# Of The Government B.io6190

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## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

I

ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPR

Significant Audit
Findings In T
Departments
ties
Of The Government B.io6190

BY THE COMPTR,
OF THE UNITED’S

COMPTROLLER

GENERAL

OF THE

WASHINGTON.

D.C.

UNITED

STATES

20848

B-106190
The Honorable George H. Mahon
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
G”
Dear Mr.

Chairman:

This report
contains
significant
audit findings
developed
during our audits and other examinations
in the civil
departThese findings
pertain
ments and agencies of the Government.
for the most part to matters
on which we believe
administrative
action,
and in some cases legislative
action,
is required
to
achieve greater
economy or efficiency
in Government operations,
Some findings
and recommendations
on which the departments
and agencies have reported
that corrective
action was being
t.aken also have been included because we have not yet observed
the effectiveness
of the reported
action.
This compilation
is made in response to the request that
information
of this type be made available
to your Committee
before the commencement of appropriation
hearings at each
session of the Congress.
Concurrently
with the release of this
we are sending to the departments
and agencies copies
report,
of the sections
specifically
applicable
to them so that they
may be in a position
to answer any inquiries
which may be made
on these matters
during the appropriation
hearings.
A report
on significant
audit findings
partment of Defense and the three military
being submitted
separately.
Sincerely

involving
departments

yours,

Comptroller
General
of the United States

the Deis

Contents
Page

.

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural
Stabilization
and Conservation
Commodity Credit Corporation
Export Marketing Service
Farmers Home Administration
Food and Nutrition
Service
Soil Conservation Service

1
Service

and

.
DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

13
15

DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
Health Services and Mental Health Administration
National Institutes
of Health
Office of Education
Social and Rehabilitation
Service
Social Security Administration

17
19
20
22
24
31

DEPARTMENTOF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Community Development
General Insurance
Housing Production and Mortgage Credit
Interstate
Land Sales

33
35
38
39
46

DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Reclamation
Geological Survey
Southwestern Power Administration

47
49
50
52

DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance

53
55
57

Administration

DEPARTMENTOF LABOR
Manpower Administration
Occupational
Safety and Health

n

4

3
6
9
10
11

Administration

59
65

DEPARTMENTOF STATE, AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

67

DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION
Department-wide
Federal Aviation
Rdminis':ration
National Highway Traffi c Safety Administration
National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(AMTRAK)

77
79
80
82
83

DEPARTMENTOF THE TREASURY
Internal
Revenue Service
International
Financial
Affairs
U.S. Customs Service

87
89
90
92

ATOMIC ENERGYCOMMISSION
Director
of Regulation

95
97

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT
courts
Department of Corrections
Department of Environmental
Services
Department of Highways and Traffic
Department of Human Resources
Executive Office of the Commissioner

Page
99
101
102
103
104
105
106

ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY

107

EXPORT-IMPORTBANK OF THE UNITED STATES

113

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONSCOMMISSION

119

GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Automated Data and Telecommunications
Federal Supply Service
National Archives and Records Service
Public Buildings
Service

123
125
126
128
130

Service

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION

133

NATIONAL AERONAUTICSAND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

137

0 FFICE OF ECONOMICOPPORTUNITY
Economic Development Division
Experimental Research Division
External Audit Division
Office of Legal Services
State and Local Government Division

141
143
145
147
149
151

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET

153

RENEGOTIATION BOARD

157

TENNESSEEVALLEY AUTHORITY

161

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

165

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

171

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

175

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIES
Civil Service Commission, Off'ice of Management and Budget,
and Department of Labor
Department of Agriculture
and Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare
Department of Agriculture;
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare; Department of Justice;
Department of the
Treasury; and Office of Management and Budget
Department of Agriculture;
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare; Department of Labor; Office of Economic
Opportunity;
and Office of p4anagement and Budget

181

l

-

1

182
183
185
187

1

Page
VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (continued)
Department
of Agriculture
and Department
of the Interior
Department
of Agriculture,
Department
of State,
and
Agency for International
Development
Department
of Commerce;
Department
of Defense;
General
Services
Administration;
Department
of Health,
Education,
and Welfare;
Department
of Labor;
and Veterans
Administration
Department
of Commerce,
Department
of the Interior,
and
Office
of Management
and Budget
Department
of Defense,
General
Services
Administration,
and Tennessee
Valley
Authority
Department
of Defense
and Department
of State
Department
of the Interior,
Department
of Agriculture,
Department
of Defense,
and the General
Services
Administration
Department
of Justice
and Department
of State
Department
of Justice
and Department
of the Treasury
Department
of Labor and Department
of Health,
Education,
and Welfare
Office
of Management
and Budget,
Corps of Engineers,
Department
of Housing
and Urban Development,
and Department
of
Transportation
Office
of Management
and Budget
and General
Services
Administration

189
191

193
197
199
201
205
207
209
211

213
215

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
Contents
Page
AGRICULTURALSTABILIZATION AND CONSERVATIONSERVICE AND COMMODITY
CREDIT CORPORATION
Need intensifies
to amend legislation
to reduce Government losses
on the peanut price-support
program
Fees for processing price-support
loans and storage facility
and
equipment loans not related to actual costs
EXPORT MARKETING SERVICE
Russian wheat sales and weaknesses in Agriculture's
wheat export subsidy program
FARMERSHOMEADMINISTRATION
Ways to improve effectiveness

of rural

business

3
3
4
6

management of
6
loan programs

9
9

FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE
Need for more accurate information
on schools not participating
in
the school lunch program and on the cost of lunches served under
the program

10

SOIL CONSERVATIONSERVICE
Progress in meeting important objectives
of the Great Plains
Conservation Program could be improved

11

1

10

11

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION
AND CONSERVATION SERVICE AND
COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION
.

Need intensifies
reduce
Government
peanut
price-supnort

to amend legislation
losses
on the
program

to

In May 1968 GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the Commodity
Credit
Corporation
(CCC) had lost
about
$270 million
on the peanut
price-support
program
between
1955 and 1966 and would lose at least
$248 million
over the
next 5 years 9 1967 through
1971.
At that
time GAO recommended
that
the
Department
develop
for the Congress’
consideration
a program
to more effectively
control
peanut
production.
Because the program
was not changed
and CCC incurred
greater
losses,
GAO reassessed
the program
to determine
what should
be done to effectively
control
production
and reduce
losses.
In an April
1973 report
to the Congress,
GAO stated
that
the Agricultural
Adjustment
Act of 1938, as amended,
requires
the Secretary
of
Agriculture
to control
peanut
production
on the basis
of demand but
specifies
also that he authorize
annually
not less than 1,610,OOO
acres
for growing
peanuts.
The sponsors
of the act had expressed
hope that
this
acreage
would be sufficient
on all occasions
to supply
the edible
trade
without
any substantial
surplus.
Since 1955, however,
fewer than 1,610,OOO
acres have been needed annually
to satisfy
commercial
demand because
advances
in farm technology
have increased
yields
per acre by an average
of
70 pounds a year.
An average
of 1,015,OOO
acres annually
would have produced the necessary
supply
during
1967 through
1971.
Under the program,
CCC has to buy the surplus
peanuts
and store
them
until
they are sold.
CCC sells
them for significantly
lower prices
than it
From 1967 through
1971 CCC recovered
through
sales
53 perpays for them.
cent of its cost of buying
surplus
peanuts
and lost
$279 million
on the
program,
a 66-percent
increase
over the loss of $168 million
from 1962
through
19 66.
In March 1972 the Department’s
Agricultural
Stabilization
and Conservation
Service
(ASCS), which
administers
the program
for CCC,
if the present
program
were continued,
losses
from 1973
projected
that,
through
1977 would total
$537 million,
a 92-percent
increase
over the
losses
incurred
between
1967 and 1971.

.

Although
GAO made no recommendations
to the Department,
it recommended
to the Congress
that
the Agricultural
Adjustment
Act of 1938 be amended to
rescind
the minimum acreage
provision
to give the Secretary
more flexibility
to adjust
production
so that
it will
be consistent
with commercial
demand.
Although
the Department
agreed
that
such a change could help bring
peanut
production
more in line
with
demand,
it said that
it was not completely
satisfied
that
the change was the most desirable
solution
in the
long run.
It said further
that
it was studying
GAO’s recommendation
and
possible
alternatives.

3

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AAGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION
.\ND CONSERVATION SERVICE AND
CObiblODITY CREDIT CORPORATION (continued)
GAO recognized
demand more in line
would not preclude
of the Department’s

that
alternatives
existed
for bringing
production
and
but noted
that
removal
of the minimum acreage
provision
any actions
the Secretary
may wish to take as a result
study of alternatives.
(B-163484,
Apr.
13, 1973.)

Fees for processing
price-support
and storage
facility
and equipment
not related
to actual
costs

loans
loans

GAO examined
into
the fee assessment
policies
concerning
its processing
of price-support
loans
equipment
loans
authorized
under CCC programs,

and practices
of
and storage
facility

ASCS
and

Title
V of the Independent
Offices
Appropriation
Act of 1952 and
Circular
No. A-25 of the Office
of Management
and Budget
state
that
Government activities
which
provide
identifiable
recipients
with
special
benefits
or privileges
should
be financially
self-sustaining
to the maximum extent
possible.
The act states
that
fair
and equitable
fees should
be prescribed
which
consider
direct
and indirect
costs
to the Government,
value
to the
recipients,
public
policy
or interest
served,
and other
pertinent
facts.
Circular
No. A-25 states
that,
in addition
to those
costs
directly
related
to the activity,
the cost to the Government
should
include
a proportionate
share of an agency) s management
and supervisory
costs
and that
the cost of
providing
the service
should
be reviewed
every year and fees should
be
adjusted
as necessary.
GAO’s review
showed that ASCS charged
fees for processing
loans--established
in 1969 and based on 1967 information--that
directly.related
to the costs
which should
have been recovered
charge
for processing
storage
facility
and equipment
loans.
antiually.review
its costs
to process
these
loans.
..
that

In a’ July
ASCS:

1972

report

--Systematically
storage
facility
for recovering
fullest
extent
public
policy,
--Review
the costs
as necessary.

to

the

Secretary

of

Agriculture,

price-support
were not
and did not
ASCS did not

GAO recommended

establish
fees for processing
price-support
loans and
and equipment
loans
on a basis
that
would provide
the related
costs,
including
overhead
costs,
to the
possible
and would consider
value
to the recipient,
interest
served,
and other
pertinent
facts.
of

these

activities

every

year

and adjust

the

fees

ASCS replied
that,
although
it did not totally
agree with GAO’s recommendat ions,
it would review
its loan-fee
arrangements.
On May 31, 1973,
ASCS issued
a directive
to its State
and county
offices
ordering
an increase
in price-support
loan service
fees,
beginning
with loans made in the 1973

4

l

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURALSTABILIZATION
AND CONSERVATIONSERVICE AND
COMMODITYCREDIT CORPORATION(continued)
crop year.
However, ASCS rescinded these increases on June 22, 1973, in
response to Executive Order 11723, dated June 13, 1973, which froze certain
prices for a maximum of 60 days. ASCS officials
advised GAO in September
and August 1973, respectively,
that:
--The price-support
loan service fees were no longer frozen under
Phase IV guidelines
and it was considering
increasing such fees
for the 1974 crop year.
--The matter of establishing
a fee for processing storage facility
and equipment loans was still
under consideration.
(B-163484,
July 13, 1972.)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
EXPORT MARKETING

SERVICE

Russian
wheat sales
and weaknesses
in Agriculture
Is management
of
wheat export
subsidy
program
The President
announced
the sign ing of an agreement
with Russia
on
July 8, 1972, making
$750 million
in credit
available
for 3 years
for purchasing
various
U.S. grains.
By then Russia
was already
purchasing
U.S.
wheat.
Within
a few weeks,
cash and credit
wheat sales
to Russia,
heavily
subsidized
by the U.S. Government,
approximated
$700 million,
the largest
private
grain
sales
in U.S. history.

I

1

The wheat export
subsidy
program
began in 1949 to help the United
States
meet its obligation
to export
wheat at prices
agreed
to under
the
International
Wheat Agreement.
The program’s
major
objectives
are to
generally
insure
that
U.S. wheat
is competitive
in world
markets
and to
reduce
Government
wheat
inventories.
The Export
Marketing
Service
establishes
daily
subsidy
rates
for
wheat.
The Service
has maintained
a zero subsidy
rate
for all
types
of
wheat since
September
22, 1972,
allowing
wheat prices
to seek their
own
levels,
but,
during
the preceding
4 months,
rates
ranged
from a few cents
to as high as 51 cents
a bushel,
Before
its suspension,
the program
incurred
about
$4.3 billion
in subsidy
costs
for exporting
about
10.5 billion
bushels
of U.S. wheat.
There is little
doubt
that
the program
has been
instrumental
in competitively
pricing
U.S. wheat moving
into
export
markets.
GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the large
sales
of U.S. wheat
to
Russia
and other
exports
in the summer of 1972 caused a dramatic
rise
in the
price
of U.S. wheat.
Hard Winter
wheat
sold at gulf
ports
for $1.68
a
bushel
in July brought
$2.49
a bushel
in September
and even more later.
An
export
goal of 650 million
bushels
and a fiscal
year 1973 budget
estimate
of $67 million
in subsidy
mushroomed
to 1.1 billion
bushels
in exports
and
over $300 million
in subsidy.

tbtaling
addition

Agriculture
claims
that
about
$457 million
to other
benefits.

the U.S. Treasury
as a result
of the

will
accrue
wheat sales

net benefits
to Russia
in

Agriculture
is committed
to pay over $300 million
in subsidies
on the
Russian
and other
export
sales.
GAO expressed
the belief
that many of these
sales would have been made even with
reduced
subsidies
and that Agriculture
should
have responded
more rapidly
to the available
information
and reduced
or eliminated
the subsidies
sooner.
Wheat

export

subsidy

6

program

After
October
1971 the key determinant
in establishing
daily
wheat subsidy rates
was the export
target
price.
The difference
between
the target
price
and the domestic
price
was the daily
export
subsidy
rate.
Maintenance
of a low target
price
throughout
the period
of the Russian
sales
and for

6

1

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

m
*

EXPORT MARKETING

SERVICE

(continued)

several
subsequent
Government
to pay

weeks was a crucial
excessive
subsidies.

factor

in

obligating

the

U.S.

GAO questioned
the maintenance
of a low target
price
in view of available intelligence
reports
and analyses
indicating
adverse
Russian
crop conditions.
Agriculture
also knew that
the United
States
was the dominant
wheat
supplier
and that
purchasers
of large
supplies
had to come to the
United
States.
Agriculture
officials
recognized
early
in 1972 that
the world
wheat
situation
was changing
but decided
against
increasing
the export
target
price
for several
reasons.
GAO expected
to find
a detailed
analysis
to
support
such a major policy
decision,
but it seems to have been based
largerly
on intuitive
judgments
made by Agriculture
officials.
Speculating

in

subsidy

registrations

Changes made in 1967 to the basic
wheat export
subsidy
program,
ting
subsidy
registrations
at exporters’
options,
and other
program
in effect
at the time of the Russian
wheat
sales
tended
to minimize
and created
an environment
whereby
exporters
could make substantial
Although
Agriculture
sought
to increase
the flexibility
for exporters
price
U.S. wheat competitively
in international
markets,
the program
appropriate
administrative
controls.

permitfeatures
risks
profits.
to
lacked

Some exporters
making
sales
in August
1972 registered
weeks later
at higher
subsidy
rates.
In five
examples,
of about
$604,493
was paid.
Had exporters
been required
the subsidy
would have been $286,188,
the dates
of sales,

sales
several
a total
subsidy
to register
on
or $318,305
less.

Export
the program
exporters.

no evidence
competition

Marketing
Service
had allowed
excess

Carrying-charge

officials
profit

contend
there
is
because
of intense

that
among

payments

In addition
to the basic
export
subsidy,
Agriculture
provided
a
carrying-charge
subsidy
to cover
the estimated
costs
of owning wheat
for
future
delivery,
The subsidy
registration
date,
instead
of the sale date,
is used to calculate
subsidy
entitlement.
In 28 instances
totaling
about
$360,000,
had the sale contract
dates
rather
than the registration
dates
determined
the carrying-charge
subsidies,
the payments
would have been
about
$350,000
less.
Program

h

evaluation

needs

Despite
annual
subsidy
outlays
of millions
not comprehensively
evaluated
the wheat export
evaluations
indicating
that
the subsidy
program
dismissed
by operating
officials.

7

of dollars,
Agriculture
subsidy
program.
Limited
was not fully
effective

has
were

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
EXPORT MARKETING

SERVICE

(continued)

GAO examined
several
pertinent
statistical
relationships
indicative
of
program
effectiveness.
It concluded,
on the basis
of making U.S. wheat
competitive
in international
markets,
that Agriculture
seemed to have paid
greater
subsidies
than the marketplace
required.
Other agricultural
economists
questioned
the need for subsidy
payments
and suggested
that
the
program
needed
to be completely
reevaluated,

The major GAO recommendation
to the Secretary
of Agriculture
was that
the wheat,export
subsidy
program
be reviewed
in its entirety
and that
its
reinstatement
be predicated
on a meaningful
justification
for its existence.

ment
tion

The Secretary
of Agriculture
said GAO’s study would help the Departimprove
the program.
The Secretary
agreed
with GAO’s major
recommendabut took issue with
GAO on some other
observations
and conclusions.

GAO suggested
that
the Congress
should
consider
requiring
that
agencies
develop
definitive
ground
rules
so that
expected
benefits
from exports
can
be appropriately
weighed
against
their
impact
on various
segments
of the
domestic
economy,
(B-176943,
July 9, 1973.)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
Ways to improve
.rural
business
c

It
/’’
I

*/:

effectiveness
loan programs

of

The Economic
Opportunity
Act of 1964, as amended,
authorized
several
One of these programs-special
programs
to combat poverty
in rural
areas.
the Economic
Opportunity
Cooperative
Loan Program--administered
by the
Farmers
Home Administration
(FHA) provided
loans
to cooperative
associations
in rural
areas.
Although
the program
was terminated
could be helpful
to FHA in administering
dustrial
loan programs
authorized
by the

on June 30, 1971,
GAO’s findings
the new rural
business
and inRural
Development
Act of 1972.

GAO found that
many economic
opportunity
cooperatives
encountered
problems,
such as weak management
and adverse
market
conditions,
and
therefore
failed
to stay in business
or became delinquent
in their
loan
repayments.
Not all problems
encountered
by the cooperatives
could
have
been foreseen.
Many problems,
however,
could have been identified
and
corrected
had FHA required
adequate
determinations
of the economic
soundness
and feasibility
of cooperative
projects
and had FHA improved
its policies
and procedures
for supervising
and evaluating
cooperatives’
activities.
In accordance
with
GAO’s recommendations
for implementing
the business
and industrial
loan programs
authorized
by the Rural
Development
Act of
1972,
FHA stated
that
it (1) was preparing
regulations
that
would require
applications
for loan assistance
to include
feasibility
studies,
marketing
agreements,
management
evaluations,
and an analysis
of the adequacy
of working capital,
(2) had taken
steps
to provide
employee
training,
(3) had considered
additional
staffing
of new types
of professional
and technical
skills,
and (4) would,
when practical,
express
program
objectives
in specific
goals
and use such goals
to periodically
measure
program
effectiveness.

fiscal

FHA plans
to
year 1974.

implement
(B-114873,

the new business
May 2, 1973.)

9

and industrial

loan

programs

in

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
FOODAND NUTRITION SERVICE
Need for more accurate information
on schools not participating
in the
school lunch program and on the cost
of lunches served under the program
Food and Nutrition
Service (FNS) statistics
showed that, in fiscal
year’
q
1972, 82,900 schools, with about 45 million
students enrolled,
were partici-‘,
However, FNS data also showed that,
/
pating in the school lunch program.
schools, with about
‘I*
early in the 1971-72 school year, about 24,900 eligible
8.7 million
students enrolled,
were not participating
in the program.
About
18,100 of these schools did not have any type of food service;
and FNS identified
at least 4,400, with 1.4 million
students enrolled,
as needy schools.
An FNS survey in March 1972 showed that about 1.5 million
needy students
attending participating
schools were not eating free or reduced-price
lunches,
GAO found that some schools did not participate
because they lacked the
equipment and facilities
to prepare and serve the food and others did not
participate
for reasons based on local preference or on special local conditions not susceptible
to Federal persuasion.
FNS did not have reliable
data concerning which schools needed assistance and the extent of their
needs. Such data would help FNS resolve these problems and determine the
assistance or changes in administrative
policies
or legislation
needed to
enable such schools to participate.
GAO also found that FNS had not sufficiently
guided the schools on how
to compute accurate per-lunch costs which FNS needs to insure that Federal
reimbursements do not exceed the actual cost of lunches, as required by
existing
legislation.
GAO recommended that actions be taken to obtain better information
on
schools needing assistance and the extent of their needs, promote the school
lunch program, and define reimbursable
costs,
The Department generally
agreed with GAO’s conclusions
and described actions that were being taken to
implement the recommendations,
(B-178564, June 29, 1973.)

10

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
SOIL

CONSERVATION

SERVICE

Progress
in meeting
of the Great Plains
could
be improved
II

*

important
Conservation

objectives
Program

The Soil
Conservation
Service
(SCS),
Department
of Agriculture,
combats
climatic
hazards
in the Great Plains
by helping
farmers,
ranchers,
and other
landowners
and operators
voluntarily
carry
out planned
soil
and water
conservation
practices
through
technical
assistance
and direct
cost sharing
under
contracts
of from 3 to 10 years.
In June 1973 GAO reported
to the Congress
that
progress
in converting
unsuitable
cropland
to permanent
vegetative
cover
and reseeding
badly
depleted
rangeland
had been less than expected
in view of the program’s
legislative
history,
which
stressed
the importance
of meeting
these needs.
To provide
for greater
progress
before
the program’s
scheduled
expiration
in 1981,
GAO recommended
that
SCS (1) revise
its fund allocation
system
to insure
that
program
funds
are used,
to the extent
practical,
for highest
priority
work first
and (2) increase
a $25,000
administrative
limitation
on
any one contract
to recognize
cost
increases
since
the limitation
was established
and to increase
the rate
of achieving
important
program
objectives.
GAO also noted
a conflict
between
the program
and certain
features
of
the commodity
price-support
programs
and suggested
that
the Congress
explore
with
the Department
the feasibility
and desirability
of enacting
legislation
to provide
additional
incentives
for farmers
to convert
unsuitable
cropland
to permanent
vegetative
cover,
giving
consideration
to disincentives
resulting from commodity
price-support
programs.
In

response

--Had
the

to

GAO’s

studied
and will
fund allocation

continue
system,

Department

to study
the feasibility
giving
due consideration

--Had recognized
the inadequacy
of
and was reevaluating
the limitation
of conservation
practices.

t

the

recommendations,

the

$25,000
in view

The Department
did not comment on the conflict
commodity
price-support
programs.
SCS headquarters
agreed
that
the conflict
was one of the significant
progress
of achieving
program
objectives.
(B-114833,

11

stated

that

SCS:

of revising
to priorities.

limitation
per
of the increasing

contract
costs

between
the program
officials,
however,
constraints
on the
June 28, 1973.)

and

DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE
Contents
Page
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND AT!IOSPHERIC ADIIINISTRATION
Continuation
of the Fish Protein Concentrate
yield only limited
benefits

13

15
Program would
15

DEP.I\RT!IENT OF CO?QIERCE
I;.\TIONXL

OCE-\YIC

Continuation
Fish Protein
r;ould
)-ield

.YiD .JIT\IOSPHERIC XDI\IIYISTR.4TI@N

of the
Concentrate
only limited

Program
benefits

.\t the request
of the Chairman,
Subcommittee
on Fisheries
and Wildlife
Conserration,
House Committee
on !Ierchant
!larine
and Fisheries,
GAO reviewed
the Fish Protein
Concentrate
(FPC) Program
administered
by the Administration’s
Sational
Yarine
Fisheries
Service,
Under this
program
a Governmentoiined experimental
plant
\

in the Ei:dr:rnl

PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE
Participation
certificates
sold at higher interest
those obtainable
for long-term Government bonds

123

1 :! 6

of tab papf:r

1.:ti
130

rates

than

6
!

GENERAL SERVICES

AD#INISTRATION

AUTOMATED DATA AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICE
Opportunities
for
of local
telephone

improving
‘service

manageme’nt -

The Federal
Telecommunications
System
(FTS) , which
is managed by the
General
Services
Administration
(GSA), provides,
among its many services,
intercity
and local
telephone
service.
As part
of this
telephone
service
GSA manages over 400 switchboards
in the United
States.
At 153 of these
switchboards
GSA manages 4,634
local
service
trunks,
costing
an estimated
$989,000
annually.
Periodic
traffic
studies
provide
a measure
of the traffic
volume,
which,
in part,
determine
the number of local
service
trunks
required
at
a switchboard.
However,
limitations
of these
studies
restricted
their
usefullness
to GSA’s management
for achieving
optimum
economical
and efficient
service
and providing
it on an equal basis
to all
customers.
GSA and telephone
company studies
(1) were not performed
at all
switchboard
locations,
(2) had not included
all
local
trunks
managed by GSA
and (3) sampling
periods
were too limited
at some locaat each location,
tions.
Also,
telephone
company studies
were not frequent
enough
to disclose
seasonal
changes
and growth
or decline
trends.
The different
methods
used to convert
traffic
volume
into
trunk
requirements
produced
dissimilar
results
when applied
to the same statistics.
For example,
GAO estimated
that
one method would
require
78 fewer
trunks-costing
$25,400
annually-than those proposed
by telephone
companies
using
another
method
at 10 selected
switchboards.
However,
telephone
company
reports
did not include
sufficient
detailed
information
for GSA to independently
evaluate
or recompute
the information.
GAO proposed
that
the Administrator
methods
and procedures
for determining
with
telephone
companies
for improved
(3) instruct
regional
offices
on the
conversion
to trunk
traffic
studies,
changes,
and (4) expand and implement

of GSA (1) establish
standard
trunk
requirements,
(2) negotiate
traffic
studies
and statistics,
evaluation
and/or
performance
of
requirements,
and implementation
of
internal
control
procedures.

GSA’s response
to material
included
in this
report
was in general
agreement
with
GAO’s findings.
GSA is currently
preparing
a report
of
actions
taken
in response
to this
report.
(B-146864,
Mar. 19, 1973.)

125

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE
Opportunities
the nrocurenient

for

savings
in
‘of ‘tab ‘naner

GAO examined
into
the procedures
for procuring
marginally
punched,
continuous
forms
(tab paper)
because
an estimated
$100 million
is spent
annually
by the Government
for tab paper for use with
over 6,700
computers
at 1,700
locations.
GSA is responsible
for procuring
the Government’s
tab paper but has
delegated
authority
to the Government
Printing
Office
(GPO) to procure
most
of the tab paper.
GSA purchases
and stocks
six commonly
used tab paper
forms.
GPO annually
awards contracts
against
which
installations
place
orders,
within
prescribed
dollar
limitations,
for tab paper not available
from GSA stock.
The GPO contracts
are awarded
to all
responsive
suppliers
on a nationwide
basis.
GAO examined
fiscal
year 1971 tab paper purchases
of $6.5 million
that
were made by 45 installations.
The most favorable
prices
for tab paper were
obtained
by six installations
purchasing
their
tab paper
in volume under
competitive
contracts.
Prices
paid by the six installations
were about
$500,000,
or 22 percent,
less than the lowest
prices
available
under
the
GPO contracts
for the same volume of paper.
Most
year from
requirements

installations
procure
their
tab paper periodically
throughout
the
the GPO contracts
rather
than estimating
their
annual
tab paper
and purchasing
in volume under competitive
contracts.

Although
installations
are required
to obtain
their
tab paper
from
the lowest
priced
supplier
under
the GPO contracts,
more than half
of the
installations
obtaining
tab paper under
the GPO contracts
had made purchases
from other
than the lowest
priced
supplier.
On total
orders
against
GPO
contracts
of $2.2 million,
GAO found that
the prices
exceeded
those
of the
lowest
priced
suppliers
by $54,000.
If this
condition
is representative
of all
reported
orders
against
GPO contracts
totaling
$11.8 million
for the
year ended November
1971,
the costs
of tab paper were $300,000
more than
if purchased
from the lowest
priced
sources.
In addition,
some installations
were purchasing
carbon
tab paper when narrow-carbon
paper may have
use.
Installations
used GPO contracts
to purchase
$600,000.
If narrow-carbon
paper had been adopted
$600,000
cost could have been reduced
by $172,000,
To realize
the opportunities
for savings
in
Government’s
tab paper
GAO suggested
that
GSA:
--Instruct
installations
to determine
and GSA or GPO use this
information
competitive
contracts
or authorize
contracts
directly.

126

higher
priced,
widebeen suitable
for their
wide-carbon
paper
costing
for use in all
cases,
the
or 28 percent.
the

procurement

of

the

their
annual
tab paper needs
to make volume purchases
under
the installations
to award such

*

GENER4L SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE

(continued)

--Consider,
in conjunction
with
GPO, a more competitive
awarding
the GPO contracts,
such as making
awards of
used types of tab paper
on a geographic
basis
to the
offering
the lowest
prices
for each type of paper
or
number of multiple
suppliers
to be awarded
contracts
basis.

method
of
the more common lY
single
supplier
by limiting
the
on a nationwide

--Instruct
heads of departments
and agencies
to establish
procedures
for systematic
monitoring
and internal
reviews
of recent
and ongoing
procurements
to identify
use of other
than the lowest
priced
paper
suitable
for installations’
needs.
GSA agreed with
our suggestions,
but GPO was concerned
that
the methods
GAO had proposed
for awarding
the GPO contracts
would not result
in more
competition
and lower prices.
GAO recognizes
that
other
alternatives
may
be available.
GAO believes,
and GSA agrees,
that
efforts
should
be made to
develop
a method of awarding
the GPO contracts
under more competitive
conditions.

127

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL

ARCHIVES

AND RECORDS SERVICE

Ways to
practices

improve
records
in the Federal

management
Government

GAO reviewed
the effectiveness
Service
(NARS) of GSA in improving
Government
because
of the substantial
preparation,
handling,
and storage.
costs
of paperwork
have increased
Similarly,
the Government’s
record
cubic
feet
and now total
about
30
Records
Centers
are at an alltime
As a result,
feet.
storage
space
panded by 30 percent.

of the National
Archives
and Records
records
management
programs
throughout
the
increases
in the costs
of paperwork
GAO estimated
that,
since
1966,
Federal
from $8 billion
to $15 billion
a year.
holdings
have increased
by about
4 million
million
cubic
feet.
Holdings
by Federal
high and now total
over 11.5 million
cubic
has become critical
and may have to be ex-

*

1

NARS has had limited
success
in persuading
agencies
to correct
weaknesses
in their
records
management
programs.
One reason
is that
NARS
identifies
needed
improvements
and recommends
rather
sweeping
changes
without showing
corresponding
savings,
a factor
of vital
concern
to agency
management.
Another
reason
for the limited
success
is that
NARS has never
exercised
the authority
contained
in Public
Law 90-620
to report
to the
or the Office
of Management
and Budget
(OMB) , a
President,
the Congress,
particular
agency’s
poor records
management
program,
even though
the NARS
evaluation
teams consistently
have found
serious
weaknesses
in agencies’
programs.
In addition,
NARS could be more effective
in minimizing
the time that
records
are stored
in Federal
Records
Centers
by establishing
closer
surby developing
a better
method
veillance
of agency
records
control
schedules,
of evaluating
the validity
of the record
retention
periods
specified
by agenties,
and through
better
procedures
for removing
from storage
those records
that
are eligible
for disposal.
GAO suggested

that

NARS and

--Point
out how agencies
NARS recommendations.

GSA:

could

save

money

if

--Develop
criteria
describing
circumstances
nesses
or deficiencies
in agency records
President,
the Congress,
or OMB.
--If

an agency
fails
after
a reasonable
time
nesses
in its records
program
on the basis
form the President,
the Congress,
or OMB.

--Monitor
schedule

agencies
showing

they

would

implement

when NARS would report
management
programs
to

to
of

correct
serious
this
criteria,

more closely
to see that
they maintain
retention
periods
for all
their
records.

- - Develop,
on a pilot
basis,
a method
to evaluate
at centers
and to provide
agencies
with feedback
lishing
more realistic
retention
periods.

128

weakthe

weakthen in-

an up-to-date

records
usage patterns
as a basis
for estab-

l

GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDSSERVICE (continued)
--Revise
procedures
at centers
are destroyed
promptly.

GSA and NARS have
suggestions.

(B-146743,

initiated
Aug.

so that

a program
13, 1973.)

129

records

to

eligible

implement

all

for

of

destruction

the

GAO

GENERAL SERVICES
PUBLIC

BUILDINGS

Participation
at higher
obtainable

ADMINISTRATION

SERVICE

certificates
interest
rates
for long-term

sold
than those
Government

bonds

Section
5 of Public
Law 92-313,
dated June 16, 1972,
authorized
GSA
for 3 years
to enter
into
purchase
contracts
with private
developers
who
would finance
and construct
public
buildings
to GSA specifications.
GSA
would make periodic
installment
payments
during
the contract
period
to
amortize
construction
and financing
costs.
At the end of the contract
period--not
to exceed
30 years--title
to the building
would transfer
to
the Government.
In sponsoring
Public
Law 92-313,
GSA asked the Congress
in 1971 for
purchase
contract
authority
for 3 years
as a stop-gap
expedient
that
would
eliminate
the construction
backlog
of about
60 projects
estimated
to cost
These projects
had been authorized
by the Congress
about
$750 million.
for Federal
construction
but had not been funded.
In addition
to the 60
buildings
authorized
by Public
Law 92-313,
GSA requested
approval
in
under purchase
contract
arrangeJanuary
19 73 for construction
and funding,
ment , of three
Social
Security
Administration
payment
centers
estimated
to
cost
$110 million,
GSA has been obtaining
most of its financing
through
the sale of 30year participation
certificates
by the GSA trustee,
the First
National
City Bank of New York.
At the time GAO first
wrote
to GSA on February
27,
1973,
about
its method of financing,
GSA had sold
$396 million
of participation
certificates,
By the end of March 1973,
GSA had sold another
issue
of certificates.
All together
GSA has sold three
issues
of participation
certificates
amounting
to $522.5
million.
The first,
amounting
to $196.5
million,
was
sold in increments
from October
30 through
November
3, 1972, and had
interest
rates
varying
from 7.125 to 7.4 percent;
the second,
amounting
to
$200 million,
was sold on December 13, 1972, and had an interest
rate
of
7.15 percent;
and the third,
amounting
to $126 million,
was sold on
March 14, 1973,
and had an interest
rate
of 7.5 percent.
The issues
were
sold at a total
discount
of about
$4.6 million,
which
resulted
in an overall
effective
interest
rate
of 7.25 percent
on the first
and second issues
and 7.90 percent
on the third
issue.
Public
Law 92-313
and its
legislative
history
are silent
concerning
the
financing
with participation
certificates.
The Comptroller
General
has
ruled,
however,
that
this
method
is within
the framework
of the law.
Also,
the Attorney
General
has advised
GSA that
the certificates
are general
obligations
of the United
States,
backed by its full
faith
and credit.
On the basis
of market
conditions
at the time GSA participation
certificates
were issued,
GAO estimated
that
the Treasury
could have issued
longterm Government
bonds for about
3/4 of 1 percent
less than the effective
interest
rate
for the certificates.
The additional
interest
costs
associated
with
the $522.5
million
of participation
certificates
is about
$3.92 million
a year,
which
amounts
to $117.6
million
for the 30-year
term.

130

GENERAL SERVICES
PUBLIC

*

*

BUILDINGS

SERVICE

ADMINISTRATION

(continued)

Because of the potential
interest
savings
that would be possible
by
financing
the GSA purchase
contract
program
through
Treasury
borrowings,
GAO’s February
27, 1973,
letter
to GSA suggested
that
GSA consider
seeking
change
in the law that
would provide
for the remaining
financing
by direct
Treasury
borrowings.

,
a

GSA concurred
with
GAO that
direct
Treasury
borrowings
would be more
economical
than participation
certificates
or the variety
of financing
GSA stated
that,
to remedy
methods
used by certain
other
Federal
agencies.
the Administration
has sponsored
the proposed
Federal
Financing
the problem,
Bank Act of 1973.
GSA stated
that
enactment
of this
proposed
legislation
(S. 925, Feb. 20, 1973) is intended
to accomplish
the objectives
GAO proposed
for GSA; it will
accomplish
the same objective
for other
Federal
agencies
as
well.
The purpose
of the legislation
is to (1) insure
coordination
of the financing
needs of Federal
and federally
assisted
borrowing
programs
with
overall
economic
and fiscal
policies
of the Government,
(2) reduce
the costs
of Federal
and federally
assisted
borrowings
from the public,
and (3) insure
that
such borrowings
are financed
in a manner least
disruptive
to the private
financial
markets
and institutions.
A Federal
financing
bank would be established
to carry
out the legislaThe bank would be subject
to the general
supervision
and direction
of
tion.
the Secretary
of the Treasury.
Federal
agencies
would be required
to submit
their
financing
plans
for approval
to the Secretary
of the Treasury,
who
would be the chairman
of the bank’s
board
of directors.
Since GAO first
brought
$126 million
of participation
issues
in calendar
year 1974

this
matter
certificates
to finance

to

its attention,
GSA has
and is scheduled
to sell
the remaining
projects.

sold
more

GAO does not believe
that
enacting
the proposed
legislation
would result
in any sizable
savings
for GSA because
it would have sold most,
if not
all,
of its participation
certificates
before
the proposed
legislation
could
be enacted
and implemented.
Two features
of the proposed
legislation
may affect
interest
savings
on
any GSA financing
remaining
at the time of passage.
First,
according
to
Senate
Report
92-853,
dated June 12, 1972 (on an earlier
version
of the proposed legislation),
the proposed
legislation
would not require
the bank to
lend to any agency nor require
any agency to borrow
from the bank.
Therefore,
even if the legislation
is passed,
GSA could,
with
the approval
of the
Secretary
of the Treasury,
continue
to sell
its participation
certificates
to the public.
Second,
interest
on GSA’s certificates
and Treasury
obligations
is not subject
to State
and local
income taxes;
under Senate
bill
925,
interest
on the proposed
bank securities
would be.
This would
tend to increase
the interest
rate on the bank’s
securities.
(Letter
dated
February
27,
1973,
to Acting
Administrator
of General
Services).

131

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION
Contents
Page
Need to clearly
Foundation

define

the role

of the Inter-American
135

l

.

133

INTER-AMERICAN
Need to clearly
define
of the Inter-American

L

*

FOUNDATION

the role
Foundation

The Congress
created
the Inter-American
Foundation
(IAF)
to
social
development
shortcomings
in prior
U.S. assistance
efforts
America.
IAF was to provide
assistance
primarily
through
private
principal
participators
in the development
would be United
States
American
private
groups.

rectify
in Latin
channels;
and Latin

GAO reported
to the Congress
that
IAF assisted
Latin
American
private
groups,
but not U.S. private
groups.
IAF relies
solely
on Latin
American
groups
to conceive
and implement
development
efforts.
IAF also provides
assistance
on easy terms primarily
in the form of grants,
rather
than loans,
and has softened
the prior
practice
of requiring
the recipient
to obtain
matching
funds.
GAO expressed
the belief
that
these practices
beneficial
participation
by others,
namely private
be excluded
and they may be setting
the stage
for
stimulate
Latin
American
effort.
GAO recommended
proach
to provide
assistance
through
private
U.S.
a greater
variety
of assistance
terms specifically
objectives.
IAF
its role
believed

introduce
the chance
that
U.S. organizations,
will
losing
opportunities
to
that
IAF broaden
its aporganizations
and to use
tailored
to development

informed
GAO that
it opposed
changing
its approach
and perceived
to be limited
to promoting
Latin
American
experimentation
and
its
approach
to be appropriate
for that
role.

GAO believes
that
IAF was established
to do more,
that much of IAF’s
assistance
actually
went for nonexperimental
projects,
and that
IAF should
therefore
reconsider
the propriety
of its approach.
The Congress
may wish
to consider
whether
IAF’s
intended
role
is adequately
defined
and understood.
(B-135075,
July
23, 1973.)

135

NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS

AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Contents
Page
.

f

Need for
Shuttle

annual

Allocation
programs

of

congressional

the

costs

of

review

common

of

estimates

support

services

137

for

the

Space

to benefiting

139

140

NXTIONXL

AERONAUTICS

Need for annual
congressional
of estimates
for the Space
n

.

AND SPACE AD~IINISTRATION

review
Shuttle

Senator
Walter
F, I!ondale
requested
GAO to review
cost estimates
released
by the National
Aeronautics
and Space Administration
(NASA) on
Yarch
15, 1972.
NASA said that
its
cost estimates
indicated
that
the Space
Shuttle
would
cost about
$5.2 billion
less than alternative
expendable
systems for performing
the same mission.
The Space Shuttle
is a proposed
manned space transportation
system which would be sent into
orbit
and returned
to earth
to be reused
on other
flights.
For the most part
the alternative
systems
are outgrowths
of existing
systems
which have been used
on other
space missions.
GAO was not certain
that
the Space Shuttle
was economically
justified
(is less costly
when the time value
of money is considered),
even
though
NASA’s calculations
showed that
it was,
GAO did not believe
it
prudent
for the Congress
to place
too much confidence
in the projected
savings.
GAO conclusions
were based on (1) uncertainties
related
issues
involving
alternative
systems
and (2) uncertainties
costs
and savings
attributed
to payloads
in the life-cycle
Shuttle,
particularly
in the number of payloads.

cost

to nine
cost
in the estimated
costs
of the Space

GAO also concluded
that
the’choice
of a launch
system
should
not be
based principally
on cost comparisons
and cited
five
related
issues
GAO be(1) the priority
the Nation
lieves
should
be considered
in the decision:
places
on space programs,
(2) the value
of new technology
that
might
result
from the Space Shuttle,
(3) the need for the unique
capabilities
the Space
Shuttle
offers,
(4) the prestige
the United
States
might
get from its
developnen t , and (5) the merits
of an extensive
manned space flight
program.
NASA agreed
that
cost
for deciding
on whether
to
vehicles.
However,
it has
alternative
would be least

.

comparisons
select
the
chosen the
costly.

were
Space
Space

not necessarily
the best basis
Shuttle
or the expendable
Shuttle
and maintained
that
this

To enable
the Congress
to reach the most prudent
decision
on the
funding
of the Space Shuttle
or the alternative
expendable
systems,
GAO recommended that
the Congress
consider
the future
space missions
used in NASA’s
economic
analysis
of the Space Shuttle
to determine
whether
these
missions
are a reasonable
basis
for space program
planning
at this
time.
In addition,
GAO recommended
that,
as part
of the NASA authorization
and appropriation
process,
the Congress
review
the estimates
for the Space Shuttle
annually,
.giving
due consideration
to the appropriateness
of the missions
used in
making
those
estimates.
GAO testified
on this
matter
at the request
of the Subcommittee
on
Housing
and Urban Development,
Space,
Science,
Veterans,
Senate
Committee
the Subcommittee
on Yanned
Appropriations,
on June 12, 1973, and before

139

on

Space
1973.

Flight
of
(B-173677,

Allocation
of benefiting

of

the House
June 1,

the costs
programs

of

Committee
1973.)
common

on Science

support

and Astronautics

on June

26,

services

The Chairman
of the House Committee
on Science
quested
GAO to review
the distribution
of costs
for
among the various
programs
administered
by NASA.

and Astronautics
common support

reservices

GAO determined
that NASA had directed
its Marshall
Space Flight,
Manned
Spacecraft,
and Kennedy Space Centers
to include
in the Apollo
Program
all
costs
for common support
services
although
various
other
programs
benefited
from these
services.
This practice
resulted
in a substantial
overstatement
of Apollo
Program
costs
and in understatements
of the costs
of the other
benefiting
programs.

n

(c

To measure
the significance
of the overstatement
of Apollo
costs
caused by NASA’s practice,
GAO analyzed
the common support
costs
charged
during
the period
July 1, 1970, through
February
29, 1972, to the fiscal
year 1971 and fiscal
year 1972 Apollo
program
at two of the centers.
Based
on GAO’s analysis,
it appears
that
the costs
of the Apollo
program
were overstated
in NASA accounting
reports
by about
$85 million
and the costs
of the
benefiting
program
were understated
by a like
amount.
NASA stated
to the Congress.
ing total
program
change its budget

that
it revealed
this
practice
in its budget
justifications
NASA also stated
that
it was studying
means of accumulatcosts
for internal
management
purposes
and the need to
practices
for common support
costs.

NASA subsequently
informed
GAO that
it would accumulate
data on a
pilot
basis
in the institutional
support
area in an attempt
to identify
the
ultimate
benefiting
project
or program.
However,
basic
appropriation
and
program
structure
would remain
unchanged
and accounting
procedures
revised
only to the extent
necessary
to provide
for the accumulation
and reporting
of such data for internal
management
purposes.
NASA also stated
that
subsequent
to its further
evaluation
of this
matter
it would be in a position
to know whether
changes would
enhance
its
ability
to manage and whether
an accompanying
change to the budget
or appropriation
structure
should
be recommended.
It further
stated
that
any such
proposed
change would be based on a number of considerations
and would evolve
not as the result
of some specific
study but rather
as part
of NASA’s normal
budget
process
and continuing
dialogue
with
the Office
of Management
and
Budget
and the Congress.
(B-158390,
Mar. 9, 1973.)

140

‘c

OFFICE OF ECONOMICOPPORTUNITY
Contents
Page
.

I

ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTDIVISION
Economic development programs in Bedford-Stuyvesant
under the
Special Impact program have had a visible
but limited
impact

143

EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCHDIVISION
Question on merits of performance contracting
traditional
methods remains unanswered

145

EXTERNALAUDIT DIVISION
Need for more effective

audit

in education

versus
145
147
147

activities

OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVICES
Improvements needed in Legal Services
operations and administration
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DIVISION
Noncompliance with grant conditions

149
program grantees'
149
and OEO and other

141

143

requirements

151
151

OFFICE

OF ECONOi:IIC OPPORTUNITY

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
Economic
development
Bedford-Stuyvesant
have had a visible
L

programs
under
the
but limited

in
Special
impact

Impact

program

GAO reported
to the Congress
in August
1973 on its evaluation
of the
results
of the Office
of Economic
Opportunity’s
(OEO’s)
experimental
Special
Impact
program
in Bedford-Stuyvesant,
Brooklyn,
New York,
and the
manner
in which
the program
was being
managed.
Special
Impact
programs
are
intended
to create
training
and job opportunities,
improve
the living
environment,
and encourage
the development
of local
entrepreneurial
skills
in urban
areas with
large
concentrations
of low-income
residents
or in
rural
areas having
substantial
migration
to such urban
areas.
Legislation
has been submitted
to the Congress
which would
transfer
responsibility
for administering
Special
Impact
programs
from OEO to the
Department
of Commerce.
GAO believes
that
information
in this
report
on
the accomplishments
and problems
of the Bedford-Stuyvesant
Special
Impact
program
should
be of interest
to the Congress
in considering
this
legislation.
The Special
Impact
program
in the Bedford-Stuyvesant
community
was the
first
and largest
such program
to be sponsored
by the Federal
Government.
The program
was started
in 1967 with
two nonprofit
corporations
as sponsors.
GAO reported
that,
as of June 1972 and after
more than 5 years
of Fedthe program
had a visible
but limited
impact
on Bedforderal
funding,
Stuyvesant,
although
some of the activities
and projects
underway
could,
in
The program
has
time,
have greater
effect
on the area.
--created
program
--initiated
exteriors
-I

identified

employment
opportunities
through
a comprehensive
which
recruited,
counseled,
and developed
jobs
new housing
of existing

developments
residences;

and

local

solved

and

renovated

manpower
residents;

interiors

and

problems;

--established
benefits;

neighborhood
and

centers

to

--provided
commercial

facilities
use.

community

activities,

for

the

for

facilitate

delivery

of program

cultural

events,

and

The program
fell
short
of its goals
in areas relating
to development
of
minority-owned
businesses
and in attracting
outside
industry
to create
jobs
for residents.
Even though
the sponsors
through
their
housing
program
had
a significant
number of housing
units
planned
or under construction,
only
a small
number of units
were constructed
and rehabilitated.

143

OFFICE
ECOJ401\IIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
(continued)

Even if the sponsors
had substantially
met program
goals,
it is doubtful
because
of
its
limited
scope,
would
have
had
more
than a
that
the program,
minimal
impact
on the area’s
problems,
particularly
those
relating
to jobs
and housing .
*
GAO recommended
that
the sponsors,
OEO, and the Department
of Commerce-if responsibility
for administering
the Special
Impact
program
was transferred
to Commerce--consider
this
report
in determining
the future
strategy
of the Bedford-Stuyvesant
program.
OEO generally
agreed
with
GAO’s findings
and conclusions,
Commerce said the report
could be useful
to it if it becomes responsible
for administering
the program.
(B-130515,
Aug. 20, 1973.)

144

*

QFFICE
ESPERISIENTAL

RESEARCH DIVISION

Question
on merits
in education
versus
remains
unanswered

+

OF ECONOPIIC OPPORTUNITY

of performance
traditional

contracting
methods

An OEO report
released
in June 1972 stated
that
OEO’s performance
contracting
in education
experiment
clearly
indicated
that
the firms
operating
under performance
contracts
did not perform
significantly
better
than the
more traditional
school
systems.
“Performance
contracting”
has been defined
as an agreement
between
a local
education
agency,
such as a public
school,
and a private
educational
firm,
known as a “learning
system
contractor.”
The OEO experiment,
conducted
during
the 1970-71
school
year at an estimated
cost of $6 million,
was designed
to assess
the overall
impact
of
remedial
reading
and mathematics
programs
conducted
by private
educational
firms.
These programs
were carried
out under performance
contracts
for
students
from low-income
families
performing
well
below average
in the
subjects
relative
to national
norms.
GAO evaluated
the experiment
because
of its potential
impact
in education
and reported
to the Congress
that,
because
of a number of shortcomings
in both the design
and implementation
of the experiment,
the question
of the
merits
of performance
contracting
versus
traditional
educational
methods
in
improving
the reading
and mathematics
skills
of poor children
remained
unanswered.
These shortcomings
included:
--The experimental
and control
groups
achievement
levels
and socioeconomic
and family
income.
--OEO’s

t

design

did

not

provide

--OEO’s
design
periods.

did

not

call

for
for

were not comparable
characteristics,

monitoring

coordinating

control
the

length

in
such

initial
as race

groups.
of

instructional

As part
of its
overall
assessment
of the impact
of the experiment,
OEO
initially
intended
to report
the results
of the experiment
on a schooldistrict-by-school-district
basis
by use of comparisons
between
the experimental
and control
programs
and among the programs
of the six educational
firms.
The experiment
was designed
to provide
data for such an analysis.
OEO did not report
the results
of the programs
in this
manner because
it found
no significant
differences
between
the results
of the majority
of the programs
and because
it was unable
to determine
the cause of apparent
successes
and
Consequently,
much of the
failures
on an individual
school-district
basis.
data collected
on this
basis
was of little
or no use.
In addition,
OEO’s nonobservance
otherwise
questionable
actions
involved
tering
and settling
contracts
indicated
in OEO’s procurement
practices.

of

145

Federal
Procurement
Regulations
and
in selecting
contractors
and administhe existence
of serious
weaknesses

OFFICE,OF
.
EXPERIMENTAL

RESEARCH DIVISION

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
(continued)

If OEO had performed
a cost analysis
of the prospective
contractors’
proposals;
that
is,
related
the contractors’
proposed
costs
to the tasks
required
in the request
for proposals,
OEO would have identified
costs
which
were low in relation
to the requirements
and requirements
for which no cost
estimates
were provided.
OEO should
have explored
the financial
stability
of all
the educational
firms
before
committing
itself
to large
fund advances
without
any assurances
that
the firms
could
repay advances
in excess
of earnings
at the end of the
In the case of one firm,
final
settlement
negotiations
contract
period.
apparently
resulted
in a lessening
of the uncollectible
advances
by increasing the proposed
payments
to that
firm.
OEO’s research
and development
activities
to HEW’s National
Institute
of Education
in
many of the observations
and conclusions
in
the Institute
and local
education
authorities
conducted
in the future.

in education
were transferred
GAO believed
that
August
1973.
this
report
will
be of value
to
if similar
experiments
are

OEO believed
that
its June 1972 report
contained
a comprehensive
analysis of the results
of the experiment
and that
many of the problems
pointed
OEO beout in the GAO report
were appropriately
noted
in OEO’s report.
lieved
that
its report
provided
a useful
perspective
within
which
the overall performance
contracting
experiment
might
be judged.
(B-130515,
May 8,
1973.)

146

*

*

EXTERNAL AUDIT

DIVISION

Need

effective

for

more

In April
1973
accountants
+ audits
OEO.

b

OFFICE

OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

audit

activities

GAO reported
to the
of local
antipoverty

Congress
on the adequacy
agencies
which
received

of public
grants
from

The Congress
requires
that
each local
antipoverty
agency have adequate
accounting
and internal
control
systems.
It requires
also
that
these
agencies
be audited
yearly
to insure
that
the systems
are adequate
and that
funds
are spent
in accordance
with
law, regulations,
and grant
conditions.
OEO, rather
than auditing
about
1,500
antipoverty
agencies
(or grantees),
required
the grantees
to arrange
with
qualified
accountants--generally
certified
public
accountants--to
audit
their
activities.
Deficiencies
controls
not

issued
control

in accounting
disclosed
in

About
60 percent
in fiscal
year
deficiencies.

systems
and
audit
reports

of over 1,000
1970 reported
GAO reviewed

audit
reports
on grantee
operations
no major accounting
system
or internal
27 reports
from this
group.

Of the 27, 17 failed
to disclose
significant
deficiencies
in the financial
operations
of OEO grantees.
Rather
than include
them in their
formal
audit
reports,
some public
accountants
informally
reported
such deficiencies
to their
grantees-clients.
The deficiencies
included
inadequate
controls
over cash, payroll,
travel
expense,
procurement,
consultant
services,
and
property
and two cases of misappropriations
of funds.
Public
affected

accountants+
by other

independence
may be
services
to grantees-clients

In 10 cases the public
accountants
performed
services
for the grantees
which
could
affect
their
independence.
These services
included
functions
such as day-to-day
and/or
periodic
normally
performed
by grantees+
employees,
bookkeeping.
Although
the accounting
profession’s
ethical
standards
permit
accountants to perform
many of these
services,
the fact
that
these
accountants
did
not always
include
significant
grantee
financial
management
deficiencies
in
their
audit
reports
raises
a question
whether
the independence
of some accountants
may have been impaired.
Independent
auditors
guidance
and
training
--

need

The types
of findings
noted
ants need additional
OEO guidance
OEO’s audit
requirements.

by GAO indicate
and additional

147

that
some public
accounttraining
to comply
with

OFFICE OF ECONOMICOPPORTUNITY
EXTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION (continued)
Although
uniform
standards
for auditing
Government
programs
have been
developed
by a committee
consisting
of GAO, OEO, and seven major
Federal
grantor
agencies,
there
is a continuing
need for orientation
and training
programs
for public
accountants
on audits
of Federal
grantees.
A
Need for strengthening
contractual
relationship
independent
accountants

with

Several
of the accountants
said their
allegiance
and responsibility
GAO holds
that
OEO should
require
to the grantee
rather
than to OEO.
grantees
to strengthen
the contractual
arrangements
with
the auditors
see that
auditors
are held responsible
for their
work.

is
and

to

OEO’s audit
organization
did not effectively
monitor
the adequacy
of
public
accountants’
audits,
and audit
reports
with monetary
and/or
nonmonetary
audit
exceptions
had been closed
without
OEO’s regional
offices
verifying
whether
corrective
actions
promised
by the grantees
actually
had
been taken.
GAO made several
recommendations
activities.
OEO informed
GAO that
tions
but that
their
implementation
(B-130515,
Apr.
4, 1973.)
staff,

it

to OEO for strengthening
its
audit
generally
agreed
with
GAOss recommendamay, in some cases,
require
additional

148

OFFICE
JFFICE

OF ECONOXIC OPPORTUNITY

OF LEGAL SERVICES

lmn rovement s needed
in
Legal
Services
program
grantees’
operations
and administration
*

l

GAO reported
to the Congress
in March 1973 on its evaluation
of the results
of OEO’s Legal
Services
program
grantees’
operations
and the manner
in
which
they were administered.
This program
seeks to provide
representation
which will
benefit
the poor and help alleviate
their
problems.
GAO reviewed
seven standard
program
grantees
operating
in five
States
and Puerto
Rico which
employed
attorneys
to provide
legal
services
and the
Wisconsin
Judicare
project,
under which
legal
services
provided
by private
attorneys
were paid for by the project
from OEO funds.
Standard

program

grantees

GAO reported
that
standard
program
grantees
could
increase
grams ’ effectiveness
if they developed
clearer
and more detailed
achieve
program
goals
and if OEO developed
a reliable
system
to
on grantees’
accomplishments.

their
proplans
to
gather
data

GAO noted
only limited
achievements
by most grantees
in the economic
development
and law reform
program
goal areas.
This happened
partly
because the grantees
had neither
clearly
defined
objectives
and priorities
set operating
plans
to achieve
these
goals.

nor

GAO had considerable
difficulty
interpreting
and analyzing
results
reported
by the grantees.
They had not defined
their
objectives
in operational
terms.
Their
records
were inadequate
and the confidentiality
of the
attorney-client
relationship
precluded
GAO from reviewing
certain
records.
Adequate
data was not available
to determine
the actual
number and types
of cases handled,
to measure
achievements
in some program
goal areas,
and to
compute
the average
cost
for cases handled.
Standard
program
grantees
need to improve
their
management
and
administration
so they can use resources
more effectively
and efficiently.
Grantees
need to improve
their
(1) determinations
of persons’
eligibility
legal
assistance,
(2) documentation
of non-Federal
contributions,
and
controls
over client
deposits.
Wis cons in

for
(3)

Judicare

Although
the Wisconsin
Judicare
project
was established
in 1966 as an
alternative
method
of providing
legal
services
to the rural
poor,
it was not
designed
to test
its own effectiveness
or its effectiveness
in comparison
to
Wisconsin
Judicare
Consequently,
standard
Legal
Services
program
grantees.
has not been evaluated
in depth
and standard
methods
of delivering
legal
services
and the value
of the judicare
concept
remain
in question.

149

OFFICE
OFFICE

OF LEGAL SERVICES

OEO did
--A

--A

not

OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

(continued)

establish:

systematic
method
of extracting
each type of legal
case handled,
sults
and for comparing
Wisconsin
grantees
0
model
collecting

GAO noted
operations.
--Private
nomic

standard
data
the

following

attorneys
development.

--Services
provided
were limited
to
--Private

Legal
Services
for comparison

attorneys

were

information,
such as the cost
needed
for documenting
judicare
Judicare
with
standard
program

program
grantee
having
to Wisconsin
Judicare.

problems

relating

involved

very

to

little

Wisconsin

in

in education,
advocacy,
and
a narrow
spectrum
of target-area
were

not

involved

in

appellate

law

of
re*

a system

for
*

Judicare’s

reform

and

eco-

economic
development
residents.
actions.

GAO noted
also that
the management
and administration
of the judicare
project
should
be improved
in areas relating
to documentation
of judicare
payments
to private
attorneys,
client
eligibility,
and non-Federal
contributions.

OEO generally
concurred
in GAO’s recommendations
and promised
to take
corrective
actions
so that
it could bequeath
to the proposed
successor
organization-the Legal
Services
corporation--a
mechanism
that
would
effectively
meet the legal
needs of the poor.
(B-130515,
Mar. 21, 1973.)

150

OFFICE OF ECONOMICOPPORTUNITY
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTDIVISIONNoncom@iance
with
grant
conditions
-1-and OEO and other
requirements
-P

At the request
in June 1973 on its
the California
State

ic

Investigations

of 2 :! Members of Congress
from California,
GAO reported
examination
of charges
made about
certain
activities
of
Economic
Opportunity
Office--an
OEO grantee.
and

evaluations

The California
State
office
did not comply with
the special.
conditions
of the 1972 grant
which
prohibited
investigations
and unilateral
evaluations.
The OEO San Francisco
regional
office
was aware that
the State
office
was
conducting
unilateral
evalua.tions
and found
them useful
for assessing
grantet
performance.
OEO did not try to prevent
the State
office
from conducting
evaluations
or to modify
the restrictions
in the grant.
The OEO San
Francisco
regional
office
apparently
was unaware
of the State
office’s
investigative
activities.
OEO headquarters
informed
GAO, however,
that
it was
aware that
the State
office
was performing
investigations
and evaluations
and
thus it may be said that
it implicitly
waived
these prohibitions.
Professional

staf-

oua~ifications

-

GAO’s examination
of the State
officess
professional
staff
qualifications
showed that
it was questionable
as to whether
almost
half
of the professional
staff
met certain
education
and/or
experience
requirements
contained
in the State
office’s
written
job descriptions.
However,
because
the ambiguous
terminology
of the job descriptions
could be broadly
interpreted,
GAO could not conclusively
determine
whether
the employees
met the
job qualifications.
Consultant

contracts

and unexpended

carryover

funds

The State
office
spent
at least
$60,657
of technical
for consultant
services
during
program
year 1972 without
so.
Moreover D the State
office’s
internal
controls
over
inadequate.

T

funds
to do
were

Although
OEO established
a policy
in April
1970 of requiring
grantees
to return
prior
years9
unexpended
funds
to the Treasury
or reprogram
the
funds
to reduce
Federal
funding
of grantees’
operations,
the policy
was not
required
by law and the OEO permitted
the State
office
to keep its prior
years V unexpended
funds,
Non-Federal
-.-

I

assistance
the authority
contracting

contributions

The State
office9s
recorded
non-Federal
contributions
greatly
exceeded
OEO’s requirement.
However p the majority
of these claims
were questionable
and the State
office’s
non-Federal
contribution
may have been deficient
for
the 1972 program
year.
GAO reported
that
the State
office
could
meet its
non-Federal
contribution
requirement
if OEO’s Office
of General
Counsel
determined
that
the funds
spent by the State
office
under
an OEO migrant
program
were allowable
o

OFFICE

OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION

(continued)

After
this
report
was released,
the Comptroller
General
issued
a
decision
on this
matter
at Senator
Alan Cranston’s
request.
In a July
1973,
decision,
the Comptroller
General
stated
that
the funds
expended
the State
office
under the OEO migrant
program
did not constitute
valid
claims
against
the non-Federal
contributions
requirement.

20,
by

GAO recommended
that
OEO’s Acting
Director
see that
the corrective
action
proposed
by the State
office
and the OEO San Francisco
regional
office
was taken.
OEO’s Acting
Director
indicated
to GAO that
corrective
actions
were begun in response
to specific
identified
problems
and that
OEO
would continue
to monitor
the actions
taken.
(B-130515,
June 14, 1973.)

1.52

*

*

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET
Contents
Page
Better management needed in civil
agencies over selection
of in-house or contract performance of support activities

153

155

OFFICE

OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Better
management
needed
in
civil
agencies
over sele.ction
-of in-house
or contract
performance
of support
activities
.

As stated
in Office
of Management
and Budget
(OMB) Circular
A-76,
the
Government’s
policy
for obtaining
certain
products
and services
is to rely
on the private
enterprise
system unless
the national
interest
requires
a
Government
agency to provide
them directly.
GAO made a review
to determine
whether
selected
civil
agencies
were
adhering
to the circular
requirements
in obtaining
commercial
or industrial
The review
was conducted
at selected
installations
products
or services.
within
the Atomic
Energy
Commission,
the Bureau of Reclamation,
the Federal
Aviation
Administration,
the Department
of Labor,
the General
Services
Administration,
the National
Institutes
of Health,
and the National
Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
GAO encountered
a widespread
failure
by Federal
civil
agencies
to adhere
to this
policy
and to the detail
procedures
required
by the circular.
In its report
to the Congress,
GAO stated
that
the agencies
have not
supported
justifications
for in-house
performance
of activities
nor have
they inventoried
and/or
reviewed
significant
activities
in accordance
with
circular
requirements.
GAO also observed
that
generally
(1) the inventoried
activities
have
not been converted
to contract
as a result
of reviews
prescribed
by the
audit
groups
have not reviewed
the agencies’
implecircular,
(2) internal
mentation
of the circular,,and
(3) the agencies’
instructions
implementing
the circular
do not contain
sufficient
guidance.
GAO’s recommendations,
which
generally
parallel
those
of the entire
Commission
on Government
Procurement,
are that
a new approach
and stronger
implementation
are needed
to achieve
consistent
and timely
Government-wide
application
of Circular
A-76.
GAO recommended
that
OMB take steps
to apply
the circular
more
vigorously
and comprehensively
and appoint
a senior
OMB member to devote
full
time to this
matter.
This appointee
would be assisted
by an interagency task force.

factual

In official
content.

comments
to
(B-158685,

the report,
agency
July
31, 1973.)

c.

155

officials

agreed

with

its

/

RENEGOTIATION BOARD
Contents
Page
Objectives
of the Renegotiation
Act could be more fully
attained by
strengthening
provisions
of the act and improving procedures of
the Renegotiation
Board

157

159

RENEGOTIATION
Objectives
of the Renegotiation
Act
more fully-attained
by strengthening
of the act and improving
procedures
the Renegotiation
Board

/

BOARD

could be
provisions
of

The Renegotiation
Board is an independent
agency created
under
the
Renegotiation
Act of 1951 to eliminate
contractors’
excessive
profits
on
defense
and space contracts
and related
subcontracts.
In renegotiation,
the
Board requires
contractors
to refund
to the Government
those
portions
of
profits
determined
to be excessive.
Each contractor
whose total
renegotiable sales
in a fiscal
year exceed
$1 million
must file
a report.
GAO’s review
objectives
of the
strengthening
the
certain
provisions
GAO recommended
--Develop
be used
weighted
tion
of

of the operations
Renegotiation
Act
procedures
of the
of the act itself.
that

the

of the Renegotiation
could be more fully
Renegotiation
Board

Renegotiation

guidelines
to show specifically
in excessive
profit
determinations
and include
in the renegotiation
the rationale
for decisions.

Board
attained
and by

showed that
by
strengthening

Board:
how the statutory
factors
are to be applied
and
files
adequate
documenta-

--Give
greater
consideration
to the rate
of return
in generating
renegotiable
sales
and use industry
for more objective
and broader
based analyses.

on capital
averages

--Assign
contractors
’ filings
which
show seemingly
reasonable
(especially
in borderline
cases)
to the regional
boards
for
review
to insure
that
contractors
are not escaping
excessive
determinations
because
inaccurate
data was submitted.

to

employed
to provide

profits
further
profit

--Establish
liaison
with
the Armed Services
Board of Contract
Appeals
and other
claims
settlement
review
groups
to insure
that
contractors
are reporting
accurate
data on pending
and paid claims.
--Consider
forwarding
price
determinations
tions.

l

for use of procurement
offices
and on the Board’s
analyses

of

data on excessive
such determina-

The Board stated
that
it was engaged
in an intensive
program,
still
unfinished,
the results
of which were to some extent
evident
in GAO’s reThe improvements
include
(1) guidelines
for screening
contractors’
port.
filings,
(2) actions
to develop
written
guidelines
for determining
excessive
profits,
and (3) a system
of automatic
data processing
techniques
to provide
a basis
for more broadly
based analyses
of cases in both screening
and fullscale
negotiation.
GAO recommended

that

the

Congress:

159

RENEGOTIATION
--Require
standard
significant

BOARD

the Board to obtain
and analyze
profit
and cost data on
commercial
articles
and services
to determine
whether
amounts
of profits
are escaping
renegotiation.

--Determine
whether
the new, durable,
productive
equipment
valid
since
the rationale
for the exemption--the
release
Government
stockpile
of such equipment--has
not occurred.
--Amend the act to penalize
contractors
failing
to file
penalty
could be patterned
after
that
of the Internal
ice ; that
is, the Board could
charge
interest
on the
profits
for the period
the filing
was late
or charge
if no excessive
profit
determination
was made.
--Revise
the penalty
provision
to hold contractors
furnishing
all data required
by the Board and
show reasonable
cause why they did not furnish
--Consider
whether
the minimum amount of excessive
the Board does not require
refunds
is appropriate
whether
the
Board
has
clearly
stated
its
if so,
tablishing
minimums
and whether
these
objectives
(B-163520,
May 9, 1973.)

160

exemption
of the

on time.
The
Revenue Servexcessive
a fixed
amount

responsible
to have the
the data.

for
contractors

profits
below which
under
the act and,
objectives
for esare being
attained.

is

TENNESSEEVALLEY AUTHORITY
Contents
Page
Alternative

to requirement

for

repayment of Federal

161

investment

163

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Alternative
repayment
‘L

4

of

to requirement
for
Federal
investment

At

the request
of the Chairman,
Subcommittee
on Public
Works AppropriaHouse
Committee
on
Appropriations,
GAO
reported
on
an
alternative
tions,
method
for the Tennessee
Valley
Authority
(TVA) to use in repaying
the Federal
investment
in TVA’s electric
power system.
This alternative
repayment
method would
treat
the Federal
investment
in
TVA as equity
and, therefore,
require
a payment
to the Treasury
as a return
on the investment.
The principal
amount of the investment,
however,
would
,The annual
rate
of return
on the investment
would be based on
not be repaid.
the average
interest
rate payable
by the Treasury
on its
total
marketable
public
obligations
as of the beginning
of each fiscal
year and therefore
would not result
in any net interest
cost to the Treasury
to have the investment outstanding.
GAO estimated
that,
should
the
method,
TVA’s power customers
could
1974 through
fiscal
year 2014 without
(B-114850,
Apr.
27, 1973.)

Congress
adopt
the alternative
repayment
save about
$287 million
from fiscal
year
any net interest
cost to the Treasury,

163

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Contents
Page
.

A

Improvements needed to increase the effectiveness
employees incentive
awards program

of the Government

Unclaimed

Fund

benefits

in the Civil

Service

165

Retirement

167
168

CIVIL

SERVICE

COF~MISSION

Improvements
needed
to increase
the effectiveness
of the Government
Employees
Incentive
Awards Program
Incentive
Awards Program
to
GAO reviewed
the Government
Employees’
determine
whether
cash performance
awards
(lump-sum
special
achievement
and quality
increases)
and cash suggestion
awards had been effective
in
Of the more
couraging
employees
to help improve
Government
operations.
1,900 randomly
selected
employees
responding
to a GAO questionnaire,
56
cent indicated
that
the Incentive
Awards Program
had not motivated
them
During
fiscal
year 1972,
Government
agencies
granted
a better
job.
--over

$16 million

--$4.6

million

--42,570

for

quality

$17 million.

pay,

for

these

91,161

56,606

special

employee

achievement
suggestions,

awards,
and

increases
having
an estimated
first-year
Since
these
increases
are reflected
in
awards will
eventually
cost
the Government

The Civil
Service
Commission
reported
measurable
benefits
lated
to special
achievements
and adopted
suggestions.
not determined
for quality
increases.
GAO’s review
ties,
representing
Service
Commission.
--Cash

was made in 10 civilian
a cross-section
of the
GAO found
that:

performance

awards

--There
was no clear
distinction
special
achievement
award and
is much more expensive.

between
a quality

the criteria
increase,

--Many

employees

why specific

awards

--About
quality
tions.

one-fourth
increase

Employee
participation
increased
by actively
suggestions
promptly.

told

of Federal
civilian
employees
award because
of restrictions

--Quality
increases
Commission
although
awards.
I

and Defense
departments
Federal
Government
and

inconsistently.

not

are

not officially
the agencies

in the
promoting

cost of
subsequent
years’
much more.

of $315 million
Related
benefits

used

were

had been

awards
enthan
perto do

and agenin the Civil

for granting
although
the

were

rewere

a
latter

granted.

are not eligible
for
in Commission
regula-

included
in the program
by the
contacted
treated
them as incentive

suggestion
award
and publicizing

portion
this

of the program
could
be
portion
and by processing

Further,
the Commission’s
annual
report
on the incentive
awards program
did not present
a complete
picture
because
it did not include
the substantial
costs
of quality
increases
and program
administration
and may have significantly
overstated
measurable
benefits.
Also,
neither
the Commission
nor the
agencies
had made reviews
of sufficient
frequency
or depth
to identify
problems in the program.

167

the

CIVIL
GAO recommended
--Establish
performance

that

criteria
has

the

SERVICE

COMMISSION

Chairman,

limiting
cash
clearly
improved

Civil

Service

performance
Government

Commission:
awards to
operations.

employees

whose

--Revise
standards
to clearly
distinguish
between
the level
of performance
needed to receive
a special
achievement
award or a quality
increase
so that
quality
increases
will
be relatively
more difficult
to obtain,
--Emphasize
specific

the importance
of
reasons
for awards.

--Include
consider
ineligible

quality
increases
as part
of
creating
a comparable
value
for quality
increases.

--Insure
gestions

that
agencies
promote
and publicize
are processed
promptly.

the

--Increase
quality
curacy

the usefulness
of the Commission’s
increase
and administrations
costs
of reported
benefits
and costs.

annual
report
and by improving

by

identify

strengths

--Make reviews
and weakness

and
es.

evaluations

keeping

necessary

employees

well

informed

of

the

the Incentive
Awards Program
and
award for employees
who are now

to

program

and

program

that

sug-

including
the ac-

The Commission
said that
GAO’s report
presented
a clear
and accurate
perspective
on the Incentive
Awards Program
and that
it believed
GAO’s conAs a result,
the Commission
clusions
and r&commendations
were constructive.
certain
corrective
actions
and will
said it had taken,
or planned
to take,
fully
discuss
with
agencies
the approaches
to be taken
to deal with
the
Nov. 1, 1973.)
problems
identified
by GAO,. (B-166802,

Over a quarter
million
former
Federal
employees,
most of whom are well
have
not
applied
for
annuities
or refunds
of their
beyond retirement
age,
contributions
totaling
about
$26 million
to the Civil
Service
Retirement
are not claimed,
the Civil
Service
Fund.
Under current
law, if the benefits
Commission
must maintain
records
on the contingent
liability
for claims
in
perpetuity
.
.
GAO tests
indicated
that
current
addresses
could be located
for many of
the people
entitled
to those benefits.
Accordingly,
GAO recommended
that
the
Commission
seek approval
from the Congress
to finance,
out of interest
income
of the Retirement
Fund, a program
to locate
former
employees
with
balances
in the fund amounting
to $100 or more and to settle
their
claims.
GAO also
recommended
that
the Commission
propose
legislation
providing
for a statute
of limitations
permitting
the destruction
of retirement
records
when it would
be statistically
sound to conclude
that
no claims
would be made.
Further,

l

CIVIL
GAO recommended
Commission
for

SEjWICE

to the Congress
that
such spending
authority

On October
30,
This law, providing
(including
the Civil
$641,000
to finance
Retirement
Fund and
does not provide
for
Dec. 20, 1972.)

it

COMM.SSION
consider
favorably
the
and enabling
legislation.

requests

of

the

1973,
Public
Law 93-143
was signed
by the President.
fiscal
year 1974 appropriations
to independent
agencies
Service
Commission),
authorizes
the Commission
to spend
a program
to locate
former
employees
with balances
in the
to settle
their
claims
as proposed
in our report.
The law
the statute
of limitations
recommendation.
(B-130150,

169

UNITED

STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Contents
Page

Prototype
mechanized
system
should
be proved
before
expanding
to additional
facilities
Cost comparison
leading
to decision
to purchase
leased
postal
did not conside’r
local
real
estate
taxes
forgone
Airmail
Improvement
Program
initiated
without
the benefit
of
studies
to determine
whether
the program
would be economical

171

system
173
facility
173
market
173

UNITED

STATES POSTAL SER’iJICE

Prototype
mechanized
system
should
before
expanding
system
to additional

be proved
facilities

The letter
mail
code sort
system
(LMCSS) is designed
to sort
letters
automatically
by means of a machine-readable
code imprinted
on the envelopes.
The Postal
Service
plans
to install
these
systems
in 179 strategically
loat a cost of about
$7 million
cated,
large-volume
postal
facilities
by 1978,
The Postal
Service
believes
that
LMCSS will
reduce
mail
for each facility.
processing
costs
by about
$1 billion
a year.
GAO reviewed
the operating
and testing
of a prototype
LMCSS at the
Cincinnati,
Ohio,
Post Office.
In a report
to the Postmaster
General,
copies
of which were sent to cognizant
congressional
committees,
GAO questioned
the
Postal
Service’s
plan to procure,
in the near future,
new and advanced
system equipment
for installation
at four
facilities
before
fully
demonstrating
GAO noted
that
a complete
LMCSS had not been installed
or tested;
the system.
the partial
LMCSS was not meeting
Postal
Service
performance
standards;
and
the partial
LMCSS was more costly
than the existing
letter
sorting
system.
A Postal
Service
official
advised
GAO that
the Postal
Service
recognized
the need for satisfactorily
demonstrating
the LMCSS equipment
before
making
a
major
capital
investment
and that
expanding
the LMCSS would be delayed
pending such a demonstration.
(B-114874,
Nov. 8, 1972.)
Cost
to purchase
leased
postal
consider
local
real
estate

facility
taxes

did not
forgone

At the request
of Congressman
James A. Burke,
GAO reviewed
the economics
of a decision
by the Postal
Service
to abrogate
an existing
lease
arrangement
and purchase
the South Boston
Postal
Annex Addition
in Boston,
Massachusetts.
GAO reported
that,
in determining
that purchasing
was more economical
than
leasing,
the Postal
Service
did not consider
real
estate
taxes
forgone
by
Boston
as a cost of ownership.
Including
real
estate
taxes
forgone
in the
cost comparison
showed an advantage
of leasing
over purchasing
of about
$3.6 million.
After
GAO’s review,
the Postal
Service
changed
its policy
and now considers
the effect
of removing
property
from local
tax rolls,
so that
its
(B-145650,
policy
is consistent
with
that
of other
Federal
agencies.
Dec. 29, 1972.)

F

t

]
the benefit
whether
the

of market
studies
to determine
program
would be economical

The Postal
Service’s
Airmail
Improvement
Program
objectives
are to
arrest
and reverse
the decline
in airmail
volume
and thus increase
revenue
by offering
improved
service,
This was the first
program
for which
the
Service
established
delivery
standards.

not

In August
performed

1973 GAO reported
to
a market
study before

the Congress
it initiated

173

that
the Service
had
the program;
delivery

$

UNITED

STATES POSTAL SERVICE

standards
were not being
met; and increased
costs
associated
with
the program
were not being
offset
because
anticipated
increased
airmail
volume had not
materialized.
On the bases of interviews
with
large
mailers,
GAO believed
that
there
was a need to reevaluate
the program
to determine
(1) whether
it
could
be modified
to better
meet customer
needs and, in turn,
to increase
participation
or (2) whether
it should
be curtailed,
In response
to GAO’s recommendations,
was examining
possible
program
modifications
customer
needs.
(B-114874,
Aug. 6, 1973.)

174

the

Postal
Service
stated
that
it
and making
surveys
to determine

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Contents
Page

I

Better
use of outpatient
improve
health
care

services
delivery
to

and nursing
veterans

175

care

bed

facilities

could
177

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Better
use of outpatient
services
and nursing
care bed facilities
could
improve
health
care delivery
to veterans
v

The Veterans
Administration
(VA) outpatient
program
for medical
and
dental
activities
and the number of veterans
treated
have increased
significantly
over the last
decade,.
GAO reviewed
VA’s health
care delivery
system
to determine
if better
use of outpatient
clinics
could
improve
the care provided
to veterans.
The outpatient
program
has helped
shorten
the length
of hospital
stay;
however,
opportunities
exist
to further
improve
the program.
On the basis
of a random sample of 420 patient
medical
records,
which
were reviewed
by
the treating
physicians
at six hospitals,
GAO estimated
that
about
146,000
or 15 percent
of the 1 million
hospital
days furnished
at these
hospitals
during
fiscal
year 1971 could have been avoided.
GAO found

that:

--Less
than 10 percent
of the
hospitals
received
outpatient
hospitalization.

patients
care

for

admitted
to
diagnostic

--Many patients
could have been discharged
been made of outpatient
facilities
or if
had been available.

to

--Poor
planning
and
surgical
facilities

coordination
unnecessarily

--Utilization
evaluating

review
matters

committees
placed
relatively
related
to more efficient

--Outpatients
cause the

often
had
appointment

use had
facilities

admissions
with
hospitalization.
little
patient

available

emphasis
care.

use

modern

dentistry

concepts

on

be-

extensively

that:

--Dental
clinic
productivity
personnel
and using
more
--At
some clinics
VA dentists
reduced
the amount of time
--Dental
reduce

hospital
lengthened

if greater
care bed

the six
before

to wait many hours to see a VA physician
scheduling
system was inadequate.

Some VA dental
clinics
do not
increase
professional
productivity,
GAO found

of

earlier
nursing

each of
testing

could
be improved
than one chair
per

performed
administrative
they devoted
to dental

clinic
efficiency
could be improved
the number of broken
appointments.

--The number
if resources

of

by using
more paradental
dentist
where possible.

veterans
referred
among neighboring

to private
VA stations

177

if

steps

duties
work.
were

which

taken

to

dentists
could
be reduced
were better
coordinated.

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
G.1\0 made various
recommendations
designed
clinic
scheduling,
productivity,
and efficiency
erally,
VA agreed
with GXO and said
it would
(B-167656,
Apr. 11, 1973.)

178

to

improve
hospital
and
review
procedures.
Gentake corrective
action.

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIES
Contents
Page

.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, AND
DEPARTMENTOF LABOR
Improvements needed in conducting the survey of non-Federal
salaries
used as basis for adjusting
Federal white-collar
salaries
DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTUREAND DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE
Processed fruits
and vegetables:
need for better controls and
improvement in sanitation
in some plants

183
183

185

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE; DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE; DEPARTMENTOF LABOR; OFFICE OF ECONOMICOPPORTUNITY; AND
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET
Problems limiting
progress of Federal programs affecting
migrant
and other seasonal farmworkers

-187

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENTOF STATE, AND AGENCYFOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Better use could be made of U.S. assistance and other support
to the Philippines

4

181

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE; DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE; DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE; DEPARTMENTOF THE TREASURY; AND
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
A single agency needed to manage port-of-entry
inspections-particularly
at U.S. airports

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTUREAND DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR
Additional
actions needed to minimize adverse environmental
impacts of timber harvesting
and road construction
on forest land

I

181

185

187
189
189
191
191

DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE;DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE; GENERALSERVICES
ADMINISTRATION; DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE;
DEPARTMENTOF LABOR; AND VETERANSADMINISTRATION
Opportunities
for reducing the cost of constructing
and operating
health facilities

193

DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE,DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR, AND OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET
Need for a national
earthquake research program

197
197

193

DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE, GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION, AND
TENNESSEEVALLEY AUTHORITY
Improvement needed in use of formal advertising
procedures
for procurement

199

DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENTOF STATE
Need for tighter
control over U.S. commitments to other nations
Desirability
of improved reporting
on U.S. contributions
to NATO
Payment of phantom troops in the Cambodian military
forces

201
201
202
202

199

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIES
C o n t e n t s (continued)
Page
DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENTOF
DEFENSE, AND THE GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Need for Federal agencies to improve solid waste management
.-.
practices
DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE AND DEPARTMENTOF STATE
Progress toward and improvements needed in preventing
illicitly
reaching the United States

205
205
207

heroin

from

207

DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE AND DEPARTMENTOF THE TREASURY
Heroin being smuggled into New York City successfully

209
209

DEPARTMENTOF LABOR AND DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
Problems in operating certain training
programs in Appalachian
Kentucky under the Manpower Development and Training Act

211

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, CORPSOF ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENTOF
HOUSINGAND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,AND DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION
Differences
in administration
of relocation
assistance program
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGETAND GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Revisions needed in financial
management policies
of the
Federal Government's Automatic Data Processing Fund

180

211
213
213
215
215

VARIOUS
(Civil

Service

Improvements
needed
survey
of non-Federal
basis
for adjusting

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Commission,
Office
of Management
and Department
of Labor)

conducting
the
salaries
used as
Federal
white-collar

and Budget,

in

salaries

.
The principle
that
salaries
for Federal
white-collar
employees
should
be comparable
with
salaries
paid
in private
enterprise
for the same levels
of work is established
by law.
GAO is reviewing
the comparability
process
for adjusting
Federal
white-collar
salaries
because
it is desirable
that
an
independent
assessment
be made and because
it costs
about
$420 million
a
year for each l-percent
increase
in pay.
The first
phase of the review
was
completed
during
fiscal
year 1973 and dealt
with
the design
and conduct
of
the annual
survey
of non-Federal
salaries.
The survey
is used as the basis
for assessing
and adjusting
Federal
white-collar
salaries.
In its report
on this
phase of the review,
GAO stated
that
the adoption
of the comparability
principle
and the provision
for annual
review
and
adjustment
have generally
advanced
the evolution
of Federal
white-collar
salary
determination.
The resultant
pay adjustments
have, on the whole,
significantly
narrowed
the spread
between
Government
and private
sector
average
salary
rates
determined
by the annual
survey.
There is, however,
a
need to supplement
and strengthen
the design
and data-gathering
process
of
the annual
survey
to better
accomplish
the basic
purposes
for which
the
principle
of comparability
was adopted.
Further,
more emphasis
should
be
given
to compensate
evaluation
and research
in order
that
timely
changes
in
the comparability
process
can be made.
In the annual
survey,
it would not be feasible
to survey
every
Government job to determine
its average
salary
in the private
sector.
Instead,
a
An
arithmetic
select
group of positions
at various
work levels
is surveyed.
mean of the private
enterprise
rate
for each work level
is computed.
These
means are the bases used to assess
and adjust
Federal
rates.
GAO reported
that
the occupational
composition
of the jobs
selected
for
survey
were not sufficiently
representative
of the variety
of Federal
jobs
The job mixes at certain
of
at the GS-5, GS-7, GS-9, and GS-15 work levels.
those
levels
contained
disproportionate
numbers
of jobs which were highly
and this
resulted
in an upward
bias of the averpaid in the private
sector,
age work- level
rates.
Although
the annual
survey
is designed
to estimate
the national
salary
rates
in the private
sector
for selected
jobs comparable
to those
in the
the scope of the survey
includes
only the salaries
of about
Federal
sector,
Employees
of State
25 percent
of non-Federal
sector
white-collar
employees.
nonprofit
organizations,
and some industries
are
and local
governments,
excluded.
The rationale
for many of the exclusions
no longer
seems valid.
Including
a more representative
cross
section
of the non-Federal
sector
would allow
the survey
to reflect,
proportionately,
employment
and pay for
each of the major
segments
of the non-Federal
sector.

181

VARIOUS
(Civil

Service

With respect
for the comparability
errors
to determine
a need to:
--Clarify

to

Commission,
Office
of Management
‘and Department
of Labor)

and Budget,

the actual
conduct
of the survey,
GAO observed
a need
process
to include
a means of measuring
nonsampling
the degree
of data reliability.
Further,
GAO reported

certain

--Reevaluate
certain
the job-matching
--Provide

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

additional

job

definitions.

surveyed
technique.

jobs

to

see

guidance

and

training

if

to

they

are

susceptible

data

collectors.

to

GAO’s report
contained
a number of recommendations
to the Director,
Office
of Management
and Budget;
Chairman,
Civil
Service
Commission;
and
the Secretary
of Labor.
Agency officials
were generally
in accord
with
the
message
of GAO’s report.
The Civil
Service
Commission,
with
approval
of
the Office
of Management
and Budget,
has requested
a supplemental
appropriastudy
of the feasibility
of implementing
tion
of $760,000
for a “crash”
GAO’s recommendations
along with numerous
other
matters
relating
to Federal
compensation
policies
and procedures,
The Bureau
of Labor
Statistics
also agreed
that
the recommended
improvements
in its conduct
of the salary
survey
were needed
and requested
$600,000
for fiscal
year 1975 to make the needed
changes
for incorporation
into
the March 1976 survey.
(B-167266,
May 11, 1973.)

182

VARIOUS

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

(Department
of
Department
of Health,

Agriculture
Education,

and
and Welfare)

Processed
fruits
and vegetables:
need for better
controls
and improvement
in sanitation
in some plants

t-

HEW, has primary
Federal
responThe Food and Drug Administration
(FDA),
sibility
for inspecting
foods--except
for meat,
poultry,
and egg products-and for insuring
that
foods
entering
interstate
commerce are safe and wholesome and that
adulterated
and misbranded
products
are removed
from the market.
The Agricultural
Marketing
Service
(AMS), Department
of Agriculture,
provides
grading
services
in fruit
upon request
and on a reimbursable
basis,
To receive
the service,
a plant
must be
and vegetable
processing
plants.
maintained
under sanitary
conditions.
A 1953 agreement
between
AMS and FDA
arranged
for carrying
out activities
having
common or related
objectives.
Need to control
processed
fruits
vegetables
which may be adulterated

and

From January
1, 1970, through
March 31, 1971,
about
15 billion
pounds
of
fruits
and vegetables
were subject
to AMS grading.
During
that
period,
AMS
identified
about
39 million
pounds
in 132 plants
that
did not meet U.S. grade
standards
because
the products
had excessive
foreign
materials--such
as
worms,
insects,
oil,
rust,
and paint
flakes--or
because
the products
had
been packed under unsanitary
conditions.
GAO found
that
AMS, in accordance
with
its normal
procedures,
did not
control
such products
but left
their
disposition
to the processors.
Also,
FDA did not routinely
obtain
from AMS information
on these products
which
might have been adulterated.
In July
1971 GAO asked FDA to investigate
specific
production
lots
which
did not meet U.S. grade standards.
Of 31 lots
investigated,
FDA reported
that
2 which had been shipped
in interstate
commerce were adulterated;
3 had been destroyed
or diverted
for use as cattle
feed;
and the rest
had been shipped
from the plants
and were not available
for sampling
or could not be traced.

I

The agreement
between
FDA and AMS was revised
in May 1972 to provide
that,
whenever
AMS found
a production
lot
to be hazardous
to health,
it
would report
this
information
to FDA.
However,
the revision
did not cover
potentially
adulterated
products
other
than those
considered
hazardous
to
health.
Potentially
adulterated
products
include
those
that
consist,
in
whole or in part,
of any filthy,
putrid,
or decomposed
substance;
those
that
are otherwise
unfit
for food;
and those
that
have been prepared,
packed,
or
held under unsanitary
conditions
whereby
they may have become contaminated
by
filth.
In

h

under
obtain

a February
1973
the authority
of
from Agriculture

report
to the Congress,
the Federal
Food, Drug,
necessary
information

183

GAO recommended
that
(1)
and Cosmetic
Act,
routinely
for FDA to take appropriate

FDA,

VARIOUS

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

(Department
of Agriculture
Department
of Health,
Education,
action
against
all processed
fruits
grade standards
for reasons
which,
products
adulterated
and that
(2)
tion
on a timely
basis.

and
and Welfare)

and vegetables
which
failed
to meet U.S.
under FDA standards,
would render
the
AMS cooperate
in providing
such informaJL

HEW said it concurred
in the recommendation
and would work with AgriculAgriculture
replied
that
AMS’s grading
service
was
ture
to implement
it.
voluntary
and that
its minimum guidelines
for foreign
material
were more
restrictive
than FDA’s.
Agriculture
expressed
the belief
that,
if AMS reported
to FDA all products
which
failed
to meet AMS’s grade and quality
standards,
the participating
plants
would be disadvantaged
by being
subjected
to standards
different
from those
applied
to nonparticipating
plants.
In April
1973 Agriculture
reported,
however,
that
it was developing
amendments
to its agreement
with
FDA to provide
that
products
which
failed
meet U.S. grade standards
and which
might
have been adulterated
would be
(1) made to comply with
the standards,
(2) diverted
for processing
into
other
products,
(3) voluntarily
disposed
of for nonfood
purposes,
or (4)
reported
to FDA.

t

to

In August
1973 an AMS official
advised
GAO that
the agencies
had agreed
on the amendments
and that
the revised
agreement
would be published
in the
Federal
Register
.
AMS does not notify
FDA of plantsfrom which
its grading
service
has
been withdrawn,
suspended,
or terminated
Conditions
revealed
by GAO visits
to fruit
and vegetable
processing
plants
and AMS sanitation
reports
and grading
records
showed that
some plant
managements
were not taking
appropriate
and timely
actions
to correct
known
sanitation
deficiencies
and that
some AMS employees
were not effective
in
having
plant
managements
maintain
their
plants
under
sanitary
conditions.
Under its
1953 agreement
with FDA, AMS was not required
to and did not notify
FDA of plants
where grading
service
had been denied
or withdrawn
because
of
sanitation
deficiencies.
During
GAO’s review,
AMS took action
which
should
improve
plant
sanitation
conditions.
In August
1973 an AMS official
told
GAO that
AMS and FDA
had agreed
to amend their
agreement
to provide
that
the denial
or withdrawal
of inspection
services
would be reported
to FDA.
He stated
also that
the revised
agreement
would be published
in the Federal
Register.
(B-164031 (2))
Feb. 21, 1973.)

184

-

VARIOUS

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

(Department
of Agriculture;
Pepartment
of
Health,
Education,
and Welfare;
Department
of Justice;
Department
of the Treasury;
and Office
of Management
and Budget1
*i

‘t

A single
agency needed
inspections--particularly

to manage port-of-entry
at U.S. airports

In May 1973 GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the inspection
resources
of the four
Federal
agencies
responsible
for inspecting
persons
entering
the
United
States-Immigration
and Naturalization
Service,
Department
of Justice;
Bureau
of Customs,
Department
of the Treasury;
Public
Health
Service,
Cepartment of Health,
Education,
and Welfare;
and Department
of Agriculture--are
strained
by the increases
in the number of arrivals,
particularly
at international
airports.
The situation
is further
aggravated
by the uneven
distribution
of arrivals
during
both the day and year.
The increases
in and
concentration
of air arrivals
and the present
four-way
division
of inspection
functions
contribute
to management
problems,
At Kennedy
International
Airport,
in New York,
for example:
--The agencies
locations.

must

staff

--The agencies
work shifts

have different
and for billing

--The agencies
have different
sults
in wide disparities
work.
--The pressure
inspections

and

in

supervise

inspections

policies
airlines

and procedures
for services.

at

four

for

pay scales
for overtime
work
pay for inspectors
performing

to quickly
process
arrivals
at peak traffic
periods.

dilutes

the

separate

establishing

which
resimilar

quality

of

The four agencies
recognized
that
a fragmented
approach
to inspections
will
not allow
a more efficient
and effective
inspection
system
to develop.
Attempts
to improve
the system have been frustrated
due to the difficulties
of multiagency
cooperation.
GAO recommended
that
the Director,
Office
of Management
and Budget
(OMB), in cooperation
with
the four agencies,
should
implement
single-agency
management
of port-ofentry
inspections.
Immigration,
Customs,
and Agriculture agreed
with
GAO’s recommendation.
I

/

However,
and emphasized
miology
could
single-agency
in a particular

HEW did not agree with
the concept
of single-agency
management
that
only
experienced
inspectors
understanding
disease
epideadequately
carry
out their
inspections.
GAO pointed
out that
management
would not eliminate
experienced
judgment
or expertise
inspection
function.

On March 28, 1973,
the President
transmitted
to the Congress
a reorganization
plan which
included
a proposal
to transfer
Immigration’s
inspections
to Customs . This would be a significant
first
step in eliminating
the
fragmented
inspections
management.
Although
the plan was approved,
the

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIBS
[Department
Health, Education,
and Welfare; Department
of Justice;
Department of the Treasury;
and Office of Management and Budget)
transfer was not carried out.
OMB informed GAO in June 1973 that it did not
believe the reorganization
plan was the appropriate
vehicle for the transfer.
OMB, however, had no objection
to GAO's conclusions
and recommendations.
(B-114898, May 30, 1973.)

186

VARIOUS

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

(Department
of Agricult,ure;
Department
of
Health,
Education,
and Welfare;
Department
of
Labor;
Office
of Economic
Opportunity;
and
Office
of Management
and Budget)
Problems
limiting
progress
of
Federal
programs
affecting
migrant
and other
seasonal
farmworkers
t
In February
Federal
programs
sonal
farmworkers
New York,
Texas,
is administered

sonal
tion,

1973 GAO reported
to the Congress
on the impact
of major
to improve
the living
conditions
of migrant
and other
seain six agricultural
areas in California,
Florida,
Michigan,
Federal
participation
in these programs
and Washington.
by the Departments
of Agriculture,
HEW, and Labor and OEO.

The Federal
Government
provides
funds
to help migrant
farmworkers
improve
their
living
conditions
through
health,
housing,
and day-care
programs.

and other
manpower,

seaeduca-

although
the Federal
Government’s
programs
provided
GAO reported
that,
needed
services
for many of the estimated
199,000
migrant
and other
seasonal
farmworkers
and dependents,
the amount of funds made available
in relation
to the target
population,
which OEO estimates
at 5 million,
and the magnitude
of their
problems
have limited
the programs’
effectiveness.
Although
the
funding
of programs
has increased
and larger
amounts
are expected
to be
made available
in the future,
budgetary
constraints
will
almost
certainly
continue
to limit
progress
in meeting
these
farmworkers’
needs.
GAO also

reported

--Administrators
more effectively
families.

that:
need to improve
the operations
of their
aid migrant
and seasonal
farmworkers

programs
and their

to

--Federal
assistance
directed
to problems
of migrant
and other
seasonal
farmworkers
is administered
by four executive
agencies
on a fragmented
basis
through
numerous
programs,
each having
separate
legislative
authority
and intent.

I

*

Federal
agencies
operating
the programs
generally
agreed
with
GAO’s
recommendations
and said action
had been,
or would be, taken
accordingly.
In response
to GAO’s recommendation
concerning
the need for developing
an
overall
plan and a common direction
of effort
among Federal
agencies
operating these programs,
OMB said that
it was working
with
the,agencies
on what
sort
of interagency
coordination
might
be necessary.
(B-177486,
Feb. 6,
1973.)

187

VARIOUS
(Department

of

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Agriculture

and

Department

of

the

Interior)

Additional
actions
needed
to minimize
adverse
environmental
impacts
of timber
harvesting
and road construction
on
forest
land

-

Two Federal
agencies--the
Forest
Service,
Department
of Agriculture,
and the Bureau
of Land Management
(BLM),
Department
of the Interior--manage
about
660 million
acres
of federally
owned land for a sustained
high-level
output
of forest
resources
to meet public
demands without
impairing
land
productivity.
Both agencies
are required
to consider
environmental
values
in making
land management
decisions.

ii

In March 1973 GAO reported
to the Congress
that
procedures
and practices
followed
by both agencies
in planning
timber
sale and road construction
projects
did not insure
that
the expertise
of resource
specialists
was
obtained
and used to minimize
the adverse
impact
on forest
resources.
In
many instances
in which
timber-harvesting
and road construction
projects
caused serious
damage to forest
resources
and the environment,
project
planners either
had not obtained
or had not followed
the advice
of resource
specialists.
To minimize
adverse
environmental
impact
of decisions
relating
to land
management,
GAO recommended
that
the Forest
Service
and BLM (1) require
project
planners
to obtain
and use the expertise
of resource
specialists
in
planning
and designing
each timber
sale and road construction
project
or,
when such expertise
is not obtained
or used,
document
the reasons
therefor,
(2) require
that
the resource
specialists*
views
and recommendations
be made
part of the project
planning
documents
for review
by supervisory
officials,
and (3) identify
and analyze
where and why needed
assistance
from resource
specialists
could
not be obtained
and explore
ways to provide
such assistante.
Agriculture
generally
agreed
with
GAO’s conclusions
Forest
Service’s
national
instructions
had been or were
require
engineering
representatives
to call
on appropriate
ists
while
planning
and constructing
roads.
Agriculture
the national
instructions
covering
timber
sale planning
out were being
revised
to require
that
needed
skills
be
mented,
and made available
to district
rangers
and that
made of the use or nonuse of specialists
or the failure
cialists’
advice.

and stated
that
the
being
modified
to
resource
specialstated
also
that
and timber
sale layidentified,
docud.ocument.ation
be
to follow
the spe-

Interior
said that BLM had installed
procedures
which met most of GAO’s
recommendations
but that
these procedures
had not yet been fully
implemented
at the field
level.
However,
those procedures
make the use of resource
specialists
optional
rather
than mandatory.
GAO believes
that
additional
actions
are needed
to strengthen
BLM’s new
procedures
to require
that
the expertise
of specialists
be obtained
and used
when
it
is
not,
to
document
for
supervisory
review
why
it
was
not
conor,
sidered
necessary,
was not available,
or was not used.
(B-125053,
Mar. 20,
1973.)

189

i
1

I

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
(Department

of
Agency

Better
use could be made
U.S. assistance
and other
support
to the Philippines

Agriculture,
Department
of State,
for International
Development)

and

of

Direct
U.S. economic
and military
assistance
programs
to the Philippines
However,
less visible
averaged
$68 million
annually
from 1965 through
1971.
such as sugar premium
payments,
favorable
but larger
forms of dollar
flows,
have averaged
about
$388 miltariff
agreements,
and U.S. military
spending,
lion
annually.
These latter
means stem from programs
of the U.S. Government
and are not necessarily
directed
to the
serving
specific
U.S. interests
orderly
development
of Philippine
economy,

t

assistance
programs--based
on the criGAO reported
that
I-J.S. economic
terion
of self-help--have
achieved
little
success
in bringing
about much
The influence
of
needed
social
and economic
changes
in the Philippines.
these programs
has been lessened
by inadequate
Philippine
Government
support.
GAO found
that
over the years
the Agency for International
Development
(AID)
has planned
technical
assistance
grant
and direct
loan programs
on the assumption
that
the Philippine
Government
would provide
adequate
local
currency
support
to carry
out the various
agreements.
In 1965 GAO reported
that
Philippine
Government
support
was inadequate.
There has been some improvement but this
problem
still
persists.
For other
types of dollar
inflows
to the Philippines
States,
GAO observed
that
U.S. payments
of $485 million
130 percent
of the world
price
of sugar during
the past
U.S. sugar
quota
system have not provided
much assistance
ment of the Philippines
and its people.

by the United
over and above
7 years
through
the
toward
the develop-

GAO recommended
that
(1) the Secretaries
of State
and Agriculture
develop
methods
to direct
at least
part
of the sugar premium
payments
to economic
development
and social
reform
programs
and that
(2) the Secretary
of State
impress
upon the Philippine
Government
the need for such use.
In providing
direct
assistance,
the United
States
should
more effectively
insure
that
Philippine
funds will
be available
when needed before
it turns
over U.S e
a portion
of the receipts
from
resources
to joint
projects.
For example,
U.S. sugar
trade
could be used for this
purpose.

*

*

The Department
of State
said
that
any attempt
to use the benefits
accruing
to the Philippines
from the sugar legislation
to implement
U.S. policy
objectives
would be tenable
anly
if done without
detracting
from the main
purposes
of U.S. sugar policy.
AID cited
various
assistance
projects
for
which
it stated
that
Philippine
financial
support
had been adequate.
It
agreed
that
Philippine
local
currency
support
and program
implementation
continue
to be problems
but that
these problems
have become less serious
in
recent
years.

191

VARIOUS
(Department

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

of Agriculture,
Department
of State,
Agency for International
Development)

and

In view of the magnitude
of the indirect
assistance
provided
to the
Philippines
through
sugar premiums
and the great
interest
of the United
States
in assisting
with
the economic
and social
development
of the PhilipGAO expressed
the belief
that
the United
States
should
act to impress
pines,
upon the Philippines
the potential
better
use of a portion
of these funds.
GAO stated
in its report
that
the Congress
may wish to review
this
matter
with
the Departments
of State
and Agriculture
and AID.
(B-133359,
Mar. 2, 1973.)

192

-L

t

VARIOUS

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

(Department
of Commerce;
Department
of
General
Services
Administration;
Department
Educat ion,
and Welfare;
Department
of
and Veterans
Administration)
Opportunities
constructing
.

for reducing
and operating

Defense;
of Health,
Labor;

the cost of
health
facilities

GAO undertook
a comprehensive
Pursuant
to a law enacted
by Congress,
study
of the costs
of constructing
and operating
health
facilities
and reported
to the Congress
on ways to reduce
these
costs
for facilitFes
built
with
assistance
provided
under
the Public
Health
Service
Act.
GAO also
examined
ways in which
the demand for facilities
could be reduced
or
eliminated.
Constructing
operating

tunities
cilities,
fication
different

and
health

facilities

In a November
1972 report
to the Congress,
GAO identified
many opporfor improved
planning,
construction,
and operation
of health
faincluding
advance
analysis
of specific
health
care needs,
identiof alternative
sources
of funds,
reuse of building
designs,
and
construction
techniques.

Hospital
planners
generally
do not evaluate
on a life-cycle
basis
alternative
construction
techniques,
material,
designs,
and operating
systems.
Many hospital
administrators
and architects,
in efforts
to-curb
the. rising
cost of hospital
construction,
search
for obvious
savings
in
initial
construction.
These initial
savings
often
preclude
later
savings
in operations
and maintenance
that
exceed
the initial
cost savings.

initial
hospital

To demonstrate
construction
for detailed

the impact
that
certain
alternatives
and life-cycle
costs,
GAO selected
study.
The demonstration
showed

--Initial
construction
costs
of the
as much as 8.6 percent
lower
than
built.
--Life-cycle
incorporating
hospital.
I

b

redesigned
those
of

costs
of as much as $10.4
million
the improvement
alternatives

the

would have on
a recently
opened
that:

facility
facility

would have been
that was

could
have been
into
the redesigned

saved

by

GAO recommended
that
the Secretary
of HEW (1) compile
and publish
information
on the essential
factors
to be considered
in project
planning,
(2) explore
the feasibility
of reusing
hospital
designs,
(3) adopt
a common
set of construction
requirements
for HEW-administered
programs,
(4) develop
and disseminate
a scientific
base of knowledge
on construction
requirements,
and (5) require
that
the fast-track
and total
concept
approaches
be considered
for health
facility
projects
assisted
under
the Public
Health
Service
Act.

193

VARIOUS

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

(Department
of Commerce;
Department
of
General
Services
Administration;
Department
Education,
and Welfare;
Department
of
and Veterans
Administration)

Defense;
of Health,
Labor;

GAO also recommended
that
HEW establish
the capacity
to provide
lifecycle
cost data to health
facility
planners
and require
that
applicants
for
Federal
funding
justify
the use of construction
techniques,
materials,
designs,
and operating
systems
which
differ
from those
recommended
by HEW.
GAO recommended
further
that,
until
HEW establishes
the capacity
to provide
life-cycle
cost data to health
facility
planners,
HEW should
encourage
planners
to consider
the information
presented
in this
report,
along with
local
operating
conditions
and costs,
in identifying
the alternatives
for
life-cycle
analysis
that
are likely
to be the most appropriate
for inclusion
in the facility.
Demand
facility

for

health
construction

GAO also identified
and studied
ways in which health
facility
construction
could be avoided
by either
reducing
the demand for such facilities
or
increasing
the productivity
of existing
facilities.
The study
showed that
the demand for hospitals
and, to a lesser
extent,
other
health
care facilities
could be reduced
and that,
by more efficiently
using
existing
facilities,
millions
of dollars
in construction
costs
would not need to be spent.
These results
could be attained
by (1) placing
greater
emphasis
on preventive
medicine,
(2) making more appropriate
use of various
types of health
care facilities,
(3) increasing
the use of more efficient
and economical
medical
care delivery
systems,
(4) using
more effective
utilization
review
techniques,
(5) changing
health
insurance
incentives
that
emphasize
inpatient
care,
(6) sharing
more hospital
services,
(7) organizing
more efficient
and economical
health
care systems,
and (8) strengthening
the role
and
increasing
the capabilities
of areawide
health
planning
agencies.
GAO made a number of recommendations
to the Secretary
of HEW calling
for these changes.
In implementing
these
changes,
GAO recommended
that
HEW
solicit
the cooperation
of other
Government
agencies,
private
health
organizations,
and medical
professionals
and assume leadership
in these
areas.
Some health
care providers
have changed
traditional
health
care demand
and utilization
patterns,
decreasing
the need to construct
acute
care and
other
types
of health
facilities.
The economic
benefits
emanating
from
these
changes
and the means by which
such changes
have been effected,
as
discussed
in GAO’s report,
should
be of particular
interest
to the Congress.
Accordingly,
GAO recommended
that
the Congress
consider
these matters
when
it considers
legislative
health
care proposals,
such as those providing
for
the reorganization
of the existing
health
care delivery
system
and for
programs
on national
health
insurance.

‘194

.

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIES
(Department of Commerce; Department of Defense;
General Services Administration;
Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare; Department of Labor;
and Veterans Administration)
HEW, 5 other Federal agencies, and 17 private
organizations
were
The
agencies
requested to review and comment on all or parts of the study.
(B-164031(3),
Nov. 20,
and organizations
generally
concurred in the report.
1972.)
*

195

VARIOUS
(Department
the Interior,

*

3

Need for
research

a national
program

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
of

Commerce,
and Office
and Budget)

Department
of
of Management

earthquake

After
the Alaska
earthquake
in 1964,
Federal
agencies
developed
and
Earthquake
researc

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Agao%3A6a7216df81cb2f2f. Public record. Not legal advice.
