# United States Tax Court

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Atax-court%3A720be3e192919567

## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo. 2025-37
JOANNE SALVI VANOVER,
Petitioner,
AND MICHAEL D. VANOVER,
Intervenor
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent
__________
Docket No. 11047-22.

Filed April 22, 2025.
__________

Joanne Salvi Vanover, pro se.
Christopher L. Bourell and John Nevergall (student), for intervenor.
John D. Davis and Nancy P. Klingshirn, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
JONES, Judge: In this case petitioner, Joanne Salvi Vanover
(Ms. Salvi), 1 seeks relief from joint and several liability for federal
income tax obligations pursuant to section 6015. 2 Ms. Salvi seeks relief
from income tax obligations arising from returns she jointly filed with
her former spouse and intervenor in this case, Michael D. Vanover, for
taxable years 2017 and 2018 (taxable years at issue). For taxable year
1 At trial, petitioner requested that the Court address her as Ms. Salvi. Mindful
of this request, the Court will refer to petitioner as Ms. Salvi throughout this Opinion.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue
Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, regulatory references are to the
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All monetary
amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Served 04/22/25

2
[*2] 2017, Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(f) from the
underpayment of tax shown as due on the joint return. For taxable year
2018, Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) from a
deficiency in income tax attributable to the couple’s failure to report
various items of income on the return and relief under section 6015(f)
from an underpayment of tax shown as due on the joint return.
For the reasons discussed below, we will grant partial relief to
Ms. Salvi pursuant to section 6015(c) with respect to the
understatement items attributable to Mr. Vanover for taxable year
2018. But we will deny relief pursuant to section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for
all other items for the taxable years at issue.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts are stipulated and are so found. The
Administrative Record and First Stipulation of Facts and the Exhibits
attached thereto are incorporated herein by this reference. Ms. Salvi
resided in Ohio when she timely filed her Petition. Mr. Vanover timely
filed a Notice of Intervention. See Rule 325.
I.

Ms. Salvi, Mr. Vanover, and Their Marriage

Ms. Salvi has a bachelor’s degree in political science and a
master’s degree in human resource management. During the taxable
years at issue, and at the time of trial, Ms. Salvi was employed as a
human resource professional. At the time of trial, Ms. Salvi earned
approximately $85,000 per year. Mr. Vanover attended some university
classes, but he did not earn a college degree. During the taxable years
at issue, Mr. Vanover was employed as an information technology
consultant.
Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were married on September 12, 2015.
From the date of their marriage until February 2020, Ms. Salvi and Mr.
Vanover resided at a home in Newbury, Ohio. Ms. Salvi was the sole
owner and mortgage holder of the Newbury home, which she has lived
in for approximately 20 years. Ms. Salvi has two children from a prior
relationship that lived with her and Mr. Vanover during the taxable
years at issue.
A.

Financial Management

During the taxable years at issue, Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did
not split household expenses equally. Because Ms. Salvi’s two children

3
[*3] also lived in the home, she paid two-thirds of the living expenses
and Mr. Vanover paid one-third. Mr. Vanover’s contribution to joint
household expenses included a monthly contribution to Ms. Salvi’s
mortgage. Ms. Salvi was primarily responsible for writing checks and
ensuring that the household bills were paid, but Mr. Vanover was
separately responsible for paying for his vehicle and car insurance, as
well as some medical expenses such as prescription medication.
Throughout their marriage, Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover each
individually maintained at least one separate bank account, and they
also maintained a joint bank account. Ms. Salvi’s and Mr. Vanover’s
respective salaries and other income were deposited into their separate
bank accounts. Each of them then transferred some of the amounts
deposited into their separate accounts into the joint account.
Payments for electric, gas, and cable bills and, as discussed
further below, an installment agreement relating to taxable year 2015,
were drafted from the joint bank account. Mr. Vanover knew that the
funds in the joint account were used for expenses. But he generally did
not know the precise nature or amounts of the expenses and he did not
spend any of the money in the joint account. The mortgage payments for
Ms. Salvi’s home were drafted out of her separate bank account.
B.

Financial Issues

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover each individually had financial
problems that affected their marriage to varying degrees. Ms. Salvi filed
for bankruptcy in 2016, although the details regarding the bankruptcy
are not set forth in the record. Mr. Vanover had numerous tax and other
financial problems before and during his marriage to Ms. Salvi.
Specifically, Mr. Vanover had outstanding debts to several
creditors, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the State of
Ohio, former landlords, a utility company, a car dealership, and doctors.
He was also delinquent on child support payments. Mr. Vanover did not
file Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for taxable years
2004 through 2014. Ms. Salvi learned that Mr. Vanover struggled with
money management “[p]robably after we’d been married a couple years,”
i.e., 2017, “because [Mr. Vanover] would get a lot of phone calls for
collections” and he “couldn’t get credit cards.”

4
[*4] II.

Tax Filings and Liabilities

In the decades before her marriage, Ms. Salvi’s income tax
returns were prepared by her cousin, Patrick DiPietro, a certified public
accountant (CPA). After Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were married, Mr.
DiPietro prepared joint returns for the couple. Ms. Salvi and Mr.
Vanover elected to file joint income tax returns for taxable years 2015,
2016, 2017, and 2018.
During their marriage Ms. Salvi played an important role in
facilitating the couple’s tax filings. It was “very difficult to get tax stuff
done with Mr. Vanover,” and Ms. Salvi “had to put [her] foot down and
say, we have to get these taxes done.” The returns for taxable years
2016, 2017, and 2018 were prepared by Mr. DiPietro once Mr. Vanover
“finally gave [Ms. Salvi] his W[–]2s . . . [after she had] begg[ed] for the
information.”
Although a request for relief from joint and several liability for
taxable year 2015 is not at issue, 3 the facts related to taxable year 2015
provide important insights into the instant case. Ms. Salvi and Mr.
Vanover filed a joint Form 1040 for taxable year 2015 (2015 joint return)
with a balance shown as due, but they did not pay the balance. The 2015
joint return was received by the IRS on October 17, 2016, and processed
on November 21, 2016.
Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover retained an attorney, Carol
Szczepanik, to assist them with matters related to their return and
unpaid tax liability for taxable year 2015. On April 6, 2017, Ms. Salvi
and Mr. Vanover entered an installment agreement with the IRS for the
taxable year 2015 liability. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover each contributed
half of the $275 payment to their joint bank account, and the IRS
electronically debited the payment from that account.
While working with Ms. Szczepanik to procure an installment
agreement for taxable year 2015, Ms. Salvi “began to suspect problems”
when Ms. Szczepanik “discovered [that Mr. Vanover] ha[d] a lot of past
due taxes.” Ms. Salvi inquired about the amount of Mr. Vanover’s total
unpaid tax liability, although Ms. Szczepanik did not disclose that

3 By Order dated May 10, 2024, the Court granted respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Strike with Respect to Claim for Relief from
Joint and Several Liability for the 2015 Tax Year (Doc. 46).

5
[*5] information. Sometime after filing for divorce, Mr. Vanover stopped
contributing his portion to the installment agreement.
A.

Taxable Year 2017

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover timely filed a joint request for an
extension of time to file their return for taxable year 2017, but they
failed to timely file a return by the extended deadline. On July 8, 2019,
Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed an untimely joint Form 1040 for taxable
year 2017 (2017 joint return). On the 2017 joint return, Ms. Salvi and
Mr. Vanover reported adjusted gross income totaling $155,623, total tax
liability of $22,432, and an amount due of $2,291. 4 Ms. Salvi and Mr.
Vanover did not pay the amount shown as due on the return for taxable
year 2017.
The parties have stipulated that during taxable year 2017, Ms.
Salvi had income of $89,280, comprising wages of $69,063, dividends of
$857, capital gains of $3,674, 5 and a taxable retirement account
distribution of $15,686. 6 The parties have also stipulated that Mr.
Vanover had income of $71,721, comprising wages of $70,384 and selfemployment income of $1,337. 7
On April 8, 2020, Ms. Salvi filed Form 1040–X, Amended U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return, using the same numbers as shown on
4 The parties stipulated that the “joint 2017 Form 1040 . . . reflected a balance

due of $3,17[8].” However, as previously stated, the amount shown as due on the Form
1040 for taxable year 2017 is $2,291. The parties’ stipulation appears to be inclusive
of penalties, additions to tax, and interest, totaling $887, which combined with the
amount due of $2,291, equals $3,178.

5 We further note that $857 of dividends, and the $3,674 of capital gain that

the parties stipulated was attributable to Ms. Salvi, were not reported on the 2017
joint return. Respondent did not issue a Notice of Deficiency for taxable year 2017.
6 The parties stipulated that the pension distribution of $15,686 for taxable
year 2017 was attributable to Ms. Salvi. We note that the Form 1099–R, Distributions
From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance
Contracts, etc., included in the record lists Mr. Vanover’s name, but the income is
reflected on Ms. Salvi’s tax account transcript and associated with her tax
identification number. Given this discrepancy, and in the absence of any contrary
evidence, we will defer to the Stipulation. See Freman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2023-10, at *4 n.4. No evidence presented by the parties suggests any nominal
ownership issue exists in the present case.

7 We note that the amount of gross receipts reported on Schedule C, Profit or
Loss From Business, for taxable year 2017 totaled $1,338 (a discrepancy of $1), and
the net profit or loss reflected on the Schedule C, which was reported on line 12 of the
Form 1040, totaled $528.

6
[*6] the joint Form 1040 filed July 8, 2019, seeking to change her filing
status from joint to married filing separately. On April 9, 2020, Ms. Salvi
filed Form 8379, Injured Spouse Allocation, for taxable year 2017.
B.

Taxable Year 2018

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did not file a joint request for an
extension of time to file their return for taxable year 2018, nor did they
timely file a joint Form 1040 for the taxable year. In or around July 2019
Mr. DiPietro prepared a joint Form 1040 for Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover
for taxable year 2018, showing an adjusted gross income totaling
$112,307, total tax liability of $11,140, and an amount due of $63. Ms.
Salvi and Mr. Vanover signed Form 8879, IRS e-file Signature
Authorization, which authorized Mr. DiPietro to file the return showing
an amount due of $63. However, this return failed to reflect some of Mr.
Vanover’s income reported on Form W–2, Wage and Tax Statement, for
taxable year 2018. Therefore, it was not filed with the IRS.
Mr. DiPietro prepared a revised joint return for taxable year 2018
that included all of Mr. Vanover’s Form W–2 income for taxable year
2018. On July 16, 2019, Mr. DiPietro submitted an original Form 1040
on behalf of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover for taxable year 2018, which was
processed by the IRS on August 19, 2019. 8 The Form 1040 filed with the
IRS for taxable year 2018 shows a total tax due of $21,551. Ms. Salvi
and Mr. Vanover did not pay the amount shown as due on the return.
The IRS issued Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover a Notice of Deficiency,
dated April 5, 2021, determining a deficiency of $2,233 and a section
6651(a)(1) failure to file addition to tax of $446. Therein, the IRS
determined that Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover failed to report
nonemployee compensation of $850 received from A-Tek Computer
Services, Inc. (A-Tek); taxable dividend income of $1,001 received from
Fundamental Investors—An American Funds Service Company
(Fundamental Investors); and capital gains of $4,823 received from
Fundamental Investors. Respondent also determined an additional tax
of $396 on an early distribution from a qualified plan pursuant to section
72(t). Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did not file a petition with this Court
seeking review of the Notice of Deficiency issued by the IRS.
The parties have stipulated that during taxable year 2018 Ms.
Salvi had income of $94,831, comprising wages of $70,715, dividends of
8 Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did not file a request for an extension of time to
file their return for taxable year 2018.

7
[*7] $1,001, capital gains of $4,823, and a taxable retirement account
distribution of $18,292. The parties have also stipulated that Mr.
Vanover had income of $74,217, comprising wages of $69,410, selfemployment income of $850, and a taxable retirement account
distribution of $3,957. Mr. Vanover’s $3,957 taxable retirement account
distribution was reported on both the initial return prepared by Mr.
DiPietro for taxable year 2018 and the return that was actually filed
with the IRS for taxable year 2018.
On April 8, 2020, Ms. Salvi filed Form 1040–X for taxable year
2018, seeking to change her filing status from joint to married filing
separately for the August 19, 2019, return. On April 9, 2020, Ms. Salvi
filed Form 8379 for taxable year 2018.
III.

Marital Issues and Divorce

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover had a number of problems that led to
the deterioration of their marriage. One arose in February 2020 when
Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were involved in a physical altercation, the
impetus for which occurred months before. Around November 2019,
after growing discontent with Mr. Vanover’s financial management, Ms.
Salvi told Mr. Vanover that he had three months to leave her home.
Three months later, on the day of the physical altercation, Ms. Salvi and
Mr. Vanover were arguing about bills. Mr. Vanover attempted to leave
the residence to stay at a hotel for the night, but Ms. Salvi prevented
him from doing so. The verbal argument became physical when Ms.
Salvi attacked Mr. Vanover, attempting to take his cell phone, and while
doing so, she raked her nails down his arms leaving marks, bit him, and
punched his ribs. Mr. Vanover pushed Ms. Salvi and she fell to the
ground, sustaining bruises on her thigh.
After their physical altercation, Mr. Vanover left the Newbury
residence and called 911. The police arrived and, after an investigation,
arrested Ms. Salvi. Ms. Salvi was tried and found guilty of domestic
violence and disorderly conduct. After her sentencing, Ms. Salvi
appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Eleventh
Appellate District, Geauga County. On September 13, 2021, the Court
of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 9 Ms. Salvi
9 At trial of this case Ms. Salvi stated that she was pursuing various options to
continue litigating the verdict of the Chardon Municipal Court that was affirmed in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Ohio, and that she secured representation from
a domestic violence advocacy group to assist her. This Court admitted the opinion of

8
[*8] appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, but that court declined
jurisdiction over the appeal.
Following the altercation, Mr. Vanover moved out of Ms. Salvi’s
home. Or, as Ms. Salvi characterizes it, she “booted” Mr. Vanover out.
On June 20, 2020, Mr. Vanover filed a petition for divorce with the
Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were declared divorced on
January 20, 2023. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Ms. Salvi retained
sole ownership of her residence. Further, the parties were ordered to
evenly divide the balances owed to the IRS for marital tax years 2015
through 2019, subject to modification by a ruling or order of this Court
and the IRS.
IV.

Ms. Salvi’s Request for Relief Under Section 6015 and Other
Filings

On March 31, 2021, Ms. Salvi filed Form 8857, Request for
Innocent Spouse Relief. Therein, Ms. Salvi requested relief for taxable
years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018.
On Form 8857, Ms. Salvi stated that she was unaware of Mr.
Vanover’s previous tax debts to the IRS, and that he “withheld his
W[–]2s for years which delayed our filing.” Ms. Salvi claimed that she
was not involved in preparing the returns, that she “did not know
anything was incorrect or missing,” and that she did not know all the
sources of income or earnings. However, Ms. Salvi also claimed that the
returns were prepared by a third party only “after [Mr. Vanover] finally
gave [her] his W[–]2s after filing extension and begging for the
information.”
On her Form 8857, Ms. Salvi stated that she began to suspect that
Mr. Vanover had financial problems in 2017. Ms. Salvi stated that she
and Mr. Vanover went to an attorney (i.e., Ms. Szczepanik) to explain
the past due amount and arrange for a payment plan with the IRS. 10 It
was at that point that Ms. Szczepanik discovered that Mr. Vanover
“ha[d] a lot of past due taxes,” although despite Ms. Salvi’s inquiries,
neither Ms. Szczepanik nor Mr. Vanover disclosed the exact amount of
the Court of Appeals of Ohio into evidence with this understanding and directed Ms.
Salvi to notify the Court of any subsequent filings relating to the matter in her briefing.
The Court notes that Ms. Salvi did not notify the Court of any subsequent
developments related to further appeal of her criminal conviction.
10 An installment agreement was entered for taxable year 2015.

9
[*9] past due taxes to Ms. Salvi. On the basis of Ms. Salvi’s own written
statements from her Form 8857, we find as fact that Ms. Salvi knew or
had reason to know of Mr. Vanover’s tax problems as early as 2017,
although she may not have known the precise amount due until a later
date.
Further, on Form 8857 Ms. Salvi claimed that Mr. Vanover “never
showed [her] his pay or account” and that he “gave [her] what he deemed
was appropriate” and that she “always had to beg for bill money.” Ms.
Salvi indicated that she had equity in assets, including her home, car,
and retirement account, of approximately $168,200, total monthly
income of $1,950, and monthly expenses of $4,100. Ms. Salvi also stated
that at the time she submitted her request for relief she was making
withdrawals from her retirement account to pay her monthly expenses.
According to Ms. Salvi, she had been able to find only part-time work
after she lost her previous full-time job on account of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Additionally, Ms. Salvi claimed that she was a victim of spousal
abuse or domestic violence either during the taxable years for which she
seeks relief or at the time when the returns were filed for those taxable
years. Ms. Salvi claims that Mr. Vanover sexually abused her, knocked
her into a wall and caused her injuries, verbally abused her, financially
abused her, and blamed her for causing him to have an affair. Ms. Salvi
also said that Mr. Vanover abused alcohol, caused her to fear for her
safety, and made most or all decisions for her, including financial
decisions. She further claims that Mr. Vanover lied to the sheriff about
abusing her and blamed her for everything.
On May 24, 2021, the IRS issued Ms. Salvi Letter 3659–C,
Requesting Spouse Initial Contact Letter. That same day, the IRS
issued Mr. Vanover Letter 3284–C, Non-Requesting Spouse Initial
Contact Letter. The IRS did not receive a response from Mr. Vanover,
and he did not participate during the administrative proceedings. On
October 26, 2021, the IRS assigned Ms. Salvi’s request to Tax Examiner
Peal (TE Peal) to examine the request and make a recommendation.
On November 2, 2021, the IRS issued a preliminary
determination denying relief for the taxable years at issue. In the
determination, TE Peal explained that for taxable year 2017 the couple
had filed a valid joint return and that the unpaid tax was attributable
to Ms. Salvi’s pension withdrawal. Because the liability was due to an
underpayment, relief was not available under section 6015(b) or (c), and

10
[*10] relief was not available under section 6015(f) because the liability
was attributable to her.
For taxable year 2018, TE Peal concluded that the couple filed a
valid joint return. With respect to the underpayment of tax, TE Peal
explained that Ms. Salvi was ineligible for relief under section 6015(b)
or (c) because she had actual knowledge of the understatement. Further,
with respect to the understatement and underpayment of tax for taxable
year 2018, TE Peal concluded that Ms. Salvi was ineligible for relief
under section 6015(f) because she had knowledge of the understatement
and was not in compliance with her filing obligation, with most other
factors being neutral. The preliminary determination also gave Ms.
Salvi 30 days from the date of the preliminary determination to appeal
the decision to the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.
In response Ms. Salvi submitted Form 12509, Statement of
Disagreement, dated December 11, 2021. In her statement, she asserted
that taxes and penalties were incurred because Mr. Vanover did not
provide her with the necessary documents to file on time. Further, she
stated that she would not have married Mr. Vanover had she known
about his financial situation and that Mr. Vanover physically and
financially abused her. Additionally, Ms. Salvi stated that she had lost
her job and was suffering financially because of the effects of COVID-19.
Ms. Salvi’s Statement of Disagreement was submitted more than 30
days after the date of the preliminary determination. Accordingly, on
January 25, 2022, the IRS issued two separate Final Determinations
denying relief under section 6015 for taxable years 2017 and 2018.
V.

Ms. Salvi’s Tax Compliance

Since her separation from Mr. Vanover, Ms. Salvi has had varying
degrees of tax compliance. The record contains no evidence regarding
Ms. Salvi’s tax compliance for taxable year 2019 or 2020. With respect
to taxable year 2021, Ms. Salvi states that she “worked a small job
during 2021, so I don’t even believe I made enough to file, based on all
my deductions.” Ms. Salvi could not remember whether she filed her tax
return for taxable year 2021. With respect to taxable year 2022, Ms.
Salvi stated that she earned income and that she filed for an extension,
but as of the time of trial on April 15, 2024, she had not yet filed her
return for taxable year 2022 because she “keep[s] renewing” her
extension. The record does not contain any evidence regarding Ms.
Salvi’s tax compliance for taxable year 2023.

11
OPINION

[*11]
I.

Jurisdiction

The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and can exercise
its jurisdiction only to the extent provided by Congress. § 7442; Judge v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175, 1180–81 (1987); Naftel v. Commissioner,
85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985); see also Rules 13(a) and (b), 320(b). Pursuant to
section 6015(e), as applicable in this case, this Court has jurisdiction to
review a stand-alone petition when the taxpayer files a petition no later
than the close of the 90th day after the Commissioner has issued a final
determination denying the requesting spouse’s claim for relief. See
§ 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(I), (ii).
Ms. Salvi timely filed a stand-alone Petition with this Court on
May 6, 2022. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction under section
6015(e) to review the final determination denying Ms. Salvi’s request for
relief for the taxable years at issue. Additionally, pursuant to section
6015(e)(4) and Rule 325, on October 17, 2022, Mr. Vanover filed a Notice
of Intervention and became a party to this case, opposing relief.
II.

Scope and Standard of Review

We apply a de novo standard of review to any determination made
by the Commissioner under section 6015. § 6015(e)(7); see Porter v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009), superseded in part by statute,
Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1203, 133 Stat. 981, 988 (2019).
Our scope of review is limited to the administrative record established
at the time of the Commissioner’s determination and any newly
discovered or previously unavailable evidence. § 6015(e)(7). The Court
will consider Ms. Salvi’s and Mr. Vanover’s testimony because it was
“unavailable evidence” at the time of the administrative proceeding. See
Thomas v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. 9, 20 (2024) (first citing Freman, T.C.
Memo. 2023-10, at *10; and then citing Sleeth v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2019-138, at *3, aff’d, 991 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2021)). Ms. Salvi,
as the requesting spouse, generally bears the burden of proving that she
is entitled to relief. See Rule 142(a); Porter, 132 T.C. at 210
III.

Witness Credibility

In deciding whether a taxpayer has carried her burden of proof,
witness credibility is an important consideration. Ishizaki v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-318, 2001 WL 1658189, at *7. “[T]he
distillation of truth from falsehood . . . is the daily grist of judicial life.”

12
[*12] Diaz v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 560, 564 (1972). “As a trier of fact,
it is our duty to listen to the testimony, observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and determine what we believe.” Kropp
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-148, 2000 WL 472840, at *3.
We found some of Ms. Salvi’s testimony credible, but we found
other parts of her testimony contradictory, self-serving, and lacking
credibility. Specifically, Ms. Salvi’s testimony that she did not know of
Mr. Vanover’s tax problems until 2019 conflicted with her own sworn
statements on her Form 8857 that she knew, and certainly had reason
to know, that Mr. Vanover had tax problems as early as 2017, although
she may not have known the precise amounts thereof until a later date.
Further, we found Ms. Salvi was not credible when discussing the
circumstances surrounding the filing of the 2018 joint return.
We found Mr. Vanover’s testimony to be credible. With respect to
his testimony about the February 2020 altercation with Ms. Salvi, we
thought Mr. Vanover was truthful and sincere. With respect to financial
matters, we thought his testimony was an honest recounting of the
occurrences during the taxable years at issue, which was also supported
by the record.
IV.

Section 6015, Relief from Joint and Several Liability

Married taxpayers may elect to file a joint federal income tax
return. § 6013(a). If a joint return is made, (1) the tax is computed on
the spouses’ aggregate income; (2) each spouse is fully responsible for
the accuracy of the return; and (3) each spouse is jointly and severally
liable for the entire amount of tax shown on the return or found to be
owing. § 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 282 (2000).
Nevertheless, section 6015 provides three potential avenues and
procedures for relief from joint and several liability: (1) full or partial
relief for an understatement of tax under section 6015(b),
(2) proportionate relief for an understatement of tax under section
6015(c), and (3) full or partial relief for an understatement or
underpayment of tax under section 6015(f).
Ms. Salvi seeks relief from joint and several liability under section
6015(f) for the underpayments for taxable years 2017 and 2018, and
under sections 6015(b), (c), and (f) for the understatements for taxable
year 2018.

13
[*13] A.

Joint Return Requirement

The availability of each type of relief under section 6015 depends
upon the filing of a joint return. See § 6015(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (c)(1); Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.6015-2(a)(1), 1.6015-3(a), 1.6015-4(a), (c); see also Rev. Proc.
2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. Whether a joint return was filed
is a question of fact, the resolution of which depends, inter alia, on the
intent of the parties. Okorogu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-53,
at *19 (citing Heim v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 270, 273–74 (1956), aff’d,
251 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1958)). To file jointly, both spouses must intend to
make a joint return. See Lane v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 405, 408–09
(1956).
In evaluating intent, the Court has considered whether the
nonsigning spouse filed a separate return, whether the nonsigning
spouse objected to the filing of a joint return, and whether prior filing
history indicates an intent to file jointly. See, e.g., Estate of Campbell v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12–13 (1971); Heim, 27 T.C. at 274; Howell v.
Commissioner, 10 T.C. 859, 866 (1948), aff’d per curiam, 175 F.2d 240
(6th Cir. 1949). If intent to file a joint return otherwise exists, it is not
fatal that one spouse did not sign the return. Harrington v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-285, at *8 (citing Hennen v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 747, 748 (1961)). If neither spouse signs the
purported return, there is no joint return. See Arnold v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-259, 2003 WL 22053838, at *2.
Ms. Salvi does not dispute that she filed a joint return for taxable
year 2017, but she alleges that she did not sign the purported joint
return filed for taxable year 2018 nor a Form 8879. But even if Ms. Salvi
did not sign the return for taxable year 2018, that does not necessarily
mean that the return for taxable year 2018 was not a joint return. See
Harris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-324.
However, we need not resolve this question because we find the
parties’ stipulations foreclose Ms. Salvi’s argument, and on that basis
we conclude that Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed a joint return for
taxable year 2018. There are two stipulations relevant to this analysis.
First, the parties have stipulated that “[f]or tax[able] year[] . . . 2018,
petitioner and intervenor elected to file a joint personal income tax
return as a married couple.” Second, the parties have also stipulated
that “[o]n August 19, 2019, an original Form 1040 for tax year 2018 was
e-filed on behalf of Petitioner and Intervenor, showing total tax due of
$21,551.”

14
[*14] Rule 91(e) provides that “[a] stipulation will be treated, to the
extent of its terms, as a conclusive admission by the parties to the
stipulation, unless otherwise permitted by the Court or as agreed by
those parties.” (Emphasis added.) Rule 91(e) continues, providing that
“[t]he Court will not permit a party to a stipulation to qualify, change,
or contradict a stipulation in whole or in part, except that it may do so
if justice requires.”
Stipulations, like contracts, bind the parties to their terms. See
McGivney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-224, 2000 WL 1036364,
at *1 (citing Stamos v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1451, 1455 (1986)). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to which this case is
presumptively appealable, see § 7482(b)(1)(F), has held that stipulations
will be treated as binding and conclusive, absent exceptional
circumstances, see Estate of Quirk v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 751,
758–59 (6th Cir. 1991), aff’g in part, remanding in part T.C. Memo.
1988-286; see also, e.g., Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103, 121
(1st Cir. 2003).
As applicable to this case, we find that the above-referenced
stipulations resolve the issue that Ms. Salvi now seeks to dispute. The
parties stipulated that a Form 1040 for taxable year 2018 was filed on
behalf of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover. The record reflects that the return
for taxable year 2018 was filed on behalf of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover
by a paid return preparer, Mr. DiPietro (who was also Ms. Savi’s cousin).
Further, the parties have also stipulated that for taxable year
2018 Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover elected to file a joint personal income
tax return. Pursuant to section 6013(a), a married couple may elect to
file a joint return. See Camara v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 317, 320 (2017)
(referring to the section 6013(a) election to make a joint return in the
first instance); Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-1(a)(1); see also § 7701(a)(38) (“The
term ‘joint return’ means a single return made jointly under section
6013 by a husband and wife.”).
A married couple makes the election to file a joint return by
actually filing their joint return, see § 6013; see also, e.g., Casey v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-170, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 198,
at *7 (citing Thompson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 558, 561 (1982)), aff’d,
876 F.2d 899 (11th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision), and to make
such a valid election contemplates that, inter alia, the married couple
had the requisite intent to make a joint return, see Okorogu, T.C. Memo.
2017-53, at *19 (citing Heim, 27 T.C. at 273–74), and that at least one

15
[*15] spouse signed the return, Harrington, T.C. Memo. 2012-285, at *8
(citing Hennen, 35 T.C. at 748). The terms of the parties’ stipulations
are clear and foreclose Ms. Salvi’s contention that she did not sign the
return for taxable year 2018. 11 Accordingly, we will give effect to the
terms of the stipulations, which we treat as conclusive admissions. See
Rule 91(e); see also Franc v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-79, 2010
WL 1558333, at *1.
In any event, the evidence and the testimony in the record
support the conclusion that Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed a joint
return for taxable year 2018. The Court considers various factors when
considering whether a nonsigning spouse intended to file a joint return.
See, e.g., Estate of Campbell, 56 T.C. at 12–13; Heim, 27 T.C. at 274;
Howell, 10 T.C. at 866. The facts here militate in favor of the conclusion
that Ms. Salvi intended to file a joint return with Mr. Vanover for
taxable year 2018. When the return was filed for taxable year 2018, Ms.
Salvi and Mr. Vanover were in the process of filing their delinquent
returns. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed their delinquent returns for
taxable years 2016 and 2017 on July 8, 2019, and in short succession, on
July 16, 2019, submitted their delinquent Form 1040 to the IRS for
taxable year 2018. 12 These facts, when combined with the fact that Ms.
Salvi and Mr. Vanover previously filed the 2015 joint return,
demonstrate that Ms. Salvi had a history of filing joint returns with Mr.
Vanover. See Heim, 27 T.C. at 274.
Further, at the time the joint return was filed, Ms. Salvi did not
file her own return for taxable year 2018. See Howell, 10 T.C. at 866.
Rather, it was only after the physical altercation occurred between Ms.
Salvi and Mr. Vanover—and Mr. Vanover vacated the marital
residence—that Ms. Salvi filed Forms 1040–X and Forms 8379 13 for
11 The parties stipulated the inclusion of an affidavit executed by Mr. DiPietro

concerning taxable year 2018, marked as Exhibit 25-J. Mr. DiPietro did not testify at
the trial in this case, and the affidavit seeks to speak to the circumstances of filing for
taxable year 2018. Although the affidavit is included in the record, we accord it no
weight.

12 On July 16, 2019, Mr. DiPietro submitted an original Form 1040 on behalf
of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover for taxable year 2018, which was processed by the IRS
on August 19, 2019. The parties have stipulated that the return for taxable year 2018
was filed on August 19, 2019.

13 Injured spouse relief is different from innocent spouse relief pursuant to
section 6015. Injured spouse relief “involves obtaining a refund of a spouse’s interest
in an overpayment that has been offset pursuant to § 6402.” Lawrence A. Sannicandro,
Innocent Spouse Relief, 645-3rd Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at XI (comparing innocent spouse
and injured spouse relief).

16
[*16] taxable years 2016 through 2018. Again, this fact supports the
conclusion that Ms. Salvi intended to file a joint return with Mr.
Vanover for taxable year 2018.
Finally, Mr. DiPietro was Ms. Salvi’s tax preparer for decades
before the filing of the return for taxable year 2018. It strains credulity
to suggest that Mr. DiPietro—who is Ms. Salvi’s cousin and long-time
preparer—conspired with Mr. Vanover, who did not take an active role
in managing the couple’s finances, to file a joint return about which she
had no knowledge. We found Ms. Salvi’s testimony on this point wanting
for credibility.
Accordingly, on the basis of the stipulations, and as further
supported by the evidence in the record, we find that the joint return
requirement is satisfied for the taxable years at issue. See § 6015(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), (c)(1); Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01.
B.

Section 6015(b) Relief
1.

Section 6015(b) Generally

Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(b) for the
understatement of tax for taxable year 2018. To qualify for relief under
section 6015(b), the requesting spouse must satisfy all of the following
conditions: (1) a joint return was filed for the taxable year; (2) there was
an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of the
nonrequesting spouse on the joint return; (3) the requesting spouse did
not know and had no reason to know of the understatement at the time
that the return was signed; (4) taking into account all of the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for
the deficiency in tax attributable to such understatement; and (5) the
requesting spouse made a timely election for relief under section
6015(b). See § 6015(b)(1). These conditions are stated in the conjunctive,
and thus a failure to meet any one of them precludes relief under section
6015(b). Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 313 (2002), aff’d, 101
F. App’x 34 (6th Cir. 2004); Haltom v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005209, 2005 WL 2132599, at *4. Ms. Salvi bears the burden of proving her
entitlement to relief under section 6015(b). See Alt, 119 T.C. at 311.
As discussed supra Part IV.A, we find that the joint return
requirement is satisfied. Further, Ms. Salvi filed her request for relief in
a timely manner. See § 6015(b)(1)(E). These requirements cannot
reasonably be disputed.

17
[*17]

2.

Section 6015(b)(1)(B)—Understatement
Attributable to Nonrequesting Spouse

of

Tax

Section 6015(b)(1)(B) provides that a requesting spouse can be
relieved of joint and several liability if the requesting spouse shows that
there was an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of
the nonrequesting spouse.
First, as a starting point, there was an understatement of tax on
Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover’s return for taxable year 2018. Accordingly,
the IRS issued Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover a Notice of Deficiency, dated
April 5, 2021, determining a deficiency of $2,233 and a section 6651(a)(1)
failure to file addition to tax of $446. The Notice of Deficiency addressed
the following items: (1) unreported taxable dividends of $1,001 received
from Fundamental Investors; (2) unreported capital gains of $4,823
received from Fundamental Investors; and (3) unreported nonemployee
compensation of $850 received from A-Tek. Further, respondent also
determined, inter alia, an additional tax of $396 on an early distribution
from a qualified retirement plan pursuant to section 72(t).
The parties have stipulated that Mr. Vanover had $850 of selfemployment income for taxable year 2018 and that he had a taxable
retirement account distribution of $3,957 for taxable year 2018.
Therefore, we find that this self-employment income and the 10%
section 72(t) tax (additional tax of $396) are attributable to Mr. Vanover.
The parties have also stipulated that Ms. Salvi’s income included the
$1,001 of dividends and the $4,823 capital gain. Therefore, we find that
these amounts are properly attributable to Ms. Salvi. Accordingly, we
find that Ms. Salvi is not eligible for relief from the items that are
attributable to her. See, e.g., Wright v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023153, at *7; see also Bartak v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-83, 2004
WL 565455, at *9–10, aff’d, 158 F. App’x 43 (9th Cir. 2005); Ellison v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-57, 2004 WL 793183, at *8–9. Thus, we
will consider whether Ms. Salvi is eligible for relief from those items
attributable only to Mr. Vanover.
3.

Section 6015(b)(1)(C)—Knowledge or Reason to
Know

We now turn to section 6015(b)(1)(C), which requires a requesting
spouse to establish that she did not know or have reason to know of the
understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of the
nonrequesting spouse. A requesting spouse has knowledge or reason to

18
[*18] know of an understatement of tax if he or she actually knew of the
understatement or if a reasonable person in similar circumstances
would have known of the understatement. Jacobsen v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2018-115, at *11, *14 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-2(c)), aff’d,
950 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Pietromonaco v. Commissioner,
3 F.3d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1991-361.
Respondent asserts that Ms. Salvi had reason to know of the
erroneous items attributable to Mr. Vanover. First, respondent argues
that Ms. Salvi had reason to know of Mr. Vanover’s unreported
nonemployee compensation because she was aware that Mr. Vanover
was employed and earned income during taxable year 2018. Second,
respondent argues Ms. Salvi had reason to know of the part of the
understatement attributable to the failure to report the early
withdrawal additional tax under section 72(t) because Mr. Vanover’s
retirement account distribution for taxable year 2018 was reported on
the return.
We agree with respondent that Ms. Salvi had “reason to know” of
the understatement of tax attributable to Mr. Vanover. A requesting
spouse has reason to know of an understatement if a reasonably prudent
person could be expected to know of the understatement. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6015-2(c); see also Crouse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-97,
2011 WL 164172, at *16 (citing Alt v. Commissioner, 101 F. App’x at 41).
This standard is not abstract, however, as the prudent taxpayer must
be placed in Ms. Salvi’s particular circumstances. See Resser v.
Commissioner, 74 F.3d 1528, 1536 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’g and remanding
T.C. Memo. 1994-241.
Further, a taxpayer who signs a return is generally charged with
constructive knowledge of its contents. See Hayman v. Commissioner,
992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1992-228. But, even
if a requesting spouse is not aware of sufficient facts to give her reason
to know of the understatement, she may nevertheless know enough facts
to impose a “duty of inquiry” that may put the requesting spouse on
notice that an understatement of tax exists. Price v. Commissioner, 887
F.2d 959, 963 n.9, 965 (9th Cir. 1989), rev’g T.C. Memo 1987-360. A
requesting spouse seeking to establish that she had no reason to know
of an understatement must show that she was unaware of the
circumstances that gave rise to the error and not merely unaware of the
tax consequences. See Richardson v. Commissioner, 509 F.3d 736,
745–46 (6th Cir. 2007), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2006-69; Purcell v.
Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 473–74 (6th Cir. 1987), aff’g 86 T.C. 228

19
[*19] (1986). When a duty to inquire exists and a requesting spouse fails
to fulfill that obligation, the requesting spouse is deemed to have
constructive knowledge. See Di Giorgio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2023-44, at *31.
In considering whether a requesting spouse had reason to know
of an understatement, we consider various factors, including the
requesting spouse’s level of education, involvement in the family
finances, the presence of lavish or unusual expenditures, and the
nonrequesting spouse’s evasiveness or deceit about the family’s
finances. Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d at 965 (citing Stevens v.
Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989), aff’g T.C. Memo.
1988-63). Applying the foregoing, we find that Ms. Salvi had reason to
know of the erroneous items attributable to Mr. Vanover for taxable year
2018.
As an initial matter, respondent argues that Ms. Salvi had reason
to know of Mr. Vanover’s nonemployee compensation because she was
aware that Mr. Vanover was employed during taxable year 2018. While
the record supports respondent’s argument that Ms. Salvi knew of Mr.
Vanover’s Form W–2 employment, the record is silent as to Ms. Salvi’s
specific level of knowledge about Mr. Vanover’s work as an independent
contractor. Nevertheless, the surrounding facts and circumstances
support a conclusion that Ms. Salvi had, at a minimum, a duty to
investigate the veracity of the information presented on the return, a
duty she did not fulfill.
Ms. Salvi had known, at least since taxable year 2017, that Mr.
Vanover had money troubles, including the fact that he received a lot of
debt collection phone calls. Further, while working with Ms. Szczepanik,
Ms. Salvi “began to suspect” that there were problems when it was
discovered that Mr. Vanover had lots of past due taxes. Given Ms. Salvi’s
suspicions about Mr. Vanover’s tax delinquency, the facts support a
conclusion that Ms. Salvi had a heightened duty to inquire given that
Mr. Vanover struggled with financial management. See, e.g., Cotroneo
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-70, at *17. Such a duty is even
clearer given that Mr. Vanover reported similar items of income on the
return filed for taxable year 2017. Ms. Salvi is highly educated, having
earned both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree. Further, Ms. Salvi took
a lead role in managing the finances and facilitating the couple’s tax
filings through her longtime CPA, her cousin. These facts strongly
support the conclusion that Ms. Salvi had reason to know, and that she
certainly had a duty of inquiry to investigate, the accuracy of the return

20
[*20] for taxable year 2018. A reasonably prudent person in Ms. Salvi’s
circumstances would inquire about the sufficiency and completeness of
the information in the return, rather than briefly looking at the amounts
on the return and then signing it, as occurred here. See Alt v.
Commissioner, 101 F. App’x at 41. Ms. Salvi did not satisfy her duty of
inquiry.
Furthermore, with respect to the part of the understatement
arising from the failure to report the section 72(t) additional tax on Mr.
Vanover’s taxable retirement account distribution, we also find that Ms.
Salvi had reason to know of this amount. Once again, a requesting
spouse has “reason to know” of the understatement of tax if she knew
every fact necessary to determine the legal consequences of the income
or if such facts are reasonably within her reach. See Richardson v.
Commissioner, 509 F.3d at 745–46; Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d
at 473–74. Both the initial return prepared by Mr. DiPietro for taxable
year 2018 and the return that was actually filed with the IRS for taxable
year 2018 included Mr. Vanover’s retirement account distribution of
$3,957. The inclusion of Mr. Vanover’s taxable retirement account
distribution on the return for taxable year 2018 means that Ms. Salvi
had reason to know of the unreported section 72(t) additional tax. See,
e.g., Porter, 132 T.C. at 212. Accordingly, because Ms. Salvi had
constructive knowledge of the erroneous items attributable to Mr.
Vanover, she is not eligible for relief under section 6015(b).
Because the requirements of section 6015(b) are conjunctive, we
decline to address section 6015(b)(1)(D), and we determine that Ms.
Salvi is not entitled to relief under this subsection. See Alt, 119 T.C.
at 313.
C.

Section 6015(c) Relief

Next, Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(c) for the
understatement of tax for taxable year 2018. Section 6015(c) allows a
requesting spouse to elect to be liable only for the portion of the
deficiency on the joint return that is properly allocable to him or her as
provided by section 6015(d). See Cotroneo, T.C. Memo. 2024-70, at *18.
To qualify for relief under section 6015(c), the requesting spouse
must satisfy all of the following conditions: (1) a joint return was filed
for the taxable year; (2) at the time of the election, the requesting spouse
was separated or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse or was not a
member of the same household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time

21
[*21] during the 12-month period ending on the date of the request for
relief; and (3) the requesting spouse made a timely election for relief.
§ 6015(c)(1), (3). However, if the Commissioner demonstrates that, at
the time of signing the return, a requesting spouse had actual knowledge
of the item giving rise to the deficiency (or a portion thereof), the
requesting spouse shall be ineligible for relief under this section for the
deficiency (or portion thereof). § 6015(c)(2), (3)(C).
First, as discussed supra Part IV.A, we find that the joint return
requirement is satisfied. Second, we also find that Ms. Salvi satisfies the
separated, divorced, or living apart requirement set forth in section
6015(c)(3)(A)(i). Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover resided at the same
residence until approximately February 2020, shortly after the physical
altercation occurred. Ms. Salvi filed her request for innocent spouse
relief on March 31, 2021, approximately 13 months after she and Mr.
Vanover ceased living together. Accordingly, Ms. Salvi satisfies the
separated, divorced, or living apart requirement.
However, we find that Ms. Salvi is entitled to relief only to the
extent conceded by respondent. As discussed supra Part IV.B.2, the IRS
determined a deficiency for taxable year 2018, some items of which are
allocable to Ms. Salvi. In the Notice of Deficiency respondent determined
unreported income of $850 from A-Tek, which the parties have
stipulated is part of Mr. Vanover’s income, and $1,001 of unreported
taxable dividends and a $4,823 capital gain from Fundamental
Investors, which the parties have stipulated are part of Ms. Salvi’s
income. Additionally, respondent determined that Ms. Salvi and Mr.
Vanover were liable for the 10% additional tax of $396 on an early
retirement account withdrawal pursuant to section 72(t), and the
parties have stipulated that the underlying retirement account
withdrawal is part of Mr. Vanover’s income. Ms. Salvi is not eligible for
relief from the items that are allocable to her. See, e.g., Wright, T.C.
Memo. 2023-153, at *6 (citing Francel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2019-35, at *45–46). Accordingly, we will consider her eligibility for
relief from those items allocable only to Mr. Vanover.
As to the items allocable to Mr. Vanover, the benefit of section
6015(c) is not available to an individual with actual knowledge of “any
item giving rise to a deficiency.” See § 6015(c)(3)(C). To preclude relief
under section 6015(c), the Commissioner must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the requesting spouse had actual knowledge of any
item giving rise to a deficiency. Culver v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 189,

22
[*22] 196 (2001); see also Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326, 335
(5th Cir. 2002), aff’g 115 T.C. 183 (2000).
Respondent agrees that Ms. Salvi is eligible for relief for the items
giving rise to the deficiency that are allocable to Mr. Vanover.
Specifically, respondent states that there is no evidence that Ms. Salvi
had actual knowledge of the $850 Mr. Vanover earned from A-Tek or the
retirement account distribution, which required inclusion of the 10%
additional tax of $396 pursuant to section 72(t). In such situations where
the requesting spouse and the Commissioner agree to relief (or partial
relief), but the intervening spouse objects to relief, as is the case here,
whether the taxpayer had actual knowledge should be “established by a
preponderance of the evidence as presented by all three parties.” See
Young v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-255, at *10 (first citing
Pounds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-202; and then citing Stergios
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-15).
On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, we agree
with Ms. Salvi and respondent that Ms. Salvi is eligible for relief from
the portion of the deficiency due to items allocable to Mr. Vanover. 14 Ms.
Salvi did not have actual knowledge of the items allocable to Mr.
Vanover. The parties’ stipulation that Ms. Salvi’s and Mr. Vanover’s
incomes were deposited in their respective separate bank accounts is
also supported by the broader record. We do not find any evidence in the
record to support the conclusion that Ms. Salvi had actual knowledge (in
whole or in part) of the specific amounts allocable to Mr. Vanover,
despite the fact that she may have had reason to know. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6015-3(c)(4) (example 2) (providing that a requesting spouse is
eligible for relief when the nonrequesting spouse deposited funds into a
separate bank account, despite the fact that the requesting spouse
generally knew about the circumstances the funds were derived from
because, for purposes of section 6015(c), the IRS may not infer actual
knowledge from a reason to know of the income). Because there is no
evidence that Ms. Salvi had actual knowledge of the amounts earned
from A-Tek or the amount of Mr. Vanover’s retirement account
distribution for taxable year 2018, 15 we find that Ms. Salvi is
14 In his Simultaneous Answering Brief (Doc. 64) Mr. Vanover argues that this
Court should “infer[] an equitable standard that would prevent an abusive spouse from
obtaining section 6015(c) relief.” We find no textual basis for this assertion, so we find
the argument unavailing.

15 The fact that Ms. Salvi compiled tax documents and signed the return
indicates constructive knowledge of the distribution, but it does not indicate actual
knowledge as is relevant for relief under section 6015(c).

23
[*23] eligible for proportional relief for these items pursuant to section
6015(c).
D.

Section 6015(f) Relief

Finally, except to the extent stated above, because Ms. Salvi does
not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c), she may seek relief
under section 6015(f) for the understatement of tax for taxable year
2018. Additionally, Ms. Salvi can seek relief only under section 6015(f)
for the underpayments of tax for taxable years 2017 and 2018. Section
6015(f) provides relief from joint and several liability if it is inequitable
to hold the requesting spouse liable for an unpaid tax or any deficiency
(or any portion thereof) after taking into account all the facts and
circumstances. § 6015(f)(1)(A); Porter, 132 T.C. at 206; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6015-4(a).
Treasury Regulation § 1.6015-4(c) directs us to Revenue
Procedure 2013-34 for relevant guidance. 16 Revenue Procedure 2013-34
sets forth a three-step analysis for evaluating section 6015(f) claims for
relief: (1) the requesting spouse must satisfy the seven threshold
requirements, Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01; (2) the requesting spouse must
satisfy the three-part test for streamlined relief, id. § 4.02, 2013-43
I.R.B. at 400; or (3) if a requesting spouse does not satisfy the test for
streamlined relief, the requesting spouse may still qualify for relief from
joint and several liability if it would be inequitable to hold the spouse
liable in the light of the nonexclusive list of factors outlined in Revenue
Procedure 2013-34, § 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400–403. Although the
Court considers those procedures when reviewing the Commissioner’s
determination, the Court is not bound by them. Leith v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2020-149, at *19.
1.

Threshold Requirements

The requesting spouse must meet seven threshold requirements
to be considered for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2013-34,
§ 4.01. Those requirements are (a) the requesting spouse filed a joint
return for the taxable year for which relief is sought; (b) relief is not
available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (c) the
claim for relief is timely filed; (d) no assets were transferred between the
spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme; (e) the nonrequesting spouse did
not transfer disqualified assets to the requesting spouse; (f) the
16 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, superseded by Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 20032 C.B. 296, superseded by Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397.

24
[*24] requesting spouse did not knowingly participate in the filing of a
fraudulent joint return; and (g) absent certain enumerated exceptions,
the tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is
attributable to an item of the nonrequesting spouse or an underpayment
resulting from the nonrequesting spouse’s income. Rev. Proc. 2013-34,
§ 4.01.
As discussed supra Part IV.A, the parties have stipulated that
Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover elected to file a joint return for the taxable
years at issue, a stipulation which is also supported by the broader
record. Next, with respect to the items attributable to Mr. Vanover for
taxable year 2018, the Court has granted Ms. Salvi relief under section
6015(c); therefore, she is not eligible for relief for those items pursuant
to 6015(f). Further, Ms. Salvi filed a timely claim for relief for the
taxable years at issue, and there is no evidence that Ms. Salvi and Mr.
Vanover transferred assets as part of a fraudulent scheme, that Mr.
Vanover transferred disqualified assets to Ms. Salvi, or that they
knowingly filed a fraudulent return. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34,
§ 4.01(1)–(6), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399.
We now turn to the final threshold requirement, that to be eligible
for relief under section 6015(f) a requesting spouse, like Ms. Salvi, must
show that the income tax liability from which she seeks relief is
attributable (either in full or in part) to an item of the nonrequesting
spouse or an underpayment resulting from the nonrequesting spouse’s
income. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399–400.
This rule is subject to a number of exceptions, including in instances
where attribution is solely due to the operation of community property
laws, nominal ownership, misappropriation of funds, abuse, or fraud
committed by the nonrequesting spouse. 17 Id.
17 In his Simultaneous Opening Brief (Doc. 61) respondent states that Ms. Salvi

satisfies all seven threshold conditions for relief under section 6015(f). See Rev. Prov.
2013-34, § 4.01. But respondent also states that the entire underpayment for taxable
year 2017 was due to insufficient withholding by Ms. Salvi and that approximately
two-thirds of the underpayment for taxable year 2018 was due to insufficient
withholding by her. Respondent then continues, stating that Ms. Salvi’s Form W–2
income is attributable or partially attributable to Ms. Salvi because the nominal
ownership exception applies in this case. Respondent reasons that the nominal
ownership exception applies because the Form W–2 income was titled in Ms. Salvi’s
name.
Respondent misapplies the threshold attribution condition and the nominal
ownership exception. If the liability is wholly or partially attributable to the requesting

25
[*25] Respondent asserts that the entire underpayment for taxable
year 2017 was attributable to insufficient withholding by Ms. Salvi.
Further, respondent argues that approximately two-thirds of the
underpayment for taxable year 2018 is attributable to insufficient
withholding by Ms. Salvi. Ms. Salvi bears the burden of proving that she
is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f), see Porter, 132 T.C.
at 210, which includes showing that the income tax liabilities are
attributable to items of Mr. Vanover or his income, see Wang v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-206. Ms. Salvi has not met her burden
of proving the proper allocation of items. See id. And in any event, even
assuming arguendo that Ms. Salvi had shown that the underpayments
were solely attributable to Mr. Vanover or his income, as discussed
further below, it would not change the outcome of this case.
With respect to the understatement for taxable year 2018, as
discussed above, the Court has already granted Ms. Salvi relief under
section 6015(c) for the items allocable to Mr. Vanover. With respect to
the remaining items for taxable year 2018, we find that such items are
attributable to Ms. Salvi and, because no exception is applicable, we
conclude that Ms. Salvi is not eligible for relief with respect to those
items. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01(7); see also, e.g., Phemister v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-201, 2009 WL 2877907, at *16.
Accordingly, we need not address further the understatement for
taxable year 2018.
2.

Streamlined Determination

Revenue Procedure 2013-34, § 4.02, sets forth circumstances
under which the Commissioner will make a streamlined determination
granting equitable relief to the requesting spouse. These include that
she establishes that she (a) is no longer married to the nonrequesting
spouse, (b) would suffer economic hardship if not granted relief
(economic hardship requirement), and (c) did not know or have reason
to know that there was an understatement or deficiency on the joint
income tax return or did not know or have reason to know that the
spouse, then the requesting spouse is generally not eligible for relief from those
amounts unless an exception applies. See id. § 4.01(7). As is the case here, Ms. Salvi’s
Form W–2 income is attributable to her, and she generally is ineligible for relief from
those items. See id. The nominal ownership exception would apply if the income items
were titled in Ms. Salvi’s name, but Mr. Vanover ultimately received or was the
beneficial owner of such items of income. See id.; see also, e.g., Robinson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-134, at *22–23. As that is not the case here, we do not
find that the nominal ownership exception applies.

26
[*26] nonrequesting spouse would not or could not pay the tax reported
on the joint income tax return. Id. The requesting spouse must establish
that she satisfies each of the three conditions to receive a streamlined
determination granting relief. Id. As relevant here, we find that Ms.
Salvi would not suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted;
therefore, not all the streamlined determination conditions are satisfied.
Specifically, the economic hardship condition is met when a
failure to grant relief from joint and several liability would cause the
requesting spouse to be unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses.
Id. § 4.02(2), 4.03(2)(b), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400, 401. If denying relief
would not cause the requesting spouse economic hardship, this condition
for streamlined relief is not satisfied. Id. § 4.02(2). Generally, a
requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship if (1) the requesting
spouse’s income is less than 250% of the federal poverty guidelines or if
her monthly income exceeds her reasonable basic living expenses by
$300 or less and (2) the requesting spouse does not have assets from
which the requesting spouse can make payments towards the tax
liability and still meet reasonable basic living expenses. Id. § 4.02(2),
4.03(2)(b); see also Contreras v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-12,
at *16–17.
Additionally, if neither of the foregoing tests is met, then the
Court will also consider additional factors such as (1) the taxpayer’s age
and earning potential, (2) an amount reasonably necessary for food,
clothing, housing, medical expenses, and transportation, (3) the amount
of assets available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses, (4) the cost of living
in the geographical area in which the taxpayer lives, and (5) any other
factors bearing on economic hardship. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02(2)
(citing id. § 4.03(2)(b) (“Whether the requesting spouse will suffer
economic hardship is determined based on rules similar to those
provided in Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) . . . .”)).
This Court is tasked with evaluating Ms. Salvi’s economic
position at the time of trial on April 15, 2024. 18 See Pullins, 136 T.C. at
446–47. A hypothetical hardship is insufficient to justify relief, and a
taxpayer must demonstrate that imposing joint and several liability is

18 Because we must evaluate Ms. Salvi’s economic position as of the time of
trial, we do not find Ms. Salvi’s statements regarding her economic position on her
Form 8857 helpful in the instant analysis. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432,
446–47 (2011).

27
[*27] “inequitable in present terms.” Id. at 446 (quoting Von Kalinowski
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-21, 2001 WL 77034, at *8).
At the time of trial, on April 15, 2024, Ms. Salvi testified that she
makes approximately $85,000 per year. The federal poverty guidelines
for taxable year 2024 provide that a household with three persons in the
contiguous 48 states has a poverty threshold of $25,820, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 9902(2); see also Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 89
Fed. Reg. 2961, 2962 (Jan. 17, 2024), 250% of which equals $64,550.
Accordingly, on the basis of the facts and circumstances, Ms. Salvi does
not meet the requirements to show economic hardship.
Further, considering the evidence before the Court, Ms. Salvi has
not established that she would face present hardship if she were not
granted relief. Ms. Salvi is highly educated, with both a bachelor’s and
a master’s degree. Ms. Salvi is currently employed as a human resource
professional and owns her home. These facts do not support a finding
that it would be inequitable to impose joint and several liability based
on Ms. Salvi’s economic position. See Pullins, 136 T.C. at 446 (citing Von
Kalinowski v. Commissioner, 2001 WL 77034, at *8). Accordingly, this
condition for streamlined relief is not satisfied.
Because the requirements of the streamlined determination are
conjunctive, and because Ms. Salvi fails to meet the economic hardship
requirement of the streamlined determination, she is not eligible for
streamlined relief, and we will proceed to the full equitable relief
analysis.
3.

Full Equitable Relief Analysis

Under the full equitable relief analysis of section 6015(f), the
Court will consider the following list of nonexclusive factors: (a) current
marital status; (b) whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic
hardship if relief were not granted; (c) in understatement cases, whether
the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know of the
understatement, or in underpayment cases, whether the requesting
spouse knew or had reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would
not or could not pay the tax liability, and in either case, the effect of any
spousal abuse or financial control; (d) whether either spouse has a legal
obligation to pay the outstanding federal income tax liability;
(e) whether the requesting spouse significantly benefited from the
understatement or underpayment; (f) whether the requesting spouse
has made a good faith effort to comply with the income tax laws in the

28
[*28] years following the tax years for which relief is sought; and
(g) whether the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health
at the time the joint return was filed. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2). No
single factor is dispositive, and “[t]he degree of importance of each factor
varies depending on the requesting spouse’s facts and circumstances.”
See Rawat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-56, at *7 (quoting Rev.
Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)). The Court can also consider any other relevant
facts. Id.
a.

Marital Status Factor

This condition is met if the requesting spouse is no longer married
to the nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(a), 2013-43
I.R.B. at 400. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover stipulated that they were
divorced on January 20, 2023, which is supported by the accompanying
decree of divorce in the record. Accordingly, this factor favors relief.
b.

Economic Hardship Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief when a failure to grant relief
from joint and several liability would cause the requesting spouse to be
unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses. Id. § 4.03(2)(b), 2013-43
I.R.B. at 401. If denying relief would not cause the requesting spouse
economic hardship, this factor is neutral. Id. As discussed supra
Part IV.D.2, Ms. Salvi has not presented sufficient evidence to prove her
claim of economic hardship. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
c.

Lack of Knowledge Factor

The standard for the lack of knowledge factor with respect to an
underpayment of income tax, as occurred here for taxable years 2017
and 2018, weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse reasonably
expected the nonrequesting spouse to pay the tax liability reported on
the return. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 401–02.
This factor weighs against relief if it was not reasonable for the
requesting spouse to believe that the nonrequesting spouse would or
could pay the tax liability reported on the return. Id. However,
knowledge may be mitigated in instances where there is abuse or
financial control by the nonrequesting spouse. See id. § 4.03(2)(c)(i)
and (ii).
Specifically, the requesting spouse must establish that (1) when
she signed the return she did not know and had no reason to know that
the tax reported on the return would not be paid and (2) it was

29
[*29] reasonable for the requesting spouse to believe that the
nonrequesting spouse would pay the tax shown due. Id. § 4.03(2)(c)(ii);
see Morello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-181, 2004 WL 1765148,
at *4.
At the time Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed the joint returns for
taxable years 2017 and 2018, Ms. Salvi had knowledge of, and certainly
had reason to know that tax reported on the returns would not be paid.
Furthermore, it was entirely unreasonable for Ms. Salvi to believe that
Mr. Vanover would pay the amounts due for the taxable years at issue.
The testimony and the documentary evidence in the record reflect
that Ms. Salvi was primarily responsible for managing the bills in the
household and that she took a primary role in gathering tax information
and communicating with Mr. DiPietro, her cousin and CPA, who
prepared joint returns for the taxable years at issue. Additionally, Ms.
Salvi knew that Mr. Vanover had financial problems “[p]robably after
we’d been married a couple years,” i.e., 2017, “because [Mr. Vanover]
would get a lot of phone calls for collections” and he “couldn’t get credit
cards.” This indicates that Ms. Salvi had reason to know that Mr.
Vanover would not pay the tax due and that any contrary belief was
unreasonable.
Furthermore, Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover had previously filed for
an extension for taxable year 2015, and they failed to pay the tax on the
2015 joint return. Accordingly, in 2017 Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover
retained a lawyer to help secure an installment agreement for the
outstanding liability for taxable year 2015. This fact alone is sufficient
to demonstrate that Ms. Salvi knew or should have known that Mr.
Vanover would not pay the tax shown as due on the return and that it
was unreasonable for her believe that Mr. Vanover would pay that tax.
See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii); see also Morello v. Commissioner,
2004 WL 1765148, at *4. Further, on her Form 8857 Ms. Salvi stated
that she “began to suspect problems” when Ms. Szczepanik “discovered
[that Mr. Vanover] ha[d] a lot of past due taxes.” This fact further
demonstrates that Ms. Salvi had reason to know that Mr. Vanover would
not pay the tax due and that any belief that he would pay the tax liability
was unreasonable.
Ms. Salvi makes various claims that she was subject to abuse or
financial control by Mr. Vanover. Knowledge may be negated if the
nonrequesting spouse abused the requesting spouse or maintained
control of the household finances by restricting the requesting spouse’s

30
[*30] access to financial information such that the nonrequesting
spouse’s actions prevented the requesting spouse from questioning or
challenging the understatement on the return or the underpayment of
the liability. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02(3)(a), 4.03(2)(c)(i) and (ii). We
will discuss these items in turn.
i.

Financial Control

Ms. Salvi claims that she was a victim of financial abuse.
However, considering the evidence in the record, we cannot agree. The
record reflects that Ms. Salvi was the spouse primarily responsible for
managing the finances of the household. Further, during the taxable
years at issue, the parties stipulated, and the record also supports, that
Mr. Vanover contributed funds to a joint bank account for various
household expenses, including Ms. Salvi’s mortgage. Ms. Salvi had
control of the joint funds to pay household expenses, including her
mortgage, and of her own funds deposited in her separate bank account.
At trial Ms. Salvi claimed that Mr. Vanover withheld funds on
occasion. However, Ms. Salvi has failed to carry her burden. Aside from
Ms. Salvi’s testimony, which we did not find credible and which
contradicts the parties’ stipulations, Ms. Salvi did not present any
evidence to support her uncorroborated testimony that Mr. Vanover did
not contribute to the household expenses while he lived at the marital
residence. This is despite the fact that Ms. Salvi claimed to have in her
control evidence showing that Mr. Vanover did not contribute to the
household expenses. Accordingly, we do not find evidence of financial
control sufficient to obviate Ms. Salvi’s knowledge for the taxable years
at issue.
ii.

Abuse

Finally, Ms. Salvi claims that she was a victim of abuse during
her relationship with Mr. Vanover. “Abuse comes in many forms and can
include physical, psychological, sexual, or emotional abuse, including
efforts to control, isolate, humiliate, and intimidate the requesting
spouse, or to undermine the requesting spouse’s ability to reason
independently and be able to do what is required under the tax laws.”
Id. § 4.03(2)(c)(iv), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 402; see, e.g., Leith, T.C. Memo.
2020-149, at *27. This Court takes all facts and circumstances into
account in determining the presence of abuse, and it requires—at a
minimum—specificity regarding allegations of abuse. Rev. Proc. 201334, § 4.01; see Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135, 2008

31
[*31] WL 2120983, at *10–11; see also Deihl v. Commissioner, 603
F. App’x 527, 529 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2012-176.
A generalized claim of abuse is insufficient. See Thomassen v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-88, 2011 WL 1518446, at *11–12, aff’d,
564 F. App’x 885 (9th Cir. 2014).
The Court takes claims of abuse seriously, but it is Ms. Salvi’s
burden to prove entitlement to relief. See Porter, 132 T.C. at 210.
Considering the facts and circumstances in the record, we do not find
that Ms. Salvi’s claims rise to a level that negates her knowledge. See
Freman, T.C. Memo. 2023-10, at *17. Generally, we found Ms. Salvi’s
claims of abuse too generalized to support a finding of abuse. See
Thomassen v. Commissioner, 2011 WL 1518446, at *11–12. At trial, Ms.
Salvi did not provide specific testimony regarding the physical
altercation between herself and Mr. Vanover in February 2020 or
regarding any other instances of physical abuse. Rather it was Mr.
Vanover who credibly testified that Ms. Salvi engaged in physical acts
of violence against him during the February 2020 altercation. We found
Mr. Vanover’s testimony on this point both sincere and candid. Further,
Ms. Salvi was convicted of domestic violence and disorderly conduct.
That conviction stemmed from the February 2020 incident and was
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Ohio.
To the extent Ms. Salvi herself was a victim of spousal abuse in
February 2020, it does not warrant a different outcome. First, at trial
Ms. Salvi did not testify about the February 2020 altercation with Mr.
Vanover. To the extent that Ms. Salvi alleged abuse in her Forms 8857
and 12509, and attached thereto evidence in support of this contention,
we find that it occurred after the tax returns at issue were filed and is
therefore immaterial to the issues before us. See Welwood v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-113, at *21 (“[W]e are unpersuaded
that any perceived abuse was material to the issues before us.”).
Accordingly, we find that Ms. Salvi had reason to know that the
tax on the return would not be paid, and therefore we find the knowledge
factor weighs against relief.
d.

Legal Obligation Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief when the nonrequesting
spouse, through a divorce decree or other legally binding agreement,
bears the sole legal obligation to pay the outstanding liability. Rev. Proc.
2013-34, § 4.03(2)(d), 2013-34 I.R.B. at 402. This factor weighs against

32
[*32] relief if the requesting spouse has the legal obligation to pay, and
it is neutral if the divorce decree is silent as to tax liabilities or the
spouses are not separated. Id. The divorce decree orders that “the
parties shall evenly divide the remaining balances owed to the [IRS] . . .
for the marital tax years of 2015 through 2019.” This militates against
relief. However, the divorce decree continues, and orders that “[t]he
equal division of these marital tax years is subject to modification upon
future ruling/order of the United States Tax Court and the IRS.”
Because the equal division of the tax liability remains subject to
modification by the Tax Court, this factor is neutral.
e.

No Significant Benefit Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse did
not receive a significant benefit, that is, a benefit in excess of normal
support, due to the understatement or underpayment of tax. 19 Soler v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-78, at *12–13 (citing Butner v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-136). This factor weighs against relief
if the requesting spouse received a significant benefit due to the
understatement or underpayment of tax. Rev. Proc. 2013-34,
§ 4.03(2)(e), 2013-34 I.R.B. at 402. Any amounts Ms. Salvi received from
Mr. Vanover constitute normal support, and we find that Ms. Salvi did
not receive any significant benefit because of the underpayment of tax
during the taxable years at issue. See Pullins, 136 T.C. at 452
(“Mortgage payments on a middle-class home constitute normal support
that is not considered to generate ‘significant benefit’.”). We find this
factor weighs in favor of relief.
f.

Compliance Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse is in
compliance with the tax laws for the tax years after being divorced from
the nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-43, § 4.03(2)(f)(i), 2013-34
I.R.B. at 402. This factor weighs against relief if the requesting spouse
is not in compliance for the tax years after being divorced from the
nonrequesting spouse. Id. This factor is neutral if the requesting spouse
has made a good faith effort to comply with the tax laws but was unable
to fully comply. Id.

19 The Court treats this factor as favoring relief despite the fact that Revenue
Procedure 2013-34 treats this factor as neutral. Compare Robinson, T.C. Memo. 2020134, at *33–34, with Rev. Proc. 2013-36, § 4.03(2)(e).

33
[*33] Since her separation from Mr. Vanover, Ms. Salvi’s tax
compliance has varied. During the administrative proceeding the IRS
determined that the compliance factor weighed against relief because,
although Ms. Salvi filed separate tax returns after her separation from
Mr. Vanover, she was not in full compliance with federal tax laws. At
present, the record does not contain any evidence regarding Ms. Salvi’s
tax compliance for taxable year 2019 or 2020. As to taxable year 2021,
Ms. Salvi could not remember whether she had filed a return. For
taxable year 2022 Ms. Salvi stated that she had filed for an extension
that she “keep[s] renewing,” and that, as of the time of trial, she had not
yet filed that return. The record does not contain any evidence regarding
Ms. Salvi’s tax compliance for taxable year 2023. 20
With the exception of the return for taxable year 2023, since her
separation from Mr. Vanover in February 2020, Ms. Salvi has either not
filed a tax return or has failed to present any evidence to support the
contention that she has made a good faith effort to comply with the
income tax laws. Considering all the facts regarding her subsequent
compliance with the income tax laws, and particularly Ms. Salvi’s
testimony regarding her yet-to-be-filed return for taxable year 2022, we
find that this factor militates against relief.
g.

Mental or Physical Health Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse was
in poor physical or mental health at the time the returns from which she
seeks relief were filed, or at the time she requested relief. Id. § 4.03(2)(g),
2013-34 I.R.B. at 403. If the requesting spouse was in neither poor
mental nor physical health, this factor is neutral. Id. While Ms. Salvi
claimed that she was a victim of abuse at trial, she did not testify or
argue that she suffered emotional distress as a result of such abuse. On
brief, Ms. Salvi claims that she has suffered mental duress from the
abuse inflicted by Mr. Vanover. The Court is sympathetic to Ms. Salvi’s
claim of abuse and mental duress, but Ms. Salvi raised her argument
regarding mental duress for the first time in her Simultaneous
20 The record is void of evidence regarding Ms. Salvi’s tax compliance for
taxable year 2023. The filing deadline for returns for taxable year 2023 was on or before
the end of the day on April 15, 2024. I.R.S. News Release IR-2024-04 (Jan. 8, 2024);
see also § 6072(a) (providing that a person required to make a return of income under
section 6012 shall file such return on or before April 15). Trial in this case occurred
during the day on April 15, 2024, and thus Ms. Salvi had until the end of the day to
file her return. Accordingly, we find that the absence of this evidence is neutral. See
Freman, T.C. Memo. 2023-10, at *31.

34
[*34] Answering Brief (Doc. 67); consequently, she has waived the
argument. See Sehati v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-3, at *7.
Further, we find that any such claims are unsupported by the record.
Accordingly, we find that this factor is neutral.
Considering the foregoing factors, we conclude that it would not
be inequitable to hold Ms. Salvi liable for the underpayment amounts
for the taxable years at issue. Accordingly, we find that Ms. Salvi is not
eligible for relief pursuant to section 6015(f) for the taxable years at
issue.
V.

Conclusion

We conclude that Ms. Salvi is eligible for partial relief pursuant
to section 6015(c) with respect to the understatement of tax attributable
to erroneous items of Mr. Vanover for taxable year 2018. However, we
conclude that it is not inequitable to hold Ms. Salvi liable for all
remaining amounts, and therefore we will deny relief pursuant to
section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for all other items for the taxable years at
issue.
The Court has considered all the other contentions of the parties
and, to the extent not discussed above, finds those arguments to be
irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Atax-court%3A720be3e192919567. Public record. Not legal advice.