# Federal Trade Commission (2007)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aftc%3Ad94bd86c6a56e2a8

## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

Federal Trade Commission
Bureau of Competition
Jeffrey Schmidt, Director

Antitrust Enforcement Activities
Fiscal Year 2003 - March 31, 2007
ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting 2007

ABA ANTITRUST SECTION
SPRING MEETING
Summary of Bureau of Competition Activity
Fiscal Year 2003 Through March 31, 2007
Table of Contents
I.

Mergers ........................................................................................................1
A.

Consent Orders .............................................................................................................. 1
American Air Liquide, Inc. ........................................................................................... 1
Allergan, Inc. .................................................................................................................. 2
Aspen Technology, Inc. ................................................................................................. 2
Baxter International, Inc............................................................................................... 2
Barr Pharmaceutical, Inc.............................................................................................. 2
Buckeye Partners, L.P. .................................................................................................. 2
Boston Scientific Corp ................................................................................................... 3
Cemex, S.A...................................................................................................................... 3
Cephalon, Inc.................................................................................................................. 3
Chevron Texaco Corporation ....................................................................................... 3
Cytec Industries, Inc...................................................................................................... 3
Dainippon Ink and Chemicals, Inc............................................................................... 3
DaVita Inc....................................................................................................................... 4
DSM N.V......................................................................................................................... 4
Enterprise Products Partners L.P. ............................................................................... 4
Enterprise Products Partners L.P. ............................................................................... 4
Fresenius AG .................................................................................................................. 4
GenCorp Inc. .................................................................................................................. 4
General Dynamics Corporation.................................................................................... 5
General Electric Company............................................................................................ 5
General Electric Company............................................................................................ 5
Genzyme Corporation ................................................................................................... 5
Hologic, Inc..................................................................................................................... 5
Hospira, Inc. ................................................................................................................... 6
Itron, Inc. ........................................................................................................................ 6
Johnson & Johnson........................................................................................................ 6
Johnson & Johnson........................................................................................................ 6
Kinder Morgan, Inc. ...................................................................................................... 6
Libbey, Inc. ..................................................................................................................... 7
Linde, AG........................................................................................................................ 7
Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P.............................................................................. 7
MSC. Software Corporation ......................................................................................... 7
Novartis AG.................................................................................................................... 8
Occidental Chemical Corporation................................................................................ 8
Penn National Gaming, Inc........................................................................................... 8

i

B.

C.

D.
E.

F.
G.
H.

II.

Pfizer Inc......................................................................................................................... 8
Phillips Petroleum Company ........................................................................................ 8
Quest Diagnostics, Inc. .................................................................................................. 8
Sanofi-Synthélabo .......................................................................................................... 9
Service Corporation International ............................................................................... 9
Shell Oil Company ......................................................................................................... 9
Southern Union Company............................................................................................. 9
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd............................................................................ 9
The Procter & Gamble Company ................................................................................ 9
The Boeing Company .................................................................................................. 10
Thermo Electron Corporation.................................................................................... 10
Valero L.P..................................................................................................................... 10
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. .................................................................................................. 10
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. .................................................................................... 11
Authorizations to Seek Preliminary Injunctions ...................................................... 11
Aloha Petroleum, Ltd .................................................................................................. 11
Arch Coal, Inc. ............................................................................................................. 11
Kroger Company/Raley’s Corporation ..................................................................... 11
Nestlé Holdings, Inc. .................................................................................................... 11
Vlasic Pickle Company ................................................................................................ 12
Commission Opinions/Initial Decisions ..................................................................... 12
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company .............................................................................. 12
Northwestern Healthcare Corporation...................................................................... 12
Court Decisions ............................................................................................................ 13
Arch Coal, Inc. ............................................................................................................. 13
Order Violations........................................................................................................... 13
Boston Scientific Corporation..................................................................................... 13
RHI AG ......................................................................................................................... 14
Other Commission Orders .......................................................................................... 14
Administrative Complaints ......................................................................................... 14
Equitable Resources, Inc. ............................................................................................ 14
Other ............................................................................................................................. 14
Horizontal Merger Investigation Data....................................................................... 14
Conference on the Price Effects of Mergers and Concentration in the United
States Petroleum Industry........................................................................................... 15
Horizontal Merger Investigation Data....................................................................... 15
Merger Efficiency Roundtable.................................................................................... 15
Merger Enforcement Workshop ................................................................................ 15
Merger Remedies - Second Workshop....................................................................... 15

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act Enforcement ...........16
A.

B.
C.

Court Decisions ............................................................................................................ 16
Scott R. Sacane ............................................................................................................. 16
William H. Gates, III ................................................................................................... 16
Consent Orders ............................................................................................................ 16
Complaints - Filed........................................................................................................ 16
Blockbuster, Inc. .......................................................................................................... 16

ii

D.
E.
F.

III.
A.

B.

C.

D.

Complaints - Authorized ............................................................................................. 17
Arch Coal, Inc. ............................................................................................................. 17
Rules and Formal Interpretations.............................................................................. 17
Other ............................................................................................................................. 18

Non-Merger Enforcement ........................................................................19
Commission Opinions/Initial Decisions ..................................................................... 19
Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Association, Inc. ........................................... 19
North Texas Specialty Physicians............................................................................... 19
Rambus, Inc.................................................................................................................. 20
South Carolina State Board of Dentistry................................................................... 21
Union Oil of California................................................................................................ 21
Court Decisions ............................................................................................................ 21
PolyGram Holding, Inc. (The Three Tenors)............................................................ 21
Schering-Plough Corporation..................................................................................... 22
Authorizations to Seek Preliminary/Permanent Injunctions .................................. 22
Alpharma, Inc. and Perrigo Company ...................................................................... 22
Warner Chilcott ........................................................................................................... 23
Consent Orders ............................................................................................................ 23
Advocate Health Partners ........................................................................................... 23
Alabama Trucking Association, Inc........................................................................... 23
American Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works .................... 23
Anesthesia Service Medical Group, Inc. and Grossmont Anesthesia Services
Medical Group ............................................................................................................. 24
Austin Board of Realtors............................................................................................. 24
Biovail Corporation ..................................................................................................... 24
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company................................................................................. 24
California Pacific Medical Group dba Brown and Toland Medical Group........... 25
Carlsbad Physician Association.................................................................................. 25
Clark County, Washington Attorneys ....................................................................... 25
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation..................................................... 25
Health Care Alliance of Laredo, L.C., ....................................................................... 25
Indiana Household Movers and Warehousemen, Inc. ............................................. 26
Information and Real Estate Services, LLC.............................................................. 26
Institute of Store Planners........................................................................................... 26
Iowa Movers and Warehousemen’s Association....................................................... 26
Maine Health Alliance ................................................................................................. 26
Memorial Hermann Health Network Providers ....................................................... 26
Minnesota Transport Services Association ............................................................... 26
MiRealSource, Inc........................................................................................................ 27
Missouri Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors............................................. 27
Monmouth County Association of Realtors .............................................................. 27
Movers Conference of Mississippi, Inc. ..................................................................... 27
National Academy of Arbitrators............................................................................... 27
New Hampshire Motor Transport Association......................................................... 28
New Century Health Quality Alliance, Inc................................................................ 28
New Millennium Orthopaedics................................................................................... 28

iii

E.

F.

IV.
V.
VI.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Northern New England Real Estate Network, Inc.................................................... 28
Partners Health Network, Inc..................................................................................... 28
Physician Network Consulting, L.L.C. ...................................................................... 28
Piedmont Health Alliance, Inc. ................................................................................... 29
Preferred Health Services, Inc.................................................................................... 29
Professionals in Women’s Care .................................................................................. 29
Puerto Rico Association of Endodontists, Corp. ....................................................... 29
Realtors Association of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc. ................................................... 30
San Juan IPA................................................................................................................ 30
Southeastern New Mexico Physicians IPA ................................................................ 30
South Georgia Health Partners, L.L.C. ..................................................................... 30
SPA Health Organization dba Southwest Physician Associates.............................. 30
Surgical Specialists of Yakima.................................................................................... 30
Tenet Healthcare Corporation.................................................................................... 31
Union Oil Company of California .............................................................................. 31
Valassis Communications, Inc. ................................................................................... 31
Virginia Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers.............................................. 31
Washington University Physician Network............................................................... 32
White Sands Health Care System, L.L.C. ................................................................. 32
Williamsburg Area Association of Realtors, Inc....................................................... 32
Administrative Complaints ......................................................................................... 32
MiRealSource, Inc........................................................................................................ 32
RealComp II Ltd. ......................................................................................................... 32
Other ............................................................................................................................. 33
Public Documents/Policy Statements/Conferences................................................... 33
Commission Studies/Guidelines.................................................................................. 33
Advisory Opinions ....................................................................................................... 35
Advocacy Filings .......................................................................................................... 36
Workshops/Hearings/Conferences ............................................................................. 43
Intellectual Property and Patent Law........................................................................ 45
Other ............................................................................................................................. 46

International Activities .............................................................................47
Competition Speeches ...............................................................................48
Statistics .....................................................................................................57
Fiscal Year 2007 (October 1, 2006 though March 31, 2007).................................... 57
Fiscal Year 2006 ........................................................................................................... 58
Fiscal Year 2005 ........................................................................................................... 59
Fiscal Year 2004 ........................................................................................................... 60
Fiscal Year 2003 ........................................................................................................... 62

iv

ABA ANTITRUST SECTION
SPRING MEETING
Bureau of Competition Activity
Fiscal Year 2003 through March 31, 2007

Fiscal
Year

Total
Enforcement
Actions

Consents

Complaints

Merger

Non
Merger

Merger and
Non Merger

Preliminary
and/or
Permanent
Injunctions

Civil Penalty
Cases

Abandoned or
Fix-it-First
Transactions

2003

44

7

16

8

3

0

10

2004

26

10

7

2

2

2

3

2005

20

9

4

0

1

2

4

2006

22

9

5

0

1

0

7

20

9

7

3

0

0

1

2007
(Oct-Mar)

I.

Mergers
A.

Consent Orders

American Air Liquide, Inc.
(Final Order June 29, 2004): L’Air Liquide was permitted to acquire Messer Griesheim GmbH, a
leading industrial gas producer. Under terms of the order, Air Liquide is required to divest six
air separation units operated by Messer in California, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi within
six months. According to the complaint, the transaction as proposed would substantially lessen
competition in the market for liquid argon, liquid oxygen and liquid nitrogen.

1

Allergan, Inc.
(Final Order April 21, 2006): The consent order requires that Allergan and Inamed divest the
rights to develop and distribute Reloxin, a potential Botox rival, to settle charges that Allergan’s
$3.2 billion purchase of Inamed would reduce competition and force consumers to pay higher
prices for botulinum toxin type A products. Under the terms of the FTC settlement, the
companies will return the development and distribution rights to Reloxin to Ipsen Ltd., its U.K.based manufacturer.
Aspen Technology, Inc.
(Final Order December 20, 2004) Under terms of a consent order, Aspen agreed to divest
Hypotech’s continuous process and batch process assets and Aspen’s operator training software
and service business to a Commission-approved buyer to settle charges in the complaint and
resolve the administrative proceedings. The Commission issued an administrative complaint on
August 6, 2003 that challenged Aspen’s 2002 acquisition of Hyprotech, Ltd. alleging that the
acquisition eliminated a significant competitor in the provision of process engineering simulation
software for industry. According to the complaint, the acquisition has led to reduced innovation
competition in six specific process engineering simulation software markets.
Baxter International, Inc.
(Final Order February 3, 2003): Baxter settled Commission concerns stemming from its $316
million proposed acquisition of Wyeth Corporation’s generic injectable drug business and agreed
to divest several pharmaceutical products. The Commission charged that the acquisition would
reduce competition in the manufacture and sale of propofol (a general anesthetic); new injectable
iron replacement therapies; metoclopramide (used to treat nausea); and vecuronium and
pancuronium (neuromuscular blocking agents used to temporarily freeze muscles during
surgery). The consent order requires divestitures in each of the pharmaceutical markets.
Barr Pharmaceutical, Inc.
(Final Order December 8, 2006): The consent order settles charges that Barr Pharmaceutical,
Inc.’s proposed acquisition of Pliva d.d for approximately $2.5 billion would have eliminated
current or future competition between Barr and Pliva in certain markets for generic
pharmaceuticals treating depression, high blood pressure and ruptured blood vessels, and in the
market for organ preservation solutions, thereby increasing the likelihood that consumers would
pay more for these vital products. In settling the Commission’s charges, Barr is required to sell
its generic antidepressant trazodone and its generic blood pressure medication
triamterene/HCTZ. Barr also is required to divest either Pliva’s or Barr’s generic nimodipine for
use in treating ruptured blood vessels in the brain. Finally, Barr is required to divest Pliva’s
branded organ preservation solution Custodial.
Buckeye Partners, L.P.
(Final Order December 17, 2004): Buckeye agreed to notify the Commission before acquiring
any interest in the Niles petroleum terminal for a period of ten years under provisions of a
consent order. The consent order settled charges that Buckeye's proposed acquisition of five
refined petroleum products pipelines and 24 petroleum products terminals in the United States

2

from Shell Oil Company would reduce competition in the market for the terminaling of gasoline,
diesel fuel, and other light petroleum products in the area of Niles, Michigan.
Boston Scientific Corp
(Final Order July 25, 2006): The consent order settles chargers that the $27 billion acquisition of
Guidant Corporation by Boston Scientific Corporation would harm competition and consumers
in several significant medical device markets. Guidant Corporation by Boston Scientific
Corporation are the largest market shareholders in several coronary medical device markets in
the U.S., together accounting for 90% of the U.S. PTCA balloon catheter market and 85% of the
U.S. coronary guidewire market. The consent order required the divestiture of Guidant’s
vascular business to an FTC-approved buyer.
Cemex, S.A.
(Final Order March 25, 2005): Cemex S.A. agreed to settle concerns stemming from its proposed
$5.8 billion acquisition of RMC Group PLC. The final consent order required Cemex to divest
RMC’s five ready-mix concrete plants in the Tucson, Arizona area, at no minimum price to a
Commission-approved buyer.
Cephalon, Inc.
(Final Order September 20, 2004): The consent order settled charges that Cephalon's proposed
acquisition of Cima Labs, Inc. would allow Cephalon to continue its monopoly in the United
States market for drugs that eliminate or reduce the spikes of severe pain that chronic cancer
patients experience. The consent order required Cephalon to grant Barr Laboratories, Inc. a fully
paid, irrevocable license to make and sell a generic version of Cephalon's breakthrough cancer
pain drug, Actiq, in the United States.
Chevron Texaco Corporation
(Final Order July 27, 2005): Under the terms of the consent orders Chevron and Unocal will
cease enforcing Unocal’s patents covering reformulated gasoline that complies with California
Air resources Board Standard, will not undertake any new enforcement efforts related to the
particular patents, and will cease all attempts to collect damages, royalties, or other payments
related to the use of any of the patents. In addition, the companies will dismiss all pending legal
actions related to alleged infringement of the patents. According to the complaint, the
acquisition of the Unocal patents by Chevron would have facilitated coordinated interaction
among downstream refiners and marketers of CARB gasoline.
Cytec Industries, Inc.
(Final Order April 7, 2005): A final consent order requires Cytec Industries, Inc. to divest UCB’s
Amino Resins Business in Massachusetts and Germany to a Commission-approved buyer.
According to the complaint issued with the agreement, the acquisition as proposed would
eliminate direct competition between the two firms in the market for amino resins used for
industrial liquid coatings and rubber adhesion promotion.
Dainippon Ink and Chemicals, Inc.
(Final Order March 13, 2003): Dainippon agreed to divest the perylene business of its U.S.
subsidiary, Sun Chemical Corporation, to Ciba Specialty Chemicals Inc. and Ciba Specialty

3

Chemicals Corporation to settle allegations that its proposed acquisition of Bayer Corporation’s
high-performance pigment manufacturing facility would eliminate competition in the highly
concentrated world market for perylenes – organic pigments used to impart unique shades of red
color to products, including coatings, plastics and fibers.
DaVita Inc.
(Final Order November 18, 2005): The consent order resolves the competitive issues raised by
DaVita’s proposed $3.1 billion purchase of rival outpatient dialysis clinic operator Gambro
Healthcare Inc. from Gambro AB. Pursuant to the order, DaVita sold 69 dialysis clinics and end
two management services contracts in 35 markets across the United States within 10 days of
consummating its purchase of Gambro. The Commission has approved Renal Advantage Inc. as
the buyer of most of the clinics to be divested, and entered into an order to maintain assets with
DaVita.
DSM N.V.
(Final Order January 6, 2004): A consent order permitted DSM N.V. to acquire the Vitamins and
Fine Chemicals Division of Roche Holding AG but requires DSM to divest its phytase business
to BASF AG within 10 days after the transaction is completed. Phytase is an enzyme added to
certain animal feed to promote the digestion of nutrients necessary for livestock production.
Enterprise Products Partners L.P.
(Final Order November 23, 2004): Enterprise Products Partners L.P. settled charges that its $13
billion merger with GulfTerra Energy/Partners L.P. would eliminate competition in two markets:
the pipeline transportation of natural gas from the West Central Deepwater region of the Gulf of
Mexico; and propane storage and terminaling services in Hattisburg, Mississippi. The consent
order requires the divestiture of an interest in a pipeline transportation system and an interest in a
propane facility that serves the Dixie Pipeline.
Enterprise Products Partners L.P.
(Final Order November 3, 2006): Enterprise Products Partners L.P. settled charges that its $1.1
billion acquisition of TEPPCO Partners’ NGLs salt dome storage businesses would likely result
in higher prices and service degradations by reducing the number of commercial salt dome NGL
storage providers in Mont Belvieu, Texas, from four to three. The FTC’s order required
TEPPCO to divest its interests in the world’s largest NGL storage facility in Mont Belvieu,
Texas, to an FTC-approved buyer.
Fresenius AG
(Final Order July 6, 2006): Fresenius AG settled charges that its purchase of rival dialysis
provider Renal Care Group, Inc. would likely have resulted in higher prices for dialysis services.
The consent order requires that Fresenius AG will sell 91 outpatient kidney dialysis clinics and
financial interests in 12 more.
GenCorp Inc.
(Final Order December 19, 2003): A consent order allowed GenCorp Inc. to acquire Atlantic
Research Corporation while requiring the divestiture of Atlantic’s in-space liquid propulsion
business within six months of consummating the transaction. According to the complaint issued

4

with the consent order, the transaction as originally planned would have lessened competition in
the United States in four different types of in-space propulsion engines: monopropellant
thrusters; bipropellant apogee thrusters; dual mode apogee thrusters; and biopropellant attitude
control thrusters.
General Dynamics Corporation
(Final Order February 9, 2007): The consent order settled charges that General Dynamics’
proposed $275 million acquisition of SNC Technologies, Inc. and SNC Technologies, Corp.
(collectively, SNC) would likely undermine competition by bringing together two of only three
competitors providing the U.S. military with melt-pour load, assemble, and pack (LAP) services
used during the manufacture of ammunition for mortars and artillery. Absent relief, the proposed
acquisition would likely force the U.S. military to pay higher prices for these munitions. General
Dynamics is required to sell its interest in American Ordnance to an FTC-approved buyer within
four months of acquiring SNC.
General Electric Company
(Final Order January 28, 2004): A final consent order settled antitrust concerns stemming from
General Electric Company’s proposed acquisition of Agfa-Gevaert N.V.’s nondestructive testing
business. According to the complaint issued with the consent order, the transaction as proposed
would have eliminated competition in the United States markets for portable flaw detectors,
corrosion thickness gages, and precision thickness gages - equipment used to inspect the
tolerance of materials without damaging them or impairing their future usefulness. The consent
order requires General Electric to divest its worldwide Panametrics Ultrasonic NDT business to
R/D Tech, Inc. within 20 days after the transaction is completed.
General Electric Company
(Final Order October 25, 2004): General Electric was permitted to acquire InVision
Technologies, Inc. with conditions that it divest InVision's YXLON x-ray nondestructive testing
and inspection equipment to a Commission approved acquirer. According to the complaint
issued with the consent order, the two firms are direct competitors in a highly concentrated
market. The consent order protects competition in the United States market for specialized x-ray
testing and inspection including standard x-ray cabinets; x-ray systems equipped with automated
defect recognition software; and high-energy x-ray generators.
Genzyme Corporation
(Final Order January 31, 2005): A consent order allowed Genzyme’s acquisition of ILEX
Oncology, Inc., but requires the companies to divest certain assets in the market for solid organ
transplant acute therapy drugs. Specifically, Genzyme is required to divest all contractual rights
related to ILEX’s Campath®, an immunosuppressant antibody used in solid organ transplants to
Schering AG.
Hologic, Inc.
(Final Order August 9, 2006): The Commission approved a final consent order to ensure the
maintenance of competition in the market for prone stereotactic breast biopsy systems (SBBSs).
The Commission had challenged this merger which was consummated in 2005. The order

5

required the divestiture of all prone SBBS assets to Siemens, a company well-positioned to
become a competitor in this market.
Hospira, Inc.
(Final Order March 23 18, 2007): The consent order settles charges that Hospira Inc.’s proposed
$2 billion acquisition of rival drug manufacturer Mayne Pharma Ltd. Would likely reduce
competition and harm consumers. In settling the Commission’s charges, the companies have
agreed to divest to Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Barr), within 10 days of the acquisition, Mayne’s
rights and assets related to the following products: hydromorphone hydrochloride
(hydromorphone), nalbuphine hydrochloride (nalbuphine), morphine sulfate (morphine),
preservative-free morphine, and deferoxamine mesylate (deferoxamine).
Itron, Inc.
(Final Order August 5, 2004): The consent order, designed to preserve competition in the market
for the manufacture and sale of mobile radio frequency automatic meter reading technologies for
electric utilities in the United States, permitted Itron's $255 million acquisition of Schlumberger
Electricity, Inc. The consent order requires Itron to grant a royalty-free, perpetual, and
irrevocable license to Hunt Technologies, Inc., creating an effective competitor in this market
that allows utility companies and others to gather electric consumption data automatically and
remotely from electricity meters.
Johnson & Johnson
(Final Order December 12, 2005): The consent order protects competition in three medical
device product markets affected by Johnson & Johnson’s proposed $25.4 billion acquisition of
Guidant Corporation. Under the terms of the order, J&J is required to 1) grant to a third party a
fully paid-up, non-exclusive, irrevocable license, enabling that third party to make and sell drug
eluting stents with the Rapid Exchange delivery system, 2) divest to a third party J&J’s
endoscopic vessel harvesting product line, and 3) end its agreement to distribute Novare Surgical
System, Inc.’s proximal anastomotic assist device. On May 31st, 2006 the Commission granted
a petition filed by Johnson and Johnson Corporation, requesting that the FTC reopen and set
aside the entire decision and order concerning the proposed acquisition of Guidant Corporation.
Johnson & Johnson
(Final Order January 19, 2007): The consent order settles charges that Johnson & Johnson’s
(J&J) proposed $16.6 billion acquisition of Pfizer Inc.’s (Pfizer) Consumer Healthcare business
would likely reduce competition in the U.S. markets for over-the-counter (OTC) H-2 blockers
used to prevent and relieve heartburn, OTC hydrocortisone anti-itch products, OTC night-time
sleep aids, and OTC diaper rash treatments. In settling the Commission’s charges, the
companies have agreed to sell Pfizer’s Zantac H-2 blocker business to Boehringer Ingelheim
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Boehringer), and Pfizer’s Cortizone hydrocortisone anti-itch business,
Pfizer’s Unisom night-time sleep aid business, and J&J’s Balmex diaper rash treatment business
to Chattem, Inc.
Kinder Morgan, Inc.
(Final Order March 16, 2007): The order settles charges that the proposed $22 billion deal
whereby energy transportation, storage, and distribution firm Kinder Morgan, Inc. (KMI) would

6

be taken private by KMI management and a group of investment firms, including private equity
funds managed and controlled by The Carlyle Group (Carlyle) and Riverstone Holdings LLC
(Riverstone) would threaten competition between KMI and Magellan in eleven metropolitan
areas in the Southeast, likely resulting in higher prices for gasoline and other light petroleum
products. The order requires that Carlyle’s and Riverstone’s interest in Magellan become a
passive investment, by requiring them to: (1) removing all of their representatives from the
Magellan Board of Managers and its boards of directors, (2) ceding control of Magellan to its
other principal investor, Madison Dearborn Partners, and (3) not influencing or attempting to
influence the management or operation of Magellan.
Libbey, Inc.
(Final Order October 7, 2002): The Commission authorized staff to seek a preliminary injunction
to block Libbey’s proposed $332 million acquisition of Anchor Hocking, a subsidiary of Newell
Rubbermaid, Inc., on grounds that the acquisition would substantially lessen competition in the
market for soda-lime glassware sold to the food service industry in the United States. A
complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on January 14, 2002.
The district court granted the Commission’s request for an injunction on April 22, 2002. An
administrative complaint, issued on May 9, extend the injunction until the conclusion of the
administrative proceedings. Pursuant to the delegation of authority, the Commission withdrew
the matter from adjudication on July 25, 2002, to consider a proposed consent agreement. A
consent order was finalized October 7, 2002.
Linde, AG
(Final Order September 5, 2006): In August 2006, the FTC approved a final consent order
relating to the proposed $14.4 billion acquisition of the BOC Group by Linde requiring Linde to
divest Air Separation Units (ASUs), bulk refined helium assets, and other assets in eight
localities across the United States. The consent order aims to maintain competition in the
markets for liquid oxygen, liquid helium, and bulk refined helium in several U.S. markets.
Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P.
(Final Order November 23, 2004): Under terms of a consent order, Magellan completed its
acquisition of pipelines and terminals in the Midwestern United States and a refined petroleum
products terminal in Oklahoma City that supplies light petroleum products such as gasoline and
diesel fuel from the Shell Oil Company. The consent order required Magellan to divest the
Shell Oklahoma City terminal to a Commission-approved buyer within six months after the
transaction is consummated.
MSC. Software Corporation
(Final Order October 29, 2002): MSC settled charges that its 1999 acquisitions of Universal
Analytics, Inc. and Computerized Structural Analysis & Research Corp. eliminated competition
between the three firms in the development and application of engineering software. The
administrative complaint issued October 2000, alleged that the two acquisitions would eliminate
competition for advanced versions of Nastran, an engineering simulation software program used
throughout the aerospace and automotive industries. The consent order required MSC to divest
at least one clone copy of its current advance Nastran through royalty-free perpetual, nonexclusive licenses to one or two acquirers approved by the Commission.

7

Novartis AG
(Final Order September, 21 2005): To resolve overlaps for three generic pharmaceuticals that
arose from Novartis AG’s acquisition of Eon Labs, Inc., under the terms of a consent order,
Novartis is required to divest all the assets necessary to manufacture and market generic
desipramine hydrochloride tablets, orphenadrine citrate extended release (ER) tablets, and
rifampin oral capsules in the United States to Amide within 10 days of Novartis’s acquisition of
Eon. Further, Novartis, through its Sandoz generic pharmaceuticals division, will supply Amide
with orphenadrine citrate ER and desipramide hydrochloride tablets until Amide obtains Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval to manufacture the products itself, and will assist
Amide in obtaining all necessary FDA approvals.
Occidental Chemical Corporation
(Final Order July 13, 2005): A consent order allows Occidental Chemical Company’s purchase
of the chemical assets of Vulcan Materials Company, provided Occidental divests Vulcan’s Port
Edwards, Wisconsin, chemical facility and related assets. The consent order alleviates the
alleged anticompetitive impact of the acquisition in the markets for potassium hydroxide,
anhydrous potassium carbonate (APC), and potassium carbonate, which includes APC and liquid
potassium carbonate. The Port Edwards facility will be divested to ERCO Worldwide or to
another Commission-approved buyer within six months if a problem is encountered with ERCO
sale.
Penn National Gaming, Inc.
(Final Order September 15, 2005): A consent order permitted Penn National Gaming, Inc.’s
acquisition of Argosy Gaming Company, provided Penn sells Argosy’s Baton Rouge casino to
Columbia Sussex Corporation within four months of the order becoming final.
Pfizer Inc.
(Final Order May 27, 2003): A final consent order permits Pfizer Inc.’s acquisition of Pharmacia
Corporation while requiring the divestiture of various products including extended release drugs
used in the treatment of an overactive bladder; hormone replacement therapies; erectile
dysfunction; canine arthritis; and motion sickness. Novartis AG, Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc.,
Schering-Plough Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, Insight Pharmaceuticals Corporation, and
Cadbury Schweppes are named in the order as potential buyers of the various pharmaceuticals
and products.
Phillips Petroleum Company
(Final Order February 7, 2003): A final consent order allows the merger of Phillips Petroleum
and Conoco Inc. but requires certain divestitures and other relief to maintain competition in the
gasoline refining market in specific areas of the United States. Among the assets to be divested
are refineries, propane terminals, and natural gas gathering facilities. The combined firm will be
known as ConocoPhillips.
Quest Diagnostics, Inc.
(Final Order April 3, 2003): Quest Diagnostics settled antitrust concerns that its proposed
acquisition of Unilab Corporation would substantially increase concentration in the clinical

8

laboratory testing services market by agreeing to divest clinical laboratory testing assets in
Northern California to Laboratory Corporation of America.
Sanofi-Synthélabo
(Final Order September 20, 2004): The consent order settled antitrust concerns that Sanofi's
proposed $64 billion acquisition of Aventis would create significant overlaps in several markets
for pharmaceutical products while creating the world's third largest pharmaceutical company.
Under terms of the consent order, Sanofi must: 1) divest its Arixtra factor Xa inhibitor to
GlaxoSmithKline, plc; 2) divest its key clinical studies for the Campto® cytotoxic colorectal
cancer treatment to Pfizer, Inc. and 3) divest Aventis' contractual rights to the Estorra insomnia
drug either to Sepracor, Inc. or to another Commission-approved buyer.
Service Corporation International
(Final Order January 5, 2007): The consent order settled charges that Service Corporation
International’s (SCI) proposed acquisition of Alderwoods Group Inc. would likely lessen
competition in 47 markets for funeral or cemetery services, leaving consumers with fewer
choices and the prospect of higher prices or reduced levels of service. Under the settlement, SCI
must sell funeral homes in 29 markets and cemeteries in 12 markets across the United States. In
six other markets, SCI must sell certain funeral homes that it plans to acquire or end its licensing
agreements with third-party funeral homes affiliated with SCI.
Shell Oil Company
(Final Order November 18, 2002): Shell Oil Company was allowed to complete its $1.8 billion
acquisition of Pennzoil-Quaker State Company but required to divest certain assets to maintain
healthy competition in the refining and marketing of Group II paraffinic base oil in the United
States and Canada. Under terms of the consent order, Shell and Pennzoil must divest its 50
percent interest in Excel Paralubes (a base oil refinery in Westlake, Louisiana) and freeze
Pennzoil’s right to obtain additional Group II supply under a contract with ExxonMobil at
approximately current levels (up to 6,500 barrels of base oil per day).
Southern Union Company
(Final Order July 16, 2003): Southern Union Company settled antitrust concerns stemming from
its proposed acquisition of the Panhandle pipeline from CMS Energy Corporation. The consent
order permitted the acquisition but required Southern Union to terminate an agreement to
manage the Central pipeline which transports natural gas to several counties in Missouri and
Kansas.
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd
(Final Order March 7, 2006): The consent order allowed Teva to acquire IVAX Corporation,
provided the companies sell the rights and assets needed to manufacture and market 15 generic
pharmaceutical products. Among the drugs sold were several forms of generic amoxicillin and
amoxicillin clavulanate potassium that are widely used in the United States.
The Procter & Gamble Company
(Final Order December 16, 2005): The consent order permitted The Procter & Gamble
Company’s acquisition of rival consumer products manufacturer The Gillette Company,

9

provided the companies divest: 1) Gillette’s Rembrandt at-home teeth whitening business; 2)
P&G’s Crest SpinBrush battery-powered and rechargeable toothbrush business; and 3) Gillette’s
Right Guard men’s antiperspirant deodorant business. In addition, P&G must amend its joint
venture agreement with Philips Oral Health Care, Inc. regarding the Crest Sonicare IntelliClean
System rechargeable toothbrush to allow Philips to independently market and sell rechargeable
toothbrushes.
The Boeing Company
(Proposed Consent Agreement Accepted for Public Comment on October 3, 2006): The
Commission intervened in the formation of United Launch Alliance (ULA), a proposed joint
venture between the Boeing Corp. and Lockheed Martin Corp. The FTC’s complaint alleged
that the formation of ULA as originally structured would have reduced competition in the
markets for U.S. government medium to heavy launch services and space vehicles. In settling
the Commissions’ charges, the parties agreed to take certain actions (such as nondiscrimination
requirements and firewalls) to address ancillary competitive harms not inextricably tied to the
national security benefits of ULA.
Thermo Electron Corporation
(Final Order December 5, 2006): The consent order settled charges that charged that Thermo
Electron Corporation’s proposed $12.8 billion acquisition of Fisher Scientific International, Inc.
would harm competition in the U.S. market for high-performance centrifugal vacuum
evaporators (CVEs) in violation of the antitrust laws. Thermo and Fisher are the only two
significant suppliers of high-performance CVEs in the United States and the proposed
transaction would eliminate the direct price, service, and innovation competition that exists
between them. To settle the Commission’s charges, Thermo is required to divest Fisher’s
Genevac division, which includes Fisher’s entire CVE business, within five months of the date
the consent agreement was signed.
Valero L.P.
(Final Order July 27, 2005): The consent order permitted Valero L.P. to acquire Kaneb Services
LLC and Kaneb Pipe Line Partners subject to the divestitures of assets that will preserve existing
competition for petroleum transportation and terminaling in Northern California, Pennsylvania,
and Colorado, and avoid a potential increase in bulk gasoline and diesel prices. The order also
requires Valero to develop an information firewall and maintain open, non-discriminatory access
to two retained Northern California terminals, in order to ensure access to ethanol terminaling in
Northern California.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(Final Order February 27, 2003): A consent order settled Commission concerns that Wal-Mart’s
proposed acquisition of the largest supermarket chain in Puerto Rico, Supermercados Amigo,
Inc., would eliminate competition between supercenters and club stores owned or controlled by
Wal-Mart and supermarkets owned or controlled by Amigo. While the consent order permits the
acquisition, it requires Wal-Mart to divest four Amigo supermarkets in Cidra, Ponce, Manati,
and Vega Baja, Puerto Rico to Supermercados Maximo.

10

Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(Final Order December 12, 2006): A consent order settled charges that Watson Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.’s proposed $1.9 billion acquisition of Andrx Corporation, would have likely led to
competitive problems in the markets for 13 generic drug products. Watson was required to end
its marketing agreements with Interpham Holdings, divest Andrx’s right to develop, make, and
market generic extended release tablets that correct the effects of type 2 diabetes, and divest
Andrx’s rights and assets related to the developing and marketing of 11 generic oral
contraceptives.

B.

Authorizations to Seek Preliminary Injunctions

Aloha Petroleum, Ltd
(July 26, 2005): The Commission authorized staff, in conjunction with the Hawaii Attorney
General, to seek a preliminary injunction to block Aloha Petroleum’s proposed acquisition of
Trustreet Properties. Aloha sought to acquire Trustreet’s half interest in the Barber Point
petroleum importing terminal, when Aloha already owned the other half interest. The proposed
acquisition would have reduced the number of marketers with ownership or access to a refinery
or importing terminal from five to four, and the number of suppliers selling to unintegrated
retailers from three to two. After Aloha subsequently announced a long-term agreement with a
third party, Mid-Pac Petroleum that would enable Mid-Pac to replace Trustreet as a bulk gasoline
supplier, the Commission sought to dismiss its federal court complaint on the ground of changed
circumstances.
Arch Coal, Inc.
(March 30, 2004): The Commission authorized staff to file a complaint to block Arch Coal,
Inc.’s proposed acquisition of Triton Coal Company, L.L.C. from New Vulcan Holdings, L.L.C.
on grounds that the acquisition would increase concentration and tend to create a monopoly in
the market for coal mined from the Southern Powder River Basin and in the production of 8800
British Thermal Unit coal. On April 1, 2004, the complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. On June 13, 2005 the Commission announced that it was closing
its investigation, saying that it will not continue with administrative litigation challenging the
deal.
Kroger Company/Raley’s Corporation
(October 2, 2002): The preliminary injunction authorized by the Commission during the
investigation into Kroger’s acquisition of 18 Raley’s supermarkets in the Las Vegas, Nevada
area was not filed. After staff determined that the transaction would promote healthy
competition in the Las Vegas/Henderson area due to the rapid growth of the market and the
presence of Wal-Mart, Albertson’s, Kroger and Safeway - the four major competitors in the area,
the investigation was closed.
Nestlé Holdings, Inc.
(March 4, 2003): The Commission authorized staff to seek a preliminary injunction to block the
merger of Nestlé and Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. on grounds that the merger would reduce
competition in the highly concentrated market for superpremium ice cream. Nestlé markets

11

superpremium ice cream under the Häagen Dazs brand; Dreyer’s superpremium brands include
Dreamery, Godiva and Starbucks. Before the complaint was filed in a federal district court, the
parties agreed to enter into a consent agreement to settle the charges. The final order requires the
divestiture of superpremium ice cream brands Dreamery and Godiva, the Whole Fruit sorbet
brand, and Nestlé’s distribution assets to CoolBrands International, Inc.
Vlasic Pickle Company
(October 22, 2002): The Commission authorized staff to seek a preliminary injunction to block
the proposed acquisition of Claussen Pickle Company by Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst Equity Fund
V L.P., the owner of Vlasic Pickle Company on grounds that the transaction would combine the
dominant firm in the market for refrigerated pickles (Claussen) with its most significant
competitor in refrigerated pickles (Vlasic). Six days after the complaint was filed in federal
district court, the parties abandoned the transaction.

C.

Commission Opinions/Initial Decisions

Chicago Bridge & Iron Company
(January 7, 2005): The Commission upheld in part the ruling of an administrative law judge that
Chicago Bridge & Iron’s acquisition of the Water Division and the Engineered Construction
Division of Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. created a near-monopoly in four separate markets involving the
design and construction of various types of field-erected specialty industrial storage tanks in the
United States. In an effort to restore competition as it existed prior to the merger, the
Commission ordered Chicago Bridge to reorganize the relevant product business into two
separate, stand-alone, viable entities capable of competing in the markets described in the
complaint and to divest one of those entities within six months.
With an administrative complaint issued on October 25, 2001, the Commission
challenged the February 2001 purchase of the Water Division and Engineered Construction
Division of Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. alleging that the acquisition significantly reduced competition
in four separate markets involving the design and construction of various types of field-erected
specialty industrial storage tanks in the United States. The initial decision filed June 27, 2003
upheld the complaint.
On June 27, 2004, an administrative law judge upheld the complaint and ordered the
divestiture all of the assets acquired in the acquisition. In December 2004, the Commission
approved an interim consent order prohibiting Chicago Bridge & Iron from altering the assets
acquired from Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. except “in the ordinary course of business.” These assets
included but were not limited to real property; personal property; equipment; inventories; and
intellectual property.
Northwestern Healthcare Corporation
(October 17, 2005): In an Initial Decision the Administrative law judge found that Evanston
Northwest Healthcare Corporation’s acquisition of an important competitor, Highland Park
Hospital, resulted in higher prices and substantially lessened competition for acute care inpatient
services in parts of Chicago’s northwestern suburbs. The Administrative law judge found that
the evidence established that the merged hospital exercised its enhanced post-merger market
power to obtain price increases significantly above its premerger prices and substantially larger

12

than price increases obtained by comparable hospitals. The ALJ also found that the evidence
ruled out explanations for the price increase, other that the exercise of market power. The ALJ
entered an order that would require the divestiture of the acquired hospital.
The hospital’s appeal of the ALJ’s decision and order requiring divestiture of Highland Park
Hospital is now pending before the Commission.
On February 10, 2004 the Commission issued an administrative complaint alleging that
following Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporations’s acquisition of Highland Park
Hospital prices charged to health insurers for medical services increased and, therefore, higher
costs for health insurance were passed on to consumers of hospital services in the Cook and Lake
counties of Illinois. The complaint also alleges that a physicians group affiliated with both
hospitals, Highland Park Independent Physician Group, negotiated prices for physicians on staff
at Evanston as well as for several hundred independent physicians not affiliated with either
hospital. According to the complaint, these actions constitute illegal price fixing among
competing physicians or physician groups and deny consumers the benefits of competition in
physician services.
In May, 2005, the Commission approved a final consent order to resolve a separate count
in the complaint involving alleged price fixing by doctors associated with the two hospitals.

D.

Court Decisions

Arch Coal, Inc.
(August 13, 2004): The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the
Commission’s request for a preliminary injunction to block Arch Coal, Inc.’s proposed
acquisition of Triton Coal Company, L.L.C. from new Vulcan Holdings, L.L.C. The parties
consummated the deal after the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to
issue a stay pending an appeal of the district court decision.
The administrative complaint issued on April 6, 2004 challenged the proposed acquisition
of all the assets of Triton Coal Company, L.L.C. from New Vulcan Coal Holdings, L.L.C.
According to the complaint, the acquisition would have combined two of the four leading
producers of coal in Wyoming’s Southern Powder River Basin. On September 10, 2004, the
administrative complaint was withdrawn from adjudication. The Commission decided not to
pursue an appeal of the decision of the U.S. District Court for a preliminary injunction to block
the sale of Triton to Arch Coal. On June 13, 2005 the Commission announced that it was closing
its investigation, saying that it will not continue with administrative litigation challenging the
deal.

E.

Order Violations

Boston Scientific Corporation
(March 31, 2003): A federal district judge ordered Boston Scientific Corporation to pay
$7,040,000 in civil penalties to settle charges that it violated a 1995 consent order when it failed
to provide Hewlett-Packard Company with a license to all of its intellectual property and
technical information relating to intravascular ultrasound catheters. The complaint was filed on

13

October 31, 2000 by the Department of Justice on behalf of the Commission. The trial was held
in August 2002.
RHI AG
(April 1, 2004): RHI AG paid a total civil penalty of $755,686.41 to settle charges that it violated
a 1999 consent order concerning its acquisition of Global Industrial Technologies, Inc.
According to the complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
RHI not only failed to divest the two refractories plants and other assets to Resco Products, Inc.,
but it did not completely comply with other provisions required by the settlement agreement.

F.

Other Commission Orders

None

G.

Administrative Complaints

Equitable Resources, Inc.
(March 15, 2007): The Commission authorized staff to file an administrative complaint
challenging Equitable Resources, Inc.’s (Equitable) proposed acquisition of The Peoples Natural
Gas Company (Dominion Peoples). Equitable and Dominion Peoples are each other’s sole
competitors in the distribution of natural gas to nonresidential customers in certain areas of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, which includes Pittsburgh. The complaint alleges that the
proposed transaction would result in a monopoly for many customers that now enjoy
competition.

H.

Other

Horizontal Merger Investigation Data
Fiscal Years 1996 – 2005. Staff analysis of horizontal investigations. The staff tabulated certain
market structure information as it relates to the Commission’s decision whether or not to seek
relief in specific markets investigated. Released January 25, 2007.
2006 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration
The study examines the current state of ethanol production in the United States and measures
market concentration using capacity and production data. Released December 5, 2006.
2005 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration
The study examines the current state of ethanol production in the United States and measures
market concentration using capacity and production data. Released December 2, 2005.

14

Reforms to the Merger Review Process
(Effective February 17, 2006): Reforms to the agency’s merger review process establishing that
the FTC will:
• limit the number of employees required to provide information in response to a second
request, provided the party complies with specified conditions;
• reduce the time period for which a party must provide documents in response to the
second request;
• allow a party to preserve far fewer backup tapes and produce documents on those tapes
only when responsive documents are not available through more accessible sources; and
• significantly reduce the amount of information parties must submit regarding documents
they consider to be privileged.
Conference on the Price Effects of Mergers and Concentration in the United States
Petroleum Industry
(January 14, 2005, Washington, DC.) The conference reviewed two studies that examined price
effects within the petroleum industry: the March 2004 case study of the effects of the
Marathon/Ashland Corporation joint venture; the second, the May 2004 report by the
Government Accountability Office that examined the effects of mergers and market
concentration in the United States petroleum industry.
Horizontal Merger Investigation Data
Fiscal Years 1996 – 2003. Staff analysis of horizontal investigations. The staff tabulated certain
market structure information as it relates to the Commission’s decision whether or not to seek
relief in specific markets investigated. Released February 2004.
Merger Efficiency Roundtable
(December 9 - 10, 2002; Washington, DC): Experts in mergers and acquisitions from the
academic, consulting, and business communities gave presentations on how to determine
whether a proposed transaction is likely to generate merger efficiencies.
Merger Enforcement Workshop
(February 17 - 19, 2004) sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice. Topics discussed:
• Hypothetical Monopolist Test
• Concentration & Market Shares
• Monopsony
• Non-Price Competition/Innovation
• Unilateral Effects
• Coordinated Effects
• Uncommitted Entry
• Efficiencies/Dynamic Analysis/Integrated Analysis
Merger Remedies - Second Workshop
(October 23, 2002; New York, New York): Workshop, co-hosted by the Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Committee of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, was designed to

15

gather information from a broad range of interested parties regarding consent order remedies in
merger and acquisition matters.

II. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
Enforcement
A.

Court Decisions

Scott R. Sacane
(September 26, 2005): A Connecticut-based hedge fund manager who failed to report several
large stock purchases before they were made, as required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR)
Premerger Notification Act, paid a $350,000 civil penalty to settle Federal Trade Commission
charges. The complaint alleged that Scott Sacane, manager of the Durus Life Sciences Master
Fund, failed to make four required premerger notification filings. His failure to do so violated the
HSR Act for each transaction.

William H. Gates, III
(May 4, 2004): William H. Gates, III paid $800,000 in civil penalties to settle charges that he
acquired more than ten percent of the voting securities of Republic Services, Inc. without
observing the filing and waiting period requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976. The complaint was filed in the federal district court in Washington,
DC.

B.

Consent Orders

None

C.

Complaints - Filed

Blockbuster, Inc.
(March 4, 2005): The Commission filed a complaint under Section 7A(g)(2) of the Clayton Act
in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to require Blockbuster, Inc. to provide
sufficient and accurate pricing data in compliance with the second request issued by the
Commission under the statutory rules of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Blockbuster cannot proceed
with its proposed acquisition of Hollywood Entertainment Corporation until 30 days from the
date it has substantially complied with the second request.

16

D.

Complaints - Authorized

Arch Coal, Inc.
(February 23, 2004): The Commission authorized staff to file a complaint in federal district court
for a temporary restraining order under Section 7A(g)(2) of the Clayton Act to block Arch Coal’s
proposed acquisition of Triton Coal Company until Arch Coal substantially complied with the
Commission’s request for addition information under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. After Arch
Coal was notified that the Commission authorized a Section 7A(g)(2) complaint, Arch withdrew
its Certification of Substantial Compliance with the second request and provided additional
information. On June 13, 2005 the Commission announced that it was closing its investigation,
saying that it will not continue with administrative litigation challenging the deal.

E.

Rules and Formal Interpretations

Hart-Scott Final Rulemaking
(Effective February 21, 2007): The notification and filing thresholds under the premerger rules
have been revised as required by the 2000 amendments to Section 7A of the Clayton Act.
Section 7A(a)(2) requires the Commission to revise the jurisdictional thresholds annually, based
on the change in gross national product, in accordance with section 8(a)(5) for each fiscal year
beginning after September 30, 2004.
Hart-Scott Final Rulemaking
(Effective July 23, 2006): The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division implemented an electronic filing system that allows merging parties to submit
via the Internet premerger notification filings required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
Hart-Scott Final Rulemaking
(Effective February 18, 2006): The notification and filing thresholds under the premerger rules
have been revised as required by the 2000 amendments to Section 7A of the Clayton Act.
Section 7A(a)(2) requires the Commission to revise the jurisdictional thresholds annually, based
on the change in gross national product, in accordance with section 8(a)(5) for each fiscal year
beginning after September 30, 2004.
Hart-Scott Rodino Reform / Amended Final Rules
(Effective January 11, 2006): Amendments to Parts 801 and 802 of the Premerger Notification
Rules allowing filing persons to provide an Internet address linking directly to the documents
required by Items 4(a) and (b) in lieu of providing paper copies.
Hart-Scott Rodino Reform / Amended Final Rules
(Effective December 12, 2005): Amendments to Parts 801 and 802 of the Premerger Notification
Rules requiring use of 2002 NAICS rather than 1997 NAICS when reporting economic data by
industry and product codes.

17

Hart-Scott Rodino Final Rulemaking
(Effective April 7, 2005): Final rules adopted from proposed rules published April 8, 2004. The
amendments require notification of acquisitions of interests in unincorporated entities and
formations of unincorporated entities. The rules also extend the application of certain
exemptions, including the intraperson exemption, to unincorporated entities.
Hart-Scott Final Rulemaking
(Effective March 2, 2005): The notification and filing thresholds under the premerger rules have
been revised as required by the 2000 amendments to Section 7A of the Clayton Act. Section
7A(a)(2) requires the Commission to revise the jurisdictional thresholds annually, based on the
change in gross national product, in accordance with section 8(a)(5) for each fiscal year
beginning after September 30, 2004.

F.

Other

Model Retail Second Request
(April 28, 2004) Model Request for Additional Information and Documentary Material (Second
Request) for transactions involving retail industries.
Premerger Notification Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 201 of the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(August 1, 2003): Twenty-fifth Annual Report (Fiscal Year 2002).
Premerger Notification Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 201 of the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(September 7, 2004): Twenty-sixth Annual Report (Fiscal Year 2003).
Premerger Notification Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 201 of the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(August 16, 2005): Twenty-seventh Annual Report (Fiscal Year 2004).
Premerger Notification Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 201 of the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(September 8, 2006): Twenty-eight Annual Report (Fiscal Year 2005).

18

III. Non-Merger Enforcement
A.

Commission Opinions/Initial Decisions

Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Association, Inc.
(June 21, 2004): An administrative law judge upheld an administrative complaint that charged a
group of affiliated intrastate movers with engaging in horizontal price-fixing by filing collective
rates on behalf of its member motor common carriers for the intrastate transportation of property
within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The judge also ruled that the association’s conduct was
not protected by the state action doctrine because the State of Kentucky did not supervise the
rate-making practices of the group. On July 12, 2004, the Kentucky Household Goods Carriers
Association, Inc. filed an appeal of the initial decision with the Commission. The oral argument
was held January 24, 2005. On June 22, 2005, the Commission issued a unanimous opinion
upholding the Initial Decision finding that the Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Association,
Inc., consisting of competing firms, engaged in illegal price-fixing by jointly filing tariffs
containing collective rates on behalf of its members, and that the state action doctrine does not
immunize that activity from antitrust liability. On August 22, 2006, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Commission in Kentucky Household Goods Carriers
Association, Inc., finding that the Association’s ratemaking activities constituted unlawful price
fixing and were not exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine.
The administrative complaint issued on July 8, 2003 by the Commission charged that the
association composed of competing household goods movers filed collective rates for intrastate
moving services in the state of Kentucky. According to the complaint, these activities were not
protected under the state action doctrine and are not immune from federal antitrust scrutiny.
North Texas Specialty Physicians
(November 8, 2004): An administrative law judge upheld the administrative complaint that
charged that the North Texas Specialty Physicians, a physician group practicing in Forth Worth,
Texas, collectively determined acceptable fees for physician services in negotiating contracts
with health insurance plans and other third party payers. The judge ruled that complaint counsel
proved that North Texas Specialty Physicians engaged in horizontal price fixing. The
accompanying order prohibits the group from negotiating, on behalf of its members, collective
pricing of contracts with health plan services for the provision of physician services. On January
14, 2005, North Texas Specialty Physicians filed a notice of appeal of the initial decision. On
December 1, 2005, the Commission issued a unanimous decision upholding the allegations that
North Texas Specialty Physicians negotiated agreements among participating physicians on price
and other terms, refused to negotiate with payers except on terms agreed to among its members,
and refused to submit payor offers to members if the terms did not satisfy the group’s demands.
The Commission concluded that the group’s contracting activities with payors “amount[s] to
unlawful horizontal price fixing” and that respondent’s efficiency claims were not legitimate and
not supported by the evidence. The respondent has appealed the Commission decision to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On March 7, 2007, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals heard oral arguments in the appeal by respondents of the Commission's opinion in North
Texas Specialty Physicians.

19

The administrative complaint, issued on September 16, 2003 by the Commission, charged
that the corporation of 600 physicians negotiated the price and other terms of medical services
that its participating physicians would accept in contracting with third party payers. According
to the complaint, the exchange of prospective price information among otherwise competing
physicians reduced competition and enabled the physicians to achieve supra-competitive prices.
Rambus, Inc.
(June 19, 2002) The Commission filed a complaint with an administrative law judge charging
that between 1991 and 1996 Rambus, Inc. joined and participated in the JEDEC Solid State
Technology Association (JEDEC), the leading standard-setting industry for computer memory.
According to the complaint, JEDEC rules require members to disclose the existence of all
patents and patent applications that relate to JEDEC’s standard-setting work. While a member of
JEDEC, Rambus observed standard-setting work involving technologies which Rambus believed
were or could be covered by its patent applications, but failed to disclose this to JEDEC. In 1999
and 2000, after JEDEC had adopted industry-wide standards incorporating the technologies at
issue and the industry had become locked in to the use of those technologies, Rambus sought to
enforce its patents against companies producing JEDEC-compliant memory, and in fact has
collected substantial royalties from several producers of DRAM (dynamic random access
memory).
(February 17, 2004) The administrative law judge dismissed all charges against Rambus,
ruling that Commission staff had failed to sustain their burden of proof with respect to all three
violations alleged in the complaint. The Initial Decision found that Rambus’ conduct before the
JEDEC standard-setting organization did not amount to deception and did not violate any
extrinsic duties, such as a duty of good faith to disclose patents or patent applications. The
Initial Decision also found that the there was insufficient evidence that there were viable
alternatives to Rambus’ technology before the standard setting organization.
(August 2, 2006) The FTC issued an opinion by Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour
concluding that Rambus unlawfully monopolized markets for four computer memory
technologies that have been incorporated into industry standards DRAM chips. DRAMs are
widely used in personal computers, servers, printers, and cameras. The Commission found that,
through a course of deceptive conduct, Rambus was able to distort a critical standard-setting
process and engage in an anticompetitive “hold up” of the computer memory industry. The
Commission held that Rambus’s acts of deception constituted exclusionary conduct under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and contributed significantly to Rambus’s acquisition of monopoly
power in the four relevant markets.
(February 5, 2007) Chairman Majoras issued the opinion of the Commission on remedy
in the Rambus matter. In this opinion, the Commission prescribed a set of remedies barring
Rambus from making misrepresentations or omissions to standard-setting organizations,
requiring Rambus to license its SDRAM and DDR SDRAM technology and setting limits to the
royalty rates it can collect under the licensing agreements including with those firms that may
have already incorporated its DRAM technology, and requiring Rambus to employ a
Commission-approved compliance officer to ensure it discloses relevant patent information to
any standard-setting organizations in which it participates.

20

South Carolina State Board of Dentistry
(July 30, 2004) The Commission denied the motion of the Board to dismiss the complaint on
grounds that its actions were protected from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine.
The South Carolina State Board of Dentistry brought an interlocutory appeal to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the denial of immunity under the State Action doctrine was
a collateral order that could be appealed before a final decision. On May 1, 2006, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and subsequently, the
Supreme Court denied the board’s petition for certiorari.
An administrative complaint issued on September 12, 2003 charged that the South
Carolina State Board of Dentistry prevented dental hygienists from providing dental care and
services on-site to children in South Carolina schools. According to the complaint, the Board
passed regulation that required the children to have a dentist examine the children before they
would be eligible for the school dental program. The complaint further alleged that this provision
decreased competition in the delivery of preventive dental services to school-aged children. On
July 30, 2004,
Union Oil of California
(November 25, 2003): An administrative law judge dismissed a complaint in its entirety against
Union Oil of California that charged the company with committing fraud in connection with
regulatory proceedings before the California Air Resources Board regarding the development of
reformulated gasoline. The judge ruled much of Unocal’s conduct was permissible activity
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and that the resolution of the issues outlined in the
complaint would require an in depth analysis of patent law which he believed were not with the
jurisdiction of the Commission. In July 2004, the Commission reversed the judge’s ruling and
reinstated charges that Unocal illegally acquired monopoly power in the technology market for
producing a “summer-time” low-emissions gasoline mandated for sale and use by the California
Air Resources Board for use in the state for up to eight months of the year. While the case was
pending before the administrative law judge, a consent agreement was signed

B.

Court Decisions

PolyGram Holding, Inc. (The Three Tenors)
(July 24, 2003): The Commission upheld the ruling of an administrative law judge and
prohibited PolyGram from entering into any agreement with competitors to fix the prices or
restrict the advertising of products they have produced independently. The administrative
complaint, issued on July 30, 2001, generally known as The Three Tenors and involving
respondents PolyGram Holding, Inc.; Decca Music Group Limited; UMG Recordings Inc.; and
Universal Music & Video Distribution Corporation charged PolyGram with entering into an
illegal price fixing agreement not to advertise or discount earlier albums and video recordings of
concerts featuring the Three Tenors in an effort to promote the latest concert, thought to be less
appealing to the public. The Commission ordered the respondents to cease and desist from
entering into any combination, conspiracy, or agreement - with producers or sellers at wholesale
of audio or video products - to “fix, raise, or stabilize prices or price levels” in connection with
the sale in or into the United States of any audio or video product. In July 2005, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Commission’s decision in Polygram

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Holding Inc., validating the Commission’s approach to analyzing horizontal conduct among
competitors.
Schering-Plough Corporation
(March 8, 2005) The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit set aside and
vacated the Commission decision that found that Schering-Plough entered into agreements with
Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. and American Home Products to delay the entry of generic
versions of Schering’s branded K-Dur 20, a prescribed potassium chloride supplement. The
Commission filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2005,
arguing that the lower court failed to recognize how some agreements limiting entry during the
term of a patent can still be improper; the decision jeopardizes particularly important consumer
interests; and the court of appeals misapplied the substantial evidence standard of review. The
Supreme Court denied the petition.
In the complaint dated March 30, 2001 the Commission alleged that Schering - Plough,
the manufacturer of K-Dur 20 - a prescribed potassium chloride, used to treat patients with low
blood potassium levels - entered into anticompetitive agreements with Upsher-Smith
Laboratories and American Home Products Corporation to delay their generic versions of the KDur 20 drug from entering the market. According to the charges, Schering-Plough paid UpsherSmith $60 million and paid American Home Products $15 million to keep the low-cost generic
version of the drug off the market. The charges against American Home Products were settled
by a consent agreement.
An initial decision filed July 2, 2002 dismissed all charges against Schering - Plough and
Upsher-Smith Laboratories. On December 8, 2003 the Commission reversed the administrative
law judge’s initial decision that had dismissed all charges. The Commission found that
Schering-Plough Corporation entered into agreements with Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. and
American Home Products to delay the entry of generic versions of Schering’s branded K-Dur 20.
According to the opinion, the parties settled patent litigation with terms that included
unconditional payments by Schering in return for agreements to defer introduction of the generic
products. The Commission entered an order that would bar similar conduct in the future.

C.

Authorizations to Seek Preliminary/Permanent
Injunctions

Alpharma, Inc. and Perrigo Company
(August 11, 2004): The Commission authorized staff to file a complaint in federal district court
charging that Alpharma, Inc. and Perrigo Company drove up the prices for over-the-counter
store-brand children’s liquid ibuprofen through an agreement eliminating competition between
the two firms and allowing Perrigo to raise its prices creating higher profits to then be shared
between the firms. According to the complaint, while both Alpharma and Perrigo filed for U.S.
Food and Drug Administration approval to sell a generic version of children’s liquid Motrin,
Alpharma was eligible to sell its product at least six months before approval would be granted to
Perrigo. The two companies entered into an agreement not to compete whereby Perrigo would
sell the children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years and Alpharma, while would not marketing a
competing product, would receive an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of the
product. To settle the charges, Alpharma and Perrigo paid a total of $6.25 million in illegal

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profits and agreed not to enter into agreements not to compete when one party to the agreement
is a first filer of an abbreviated new drug application.

Warner Chilcott
(November 5, 2005) A complaint was filed in District Court for the District Columbia seeking to
put an end to an agreement between drug manufacturers Galen Chemicals Ltd. (now known as
Warner Chilcott) and Barr Laboratories that denies consumers the choice of a lower-priced
generic version of Warner Chilcott’s Ovcon® oral contraceptive. According to the FTC’s
complaint, Barr planned to launch a generic version of Ovcon as soon it received regulatory
approval from the Food and Drug Administration. Warner Chilcott expected to lose half its
Ovcon sales within the first year if Ovcon faced competition from a generic equivalent. Faced
with this prospect, instead of competing with Barr, Warner Chilcott entered into an agreement
with Barr, preventing entry of Barr’s generic Ovcon into the United States for five years. In
exchange for Barr’s promise not to compete, Warner Chilcott paid Barr $20 million.
In September 2006, under the threat of a preliminary injunction sought by the Commission,
Warner Chilcott waived the exclusionary provision in its agreement, and the next day Barr
announced its intention to start selling generic Ovcon in the United States. Under the terms of
the October 2006 order settling the Commission’s charges, Warner Chilcott agreed to certain
terms to protect generic entry into the market. Though Warner Chilcott settled, the FTC’s case
against Barr continues.

D.

Consent Orders

Advocate Health Partners
(Final Order February 9, 2007) The final consent order settles charges that the conduct of several
organizations representing more than 2,900 independent Chicago-area physicians for agreeing to
fix prices and for refusing to deal with certain health plans except on collectively determined
terms. The order will prohibit the respondents from engaging in such anticompetitive conduct in
the future.
Alabama Trucking Association, Inc.
(Final Order October 28, 2003) With an administrative complaint issued on July 8, 2003 the
Commission charged that the association of household goods movers engaged in the collective
filing of tariffs on behalf of its members who compete in the provision of moving services in the
state of Alabama. Under terms of a final consent order, Alabama Trucking Association, Inc.
agreed to stop filing tariffs containing collective intrastate rates and to void collectively filed
tariffs currently in effect in Alabama.
American Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works
(Final Order October 30, 2002): A consent order settled charges that the American Institute for
Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works adopted and enforced provisions in its rules of
conduct that prohibited professional conservators to work for free or at reduced fees. The
association agreed to remove all provisions from its Code of Ethics, and its Commentaries to the
Guidelines for Practice that are inconsistent with the order. Professional conservators manage

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and preserve cultural objects (including historical scientific, religious, archaeological and artistic
objects).
Anesthesia Service Medical Group, Inc. and Grossmont Anesthesia Services Medical
Group
(Final Order July 11, 2003): Two anesthesiologists groups settled charges that they entered into
joint agreements to establish fees and services from Grossmont Medical Hospital in San Diego
County. Specifically, the groups agreed on fees that both would demand from health care
insurance companies and other third party payers for taking call for obstetrics and providing
services to uninsured emergency room patients. Together, the two groups are composed of
approximately 200 physicians that provide competing anesthesiology services in the San Diego
area.
Austin Board of Realtors
(Final Order September 6, 2006): The Commission entered into a final consent order settling
charges against the Austin Board of Realtors (ABOR) for its practice of preventing consumers
with listing agreements for potentially low-cost, unbundled brokerage services from marketing
their listings on public real estate-related Internet sites. In settling the charges, ABOR is
prohibited from adopting or enforcing any rule that treats one type of real estate listing
agreement more advantageously than any other, or from interfering with its members ability to
enter into any lawful listing agreement with home sellers.
Biovail Corporation
(Final Order October 2, 2002): The Commission charged Biovail Corporation with illegally
acquiring an exclusive patent license for Tiazac, a pharmaceutical used to treat high blood
pressure and chronic chest pain. The complaint further alleged that Biovail, in an effort to
maintain its monopoly, wrongfully listed the acquired license in the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration’s “Orange Book” for the purpose of blocking generic competition to its branded
Tiazac. The consent order requires Biovail to divest part of its exclusive rights to DOV;
prohibits the firm from taking any action that would trigger additional statutory stays on final
FDA approval of a generic form of Tiazac; and also prohibits Biovail from wrongfully listing
any patents in the Orange Book for a product for which the company already has an New Drug
Application from the FDA.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
(Final Order April 14, 2003): Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) settled charges that it
engaged in illegal business practices to delay the entry of three low price generic
pharmaceuticals that would be in direct competition with three of its branded drugs. The
complaint alleged that BMS purposely made wrongful listings in the Orange Book of the U.S.
Food & Drug Administration and that it also paid a potential competitor over $70 million to
delay the entry of its generic drug. The three drugs involved in the complaint are: Taxol
(containing the active ingredient paclitaxel) – used to treat ovarian, breast, and lung cancers;
Platinol (containing the active ingredient cisplatin) – used for the treatment of various forms of
cancer; and BuSpar (containing the active ingredient buspirone) – used to manage anxiety
disorders.

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California Pacific Medical Group dba Brown and Toland Medical Group
(Final Order February 3, 2004): With an administrative complaint issued on July 8, 2003 the
Commission charged a San Francisco, California physicians’ organization with engaging in an
agreement under which its competing members agreed collectively on the price and other terms
on which they would enter into contracts with health plans or other third party payers. The
complaint also alleged that Brown and Toland directed its physicians to end their preexisting
contracts with payers and required its physician members to charge specified prices in all
Preferred Provider Organization contracts. A final consent order prohibits Brown and Toland
from negotiating with payers on behalf of physicians, refusing to deal with payers, and setting
terms for physicians to deal with payers, unless the physicians are clinically or financially
integrated.
Carlsbad Physician Association
(Final Order June 13, 2003): A New Mexico physician organization settled charges that it and its
members entered into agreements to fix prices and to refuse to deal with third party payers and
other health care plans except on collectively agreed-upon terms.
Clark County, Washington Attorneys
(Final Order July 23, 2004): Private attorneys in Clark County, Washington who provide
criminal legal services for indigent defendants under a county contract settled charges that they
illegally entered into an agreement known as the “Indigent Defense Bar Consortium Contract” to
collectively demand higher fees for certain types of cases and refuse to accept specific additional
cases unless the Clark County complied with their demands. The county was forced to
substantially increase the reimbursement rate for each of the case categories specified in the
Consortium Contract. According to the Commission, the conduct of the attorneys was identical
to the boycott staged by criminal defense attorneys in Washington, DC which was ruled to be
price fixing by the U.S. Supreme Court in the matter of Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Association. Robert Lewis, James Sowder, Gerald Wear, and Joel R. Yoseph, the four attorneys
who led the activities and served as the representatives of the 43 attorneys who signed the
Consortium Contract, were named in the complaint and in the consent order.
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation
(Final Order May 17, 2005): Under terms of a consent order, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
Corporation agreed not to collectively negotiate fee-for-service contracts. The order settled
charges of one count of an administrative complaint issued February 10, 2004. The count
alleged that a physician group associated with a hospital negotiated prices for several hundred
independent physicians who were not financially or clinically integrated with the group.
Health Care Alliance of Laredo, L.C.,
(Final Order March 28, 2006): A physicians’ independent practice association in Texas agreed to
settle charges that it engaged in unlawful collective bargaining to set fees its members would
accept from health insurance plans and advised its members against dealing individually with
plans. The Commission charged that both practices resulted in higher medical costs for
consumers. The consent order settling the FTC’s charges will prohibit the IPA from engaging in
such anticompetitive conduct in the future.

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Indiana Household Movers and Warehousemen, Inc.
(Final Order April 25, 2003): The corporation that represents household goods movers in Indiana
settled charges that it filed collective intrastate rate tariffs with the State’s Department of
Revenue on behalf of its members. According to the complaint issued with the consent order,
these collective filings reduced competition for household goods moving services within the
state.
Information and Real Estate Services, LLC.
(Final Order December 1, 2006): The Commission settled charges that Information and Real
Estate Services, LLC (IRES) adopted rules that withheld valuable benefits of the Multiple
Listing Services (MLSs) they control from consumers who chose to enter into non-traditional
listing contracts with real estate brokers. The consent order settling the FTC’s charges will
prohibit IRES from discriminating against non-traditional listing arrangements.
Institute of Store Planners
(Final Order May 27, 2003): Under the terms of a final consent order, The Institute of Store
Planners is required to remove from its Code of Ethics any provision that prohibits its members
from providing their services for free and any provision that prohibits competition with other
members for work on the basis of price. Its members provide architectural store design and store
and merchandise planning to retail stores.
Iowa Movers and Warehousemen’s Association
(Final Order September 10, 2003): The Iowa Movers and Warehousemen’s Association settled
allegations that it filed collectively established tariffs for intrastate moving rates in Iowa - a
practice which did not meet the requirements of the state action doctrine. Under the state action
doctrine, some practices of private firms are protected against scrutiny by the federal antitrust
laws.
Maine Health Alliance
(Final Order August 27, 2003): A network of doctors, hospitals, and its executive director,
William R. Diggins, settled charges that they illegally engaged in price-fixing activities that
raised health care costs in five Maine counties by negotiating jointly with third-party payers in a
effort to obtain higher compensation and more advantageous contract terms for its members.
Memorial Hermann Health Network Providers
(Final Order January 18, 2004): Memorial Hermann Health Network Providers settled charges
that it negotiated fees and other services for medical care provided by its member physicians in
the Houston, Texas area in an effort to obtain higher fees and more advantageous terms.
According to the complaint these alleged price fixing practices increased costs for consumer,
employers, and health plans.
Minnesota Transport Services Association
(Final Order September 15, 2003): A consent order settled charges that the household goods
movers association filed collectively established rate tariffs for its members in Minnesota,
conduct that was not protected by the state action doctrine. Under a state action doctrine, some

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private companies may be protected from the federal antitrust laws if the state authority regulates
and regularly reviews the operations and practices of the companies.
MiRealSource, Inc.
(Final Order March 23, 2007): The Commission filed a Part 3 administrative complaint
challenging a set of rules adopted by MiRealSource, Inc. to keep Exclusive Agency Listings
from being listed on its MLS, as well as other rules that restricted competition in real estate
brokerage services. The complaint alleges that the conduct was collusive and exclusionary,
because in agreeing to keep non-traditional listings off the MLS or from public Web sites, the
brokers enacting the rules were, in effect, agreeing among themselves to limit the manner in
which they compete with one another, and withholding valuable benefits of the MLS from real
estate brokers who did not go along. On February 5, 2007 the Commission approved a consent
order for public comment settling the complaint. Under the terms of the final consent order,
MiRealSource has agreed to abandon such collusive conduct and provide its services to all
member brokers representing potential home sellers, regardless of the type of listing contract that
they choose.
Missouri Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
(Proposed Consent Agreement Accepted for Public Comment on March 9, 2007): Under the
terms of the proposed consent order, the Missouri Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
(Board) agreed to settle charges that it deterred competitive entry in the retail sale of caskets by
adopting a rule that only licensed funeral directors could sell caskets to consumers on an at-need
basis. Under the proposed settlement, the Board must include in various forms of
communications to the publics that it is not necessary to obtain a license from the Board to offer
for retail sale caskets and other funeral merchandise to customers in Missouri.
Monmouth County Association of Realtors
(Final Order December 1, 2006): The Commission settled charges that Monmouth County
Association of Realtors (Monmouth) adopted rules that withheld valuable benefits of the
Multiple Listing Services (MLSs) they control from consumers who chose to enter into nontraditional listing contracts with real estate brokers. The consent order settling the FTC’s
charges will prohibit Monmouth from discriminating against non-traditional listing
arrangements.
Movers Conference of Mississippi, Inc.
(Final Order October 28, 2003): With an administrative complaint issued on July 8, 2003 the
Commission charged that the association composed of competing household goods movers filed
collective rates for intrastate moving services in the state of Mississippi. According to the
complaint, these activities were not protected under the state action doctrine and are not immune
from federal antitrust scrutiny. Under terms of a final consent order the Movers Conference
agreed to stop filing tariffs containing collective intrastate rates.
National Academy of Arbitrators
(Final Order January 13, 2003): The National Academy of Arbitrators is prohibited from
adopting policies that restrict its members from advertising truthful information about their
services, including prices and conditions of services, under terms of a consent order. The

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association is required to remove all provisions that do not conform to the provisions in the
consent order from: (1) its Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of LaborManagement Disputes; (2) its Formal Advisory Opinions; (3) any Statements of Policy; and (4)
its Web site.
New Hampshire Motor Transport Association
(Final Order December 4, 2003): The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association settled
charges that it filed tariffs containing rules that called for automatic increases in intrastate rates.
In addition, the organization agreed to void its collectively filed tariffs current in effect in New
Hampshire.
New Century Health Quality Alliance, Inc.
(Final Order October 6, 2006): The Commission approved a final consent order settling
Commission charges alleging that two independent practice associations (IPAs) and 18 member
physician practices in the Kansas City, MO area, refused to deal with health care plans, except
on collectively agreed-upon prices and other terms.
New Millennium Orthopaedics
(Final Order June 13, 2005): The Commission settled charges with two small groups of
orthopaedic physicians in the Cincinnati area that had formed an independent practice
association that jointly negotiated contracts regarding the rates its physician members would
charge health plans and other payors for their services. In addition to the usual prohibitions on
joint negotiations, the Commission’s order disbanded the IPA and prohibited future collective
bargaining.
Northern New England Real Estate Network, Inc.
(Final Order December 1, 2006): The Commission settled charges that Northern New England
Real Estate Network, Inc. adopted rules that withheld valuable benefits of the Multiple Listing
Services (MLSs) they control from consumers who chose to enter into non-traditional listing
contracts with real estate brokers. The consent order settling the FTC’s charges will prohibit
Northern New England Real Estate Network, Inc. from discriminating against non-traditional
listing arrangements.
Partners Health Network, Inc.
(Final Order September 23, 2005): A physician-hospital organization operating in northwestern
South Carolina, agreed to settle charges that it orchestrated and carried out agreements among its
physician members to set the prices they would accept from health plans, and to refuse to deal
with health plans that did not agree to its collectively determined prices. The consent order
settling the FTC’s charges prohibits the PHO from collectively negotiating with health plans on
behalf of its physicians and from setting terms of dealing with purchasers.
Physician Network Consulting, L.L.C.
(Final Order August 27, 2003): The Physician Network Consulting, L.L.C. of Baton Rouge
Louisiana; Michael J. Taylor; Professional Orthopedic Services, Inc; The Bone and Joint Clinic
of Baton Rouge, Inc.; Baton Rouge Orthopaedic Clinic, L.L.C.; and Orthopaedic Surgery
Associates of Baton Rouge, L.L.C. settled charges that they entered into agreements to fix prices

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and other terms on which they would deal with United HealthCare of Louisiana, Inc., a health
insurance company. Physician Network Consulting is an agent for Professional Orthopedic
Services’ members.
Piedmont Health Alliance, Inc.
(Final Order October 1, 2004): With an administrative complaint issued on December 22, 2003
the Commission charged Piedmont Health Alliance, Inc. with collectively setting prices it
demanded for physician services with third party payers. According to the complaint, the
physician-hospital organization entered into signed agreements on behalf of its member
physicians to participate in all contracts negotiated and to accept the negotiated physician fees.
The complaint further alleges that these practices eliminated price competition among physicians
in the North Carolina counties of Alexander, Burke, Caldwell and Catawba. The complaint also
names ten individual physicians who participated in the alleged price fixing services. On August
10, 2004, the organization and physicians agreed to settle charges that they fixed prices for
medical services. A final consent order prohibited Piedmont Health Alliance, Inc. and the ten
physicians from entering into any such agreements with physicians in the area that negotiate fees
or terms of services with health insurance companies or other third party payers. Also refer to
settlement entered with Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Frye Regional Medical Center, Inc.).
Preferred Health Services, Inc.
(Final Order April 13, 2005): The order prohibits Preferred Health Services from orchestrating
collective agreements and other terms for physician services when negotiating with health
insurance plans and other third party payers. According to the complaint these agreements
among the physician-hospital organization of doctors and the Oconee Memorial Hospital in
northwestern South Carolina to collectively negotiate fees and terms of services could lead to
higher health care costs and limited physician access.
Professionals in Women’s Care
(Final Order October 2, 2002): Eight Denver, Colorado physician groups specializing in
obstetrics and gynecology and their non-physician agent settled allegations that the practice
group and other physicians entered into collective contracts in an effort to increase prices and
terms of services when dealing with health insurance firms and other third-party payers. The
consent order prohibits the following respondents from entering into such agreements in the
future: R.T. Welter and Associates, Inc.; R. Todd Welter; Consultants in Obstetrics and
Gynecology, P.C.; Mid Town Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.; Mile High OG/GYN Associates,
P.C.; The OB-GYN, P.C.; The Women’s Health Group, P.C.; Cohen and Womack, M.D., P.C.;
and Westside Women’s Care, L.L.P.
Puerto Rico Association of Endodontists, Corp.
(Final Order August 29, 2006): The Commission approved a final consent order settling charges
alleging that thirty competing association members acted unlawfully by agreeing to set the prices
they would charge dental insurance plans, and by refusing to deal with plans that would not
accept the collectively determined prices.

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Realtors Association of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc.
(Final Order December 1, 2006): The Commission settled charges that Realtors Association of
Northeast Wisconsin, Inc. adopted rules that withheld valuable benefits of the Multiple Listing
Services (MLSs) they control from consumers who chose to enter into non-traditional listing
contracts with real estate brokers. The consent order settling the FTC’s charges will prohibit
Realtors Association of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc. from discriminating against non-traditional
listing arrangements.
San Juan IPA
(Final Order June 30, 2005): San Juan IPA, Inc., a physicians’ independent practice association
operating in northwestern New Mexico, agreed to settle Commission charges that it orchestrated
and carried out agreements among its member doctors to set the price that they would accept
from health plans, to bargain collectively to obtain the group’s desired price terms, and to refuse
to deal with health plans except on collectively determined price terms. According to the
complaint, the effect of this conduct was higher prices for medical services for the area’s
consumers. The consent order prohibits the association from collectively negotiating with health
plans on behalf of its physicians and from setting their terms of dealing with such purchasers.
This consent involves 120 physicians who make up about 80 percent of the doctors practicing
independently in the area of Farmington, New Mexico.
Southeastern New Mexico Physicians IPA
(Final Order August 6, 2004): A Roswell, New Mexico physicians’ association, Southeastern
New Mexico Physicians IPA, settled charges that it and two of its employees entered into
collective agreements among physician members on fees and refused to deal with health plans
that did not accept the collective agreed-upon terms. According to the complaint, these practices
increased the price of health care in the Roswell area. The consent order prohibits the IPA and
its employees named in the consent from orchestrating agreements between physicians to
negotiate with health insurance plans on behalf of any physician and deal or refuse to deal
individually with any third party payer.
South Georgia Health Partners, L.L.C.
(Final Order October 31, 2003): A Georgia physician-hospital organization and its other
associated physician groups settled charges that they entered into agreements to fix physician
and hospital prices and refused to deal with insurance companies, except on collectively agreedupon terms.
SPA Health Organization dba Southwest Physician Associates
(Final Order July 17, 2003): A physician group in the Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas area settled
charges that it collectively bargained on behalf of its members to negotiate fee schedules with
third party payers and other health insurance companies. According to the complaint, issued
with the consent order, these practices decreased competition and increased prices for the
provision of medical services to area consumers.
Surgical Specialists of Yakima
(Final Order November 11, 2003): The Surgical Specialists of Yakima, Cascade Surgical
Partners, Inc., P.S. and Yakima Surgical Associates, P.S. settled charges that they jointly entered

30

into agreements for their members to fix prices and terms for the provision of medical services
when dealing with health care insurers.
Tenet Healthcare Corporation
(Final Order January 29, 2004): A consent order prohibits Frye Regional Medical Center, Inc., an
acute care hospital in Hickory, North Carolina, and its parent company Tenet Healthcare
Corporation from entering into any agreement to negotiate fees on behalf of any physician
practicing in four North Carolina counties and from refusing to deal with insurance companies
and other payers. Also refer to related administrative complaint issued to Piedmont Health
Alliance. This settlement is the first case in which the Commission has named a hospital as a
participant in an alleged physician price-fixing conspiracy.
Union Oil Company of California
(Final Order August 2, 2005): With an administrative complaint issued on March 4, 2003 the
Commission charged that Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) made misleading
statements concerning its emissions results for the production of “summer-time” gasoline
mandated by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) for use March through October.
According to the complaint, Unocal lead producers of the CARB gasoline to believe that its
research was non-proprietary and in the public interest, while at the same time it failed to
disclose that it had patent pending claims on the research results with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. As a result of the patent being allowed, Unocal is now in a position to
enforce its patent rights – requiring companies that produce the “summer-time” CARB gasoline
to pay substantial royalties to Unocal if they use the patented technology. An initial decision
dismissing the complaint was filed on February 17, 2004.
A consent order settled the Commission’s monopolization complaint against Unocal. Under the
terms of the settlement, Unocal will stop enforcing the relevant reformulated gasoline patents,
which the Commission alleged could have imposed additional costs of over $500 million per
year on California consumers. In addition, Unocal will release all relevant gasoline patents to the
public.
Valassis Communications, Inc.
(Final Order April 28, 2006): Valassis, a leading producer of free-standing newspaper inserts
(FSIs) in the United States, has settled charges that it attempted to collude with News America
Marketing, its only FSI rival, to eliminate competition between the two companies. Under the
consent order settling the FTC’s complaint, Valassis is barred from engaging in collusive
agreements with other FSI publishers or attempting to collude with its competitors.
Virginia Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers
(Final Order October 1, 2004): The Virginia Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers settled
charges that it prohibited Virginia funeral directors and service providers from engaging in
truthful advertising to notify consumers of prices and discounts for funeral products and services.
Under terms of the consent order, the Board is prohibited from engaging in such practices in the
future and is required to amend its regulation prohibiting Board licensees from advertising
funeral services including those services that can be contracted prior to the death of the person
whose funeral is being planned.

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Washington University Physician Network
(Final Order August 22, 2003): A consent order prohibits a St. Louis, Missouri physicians’
organization from negotiating with third party payers on behalf of its member physicians and
from refusing to deal with health insurance companies.
White Sands Health Care System, L.L.C.
(Final Order January 11, 2005): A consent order settled charges that the White Sands Health
Care System refused to deal with health care insurers that resisted the collectively negotiated
prices set by its member physicians and nurse anesthetists. The complaint alleged that these
practices increased costs for health care for consumers in the Alamogordo, New Mexico area.
White Sands, a physician-hospital organization, consists of Alamogordo Physicians, an
independent practice association; Gerald Champion Regional Medical Center, and 31 nonphysician health care providers, including all five nurse anesthetists in the area.
Williamsburg Area Association of Realtors, Inc.
(Final Order December 1, 2006): The Commission settled charges that Williamsburg Area
Association of Realtors, Inc. adopted rules that withheld valuable benefits of the Multiple Listing
Services (MLSs) they control from consumers who chose to enter into non-traditional listing
contracts with real estate brokers. The consent order settling the FTC’s charges will prohibit
Williamsburg Area Association of Realtors, Inc. from discriminating against non-traditional
listing arrangements.

E.

Administrative Complaints

MiRealSource, Inc.
(October 12, 2006): The Commission filed a Part 3 administrative complaint challenging a set of
rules adopted by MiRealSource, Inc. to keep Exclusive Agency Listings from being listed on its
MLS, as well as other rules that restricted competition in real estate brokerage services. The
complaint alleges that the conduct was collusive and exclusionary, because in agreeing to keep
non-traditional listings off the MLS or from public Web sites, the brokers enacting the rules
were, in effect, agreeing among themselves to limit the manner in which they compete with one
another, and withholding valuable benefits of the MLS from real estate brokers who did not go
along. On February 5, 2007 the Commission approved a consent order for public comment
settling the complaint. Under the terms of the proposed consent order, MiRealSource has agreed
to abandon such collusive conduct and provide its services to all member brokers representing
potential home sellers, regardless of the type of listing contract that they choose.
RealComp II Ltd.
(October 12, 2006): The Commission filed a Part 3 administrative complaint challenging a set of
rules adopted by RealComp II Ltd. that prohibited information on Exclusive Agency Listings and
other forms of nontraditional listings from being transmitted from the MLS it maintains to public
real estate Web sites. The complaint alleges that the conduct was collusive and exclusionary,
because in agreeing to keep non-traditional listings off the MLS or from public Web sites, the
brokers enacting the rules were, in effect, agreeing among themselves to limit the manner in
which they compete with one another, and withholding valuable benefits of the MLS from real
estate brokers who did not go along.

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F.

Other

Public Documents/Policy Statements/Conferences
Enforcement Perspectives on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine (November 2, 2006): The
report provides enforcement perspectives on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which precludes
enforcement of the antitrust laws against certain private acts that urge government action.
Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases (July 25, 2003):
The Commission issued a policy statement that identified three factors that will be considered in
determining whether the Commission will seek disgorgement or restitution in competition cases.
First, the Commission will ordinarily seek monetary relief when the underlying violation is clear.
Second, there must be a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of remedial payment. Third,
the Commission will consider the value of seeking monetary relief in light of other remedies
available in the matter including private actions and criminal proceedings.
FTC Antitrust Actions in Pharmaceutical Services and Products (November 8, 2002):
Summary of health care antitrust matters involving the pharmaceutical industry and enforcement
policy prepared by the FTC Health Care Services and Products Division Staff.

Commission Studies/Guidelines
Agreements Filed With the Federal Trade Commission Under the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed in Fiscal
Year 2006: A Report by the Bureau of Competition (January 17, 2007): Summary of
agreements filed with the Commission in fiscal year 2006 (ending September 30, 2006) by
generic and branded drug manufacturers.
Municipal Provision of Wireless Internet: A Report of the Staff of the Federal Trade
Commission (October 10, 2006): The report describes the various wireless Internet technologies
currently in use or under development, identifies a range of operating models that have been used
to provide or facilitate wireless Internet service, summarizes the major arguments for and against
municipal participation, and describes various types of legislative proposals related to municipal
Internet service.
Investigation of Gasoline Price Manipulation and Post-Katrina Gasoline Price Increases: A
Report by the Federal Trade Commission (May 22, 2006): The report details the results of an
intensive, Congressionally-mandated Commission investigation into whether gasoline prices
nationwide were “artificially manipulated by reducing refinery capacity or by any other form of
market manipulation or price gouging practices” and into gasoline pricing by refiners, large
wholesalers, and retailers in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

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Agreements Filed With the Federal Trade Commission Under the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed in Fiscal
Year 2005: A Report by the Bureau of Competition (April 24, 2006): Summary of agreements
filed with the Commission in fiscal year 2006 (ending September 30, 2005) by generic and
branded drug manufacturers.
Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed in FY 2004: A
Report by The Bureau of Competition (January 7, 2005): Information regarding the 22
agreements that were filed with the Commission in fiscal year 2004.
The Petroleum Industry: Mergers, Structural Change and Antitrust Enforcement: A Report of
the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics (August 2004): The staff
report describes the Commission’s merger enforcement actions in petroleum-related markets
during the past 20 years; provides an overview of industry trends in production and pricing;
provides an analysis of merger activity for the period 1985 through 2001; and examines trends at
specific industry levels: crude oil production and reserves; bulk transport of crude oil; refining;
bulk transport of refined products; and product terminals and gasoline marketing.
Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition: A Report by the Federal Trade Commission
and the Department of Justice (July 23, 2004): Joint report to inform consumers, businesses,
and policy-makers on a range of issues affecting the cost, quality, and accessibility of health
care.
Fulfilling the Original Vision: The FTC at 90 (April 2, 2004): Report highlights some of the
Commission’s accomplishments from the past year and outlines several goals to guide the
agency’s twin missions of competition and consumer protection.
Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: Contact Lenses: A Report from the Staff of
the Federal Trade Commission (March 29, 2004): The staff report concludes that e-commerce
offers consumers greater choices and more convenience in the contact lens market.
Pharmaceutical Agreement Notification Filing Requirements (Effective January 7,

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aftc%3Ad94bd86c6a56e2a8. Public record. Not legal advice.
