# RONALD,AND SUSAN ROSENBLATT, Petitioners v .

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## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

RONALD,AND SUSAN ROSENBLATT, Petitioners v .
COMMISSION .R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Responden t

Docket No . 17002-06S .

Filed

October

30,

2008 .

Elizabeth Opalkaj and Suzanne Meiners-Levy , for petitioners .

RUWE,

Judge : Ths case was'heard pursuant to the provisions

of section ~7463 ofthe internal Revenue Code in effect when the
petition was filed .' ursuant to section 7463(b), the decisio n

1 Unless otherwis indicated, all .section,references are t o
the Internal Revenue C de in effect . for the .years in issue, and
all Rule references ar to the Tax Court Rules of Practice an d

Procedure .

SERVE W OCT 3 0 2008

- 2 to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this
opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case .
Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners' Federal
income taxes of $33,583 and $20,684 and section 6662 accuracyrelated penalties of $6,716 .60 and $4,136 .80 for the taxable
years 2.002 and 2003, respectively . The issues for decision are :2
(1) Whether petitioners' aircraft activity during 2002 and 2003
was engaged in for profit within the meaning of section 183 ; (2)
whether petitioners are entitled to deductions for worthless
stock and bad debts incurred in 2002 ; and (3) .whether petitioners
are liable for section 6662 accuracy-related penalties for 2002
and 2003 . 3

2 Before trial, petitioners' counsel submitted to the Court
a document entitled "Petitioners' Consolidated Pre-Trial Motion",
which the Court treated as petitioners' pretrial memorandum . At
trial, petitioners' counsel requested that the Court treat part
of their pretrial memorandum as a motion for partial summary
judgment (motion) . The Court obliged the request but,hdenied the
motion and declined to rule on petitioners' counsel's request to
shift the burden of proof . Petitioners failed to pursue some of
the arguments made in their motion at trial or in their posttrial briefs . Accordingly, we deem those arguments to have been
abandoned and will decide only the issues that petitioners'
counsel disputed in their posttrial briefs . See Nicklaus v .
Commissioner , 117 T .C . 117, 120 n .4 (2001) .
Respondent also determined that petitioners' itemized
deductions should be decreased by $2,534 in 2002 and $2,052 in
2003 . These are computational adjustments that depend on our
disposition of the other issues in this case .

3 Backgroun d
Some'facts'have been stipulated and are~so found . The
stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated
by this reference . t the time : of filing the petition,
petitioners resided n Iowa .
Ronald Rosenbla t '(petitioner) is a graduate of'Columbia
University with a ba helor's . degree in art history, a minor i n

economics, and"a master's of art . Petitioner also holds a Ph .D .
in economics .from,the University of'Idaho . Petitioner work-ed'as
a professor and taugh economics for 7 years after he received
his Ph . D' .''
In 2002, petitio er was employed by Principal Residential
Mortgage ; Inc . (PRM), a subsidiary of`Principal Financial Group .
Petitioner' directly m naged°°six or seven people . Indirectly, he
managed approximately 500 people . Petitioner- .worked
approximately 50 hour' pe'rweek`in 2002, and he spent,most of his
work week in the offi es of PRM in downtown Des Moines- . Most°of
petitioner's incomea '2002 came from his position .at PRM .
Between 2002 and 003, -PRM .'"sold the division that petitioner
managed to American Ho e Mortgage (AHM) . In 2003, petitioner was
employed by AHM as an xecutive vice president of sales support
and development . Peti ioner's work hours and responsibilitie s

did not change very mu h between .2002 and 2003' . Petitioner Susa n
Rosenblatt (Mrs . Rosen latt) is an anchor reporter for the, local .

- 4 FOX news network in Des Moines, Iowa . Petitioners reported wages
on their Federal income tax-returns in excess of $593,000 for
2002 and $742,000 for 200 1 .
Petitioner always had an . interest in flying . Petitioner had
been interested in being a pilot since .his youth . In 1965, when
petitioner graduated from high school, he had an appointment to
the Air Force Academy, and he intended to become an Air Force
pilot . However, petitioner did not attend the Air Force Academy
because,his eyesight did not meet the requirements for him to
train as a pilot .
Petitioners' daughter Katie received flight instruction from
Executive One Aviation (EOA),

.beginning in 2001 . In the fall of

2001, petitioner also began taking flight training lessons from
EOA . On June 6, 2002, petitioner formed KAR RRR Aviation
Leasing, LLC (KAR RRR) . Mrs . Rosenblatt purchased a one-half
interest in KAR RRR on September 30, 2002 . Before Mrs .
Rosenblatt became a member of KAR RRR, petitioner was the sole
member, and they were the only two members thereafter .' Aside
from petitioners, KAR RRR had no employees .

' Petitioners apparently accounted for the aircraft activity
as a sole proprietorship on a Schedule C, Profit or Loss From
Business, until Mrs . Rosenblatt became a member of KAR RRR in
2002 . Thereafter, petitioners accounted for the aircraft
activity as a partnership on a Schedule E, Supplemental Income
and Loss .

In June 2002 ,

AR RRR purchased a Cessna~172 R (N3529D )

aircraft .( Cessna)`f om,EOA . Petitioner has never been a license d
pilot . Before the Cessna was purchased, petitioner had n o
experience in the'av ation industry other than being a "frequent
flyer" .

.Petitioner

escribed his decision to purchase- the Cessn a

"as a way of having

good new plane upon which to learn, and as

a way of starting a

ew business with the'plane .

KAR RRR finance
Petitioners paid 10

the Cessna with Cessna Finance Corp . (CFC) .

M ercent of the purchase price for the Cessna

as a down payment, a . d KAR RRR financed $144,350, the,balance'of
the purchase price f r the Cessna, through CFC . Petitione r
personally guarantee,

the loan from CFC to KAR RRR . The .Cessna

was hangared at Anke; y Regional Airport in Ankeny, Iowa .

On May 6, 2002,

before petitioner purchased the Cessna, EO A

provided a written projection of net income to petitioners
related to a purchase and leaseback of a Cessna . EOA projected
that if the Cessna wa rented out for 700 hours per year at $95
per Hobbs hour,' it c uld potentially generate $66,500 in gross
receipts .6 After sub racting expenses for insurance, hangar,
fuel, maintenance, on ine reserve, and management fees totalin g

5 A Hobbs meter ils .a device used to measure the amount of
time an'aircraft is operation .

6-Petitioners .had actual, gross receipts fromthe aircraft
activity of $21',645 i 2002 and $31,865 in 2003 .

- 6 $44,725 ,

EOA projected a net income of $21, 775 on a leaseback by

EOA of the Cessna .

Petitioner did not produce any other forma l

business , plan for KAR RRR . 7
EOA's projection did not include , finance expenses,
co mm issions ,
depreciation .
aircraft

legal and professional services expenses, :or
Reported expenses for petitioners '

2002 and 2003

activity were as follows :
2002 Expense s

Deductions
Repairs and
maintenanc e
Interest
Depreciation
(and sec . 179 )
Commissions
(and fees )
Fuel
Hangar
Insurance
Miscellaneous
Legal and professional
service s
Management fees
Total

Schedule C

Schedule E

Tota l

$1,210

$2,146

$3,35 6

1,777
73,447

1,777
5,924

3,55 4
79,37 1

1,595

1,160

; 2,75 5

3,513
375
2,495
-3,100

2,385
375
2,709
39

5,89 8
75 0
5,20 4
39
3,10 0

2,087
89,599

-16,515

2,08 7
106,11 4

Petitioner testified that he "worked off *

* *'[a] pro

forma and * * * [his] own notes about marketing and so on" and
that those materials indicated that, "given a certain, ; number of
hours per month of * * * lease that it would be profitable ."
Petitioner's "pro forma" and marketing notes were not offered
into evidence .
!p,

l

Repairs and aintenance $8,739
Interest
5,942, .
Depreciation (and 35,882
sec . 179 )
Commissions and fees) 4,282
Fuel
6,203
Hangar
1,500
Insurance
10,762
Miscellaneou
906
Legal and pr fessional .
1,50 0
service s
Instruction
591
Total
76,30 7
On June 14, 200, KAR RRR, CFC, and EOA entered into a .

"Consent to Lease"Agreement " ( lease agreement ), related to th e
Cessna . CFC require the lease agreement as a condition
precedent to obtaini g financing on the Cessna because the Cessna
would be rented out o the general public . Under the leas e
agreement, KAR RRR was designated the "Lessor" and .EOA was,
designated the "Lessee" . The lease agreement stated in pertinent
part : "Neither Lesso [KAR RRR] nor Lessee

lease the * * *

.[EOA] shall furthe r

[Cess "-a] or assign the Lease . without firs t

obtaining the prior w itten consent of CFC ,

which consent may be

withheld at the sole iscretion of CFC . "
KAR RRR and EOA lso entered i nto an " Aircraft Marketing
Agreement " ( marketing agreement ),
which stated as folio s :,

drafted by Advocate Consulting,

.

.
AIRCRAFT .MARKETI G AGREEMENT
This agreement, ade .on .this 14th day of . June, 2002 by .,
and between KAR RR Aviation Leasing, LLC ., hereinafter

- 8
referred to as the Owner, and * * *
referred to as the Agent .

[EOAJ,

hereinafter

WITNESSET H
WHEREAS, Owner is the owner of one (1) Cessna 172R,
Registration Number N3529D ;
WHEREAS, Agent in the ordinary course of business
develops relationships with prospective customers for
owner seeking to rent aircraft ;
i
WHEREAS, Agent is willing to serve as marketing and
compliance agent on a ,non-exclusive basis upon the
terms and conditions herein set forth .
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
covenants and agreements herein contained, the parties
hereto do hereby agree as follows ;
1) Aircraft : Owner hereby authorizes Agent to
serve as a nonexclusive marketer for the aircraft
outlined on Exhibit A .
2) Terms of Agreement : The term of this agreement
shall be for a period of seven (7) days commencing on
the date hereof, and automatically renew each seven (7)
days thereafter . This agreement shall be subject to
termination by either the Owner or Agent for any reason
whatsoever upon five (5) days advance written notice
given to the other party .

3) The aircraft will be based at the Ankeny
Airport, and the owner will assume all responsibility
for storage fees in the amount of $125 .- per month for
heated, community hangar space .
4) Owner has had the aircraft inspected b y
[EOA], verifying that the aircraft meets the standards
required by the Federal Aviation Regulations and that a
valid Airworthiness Certificate exists in respect
thereto, and that all other requirements and paperwork
are in good order and effect .
5) The fees payable by Owner to Agent for the
rental of said aircraft shall be calculated at the rate
of 15% of the gross Hobbs rental charge . At the start
of this agreement, said hourly rate shall be $90'..00,

11

- 9 and may be adj sted with approval of both parties . The
rent shall b .e aid within ten days after the end o f
each calendar onth, based upon the hours rented during
each prior mon h . . Agent agrees to waive charges for'
the use of the aircraft by Owner : .. Owner agrees to
follow scheduling procedures established by Agent for
the reservat'io s of aircraft . and to return aircraft
with full fuel to the Agent .
6) Owner s
satisfactorily
thereby meeting
Aviation Admin i

all maintain the aircraft t o
etain its airworthiness certificate
the requirements of the Federal
tration .

7) .Owner s
fuel, oil, lubr
the .operation . o
by Agent to Own
cents below the
all shop labor
current list an
cost, plus frei
required & rout
* * * [EOA] mai
to Owner .

all furnish at their own expense all
cants and other materials necessary fo r

8) Renters
12 hours total
Approved Curren
this aircraft .
this aircraft s
all times .

force and effect
shall be writte n
parties and nami
Lienholder as in
of the Owner, Ag
risk is covered
the Owner shal l

said aircraft . Fuel shall be price d
r at the leaseback-rate of twenty (20)
then current retail . rate . In addition
hall be priced at $5 per'hour belo w
parts shall : be charged at 15% above
ht or other added charges . Al l
ne maintenance may be performed by the
tenance facility without prior notic e

shall-be required at a minimum to have
ime plus a sign-off from an FA A

Flight Instructor in order to solo
Other than for maintenance down time ,
all . be available .for scheduled rent a t

at their own expense . Such insuranc e
by an underwriter satisfactory to all
g the Owner, Agent and Curren t
ured, and shall protect the interest s

nt and Current Lienholder . If'the
y the insurance policy of the Agent,
repay Agent'the amount , of suc h
insurance at th e first of each calendar month and Agent
shall provide Ow er evidence of such Insurance coverage-in force and sat sfactory,to the Owner and Current Lien
holder . Agent s all be responsible for deductible if
the aircraft is
amaged while hangared at * * * [EOA] ,
if such damage i
caused by an * * * [EOA] employee o r
by a customer re ting the aircraft through * * *. [EOA] .

- 10 -

10) The term of this agreement shall be 5 years,
commencing on the below mentioned execution date . '
Owner may terminate this agreement for any reason upon
thirty (30) days written notice to Agent .
lu
Petitioner provided documents (logs) indicating his
'l
involvement with KAR RRR during 2002 and 2003 . These logs sho w
that petitioner spent approximately 197 .058 and 208 .25 hours o n
KAR RRR activities in 2002 and 2003, respectively .9 Petitione r
prepared these logs himself, though he admits they are!''
incomplete . Much of the time reflected in petitioner's .. logs
represents time during which he participated in flight
instruction, ground school, and test flights .
Petitioners relied on the services of EOA for taking
reservations for the Cessna, providing storage for the'iCessna,
and providing : licensed flight instructors to fly the Cessna . The
customers who rented the Cessna did not enter into written leas e
II'
agreements, but they did sign a document ensuring that the peopl e
who flew the Cessna were licensed pilots . These agreements were
maintained by EOA . The people who flew the Cessna included both
flight instruction students and private pilots . KAR RRR's Cessn a

8 The total time on petitioner's log for 2002 is listed as
191 .3 hours but actually adds up to 197 .05 hours .
The logs separate petitioner's "Business Time" and "Travel
Time" spent on KAR RRR . In 2002, petitioner's log reflects 52 .75
hours of travel time and 144 .3 hours of business time .` In 2003,
petitioner's log reflects 41 hours of travel time and 167 .2 5
hours of business time .

- 11
was one of three o r four aircraft available to rent at•the_ .Ankeny
Regional Airport-in 2002 . and 2003 .
Benefit Techn o ogies, Inc . •(BTI), is a research and

development business specializing in full flexible benefit plan s
for small to midsiz e
founder of BTI and ils still actively involved with BTI . BTI '
filed for chapte r

ankruptcy .protection in February 2001,'

shortly after BTI d e aulted on a $250,000 interest payment to a
venture capital fir m on January 15, 2001 . Sometime after filin g
for bankruptcy, . BTI '

bankruptcy proceedings were converted from

chapter 7 to chapte r

11 .

Petitioner own e

.

BTI stock, lent money to BTI', and served o n

BTI's board of direc
BTI . Petitioner wa s

having attended occaIional board meetings . Petitioners claime d
2002 relating to the alleged worthlessness
d loans that :petitioner made to BTI .
Discussio n

Generally, the ommissione•r's determinations in a notice of
deficiency are presumed correct, and the,taxpayer'bears the
burden . of proving that the determinate ns are incorrect . "Rule

- 12 I .

Claimed Losses From Aircraft Activit y
Pursuant to section 183(b), deductions with respect to an

activity "not engaged in for profit!' generally are limited to the
amount of gross income derived from such activity . Section
183(c) defines an activity not engaged in for profit as ; ;"any
activity other than one with respect .to which deductions are
allowable for the taxable year under section 162 or under
paragraph (1) or (2) of section 212 . "

Deductions are allowed under section 162 for the ordinar y
and necessary expenses 'of carrying on an activity whic h
constitutes the taxpayer's trade or business . . Deductions are
allowed under section 212 for expenses paid or incurred•in
connection with an activity engaged in for the-production or
collection of income, or for . the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held .for the production of income . With
respect to either section, however, the taxpayer must demonstrate
a profit objective for the activities in order to deduct
associated expenses .

Dreicer v . Commissioner , 78 T .C . 642, 644-

645 (1982), affd . without published opinion 702 F .2d 1205 (D .C .
Cir . 1983) ;

Warden v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1995-176, affd .

without published opinion 111 F .3d 139 (9th Cir . 1997) ;--sec .
1 .183-2(a), Income Tax Regs . In order to meet the required
profit objective, "the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in
the activity must be for income or profit ."

Commissioner v .

13
Groetzinger ,, 480 U- c . 23, 35 (1987) ; Bot v . Commissioner , 353
F .3d 595, 599 (8th ir . 2003), affg . 118 T .C . 138 (2'002) ;

Am .

Acad . of Family Ph icians v. . United States, 91 F .3d 1155,

1157-

1158 . (8th Cir . 1996) .
Section 1 .183-2(b) ., Income Tax Regs ., provides factors to be
considered when determining whether an activity is engaged in for
profit as-follows :
(b), .-Relevant factors .--In determining-whether an
activity .is engaged in for profit, all facts and
circumstances with respect to the activity are to be
taken into accont . No one factor is determinative in
making this det rmination . In addition, . .it is not'
intended that oily the factors described in this
paragraph are t -be taken into account .in making the
determination, r that a determination is to be made on
the basis that he number of factors (whether or . not
listed in this aragraph) indicating a lack of profit
objective excee s the number of factors indicating a
profit objective , or vice versa . * * *

Nine nonexclusive factors are set forth in the regulations
which are to be considered when determining profit intent . Those
factors are : (1) .Th manner in which the taxpayer carried on the
activity ; (2) the ex ertise of the taxpayer or his advisers ; (3 )
the time and effort ~xpended by the taxpayer in-carrying on th e
activity ; (4) the exLectation that assets used in the activit y
may appreciate in value ; (5) the success of the taxpayer in
carrying on other si ilar or dissimilar activities ; (6) the
taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to th e

activity ; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which ar e
earned ; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer ; and (9) whether

14 elements of personal pleasure or recreation exist .

Id ..

Not all

of the factors are applicable in every case, and no one factor is
controlling . See Abramson v . Commissioner , 86 T .C . 360, 371
(1986) ; sec . 1 .183-2(b), Income Tax Regs . We begin by applying
each of these factors to the facts relating to petitioners'
aircraft activity .

The fact that a taxpayer carries on an activity in~ .a
businesslike manner and maintains, complete and accurate books and
records may indicate that the activity was engaged in for profit .
See Engdahl v . Comm issioner , 72 T .C .
.
2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs .

659, 666

(1979) ;

sec . 1 .183-

During the years at issue, petitione r

kept logs noting his involvement with KAR RRR, but he admitted
that those logs were incomplete . The logs were not made
contemporaneously with the activities petitioner noted therein .
Much of the time memorialized in the logs is attributable to
travel time and time that petitioner spent on his own flight
training activities and classes .

Petitioner failed to develop a formal business plan .
Although petitioner testified that he used a "pro forma", it wa s
not produced at trial . EOA's financial projections overestimate d
the profitability of renting the Cessna, and the projecte d
expenses did not include finance expenses ,

sales tax, o r

registration fees and did not take into account actua l
depreciation of the Cessna .

- 15 Petitioner tes_ified that he was active in advertising the
Cessna throughout the community, but he failed to adequatel y
corroborate : that tes

imony with evidence of such marketin g

activities . •Petitio er also did bookkeeping for KAR'RRR,
including=the estab i
account . However,

shment and maintenance of the'company bank

p titioners relied on . the services of EOA for e

the day-to--day. renta

of the Cessna ,

reservations for the Cessna ,

including takin g

providing storage for the Cessna,

and providing licens

d flight instructors to fly the Cessna .

Moreover, the mainte

ance,ren.tal of the aircraft,-and collection

of rental receipts w re performed by either .EOA or the flight
instructors associa t d .with the rental flights .. Petitione r
explained at'trial t

at student pilots and renters would'pay .EOA

directly for the use

of the Cessna at the end of the renta l

period . EOA would t en credit the account of KAR RRR for the feegenerated . At the e

d of the month, EOA wou .ld ;deduct :thei r

commission and : other expenses , such as fuel and maintenance .

Petitioner was not quIalified to perform th e maintenance on th e
Cessna necessary to k ep it airworthy . Petitioner reviewed :some
of these activities b t did not perform them himself and .

otherwise had limite d involvement`in the day-tb-day,activitie s
involving the Cessna ..

Consequently, consideration of the first

factor weighs against

the finding of a profit objective .

.

- 16 A taxpayer's expertise or that of his advisers is 'a factor
in determining profitability . Sec . .1 .183-2(b)(2), Income Tax
Regs . Before his purchase of the Cessna, petitioner had no
relevant experience in the aircraft industry . Petitioner spent
time "going on the FAA's website" to understand what rules and
regulations governed private aviation . He also researched
Cessna's advisories about his type of aircraft to determin e
"whether there were recalls or anything like that ."

i

Petitioner sought advice in selecting the appropriate
aircraft for the activity, relying in part on the knowledge of
local flight instructors . Otherwise, petitioner relied on EOA,
the seller of the Cessna, and Advocate Consulting . Before the
purchase of the Cessna, petitioner was informed by EOA's
president that the Cessna could be rapidly depreciated,i!for tax
purposes . At the same time, employees of EOA informed petitioner
that Advocate Consulting could structure the purchase of the
Cessna in a tax-advantageous manner . Petitioner's independent
research-'on Advocate .. Consulting entailed going online and trying
"to get a little background on the * * * company ." Petitioner
did not know anyone else who was referred to Advocate Consulting .
Petitioner testified that Advocate Consulting agreed to represen t

petitioners before the IRS as part of their agreement ;, with KA R
RRR .

17 Petitioners'-retained the services of Advocate Consulting on
a yearly basis . Petitioners sought the advice of Advocate
Consulting because a rcraft-leasing "was a field that
[petitioner] really idn't know in terms of-legal or tax issues .'
When asked at trial if he ever thought that the tax advice he
received was too goo to be true, petitioner responded that if
he's "paying for their advice and ' their . counsel tells me that
this is the way it is,-then *•* I believe them .

As we have alrea y noted,, EOA provided a written projection
of,net income that di not include finance expenses, commissions,
legal and professiona services expenses, or tax depreciation
expenses related to t e Cessna . Given petitioner's educationa l
background in economi :s and his discussions with- employees of EOA'
and Advocate Consulti g about structuring the purchase of the
Cessna in~a tax-advan ageous manner, it is reasonable to assume
that petitioner recog ized the significant distortions these
omissions would create between the projected profits and the
profits or-losses from the aircraft activity that petitioners
would report on their tax returns . In preparing for an'activity,
a taxpayer need not m ke a formal market'study, but might be

a

expected to undertake a basic investigation of the factors that
would affect profit . Westbrook v . Commissioner, T .C . Memo . 1993634, affd . 68 F .3d 868-(5th Cir . 1995) . Yet petitioner failed to
seek an objective opinion about the profit potential of•such a n

- 18 undertaking . and relied heavily on parties with their on
subjective interest in the transaction . Under the circumstances,
petitioner's independent research of profitability . of the
aircraft activity was insufficient . Consequently, the'secon d

factor weighs against a finding of a profit objective .
The fact that a taxpayer devotes much of his personal time
and effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if .there are
no substantial personal or recreational elements, may indicate a
profit motive . Sec . 1 .183-2(b)(3), Income Tax Regs . Much of the
time that petitioner spent on the aircraft activity involved his
own flying lessons . Petitioner and his daughter, had decided to
learn how to fly, and petitioner purchased the Cessna as a way to
do that . Petitioner had long wanted to learn to fly airplanes,
having attempted to join the Air Force when he was younger .
.Petitioner created logs documenting hi,s activities related to th e
Cessna . The logs, though incomplete, indicate that petitioner
spent approximately 197 .05 and 208 .25 hours on KAR RRR activities
in 2002 and 2003, respectively . Much of that time represents
petitioner's own flying instruction . While the logs . petitioner
kept indicate some activity that could be construed as business
related, it could also be construed as a genuine interest in

a

recreational activity . Regardless, the relatively small amount
of time spent on this activity that was substantiated in the
record does not outweigh the evidence indicating that petitioner

f

- 19 had a significant in terest in the recreational elements of th e
activity . Consequently, the third factor does not support a
finding of a profit objective .

An expectation that the assets used in the activity will
appreciate in value ight indicate a_profit objective ;. Sec .
1 .183-2(b)(4),

Incom Tax Regs . It is unlikely that petitioner

expected the Cessna, , the only asset owned by KAR RRR, to
appreciate in value . Additionally, absent extenuating
circumstances, none of which were established in this case, the
regular-wear and tea on a Cessna would likely cause economic
depreciation . Accordingly, the fourth factor weighs against
finding-a profit-obj ctive .

The fact that t e taxpayer has engaged in similar activitie s
in the past and cony rted them from unprofitable to

.profitable

enterprises may indicate that he .is engaged in the present
activity for profit, even though the'activity is presently,
unprofitable . . Sec .

.183-2(b)(5), Income Tax Regs . Petitioner

had no previous'expe ience in, the aircraft-industry, and provided
no evidence that he had engaged in any similar activities for
profit . Consequently, the fifth factor is neutral .

.

A series of :;losses'during'the initial or startup stage of an
activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity .
is not engaged in for profit . Sec . 1 .183-2(b)(6), Income Tax
Regs . However,,where losses continue to be sustained beyond the

20
period that customarily is necessary to bring the operation to
profitable status, such continued losses, if not explainable as
due to customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative
that the activity is not being engaged in for profit .

Id .

Ultimately, a taxpayer must demonstrate an ability to make a
profit in the long term to offset any startup losses . See
Bessenyey v . Commissioner , 45 T .C . .261 (1965), affd . 379 F .2d 252
(2d Cir . 1967) .
There was no prior history . of either profits or losses from
petitioner's aircraft activity because the years at issue were
the first 2 years in which petitioner's aircraft activity
existed . In neither 2002 nor 2003 did the aircraft activity
generate a profit .10 Petitioner testified and submitted evidence
indicating that in the years following the years at issue,
several flight instructors who had used petitioner's Cessna to
give lessons decided to start their own flight instruction
business using petitioner's Cessna at Des Moines International
Airport . Petitioner explained that he became very involved in
the marketing and organization of this new business and had plans
to merge his aircraft activity with the flight instructors' .
business . However, petitioner failed to submit evidence
regarding the profitability of the aircraft activity in the year s

to The aircraft activity generated losses of $84,469 for
2002 and $44,442 for 2003 .

- 21 after 2003 . Without) any proof of profitability in later years ,
the sixth factor is•ieutral .
The amount of occasional profits earned in relation to the
amount of losses incurred may provide useful criteria in
determining the tax .p yer's intent . Sec . 1 .183-2(b)(7), Income -Tax Regs .- A-s . we hav established, there is no history of the
aircraft activity's eing profitable . Consequently, the "sevent h
factor is neutral .
Substantial income from sources other than the activity may
indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit,
especially if there are personal or recreational elements
involved .- Sec .

1 .1813-2(b) ' (8),

Income Tax Regs . Petitioner

worked approximately 50 hours per week in 2002, and he spent most
of his work week in he offices'ofPRM in downtown Des Moines .
Most of petitioner's income came .from his position at•PRM .`
Petitioner's hours a rd responsibilities did not change 'very much
between 2002 and 200--" . Petitioners . reported salaries in`excess
of $593,000 in-2002 and $742,000 in 2003 . The losses created 'by
the aircraft activit , if found to be deductible, would offset
some of petitioners" substantial salaries and generate~a
significant tax savings in the years at issue . Consequently', the
eighth factor weighs against a profit objective . '
Finally, the presence of personal motives in carrying on an
activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for

- 22 profit, especially where there are recreational or personal
elements involved . Sec . 1 .183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs""i .
Petitioners' daughter Katie received flight instruction from EOA
beginning in 2001 . In the fall of 2001, petitioner also began
taking flight training lessons from EOA . Before taking flying
lessons, petitioner always had an interest in flying . Being a
pilot had been a long-term interest of .petitioner since his
youth . Petitioner acknowledges the purchase of the Cessna as "a
way of having a good new plane upon which to learn" .
Consequently, the ninth factor weighs against a finding of a
profit objective .
When considering whether a taxpayer engaged in an activity
for profit, greater weight must be given to the objective facts
than to a taxpayer's mere statement of intent .

Beck v . .

Commissioner , 85 T .C . 557, 570 (1985) . While some of
petitioner's efforts could support an argument in favor of a
profit objective, they could also be construed as a genuine
interest in and an effort to contribute to an activity that
provided personal pleasure in the form of a hobby . Regardless,
petitioner's testimony and the evidence on =record in favor of
petitioners' argument are insufficient to overcome the weight of
the objective facts indicating that petitioners were not engaging

23 in the activity pri m rily for profit ." Accordingly, we will .,
sustain .respondent '

determination with regard to th e
s created by the .aircraft activity . '

II .

Claimed Loss fr m Worthless Stock and Loan s
On ` .their 2002

F deral income tax return, petitioners claimed

losses of $432,34 6

lating to the alleged worthlessness of their

BTI stock and loans

etiti.oner made to B .I . On-petitioners'-2002
.T

Schedule D, Capita l

ains and Losses, they reported a short-term

capital loss of $3.3 2 346 . related to BTI, which contributed .to a
total net short-ter m loss of $412,,033 reported for that year .
Petitioners also rep

rted a $100,000 long-term ; capital los s

related 'to BTI on . .t h it ScheduleD for 2002, which contributed to
a total net long-te r

capital loss of $26,245 . -Petitioners were

limited by section- 1 11(b) :.(1)`to a recognized capital loss o f
$3,OQO on their 200 2 Federal income, tax return . Petitioner s
carried forward a s h

rt-term capital loss of $409,033 and a long-

term capital loss of $26,245 . to 2003 . .
Respondent dis a lowed petitioners', claimed capital losses ,
relating to BTI . H o

ever,, respondent .concedes that afte r

application . of the . s ction 1211(b)(1) capital loss limitation i n
2002, petition'ers'

' Because we

F deral'income tax return,for 2002 reflecte d

.f i

not engaged in with
decide whether petit
activity losses subj
469 .

d that petitioners' aircraft activity wa s
he required profit objective, we need not
oners ' losses were nondeductible . passive
ct to the limitations imposed under sec .

- 24 the appropriate amount of capital losses (i .e ., capitaliloss of
$3,000) . Accordingly, the disallowance of the reported loss with
respect to BTI affects only petitioners' taxable income for 2003 .
Petitioners argue that the BTI stock became worthless and
that their loans to BTI became nonbusiness bad debt when BTI "ran
out of opportunities to sell the company" in 2002 . Respondent
argues that neither the stock nor the loans became worthless in
2002 .
In order for a taxpayer to claim a loss for worthless
securities in a taxable year, the security must .become worthless
in that taxable year . Sec . 165(g)(1 .) . A loss shall be treate d
as sustained during the taxable year in which the loss occurs a s
evidenced by closed and completed transactions and as fixed by
identifiable events occurring in such taxable year . Sec . 1 .1651(d)(1), Income Tax Regs . Total worthlessness of the security is
required for the deduction . Sec . 1 .165-4,, Income Tax Regs . N o
loss deduction is allowed for partial worthlessness or for mer e
decline in value . Sec . 1 .165-5, Income Tax Regs . Stock becomes
worthless and the loss is sustained only when the stock has no
liquidating value and there is no reasonable hope and expectation
that at some future point in time it will become valuable .
Duncan v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1986-122 . The burden is on
the taxpayer to establish the worthlessness of the stock and the
year in which it became worthless .

Id .

(citing

Boehm v .

Commissioner , 326 U
established"satisfa c only only by some "identifiable event" i n
the corporation's li
expectation of revit
business operations, ,
appointment of a re c fiver for it .

Morton v . Commissioner , 3 8

B .T .A . 1270, 1279 (1 38), affd . 112 F .2d 320 (7th Cir . 1940) . .
In the case,-o f

taxpayer other than a corporation, wher e

any nonybusiness deb t
the loss resulting t erefrom shall be considered a loss from the .
sale or exchange, du
held for not more-t h
nonbusiness debt is
debt has become tota

ly worthless . Sec . 1 .166-5(a)(2), Incom e

Tax Regs . The burde
worthlessness of the
worthle-ss .

Crown ,.v . IComm i

is generally accepte d that-the year of worthlessness is to be
fixed by identifiabl e

events which form the basis of reasonable ,

grounds for abandoni n

hope of recovery .

Id .

Whether petition is loans-made to BTI should be evaluate d
for fitting the,defin .tion of worthless securities or nonbusines s
bad debt depends on w~ether the debt is evidenced by a security

- 26 as defined in section 165(g)(2) (C) .12 Sec . 166(e) . ; However,
each of these alternatives requires petitioners to show that, at
the end of 2002, there was no reasonable prospect for recovery .
See Boulafendis v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1984-321 (citing
Boehm v . Commissioner ,
supra at

598), .

supra ,at 291-292 ;

Crown v . Commissioner ,

Accordingly, we begin our analysis by addressin g

this issue .
Mr . Hyman testified that BTI owned furniture, fixtures, an d
a patent on the use of linear programming at, the time it file d
for bankruptcy in 2001 . He testified that BTI had substantia l
value at that time . Almost immediately after the bankruptcy
filing, the venture capital firm on whose interest payment BTI
defaulted and another company submitted .separate bids to purchase
the assets of BTI for $2 million ., Mr . Hyman testified that if a .
sale had occurred in 2001, BTI shareholders would have benefited .
However, Mr . Hyman believed that BTI could be .sold for, and the
assets were worth, significantly more than $2 million . According
to Mr . Hyman, that is the reason that BTI's bankruptcy truste e
turned down both of the $2 million offers .

P;

Mr . Hyman testified that it was reasonable for petitioner to
believe that he could get something for his investment in BTI a t

12 Sec . 165(g) (2) (C) defines a "security" as "a bond,
debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of
indebtedness, issued by a corporation or by a government or
political subdivision thereof, with interest coupons or in
registered form ."

- 27 the end of 2001, eve after it filed for bankruptcy . At that
time, Mr . Hyman was,iopeful .that a sale was going to occur . . Mr .
Hyman testified that, .when no sale occurred, the company was "pu t
into cold storage "

th the goal-of-trying to raise money . . BTI' s

bankruptcy proceedi n

was later,converted-from chapter 7 to

chapter 11 . .-BTI i s

resently operating as a business in chapte r

11, and Mr . Hyman to tified that "there's activity now startin g
to try to . raise capi al within the chapter 11 environment to b e
able to, to bring t h

company . potentially . out of . chapter 1 1 and

operate * **"-the co pang ."
The evidence . p r sented at trial, combined with Mr . . Hyman' s
testimony, indicates

that BTI had value at all times in 2002 an d

still has value . Pe

itioners_havewfailed to . carry their burde n

of proof to show that there was no reasonable prospect of
recovery for their s ock .and loans .in 2002 . Accordingly, we hold
that petitioners . are not entitled to deductions for worthless
securities or nonbus'ness bad debt .

III . .

AccuracV-Related Penalt y
With respect to the accuracy-related penalty under section

66 .62(a), the Commissioner has the burden of production ., Sec .'
7491(c) . To prevail, the Commissioner must'produce sufficient
evidence that it is a propriate to apply the penalty to the
taxpayer .

.'Higbee v . ommissioner, 116 T .C .438, 446 (2001) .

Once the Commissioner meets his burden of °production, the

- 28
taxpayer bears the burden of supplying sufficient evidence to
persuade the Court that the-Commissioner's determination is
incorrect .

Id .

at 447 .

Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) provides accuracy-related
penalties equal to 20 percent of the underpayment of tax required
to be ; .shown on a return if the underpayment is due to negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations .13 For purposes of section
6662, the term "negligence" includes "any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of * * * [the
Code], and the term `disregard' includes any careless, reckless,
or intentional disregard ." Sec . 6662(c) . "Negligence" also
includes any failure by a taxpayer to keep adequate books and
records or to substantiate items properly . Sec . 1 .6662-3(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs .

An accuracy-related penalty is-not imposed with respect to
any portion of the underpayment as to which the taxpayer acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith . Sec . 6664(c) :,!(l) ; see
Higbee v . Commissioner ,

supra at 448 . This determination is made

based on all the relevant facts and circumstances .
Commissioner ,

Higbee v .

supra at 448 ; sec . 1 .6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs .

13 Sec . 6662 can also apply when there is a substantial
.
understatement of tax . See sec . 6662(b) .(2) . However ; since the
only reason given in the notice of deficiency for . imposing the
penalty was negligence or intentional disregard of rules and
regulations, and respondent did not raise sec . 6662(b)(2) until
after trial, we will only consider the issue raised in the notice
of deficiency .

- 29
Relevant factors°inc ude the taxpayer's efforts to assess his
proper tax liability .
While we have h ld that petitioners did not have profit as
their primary object've for entering into the aircraft activity,
we believe that they had both personal and profit objectives in
the sense that they actually hoped that their activity might
produce a profit . S le Warden v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1995176 . Sometimes it i difficult to determine which of two motive s

for engaging in an a~tivity is primary . That is one of the basi c
reasons for using ob ective facts to determine subjective intent .
But a finding that p ofit was not the primary motive does not
automatically result in a conclusion that petitioners were
negligent or intenti nally disregarded the rules and regulations .
See Bernardo v . Co mm issioner, T .C . Memo . 2004=199 ;

Sherman v .

Commissioner , . T .C . Memo . 1989-269 . On the basis of the
previously stated facts, we find that petitioners' reporting of
their aircraft activity was not due to negligence and that they
are not liable for the penalties with respect to the portions of
the underpayments due to their aircraft activity . Likewise, we
find that petitioners are not liable for the penalty on the
portion of the 2003 u derpayment due to their claimed losses from
worthless stock and l ans . The determination of worthlessness i n

the situation describ d in this case is not without some`doubt ,
and while we have fouLd that petitioners have not proven

- 30 worthlessness, we believe that they honestly believed that their
stock and loans were worthless in 2002 .19 We therefore hold that
petitioners are not liable for the section 6662 penalties .
To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered
for respondent as to th e
deficiencies and fo r
petitioners as to th e
accuracy-related penalties .

1a In petitioners' posttrial brief, they requested the
following finding of fact :
62 . Dr . Rosenblatt believes his investments in Benefit
Technologies became worthless in 2002 because during
that year the bankruptcy trustee ran out of
opportunities to the [sic] sell the company .

In his answering brief, respondent had no objection to this
proposed finding of fact .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Atax-court%3A8395ec1e4c53dc52. Public record. Not legal advice.
