# Department of the Treasury (2013)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Airs%3A6910271c0d4a59c9

## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

United States
Department of the Treasury

Director, Office of Professional Responsibility,
Complainant-Appellant and Appellee
v.

Complaint No. 2013-07
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103

Respondent-Appellant and Appellee

Decision on Appeal

Pursuant to General Counsel Order No. 9 (January 19,2001) and Office of Chief
Counsel Notice CC-2014-008 (September 8,2014), I decide disciplinary appeals to the
Secretary of the Treasury filed under 31 C.F.R. Part 10, Practice Before the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), hereinafter referred to as Circular 230 (all references are to
Circular 230 as in effect for the periods at issue). This is such an appeal from a
Decision and Order entered into this proceeding by Administrative Law Judge Harvey C.
Sweitzer (the ALJ) on September 22,2014.

Background

This proceeding was commenced on April 15, 2013 when Timothy E. Heinlein, an
attorney acting as the authorized representative of the Complainant Appellant-Appellee
Office of Professional Responsibility (henceforth, OPR or Complainant) filed a
Complaint against Respondent Appellant“Appeliee (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 (henceforth,
Respondent) under the authority of 31 C.F.R part 10* (Circular 230), alleging that the
Respondent engaged in disreputable conduct under § 10.51of Circular 230, based
upon the revocation of his Certified Public Accountant (CPA) license by the California
state authority, and his(b)3/26USC103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103.

The Complainant requested that the Respondent

be disbarred from practice before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

1 Portions of Circular 230 were amended on June 12, 2014. See 79 Fed. Reg. 33685 (June 12, 2014);
Circular 230 (Rev. 6-2014). However, these proceedings were conducted under the prior version of
Circular 230 and Respondent's past conduct is governed by the regulatory provisions before (illegible text)
the conduct occurred. See 31 C.F.R. § 19.91 (2014). Thus, regulatory citations will reference the
applicable revisions to Circular 230 as codified in the 2008 or 2011 Code of Federal Regulations
("C.F.R."). See 72 Fed, Reg. 54540 (Sept. 26, 2007); 76 Fed. Reg. 32286 June 3, 2011); see also
Circular 230 (Rev. 4-2008); Circular 230 (Rev. 8-2011).

Internal Revenue Service APR 21 2015

Office of Professional Responsibility

2

Complainant originally initiated disciplinary action against Respondent on March 4,
2011, pursuant to the regulation governing expedited suspensions at § 10.82 of Circular
230 (2008). Complainant sought an expedited suspension based upon the revocation
of Respondent's California CPA license by the California Board of Accountancy ("CBA")
which became effective on (b)6)
I. As part of that license revocation
proceeding, a state Administrative Law Judge ("state ALJ") identified six separate bases
for revocation, including a finding that Respondent willfully practiced and held himself
out as a CPA during periods of time when his license to practice had lapsed; that
Respondent knowingly and willfully submitted untrue statements to the CBA and failed
to respond to inquiries of the CBA; and, the Respondent knowingly misrepresented to a
client whether the client’s tax return had been filed. Respondent failed to respond to
Complainant’s expedited suspension complaint, and a Decision by Default was issued,
suspending Respondent from practice before the IRS beginning May 4, 2011.
On March 14,2013, within the two-year period authorized by the disciplinary
regulations, Respondent requested the issuance of a complaint in accordance with
§ 10.60 of Circular 230. Complainant sent Respondent a notice in a Supplemental
Allegation Letter (dated March 25, 2013) of the additional allegations that could be
included in any complaint issued under § 10.60 and allowed Respondent 14 days to
respond. On April15, 2013, Complainant issued a formal Complaint instituting the
above-captioned proceeding.

Although the Complaint initially contained six separate counts of alleged incompetence
and disreputable conduct, the Complainant made a motion to withdraw two of the
counts, which was granted on May 14, 2013. The four remaining counts allege that
Respondent engaged in Incompetence and disreputable conduct under § 10.51 of
Circular 230 (2008 and 2011) based upon the revocation of his CPA license by the CBA
(Count 1) (b)(3)/26
USC6103 (b)3/26USC6103(Counts 2 through 4, respectively). The Complaint seeks
the sanction of disbarment from practice before the IRS.
As part of Respondent's Answer, he acknowledged that the CBA revoked his CPA
license, but disagreed with the CBA's reasoning and noted that he was actively pursuing
judicial review of the CBA's revocation decision. With respect to the
(b)3/26USC6103 counts,
Respondent asserted in his Answer that he (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 (b)(3)/26 USC
6103 As to each of the (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 counts, the

Respondent denied that his actions were willful, citing his father’s illness and the CBA's
proceedings against him.
During the pendency of this case, Respondent separately pursued appeals in the State
of California related to his license revocation by the CBA. He initially petitioned the
California Superior Court for a writ of administrative mandamus which the court denied,
concluding that the CBA's findings were supported by the weight of the evidence and
that the license revocation was not an abuse of discretion. See (b)(6)
(B)6 On September 27,2013, the Fourth

3

District of the California Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the CBA had not abused
its discretion by revoking Respondent's license. (b)(6) On (b)(6) the
California Supreme Court denied Respondent's request for review, thereby concluding
Respondent's judicial appeals related to the revocation of his CPA license by the State
of California.

On February 4 and 5,2014, Administrative Law Judge Harvey C. Sweitzer (the ALJ) of
the Department of the Interior held an evidentiary hearing in this matter. Complainant
presented the testimony of three witnesses and submitted exhibits that were accepted
into evidence. Respondent testified on his own behalf and entered one exhibit Into
evidence.
Following the hearing, by Decision and Order dated September 22, 2014, the ALJ
determined the following conclusions of law, based upon proof established by clear and
convincing evidence:
1. At all times material hereto, Respondent was subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Secretary of the Treasury and OPR in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 330 and 31
C.F.R. part 10 (Circular 230).
2. Respondent engaged in incompetent and disreputable conduct within the meaning of
§ 10.51 (a)(10) of Circular 230 (2008) based upon the revocation of his California CPA
license.

3. Respondent also engaged in incompetent and disreputable conduct within the
meaning of § 10.51(a)(6) based upon his (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 (b)(3)/26 USC 6103

The ALJ determined that because the Respondent's (b)3/26USC6103
fell after the effective date for his
suspension from practice before the IRS (May 4, 2011), this was an aggravating factor,
but not a separate basis of misconduct.

(b)3/26USC6103

4. The ALJ determined the proper sanction for Respondent's conduct to be a
suspension of forty-eight (48) months, with reinstatement after the period of suspension
conditioned on Respondent becoming
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103
and otherwise becoming authorized to practice.

On October 21,2014, Complainant filed its Notice of Appeal of the ALJ’s decision. The
Complainant's appeal asserted: 1) The ALJ’s decision to treat the respondent's(b)3/26USC6103(b)3/26USC
6103as an aggravating factor and not as a separate count of
misconduct was clearly erroneous; and 2) The ALJ’s decision to reduce complainant's
recommended disbarment to a forty-eight month suspension was clearly erroneous.
On October 22, 2014, Respondent filed his Notice of Appeal of the ALJ’s decision. In
summary, the Respondent's appeal asserted: First, with respect to jurisdiction that the
ALJ improperly determined jurisdiction over the respondent as practicing before the

4
IRS. Second, that the ALJ did not properly address alleged procedural and evidentiary
deficiencies in the proceeding. Third, with respect to the counts concerning the(b)(3)/26 USC6103 (b)(3)/26 USC6103
that the ALJ did not provide a clear and convincing calculation
or Respondent’s gross income supporting the filing requirements for the Respondent for
each year at issue, and the circumstances surrounding the (b)(3)/26 USC 6103

Findings of Fact
The Appellate Authority reviews the ALJ's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard of review. § 10.78 of Circular 230. The ALJ's findings of fact are well
supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.
Analysis

Both parties have appealed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Because the
consideration of the Complainant’s appeal regarding the additional count and
appropriate sanction would be obviated if I were to hold in favor of the Respondent's
appeal, I will first consider the Respondent's appeal contesting the findings of the ALJ
that the Respondent engaged in incompetence and disreputable conduct.
The Respondent's Appeal

Jurisdiction

Under 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)-(b), the Secretary of the Treasury has authority to "regulate
the practice of representatives" before the Department, and may suspend or disbar a
representative shown to be incompetent or disreputable. For purposes of OPR's
disciplinary authority, jurisdiction exists if: (1) the practitioner is authorized to practice
before the IRS and (2) the practitioner has in fact practiced before the IRS., Director,
OPR v. Ohendalski, Complaint No. 2007-10 (Decision on Appeal, June 2008). CPAs
who have not been suspended or disbarred from practice before the IRS may engage in
practice before the IRS. See 10.3(b) of Circular 230 (2008 & 2011). The regulations
define a CPA as "any person who is duly qualified to practice as a certified public
accountant in any state, territory, or possession of the United States,..." § 10.2(a)(2) of
Circular 230 (2008 & 2011).
The ALJ correctly found that when Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint, he did
not raise the Issue of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense or otherwise deny the
jurisdictional allegations pled in the Complaint The first paragraph of the Complaint
alleged that "Respondent has engaged in practice before the IRS, as defined by 31
C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4), as a certified public accountant." In response, the Respondent
stated: "Respondent has not engaged in practice before the IRS, as defined by C.F.R.
sec. 10.2(a)(4) at any time after calendar year 2009." Ex. B at 11. The ALJ correctly
found that by doing so, Respondent conceded that he had engaged in practice as a
CPA before the IRS prior to that date (2009). Moreover, in response to the second
paragraph of the Complaint, Respondent stated: "Respondent accepts and stipulates to

the disciplinary authority of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Office of Professional
Responsibility." Only days prior to the hearing before the ALJ did the Respondent first
attempt to reverse his admissions in response to the allegations contained in the
Complaint.
As found by the ALJ, by the Respondent not denying that he had engaged in past
practice before the IRS when he filed his Answer, the allegation was deemed admitted,
and the Complainant had no obligation to proffer additional evidence on this point. See
§ 10.64(c) of Circular 230 (2011). Additionally, the Respondent affirmatively stipulated
to the disciplinary authority of the Complainant in this case. To require the Complainant
to offer evidentiary proof related to allegations admitted In the Answer, as advocated by
Respondent, would abrogate the regulatory scheme and add unnecessarily expense
and delay to the hearing process.

The ALJ correctly determined that the Respondent had conceded that he had practiced
before the IRS, sufficient to confer jurisdiction with OPR under 31 USC § 330.
Incompetence and Disreputable Conduct - Disbarment
Section 10.51(a)(10) of Circular 230 provides that Incompetence and disreputable
conduct includes disbarment as a CPA by any duly constituted authority of any state.
With regard to this count, the findings of fact and the record as a whole clearly establish
that the Respondent's license to practice as a CPA was revoked by the CBA effective
March 14, 2011, and that this revocation was sustained by both the California Court of
Appeals and the California Supreme Court. The loss of Respondent’s CPA license In
California meets the standards of IRS disreputable conduct under § 10.51(a)(10) of
Circular 230. That section merely requires the fact of Respondent's disbarment or
suspension as a CPA, which occurred in California. With regard to Count 1, this clearly
and convincingly establishes that the Respondent committed acts that are deemed
incompetent or disreputable under Circular 230. Director, OPR v. Christensen,
Complaint No. 2012-05 (July 23,2013).
Incompetence and Disreputable Conduct -6103
(b)(3)/26 USC

Counts 2 through 4 of the Complaint allege that Respondent engaged in disreputable
conduct under § 10.51(a)(6) of Circular 230 (2008 and 2011) based upon his(b)3/26USC6103 (b)3/26USC6103

Respondent first challenges these counts as "supplemental charges" that did not serve
as a basis for his original expedited suspension from practice before the IRS, and were
therefore improperly raised by Complainant. The ALJ correctly determined that the
Complainant did not Improperly raise these counts; the Complainant included them in
the original Complaint issued on April 15, 2013; the Complainant detailed the counts in
a Supplemental Allegation letter to the Respondent; the Complainant afforded the
Respondent the opportunity to respond to the counts; and the Complainant conducted a

conference call with the Respondent which included these counts. It was not improper
for the Complainant to include these Counts in the Complaint, even though they were
not included in the Expedited proceeding. The Respondent’s reference to supplemental
charges Is misplaced. Under Circular 230, supplemental charges are charges made
against the Respondent by amending the Complaint with the permission of the ALJ.
§ 10.65(a) of Circular 230. The counts alleging the (b)(3)/26 USC 6103
(Counts
through 4), were contained in the original Complaint; they were not amendments to the
Complaint. The supplemental charges provisions asserted by the Respondent are not
applicable. The ALJ correctly determined that Counts 2 through 4, asserting the(b)3/26USC6103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103
were properly contained iff
the Complaint.
The Respondent next asserts that the ALJ erred In finding that the Respondent6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
because there was not sufficient legal
evidence or process for a determination of income to determine whether or not
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103 In so alleging. Respondent confuses
the (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 when one is due, with the determination of tax due from
an individual. These are two separate obligations, as the ALJ correctly determined.

(b)(3)/26 USC 6103

On Appeal, the Respondent insists that there is an obligation on the Complainant to
determine a "deficiency” of tax due from the Respondent before a (b)3/26USC103
(b)3/26USC103 may be asserted. This is incorrect The record is clear, arid the ALJ correctly
found, that for each of the(b)3/26USC10(b)3/6
(b)(3)/26
6103
Indeed,
USC
the Respondent himself presented putative
draft return forms at the hearing which Included these amounts of income (Exhibit L).

In summary, the ALJ correctly determined that the Respondent had a legal obligation to
(b)(3)/26
USC
land that
he
6(b)31/2U0SC63
(the additional determination by the ALJ with respect to Count 4
and the(b)3/26USC103
will be discussed below).
I have considered all of the arguments made on Appeal by Respondent, and to the.
extent not mentioned herein, I find them to be irrelevant or without merit. The
Respondent’s appeal is denied.
Complainant's Appeal

I will now consider the Appeal filed by the Complainant. The Complainant contests as
clearly erroneous the ALJ's findings that: 1) The Respondent’s(b)3/26USC103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103 should be treated as an aggravating factor, rather than a separate count
of incompetence and disreputable conduct; and'2) that the recommended sanction of
disbarment is to be reduced to a forty-eight month suspension.

7
Count 4 and the6103
(b)(3)/26 USC

When summarizing his determination that the Respondent6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
and engaged in incompetence and disreputable conduct, the ALJ stated:
...there is some ambiguity as to whether OPR can pursue discipline against
Respondent for his(b)3/26USC103
(b)3/26USC103 given that his suspension before the IRS became effective on May 4,
2011. However, for purposes of this Decision and the sanction imposed herein, it
is unnecessary to resolve that ambiguity. Respondent's(b)3/26USC103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103
constitutes
disreputable conduct under 31 C.F.R. § 10.51l(a)(6) (2008) for which Respondent
may be sanctioned. Decision and Order, 19.

From this, it is unclear whether this determination by the ALJ had any impact on the
proposed sanction. In determining the appropriate sanction, the ALJ stated the
following with respect to (b)(3)/26 USC 6103
Although Respondent's (b)3/26USC103
is not being
considered as a separate basis of misconduct in this Decision given that the
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103 arose after OPR suspended him from practice (b)(3)/26 USC 6103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103 constitutes an aggravating factor. Specifically, it demonstrates an
ongoing pattern of (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 a behavior that is particularly
troubling for a tax practitioner. Respondent's lack of respect for the tax laws is
further supported by his persistent(b)3/26USC6103
As of the
hearing, Respondent had yet to (b)(3)/26 USC 6103
(b)3/26USC6103 Decison and Order, 20-21
The Complainant asserts that the determination by the ALJ to treat the Respondent's
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103
as an aggravating factor, and not as a separate
count of incompetence or disreputable conduct, as asserted in the Complaint, was
clearly erroneous.

During6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
(b)3/26USC103 Complainant's Exhibit G. The
b()32/6USC10 The(b)3/26USC103

(b)3/26USC 103 The ALJ’s ambiguity on the issue appears to arise
because the extended due date of October 15,2011, falls after the effective date of the
suspension proposed by the Complainant in the original expedited proceeding, i.e., May
4, 2011. An examination of the timeline of the assertion of the (b)3/26USC103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103 reveals the troubling aspect of the ALJ’s breaking-out of this instance of
incompetence and disreputable conduct, and how that is inconsistent with the
provisions of Circular 230 in effect at the time.

The Complainant’s Expedited Notice of Proceeding, asserting the single ground of
Respondent's disbarment by the CBA, was mailed on March 4, 2011. The Respondent
did not reply; accordingly, a Decision by Default was entered on May 4, 2011, providing
the sanction of an indefinite suspension. It is important to note here that the
Respondent’s6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
was not asserted a
this time. Indeed, under the provisions of Circular 230 in effect at the time, it would not
have been appropriate for the Complainant to have asserted (b)3/26USC103
(b)3/26USC 103 as part of the expedited suspension proceedings. The
(b)3/26USC103was not described in the conduct included under § 10.82(b)
of Circular 230 (2008 and 2011). The only appropriate charge to have been brought
under the expedited suspension proceedings was the Respondent's disbarment by the
CBA, which was described by § 10.82(b)(1) of Circular 230 (2008 and 2011).
The ambiguity raised by the ALJ with respect to the(b)3/26USC103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103 results from the ALJ treating that violation asbeing raised as part of
expedited proceedings under §10.82 of Circular 230, in March of 2011. Using that
analysis, it would appear the Complainant was asserting a violation that was not yet
ripe: the expedited suspension predated the(b)3/26USC103

However; the (b)(3)/26 USC 6103
counts (Counts 2 - 4 in the Complaint) were not raise
in the expedited proceeding, and appropriately not raised. Under the provisions of
Circular 230 in effect at the time, the(b)3/26USC103
was not a basis for an
expedited suspension under § 10.82 of Circular 230. It would not have been_______
appropriate for the Complainant to have included a claim of6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103 in the expedited suspension proceedings.
The Respondent's
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103
two and a half years by the time the Respondent requested the filing of the Complaint
under § 10.82(g). Once the Respondent elected to pursue relief through the Complaint
process under § 10.60, it was then appropriate for the Complainant to include the(b)3/26USC103
(b)3/26USC103 as additional instances of incompetent or disreputable
conduct. The respondent was properly notified of these additional counts. Count 4,
asserting Respondents6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
was properly first
raised over two years and five months
(b)3/26USC103 (b)/26USC 103had passed. Thus. Count 4 is not the
case of the Complainant seeking a sanction for(b)3/26USC103
It was raised.
For these reasons, the decision of the ALJ not to sustain Count 4 for the willful failure of
Respondent to (b)(3)/26 USC 6103
was clearly erroneous. There is no
ambiguity as to the Respondent's continuing and6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
which
(b)3/26USC103 at the time of the filing of the Complaint, when
was appropriately first raised.

Appropriate Sanction

The issue in an IRS disciplinary proceeding is essentially whether the practitioner In
question is fit to practice. Discipline, including disbarment and suspension is “imposed
in furtherance of the IRS' regulatory duty to protect the public Interest and the
Department by conducting business only with responsible persons. Director, OPR v.
Bohn, Complaint No. 2012-02 (December 7,2012), citing Director, OPR v. Ross,
Complaint No. 2011 -01 (June 7, 2011).

In his Decision and Order, the ALJ imposed a sanction of suspension for a period of
forty-eight months, and any reinstatement after the period of suspension is properly
conditioned on Respondent becoming
(b)3/26USC103
and otherwise becoming authorized to practice. (It is not clear if this reduction was
attributable to the ALJ's inclusion of6103
(b)(3)/26 USC
as
an aggravating factor, and not a separate count). The Complainant asserts that this
reduction of the Complainant's proposed sanction of disbarment was clearly erroneous.
The Appellate Authority reviews the sanction sought by the Complainant and imposed
by the Administrative Law Judge in light of the charges proved and in light of other
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Appellate Authority does so de novo,
with the full authority of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service
(the charging agency). In doing so, the Appellate Authority can affirm, decrease, or
increase the sanction imposed by the ALJ. Director, OPR v. Hurwitz, Complaint No.
2007-12 (April 21, 2009); Director, OPR v. Chandler, Complaint No. 2006-23 at 3 (April,
2008).

In this case, the Respondent has been disbarred as a CPA by his state licensing board,
the CBA. That Board’s findings with respect to the disbarment include: the Respondent
held himself out as a CPA when he failed to have a valid license; he knowingly and
willfully submitted untrue statements to the CBA and failed to respond to inquiries of the
CBA; and, he knowingly misrepresented to a client whether the client’s tax return had
been filed. The disbarment by the CBA, standing alone, is considered an act of
incompetence and disreputable conduct by Circular 230. Director of OPR.V. Ross,
Complaint No. 2011-01 (June 7,2011); Director of OPR v. Christensen, Complaint No.
2012-05 (July 23,2015), In addition, the Respondent engaged in incompetence and
disreputable conduct by his(b)3/26USC10(b)3/6

The (b)3/26USC10
dishonorable.,
unprofessional and adversely reflects on the Respondent’s fitness to practice. This is
particularly true of our tax system, whose very effectiveness depends upon voluntary
compliance. Poole v. United States, 1984 No. 84-0300,1984 U.S, Dist LEXIS 15351
(D.D.C. June 29,1984).
These serious violations of the public trust in the CPA profession could have been
mitigated had the Respondent engaged in some degree of acceptance of the errors, or

10
taken some measurable action to correct them. He has done neither. (b)(3)/26 USC 6103
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103

as of the date of the ALJ's

Decision and Order in this case-- this, despite

the Respondent attempting to introduce partially completed 1040 forms of one sort or
another at the hearing, while not attesting to their accuracy or completeness. On
Appeal, the Respondent continues to insist that it is the duty of the Complainant to
determine his tax liabilities.

The Respondent was authorized to practice before the Service solely due to his status
as a CPA. He has been disbarred from that status by his state licensing board.
Although the readmission requirements for practice before the two bodies may differ, it
appears incongruous for the State licensing board to determine revocation of the license
to be appropriate, but for practice before the Service (which would require that license)
to be a suspension. Additionally, the egregious, continuing nature of the Respondent’s
(b)(3)/26USC6103
are very serious violations. I find
that it is appropriate for the sanction of disbarment to be appropriate with respect to
Respondent's practice before the Service. Accordingly, I reverse the determination of a
forty-eight month suspension by the ALJ, and determine the appropriate sanction for the
Respondent to be disbarment.
Other Matters

As part of his Response to the Complainant’s Notice of Appeal, the Respondent
appears to request both an opportunity to further brief issues on Appeal, and for
dismissal of the Complaint. Those requests are denied. All issues were adequately
addressed by the parties.
Respondent asserted that to the extent he performed work as a tax return preparer
(rather than as a CPA), he is no longer subject to Circular 230 based upon the recent
appellate decision in Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014). As correctly noted
by the ALJ, this disciplinary matter concerns the Respondent’s fitness to practice before
the IRS as a CPA practitioner. Respondent has admitted to practicing before the IRS
prior to 2009. This matter involves Respondent’s practice before the Service as a CPA.
It should be noted that on May 23,2014, the Complainant's office advised that, in light
of the Loving decisions, OPR has determined that a suspension or disbarment from
practice before the IRS may not Include a restriction on return preparation for
compensation, and that access to the Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN)
required for such services may no longer be blocked based on discipline under Circular
230. There are still certain separate statutory requirements to obtain a PTIN. No
opinion is made here by me with reference to Respondent's qualifications or eligibility to
obtain a PTIN.
I have considered all other arguments made by the parties with respect to this matter,
and to the extent not mentioned herein, I find them to be irrelevant or without merit.

11

Conclusion
For the reasons stated, I hereby determine that (b)(3)/26 USC 6103 isdisbarred from
practice before the IRS, and may seek reinstatement as provided by § 10.81 of Circular
230. This constitutes FINAL AGENCY ACTION in this proceeding.

Thomas J. Travers
AppellateAuthority
Office of Chief Counsel
Internal Revenue Service
(As Authorized Delegate of the
Secretary of the Treasury)
April 20,2015
Washington, D.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the Decision on Appeal dated April 20,2015 in Complaint No. 201307 was sent this day by UPS Next Day Air to the addresses listed below:

UPS Next Day Air:

Honorable Harvey C. Sweitzer
Supervisory Administrative Law Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals
U.S. Department of Interior
351 South West Temple, Suite 6.300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(b)(3)/26 USC 6103

(b)(3)/26 USC 6103
(b)(6)

Karen L. Hawkins
Director, Office of Professional Responsibility
Internal Revenue Service
1111 Constitution Avenue, NW
SE:OPR7238IR
Washington, DC 20224
Timothy E. Heinlein
Senior Counsel
Office of Chief Counsel, Area Counsel (GLS)
100 First Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA 94105

Thomas J, Travers
Appellate Authority
Office of Chief Counsel
Internal Revenue Service
April 20, 2015
Washington, DC

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Airs%3A6910271c0d4a59c9. Public record. Not legal advice.