to negligence. The additions to tax determined under
section 6653(a)(2) were calculated on the amount of $181,942 in the Sann case; on
the amount of $62,800 in the Addington case; and on the amount of $9,641 in the
Cohn case.

In another three notices of deficiency, issued on July 19, 1990,
in docket Nos. 22466-90 and 22399-90 (Sann and Addington,
respectively), and on July 20, 1990, in docket No. 21209-90,
(Cohn), respondent determined the following deficiencies in and
additions to petitioners' 1982 Federal income taxes:
Petitioners
Sann
Addington
Cohn

Deficiency
$94,403
44,317
15,893

Sec. 6653(a)(1)
$4,720
2,215.85
795

Additions to Tax
Sec. 6653(a)(2)
1
1
1

2

Sec. 6659
$23,030
10,649
4,020

1
50 percent of the interest payable with respect to the portion of the
underpayment attributable to negligence. The additions to tax determined under
section 6653(a)(2) were calculated on the full amount of the deficiency in each
case.
2
In the alternative to the sec. 6659 addition to tax, respondent determined
an addition to tax under sec. 6661 for substantial understatement of liability.
Respondent conceded the sec. 6661 additions to tax in the respective posttrial
briefs in each case.

In all six notices of deficiency, respondent also determined that
interest on the deficiencies accruing after December 31, 1984,
would be calculated at 120 percent of the statutory rate under
section 6621(c).

In the posttrial brief for docket No. 4789-89

(Cohn), respondent asserted a lesser section 6659 addition to tax
in the amount of $2,447.

We consider the section 6659 addition

to tax in docket No. 4789-89 to be accordingly reduced.
On July 1 and July 11, 1994, respondent filed motions for
leave to file amended answers in docket Nos. 4789-89 (Cohn) and

- 5 21518-88 (Sann), respectively.

This Court denied both motions on

July 11, 1994.
The parties in each of these cases filed substantively
identical Stipulations of Settled Issues concerning the
adjustments relating to petitioners' participation in the
Plastics Recycling Program.

In general, the stipulations

provide:3
1. Petitioners are not entitled to any deductions,
losses, investment credits, business energy investment
credits or any other tax benefits claimed on their tax
returns as a result of their participation in the
Plastics Recycling Program.
2. The underpayments in income tax attributable to
petitioners' participation in the Plastics Recycling
Program are substantial underpayments attributable to
tax motivated transactions, subject to the increased
rate of interest established under I.R.C. §6621(c),
formerly §6621(d).
3. This stipulation resolves all issues that relate to
the items claimed on petitioners' tax returns resulting
from their participation in the Plastics Recycling
Program, with the exception of petitioners' potential
liability for additions to the tax for negligence under
the applicable provisions of §6653(a).
4. With respect to the issue of the addition to the
tax under I.R.C. §6659, petitioners do not intend to
contest the value of the Sentinel Recycler or the
existence of a valuation overstatement on the
petitioners' return. Petitioners, however, reserve the
3

The stipulations of settled issues in both of the Cohn
cases, and in the Addington case for 1981, are written in the
singular. Also, the stipulations of settled issues filed in the
Cohn cases expressly refer to the sec. 6659 addition to tax as an
unresolved issue in the third stipulation. Finally, the
stipulation of settled issues in the Cohn case for 1982 (docket
No. 21209-90) expressly refers to Foam Recycling and Jabrilach
Recycling, instead of "the Plastics Recycling Program".

- 6 right to argue that the underpayment in tax is not
attributable to a valuation overstatement within the
meaning of I.R.C. §6659(a)(1), and that the Secretary
should have waived the addition to the tax pursuant to
I.R.C. §6659(e).
In the stipulations of settled issues for docket Nos. 21209-90
(Cohn), 22399-90 (Addington), and 22466-90 (Sann), petitioners
also reserved the right to argue whether the respective
assessments of tax and additions to tax for 1982 were barred by
the statute of limitations.
Long after the trials of these cases, in each case
petitioners filed a Motion For Leave to File Motion for Decision
Ordering Relief From the Negligence Penalty and the Penalty Rate
of Interest and to File Supporting Memorandum of Law under Rule
50.

These motions were filed with attached exhibits during the

last week of October and first week of November 1995.
Petitioners concurrently lodged with the Court motions for
decision ordering relief from the additions to tax for negligence
and the increased rate of interest, with attachments and
memoranda in support of the motions.

Subsequently, respondent

filed objections, with attachments and memoranda in support
thereof, and petitioners thereafter filed reply memoranda.

For

reasons discussed in more detail subsequently in this opinion,
and also in Farrell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-295, these
motions shall be denied.

See also Friedman v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1996-558; Jaroff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-527;
Gollin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-454; Grelsamer v.

- 7 Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-399; Zenkel v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-398.
The issues remaining in these consolidated cases are:

(1)

Whether the assessments for 1982 are time-barred; (2) whether
petitioners are liable for the additions to tax for negligence
under section 6653(a)(1) and (2); and (3) whether petitioners are
liable for the additions to tax under section 6659 for
underpayments of tax attributable to valuation overstatements.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated in each case and are
so found.

The stipulated facts and attached exhibits are

incorporated in the respective cases by this reference.
A.

The Plastics Recycling Transactions
These cases concern petitioners' indirect investments in

three limited partnerships that leased Sentinel expanded
polyethylene (EPE) recyclers:

Empire Associates (Empire),

Plymouth Equipment Associates (Plymouth), and Foam Recycling
Associates (Foam).

For convenience we refer to these

partnerships collectively as the Partnerships.
Petitioners acquired their indirect interests in the
Partnerships through three other partnerships:

S&H Empire (a

tier of Empire), Plymouth Partners (a tier of Plymouth), and
Jabrilach Recycling (a tier of Foam).
The transactions involving the Sentinel EPE recyclers
purportedly leased by the Partnerships are substantially

- 8 identical to those in the Clearwater Group limited partnership
(Clearwater), the partnership considered in Provizer v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177.

Petitioners have stipulated

substantially the same facts concerning the underlying
transactions as we found in the Provizer case.
In the Provizer case, Packaging Industries, Inc. (PI),
manufactured and sold six Sentinel EPE recyclers to ECI Corp. for
$981,000 each.

ECI Corp., in turn, resold the recyclers to F & G

Corp. for $1,162,666 each.

F & G Corp. then leased the recyclers

to Clearwater, which licensed the recyclers to FMEC Corp., which
sublicensed them back to PI.

The sales of the recyclers from PI

to ECI Corp. were financed with nonrecourse notes.

Approximately

7 percent of the sales price of the recyclers sold by ECI Corp.
to F & G Corp. was paid in cash with the remainder financed
through notes.

These notes provided that 10 percent of the notes

were recourse but that the recourse portion of the notes was only
due after the nonrecourse portion, 90 percent, was paid in full.4
No arm's-length negotiations for the price of the Sentinel
EPE recycler took place between or among PI, ECI, and F & G Corp.
All of the monthly payments required among the entities in the
above transactions offset each other.
done simultaneously.
4

These transactions were

Although the recyclers were sold and leased

In the Foam transaction, such notes provided that 20 percent
of the notes were recourse but that the recourse portion of the
notes was only due after the nonrecourse portion, 80 percent, was
paid in full.

- 9 for the above amounts under the structure of simultaneous
transactions, the fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler in
1981 and up to the end of 1982 was not in excess of $50,000.
PI allegedly sublicensed the recyclers to entities that
would use them to recycle plastic scrap.

The sublicense

agreements provided that the end-users would transfer to PI 100
percent of the recycled scrap in exchange for a payment from FMEC
Corp. based on the quality and amount of recycled scrap.
Like Clearwater, Empire and Plymouth leased Sentinel EPE
recyclers from F & G Corp. and licensed those recyclers to FMEC
Corp.

The Empire and Plymouth transactions differ from the

underlying transactions in the Provizer case in two respects:
(1) The entity that leased the machines from F & G Corp. and
licensed them to FMEC Corp.; and (2) the circumstance that seven
machines were sold, leased, licensed, and sublicensed by Empire
and Plymouth.

Foam leased four Sentinel EPE recyclers from F & G

Corp., but it did not license them to FMEC.

Instead, in its

fourth transaction, Foam entered into (1) a 1-year consulting
agreement with the president of PI, John D. Bambara (Bambara),
who was to assist in the placement of the machines with endusers, and (2) a joint venture agreement with PI for the further
processing and sale of the output of the Sentinel EPE recyclers.
For convenience, we refer to the series of transactions
among PI, ECI Corp., F & G Corp., each of the Partnerships, FMEC
Corp. or Bambara, and PI as the Partnership transactions.

In

- 10 addition to the Partnership transactions, a number of other
limited partnerships entered into transactions similar to the
Partnership transactions, also involving Sentinel EPE recyclers
and Sentinel expanded polystyrene (EPS) recyclers.

We refer to

these collectively as the Plastics Recycling transactions.
B.

The Partnerships
Empire, Plymouth, and Foam are New York limited

partnerships.

Empire closed on November 23, 1981; Plymouth

closed on December 21, 1981; and Foam closed on September 22,
1982.

Foam is subject to the provisions of the Tax Equity and

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) Pub. L. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324.
Richard Roberts (Roberts) is the general partner of each of
the Partnerships.

Roberts also was the Tax Matters Partner (TMP)

for Foam during 1982 and at all other times relevant hereto.
With respect to each of the Partnerships, a private
placement memorandum was distributed to potential limited
partners.

Reports by F & G Corp.'s evaluators, Dr. Stanley M.

Ulanoff (Ulanoff), a marketing consultant, and Dr. Samuel Z.
Burstein (Burstein), a mathematics professor, were appended to
the offering memoranda.

Ulanoff owns a 1.27-percent interest in

Plymouth and a 4.37-percent interest in Taylor Recycling
Associates.

Burstein owns a 2.605-percent interest in Empire and

a 5.82-percent interest in Jefferson Recycling Associates.

Like

Empire and Plymouth, Taylor Recycling Associates and Jefferson

- 11 Recycling Associates are partnerships that leased Sentinel
recyclers.

Burstein also was a client and business associate of

Elliot I. Miller (Miller), the corporate counsel to PI.
The offering memoranda for Empire, Plymouth, and Foam state
that the general partner will receive fees from those
partnerships in the respective amounts of $35,000, $37,500, and
$25,000.5

In addition, each of the offering memoranda provide

that the general partner may retain as additional compensation
all amounts not paid as sales commissions or offeree/purchaser
representative fees.

According to the offering memoranda, 10

percent of the proceeds from each offering ($95,000 in the case
of Empire, $97,500 in the case of Plymouth, and $60,000 in the
case of Foam) was allocated to the payment of sales commissions
and offeree/purchaser representative fees.

Consequently, Roberts

was scheduled to receive a minimum of $97,500 and up to a maximum
of $350,000 from the Partnerships.
The offering memoranda list significant business and tax
risk factors associated with investments in the Partnerships.
Specifically, the offering memoranda state:

(1) There is a

substantial likelihood of audit by the Internal Revenue Service
5

The Foam limited partnership agreement provided that the
$37,500 fee was "payable ten (10) days after the Closing." The
limited partnership agreements for Empire and Plymouth provided
that the fees of $35,000 and $37,500, respectively, were payable
"ten (10) days after the Sentinel Recyclers are delivered to a
licensee thereof." Such amounts were essentially guaranteed
because FMEC and PI were committed to be licensees of the
recyclers.

- 12 (IRS) and the purchase price paid by F & G Corp. to ECI Corp.
probably will be challenged as being in excess of fair market
value;6 (2) the Partnerships have no prior operating history; (3)
the general partner has no prior experience in marketing
recycling equipment and is required to devote only such time to
the Partnerships as he deems necessary; (4) the limited partners
have no control over the conduct of the Partnerships' business;
(5) there is no established market for the Sentinel EPE
recyclers; (6) there are no assurances that market prices for
virgin resin will remain at their current costs per pound or that
the recycled pellets will be as marketable as virgin pellets; and
(7) certain potential conflicts of interest exist.

The Foam

offering memorandum also notes that "since August 1981, PI has
become a sublicensee of 104 other Sentinel Recyclers" and that it
has "encountered longer start-up periods than anticipated".
C.

Richard Roberts
Roberts is a businessman and the general partner in a number

of limited partnerships that leased and licensed Sentinel EPE
recyclers, including Empire, Plymouth, and Foam.

He also is a 9-

percent shareholder in F & G Corp., the corporation that leased
the recyclers to the Partnerships.

6

From 1982 through 1985,

The offering memoranda note that "Such purchase price is the
basis for computing the regular investment and energy tax credits
to be claimed by the Partnership."

- 13 Roberts maintained the following office address with Raymond
Grant (Grant), the sole owner and president of ECI Corp.:
Grant/Roberts
Investment Banking
Tax Sheltered Investments
745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 410
New York, New York 10022
Grant was instrumental in the hiring of Ulanoff as an evaluator
of the Plastics Recycling transactions; the two had met on a
cruise.

Roberts and Grant together have been general partners in

other investments.
Prior to the Partnership transactions, Roberts and Grant
were clients of the accounting firm H. W. Freedman & Co.
(Freedman & Co.).

Harris W. Freedman (Freedman), a certified

public accountant (C.P.A.) and the named partner in Freedman &
Co., was the president and chairman of the board of F & G Corp.
He also owned 94 percent of a Sentinel EPE recycler.

Freedman &

Co. prepared the partnership returns for ECI Corp., F & G Corp.,
Empire, Plymouth, and Foam.
Bambara.

It also provided tax services to

Bambara is the 100-percent owner of FMEC Corp., as well

as its president, treasurer, clerk, and director.

He, his wife,

and daughter also owned directly or indirectly 100 percent of the
stock of PI.
D.

Guy B. Maxfield
Guy B. Maxfield (Maxfield) is an attorney specializing in

tax matters.

He does not have an engineering background and he

is not an expert in plastics materials or plastics recycling.

- 14 Maxfield earned an undergraduate degree in 1955 from Augustana
College and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

He then attended

Michigan Law School where he became a member of the Law Review
and was elected to the Order of the Coif.
Laude in 1958.

He graduated Summa Cum

After law school Maxfield became employed by the

law firm of White & Case in New York City.

In 1963 he left White

& Case to be an assistant professor in the graduate tax program
at the New York University (NYU) Law School.
professor 12 to 14 years later.

He became a full

Maxfield has written articles

for Law Reviews and co-authored a book on Federal estate and gift
taxation.

During his tenure at NYU he has been "of counsel" to

various law firms.

For approximately 10 years he was of counsel

to the law firm of Gifford, Woody, Carter & Hayes.

Sometime in

1981 he became of counsel to the law firm of Sann & Howe.

Among

his various functions at the firm, Maxfield reviewed taxadvantaged investments at Sann & Howe.
Maxfield learned of the Plastics Recycling transactions in
1981 from John Y. Taggart (Taggart), a tax partner at the law
firm of Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives (WMDI).

Taggart and other

attorneys at WMDI prepared the offering memoranda, tax opinion,
and other legal documents for Empire and Plymouth.
Taggart were close personal friends.

Maxfield and

They had known each other

since 1959 when they were colleagues at White & Case.

Maxfield

was the "best man" at Taggart's wedding and named Taggart as
executor of his will.

Before joining WMDI, Taggart also had been

- 15 employed by the U.S. Treasury Department in the Office of Tax
Legislative Counsel, and then as a full-time member of the
faculty of the NYU Law School and editor in chief of the Tax Law
Review.

Over the years, Maxfield and Taggart exchanged

information concerning investment opportunities that they
considered interesting.

Taggart owned a 6.66-percent interest in

a second-tier Plastics Recycling partnership.

Maxfield did not

consider Taggart to be an expert in engineering or plastics
recycling.
Maxfield estimates that in 1981 he spent 50 to 75 or more
hours investigating the Plastics Recycling transactions.

His

investigation involved reading the offering memorandum and
questioning Roberts and Taggart.

Scheduling conflicts prevented

him from visiting PI until 1982.

However, another attorney at

Sann & Howe, Roger Wible (Wible), visited PI in 1981 and reported
his observations to Maxfield.

Maxfield was told by Roberts and

persons at PI that competitive machines were not as efficient as
the Sentinel EPE recycler and that the owners of the other
machines had trouble placing them with end-users.
Maxfield was concerned with various aspects of the Plastics
Recycling transactions, such as how Roberts, as a promoter, would
profit from the transactions.

In Maxfield's experience,

oftentimes promoters of tax advantaged investments were highly
compensated regardless of the success of the investment.
Maxfield understood from Roberts that the source of Roberts'

- 16 profits, as a promoter, would be the operation of the
Partnerships.

Maxfield satisfied himself that "the general

partner had a real economic incentive to make these things work
if he was going to ever sell anymore of--of these things."
Maxfield visited PI in 1982 to see what it was like and "to
hear from some of the technical people there."

Although

Maxfield's perspective was that of "a tax lawyer" and "not a
scientist", he thought that he "could at least listen, and if * *
* [he] had questions on their discussion, * * *[he] could ask
them."

As Maxfield explained his understanding, the Sentinel EPE

recyclers would serve the following function:
The function served by these recycling machines
[was to grind and chemically condense the plastic
waste,] which would then be reformatted into plastic
pellets and sold * * *
They would simply tell the factory we have a way-we will dispose of--of your waste products without
charging you anything. We will provide a machine that
you can use without any cost.
In fact, end-users were not provided Sentinel EPE recyclers
without cost; they bore the service and installation costs.
According to Maxfield, among the criteria required of potential
end-users was "the physical space in their factory to have * * *
[the] machine installed" and the willingness to "spend something-roughly $5,000 or $6,000, if necessary, for the wiring of the
machine."

Maxfield testified that he thought that there were

"thousands and thousands and thousands" of potential end-users
for the recycler.

- 17 "One of the fundamental questions" Maxfield had about the
Plastics Recycling transactions was whether the Sentinel EPE
recycler was overpriced.

Notwithstanding his concern, Maxfield

did not consult an independent expert about the machines.
Instead, he relied upon the reports of F & G Corp.'s evaluators,
Burstein and Ulanoff, as confirmation of the machine's purported
value.

Maxfield did not know that Burstein and Ulanoff were

investors in the Plastics Recycling transactions.

He never spoke

to them and did not ask Roberts or Taggart whether Burstein and
Ulanoff were investors.

At a meeting held at Sann & Howe to

discuss the investment, Maxfield mentioned that hiring an
independent expert or appraiser was an option for confirming the
value of the machine.

As Maxfield recalled:

I mentioned that specifically, it was [a] possibility,
and they--somebody said, well, who? And I said I
frankly don't know, and I also don't know what the
charge would be, I have no idea.
*
*
*
I don't believe any of the people at Sann & Howe
actually hired another expert, but I said that's a
possibility.
Maxfield also told the members of Sann & Howe that he considered
the relationship between the value of the recycled pellets and
the price of oil to be a negative aspect of the investment.

As

he acknowledged, "I had no training to decide which way the price
of oil was going to go and therefore--so on."
Maxfield never represented to anyone at Sann & Howe that he
was an expert in plastics recycling or engineering.

In addition,

- 18 Maxfield always stressed that he "was not an investment analyst."
Maxfield described his role in analyzing and investigating the
Plastics Recycling transactions as follows:

"I really viewed my

role as I was a conveyor of information and of my impressions.

I

made it very clear to each of the potential investors, it's their
business decision, not mine."

(Emphasis added.)

Reflecting upon

his own decision to invest in the Plastics Recycling
transactions, Maxfield stated, "there were obviously--if I would
have asked the right questions, I wouldn't have made the
investment."
E. Petitioners and Their Introduction to the Partnership
Transactions
Petitioners in these cases do not have any education,
training, or experience in engineering, plastics recycling, or
plastics materials.

They did not independently investigate the

Sentinel EPE recyclers or see a Sentinel EPE recycler or any
other type of plastics recycler prior to participating in the
recycling ventures.

Petitioners never made a profit in any year

from their investments in the Partnerships.
1.

John and Marianne Sann

Petitioners John Sann and Marianne Sann resided in
Larchmont, New York, when their petitions were filed.

John Sann

(Sann) was born and raised in Amsterdam in the Netherlands.
After attending the Lyceum and the University of Lausanne in
Switzerland, he served in the Royal Air Force in England and the

- 19 Dutch Air Force in Holland for several years.

He then pursued a

law degree at the University of Amsterdam, transferred to
Columbia Law School in New York City, and graduated in 1952.
Sann became a member of the New York bar, and in 1955 he joined
the law firm of Mitchell, Capron.
of Debevoise & Plimpton.

In 1960 he joined the law firm

Sann left Debevoise & Plimpton in 1970

and, with Edwin Howe, formed the law firm of Sann & Howe.

He

remained a name partner at Sann & Howe until 1993.
Sann specializes in international law.

He advises foreign

individuals and entities regarding investments in the United
States.

Among his clients for many years have been Royal Dutch

Shell in the Hague and Shell Transport and Trading in London.
Together these two companies own the worldwide group of Shell
companies.

Sann has counseled executives of the two companies

with respect to investments in the United States for their
corporate pension funds.

On a personal level, Sann has invested

in the stock market, securities, mutual funds, investment
partnerships, and real estate.

Sann approaches each of his

personal investments "separately and individually, depending on
the nature of the investment."
In 1981, Sann acquired an indirect, limited partnership
interest in Empire with a $43,750 investment in S&H Empire, and
an indirect limited partnership interest in Plymouth with a
$50,000 investment in Plymouth Partners.

In 1982, he acquired an

- 20 indirect, limited partnership interest in Foam with a $50,000
investment in Jabrilach Recycling.
As a result of Sann's indirect investments in Empire and
Plymouth, on their 1981 Federal income tax return Sann and his
wife Marianne claimed operating losses in the respective amounts
of $31,520 and $35,636, and investment tax and business energy
credits totaling $156,900.7

The Sanns also claimed operating

losses from Empire and Plymouth on their 1982 return in the
respective amounts of $710 and $1,132.

As a result of his

indirect investment in Foam, on their 1982 return the Sanns
claimed an operating loss in the amount of $35,272 and investment
tax and business energy credits totaling $76,767.8

Respondent

disallowed the Sanns' claimed operating losses and credits
related to Empire, Plymouth, and Foam in full, except for the
operating losses from Empire and Plymouth claimed on their 1982
return.

In addition, with respect to Empire, respondent

determined a distributive share of income in the amount of $4,375
for 1981.

7

The Sanns claimed a total of $158,128 in investment credits
on their 1981 return. The notice of deficiency indicates that
$74,210 of the credits derived from Empire and that $82,690 of
the credits derived from Plymouth. The record in docket No.
21518-88 does not indicate the source of the additional $1,228 in
credits claimed by the Sanns.
8

The total investment credit claimed by the Sanns on their
1982 return was $101,502.

- 21 Sann learned of the Plastics Recycling transactions and the
Partnerships from Maxfield, who at the time was of counsel at
Sann & Howe.

The two had been introduced earlier in the year by

a mutual friend, and Maxfield had been hired to provide general
tax expertise to the firm.

Maxfield told Sann that he had heard

about the Plastics Recycling transactions from Taggart.

Sann had

met Taggart a year or so earlier and knew of him as a tax lawyer.
Maxfield provided Sann with a copy of an offering memorandum and
he reviewed it.

By Sann's account, he spent 60 to 70 hours over

a 7- to 10-day period studying the offering memorandum.
Sann discussed the transactions with other members of Sann &
Howe, including Maxfield, at informal and formal meetings.

He

queried Taggart, by phone, about his impression of PI and the
machines, and Sann testified that Taggart had responded in a
positive way.

Sann did not know that Taggart was making an

investment in the Plastics Recycling transactions.

He understood

that Wible was impressed with what he had seen on his visit to
PI.

Sann also spoke to his contacts in the oil business, and he

asserts that from them he understood that the consensus was that
the price of oil would gradually continue to rise, though at a
lower rate than in the past.

However, Sann did not consider such

speculation to be an ironclad assurance of the direction of the
price of oil.
Sann did not investigate PI or any of the entities involved
in the Plastics Recycling transactions.

He recalled that Roberts

- 22 visited Sann & Howe once to speak "to all those who were
interested in investing" and that he "answered any questions that
anybody might have."

Sann was not overly concerned by the fact

that Roberts only had to devote as much time as he felt necessary
to the operation of the Partnerships because, as Sann understood
the arrangement, PI was going to find the end-users, not the
Partnerships, and thus "the real operation, the real work would
be done in * * * Hyannis by PI."

Maxfield informed Sann about

his visit to PI in 1982.
Sann discussed the price of the recycler with Maxfield, but
he denies that Maxfield raised the option of hiring an
independent expert or appraiser.

Sann never saw a Sentinel EPE

recycler, investigated its value, or investigated any other
competing recyclers for a price comparison.

Sann allegedly

assumed, and understood from others, that the Sentinel EPE
recycler was a unique machine and that it was priced on a takeit-or-leave-it basis.

With respect to the uniqueness of the

Sentinel EPE recycler and its purported value, Sann acknowledges
that he "relied, indeed, to a large extent, probably too much, on
the contents of the offering memorandum and the expert opinions
contained in the memorandum."
2.

Laurence M. Addington

Petitioner Laurence M. Addington (Addington) resided in New
York, New York, when his petitions were filed.

Addington earned

an undergraduate degree from the University of Minnesota in 1958

- 23 and a law degree from Yale Law School in 1961.

After service in

the Army, Addington moved to New York City and was employed in
the trust department of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.
Approximately 4 or 5 years later, in 1967, he joined the law firm
of Breed, Abbott & Morgan and practiced in their trusts and
estates department.

In 1973 he joined the law firm of Sann &

Howe, and he became a partner in that firm the following year.
Addington specializes in estate planning and administration.
In 1981, Addington acquired an indirect, limited partnership
interest in Empire with a $25,000 investment in S&H Empire, and
an indirect limited partnership interest in Plymouth with a
$6,520 investment in Plymouth Partners.

In 1982, he acquired an

indirect, limited partnership interest in Foam with a $25,000
investment in Jabrilach Recycling.
As a result of his indirect investments in Empire and
Plymouth, on his 1981 Federal income tax return Addington claimed
operating losses in the respective amounts of $18,013 and $4,454,
and investment tax and business energy credits totaling $53,416.9
Addington also claimed operating losses from Empire and Plymouth
on his 1982 return in the respective amounts of $406 and $141.
As a result of his indirect investment in Foam, on his 1982
return Addington claimed an operating loss in the amount of

9

The notice of deficiency in docket No. 21519-88 indicates
that of the $53,416 in credits, $43,080 derived from Empire
($21,876 in investment tax credits and $21,204 in business energy
credits) and $10,336 derived from Plymouth ($5,158 in investment
tax and business energy credits each).

- 24 $17,637 and an investment tax and business energy credit totaling
$35,094.10

Respondent disallowed Addington's claimed operating

losses and credits related to Empire, Plymouth, and Foam in full,
except for the operating losses from Empire and Plymouth claimed
on his 1982 return.

In addition, with respect to Empire,

respondent determined that Addington had a distributive share of
income in the amount of $2,500 for 1981.
Addington learned of the Plastics Recycling transactions and
the Partnerships from Maxfield at a firm meeting.

At the

meeting, Maxfield briefly described the transactions and made an
offering memorandum available for review.
approximately 1 hour perusing it.

Addington spent

He did not check the figures

in the cash-flow analysis section of the offering memorandum.
Although he was aware of the tax benefits, Addington claims that
he had no idea how they were derived.
not recall ever having met Roberts.

At trial, Addington could
He could not recall reading

that the tax benefits were generated by the purported value of
the machine, nor could he recall reading about any potential
conflicts of interest.
After reviewing the offering memorandum, Addington spoke to
Maxfield.

He understood that Maxfield's investigation had

entailed speaking to Roberts and Taggart, and he also was aware

10

Addington claimed an investment credit totaling $35,498 on
his 1982 return. Of that amount, $35,094 derived from Foam. The
investment tax credit and business energy credit generated by
Foam each were in the amount of $19,192. However, his business
energy credit was subject to limitation of $15,902.

- 25 of Maxfield's visit to PI in 1982.

Maxfield explained the

transactions to Addington in his own words.

The two also

discussed PI, the people organizing the Partnerships, and the
value of the machine.

Maxfield explained to Addington that an

audit would focus on the value of the machine.

Addington

understood that Wible had visited PI and that he was impressed by
the factory and the machines.
to Sann about the proposal.

Addington also recalled speaking
Although he was initially skeptical,

Addington felt "more positive" about the investment after
speaking with Maxfield and Sann.
Addington never met Roberts or knew anything about him.

He

did not believe that the success of the Partnerships depended
upon Roberts' personal efforts.

Addington did not know how the

Sentinel EPE recycler worked, in a technical sense, and he never
saw one or asked to see one.

He did not personally investigate

the recyclers or the entities involved in the transactions.
Addington knew that Maxfield's expertise was in taxation, and he
had no reason to believe that Maxfield had a background in
plastics recycling or engineering.

He recalled that Maxfield did

not press anyone to invest in the Plastics Recycling
transactions, and Addington never felt like he was being
subjected to a hard sell.
3.

David M. Cohn

Petitioner David M. Cohn (Cohn) resided in New York, New
York, when his petitions were filed.

Cohn earned an

- 26 undergraduate degree from Brandeis University and then a law
degree from the NYU Law School in 1972.

After law school he

worked for 2 ½ years as an associate in the law firm of Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (Paul, Weiss).

He then was

employed for 1 year in the office of general counsel at Macy's.
Cohn returned to Paul, Weiss for another 2 years, and then worked
for a year in the asset swap legal division of Bankers Trust.

He

joined the law firm of Sann & Howe in approximately 1979 and
became a partner in that firm in 1982.

Cohn has specialized in

real estate law throughout his career.

At Sann & Howe, he

advised foreign investors with respect to joint ventures with
developers and investments in office buildings and residential
property.

In that role, Cohn was "very involved in * * * whether

the deals worked or not."
In 1981, Cohn acquired an indirect, limited partnership
interest in Empire through a $6,250 investment in S&H Empire.

In

1982, he acquired an indirect, limited partnership interest in
Foam through a $6,000 investment in Jabrilach Recycling.
As a result of his indirect investment in Empire, on his
1981 Federal income tax return Cohn claimed an operating loss in
the amount of $4,503 and investment tax and business energy
credits totaling $8,156.11

Cohn also claimed an operating loss

from Empire on his 1982 return in the amount of $101.

11

As a

The investment tax and business energy credits flowing from
Empire totaled $5,300 each. However, Cohn's business energy
credit for 1981 was subject to a limitation to $2,856.

- 27 result of his indirect investment in Foam, on his 1982 return
Cohn claimed an operating loss in the amount of $4,232 and
investment tax and business energy credits totaling $9,212.12
Respondent disallowed Cohn's claimed operating losses and credits
related to his indirect investments in Empire and Foam in full,
except for the operating loss from Empire claimed on his 1982
return.

In addition, with respect to Empire, respondent

determined that Cohn had a distributive share of income in the
amount of $625 for 1981.
Cohn learned of the Plastics Recycling transactions and the
Partnerships from Maxfield.

He reviewed an offering memorandum

for approximately 3 to 4 hours and then questioned Maxfield about
it.

Cohn considered that the mechanics of the deal "would have

been [Maxfield's] strong suit and not mine."

12

He described his

On his 1982 return, Cohn claimed a total investment credit
in the amount of $13,401. In his petition, Cohn asserts that his
distributive share of Jabrilach Recycling's investment tax credit
through Foam was $13,401.
However, Cohn's 1982 Schedule K-1, Partner's Share of
Income, Credits, Deductions, etc., attached to Jabrilach
Recycling's 1982 Form 1065, indicates that Cohn's share of basis
in the recyclers owned by Foam was $46,060. Accordingly, the
total investment tax and business energy credits available to
Cohn from his indirect interest in Foam was $9,212 ($4,606 each).
Cohn's 1982 return indicates that the additional $4,189 in
credits was comprised of $745 in investment tax credits from
other qualifying property, and carried over business energy
credits in the amount of $3,444. It is unclear from his 1982
return how much, if any, of the carried over business energy
credits was from Empire. Respondent disallowed Cohn's claimed
credits in full.

- 28 understanding of how the value of the machines was determined as
follows:
It was explained to me [by Maxfield]. How much I
understood about it I don't know, but I didn't know how
it got this valuation, how we got to this valuation,
and it was explained to me that, under this provision,
you could do this, and this provision, you could do
that.
* * * * * * *
As to the overall valuation, it didn't--I don't
think I questioned it, because to me the valuation was
based upon the projections of profit, that if you could
get this kind of profit out, the[n] a unique machine,
which is what I thought we were investing in, was worth
whatever they could [get] for it. So, I didn't analyze
the nuts and bolts of each machine.
Cohn understood that the potential economic returns were
dependent upon the price of oil.

He spoke to Sann about the

price of oil after Sann had spoken to his contacts in the oil
business.
Cohn spent approximately 10 to 12 hours discussing the
investment with Maxfield, as well as Sann, Addington, Wible, and
Chuck Kellert (Kellert), another partner at Sann & Howe.

He also

attended some of the firm meetings regarding the investment.
Cohn understood that Maxfield was satisfied with the offering
memorandum and tax opinion, but he could not recall Maxfield
mentioning the option of hiring an independent appraiser or
expert.

He recalled that Wible spoke approvingly of his visit to

PI and that the others thought positively about the investment.
Cohn could not recall meeting Roberts.

He understood that he

could expect to receive profits from the royalties in accordance
with the timetable set out in the offering memorandum.

- 29 Cohn questioned Maxfield about the status of his 1981
investment when no profits were forthcoming.

Cohn recalled that

the progress reports he had seen "did not look great and scared *
* * [him] a little bit."

Maxfield's "responses were not euphoric

but good enough [for Cohn] to invest again in 1982."

Even though

he had yet to receive any distributions from Empire, Cohn
invested in Foam in 1982.

Cohn testified that Maxfield spoke

positively about his visit to PI that year.

Cohn recalled that

"much further investigation" had been undertaken and that
"Explanations were given as to why the [projected economic]
return [for Empire] had not come forth."

Other than perhaps

Maxfield's visit to PI, however, Cohn did not elaborate upon what
"further investigation" had been done.

The explanation he

received with respect to Empire's lack of economic return was
that "the market was weak at that--for those few months".
Cohn thought that the plastics recycling business "was just
slow" until he read an article in the Wall Street Journal
reporting that "there was an injunction * * * restraining Mr.
Roberts from pushing these things."

At that point Cohn recalled

that discussions at Sann & Howe "focused on the fact that we had
dealt with a promoter who had not--that we had been sold a bill
of goods is the best way I can put it."

Cohn recalled that there

was a feeling that the investment did not produce as projected,
"And personally, you know, how could I or how could we be so
stupid as to--and then we would go through what--the recollection

- 30 of what more could we have done, but it certainly was mea culpa
time."
OPINION
We have decided a large number of the Plastics Recycling
group of cases.13

13

The majority of these cases, like the present

Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177, affd. without
published opinion 996 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993), concerned the
substance of the partnership transaction and also the additions
to tax.
The following cases concerned the addition to tax for
negligence, inter alia: Estate of Hogard v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-174; Henry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-86; Skyrms
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-69; Friedman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-558; Becker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-538;
Jaroff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-527; Gollin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-454; Grelsamer v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-399; Zenkel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-398;
Estate of Busch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-342; Spears v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-341; Stone v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-230; Reimann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-84;
Bennett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-14; Atkind v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-582; Triemstra v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1995-581; Pace v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-580;
Dworkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-533; Wilson v
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-525; Avellini v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-489; Paulson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-387;
Zidanich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-382; Ramesh v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-346; Reister v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-305; Fralich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-257;
Shapiro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-224; Pierce v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-223; Fine v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-222; Pearlman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-182;
Kott v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-181; Eisenberg v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-180.
Greene v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 376 (1987), concerned the
applicability of the safe-harbor leasing provisions of sec.
168(f)(8). Trost v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 560 (1990), concerned
a jurisdictional issue.
Farrell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-295; Baratelli v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-484; Estate of Satin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-435; Fisher v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-434; Foam Recycling Associates v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1992-645; Madison Recycling Associates v. Commissioner,
(continued...)

- 31 cases, raised issues regarding additions to tax for negligence
and valuation overstatement.

We have found the taxpayers liable

for such additions to tax in all but one of the opinions to date
on these issues, although procedural rulings have involved many
more favorable results for taxpayers.14
In Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177, a test
case for the Plastics Recycling group of cases, this Court (1)
found that each Sentinel EPE recycler had a fair market value not
in excess of $50,000, (2) held that the Clearwater transaction
was a sham because it lacked economic substance and a business
purpose, (3) upheld the section 6659 addition to tax for
valuation overstatement since the underpayment of taxes was
directly related to the overstatement of the value of the
Sentinel EPE recyclers, and (4) held that losses and credits
claimed with respect to Clearwater were attributable to tax-

13

(...continued)
T.C. Memo. 1992-605, concerned other issues.
14

In Zidanich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-382, we held
the taxpayers liable for the sec. 6659 addition to tax, but not
liable for the negligence additions to tax under sec. 6653(a).
As indicated in our opinion, the Zidanich case, and the Steinberg
case consolidated with it for opinion, involved exceptional
circumstances.
In Estate of Satin v. Commissioner, supra, and Fisher v.
Commissioner, supra, after the decision in Provizer v.
Commissioner, supra, the taxpayers were allowed to elect to
accept a beneficial settlement because of exceptional
circumstances. In Farrell v. Commissioner, supra, we rejected
the taxpayers' claim to a similar belated settlement arrangement
since the circumstances were different and the taxpayers
previously had rejected settlement and elected to litigate the
case. See also Baratelli v. Commissioner, supra; Zenkel v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-398.

- 32 motivated transactions within the meaning of section 6621(c).

In

reaching the conclusion that the transaction lacked economic
substance and a business purpose, this Court relied heavily upon
the overvaluation of the Sentinel EPE recyclers.
Although petitioners have not agreed to be bound by the
Provizer opinion, they have stipulated that their investments in
the Sentinel EPE recyclers in these cases are similar to the
investment described in Provizer v. Commissioner, supra.

The

underlying transactions in these cases, and the Sentinel EPE
recyclers purportedly leased by the Partnerships, are the same
type of transaction and same type of machines considered in
Provizer v. Commissioner, supra.
Based on the entire records in these cases, including the
extensive stipulations, testimony of respondent's experts, and
petitioners' testimony, we hold that each of the Partnership
transactions herein was a sham and lacked economic substance.

In

reaching this conclusion, we rely heavily upon the overvaluation
of the Sentinel EPE recyclers.

Respondent is sustained on the

question of the underlying deficiencies.

We note that

petitioners have explicitly conceded this issue in the
stipulations of settled issues filed shortly before trial.

The

records plainly support respondent's determinations regardless of
such concessions.

For a detailed discussion of the facts and the

applicable law in a substantially identical case, see Provizer v.
Commissioner, supra.

- 33 A.

Statute of Limitations
Petitioners contend that the section 6229(a) period of

limitations for assessing their partnership items for the 1982
tax year expired on June 30, 1987, several years before
respondent issued the respective notices of deficiency for
1982.15
In general, section 6229(a) provides that the period for
assessing any income tax attributable to partnership items (or
affected items) for a partnership taxable year will not expire
until the later of a date which is 3 years after the partnership
files its information return for the taxable year in question or
the last day for filing such return for such year (without
extensions).

This minimum 3-year period may be extended,

suspended, or otherwise modified as provided elsewhere in section
6229.

The relevant modifications with respect to petitioners'

cases are in subsections (b), (d), and (f) of section 6229.
Section 6229(b) provides as follows:
(b) EXTENSION BY AGREEMENT.(1) IN GENERAL.-The period described in subsection
(a) (including an extension period under this
subsection) may be extended(A) with respect to any partner, by an
agreement entered into by the Secretary and
such partner, and
(B) with respect to all partners, by an
agreement entered into by the Secretary and

15

The parties do not dispute that resolution of this issue is
governed by the TEFRA partnership provisions, secs. 6221-6233.

- 34 the tax matters partner (or any other person
authorized by the partnership in writing to
enter into such an agreement),
before the expiration of such period.
(2) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 6501(c)(4).--Any
agreement under section 6501(c)(4) shall apply with
respect to the period described in subsection (a) only
if the agreement expressly provides that such agreement
applies to tax attributable to partnership items.
Section 6229(d) provides that the running of the limitations
period is suspended from the date when the notice of Final
Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) is mailed to the
partnership's TMP for (1) the period during which an action may
be brought for judicial review of the FPAA, and if such an action
is brought, until the decision of the court becomes final, and
(2) for 1 year thereafter.

The period during which an action may

be brought is generally 150 days.

Sec. 6226(a) and (b); see sec.

7503.
Section 6229(f) provides that if partnership items become
nonpartnership items before the expiration of the limitations
period otherwise provided, then the limitations period shall not
expire before the date that is 1 year after the date on which
partnership items become nonpartnership items.
Foam filed its partnership return for the 1982 tax year on
March 16, 1983.

Therefore, the limitations period was initially

set to expire on April 15, 1986.

Sec. 6229(a).

However, on

November 5, 1985, one of the attorneys-in-fact for Foam, Shaye
Jacobson (Jacobson), executed a Form 872-P, Consent to Extend the

- 35 Time to Assess Tax Attributable to Items of a Partnership, with
respect to Foam's 1982 tax year.16

Petitioners concede that this

consent extended the period of limitations for assessment of
partnership items for all partners of Foam to June 30, 1987.
Prior to June 30, 1987, petitioners executed extensions of
time for assessment (the Consents) with respect to their 1982 tax
years.17

Cohn (or on Cohn's behalf his authorized

representative, Bernard L. Dikman (Dikman), C.P.A.) executed a
series of 3 Forms 872, Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax.
The first was executed on February 26, 1986, and extended the
limitations period until June 30, 1987.

The second was executed

on March 6, 1987, and extended the limitations period until
December 31, 1988.

The third was executed on February 12, 1988,

and extended the limitations period until December 31, 1989.
Addington and the Sanns executed Forms 872-A, Special
Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax, on December 22, 1985
and March 13, 1986, respectively.

Each of the Forms 872-A

extended the period of limitations until the 90th day after (1)
the IRS office considering the case received a Form 872-T, Notice
of Termination of Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess
Tax, from the taxpayer; (2) the IRS mailed a Form 872-T to the

16

A member of Freedman & Co., Jacobson had been named an
attorney-in-fact for Foam Recycling, along with Freedman, in a
Form 2848, Power and Declaration of Representative, executed by
Roberts on Apr. 2, 1984.
17

The records in these cases indicate, and the parties do not
dispute, that petitioners timely executed their respective
Consents in accordance with sec. 6501(c)(4).

- 36 taxpayer; or (3) the IRS mailed a notice of deficiency to the
taxpayer.

On November 21, 1989, Addington and the Sanns, through

their counsel, executed Forms 872-T for the purpose of
terminating the Forms 872-A.

The Forms 872-T were received by

the IRS on November 27, 1989.

The 90th day after November 27,

1989 was February 25, 1990.
On December 20, 1989, a Notice of Beginning of
Administrative Proceedings (NBAP) with respect to Foam's 1982 tax
year was issued to Foam's TMP and to each of petitioners.

One

day later, on December 21, 1989, an FPAA with respect to Foam's
1982 tax year was issued to Foam's TMP and to each of
petitioners.

Under section 6229(d), the issuance of the FPAA

operated to suspend the period of limitations until May 20, 1991.
In addition, because the NBAP and FPAA were issued within 120
days of each other, petitioners had the option to elect to have
their partnership items treated as nonpartnership items.
6223(e).

Sec.

On January 31, 1990, petitioners, through their

respective counsel, so elected.
The consequences of petitioners' elections to treat their
partnership items as nonpartnership items were twofold.

First,

petitioners no longer could petition for, or be treated as
parties to, any judicial review of the FPAA.
and (d)(2), 6231(b)(1)(D), 6223(e)(3)(B).

Secs. 6226(d)(1)(A)

Second, under section

6229(f), the limitations periods with respect to petitioners'
former partnership items could not expire less than 1 year later,
or January 31, 1991.

Respondent issued the 1982 notices of

- 37 deficiency at issue in these cases to petitioners on July 19 and
20, 1990.18
Petitioners argue that the Consents were not effective to
extend respondent's time to make the adjustments at the
partnership level to which any deficiency or addition to tax
could be attributed.

We disagree.

Section 6229(b)(2) provides that any agreement under section
6501(c)(4) shall apply with respect to the limitations period
described in subsection (a) only if such agreement expressly
provides that such agreement applies to tax attributable to
partnership items.

The Forms 872-A executed by the Sanns and

Addington contained the following restrictive language:
(5) The amount of any deficiency assessment is to be
limited to that resulting from any adjustments to (a)
items affected by the carryover or continuing tax
effect caused by adjustments to any prior tax return;
(b) the taxpayer's distributive share of any item of
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit of, or
distribution from
JABRILACH RECYCLING

#13-3133726

(c) the tax basis of the taxpayer's interest(s) in the
aforementioned partnership(s) or organization(s)
treated by the taxpayer(s) as a partnership; and (d);
any gain or loss (or the character or timing thereof)
realized upon the sale or exchange, abandonment, or
other disposition of taxpayer's interest in such
partnership(s) or organization(s) treated by the
taxpayer as a partnership; including any consequential
changes to other items based on such adjustment.

18

The notices of deficiency for the 1982 tax year were issued
to Addington and the Sanns on July 19, 1990, and to Cohn on July
20, 1990.

- 38 Of the 3 Forms 872 executed by or on behalf of Cohn, the first
contained no such language.

However, the second contained

similar restrictive language, and the third incorporated such
language by reference.
In Foam Recycling Associates v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1992-645, this Court found that an extension agreement containing
restrictive language virtually identical to that in petitioners'
Consents satisfied the requirements of section 6229(b)(2).

Cohn

argues that in his case, the first Form 872 executed on his
behalf did not satisfy section 6229(b)(2), and that the
limitations period under section 6229(a) expired before he
executed the second Form 872 on March 6, 1987.

However, as Cohn

conceded, the period of limitations under section 6229(a) had
been validly extended by Jacobson until June 30, 1987.
Therefore, the limitations period on assessment for 1982 was
still open when Cohn executed the second Form 872 on March 6,
1987.
Section 6229(b)(1) provides that the period of limitations
for assessing partnership items (or affected items) may be
extended before the expiration of such period.

Subparagraphs (A)

and (B) of section 6229(b)(1) define by whom and for whom the
period of limitations may be extended.

Petitioners concede that,

pursuant to the authority provided under section 6229(b)(1)(B),
the Form 872-A executed by Jacobson extended the time for making
adjustments at the partnership level with respect to all partners
until June 30, 1987.

Likewise, the Consents executed by

- 39 petitioners, pursuant to the authority provided under section
6229(b)(1)(A), also extended the time for making adjustments at
the partnership level, but only with respect to petitioners'
partnership items (or affected items) for taxable year 1982.
The respective Consents executed by petitioners were
executed prior to the expiration of the section 6229(a) period of
limitations on assessment for 1982, as extended by Jacobson for
all partners, and such Consents were sufficient to satisfy
section 6229(b)(2).

See Foam Recycling Associates v.

Commissioner, supra.

We hold that the period of limitations for

assessment of tax related to petitioners' former partnership
items (or affected items) for 1982 under section 6229(a) had not
yet expired when respondent issued the notices of deficiency for
docket Nos. 21209-90, 22399-90, and 22466-90.

Respondent is

sustained on this issue.
B.

Section 6653(a)--Negligence
In notices of deficiency for 1981 and 1982, respondent

determined that each of petitioners was liable for the additions
to tax for negligence under section 6653(a)(1) and (2).
Petitioners have the burden of proving that respondent's
determinations of these additions to tax are erroneous.

Rule

142(a); Luman v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 846, 860-861 (1982).
Section 6653(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax equal to 5
percent of the underpayment if any part of an underpayment of tax

- 40 is due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or
regulations.

Section 6653(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax equal

to 50 percent of the interest payable with respect to the portion
of the underpayment attributable to negligence or intentional
disregard of rules or regulations.
Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the due
care that a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would employ
under the circumstances.
(1985).

Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947

The question is whether a particular taxpayer's actions

in connection with the transactions were reasonable in light of
his experience and the nature of the investment or business.

See

Henry Schwartz Corp. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 728, 740 (1973).
When considering the negligence addition to tax, we evaluate the
particular facts of each case, judging the relative
sophistication of the taxpayers, as well as the manner in which
they approached their investment.
Memo. 1996-46.

McPike v. Commissioner, T.C.

Compare Spears v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-

341 with Zidanich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-382.
Petitioners argue that they were reasonable in claiming
deductions and credits with respect to the Partnerships.

They

maintain that they reviewed the offering memoranda, expected an
economic profit in light of the so-called oil crisis in the
United States in 1981, and that they reasonably relied upon
Maxfield as a qualified adviser on this matter.

- 41 1.

The Private Offering Memoranda

Petitioners each testified that they reviewed a copy of at least
one of the respective offering memoranda.19

Sann claims that he

spent 60 to 70 hours over a 7 to 10 day period studying one.
Addington recalls spending approximately 1 hour perusing one.
Cohn recalls that he spent 3 to 4 hours reviewing one.
Regardless of how much time petitioners may have devoted to the
offering memoranda, however, the records in these cases reveal
that they did not give due consideration to all of the
information set out therein, and that they did not pay sufficient
heed to the warnings and caveats contained therein.
The projected first-year tax benefits in each of the
offering memoranda exceeded petitioners' respective investments.
For each $50,000 investor, the projected first-year tax benefits
for the Partnerships were as follows:

19

It is not clear from the records in these cases whether
petitioners reviewed all three offering memoranda or just the
offering memorandum for Empire or Plymouth.
The offering memoranda and accompanying tax opinions for the
partnerships are substantially similar. WMDI prepared the
offering memoranda and tax opinions for Empire and Plymouth. The
law firm of Boylan & Evans prepared the tax opinion for Foam.
The two name partners of Boylan & Evans, William A. Boylan and
John D. Evans, were partners at WMDI during 1981, but left to
form their own firm in 1982.
The offering memoranda for Empire and Plymouth were included
in the records for docket Nos. 21518-88 and 21519-88 (the Sann
and Addington cases for 1981). Because Cohn did not invest in
Plymouth, only the Empire offering memorandum was included in the
record for his 1981 case, docket No. 4789-89.

- 42 IT and BE Credits
$84,813
82,639
76,736

Empire
Plymouth
Foam

Deductions
$40,650
40,376
39,878

With respect to their combined indirect investments in Empire and
Plymouth, petitioners claimed the following total tax benefits on
their 1981 Federal income tax returns.20

Sann
Addington
Cohn

Total Combined
Investment
$93,750
31,520
6,250

IT and BE Credits
$156,900
53,416
8,156

Loss
$67,156
22,467
4,503

With respect to their indirect investments in Foam, petitioners
claimed the following tax benefits on their 1982 Federal income
tax returns.
Sann
Addington
Cohn

Investment
$50,000
25,000
6,000

IT and BE Credits
$76,767
35,094
9,212

Loss
$35,272
17,637
4,232

The total of investment tax and business energy credits
ostensibly generated by the Partnerships and available to
petitioners was more than 1 ½ times their cash investments.
Therefore, after adjustments of withholding, estimated tax, or
final payment, like the taxpayers in Provizer v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1992-177, "except for a few weeks at the beginning,
petitioners never had any money in the * * * [Partnership
transactions]."

In view of the disproportionately large tax

benefits claimed on petitioners' Federal income tax returns,

20

As noted, Cohn invested in S&H Empire but not in Plymouth
Partners.

- 43 relative to the dollar amounts invested, further investigation of
the Partnership transactions clearly was required.
The offering memoranda raised numerous caveats and warnings
with respect to the Partnerships, including:

(1) The

Partnerships had no operating history; (2) management of the
Partnerships' business was dependent upon the general partner,
who had no experience in marketing recycling equipment and who
was required to devote only such time to the Partnerships as he
deemed necessary; (3) the limited partners had no right to take
part in, or interfere in any manner with, the management or
conduct of the business of the Partnerships; (4) there was no
established market for the Sentinel recyclers; (5) although
competitors were purportedly not marketing comparable equipment,
and the Sentinel recyclers purportedly involved "carefully
guarded trade secrets," PI did "not intend to apply for a patent
for protection against appropriation and use by others."

The

Foam offering memorandum also noted "that since August 1981, PI
[had] become a sublicensee of 104 other Sentinel Recyclers" and
had "encountered longer start-up periods than anticipated".

A

careful consideration of the materials in the offering memoranda
in these cases, especially the discussions of high writeoffs and
risk of audit, should have alerted a prudent and reasonable
investor to the questionable nature of the promised deductions
and credits.

See Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1383, 1386

(9th Cir. 1988), affg. Dister v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-

- 44 217; Sacks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-217, affd. 82 F.3d
918 (9th Cir. 1996).
Petitioners' reliance upon the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit's partial reversal of our decision in Osterhout v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-251, affd. in part and revd. in
part without published opinion sub nom. Balboa Energy Fund 1981
v. Commissioner, 85 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1996), is misplaced.

In

Osterhout, we found that certain oil and gas partnerships were
not engaged in a trade or business and sustained the
Commissioner's imposition of the negligence additions to tax with
respect to one of the partners therein.21

The Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit reversed our imposition of the negligence
additions to tax.

Petitioners point out that the taxpayer in

that case relied in part upon a tax opinion contained in the
offering materials.
In the cases before us, however, petitioners' purported
reliance on the tax opinion letters is questionable.

The tax

opinion letters expressly warned that the investment tax and
business energy credits would be reduced or eliminated if the
Partnerships could not demonstrate that the price paid for the

21

Osterhout v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-251, affd. in
part and revd. in part without published opinion sub nom. Balboa
Energy Fund 1981 v. Commissioner, 85 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1996),
involved a group of consolidated cases. The parties therein
agreed to be bound by the Court's opinion regarding the
application of the additions to tax under sec. 6653(a), inter
alia. Accordingly, although the Court's analysis focused on one
taxpayer, the additions to tax were sustained with respect to all
of the taxpayers.

- 45 recyclers approximated their fair market value.

Neither of the

tax opinions purports to rely on any independent confirmation of
the fair market value of the recyclers.

Rather, the tax opinions

refer to representations by PI and/or other entities involved in
the transactions for the value of the Sentinel EPE recycler.

For

example, in the tax opinion appended to the offering memoranda
for Empire and Plymouth, WMDI states:
PI has represented that its pricing policies are a
trade secret, but that its price for the Sentinel
Recyclers to the company which will sell the machines
to the company from which the Partnership will lease
them is no less than it would charge any other
purchaser.
In the tax opinion appended to the Foam offering memorandum,
Boylan & Evans state that "PI, ECI, F & G [Corp.] and the
Partnership have represented to us that the prices paid by ECI
and F & G [Corp.] * * * were negotiated at arm's length."

In

fact, as petitioners stipulated, no arm's-length negotiations for
the price of the Sentinel EPE recycler took place between or
among PI, ECI, and F & G Corp.
The offering memoranda for the Partnerships warned
prospective investors that the accompanying tax opinion letters
were not in final form and were prepared for the general
partner,22 and that prospective investors "MUST RELY UPON THEIR
OWN PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS WITH RESPECT TO THE TAX BENEFITS AND

22

Each of the offering memoranda notes that the opinion letter
of counsel "will be provided to the General Partner for his
individual guidance," and that prospective investors "are not
permitted to rely upon the advice contained therein."

- 46 TAX RISKS RELATING TO AN INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP."

The tax

opinion letters accompanying the Empire and Plymouth offering
memoranda were addressed solely to the general partner and began
with the following opening disclaimer:
This opinion is provided to you for your individual
guidance. We expect that prospective investors will
rely upon their own professional advisors with respect
to all tax issues arising in connection with their
investment in the Partnership and the operations
thereof. We recognize that you intend to include this
letter with your offering materials and we have
consented to that with the understanding that the
purpose in distributing it is to assist your offerees'
tax advisors in making their own analysis and not to
permit any prospective investor to rely upon our advice
in this matter. [Emphasis added.]
The tax opinion letter accompanying the Foam offering memorandum,
addressed solely to Roberts, similarly states:

"[T]his letter is

intended for your own individual guidance and for the purpose of
assisting prospective purchasers and their tax advisors in making
their own analysis, and no prospective purchaser is entitled to
rely upon this letter."

Accordingly, the tax opinion letters

expressly indicate that prospective investors such as petitioners
were not to rely upon the tax opinion letter.
Commissioner, supra at 1386.

See Collins v.

The limited, technical opinions of

tax counsel expressed in these letters were not designed as
advice upon which taxpayers might rely and the opinions of
counsel themselves so state.

- 47 2.

The So-Called Oil Crisis

Petitioners testified that they reasonably expected to make
an economic profit from the Partnership transactions because
plastic is an oil derivative and the United States was
experiencing a so-called oil crisis when they invested in the
Partnerships.

Based upon our review of the records, we find

petitioners' claims unconvincing, regardless of the so-called oil
crisis.

Moreover, persuasive testimony by one of respondent's

experts establishes that the oil pricing changes during the late
1970's and early 1980's did not justify petitioners' claiming
excessive investment credits and purported losses based on vastly
exaggerated valuations of recycling machinery.
Petitioners did not educate themselves in, or personally
investigate, the business aspects of the Plastics Recycling
transactions.

Nor did they attempt to resolve the numerous

business-related caveats and warnings in the offering memoranda.
Petitioners purport to have relied on Maxfield, but Maxfield made
it clear to all concerned that he was not an investment analyst
and that he had no training to decide whether the price of oil
was going to increase or decrease.

Maxfield also told the

members of Sann & Howe that he considered the relationship
between the potential value of the recycled pellets and the price
of oil to be a negative aspect of the proposed investment.

In

addition, petitioners received progress reports with respect to

- 48 Empire that revealed that as late as August 1982, despite the socalled oil crisis, only one of its seven recyclers was actually
generating revenue.

Nonetheless, petitioners subsequently

invested in Foam, through Jabrilach Recycling, and claim that
they expected to receive an economic profit because of the socalled oil crisis.
Moreover, petitioners did not adequately explain how the socalled oil crisis provided a reasonable basis for them to invest
in the Partnerships and claim the associated tax deductions and
credits.

The offering materials warned that there could be no

assurances that prices for new resin pellets would remain at
their then-current level.

One of respondent's experts, Steven

Grossman, explained that the price of plastics materials is not
directly proportional to the price of oil.

In his report, he

stated that less than 10 percent of crude oil is utilized for
making plastics materials and that studies have shown that "a
300% increase in crude oil prices results in only a 30 to 40%
increase in the cost of plastics products."

Furthermore, during

1980 and 1981, in addition to the media coverage of the so-called
oil crisis, there was "extensive continuing press coverage of
questionable tax shelter plans."

Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d

1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982).

Certainly

Cohn, an admitted "news nut", was aware of such media coverage.

- 49 Petitioners' reliance on Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132
(1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024
(10th Cir. 1994), is misplaced.

The facts in the Krause case are

distinctly different from the facts of these cases.

In the

Krause case, the taxpayers invested in limited partnerships whose
investment objectives concerned enhanced oil recovery (EOR)
technology.

The Krause opinion states that during the late

1970's and early 1980's, the Federal Government adopted specific
programs to aid research and development of EOR technology.
at 135-136.

Id.

In holding that the taxpayers in the Krause case

were not liable for the negligence additions to tax, this Court
noted that one of the Government's expert witnesses acknowledged
that "investors may have been significantly and reasonably
influenced by the energy price hysteria that existed in the late
1970s and early 1980s to invest in EOR technology."

Id. at 177.

In the present cases, however, as explained by respondent's
expert Steven Grossman, the price of plastics materials was not
directly proportional to the price of oil, and there is no
persuasive evidence that the so-called oil crisis had or
reasonably should have had a substantial bearing on petitioners'
decisions to invest.

While EOR was, according to our Krause

opinion, in the forefront of national policy and the media during
the late 1970's and 1980's, there is no showing in these records
that the so-called energy crisis would provide a reasonable basis

- 50 for petitioners' investing in recycling of polyethylene,
particularly in the machinery here in question.
In addition, the taxpayers in the Krause case were
experienced in or investigated the oil industry and EOR
technology specifically.

One of the taxpayers in the Krause case

undertook significant investigation of the proposed investment
including researching EOR technology.

The other taxpayer was a

geological and mining engineer whose work included research of
oil recovery methods and who hired an independent geologic
engineer to review the offering materials.

Id. at 166.

In the

present cases, petitioners were not experienced or educated in
plastics recycling, and they did not independently investigate
the Sentinel EPE recyclers or hire an expert in plastics to
evaluate the Partnership transactions.

Although Sann spoke to

client contacts in the oil business, he recognized that their
opinions about the future price of oil were nothing more than
speculation.

We consider petitioners' arguments with respect to

the Krause case inapplicable.
3.

Petitioners' Purported Reliance on an Adviser

Petitioners claim that they reasonably relied upon the
advice of a qualified adviser, Maxfield.
The concept of negligence and the argument of reliance on an
expert are highly fact intensive.

Petitioners in these cases are

very well educated and sophisticated attorneys.

Sann specializes

in international law and has advised foreign individuals and

- 51 entities with respect to investments in the United States;
Addington specializes in estate planning and administration; and
Cohn specializes in real estate law and has advised foreign
investors with respect to joint ventures and real estate
investments in the United States.

These sophisticated attorneys

ultimately relied upon another attorney to investigate the tax
law and the underlying business circumstances of a proposed
investment, the success of which depended upon a purportedly
technologically unique machine.

The attorney allegedly relied

upon by petitioners had no expertise in plastics materials or
plastics recycling and stressed to petitioners that he was not an
investment analyst.

In the end, he relied upon the offering

materials and persons connected to the transactions for the value
of the machine, and fully disclosed the limitations of his
investigation to petitioners.
a. The Circumstances Under Which a Taxpayer
May Avoid Liability Under Section 6653(a)(1)
and (2) Because of Reasonable Reliance on
Competent and Fully Informed Professional
Advice
A taxpayer may avoid liability for the additions to tax
under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) if he or she reasonably relied
on competent professional advice.

United States v. Boyle, 469

U.S. 241, 250-251 (1985); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849,
888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S.
868 (1991).

However, a taxpayer bears the responsibility for any

negligent errors of his or her professional adviser.

See

- 52 American Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1100, 11161117 (1957), affd. per curiam 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958); Buck
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-191.

Reliance on professional

advice, standing alone, is not an absolute defense to negligence,
but rather a factor to be considered.
supra.

Freytag v. Commissioner,

For reliance on professional advice to excuse a taxpayer

from the negligence additions to tax, the taxpayer must show that
the professional had the expertise and knowledge of the pertinent
facts to provide informed advice on the subject matter.

David v.

Commissioner, 43 F.3d 788, 789-790 (2d Cir. 1995), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1993-621; Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 402 (2d Cir.
1994), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-480; Freytag v. Commissioner, supra;
Buck v. Commissioner, supra; Sacks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1994-217; Kozlowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-430, affd.
without published opinion 70 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1995); see also,
e.g., Friedman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-558; Gollin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-454; Stone v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-230; Reimann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-84.
Reliance on representations by insiders, promoters, or
offering materials has been held an inadequate defense to
negligence.

Goldman v. Commissioner, supra; Pasternak v.

Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1993), affg. Donahue v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-181; LaVerne v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 637, 652-653 (1990), affd. without published opinion 956
F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1992), affd. without published opinion sub

- 53 nom. Cowles v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1991);
Marine v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 958, 992-993 (1989), affd.
without published opinion 921 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1991); McCrary
v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 827, 850 (1989); Rybak v. Commissioner,
91 T.C. 524, 565 (1988).

Pleas of reliance have been rejected

when neither the taxpayer nor the advisers purportedly relied
upon by the taxpayer knew anything about the nontax business
aspects of the contemplated venture.

David v. Commissioner,

supra, Goldman v. Commissioner, supra; Freytag v. Commissioner,
supra; Beck v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 557 (1985); Buck v.
Commissioner, supra; Lax v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-329,
affd. without published opinion 72 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1995); Sacks
v. Commissioner, supra; Steerman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1993-447; Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-619; see also
the Plastics Recycling cases cited supra note 13.
b.

Maxfield

Maxfield had no education, special qualifications, or
professional skills or experience in plastics engineering,
plastics recycling, or plastics materials.

He did not consider

himself to be an investment analyst or an expert in tax shelters.
Maxfield never represented to the members of Sann & Howe that he
was an expert in plastics recycling or engineering, and he always
stressed that he was not an investment analyst.

Even during the

course of his testimony, in recounting his observations at PI and
his understanding of how the machines worked, Maxfield was

- 54 careful to preface his recollections by cautioning:

"Remember *

* * I'm not a scientist" and "recognizing I'm not an engineer".
Maxfield testified that he spent approximately 50 to 75 or
more hours investigating the Plastics Recycling transactions.
His investigation consisted of reading the offering materials and
speaking with Roberts and Taggart in 1981, and visiting PI's
plant in Hyannis in 1982.

He did not consider Taggart to be an

expert in plastics recycling or plastics engineering.

Two of

Maxfield's principal concerns with respect to the Partnership
transactions were (1) "what was in it for the promoter", Roberts,
and (2) whether the Partnerships were "paying a fair price" for
the machines.
To learn "what was in it for the promoter", Maxfield spoke
to the promoter, Roberts.

Maxfield was concerned about Roberts'

compensation and commitment to the Partnerships because in other
tax shelters he had seen, the promoter sometimes made a
substantial profit regardless of the success of the partnership.
Roberts explained to Maxfield that the source of his profits, as
the promoter, would be from the operation of the partnerships.
Maxfield concluded from his investigation of this issue that "the
general partner had a real economic incentive to make these
things work if he was going to ever sell any more of--of these
things."

In contrast, Sann understood that "the real operation,

the real work would be done in * * * Hyannis by PI", not Roberts.

- 55 Addington also understood that the success of the Partnerships
did not depend upon Roberts' personal efforts.
Maxfield knew that Roberts did not have "the capacity to
seek out end-users" for the recyclers.

The offering memoranda

warned that the general partner had no prior experience in
marketing recycling or similar equipment and that,
the Partnership Agreement does not prohibit the General
Partner from engaging in any activity whatsoever,
including those which may be competitive with the
business of the Partnership, and [such] Agreement
requires the general partner to devote only such time
to the business of the partnership as he, in his
absolute discretion, deems necessary * * *
The offering memoranda also noted that Roberts would not be
liable to the Partnerships or the limited partners for errors in
judgment or other acts or omissions not amounting to fraud or
gross negligence.

Roberts' "economic incentive" in the success

of the Partnerships, if any, derived from a 1-percent interest in
all items of income, gain, deduction, loss, and credit from the
Partnerships (for his respective $1,000 contributions).

However,

regardless of how the Partnerships fared, Roberts was due to
receive a minimum of $97,500, and up to a maximum of $350,000,
from the three offerings.
To learn about the Sentinel recyclers, including how they
functioned, their potential market, and their fair market value,
Maxfield reviewed the offering memoranda and the reports by
Ulanoff and Burstein, spoke to Roberts, and visited PI in 1982.
One of Maxfield's concerns was whether it "was a hard sell to get

- 56 these machines placed".

He was told that it would not be

difficult to place the machines because the recyclers imposed
little or no cost on end-users and because end-users would be
relieved of the financial burden of removing their plastic waste.
Maxfield understood that among the criteria required of end-users
was the willingness to "spend something--roughly $5,000 or
$6,000, if necessary, for the wiring of the machine."
Maxfield allegedly was told by Roberts and Wible in 1981,
and persons at PI in 1982, that the Sentinel EPE recycler was
unique and had a "tremendous head-start" over its competitors.
He claims that he understood that competing recyclers were not as
efficient as the Sentinel EPE recyclers and were not easily
placed with end-users.

However, despite the purported

technological edge PI supposedly enjoyed over its competitors,
the offering memoranda warned that "PI does not intend to apply
for a patent for protection against appropriation and use [of its
trade secrets] by others."
were not unique.

In addition, the Sentinel recyclers

By 1981, several machines capable of densifying

low density materials such as polyethylene and polystyrene were
already on the market, including the Foremost Densilator,
Nelmor/Weiss Densification System (Regenolux), Buss-Condux
Plastcompactor, and Cumberland Granulator.

In contrast to the

Sentinel EPE recycler, which was priced at $1,162,666, these
machines ranged in price from $20,000 to $200,000.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-177.

See Provizer

- 57 Maxfield testified that he relied on the offering memoranda,
and in particular the reports by Ulanoff and Burstein appended
thereto, for the value of the recyclers.

However, he never spoke

to Ulanoff or Burstein and never learned that they were investors
in the Plastics Recycling transactions.

He did not ask Roberts

or Taggart whether Ulanoff and Burstein were investors in the
transaction.

Although he knew that other plastics recycling

machines existed, Maxfield did not run any price comparisons or
independently investigate the capabilities of such competing
machines.

In the end, Maxfield did not confirm the

representations in the offering memoranda upon which the
purported valuation of the recyclers was based.
caution the members of Sann & Howe on this point.

However, he did
Maxfield

testified:
[O]ne of the fundamental questions I had was is the
machine--are we paying a fair price, are we overpaying
for this machine?
Obviously, we could read the offering circular. I
was convinced, if the facts were as represented, we
weren't overpaying.
On the other hand, were the--was the offering
circular lying? I didn't have any judgment as to that,
and I said the only way to know, I suppose, would be to
hire another expert. [Emphasis added.]
Despite his express reservations, Maxfield and petitioners did
not hire an independent appraiser or expert, or otherwise
independently verify the "facts" as represented in the offering
memoranda.

Reflecting on his own decision to invest, Maxfield

testified:

"[I]f I would have asked the right questions, I

wouldn't have made the investment."

- 58 We find that petitioners' purported reliance on Maxfield was
not reasonable, not in good faith, nor based upon full
disclosure.

Maxfield's expertise was in taxation, not plastics

materials or plastics recycling.

He never represented to anyone

at Sann & Howe that he knew anything about plastics recycling or
plastics materials, and petitioners never had reason to believe
otherwise.

In addition, Maxfield never purported to be an expert

in tax shelters and stressed that he was not an investment
analyst.

Maxfield viewed his role in the matter as nothing more

than "a conveyor of information and of * * *[his] impressions",
and he "made it very clear to each of the potential investors
[that it was] their business decision [to make], not * * *
[his]."
The purported value of the Sentinel EPE recycler generated
the deductions and credits in these cases.

That circumstance was

reflected in the offering memoranda, and Maxfield also explained
the tax benefits to petitioners.

Accordingly, petitioners

learned or should have learned of the nature of the tax benefits
from the offering materials or Maxfield or both.23

However,

neither Maxfield, petitioners, nor anyone else at Sann & Howe

23

It is not plausible that such experienced and sophisticated
attorneys as petitioners remained ignorant of the nature of the
tax benefits. If such was the case, their ignorance could only
be explained by (1) their failure to read the offering memoranda,
and (2) their failure to listen to Maxfield when he explained the
tax benefits to them.

- 59 independently confirmed the value of the Sentinel EPE recycler.
Maxfield relied on the offering memoranda, and in particular the
reports of Ulanoff and Burstein, for the value of the machines.
He related this to petitioners and cautioned them that the only
way to know if the representations made in the offering memoranda
were true would be to hire an independent appraiser or expert.
In the end, petitioners and Maxfield relied on insiders
and/or financially interested persons for the value of the
Sentinel EPE recyclers and the economic viability of the
Partnership transactions.

See Vojticek v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1995-444, to the effect that advice from such persons "is
better classified as sales promotion."

As petitioners knew or

certainly should have learned, Maxfield had no education, special
qualifications, or professional skills or experience in plastics
engineering, plastics recycling, or plastics materials.

A

taxpayer may rely upon his adviser's expertise, but it is not
reasonable or prudent to rely upon an adviser regarding matters
outside of his field of expertise or with respect to facts that
he does not verify.

See David v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d at 789-

790; Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d at 408; Skeen v.
Commissioner, 864 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1989), affg. Patin v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1086 (1987); Lax v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-329; Sacks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-217;
Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-619.

- 60 4.

Miscellaneous

The parties in these consolidated cases stipulated that the
fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler in 1981 and up to
the end of 1982 was not in excess of $50,000.

Notwithstanding

this concession, petitioners contend that they were reasonable in
claiming credits on their Federal income tax returns based upon
each recycler's having a value of $1,162,666.

In support of this

position, petitioners submitted into evidence preliminary reports
prepared for respondent by Ernest D. Carmagnola (Carmagnola), the
president of Professional Plastic Associates.

Carmagnola had

been retained by the IRS in 1984 to evaluate the Sentinel EPE and
EPS recyclers in light of what he described as "the fantastic
values placed on the [recyclers] by the owners."

Based on

limited information available to him at that time, Carmagnola
preliminarily estimated that the value of the Sentinel EPE
recycler was $250,000.

However, after additional information

became available to him, Carmagnola concluded in a signed
affidavit, dated March 16, 1993, that the machines actually had a
fair market value of not more than $50,000 each in the Fall of
1981.
We accord no weight to the Carmagnola reports submitted by
petitioners.

The projected valuations therein were based on

inadequate information, research, and investigation, and were
subsequently rejected and discredited by their author.

In one

- 61 preliminary report, Carmagnola states that he has "a serious
concern of actual profit" of a Sentinel EPE recycler and that to
determine whether the machines actually could be profitable, he
required additional information from PI.

Carmagnola also

indicates that in preparing the report, he did not have
information available concerning research and development costs
of the machines and that he estimated those costs in his
valuations of the machines.
Respondent rejected the Carmagnola reports and considered
them unsatisfactory for any purpose.

There is no indication in

the records that respondent used them as a basis for any
determinations in the notices of deficiency.

Even so, counsel

for petitioners obtained copies of these reports and urge that
they support the reasonableness of the values reported on
petitioners' returns.

Not surprisingly, petitioners' counsel did

not call Carmagnola to testify in these cases, but preferred
instead to rely solely upon his preliminary, ill-founded
valuation estimates.

(Carmagnola has not been called to testify

in any of the Plastics Recycling cases before us).

The

Carmagnola reports were a part of the record considered by this
Court and reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in the Provizer case, where we held the taxpayers negligent.
Consistent therewith, we find in these cases, as we have found
previously, that the reports prepared by Carmagnola are

- 62 unreliable and of no consequence.

Petitioners are not relieved

of the negligence additions to tax based on the preliminary
reports prepared by Carmagnola.
Petitioners submitted into the records of their cases a
group of reports or updates as evidence that they monitored their
investments in the Partnerships.

A computer printout dated May

7, 1982, indicated that each of Empire's seven recyclers had been
shipped to various end-users.

Subsequent computer printouts,

dated August 20 and September 30, 1982, indicated that only four
machines were running and, contrary to the earlier printout, one
machine had not been shipped.

In a letter to Roberts dated

February 18, 1983, Bambara explained that "market prices for
polyethylene resin have remained relatively low" and "operations
of the machines * * * have not been profitable."

Roberts

forwarded this letter to the limited partners approximately 2 ½
months later on May 9, 1983.

Also, a review of the accounting

procedures relating to the recycling operations conducted by a
certified public accounting firm is among the documents submitted
into the records in these cases by petitioners.
These documents do not convince us that petitioners closely
monitored their investments in the Partnerships.

Roberts

forwarded the August 10, 1982 computer printout to petitioners on
August 25, 1982, several weeks before Foam closed.

It indicated

that no recycled material had been collected from three of the

- 63 four machines in operation.

Two other machines, which had been

shipped to their respective end-users at least 3 months earlier
had not yet been hooked up.

Although an end-user apparently had

been awaiting Empire's last recycler for at least 3 months, as
indicated by the May 7 and August 10 printouts, the recycler had
not yet been shipped.

The information in the August 10 update

and the other progress reports submitted by petitioners raised
serious questions with respect to the demand for the Sentinel EPE
recyclers, the demand for recycled plastic pellets, and the
responsiveness of PI.

Nonetheless, petitioners all invested in

Foam, through Jabrilach Recycling, in 1982 without further
investigation.

Petitioners have failed to establish that they

monitored their investments closely.

They cannot reasonably be

relieved of the negligence additions to tax on the ground of
alleged attentiveness to their investments as they have not
established such attentiveness, either before or after they made
the investments.
Petitioners cite a number of cases in support of their
positions, but primarily rely on Durrett v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d
515 (5th Cir. 1996), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo.
1994-179; Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 66 F.3d 729 (5th Cir.
1995), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1994-228;
Anderson v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1995), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1993-607; Mollen v. United States, 72 AFTR 2d 93-6443,

- 64 93-2 USTC par. 50,585 (D. Ariz. 1993); Daoust v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1994-203; and Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989607.
This Court rejected the negligence additions to tax in the
Davis and Daoust cases for reasons inapposite to the facts of
petitioners' cases.

The taxpayers in the Davis case reasonably

relied upon a "trusted and long-term adviser" who was independent
of the investment venture, and the offering materials reviewed by
the taxpayers did not reflect that the principals in the venture
lacked experience in the pertinent line of business.

In

contrast, petitioners purport to have relied on Maxfield, a
recently hired colleague contemplating a similar investment.
Maxfield acted as a conveyor of information and of his
impressions, not as an adviser with expertise in plastics
recycling, and he made it clear to petitioners and others at Sann
& Howe that it was each individual's own business decision to
make, not his.

In addition, the offering memoranda warned that

the Partnerships had no prior operating history and that the
general partner had no prior experience in marketing recycling or
similar equipment.
The Daoust case involved a cattle breeding venture that this
Court had previously held lacked economic substance and a
business purpose.

See Rasmussen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1992-212 (where we also held the taxpayers negligent because,
inter alia, they relied solely on representations made in the

- 65 offering memorandum and persons having a financial connection
with the investment).

In the Daoust case, we declined to sustain

the negligence additions to tax because the taxpayer husband,
whose family had some history in farming, reasonably relied upon
the advice of two qualified independent investment advisers and
an independent certified public accountant, who also was the
taxpayer husband's brother.

In the cases before us, petitioners

relied on Maxfield, who disclosed that he relied on the offering
materials and persons connected to the investments for the value
of the machines and economic viability of the Partnership
transactions.

We find that the facts of petitioners' cases more

closely resemble the facts in the Rasmussen case than the Daoust
case.

Petitioners' reliance on the Davis and Daoust cases is

misplaced.
In Mollen, the taxpayer was a medical doctor who specialized
in diabetes and who, on behalf of the Arizona Medical
Association, led a continuing medical education (CME)
accreditation program for local hospitals.

The underlying tax

matter involved the taxpayer's investment in Diabetics CME Group,
Ltd., a limited partnership that invested in the production,
marketing, and distribution of medical educational video tapes.
The District Court found that the taxpayer's personal expertise
and insight in the underlying investment gave him reason to
believe it would be economically profitable.

Although the

taxpayer was not experienced in business or tax matters, he did

- 66 consult with an accountant and a tax lawyer regarding those
matters.

Moreover, the District Court noted that the propriety

of the taxpayer's disallowed deduction therein was "reasonably
debatable."

Id. at 93-6447, 93-2 USTC par. 50,585, at 89,895;

see Zfass v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-167.
In contrast, petitioners in these cases did not have any
personal insight or industry know-how in plastics recycling that
would reasonably lead them to believe that the Plastics Recycling
transactions would be economically profitable.

Although Sann

spoke to client contacts in the oil business about the price of
oil, he understood that they could only speculate about the
direction of the price of oil.

Moreover, petitioners' purported

adviser, Maxfield, advised the members of Sann & Howe that the
relationship between the price of the recycled pellets and the
price of oil was a negative aspect of the investment.
Petitioners and Maxfield relied upon the offering materials and
persons with an interest in the Plastics Recycling transactions.
Accordingly, we consider petitioners' arguments with respect to
the Mollen case inapplicable under the circumstances of these
cases.
Petitioners' arguments are not supported by Anderson v.
Commissioner, supra, where the taxpayers were found liable for
the negligence additions to tax.

In Anderson, the taxpayers

claimed tax benefits based upon their acquisition of property
listed at $124,500, for which they actually paid $6,225 in a cash

- 67 downpayment (5 percent of the purchase price) plus a 5-year
financing arrangement.

Had the acquisition been nothing more

than a $6,225 passive investment in an ongoing business, noted
the Court of Appeals, it would have been reasonable for the
taxpayers to rely on the advice of a good friend who had
thoroughly investigated the investment.24

However, because the

transaction was structured and represented as a purchase in the
amount of $124,500, the Court of Appeals held that something more
was required.
In the cases before us, petitioners claimed tax benefits
based on the assumption that they owned and leased, through the
Partnerships, an interest in $20,927,98825 worth of recycling
machines in 1981 and 1982.

Based on total investments ranging

from $6,250 to $93,750 in 1981 alone, petitioners each claimed
qualified investments in new investment credit property with
bases ranging from $52,997 to $784,496.26

These inflated bases

generated claims to first-year tax credits in 1981 ranging from
$8,156 to $156,900, and claims to deductible losses ranging from

24

The adviser had his accountant and attorney review and check
out the structure of the investment; he spoke with the investment
principal; he looked into the principal's background and checked
out his references, banks, other business connections, and the
Better Business Bureau; and he spoke with competitors to make
sure the venture was viable.
25

Eighteen recyclers (4 owned by Foam, 7 each by Empire and
Plymouth) each valued at $1,162,666 totals $20,927,988.
26

The basis figures were derived from petitioners' 1981 Forms
3468, Schedule B, Computation of Business Energy Investment
Credit.

- 68 $4,503 to $67,156.

Clearly these were substantial transactions

requiring careful investigation under the Anderson case.

Unlike

the adviser in Anderson, neither Maxfield nor petitioners
thoroughly investigated or educated themselves in the industry of
the proposed investment.

In view of the substantial basis

claimed for the interest of each petitioner in the machinery (in
each case a substantial amount greater than the cash invested),
from which the investment credits stemmed, plainly something more
was required.

Accordingly, we consider petitioners' reliance on

the Anderson case inappropriate.
Petitioners' reliance on the Durrett and Chamberlain cases
is also misplaced.

In those cases, the Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit reversed this Court's imposition of the negligence
additions to tax in two nonplastics recycling cases.

The

taxpayers in the Durrett and Chamberlain cases were among
thousands who invested in the First Western tax shelter program
involving alleged straddle transactions of forward contracts.

In

the Durrett and Chamberlain cases, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the taxpayers reasonably relied upon
professional advice concerning tax matters.

In other First

Western cases, however, the Courts of Appeals have affirmed
decisions of this Court imposing negligence additions to tax.
See Foulds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-489 (the welleducated taxpayer failed to establish the substance of advice,
and the purported adviser lacked tax expertise), affd. without

- 69 published opinion 94 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 1996); Chakales v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-408 (reliance on long-term adviser,
who was a tax attorney and accountant, and who in turn relied on
a promoter of the venture, held unreasonable), affd. 79 F.3d 726
(8th Cir. 1996); Kozlowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-430
(reliance on adviser held unreasonable absent a showing that the
adviser understood the transaction and was qualified to give an
opinion whether it was bona fide), affd. without published
opinion 70 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1995); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89
T.C. at 849 (reliance on tax advice given by attorneys and
C.P.A.'s held unreasonable absent a showing that the taxpayers
consulted any experts regarding the bona fides of the
transactions).
The records in the cases before us fail to establish that
Maxfield possessed sufficient knowledge of the plastics or
recycling industries to render a competent opinion.27

This fact

has been deemed relevant by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the court to which appeal in these cases lies.

See

David v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d at 789-790 (taxpayers' reliance on
expert advice not reasonable where expert lacks knowledge of

27

As explained in more detail above, Maxfield relied upon the
representations in the offering memoranda and the reports of
Ulanoff and Burstein for the value of the Sentinel EPE recycler,
which generated the tax benefits in these cases. He did not
independently confirm such representations and, recognizing this,
told the members of Sann & Howe that the only way to confirm the
fair market value of a Sentinel recycler would be to hire an
independent expert or appraiser.

- 70 business in which taxpayers invested); Goldman v. Commissioner,
39 F.3d at 408 (same).

Accordingly, petitioners will not be

relieved of the negligence additions to tax based upon the
decisions in the Durrett and Chamberlain cases by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.28
5.

Conclusion as to Negligence

Under the circumstances of these consolidated cases,
petitioners failed to exercise due care in claiming large
deductions and tax credits with respect to the Partnerships on
their Federal income tax returns.

It was not reasonable for

petitioners to rely on the offering memoranda, insiders to the
transactions, or Maxfield.

Maxfield acted as a conveyor of

information and of his impressions, not an investment analyst,
and he stressed that the decision to invest rested with each
individual and not with him.

He explained the tax benefits to

petitioners, although these benefits also were clearly explained
in the offering memoranda.

Maxfield disclosed that he was

relying on the offering materials for the value of the Sentinel
EPE recycler, and that he did not know whether the
representations therein were true.

He mentioned that the only

way to confirm the purported value of the recyclers was to hire

28

Other cases cited by petitioners are inapplicable and
distinguishable for the following general, nonexclusive reasons:
(1) They involve far less sophisticated, if not unsophisticated,
taxpayers; (2) the reasonableness of the respective taxpayers'
reliance on expert advice was established in those cases on
grounds that do not exist here; and (3) the advice given was
within the adviser's area of expertise.

- 71 an independent appraiser or expert, but his suggestion went
unheeded.
Sann acknowledged that he relied "to a large extent,
probably too much, on the contents of the offering memorandum and
the expert opinions" appended thereto.

Addington did little more

than discuss the investment with Maxfield.

Cohn reviewed the

offering materials and spoke with others at Sann & Howe.
Petitioners and Maxfield did not in good faith investigate the
fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler, or the underlying
viability, financial structure, and economics of the Partnership
transactions.

Their reliance on the offering materials and

interested persons was not reasonable.

In Cohn's words, "how

could we be so stupid * * * it certainly was mea culpa time."

We

hold, upon consideration of the entire records, that petitioners
are liable for the negligence additions to tax under section
6653(a)(1) and (2) for the taxable years at issue.

Respondent is

sustained on this issue.
C.

Section 6659--Valuation Overstatement
In all six notices of deficiency, respondent determined that

petitioners were liable for the section 6659 addition to tax on
the portions of their respective underpayments attributable to
valuation overstatement.

Petitioners have the burden of proving

that respondent's determinations of the section 6659 additions to
tax in their cases are erroneous.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 860-861.

Rule 142(a); Luman v.

- 72 A graduated addition to tax is imposed when an individual
has an underpayment of tax that equals or exceeds $1,000 and "is
attributable to" a valuation overstatement.

Sec. 6659(a), (d).

A valuation overstatement exists if the fair market value (or
adjusted basis) of property claimed on a return equals or exceeds
150 percent of the amount determined to be the correct amount.
Sec. 6659(c).

If the claimed valuation exceeds 250 percent of

the correct value, the addition is equal to 30 percent of the
underpayment.

Sec. 6659(b).

Petitioners claimed tax benefits, including investment tax
credits and business energy credits, based on purported values of
$1,162,666 for each Sentinel EPE recycler.

Petitioners concede

that the fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler in 1981 and
up to the end of 1982 was not in excess of $50,000.

Therefore,

if disallowance of petitioners' claimed tax benefits is
attributable to such valuation overstatements, petitioners are
liable for the section 6659 additions to tax at the rate of 30
percent of the underpayments of tax attributable to the tax
benefits claimed with respect to the Partnerships.
Petitioners contend that section 6659 does not apply in
their cases for the following three reasons:

(1) Disallowance of

the claimed tax benefits was attributable to other than a
valuation overstatement; (2) petitioners' concessions of the
claimed tax benefits preclude imposition of the section 6659
additions to tax; and (3) respondent erroneously failed to waive

- 73 the section 6659 additions to tax.

We reject each of these

arguments for reasons set forth below.
1.

The Grounds For Petitioners' Underpayments

Section 6659 does not apply to underpayments of tax that are
not "attributable to" valuation overstatements.

See McCrary v.

Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 827; Todd v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 912
(1987), affd. 862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988).

To the extent

taxpayers claim tax benefits that are disallowed on grounds
separate and independent from alleged valuation overstatements,
the resulting underpayments of tax are not regarded as
attributable to valuation overstatements.

Krause v.

Commissioner, 99 T.C. at 178 (citing Todd v. Commissioner,
supra).

However, when valuation is an integral factor in

disallowing deductions and credits, section 6659 is applicable.
See Illes v. Commissioner, 982 F.2d 163, 167 (6th Cir. 1992),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1991-449; Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143,
151 (2d Cir. 1991) (the section 6659 addition to tax applies if a
finding of lack of economic substance is "due in part" to a
valuation overstatement), affg. T.C. Memo. 1989-684; Masters v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-197, affd. without published
opinion 70 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1995); Harness v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1991-321.
Petitioners argue that the disallowance of the claimed tax
benefits was not "attributable to" a valuation overstatement.
According to petitioners, the tax benefits were disallowed

- 74 because the Partnership transactions lacked economic substance,
not because of any valuation overstatements.

It follows,

petitioners reason, that because the "attributable to" language
of section 6659 requires a direct causative relationship between
a valuation overstatement and an underpayment in tax, section
6659 cannot apply to their deficiencies.

Petitioners cite the

following cases to support this argument:

Heasley v.

Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990), revg. T.C. Memo.
1988-408; Gainer v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1990),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1988-416; McCrary v. Commissioner, supra; and
Todd v. Commissioner, supra.
Petitioners' argument rests on the mistaken premise that our
holding herein that the Partnership transactions lacked economic
substance was separate and independent from the overvaluation of
the Sentinel EPE recyclers.

To the contrary, in holding that the

Partnership transactions lacked economic substance, we relied
heavily upon the overvaluation of the recyclers.

Overvaluation

of the recyclers was an integral factor in regard to:

(1) The

disallowed tax credits and other benefits in these cases; (2) the
underpayments of tax; and (3) our finding that the Partnership
transactions lacked economic substance.
Petitioners argue that in Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1992-177, we found that the Clearwater transaction lacked
economic substance for reasons independent of the valuation
reported in that case.

According to petitioners, the purported

- 75 value of the recyclers in the Clearwater transaction was
predicated upon a projected stream of royalty income, and this
Court merely rejected the taxpayer's valuation method.
Petitioners misread and distort our Provizer opinion.

In the

Provizer case, overvaluation of the Sentinel EPE recyclers,
irrespective of the technique employed by the taxpayers in their
efforts to justify the overvaluation, was the dominant factor
that led us to hold that the Clearwater transaction lacked
economic substance.

Likewise, overvaluation of the Sentinel EPE

recyclers in these cases is the ground for our holding herein
that the Partnership transactions lacked economic substance.
Moreover, a virtually identical argument was recently
rejected in Gilman v. Commissioner, supra, by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court to which appeal in
these cases would lie.

See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742,

756-758 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).

In the

Gilman case, the taxpayers engaged in a computer equipment sale
and leaseback transaction that this Court held was a sham
transaction lacking economic substance.

The taxpayers therein,

citing Todd v. Commissioner, supra, and Heasley v. Commissioner,
supra, argued that their underpayment of taxes derived from
nonrecognition of the transaction for lack of economic substance,
independent of any overvaluation.

The Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit sustained imposition of the section 6659 addition
to tax because overvaluation of the computer equipment

- 76 contributed directly to this Court's earlier conclusion that the
transaction lacked economic substance and was a sham.
Commissioner, supra at 151.

Gilman v.

In addition, the Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit agreed with this Court and with the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that "'when an underpayment
stems from disallowed * * * investment credits due to lack of
economic substance, the deficiency is * * * subject to the
penalty under section 6659.'"

Gilman v. Commissioner, supra at

151 (quoting Massengill v. Commissioner, 876 F.2d 616, 619-620
(8th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1988-427); see also Rybak v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. at 566-567; Zirker v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
970, 978-979 (1986); Donahue v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991181, affd. without published opinion 959 F.2d 234 (6th Cir.
1992), affd. sub nom. Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893
(6th Cir. 1993).
Petitioners' reliance on Gainer v. Commissioner, supra, Todd
v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 912 (1987), and McCrary v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. at 827, is misplaced.

In those cases, in contrast to the

consolidated cases herein, it was found that a valuation
overstatement did not contribute to an underpayment of taxes.

In

the Todd and Gainer cases, the underpayments were due exclusively
to the fact that the property in each case had not been placed in
service.

In the McCrary case, the underpayments were deemed to

result from a concession that the agreement at issue was a
license and not a lease.

Although property was overvalued in

- 77 each of those cases, the overvaluations were not the grounds on
which the taxpayers' liability was sustained.

In contrast, "a

different situation exists where a valuation overstatement * * *
is an integral part of or is inseparable from the ground found
for disallowance of an item."
859.

McCrary v. Commissioner, supra at

Petitioners' cases present just such a "different

situation":

overvaluation of the recyclers was integral to and

inseparable from petitioners' claimed tax benefits and our
holding that the Partnership transactions lacked economic
substance.29
2.

Concession of the Deficiency

Petitioners argue that their concessions of the deficiencies
preclude imposition of the section 6659 additions to tax.
Petitioners contend that their concessions render any inquiry
into the grounds for such deficiencies moot.

Absent such

inquiry, petitioners argue that it cannot be known if their
underpayments were attributable to a valuation overstatement or
other discrepancy.

29

Without a finding that a valuation

To the extent that Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380
(5th Cir. 1990), revg. T.C. Memo. 1988-408, merely represents an
application of Todd v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 912 (1987), affd.
862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988), we consider it distinguishable. To
the extent that the reversal in the Heasley case is based on a
concept that where an underpayment derives from the disallowance
of a transaction for lack of economic substance, the underpayment
cannot be attributable to an overvaluation, this Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have disagreed. See
Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The
lack of economic substance was due in part to the overvaluation,
and thus th

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